Download pdf - Legal & Judicial Ethics Case Digests (January 2014 - January 2015)

TAXATION II CLASS (A.Y. 2014-2015)

UNIVERSITY OF CEBU COLLEGE OF LAW

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS CASES

January 2014 – January 2015

Submitted by:

1. ABING, PATRICK LLB-3 2. ALABASTRO, MARK VINCENT JD-2 3. BALANAG, JUSTINE MARIE JD-3 4. CAPUTOL, DANICA PATRICIA LLB-3 5. DIONGZON, LORRAINE JD-2 6. GULBIN, LOU ANN LLB-3 7. LERIO, EARL CHRISTIAN JD-3 8. LUSPO, ARGELYN LLB-4 9. MAGDOZA, BREGETTE LLB-3 10. MAGLASANG, LAARNI LLB-3 11. MAHUSAY, MARIANNE AUDREY LLB-3 12. SANTOS, CHRISTINA JD-3 13. SAORNIDO, FERDINAND III LLB-3 14. TIRADO, ADRIANNE LLB-3 15. TOMONGLAY, NOEL LLB-3 16. URSAL, APRIL LYNN LLB-3

Submitted to: ATTY. STEPHEN L. YU, CPA


JANUARY 2014 1. A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014 ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Rule 1.01, Canon 7; Rule 7.03 FACTS: Rose Bunagan-Bansig filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera for Gross Immoral Conduct. On May 8, 1997, Atty. Celera and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie, legal wife of respondent. However, Atty. Celera contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. Bansig stressed that the marriage between Atty. Celera and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority. Despite repeated summons and resolutions issued by the Court, Atty. Celera failed to properly answer the complaint. The complaint dragged on for over a decade. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Celera is guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders. RULING: Yes. In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.


The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have pre-selected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to. Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof." Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.


The respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA is guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. 2. A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014 EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 FACTS: Edgardo D. Areola a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, from the Public Attorney’s Office for violation of her attorney’s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal Banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."


Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for. In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two months as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s length of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty. The Court takes note of Atty. Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty. Mendoza’s own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. Accordingly, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. 3. A.C. No. 8644 January 22, 2014 AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 7.03, Canon 737 FACTS: A complaint for disbarment on grounds of serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty is filed against Atty. Eliseo M. Campos, former presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The complainants herein are his wife, Aida R. Campos, and their children, Alistair R. Campos and Charmaine R. Campos.


Eliseo and Aida were married in 1981. Alistair was born in 1982, and Charmaine, in 1986. In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment a 936-square meter lot in Bayugan. Eliseo thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in Alistair’s name. Alistair was then a student without an income and a capacity to buy the property. In 2006, Original Certificate of Title covering the property was issued in Alistair’s name. In 2008, Eliseo filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He alleged that both he and Aida are psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. He claimed that during the first few days of their marriage, he realized that he finds no gratification in engaging in sexual intercourse with his wife. He alleged that he is a homosexual. He likewise ascribed acts of infidelity to Aida. In Sept. 2008, Eliseo executed an Affidavit of Loss wherein he represented himself as the owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-28258. He declared that he unknowingly lost the owner’s certificate of title which used to be in his files. Alistair refuted Eliseo’s representations. In Nov. 2008, Alistair filed a complaint for perjury against Eliseo. Alistair stated that the owner’s copy of OCT No. P-28258 was in his possession. Eliseo was aware of such fact, but he still deliberately and maliciously asserted a falsehood. In 2009, Aida filed a Complaint for Legal Separation, Support and Separation of Conjugal Properties against Eliseo. Aida alleged that Eliseo confessed under oath that he is a homosexual. However, Eliseo, in effect, contradicted the said confession when he admitted to Alistair and Charmaine that he was then intimately involved with another woman. Aida likewise claimed that Eliseo is temperamental and had stopped giving support to their family. In April 2009, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the Office of the Court Administrator an administrative complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo. Formal investigation was thereafter conducted. Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned administrative complaint, Eliseo resigned from his judicial post on July 1, 2009. After the conclusion of a hearing on Eliseo’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Judge Eduardo Casals called the parties for a conference in his chamber. A scuffle ensued inside the chamber. The police blotter filed promptly after the incident indicated that Eliseo choked Charmaine and attempted to box but failed to hit Alistair. In June 2010, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Eliseo. They alleged that Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in.


ISSUES: Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in: (1) causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name; (2) subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258; (3) falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss that the owner's copy of OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with Alistair; (4) stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to his children that he has an intimate relation with another woman; and (5) choking and boxing his children. RULING: Of the five issues raised herein, only the allegation of Eliseo’s engagement in the scuffle inside the chamber of Judge Casals shall be resolved. The Court, on February 8, 2012, had already imposed upon Eliseo a fine of Php20,000 for simple misconduct in causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name when the subject property actually belongs to the former. The charges of (a) immorality in engaging in extra-marital affairs; and (b) dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of Loss, were, on the other hand, dismissed by the Court after finding either the evidence of the complainants as insufficient or the issues raised being already the subjects of Eliseo’s pending Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are anchored upon almost the same set of facts, except that in the former, the issue of occurrence of the scuffle is raised as well. The Court does not intend to punish Eliseo twice for the same acts especially since they pertain to his private life and were not actually committed in connection with the performance of his functions as a magistrate before. In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare accusations were exchanged. It bears stressing that not one of the parties had presented even one independent witness to prove what transpired inside the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009. That a scuffle took place is a fact, but the question of who started what cannot be determined with much certainty. While admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo vigorously attempts to justify his conduct as self-defense on his part. While the Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s narration of the incident, and understands that the successive acts of the parties during the tussle were committed at a time when passions ran high, he shall not be excused for comporting himself in such an undignified manner. Rule 7.03, Canon 737 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer from engaging in conduct that "adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor


shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than his own children inside the chamber of a judge. The Court shall not countenance crude social behavior. Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by people with high respect and is regarded as a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed. Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity. Although Alistair and Charmaine were not entirely faultless, a higher level of decorum and restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose conduct failed to show due respect for the court and lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of the legal profession. The respondent Eliseo M. Campos violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed upon him, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. 4. A.C. No. 9872 January 28, 2014 NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent. Legal Ethics: Rule 1.01; Canon 16 Rule 16.01; Rule 16.04 FACTS: A complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, is filed by Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. In April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell to the Department of Agrarian Reform. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent received P50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it. In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo, also engaged respondent’s services to handle the registration of her lot. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is registered. Respondent obtained P200,000 from Navarro for the registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the property was already issued in the name of


one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not have spent for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real situation of the property. On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement and agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property. They also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro. In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of P1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed. At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch. Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the property mortgaged under the third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to Navarro. However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security. Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a total of P900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006, the checks issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When complainants called respondent’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months. A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006 and learned of his suspension only in May 2006. ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent is liable for the following acts: (1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;


(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her; (3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to her; (4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants; (5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and (6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were already closed. RULING: The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for P1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only P150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property. Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. The court is inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s name. It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court has ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In the instant case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity. Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her. To appease


Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional collateral but he failed to do so. Respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants. Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: “A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.”

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them. The respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s property. As regards Presbitero, it was established that the respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

“A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed P1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took


advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client. Accordingly, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court DISBARS him from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting to P50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of this Decision.

FEBRUARY 2014 1. A.C. No. 4545 February 5, 2014 CARLITO ANG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Rule 9.01, Canon 7; Rule 9.01, Canon 9 FACTS: The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint filed by complainant Carlito Ang against respondent. Ang alleged that he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo, executed an Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition involving a land which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-22409)-6433. He was given his share of 2,003 square meters designated as Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4, together with all the improvements thereon. However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out that said TCT number had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs had been issued in the names of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero. Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct participation in the commission of forgeries and falsifications because he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss and Deed of Absolute Sale that led to the transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was forged as clearly shown by the Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu since the Notarial Report indubitably showed that the document executed was an affidavit, not a Deed of Absolute Sale.


As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly executed by the late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have been executed by her as she Died three years prior to the execution of the said affidavit of loss. Ang further alleged that respondent made himself the attorney-in-fact and executed a Deed of Sale selling the lot to Lim Kim So Mecantile Co even though a civil case was pending before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. Respondent denied any wrongdoing. According to the respondent, in the pending civil case Ang anchored his claim on the Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition and sought to annul the deed of sale and prayed for reconveyance of the subject parcel of land. However, because of Ang’s admission that he is not an heir of late Candelaria Magpayo, the notice of lis pendens annotated in the title of land were ordered cancelled and the land became available for disposition. Respondent surmised that these developments in Civil Case No. Man-2202 meant that Ang would lose his case so Ang resorted to the filing of the present administrative complaint. Thus, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case for being devoid of any factual or legal basis, or in the alternative, holding resolution of the instant case in abeyance pending resolution of civil case. Investigating Commissioner Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent is administratively liable. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that respondent committed an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an instrument in the disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale executed between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. The Investigating Commissioner additionally found that respondent "delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of their office before being brought to him for his signature." This, according to the commissioner, "must have been the reason for the forged signatures of the parties in the questioned document…as well as the erroneous entry in his notarial register. Respondent should not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in accordance with Rule 9.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ISSUE: WON the respondent is administratively liable for violating the notarial law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: The Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo. it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.23 In the case at bar, the jurat of the


Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing." in notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead person, respondent is liable for misconduct. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in order. 2. A.C. No. 8761 February 12, 2014 WILBERTO C. TALISIC, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Rules on Notarial Practice FACTS: An administrative case filed by complainant Wilberto C. Talisic (Wilberto) against Atty. Primo R. Rinen1 (Atty. Rinen), charging the latter with falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to spouses Benjamin Durante and Eleonor Lavifia (Spouses Durante) of a parcel of land formerly owned by Wilberto's mother, Aurora Corpuz (Aurora). Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, for investigation, report and recommendation. Wilberto claimed that his mother died and left behind as heirs her spouse, Celedonio Talisic, and their three children, namely: Arlene, Wilberto and Alvin. It was only after his father’s death on November 2, 2000 that Wilberto and his siblings knew of the transfer of the subject parcel via the subject deed. While Wilberto believed that his father’s signature on the deed was authentic, his and his siblings’ supposed signatures were merely forged. Atty. Rinen denied the charge and explained that it was only on April 7, 1994 that he came to know of the transaction between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when they approached him in his office as the then Presiding Judge of the Municipal.


After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III (Commissioner Abelita) issued the Report and Recommendation dated November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty. Rinen’s notarial commission and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one year. The report indicated that per Atty. Rinen’s admission, the subject deed was prepared in his office and acknowledged before him. Although there was no evidence of forgery on his part, he was negligent in not requiring from the parties to the deed their presentation of documents as proof of identity. Atty. Rinen’s failure to properly satisfy his duties as a notary public was also shown by the inconsistencies in the dates that appear on the deed, to wit: "1994 as to the execution; 1995 when notarized; [and] entered as Series of 1992 in the notarial book x x x." ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rinen committed violations of his notarial duties. RULING: It must then be stressed that, "a notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity." Towards this end, the Court emphasized that "[a] notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant." In the present case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained unspecified in the subject deed’s acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex-officio. The lapses he committed in relation to such function then justified the recommendations presented by the IBP. "Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public." Thus, "notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties." Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined. The notarial commission of Atty. Rinen was revoked for one year.


MARCH 2014 1. A.C. No. 10179 March 04, 2014 BENJAMIN Q. ONG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03 FACTS: Complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29, 2008. However, the check was dishonored upon presentment because the account was closed. Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him. When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos. Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint. IBP Bar Commissioner Dela Rama stated that Ong had sufficiently established the existence of the dishonored check; and that Atty. Delos Santos did not file his answer despite notice, and did not also present contrary evidence. He recommended that Atty. Delos Santos be held liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three years, plus the return of the amount of P100,000.00 to the complainant. The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution adopting the Commissioner’s recommendation. ISSUE: WON Atty. Delos Santos violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the recommended penalty. The Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable individual in whom the public may repose confidence. Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order.16 He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oath that enjoined


him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for granted the express commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03, to wit:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 – A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

These canons required of him as a lawyer an enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his dealings. His assuring Ong that he was in good financial standing because of his lucrative law practice when the contrary was true manifested his intent to mislead the latter into giving a substantial amount in exchange for his worthless post–dated check. Such actuation did not speak well of him as a member of the Bar. Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was already dismissed, and that he already repaid to Ong the full amount of P100,000.00,23 both of which are treated as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty to suspension from the practice of law to six months. 2. A.C. No. 5359 March 10, 2014 ERMELINDA LAD VOA. DE DOMINGUEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., Respondent. Legal Ethics: Rule 18.03 FACTS: Complainant Ermelinda Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. On three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested


and received from complainant the following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriff’s fees, to wit: (1) June 3, 1996 - P3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 - P1,800.00; and September 2, 1996 - P5,250.00 or a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.1cralla Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received the amount of P10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of P100,000, aside from the filing fees. Atty. Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of P10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner stating that respondent was guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him, with modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one (1) month, instead of four months. ISSUE: WON Atty. Agleron is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that:

Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney’s fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability. He should have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months sufficient.


3. A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014 STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants, vs. ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 17 and 18 FACTS: Complainant spouses filed a case against Atty. Guaren for failure to comply with his obligation in filing the case for the titling of complainants’ lot. The spouses gave P7,000 in advance for the said service however 5 years had elapsed yet no title was issued. Moreover, complainants alleged that despite the existence of an attorney client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the MTCC. Atty. Guaren admitted that he charged P10,000 as acceptance fee but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the complainants explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Estandante, the counsel of record who failed to appear on the said hearing. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Guaren violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: Yes. The practice of law is not a business. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a moneymaking venture and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides that a lwayer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence, respectively. In the present case, Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of the complainant’s lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren is suspended from practice of law for 6 months. 4. A.C. No. 9116 March 12, 2014 NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 12 Rule 12.04; Canon 17, Canon 18 Rule 18.03 FACTS: Sps. Federico and Victoria Santander filed a suit for damages against the Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association Inc. and Ely Mabanag for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied their right of way. The association was represented by


Atty. Jimenez. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses. The Association’s appeal was denied by CA on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days before the first motion for extension was filed. Eight years later, herein petitioners filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jimenez can be administratively liable. RULING: Yes. The Court finds that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for the Association. Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case. Canon 18 also states that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. His allegation that he was merely the supervising lawyer and the fault lies with the handling lawyer is belied by the records particularly in the Urgent Motion for Extension which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm. Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case. A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. Atty. Jimenez is suspended from practice of law for 1 month. 5. A.C. No. 10185 March 12, 2014 LICERIO DIZON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1 and Notarial Law FACTS: Complainant Dizon filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Cabucana on the ground of falsification of public document. Dizon was one of the would be buyers of a parcel of land subject of a litigation. A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case and notarized before Atty. Cabucana. At the hearing, signatories testified that they signed the instrument in the court room but not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana. Because of the irregularity in the execution of the agreement, there was undue delay which caused damage and injury to the complainant. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial Law and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized that compromise agreement without the presence of all the parties.


RULING: Yes. The affiant’s personal appearance is required under the Notarial Law and the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004. As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest the truth of its contents. Atty. Cabucana is suspended for 3 months and his incumbent notarial commission revoked and hereby prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for 2 years. 6. A.C. No. 5329 March 18, 2014 HEINZ R. HECK, Complainant, vs. CITY PROSECUTOR CASIANO A. GAMOTIN, JR., Respondent. Legal Ethics FACTS: Heinz Heck filed a complaint for disbarment against then City Prosecutor Gamotin on the ground of faulty, highly improper, suspicious, anomalous and unlawful practice by respondent who had obstructed justice by delaying cases and disregarding court procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty. Adazam his business partners and friends. The following acts allegedly committed by City Prosecutor Gamotin are as follows:

1. Pending complaints against a certain Cabrera filed by Heck were dismissed by the OCP several times;

2. City Prosecutor held a private meeting with Atty. Adaza, the counsel for Heck’s opponent;

3. At one time, he acted furiously by kicking the chair holding the door to his office open and slamming the door, almost hitting the face of Heck’s friend;

4. For entertaining Atty. Adaza who was suspended from practice by the Supreme Court; and,

5. For arrogantly claiming and screaming at Heck that he is the Authority and the Law. ISSUE: Whether or not City Prosecutor Gamotin could be disbarred for the aforementioned conduct. RULING: No. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction against a misbehaving member of the Bar which is only imposed for the most imperative reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer. A lawyer like the respondent is not to be sanctioned for every perceived misconduct or wrong actuation. It is the burden of proof of the complainant to properly show that the assailed conduct or actuation constituted a breach of norms of professional conduct and legal ethics which, in


this case, was not sufficiently established. The private meeting between the Prosecutor and Atty. Adaza did not by itself indicate any illegal or corrupt activity. Moreover, the Prosecutor’s angry reactions is but a natural response to Heck’s disrespectful remark against the Philippine authorities in general. Gamotin’s actuations were not shown to be impelled by any bad motive, or had amounted to any breach of any canon of professional conduct or legal ethics. Complaint for disbarment is dismissed. 7. A.C. No. 3405 March 18, 2014 JULIETA B. NARAG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Readmission to the Bar FACTS: On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against her husband, herein respondent, whom she accused of having violated Rule 1.01 in relation to Canons 1 and 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She claimed that the respondent, who was then a college instructor in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan, maintained an amorous relationship with a certain Gina Espita, a 17–year old first year college student. Julieta further claimed that the respondent had already abandoned her and their children to live with Gina. The respondent denied the charge against him, claiming that the allegations set forth by Julieta were mere fabrications; that Julieta was just extremely jealous, which made her concoct stories against him. On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a Decision, which directed the disbarment of the respondent. Court pointed out that the respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the legal profession. A Motion for the Re–opening of the Administrative Investigation, or in the Alternative, Reconsideration of the Decision was filed by the respondent. Finding no substantial arguments to warrant the reversal of the questioned decision, the Court denied the motion with finality. On November 29, 2013, the respondent filed the instant petition for reinstatement to the Bar. The respondent alleged that he has expressed extreme repentance and remorse to his wife and their children for his misgivings. He claimed that his wife Julieta and their children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010. The respondent presented an undated affidavit prepared by his son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the truth of the respondent’s claim. ISSUE: Whether or not the applicant should be reinstated.


RULING: "Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.” The respondent’s pleas are mere words that are hollow and bereft of any substance. The Court, in deciding whether the respondent should indeed be readmitted to the practice of law, must be convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had already rid himself of any grossly immoral act which would make him inept for the practice of law. However, it appears that the respondent, while still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour – the woman for whose sake he abandoned his family. This only proves to show that the respondent has not yet learned from his prior misgivings. That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would likewise not be sufficient ground to grant respondent’s plea. It is noted that only his son, Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was supposed to evidence the forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta and the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had likewise forgiven the respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the respondent had forgiven him does not discount the fact that he is still committing a grossly immoral conduct; he is still living with a woman other than his wife. Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein he bequeaths all his properties to his wife and their children is quite immaterial and would not be demonstrative that he had indeed changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop the respondent from later on executing another last will and testament of a different tenor once he had been readmitted to the legal profession. In fine, the Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown remorse over his transgressions and that he had already changed his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display unassailable character.


8. A.C. No. 9896 March 19, 2014 MA. ELENA CARLOS NEBREJA, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN REONAL, Respondent. Legal Ethics Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: On June 26, 2006, complainant filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBP) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against respondent. Complainant alleged that she engaged respondent's services to file her petition for annulment. After paying respondent, however, complainant did not receive any word from him as to the status of her petition for annulment. She was told that her petition was dismissed for lack of evidence. He then again asked for sums of money. Complainant again, despite respondent’s receipt of sums of money, failed to receive any update from respondent. Complainant met with respondent to secure copies of her annulment case file. Respondent merely handed to her photocopies of her marriage contract and her children’s birth certificates. When she asked for copies of her case files, he just told her that his law office could not let her use the pleadings of the case. Complainant checked her records and found respondent’s demand letter bearing the address of his claimed law office, "18/f Century Towers Building, Legaspi St. corner de la Rosa, Makati." When complainant tried to look for the said office, she discovered that there was no such building. She also found respondent’s calling card bearing the address, "86 Magat Salamat Street, Project 4, Quezon City," which, complainant found out, was respondent’s residential address. These and other circumstances made complainant suspect that he did not file any petition for annulment at all. In his answer and position paper, respondent denied having been engaged by complainant to handle her petition for annulment and having been paid therefor. Respondent averred that complainant did not engage him to be her lawyer because she was unemployed and could not afford his legal services. CBD found that respondent was liable for inexcusable negligence for failing to file her petition for annulment, found that indeed, respondent used a fictitious office address to deceive complainant and recommended his suspension from the practice of law and ordered him to return the amounts taken from the complainant. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is liable. RULING: Yes. Despite the engagement of his services, respondent did not file the contracted petition. His conduct, as held in Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose,7 amounted to inexcusable negligence. This was found to be contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the

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Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoined a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.8 Thus, a lawyer was held to be negligent when he failed to do anything to protect his client's interest after receiving his acceptance fee.9 In another case,10 this Court has penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the case, among other matters. In another instance, for failure to take the appropriate actions in connection with his client's case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and was required to render accounting of all the sums he received from his client. In this case, respondent clearly received his acceptance fee, among others, and then completely neglected his client’s cause. Moreover, he failed to inform complainant of the true status of the petition. His act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the complainant's case and, subsequently, failing to render the services, was a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 9. A.C. No. 7961 March 19, 2014 ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ALICIA A. RISOS–VIDAL, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Rule 138 Section 27, Rules of Court FACTS: The present administrative case stemmed from Civil Case where De Jesus acted as counsel for the defendant Susan F. Torres. Regional Trial Court issued a decision approving the compromise agreement of the parties in the civil case. De Jesus filed an omnibus motion to compel Torres to pay his success fees and to sell some of Torres’ properties, the certificates of title of which were still with De Jesus. Torres filed an administrative complaint against De Jesus before the IBP–CBD, alleging that De Jesus refused to return her certificates of title despite already paying attorney’s fees. In the meantime, Risos–Vidal became the new counsel of Torres in the civil case and she filed a comment to De Jesus’ motion. The comment stated that De Jesus already received more than what he was entitled as attorney’s fees, and still he refused to return Torres’ certificates of title despite the termination of his services. De Jesus filed his





manifestation/compliance in the civil case, attaching Torres’ certificates of title and conditioning their release upon the payment of his success fees. In compliance with the order of Risos–Vidal, De Jesus filed his answer . In his answer, De Jesus alleged that the subject matter of the complaint was sub judice because of the civil case, and Risos–Vidal took advantage of her position as Director of the IBP–CBD by actually preparing the complaint against him and by issuing an order the next day. Torres filed her reply alleging that Atty. Solomon L. Condenuevo prepared her complaint against De Jesus, and not Risos–Vidal. Atty. Anthony L. Po and Atty. Jose Paolo C. Armas entered their appearances as counsels for Torres in the complaint against De Jesus before the IBP–CBD. De Jesus filed this present administrative complaint before the Court accusing Risos–Vidal of gross misconduct, dishonesty and gross unethical behavior under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. In this present administrative complaint, De Jesus alleged that Risos–Vidal actually prepared the following: (1) Torres’ complaint against him; (2) reply; and (3) the supplemental and/or amended complaint, which were then filed before her IBP–CBD office. Risos–Vidal allegedly converted the issue in the civil case into an administrative complaint against him, and used Po and Armas in filing the supplemental and/or amended complaint. According to De Jesus, Risos–Vidal used her position as Director of IBP–CBD to enhance her private practice. In a comment, Risos–Vidal denied any participation in the complaint filed against De Jesus. Risos–Vidal alleged that De Jesus failed to present evidence to support his accusations, while she attached Torres’ affidavit stating that: (1) Condenuevo prepared her complaint against De Jesus; (2) even before retaining Risos–Vidal’s services to defend her in the civil case, she already retained Condenuevo to file her complaint against De Jesus; and (3) when she could no longer contact Condenuevo, she asked Po, her previous lawyer, to assist her in preparing her supplemental and/or amended complaint. In a reply, De Jesus alleged that there were similarities in contents, style and computer used between the pleadings submitted by Torres with the IBP–CBD and those filed by Risos–Vidal in the civil case. In a Resolution the Court, through the First Division, referred this case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag stated that both De Jesus and Risos–Vidal appeared during the mandatory conference. They agreed that admissions and stipulations shall be limited to the pleadings already filed. In a Report and Recommendation dated 6 July 2009, Commissioner Hababag recommended that the administrative complaint against Risos–Vidal be dismissed for lack of merit. He found that De Jesus had not only failed to show sufficient proof in support of his claim, but Risos–Vidal also rebutted his accusation with preponderant evidence. In a Resolution IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Hababag’s report and recommendation dismissing the case.


N. B. CBD Director Alicia A. Risos–Vidal stepped out of the room and took no part on the discussion of this case considering that she is the respondent in this case. IBP Board of Governors likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by De Jesus since the Board found no cogent reason to reverse its initial findings. Hence, De Jesus filed this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not IBP Board of Governors erred in adopting and approving Hababag’s report and recommendation dismissing the case. RULING: We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. Thus, not only does the burden of proof that the respondent committed the act complained of rests on complainant, but the burden is not satisfied when complainant relies on mere assumptions and suspicions as evidence. In the present case, we find that De Jesus failed to discharge the burden of proving Risos–Vidal’s administrative liability by clear preponderance of evidence. Except for his allegations, De Jesus did not present any proof to substantiate his claim that Risos–Vidal used her position as Director of the IBP–CBD to enhance her law practice. Under the Rules of the IBP–CBD, within two (2) days from receipt of the verified complaint, the IBP–CBD shall issue the required summons, stating that the respondent has fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer. As Director of the IBP–CBD, Risos–Vidal merely complied with the rules when after the IBP–CBD received the complaint against De Jesus, she ordered him to answer the complaint. Risos–Vidal issued the order to De Jesus in a ministerial capacity, with no discretion, and even before she became the new counsel of Torres in the civil case. The Rules of the IBP–CBD further provide that after receiving the answer of the respondent, the case shall be assigned by raffle to an Investigating Commissioner. The Investigating Commissioner shall then set a mandatory conference, direct the submission of position papers, conduct clarification questioning, and submit his report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. Every case heard by the Investigating


Commissioner shall thereafter be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors.In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner assigned to the complaint against De Jesus was not Risos–Vidal, but Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa. Thus, Risos–Vidal could not have used her position as Director of IBP–CBD against De Jesus. The Rules further provide that it is the IBP Board of Governors, by majority vote of its total membership, which determines whether respondent should be recommended for suspension from the practice of law or for disbarment. On the other hand, De Jesus insisted that Risos–Vidal acted as Torres’ counsel in the complaint filed against him because the pleadings filed by Risos–Vidal in the civil case are similar “in contents, style, and computer used” with the complaint against him. Clearly, De Jesus’ claims are anchored on mere assumptions and suspicions, and not backed by clear preponderant evidence necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on Risos–Vidal. De Jesus cannot likewise shift the burden of proof to Risos–Vidal by asking her to present the testimonies of Condenuevo, Po and Armas. It is axiomatic that he who alleges an act has the onus of proving it. Considering that De Jesus failed to discharge the burden of proof to justify the imposition of administrative penalty against Risos–Vidal, we dismiss this complaint.

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MAY 2014 -xxx-

JUNE 2014 1. A.C. No. 9317 June 04, 2014 ADELIA V. QUIACHON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR A. RAMOS, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: The respondent represented complainant, who was then the plaintiff in a labor case filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a special proceeding case filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Complainant charges respondent with gross


negligence and deceit in violation of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The respondent on several occasions failed to update the complainant of the status of the case preventing the client from exercising her options as the decision of the cases had become final and Entry of Judgment of the decision were already made. In his Comment, respondent averred that complainant was informed of the status of the case. He claimed that he had told complainant that he “cannot cite any error of law or abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals’ decision that necessitates a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court;” thus, he supposedly advised her to “respect the decision of the Court of Appeals.” Respondent prayed that a Decision be rendered dismissing the instant disbarment Complaint for lack of merit. In a Resolution the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. During the pendency of the proceedings, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint. In his Report and Recommendation, IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda declared:

True enough, it seems clear that respondent had been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being handled by respondent in behalf of complainant. There was a failure to inform complainant (the client) of the status of the cases that thereafter prevented the client from exercising her options. There was neglect in that regard.

However, in spite of finding neglect on respondent’s part, he recommended the dismissal of the case against him, stating that “with the decision to withdraw the complaint, there does not appear basis to go ahead with the proceedings since without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding of liability.” Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP resolving to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of Almeydato dismiss the case with a warning that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely. ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP Board of Directors erred in supporting the stance of Almeyda. RULING: Yes. This Court finds this to be an opportune time to remind the investigating commissioners and the members of the Board of Governors of the IBP that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.


The IBP Board of Governors should not have supported Almeyda’s stance. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. Public interest is the primary objective. In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, it should have imposed the appropriate penalty despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges. The failure of respondent to file an appeal without any justifiable reason deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly withdraw their appearance and allow their client to retain another counsel. In the present case, respondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the status of the case, but also to avail of the proper legal remedy that would promote the client’s cause. It is clear that respondent neglected the case entrusted to him. All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause. Whenever lawyers take on their clients’ cause/s, they covenant that they will exercise due diligence in protecting the client’s rights; their failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes them unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their client/s and make them answerable to the client, the courts and society. Respondent is found guilty of negligence and is suspended for a period of 6 months. 2. A.C. No. 9881 June 4, 2014 ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 15; Rule 15.05 FACTS: The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. The Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of Atty. Molina, entered into a contract covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and security with the other unit owners. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements.


On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina for allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract. In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square Preamble was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document. On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith. On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 August 2011, but was denied by the IBP Board of Governors on 29 December 2012. ISSUE: WON Atty. Molina should be administratively dismissed for dishonesty. RULING: The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint held that when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis. The allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith. 3. A.C. No. 10378 June 9, 2014 JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canons 15, 17, 18; Rule 18.03 FACTS: The complainant engaged the services of the respondent to represent him and file a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Lourdes V. Mendiola-Baens. In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant alleged, among others, that the respondent: (1) despite receiving the amount to cover for the expenses in the said case, failed to file the


corresponding petition;(2) even with the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons belatedly filed an Answer and was able to file it only after the 15-day period stated in the Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on the petition on the ground of improper venue as neither the complainant nor his wife were and are residents of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of the case and thus failed to discover and attend all the hearings set for the case; and (5) as a result, the case was decided on October 27, 2009 without the complainant being able to present his evidence. In his Answer, the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD only the complainant appeared; thus, the respondent was declared as having waived his right to further participate in the IBP proceedings. The Investigating Commissioner finds that the respondent is guilty of violation of the Code and recommended that the respondent be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Specifically, the Investigating Commissioner found that the respondent failed to diligently attend to the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his responsibilities considering the fact that he has already been fully compensated. On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Investigating Commissioner’s report but deemed it proper to increase the recommended period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year.14 On February 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15 ISSUE: WON Atty. Sempio should be suspended from the practice of law. RULING: The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor, fairness, and loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and


he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Thus, for the respondent’s negligence and inadequacies in handling his client’s case, the recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent from the practice of law is well-taken. While the IBP Board of Governors increased the period of suspension to one year, the Court finds the period of six months as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner commensurate to the facts of the case. ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 10-2673. The Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS. 4. A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014 AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 16; Rule 16.01 FACTS: Amado Dizon alleged that he, along with his siblings, engaged the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in a case. The complainant claimed that Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) from him to expedite the proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract. According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court. Handwritten receipts signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant. In 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza’s representations that the case was still pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be found. Thereafter, the complainant instituted a complaint for disbarment against Atty. De Taza. He also attached several affidavits and documents from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. In its Report and Recommendation dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar


Discipline’s recommendation in a Resolution in which Atty. Norlita De Taza is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. ISSUE: WON Atty. De Taza should be held administratively liable for issuing bouncing checks and demanding and/or receiving money from her clients under the guise of having the proceedings before the court expedited. RULING: "In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required." Based on the documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid without any reason. Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and fairness. It was held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as she had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when she even used the name of the Court to defraud her client. When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been made in the first place. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.


All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two years. 5. A.C. No. 6677 JUNE 10, 2014 EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, and MELINDA D. SIOTING, Complainants, vs. ATTY. PHILIP z. A. NAZARENO, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1; Rule 1.01; Canon 10 FACTS: Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units from Rudex International Development Corp. (Rudex). In view of several inadequacies and construction defects in the housing units and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the monthly amortizations they had paid. Rudex was represented by Atty. Nazareno. Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of rescission cases. Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three (3) petitions for review before the HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications against forum shopping attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on September 9, 2002 against Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting).On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another complaint against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s ejectment, similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. Yet, in the certification against forum shopping attached thereto Rudex declared that it has not commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency. The said certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself. On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints for rescission of contracts to sell and ejectment, plus damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex, against the other complainants before the HLURB. The certifications against forum shopping attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex has not commenced or has any knowledge of any similar pending action before any court, tribunal or agency. On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission had


been filed by herein complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1) document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment. Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the administrative charges against him. In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 200524 and May 12, 2005,25 dismissed Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment on the ground that its statements in the certifications against forum shopping attached thereto were false due to the existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The IBP’s Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a period of six (6) months for his administrative violations. The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were unassailable proofs that the certification against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s ejectment complaint against Sps. Sioting had been erroneously declared. Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim innocence of his omission since he was not only Rudex’s counsel but the notarizing officer as well. Having knowingly made false entries in the subject certifications against forum shopping, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Nazareno be held administratively liable and thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension. In a Resolution30 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended penalty from a suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month. ISSUE: WON Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable and accordingly suspended for a period of one (1) month. RULING: The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be held administratively liable. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even bother to refute the charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be


imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score and suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public, considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register. Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule. Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood. The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1. In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false statements had his notarial commission revoked and was disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the same penalties of such nature against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this front, coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it proper to revoke his existing commission and permanently disqualify him from being commissioned as a notary public. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case, as well as malpractice as a notary public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one ( 1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, he is PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED. 6. A.C. No. 3452 June 23, 2014 HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent Legal Ethics: Rule 10.01, 11.02, 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had represented him as the plaintiff in a civil case. In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:


1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988; 2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the answer with counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it three months later; 3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and 4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte for his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.

In his comment dated April 6, 1990, Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00, contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, anent his nonattendance at the hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had informed the RTC of his having been either stranded in another province, or having attended the arraignment of another client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits despite his request because of the latter’s absence from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts. Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change counsel, stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him beforehand on the intention of not meeting his obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check after the Branch Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged the check.


ISSUE: WON Atty. Abellana was in contravention of his duties as a lawyer. RULING: Yes. By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by superimposing "0" on "4" in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the complaint in court on June 10,1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his transactions with his client. The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was entirely warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law


Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions. For Atty. Abellana, therefore, suspension from the practice of law for six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition suffices. 7. A.C. No. 9976 June 25, 2014 ALMIRA C. FORONDA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR., Respondent Legal Ethics: Canons 15, 17, Rule 1.01, 18.04, 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: The complainant is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. In May 2008, she returned to the Philippines to institute a case for the nullification of her marriage. The respondent was referred to her and the complainant agreed to engage his services for a fee of P195,000.00 to be paid as follows: 50% or P100,000.00 upon the signing of the contract; 25% or P50,000.00 on or before June 10, 2008; and 25% or P45,000.00 before the filing of the case. The complainant paid the amounts as agreed. The amount of P45,000.00 was even paid on June 10, 2008, after being informed by the respondent that the petition for the annulment of marriage was ready for filing. The complainant averred that the respondent promised to file the petition after he received the full payment of his attorney’s fee, or on June 11, 2008. In September 2008, the complainant inquired about the status of her case and was allegedly told by the respondent that her petition was pending in court; and in another time, she was told that a decision by the court was already forthcoming. However, when she came back to the country in May 2009, the respondent told her that her petition was still pending in court and apologized for the delay. Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition and found out that it was filed only on July 16, 2009. The complainant further alleged in her complaint that the week after she signed the contract of service with the respondent, the latter requested for a meeting. Thinking that they were going to discuss her case, she agreed. But during the meeting, the respondent invited her to be an investor in the lending business allegedly ran by the respondent’s sister-in-law. The respondent encouraged her to invest P200,000.00 which he said can earn five percent (5%) interest per month. The complainant finally agreed on the condition that the respondent shall issue personal and post-dated checks in her favor. But according to the complainant, upon presentment of


these checks, the drawee-bank honored the first two (2) checks, but the rest were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. In his Answer, the respondent admitted that he filed the petition for annulment only in July 2009 but this was not due to his own fault. The delay was caused by the complainant herself who allegedly instructed him to hold the filing of the said petition as she and her husband were discussing a possible reconciliation. He further claimed that he filed the petition on July 16, 2009 after negotiations with the complainant’s husband apparently failed. The respondent also admitted that he invited the complainant to be a partner in a lending business and clarified that the said business was being managed by a friend. He further stated that he was also involved in the said business as a partner. The respondent admitted that only the first two (2) of the checks he issued were honored by the drawee-bank. He stated that prior to the presentment and dishonor of the rest of the checks, he advised the complainant that the third check should not be deposited just yet due to losses in their lending business caused by the failure of some borrowers to settle their obligations. ISSUE: WON Atty. Alvarez was remiss of his duties as a lawyer. RULING: Yes. It was established that the complainant engaged the professional services of the respondent. She expected the immediate filing of the petition for the nullity of her marriage after the full payment of attorney’s fees on June 10, 2008. However, the respondent filed the said petition only on July 16, 2009. The respondent gave out different reasons for the delay in an attempt to exculpate himself. At the end, the respondent admitted the delay and apologized for it. It cannot be gainsaid that the complainant through her agent was diligent in following up the petition. The different excuses proffered by the respondent also show his lack of candor in his dealings with the complainant. "Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." "[H]e is required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion." "A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession." The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "[T]he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness


for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action." It cannot be denied that the respondent’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and the issuance of worthless checks have seriously breached the complainant’s trust. She went so far as to file multiple criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against him. "The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ‘a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.’ Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with his client." All told, this Court finds that the respondent is liable for violation of Canons 15, 17, Rule 18.04, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise, he is also liable under Rule 1.01 thereof pursuant to our ruling in Co v. Atty. Bernardino. In light of the foregoing and the Court's rulings in the cases mentioned above, the Court finds that the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law is commensurate, with a stem warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier penalty. 8. A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014 VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents. Legal Ethics: Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court FACTS: In the resolution dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of the Lawyer's Oath. Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two years. After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevented him from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended."


Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights." On Atty. Baliga's motion, the omission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of his commission as a notary public." On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as Regional Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]" this court's order of suspension. According to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and executory." ISSUE: WON a suspended lawyer may still hold a position requiring the practice of law. RULING: No. This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law. Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent" is practice of law. The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.


Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further from the practice of law for six months.

JULY 2014 1. A.C. No. 6470 July 8, 2014 MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent. Legal Ethics: Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. FACTS: Complainant alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise


complainant that the property was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated. In her Comment, respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase "absolute and registered owner" was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject public market stall under a "Build Operate and Transfer" contract with the local government unit and, technically, she could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which complainant was represented as the property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of herself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the same market stall. With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise. As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent; hence, the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the execution of the document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized in the principal’s place of residence. ISSUE: WON the respondent failed to perform her duty as a notary public.


RULING: Yes. The Court finds that she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public. The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in September 1999 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her presence. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood. Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries public. Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less


severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public. 2. A.C. No. 8108 July 15, 2014 DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Complainants, vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar. For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a government prosecutor. Atty. Lozano’s verified Complaint-Affidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP. However, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez. FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: Found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar action due to his own admissions that he drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of “feeding” the draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can be held liable for violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.


RULING: The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. Respondent is administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner, states that “a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.” We believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar. These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of “expediting the case.” The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s faith in the judicial process is diluted. The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical. Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.” The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer “to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.” Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar.


WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. 3. A.C. No. 10031 July 23, 2014 RAUL M. FRANCIA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. REYNALDO V. ABDON, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Lawyer’s Oath and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: In a verified complaint dated December 4, 2007 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), Raul M. Francia (complainant) prayed for the disbarment and imposition of other disciplinary sanctions on Labor Arbiter (LA) Reynaldo V. Abdon (respondent) for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. In November 2006, he had a meeting with the respondent at the Makati Cinema Square to seek his assistance with respect to a pending case in the Court of Appeals (CA) involving the labor union of Nueva Ecija III Electric Cooperative (NEECO III). The respondent, who is a Labor Arbiter at the National Labor Relations Commission, San Fernando, Pampanga, told the complainant that he can facilitate, expedite and ensure the release of a favorable decision, particularly the award of assets and management of NEECO III to the union. To bolster his representation, he told him that the same regional office where he was assigned had earlier rendered a decision in favor of the labor union and against the National Electrification Administration. With the respondent’s assurance, the complainant yielded. Furthermore, respondent even assured him that a favorable ruling will be rendered by the CA in no time before the year ends. Resultantly, the promised favorable decision before the end of that year was not issued by the CA, with no explanation from the respondent. On January 4, 2007, the union was advised by their counsel that the CA has already rendered a decision on their case and the same was adverse to them. The respondent promised to return the money but asked for a few weeks to do so. After two weeks, the respondent turned over the amount of P100,000.00, representing the unspent portion of the money given to him and promised to pay the balance of P250,000.00 as soon as possible. The respondent, however, reneged on his promise and would not even advise the complainant of the reason for his failure to return the money. Thus, the complainant was constrained to give his car to the union to settle the remaining balance which the respondent failed to return and thereafter filed a complaint with the IBP.


In the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD dated September 30, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner recommended for the dismissal of the complaint, holding that there is no proof that the respondent received money from the complainant. Upon review of the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution reversing the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and APPROVE the SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1) year of Atty. Reynaldo V. Abdon and to Return the Amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos ([P]250,000.00) within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can be held liable for violating Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: "It is well to remember that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof." Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar. In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer subsists and the complaint against him must be dismissed. After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the evidence submitted by the complainant fell short of the required quantum of proof. Aside from bare allegations, no evidence was presented to convincingly establish that the respondent engaged in unlawful and dishonest conduct, particularly in extortion and influence-peddling. The transcript of the alleged exchange of text messages between the complainant and the respondent cannot be admitted in evidence since the same was not authenticated in accordance with A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, pertaining to the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Without proper authentication, the text messages presented by the complainant have no evidentiary value. The complainant miserably failed to substantiate his claims with preponderant evidence. Surely, he cannot prove the respondent’s culpability by merely presenting equivocal statements of some individuals or relying on plain gestures that are capable of stirring the imagination. Considering the lasting effect of the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment on a lawyer’s professional standing, this Court cannot allow that the respondent be held liable for misconduct on the basis of surmises and imagined


possibilities. A mere suspicion cannot substitute for the convincing and satisfactory proof required to justify the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer. The respondent, however, is not entirely faultless. The records bearout that the complainant, at the outset, made clear his intention to seek the respondent’s assistance in following up the union’s case in the CA. The respondent, however, instead of promptly declining the favor sought in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety, even volunteered to introduce the complainant to Vistan, a former client who allegedly won a case in the CA in August 2006. It later turned out that Vistan represented to the complainant that he has the capacity to facilitate the favorable resolution of cases and does this for a fee. Thus, while the respondent may not have received money from the complainant, the fact is that he has made himself instrumental to Vistan’s illegal activity. In doing so, he has exposed the legal profession to undeserved condemnation and invited suspicion on the integrity of the judiciary for which he must be imposed with a disciplinary sanction. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a "lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." For, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. It is every lawyer’s duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. Also, the respondent, as a member of the legal profession, has a further responsibility to safeguard the dignity of the courts which the public perceives as the bastion of justice. He must at all times keep its good name untarnished and not be instrumental to its disrepute. WHEREFORE, for having committed an act which compromised the public’s trust in the justice system, Atty. Reynaldo V. Abdon is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) MONTH effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with severely. 4. A.C. No. 10450 July 30, 2014 EMERITA B. MAHILUM, Complainant, vs. ATTY. SAMUEL SM. LEZAMA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Notarial Law FACTS: This administrative complaint1 filed by Emerita B. Mahilum (complainant) seeks the disbarment of Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama (respondent), a commissioned notary public and practicing lawyer in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, for notarizing a 'Deed of Donation' in the absence of the affiants Rodolfo Mahilum and Jennifer Mahilum-Sorenson on May 24, 2006.

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According to the complainant, she has personal knowledge that Jennifer could not have personally appeared before the respondent on May 24, 2006 because during those dates, she was in the United States of America (USA) working at the State Fund Office in California and submitted a Certification5 from the Bureau of Immigration showing Jennifer did not enter the Philippines in the year 2006. Her travel records closest to that year showed that she arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 2004 but departed a month later or on July 22, 2004. She again arrived in the Philippines onJune 24, 2007 and left on July 20, 2007. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Notarial Law. RULING: The Court agrees with and sustains the IBP’s finding that the official record from the Bureau of Immigration showing that Jennifer never traveled to the Philippines in the year 2006 substantially established that indeed she could not have personally appeared before the respondent when he notarized the deed of donation on May 24, 2006. Certainly, the conclusive import of the contents of such certification cannot be overcome by the respondent’s mere counter-allegations unsupported by any corroborative proof. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law mandates that affiants must personally appear to the notary public. The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act and deed which constitutes the very main purpose of the existence of this Rule. The respondent is, without doubt, familiar with the above rules and duties, having been a notary public for 35 years. But he, nonetheless, failed to observe them. A holistic examination of the records illustrates that the respondent has actually met Jennifer when she went home to visit the ailing Rodolfo. But this was before and definitely not during the notarization of deed of donation because based on her travel records, she did not come to the Philippines in 2006. The respondent accommodated the notarization of the deed sans Jennifer’s physical appearance before him on May 24, 2006 since he was personally acquainted with Rodolfo. Hence, he took the latter’s representation that Jennifer voluntarily executed the deed as reliable and faithful. Even if we were to uphold such representation, however, the truth remains that Jennifer was not personally present to attest to the truthfulness of her acceptance of the donation as donee during notarization. Carelessness implies that the affiant was actually personally present and the notary public just forgot to verify her identity or that she was not personally known to her. Here, however, the affiant was not physically present during the notarization but the notary

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public nevertheless affixed his seal and signature attesting that the affiant "personally appeared" before him when in truth and in fact, she did not. An act which contravenes the foregoing guidelines is in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, which the respondent culpably committed when he notarized the ‘Deed of Donation’ in the absence of one of the affiants. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, his incumbent notarial commission is REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately.

AUGUST 2014

1. A.C. No. 7766 August 05, 2014 JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, vs. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: Complainant hired the services of the respondent. After accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of evidence. While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007, complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of P10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00 purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of P10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal before the RTC. In an Order dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court. Complainant also found out that, contrary to the


representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can be held liable for violating Canon 1 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence. In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment. Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional


Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys. 2. A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014 CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 18, Rule 18.03; Canon 16, Rule 16.01 FACTS: Respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa. The parties likewise stipulated that should complainant’s visa application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to return the said downpayment. However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the down payment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against respondent. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a period of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer penalty. The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainant’s downpayment of P350,000.00. ISSUE: Should respondent be held administratively liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility? RULING: Yes. As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.


Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable, as in this case.

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics.


SEPTEMBER 2014 1. A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014 PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON CITY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1, Rule 1.03; Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 FACTS: Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal complaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims. Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel. ISSUE: Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility? RULING: We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments. Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or


altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate, so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things. Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them. In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or haveno materiality to the case.

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation


2. A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014 MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 15; Canon 16; Rule 16.03; Canon 17; Canon 18; Rule 18.03 FACTS: Nery alleged that in June 2008, she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c) P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana. Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived. Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim. He even kept the money given him. Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law. ISSUE: Should respondent be held administratively liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility? RULING: Yes. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the dutyof fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer


also owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair. Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client thatmay come into his possession. Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x. CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Respondent even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession. 3. A.C. No. 8637 September 15, 2014 IMELDA CATO GADDI, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LOPE M. VELASCO, JR. Respondent. Legal Ethics; Rule IV, Section 2(b) and Rule VI, Section 3 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; Canon 1; Rule 1.01 FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by Imelda Cato Gaddi (Gaddi) against Atty. Lope M. Velasco (Velasco) for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. According to Gaddi, she was the Operations and Accounting Manager of the Bert Lozada Swimming School (BLSS) when she broached the idea of opening a branch of BLSS in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya (BLSS in Solano) to Angelo Lozada (Angelo), the Chief Operations Officer of BLSS. Believing that Angelo agreed, Gaddi opened a BLSS in Solano. However, in April 2010, Angelo informed the management that he did not authorize a BLSS in Solano. Upon Angelo's complaint, the police officers apprehended the swimming instructors of BLSS in Solano, namely: Jonathan Lagamzon Lozare, Katherine Agatha Gaddi Ancheta, who is Gaddi' s niece, and Lorenz Ocampo Gaddi, who is Gaddi' s grandson.


At past 10:00 a.m. of 22 April 2010, while inside the BLSS main office in Sta. Ana, Manila, Gaddi was informed of the apprehension of the swimming instructors. Worried, Gaddi pleaded with Angelo’s wife, Kristina Marie, and the BLSS Programs Manager Aleza Garcia for permission to leave the office and proceed to Nueva Vizcaya. Instead ofacceding to her plea, they commanded Gaddi tomake a handwritten admission that the BLSS in Solano was unauthorized. They warned Gaddi that she cannot leave the office without the handwritten admission. Thus, Gaddi conceded in doing the handwritten admission and left the office before 1:00 p.m. of the same day. Subsequently, Gaddi found out that Angelo filed a complaint against her regarding the BLSS in Solano using her handwritten admission, which was already notarized by Velasco. Thus, Gaddi filed the present complaint against Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, specifically Rule IV, Section 2 (b) and Rule VI, Section 3. Gaddi denied that she personally appeared before Velasco to have her handwritten admission notarized. She alleged that she did not consent to its notarization nor did she personally know him, give any competent evidence of identity or sign the notarial register. Investigating Commissioner Pablo S. Castillo (Investigating Commissioner) found the complaint impressed with merit, and recommended a penalty of fine of P5,000.00 on Velasco for violation of Rule IV, Section 2(b) and Rule VI, Section 3 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. ISSUE: Is Atty. Lope M. Velasco liable for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice? RULING: Yes. Time and again, we have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, and routinary act. Notarization converts a private document to a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a document unlessthe signatory to the document is in the notary’s presence personally atthe time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. At the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or mark the notary public’s notarial register. The purpose of these requirements is to enablethe notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature and to ascertain that the document is the signatory’s free act and deed. If the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act. A notary public is also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.


For notarizing a document without ascertaining the identity and voluntariness of the signatory to the document, for affixing his signature in an incomplete otarial certificate, and for dishonesty in his pleadings, Velasco failed to discharge his duties as notary public and breached Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Considering these findings and our previous rulings, Velasco should not only be disqualified for two years as a notary public, he must also be suspended from the practice of law for one year. 4. A.C. No. 9925 September 17, 2014 MARIANO R. CRISTOBAL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 18, Rule 18.03 FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Mariano R. Cristobal against Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta. Complainant engaged the services of Renta Pe & Associates Law Office for the filing of a "petition for recognition for the minors Codie Darnell Green and Matthew Darnell Green" before the Bureau of Immigration. Respondent as the managing partner signed the "Special Contract of Legal Services" in behalf of said law office. Respondent also received from complainant the "full and package price" of P 160,000 for the filing of the petition for recognition. No such petition, however, was filed. Thus, the instant complaint was filed against respondent for the latter's failure to file the petition for recognition and return the amount of P160,000 despite demand. In his comment, respondent explained that the petition for recognition was not filed because Anneth Tan, the one supposed to file the petition, misplaced it and did not inform him of such fact. He also claimed that he begged complainant to forgive him and assured him that he will return the money. However, respondent failed to refund the money on time for he was "hard up in funds." Eventually, he was able to save enough and refunded the money to complainant. Respondent likewise begs forgiveness from the Court and promises not to repeat his mistake. In addition, respondent submitted complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance. In the said affidavit, complainant said that respondent cried for forgiveness and that he has forgiven him. Complainant confirmed that respondent had already refunded the amount he paid. In complainant’s reply, he confirmed the contents of his affidavit of desistance, the refund made by respondent and his act of forgiving the respondent for the latter’s misdeeds. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should therefore be disbarred.


RULING: Yes, Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta was liable for violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, he was REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. On complainant’s affidavit of desistance, we hold that its execution cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings against respondent in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

We have held that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer's duty to serve the client with competence and diligence. Here, it is beyond doubt that respondent breached his duty to serve complainant with diligence and neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. He himself admits that the petition for recognition was not filed, seeks forgiveness from the Court and promises not to repeat his mistake. Complainant also submitted official letters from the Bureau of Immigration that indeed no such petition was filed. That Anneth Tan supposedly lost the petition for recognition and failed to inform respondent cannot absolve him of liability for it was his duty not to neglect complainant's case and handle it with diligence. We note that while respondent failed to refund immediately the amount paid by complainant, he nevertheless exerted earnest efforts that he eventually was able to fully repay complainant and begged complainant's forgiveness.


5. A.C. No. 7184 September 17, 2014 FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR., Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-FELIPE, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1, Rule 1.01 FACTS: On April 27, 2006, Complainant Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. charged respondent, previously of the Public Attorney's Office, for malpractice and gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and/or lawyer, alleging that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the City of Marikina, notarized the acknowledgment of the document entitled "Extra judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva" dated "25th day of 1999" (subject document), stating that he is a "notary public for and in the City of Marikina." Said document was one of the attachments to the Amended Complaint dated August 14, 2003 filed in Civil Case entitled "Esperanza Nieva Dela Cruz[(as represented by respondent)] v. Brita T. Llantada[(as represented by complainant)]." To prove his claim, complainant attached a Certification dated May 26, 2005 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, certifying that per the court’s record, respondent is not a commissioned notary public for the Cityof Marikina from March 30, 1994 to the date of issuance. In a Resolution dated July 5, 2006, the Court required respondent to file his Comment which he eventually submitted on February 13, 2007 after proper service. In said pleading, respondent admitted that he indeed notarized the acknowledgment of the subject document but denied that he was not commissioned as a notary public at that time. To prove his defense, he attached a Certification dated August 23, 2006 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City, certifying the fact of his appointment as notary public for the City of Pasig and in the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999 under Appointment No. 98. Further, respondent, thru the comment, incorporated his own administrative complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment of a fellow lawyer in view of the filing of the instant administrative case against him. In response, complainant filed a Reply dated April 26, 2007 asserting that he has the legitimate right to file the administrative complaint against respondent for his unlawful act of notarization, which is not an act of harassment as respondent claims. He also draws attention to the fact that the subject document was incompletely dated and yet notarized by respondent. In a Resolution dated July 11, 2007, the Court, inter alia, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Eventually, both parties appeared during the mandatory conference held on April 30, 2008. IBP recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law. However, since it does not appear that he was still commissioned as a notary public, the Investigating Commissioner did not recommend that he be disqualified as such.


In a Resolution dated October 9, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification, decreasing the penalty of suspension to one (1) year, with immediate revocation of notarial commission if presently commissioned, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. On reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution22 dated March 8, 2014, modified the penalty stated in its previous resolution, imposing, instead, the penalty of reprimand with warning, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for the decreased period of one (1) year. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable; RULING: Yes, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty. As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, could not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice: Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term– A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning courtfor a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied) Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, 24 of which Section 240, Article II states: Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied) For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”


It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual. (Emphases supplied) With respondent’s liability herein established, and considering further the attendant circumstances of this case, take for instance, that he is a first time offender and that he had already acknowledged his wrongdoings, the Court finds that suspension for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In addition, he is disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby revoked. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and violating the lawyer’s oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED. 6. A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014 REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1; Rule 1.01 FACTS: This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella). Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita). She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc. In her Complaint filed on May 9, 2005, Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent, her alleged illegitimate half cousin, continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order in declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s


properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations. She added that respondent mortgaged a commercial property in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00, despite an existing Trust Agreement executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same. Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had already instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCI agreed to transfer the subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement. In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also contended that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering the same issue. As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim. On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint for the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute." However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for Intervention, praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal profession. On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation, finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable; RULING: Yes, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.


Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it’s applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the factual circumstances of each case. Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case which involves the subject property’s alleged disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to comply with the demands of Rebecca – which she takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as well as respondent’s acts of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from his own assertion of the rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the Court’s determination, for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact and in law." Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended penalty. Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.


7. A.C. No. 10438 September 23, 2014 CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED, Complainant, vs. NICOLAS C. TORRES, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Rules 16.01 and 16.03; Canon 16 FACTS: Complainant hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer by profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked to serve as its legal counsel and to oversee the administration and management of legal cases and medical-related claims instituted by seafarers against complainant’s various principals. Among the cases respondent handled in his capacity as Legal and Claims Manager were the claims of seafarers Bernardo R. Mangi (Mangi), Rodelio J. Sampani (Sampani), Joseph C. Delgado (Delgado), and Edmundo M. Chua (Chua). In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondent’s request, complainant issued checks as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua. However, complainant later discovered that, save for a check issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the checks to the seafarers and instead, had them deposited at International Exchange Bank. On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline directly received the instant complaint and on even date, issued an Order7 requiring respondent to file an answer, but the latter failed to do so. Neither did respondent appear in the mandatory conference scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor did he file his position paper. Upon investigation by the IBP Investigating Commissioner it was found that respondent was administratively liable for violating the CPR and recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with modification, increasing the recommended period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years, and ordering respondent to return the full amount of money he received from complainant which is legally due to the seafarers, with legal interest, within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR?


RULING: Yes. It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. This is the standard laid down by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.

In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. Clearly, respondent’s acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his client’s interests which he is duty-bound to protect. They are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.” Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law. As already discussed, respondent’s conduct of misappropriating complainant’s money has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful, and grossly immoral acts. As a member of the Bar, he is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed in him by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Court to withdraw the same, as in this case. In view of the foregoing, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law. WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.


8. A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014 ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 FACTS: Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case he filed against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and awarded a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Ninety One Pesos (P189,491.60). Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued relative to aforesaid decision. During the implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent had already collected the total amount of P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. Consequently, complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to remit to him the amount of P95,000.00, less his attorney’s fees of P20,000.00. But respondent did not budge. In his Comment, respondent admits that he received P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total monetary award, on top of the attorney’s fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent incurred relative to the case. The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of two (2) years suspension and ordered to return in restitution all the amounts in his possession which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorney’s fees. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional engagement and return the same upon demand. RULING: Yes. “The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship.” Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to “account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.” Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that “[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds x x x of his client when due or upon demand.”


As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other than his self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would support respondent’s claim that he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof that complainant agreed to pay him additional 25% attorney’s fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the case. Respondent did not present any document, retainer’s agreement, or itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim. In any event, even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his professional employment. “The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has collected for his client.” “The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.” Moreover, a lawyer has no right “to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees.” In sum, “[r]espondent’s failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.” The Penalty: “The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from the practice of law for two years.” Thus, the IBP Board of Governors did not err in recommending the imposable penalty. Considering, however, that this is respondent’s first offense and he is already a nonagenarian, the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion, finds that a penalty of one year suspension is sufficient. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year upon the finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely.


OCTOBER 2014 1. A.C. No. 7919 October 08, 2014 DOMADO DISOMIMBA SULTAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CASAN MACABANDING, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Notarial Practice FACTS: According to the complainant, he ran for the position of Mayor. He filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for the May 14, 2007 elections. Thereafter, an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor (Affidavit of Withdrawal) was notarized and submitted by the respondent to the COMELEC, withdrawing the complainant’s candidacy without the latter’s knowledge or authorization. When the complainant learned of this, he wrote a letter and submitted an Affidavit to Acting Election Officer of the COMELEC. The complainant alleged that he neither executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal nor authorized anybody to prepare a document to withdraw his COC. He asked that the withdrawal be ignored and that his name be retained on the list of candidates. The complainant also filed a criminal complaint on May 17, 2007 with the Prosecutor’s Office for Falsification of Public Documents. Information was thereby filed against the respondent. Investigations were made on the authenticity of the signatures by handwriting experts and it was found out that the said signatures were forged. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable for notarizing a forged document. RULING: Yes. The complainant adduced preponderant evidence that his signature was indeed forged in an affidavit which the respondent notarized and submitted to the COMELEC. Consequently, the respondent should be held administratively liable for his action. “Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.” “It should be noted that a notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed


with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.”30 In fact, the respondent admitted that the affidavit was notarized in his office without the presence of the complainant.31cralawlawlibrary Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the penalties meted out against a lawyer commissioned as a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such are: the revocation of notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year. WHEREFORE is found administratively liable for misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Further, his notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine when the revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as notary public shall take effect.

NOVEMBER 2014 1. A.C. No. 7054 November 11, 2014 CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent. Legal Ethics; Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court FACTS: Conrado Que (Que) filed a disbarment case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, case against Atty. Anastacio Revilla of committing the following violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

(1) The respondent’s abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and RTC in the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondent’s clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly

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attacked the complainant’s and his siblings’ titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case;

(2) The respondent’s commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;

(3) The respondent’s lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts

by resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.

(4) The respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondent’s clients.

(5) The respondent’s deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;

(6) The respondent’s willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.

Additionally, the complainant further alleged that the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in a civil case when no such authority was ever given to him. ISSUE: Whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry. RULING: Yes, the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry. Under the circumstances, the respondent’s repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the


MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to “observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.” By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case. The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure; and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyer’s duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer “never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.” The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice, and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work. His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court. In defending his clients’ interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:

CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x xx

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor. He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. The recital of what the respondent did to


prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits. To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party. Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to “conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues.” He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself. The respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latter’s representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court. The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional misconduct. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious." Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose. As both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry. In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.


2. A.C. No. 9395 November 12, 2014 DARIA O. DAGING, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03 FACTS: Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building space where she operated the bar. Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis &Sabling Law Office signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant,, the respondent and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005. Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease. Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over the operation of the bar. Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis & Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and in force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case and filed, on behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. Respondent further alleged that it was not him who handled the complainant’s case, but his partner, Atty. Sabling. ISSUE: Whether the Respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations in the complaint. RULING: Yes, as provided by Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” "A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client." The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. In


Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. Moreover, In Hiladov. David, reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr., this Court held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took advantage of any information acquired by his law firm in the course of its professional dealings with the complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer. The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or suspension from the practice of law ranging from six months to two years. 3. A.C. No. 10240 November 25, 2014 ESTRELLA R. SANCHEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOLAS C. TORRES, M.D., Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1, Rule 1.01 FACTS: Sanchez filed this administrative suit against the respondent, Atty. Torres due to a check issued by the latter that had bounced. She claimed that the respondent had asked the complainant to lend him money in the amount of P 2,200,000.00, and that he will pay within a period of one month, plus interest. The complainant was persuaded by the respondent and agreed to the latter’s terms. Atty. Torres issued two (2) Allied Bank checks. However one month later, he failed to pay his obligation as promised. The complainant called the respondent over the phone, she was told that she could again deposit the check and assured her that the checks will be honored upon presentment for payment. When the said checks were deposited to her account, they were returned due to amount closed. Complainant made repeated demands for three years, yet respondent failed to pay his obligation. Thus, this petition

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ISSUE: Whether the Respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations in the complaint. RULING: Yes, Atty. Torres is guilty of willful dishonesty and unethical conduct for failure to pay just debt and for issuing checks without sufficient funds. In Barrientos v. Atty. Libiran-Meteoro, we held that, “x xx [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states

Canon 1— A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

4. A.C. No. 4697 November 25, 2014 FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1; Rule 1.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: Complainant Saldaga and respondent Astorga entered into a deed of sale with right to repurchase on December 2, 1981. Respondent sold to the complainant a parcel of coconut land located in Baybay, Leyte for 15,000.00. Under the deed, respondent represented that it has “the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple” the subject property, and that the property is “free from all liens and encumbrances”. The deed also provided that respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property, and if not repurchased, “the parties shall renew the instrument or agreement”. Respondent failed to exercise his right to repurchase within the period stipulated in the deed, and no renewal contract was made when complainant made a final demand. Complainant remained in peaceful possession of the property until December 1989, he


received letters from Rural Bank of Albuera (Leyte) informing him that the property is mortgaged by respondent to it. That the bank had foreclosed the property and complainant should vacate the property. Complainant was dispossessed of the property, so it filed a case of estafa against the respondent. The complainant likewise instituted an administrative case which was then referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation, where it found the respondent guilty of Bad Faith when he dealt with the complainant misrepresenting him that the property was covered with TCT No. T-662 when the said TCT was already cancelled earlier and transferred to her wife’s name without informing the complainant. It likewise held that the respondent shall be suspending from the practice of law for 2 years and ordered to return the sum of 15,000 with interest. ISSUE: Whether or not the investigating commissioner correctly ruled that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years and pay the corresponding amount? RULING: The Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative. That when the respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath to obey the laws, do no falsehood and uphold the constitution, as well as to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. This, in which he gravely violated his oath, when it caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase as he was the one who drafted or prepared such document. Respondent could have simply denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage and refer himself and the complainant as “mortgagor” and “mortgagee”, rather than “vendor a retro” and “vendee a retro”, then the controversy could have been avoided. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed the lack of legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath, to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. Indeed respondent had the right to mortgage the property but as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that the agreement faithfully, clearly and expressly embody or reflect the intention of the parties. Otherwise, it will open the door to legal disputes which in the case at bar was caused by respondent’s poor formulation of the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase”. Which played a significant factor in the controversy. Likewise, the respondent dealt with the complainant with Bad Faith, Deceit and Fraud when he made it appear that property was covered with TCT-662 when it was in fact cancelled 9 years earlier. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.


Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is “unlawful.” “Unlawful” conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on respondent’s part. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned. 5. A.C. No. 10134 November 26, 2014 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1; Rule 1.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: This case is involves the complaint for suspension or disbarment of the respondent. PACE is the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees held in a convention seminar in Davao City in 2005. Respondent is the National Treasurer of PACE, in which she was trusted with all money matters of PACE. That the liquidation for the 11th national PACE convention was submitted only on March 2007 during the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City. That when Diaz run for the election for national treasurer, she was not elected, that on the last day of the convention, it passed board resolution appropriating the amount of 30,000 as term-end bonus for each PACE official qualified thereto. That Diaz did not submit a liquidation as to the 12th PACE national convention and that there was no turnover of monies belonging to the association as a matter of procedure, despite a letter of demand sent to her. That a board resolution was passed directing her to explain why they failed to liquidate the past finances for the PACE of Davao and Iloilo conventions. In her defense, she said that she filed a statement of liquidation for the 11th national PACE convention and that the proceeds were fully accounted. That she also filed a liquidation for the 12th PACE convention, that the report, cash and receipts were fully accounted for and received by former PACE officers. That the term end bonus did not rest on her solely, rather it was approved by previous board of directors, and that she never sponsored the bonus.


ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads: "A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” RULING: Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a right. In order to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is observance of honestly and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner’s honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, opposing parties, the other counsels, and the courts. Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. It is worthwhile to note that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession which entrusts the administration of law and dispensation of justice. For this, she is an exemplar to others. She is likewise, expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of this noble profession. Therefore, her delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE, running for re-election and her involvement in the approval of the term-end bonus were definitely not the candor the court speaks of. For this reason, the court held Atty. Diaz guilty of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law for 3 months.


DECEMBER 2014 1. A.C. No. 8085 December 01, 2014 FELIPE LAYOS, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 17 & 18; Rules 18.03 & 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: This case sprouted from a “Sumbong” filed by complainant charging the respondent Atty. Villanueva for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer’s oath for neglecting the interests of his client. In the sumbong, it was alleged that respondent constantly fails to appear in the court hearings which resulted in the RTC’s issuance of an order waiving the defense’s right to cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite issuance of the order, respondent remained absent in which complainant was only able to move for reconsideration which was denied four years later. Aggrieved complainant thru respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which dismissed the case and chastised the respondent for his “lack of candidness and fervor on his part to champion the cause” of his client. That it never bothered to know the outcome of the hearings of which he was absent and for taking a long time before moving to reconsider the RTC’s order. In its comment, it denied being remiss in its duty. That during the hearing the criminal case supposed to be amicably settled, that his car broke down and that he was unable to attend the hearing. That when the car was fixed, he contacted his secretary to know the outcome and that he was unable to contact the complainant and never heard from him for a long time, as well as he did not receive any notices from the RTC. Thus he assumed that the amicable settlement pushed through. That he had a hard time locating the complainant who was not at his home address and staying at his workplace at Cavite, which caused him advance filing fees and expenses, not to mention the complainant failed to pay attorney’s fees and appearance fees due to him. The IBP found him to be administratively liable and suspended him from the practice of law for a period of 6 months, that he failed in his duty to serve the complainant’s interest with competence and diligence by neglecting the latter’s criminal case pending before the RTC. ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be administratively liable for the acts complained of.


RULING: The Supreme Court concurs with the IBP’s findings that under Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the lawyer’s duty to serve his clients duty with zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep abreast with the developments of his clients case and should inform the latter of the same as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to inform his client of whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. As such, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a clientwho deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause. In the case at hand, since the car trouble, respondent no longer kept track of complainant’s criminal case and assumed that it was amicable settled and terminated. Thereafter the respondent knew that the case was still on-going, which he attended and discovered the RTC’s issuance of an order which is prejudicial to his clients cause. Despite it, respondent did not immediately seek any remedy to further the interest of his client. Instead he merely relied on the court’s employees to send him a copy of the order. Worse, when he received the order, it took him a year to move to reconsider. Which Naturally the RTC and the CA denied the motion for being filed way beyond the reglementary period. Clearly respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in matters of professional employment. The penalty was however modified to a suspension from 6 months to 3 months, with a stern warning that repetition of similar act will be dealt with more severely. 2. A.C. No. 7687 December 03, 2014 RAUL C. LANUZA AND REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants, vs. ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III AND PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents. Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS: A.C. No. 7688: On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 92642, favoring Lanuza and directing PHI to reinstate him with full backwages. According to Lanuza, his legal counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia (Atty. Garcia), received the Notice of Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on March 28, 2007 at his law office located in Quezon City. Subsequently, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the


Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration, both dated April 12, 2007, filed by PHI and signed by Atty. Magsalin. In the said pleadings, PHI stated that it received Notice of Judgment with a copy of the CA decision on April 10, 2007. This information caused Atty. Garcia to wonder why the postman would belatedly deliver the said Notice of Judgment and the CA decision to the PRC Law Office, which was also located in Quezon City, thirteen (13) days after he received his own copies. Atty. Garcia requested the Quezon City Central Post Office (QCCPO) for a certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the Notice of Judgment with the CA decision by the PRC Law Office. In the October 31, 2007 Certification, issued by Llewelyn F. Fallarme (Fallarme), Chief of the Records Section, QCCPO, it was stated that the Registered Letter No. S-1582 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by Postman Rosendo Pecante (Postman Pecante) and duly received by Teresita Calucag on March 29, 2007, supposedly based on the logbook of Postman Pecante. With the October 31, 2007 Certification as basis, the complainants lodged the disbarment complaint against Attys. Magsalin, Go and Cruz, which was docketed as A.C. No. 7688. A.C. No. 7687: On July 10, 2007, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Notice of Resolution from the CA. Thereafter, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Compliance,7 dated July 26, 2007, filed by PHI, through the PRC Law Office. In the said Compliance, it was stated that the Notice of Resolution was received on July 23, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt8 (2nd return receipt) sent back to the CA. Atty. Garcia requested the QCCPO to issue a certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the said Notice of Resolution by the PRC Law Office. In the October 25, 2007 Certification

issued by the QCCPO, Chief of the Records Section Fallarme, stated that the Registered Letter No. S-114 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by Postman Pecante and duly received by Calucag on July 16, 2007, based on the logbook of Postman Pecante. The October 25, 2007 Certification became the basis of the other disbarment complaint against Attys. Magsalin and Cruz docketed as A.C. No. 7687. In its April 2, 2008 and June 16, 2008 Resolutions, the Court referred the said administrative cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In both cases, the Commissioner dismissed the case for lack of merit and was duly adopted by the IBP-BOG. ISSUE: Whether Attys. Magsalin, Cruz and Go should be held administratively liable based on the allegations in the complaints.


RULING: The petitions lack merit. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records to be inconclusive, thus, insufficient to hold the respondents liable for the acts alleged in the complaint. Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts as to the dates of the CA receipt of the notices, decision and resolution by the respondents, there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove that the respondents intentionally and maliciously made it appear that they received the CA notices, decision and resolution later than the dates stated in the QCCPO Certifications. The complainants would like to impress upon the Court that the only logical explanation as to the discrepancy on the dates between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts was that the respondents must have induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt by the CA for the purpose of extending the period to file, the otherwise time-barred, motion for reconsideration. 3. A.C. No. 8103 December 03, 2014 ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 7; Canon 9 FACTS: This case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.), the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents came out of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the letter.


The Report and Recommendation of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III) as Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June 11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office secretary. He admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice. Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of respondent’s commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its Resolution, dated September 28, 2013. ISSUE: Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence. RULING: The Court answers in the affirmative. Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a “Notary Public” refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public. Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.


Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint. Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people, who came into his office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded. 4. A.C. No. 10579 December 10, 2014 ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Canon 1, Rule 1.0; Canon 15, Rule 15.03; Canon 16, Rule 16.04 FACTS: Complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20, 000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses Respondent ATTY. AGTANG wrote a letter to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal problem referred by complainant FOSTER. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100, 000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. A promissory note evidenced the loan. Complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee. When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation. During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. The respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of P70, 000.00 or P50,


000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.” Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of P22, 000.00. On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50, 000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of P25, 000.00 which was covered by a receipt, stating that “it is understood that the balance of P25, 000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” Respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25, 000.00 Complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal. The respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Eventually complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination, after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied. The IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a complaint, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer. The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been issued. The IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from 1 year to 3 months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the


balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00. ISSUE: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)? RULING: Yes. 1. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. It is highly improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession. Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.”Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. 2. Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice; he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because


of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. 3. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved. Penalty For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment. Respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.


JANUARY 2015 1. A.C. No. 10568 January 13, 2015 MARILEN G. SOLIMAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 1, 15 and 21. FACTS: Mark Jimenez filed a complaint for estafa against the complainant, his common law partner. In support of Jimenez’s complaint, respondent executed an affidavit reiterating its factual averments. Complainant felt betrayed when she read the affidavit of the respondent, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against respondent for representing conflicting interest. In his answer, respondent argued that he violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the ground that complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never to the complainant. The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found respondent to have violated Canon 1 of the CPR for simulating a loan and undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. He was also found to have violated Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR when he executed an affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and complainant. The IBP-BG adopted and approved in toto the findings and recommendation of the CBD against respondent. Respondent filed MR but denied. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has violated the CPR. RULING: Yes. Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC. He has clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR, namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to act with candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also he desecrated his solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/january2015/10568.pdf


2. A.C. No. 10568 January 13, 2015 MARILEN G. SOLIMAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Canons 17 and 18. FACTS: Complainant claimed that she engaged the services of respondent in connection with a partition case. She agreed to pay the respondent P50,000 as acceptance fee. Later on, respondent advised the complainant to no longer institute a partition case since the other co-owners of the property were amenable to the partition thereof. Respondent then told complainant that some from the RD can help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee of P50,000. Complainant then deposited the amount of P8,900 to respondent’s bank account as payment for the real property tax and the amount of P50,000 as payment for the latter’s contact with the RD. Respondent failed to deliver the certificates of tile. Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent for violation of the CPR. The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found respondent to have violated the CPR by failing to observe due diligence in dealing with the complainant and recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the CBD’s recommendation, albeit with a modification that the period of suspension was increased to two (2) years and that she was ordered to return the entire amount she received from the complainant. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Amboy violated the CPR. RULING: Yes. The CPR clearly states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and that he should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. A lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence; to never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; and to keep his client informed of the status of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving payment for her professional services, failed to submit material documents relative to the issuance of separate certificates of title to the individual owners of the property. It was her negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of title. To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she asked from Soliman the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid to her “contact” inside the office of the RD in order to facilitate the release of the said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the payment of P50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of the said certificates of title. In not returning the money to Soliman after a demand therefor was made following her


failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. 3. A.C. No. 8235 January 27, 2015 JOSELITO F. TEJANO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA, Respondent. Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 18. FACTS: Complainant filed a civil case against the Province of Ilocos Sur for recovery of possession of a strip of land. The lot was wholly owned by Tejano’s family but the Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an access road without instituting the proper expropriation proceedings. The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of RTC Vigan in 1988. Judge Arquelada was one of the trial prosecutors assigned to Branch 21 representing the Province of Ilocos Sur. In 2001, he became the branch’s presiding judge. The civil case was later on dismissed. In his affidavit-complaint, complainant accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with the former’s own counsel, the herein respondent, in Judge Arquelada’s bid to take possession of the property. The CBD found that respondent manifestly failed to properly inform the RTC that his failure to appear in representation of his client was due to his two-year suspension from the practice of law. The CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years, and be fined in the amount of P50,000, considering that this is his second disciplinary action. The IBP-B adopted and approved CBD’s recommendation with modification (deleted the fine). ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Baterina violated the CPR. RULING: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.


RULE 18.03 -A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. RULE 18.04 -A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Lawyers have a fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, and must act in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. Atty. Baterina's duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their case and advise them to retain another counsel. A lawyer -even one suspended from practicing the profession -owes it to his client to not "sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty." The client "should never be left groping in the dark" and instead must be "adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two years after being found guilty of gross misconduct. In that case, Araceli Sipin-Nabor filed a complaint against Atty. Baterina for failing to file her Answer with Counterclaim in a case for quieting of title and recovery of possession where she and her siblings were defendants. Because of such failure, Sipin-Nabor was declared by the trial court to be in default and unable to present her evidence, and which, in turn, resulted in a decision adverse to her. Atty. Baterina was also found to have "converted the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent" and "deceived the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used for filing an answer with counterclaim," which he never did. The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina's "repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint [which] indicates a high degree of irresponsibility tantamount to willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court. These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of neglecting his duty to his clients, as well as a propensity for disrespecting the authority of the courts. Such incorrigible behavior is unacceptable and will not be tolerated among members of the Bar. For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty. Baterina a longer suspension period of five (5) years.