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7/27/2019 Florentino (Recovered)

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FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M.

MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National

Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE

B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.

YAP, J:

Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly

known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or

for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or

credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon

presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for

insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason

had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."

The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor

more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more

than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine

and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having

sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and

issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the

full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the

date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or

drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to

cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to

establish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledge

where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds

in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of

the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute

provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from

receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for

payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides

that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with

the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto,

giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or

issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and


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the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by

the drawee on such dishonored check."

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to

present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding

imprisonment for debt.

HELD: No.

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a

worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It

is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not

intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to

prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting

them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the

practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense

against property, but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of

the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the

community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or

holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless

commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute

the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt

the welfare of society and the public interest.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of

public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public

nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.

HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to

enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are notlawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere

contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has

become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and

therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.


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HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as

the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee

by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is

tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the

swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of

individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the

classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

JOY LEE RECUERDO, peti t ioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESAND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Before us for review is the July 16, 1997 decision of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. No. 20577 affirming that rendered by the Regional Trial Court(RTC), Branch 150, Makati City which in turn affirmed that of the MetropolitanTrial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67 convicting Joy Lee Recuerdo(petitioner) for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing ChecksLaw) on 5 counts.

From the evidence of the prosecution, the following facts are established:

Sometime in the first week of December 1993, Yolanda Floro (Yolanda)who is engaged in jewelry business sold a 3-karat loose diamond stonevalued at P420,000.00 to petitioner who gave a downpaymentof P40,000.00. In settlement of the balance of the purchase price, petitionerissued 9 postdated checks, 8 of which in the amount of P40,000.00, and 1 inthe amount ofP20,000.00, all drawn against her account at the PrudentialBank.[1]

When Yolanda deposited 8 of the 10 checks to her depository bank,Liberty Savings and Loan Association, only 3, those dated December 25,1993, January 25, 1994, and February 25, 1994, were cleared. The remaining5 were dishonored due to the closure of petitioners account.[2]

Yolanda thus went to petitioners dental clinic and advised her to changethe dishonored checks to cash. Petitioner promised alright but she welshed onit.[3]

A demand letter[4]was thereupon sent to petitioner for her to settle herobligation but she failed to heed the same,[5]hence, the filing of 5informations[6]against her for violation of B. P. 22 at the Makati MeTC, theaccusatory portion of the first of which reads:
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That sometime in the first week of December, 1993, in the Municipality of Makati,

Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make

out, drawn (sic) and issue to YOLANDA G. FLORO to apply on account or for value

the check described below:

Check No. - 008789

Drawn Against - Prudential Bank

In the Amount of - P40,000.00

Postdated/dated - July 25, 1994

Payable to - Cash

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said account did not have

sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face

amount of such check upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment

within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the

drawee bank for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite receipt of notice of

such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or

to make arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receiving

said notice.

Except for the check numbers and dates of maturity, the four otherinformations are similarly worded.

After trial, Branch 67 of the Makati MeTC convicted petitioner in a JointDecision[7]the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on five (5) counts and

therefore sentences the accused to suffer an imprisonment of 30 days for each count

and to restitute the amount of P 200,000.00 to Miss Yolanda G. Floro, which is the

total amount of the five (5) checks, and to pay her also the amount of P20,000.00 as

damages to compensate the payment of attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.[8]

As stated early on, the RTC, on appeal, affirmed the decision of theMeTC.[9]And the Court of Appeals[10]affirmed that of the RTC.
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In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioner proffers as follows:

1. Petitioner was convicted by an invalid law which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for

being an unconstitutional law.

2. Petitioner was denied her constitutional right to due process for failure of the courtsa quo to uphold her presumption of innocence and for convicting her even if the

prosecution evidence does not prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

3. The findings of fact of the courts a quo, primarily the Court of Appeals, are based

on surmises, conjectures and speculations.

4. The Court of Appeals was biased against petitioner when it denied the petition moto

propio(sic) without the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.[11]

Petitioner contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentmentof dishonored checks as they impose a penalty for each, onlycreditors/payees are unduly favored by the law; that the law is in essence aresurrected form of 19

thcentury imprisonment for debt since the drawer is

coerced to pay his debt on threat of imprisonment even if his failure to paydoes not arise from malice or fraud or from any criminal intent to causedamage;[12] and that the law is a bill of attainder[13]as it does not leave muchroom for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having already beendecided by the legislature.[14]

These matters subject of petitioners contention have long been settled inthe landmark case ofLozano v. Martinez[15]where this Court upheld theconstitutionality of B. P. 22:

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a

worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is

not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not

intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to

prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting

them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the

practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense againstproperty, but an offense against public order.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflictspunishment without trial and the essence of which is the substitution of alegislative for a judicial determination of guilt,[17]fails. For under B. P. 22, every
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element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant aconviction for violation thereof.

Reinforcing her thesis, petitioner cites the speech made by now Vice-President Teofisto Guingona delivered before the Philippine Bar Association

wherein he stressed the need to review the law since it has not prevented theproliferation of bouncing checks.[18]

As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, however, while duedeference is given to the opinion of the Vice-President, the same shouldproperly be addressed to the legislature which is in a better position to reviewthe effectiveness and usefulness of the law.[19]As held in the caseofLozano,[20]it is not for the Court to question the wisdom or policy of thestatute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between the means andthe end.

Petitioner further claims that the dishonored checks were not issued fordeposit and encashment,[21]nor was there consideration therefor, in support ofwhich she cites her alleged agreement with Yolanda that she could have thestone appraised to determine the purchase price,[22] and since she found outthat it is only worth P160,000.00,[23]there was no longer any need to fund theremaining checks which should be returned to her.[24] Yolanda, however, sopetitioner adds, could no longer be reached.[25] Petitioner thus concludes thatshe had already paid in full the purchase price of the stone, she havingpaid P40,000.00 cash plus the P120,000.00 proceeds of the three clearedchecks.[26]

Petitioners submission does not lie. Such alleged agreement does notinspire belief. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of thechecks are irrelevant.[27]

A check issued as an evidence of debt,though not intended for encashment, has

the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22,

which is explicit that any person who makes or draws and issuesany checkto apply

for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have

sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently

dishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment.[28](Emphasis supplied.)

BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be

envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the

stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is

a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which

checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate

application of the legislative enactment can be made.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
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Additionally, petitioner argues that as no bank representative testified as towhether the questioned checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds(sic), such element was not clearly and convincingly proven,[30]hence, the trialcourt failed to uphold her right to presumption of innocence when she wasconvicted based on the sole testimony of Yolanda.

Whether the checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, orAccount Closed as alleged in the informations and testified on byYolanda,[31]petitioners argument is untenable.

It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee

banks representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks because of

insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did in this case, only

complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged. She is

competent and qualified witness to testify that she deposited the checks to her account

in a bank; that she subsequently received from the bank the checks returned unpaidwith a notation drawn against insufficient funds stamped or written on the dorsal

side of the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly

given to the complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the

checks or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days

after receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee

bank.[32] (Emphasis supplied)

Yolandas testimony that when she deposited the checks to her depositorybank they were dishonored due to Account Closed[33]thus sufficed. In fact,

even petitioners counsel during trial admitted the dishonor, and on thatground.[34]

Finally, petitioner imputes bias on the part of the appellate court when itdecided her petition for review without the comment of the Office of theSolicitor General.

The rendition of the decision by the appellate court without the comment ofthe People-Appellee is not by itself proof of bias. In any event, the Office ofthe Solicitor General gave its comment on petitioners Motion forReconsideration of the appellate courts decision.

In fine, the affirmance of petitioners conviction is in order.

Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not beimposed on those found guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Administrative CircularNo. 13-2001 issued on February 14, 2001 vests in the courts the discretion todetermine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,whether the imposition of fine alone would best serve the interests of justice,
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or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate theseriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwisecontrary to the imperatives of justice.[35]

In the case at bar, this Court notes that no proof, nay allegation, was

proffered that petitioner was not a first time offender. Considering this and thecorrectness of the case, it would best serve the interests of justice if petitioneris just fined to enable her to continue her dental practice so as not to depriveher of her income, thus insuring the early settlement of the civil aspect of thecase, not to mention the FINE.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals findingpetitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

In lieu of imprisonment, accused-herein petitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO,

is ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonoredcheck subject of the five cases at bar. And she is also ordered to pay privatecomplainant, Yolanda Floro, the amount of Two Hundred Thousand(P200,000.00) Pesos representing the total amount of the dishonored checks.

SO ORDERED.

People v. Nitafan G.R. No. 75954 October 22, 1992

Facts:

On January 20, 1985, aid accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or

draw and issue to Fatima Cortez Sasaki Philippine Trust Company Check No. 117383 in the

amount of P143,000.00

He knew that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee

bank.

The check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and

despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay Sasaki the amount of said

check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five banking days after

receiving said notice.

Private respondent, Mariano Lim moved to quash the Information of the ground that the facts

charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued

was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note in thus, is civil in nature.

On 1 September 1986, respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was basedwas unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, this petition

for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the government.

Issues:

W/N B.P. 22 is unconstitutional

W/N a memorandum check issued postdated in partial payment of a pre-existing obligation is

within the coverage of B.P. 22.
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Ratio:

The constitutionality of the Bouncing Check Law has already been sustained by the SC through

jurisprudence in Lozano v. Martinez, and the seven other cases decided jointly with it.

A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo"

or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide

holder absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment.

Such a check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be

presented has the same effect as an ordinary check and if passed to the third person will be valid

in his hands like any other check.

A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law

which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand."

A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not distinguish

but merely provides that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing at the

time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which check

is subsequently dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment"

A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not

matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtednessor whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes

is the issuance itself of a bouncing check 15 and not the purpose for which it was issuance.

The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an

evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of 1 September 1986 is SET

ASIDE. Consequently, respondent Judge, or whoever presides over the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 52, is hereby directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing of the case until terminated.

SO ORDERED.

People v. Rica Cuyugan (2002)

FACTS: Rica G. Cuyugan issued to Norma Abagat several checks in payment of supplies she wanted to buy for the

Philippine Armed Forces. When the checks were presented for payment, they were all dishonored either on account of DAIF

(drawn against insufficient funds) or for reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED. Despite repeated demands, appellant failed to make

good the checks, which constrained the Abagat spouses to file a complaint for estafa against Cuyugan. Cuygan claimed that

the Abagat spousesand she were partners in obtaining construction projects with the Philippine Army. She issued postdated

checks as proof that the Abagat spouses had invested their money with her. She claimed that she was the industrial partner

as she did all the legwork in getting the projects. They then shared in the profits after deducting all the miscellaneous

expenses.

The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa committed by means of false pretenses or

fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, that is by postdating a check or issuing

a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not

sufficient to cover the amount of the check.

HELD: We find the appeal meritorious. The transaction between appellant and the Abagat spouses, in our view, was

one for a loan of money to be used by appellant in her business and she issued checks to guarantee the payment of the loan.

As such, she has the obligation to make good the payment of the money borrowed by her. But such obligation is civil in

character and in the absence of fraud, no criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of

postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment.


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FELIPA B. CUEME, peti t ioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FELIPA B. CUEME assails in this petition for review the Decision of the Courtof Appeals promulgated 22 October 1997 which affirmed the decision of thetrial court finding her guilty of fifteen (15) violations ofBatas Pambansa Blg.22(Bouncing Checks Law), sentencing her to six (6) months imprisonmentand fine for each violation, and ordering her to pay the complaining witnessthe face value of the dishonored checks with legal interest.[1]

Helen Simolde was a bank teller of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),

Makati Branch.[2]One of the banks clients was petitioner Felipa B. Cueme,General Manager of Mark-Agro Trading Corporation and AMF GeneralTrading Corporation engaged in the trading of cacao in Davao andManila.[3]Since both Simolde and Cueme hail from Davao they became friendsand soon Simolde started lending money to Cueme for which Cueme wouldissue post-dated crossed checks to Simolde covering the amounts lent plusinterests.[4]As recorded, their transactions were -

DATE S OFCHECKS

AMOUNTS LENTBY SIMOLDE

FAVE VALUECHECKS

BPI CHECK SNOS.

7 Feb. 1990

P 25,000.00

P 27,000.00

647647[5]

12 Feb. 1990 175,000.00 189,000.00 647626[6]

17 Feb. 1990 175,000.00 189,000.00 356891[7]

21 Feb. 1990 100,000.00 108,000.00 356892[8]

3 Mar. 1990 25,000.00 27,000.00 356941[9]

6 Mar. 1990 25,000.00 27,000.00 356942[10]

8 Mar. 1990 ------------- 696,000.00 356942[11]

10 Mar. 1990 135,000.00 155,000.00 647700[12]

12 Mar. 1990 50,000.00 54,000.00 356915[13]

12 Mar. 1990 50,000.00 55,000.00 356943[14]

14 Mar. 1990

200,000.00

220,000.00

356944[15]

14 Mar. 1990 75,000.00 82,500.00 356945[16]

15 Mar. 1990 130,000.00 145,000.00 356946[17]

16 Mar. 1990 350,000.00 385,000.00 356947[18]

24 Mar. 1990 27,500.00 27,500.00 356948[19]
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Case No. 92-5614, P55,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 92-5615, P220,000.00 inCrim. Case No. 92-5616, P82,500.00 in Crim. Case No. 92-5617, P145,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 92-5618, P200,000.00 in Crim. CaseNo. 92-5619, andP27,500.00 in Crim. Case No. 92-5620.[25]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial courtsdecision

The judgment of the court a quo finding the appellant guilty ascharged is hereby affirmed. However, the penalty imposed inCriminal Case No. 92-5616, where the accused was sentenced toa fine of P220,000.00 in addition to six (6) months imprisonmentmust be modified.

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that the fine to be imposed

against the accused shall be "not less than but not more thandouble the amount of the check which fine shall in no caseexceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos x x x x. "

In Criminal Case No. 92-5616, the accused issued Check No.356944 with a face value of P220,000.00. Consequently, the fineimposed against the accused must be reduced to the maximumamount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) only.

Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals,

petitioner now entreats us to reverse her conviction contending that, first, shedid not issue the checks in question as she merely signed them inblank; second, it was complainant who procured the checks from petitionerssecretary, made the corresponding entries therein, and thereafter depositedthem in her account; and third, the checks were not issued for value orconsideration as they were merely intended to be shown to would-beinvestors of Mark-Agro Trading Corporation, and not to be encashed ordeposited in the bank.

After a thorough review of the records we find petitioners conviction for

violations of B.P. Blg. 22 well-founded. B.P. Blg. 22 was purposely enacted toprevent the proliferation of worthless checks in the mainstream of dailybusiness and to avert not only the undermining of the banking system of thecountry but also the infliction of damage and injury upon trade and commerceoccasioned by the indiscriminate issuances of such checks. By its very nature,the offenses defined under B.P. Blg. 22 are against public interest. Thusin Lozano v. Martinez[26]we held -
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The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcend (sic)the private interests of the parties directly involved in thetransaction and touch (sic) the interest of the community at large.The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee andholder but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of

putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied athousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade andcommerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt thewelfare of society and the public interest.

There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (a) by making or drawing andissuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issuethat the check is not sufficiently funded; and, (b) by having sufficient funds inor credit with the drawee bank but failing to keep sufficient funds or tomaintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check when presented to thedrawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days.[27]Petitioner was convictedunder the first type of violation.

Whether petitioner indeed issued the disputed checks to complainant inpayment of outstanding obligations, or whether it was complainant whoprocured the checks from petitioners secretary only to be shown to potentialinvestors is a factual question involving as it does the credibility of witnesses.It is well-settled that where the issue is the credibility of witnesses theappellate court will not generally disturb the findings of the lower courtconsidering that it is in a better position to settle that issue. Verily, the trialcourt has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conductduring the trial, which circumstances carry great weight in assessing theircredibility. We see no reason to overturn the decisions of the trial court andthe Court of Appeals in giving credence to the testimony of complainant. Thetestimony of a lone witness when credible and trustworthy, as in this case, issufficient to convict.[28]

The claim of petitioner that she merely signed the checks in blank is belied bythe fact that some of the checks even bore her signatures at the backsuggesting that the checks had been indorsed by her, while others containingalterations in the entries were properly countersigned by her.[29]Thesecircumstances could only mean that the checks were issued either bypetitioner herself or at her instance.

Significantly, during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Cueme and herwitness Leonora Gabuan submitted their Counter-Affidavit[30]and Affidavit,respectively.[31]Petitioner categorically stated in her Counter-Affidavit that she
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issued the checks in question to complainant for purposes of showing them tovarious potential investors. On her part, Leonora Gabuan alleged in her

Affidavit that she was instructed by petitioner to deliver the checks to thecomplainant. Their admissions in their affidavits clearly contradicted theirtestimonies during the trial when they both denied that the checks were issued

to complaining witness. Their explanations, i.e., that they were in a hurry whenthey signed the affidavits and that they did not understand their contentsbecause they were Visayans and the affidavits were written in English,[32]werehardly credible in the light of the observation of the trial court that both werewell-educated in banking and finance and in fact exhibited a good commandof the English language when they testified. Certainly, their lame excusescannot prevail against complainants consistent, straightforward and positivetestimony as noted by the trial court. It must be stressed that in theprosecution of offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 it is incumbent upon the accusedto prove his defenses by clear and convincing evidence.

The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shownto prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense.The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of makingor issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon itspresentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a badcheckmalum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for beingdeemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.[33]Considering the rulein mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has beenbreached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibitedfor reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence ofcriminal intent are unavailing.

The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed ordeposited in a bank, produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What thelaw punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose forwhich the check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to itsissuance.[34]This is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose aswell as the terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly erode

the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks ascurrency substitutes, and bring about havoc in the trading and bankingcommunities.[35]Besides, the law does not make any distinction as to the kindof checks which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such distinctioncan be made by means of interpretation or application. What is important isthe fact that petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question and thosechecks were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
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In fine, it is evident from the records that there were violations of B.P. Blg. 22committed by petitioner: (a) all the checks were complete on their faces, i.e.,properly dated, signed, with the name of the payee and amount of the checksentered; (b) the checks were issued on account of loans petitioner made; (c)all the checks were dishonored and stamped "drawn against insufficient

funds;" and, (d) BPI Bookkeeper Arnulfo Fernandez presented in court aledger where Account Nos. 001-1151-95 and 0011-1318-08 of petitioner wereshown to have insufficient funds at the date of the issuance of thechecks.[36]Added to these is the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency offunds. A makers knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of his check forinsufficiency of funds.[37]Once proved that the maker or drawer had knowledgeof the insufficiency of his funds or credit, which is also an important elementfor the offense to exist, he is rendered ipso facto liable.

Lastly, we agree with the modification made by the Court of Appeals on thepenalty imposed by the court a quo. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 specificallyprovides that the fine to be imposed on the offender shall be "not less than butnot more than double the amount of the check, which fine shall in no caseexceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Thus, petitioner shouldbe made to pay only the maximum of P200,000.00 fine in Crim. Case No. 92-5616, and not P220,000.00 as fixed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22October 1997 affirming the decision of the trial court convicting petitionerFELIPA B. CUEME of fifteen (15) violations ofBatas Pambansa Blg.22otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law is AFFIRMED. Accordingly,petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment of six (6) months for each crime andto pay fines in the total amount of P1,686,000.00 for the fifteen (15) casesafter reducing the fine in Crim. Case No. 92-5616 to P200,000.00. Petitioner isfurther ordered to pay complaining witness Helen Simolde the face value ofthe dishonored checks in the aggregate amount of P2,387,500.00 with legalinterest, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.

LUIS WONG vs. CAPosted onNovember 24, 2012

G.R. No. 117857

February 2, 2001
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/133325.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/133325.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/133325.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/133325.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/133325.htm#_ftn37http://lexislove.wordpress.com/2012/11/24/luis-wong-vs-ca/http://lexislove.wordpress.com/2012/11/24/luis-wong-vs-ca/http://lexislove.wordpress.com/2012/11/24/luis-wong-vs-ca/http://lexislove.wordpress.com/2012/11/24/luis-wong-vs-ca/http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/133325.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/133325.htm#_ftn36


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FACTS:

Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of calendars. However,

petitioner had a history of unremitted collections. Hence, petitioners customers were

required to issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their purchase orders.

In early December 1985, Wong issued 6 postdated checks totaling P18,025, all dated

December 30, 1985 and drawn payable to the order of LPI. The checks were drawn against

Allied Banking Corporation.

The checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers who failed

to issue post-dated checks. However, following company policy, LPI refused to accept the

checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the checks to the payment of

petitioners unremitted collections for 1984 amounting to P18,077.07. LPI waived the P52.07

difference.

Before the maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the checks

and promised to replace them within 30 days. However, petitioner reneged on his promise.

Hence, on June 5, 1986, LPI deposited the checks with Rizal Commercial Banking

Corporation (RCBC). The checks were returned for the reason account closed.

On June 20, 1986, complainant notified the petitioner of the dishonor. However, petitioner

failed to make arrangements for payment within 5 banking days.

On November 6, 1987, petitioner was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22

under 3 separate Informations for the 3 checks amounting to P5,500.00, P3,375.00, and

P6,410.00.

Petitioner was similarly charged in Criminal Case No. 12057 for ABC Check No. 660143463

in the amount of P3,375.00, and in Criminal Case No. 12058 for ABC Check No. 660143464

for P6,410.00. Both cases were raffled to the same trial court.


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The version of the defense is that petitioner issued the 6 checks to guarantee the 1985

calendar bookings of his customers, not as payment for any obligation. In fact, the face value

of the 6 postdated checks tallied with the total amount of the calendar orders of the 6

customers of the accused. Although these customers had already paid their respective orders,petitioner claimed LPI did not return the said checks to him.

On August 30, 1990, the trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt with 3

counts of Violations of Sec.1 of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA. However, it affirmed the trial courts decision

in toto on October 28, 1994.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the checks were issued merely as guarantee or for payment of petitioners

unremitted collections.

2. WON the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of

the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22.

3. WON petitioners penalty may be modified to only payment of fine.

HELD:

1.This is a factual issue involving as it does the credibility of witnesses. Said factual issue

has been settled by the trial court and CA. Its findings of fact are generally conclusive, and

there is no cogent reason to depart from such. In cases elevated from the CA, the SCs

review is confined to alleged errors of law. Absent any showing that the findings by the

respondent court are entirely devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand.The lack of accounting between the parties is not the issue in this case. As repeatedly held,

the SC is not a trier of facts.

2. There are 2 ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22:


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(a) by making or drawing and issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at

the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded; and

(b) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue but

failing to keep sufficient funds therein, or credit with, said bank to cover the full amount of

the check when presented to the drawee bank within a period of 90 days.

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the 1st situation, pertinent to the present case, are:

(a) The making, drawing & issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(b) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have

sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon

its presentment; and

(c) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or

credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered

the bank to stop payment.

As to the 1st element, the RTC & CA have both ruled that the checks were in payment for

unremitted collections, and not as guarantee. What B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the issuance of a

bouncing check, and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions

relating to its issuance.

As to the 2nd element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the 2nd element

prima facie exists when the 1st & 3rd elements of the offense are present. Thus, the makers

knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds.

An essential element of the offense is knowledge on the part of the maker/drawer of the

check of the insufficiency of his funds in, or credit with, the bank to cover the check upon its

presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates

a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check is refused by the


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drawee because of insufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank when presented within 90

days from the date of the check. The statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if

within 5 banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker/drawer makes

arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of thecheck.

Nowhere in the said provision does the law require a maker to maintain funds in his bank

account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie

presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions: (1)

presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check &

failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after

notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within 90 days is simply one of the

conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an

element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain

sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Sec. 186 of the

Negotiable Instruments Law, a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable

time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the

loss caused by the delay. By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more

than 6 months (180 days).

Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence

said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency

of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial

evidence. As found by the RTC, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the

reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was

constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly

notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within 5 banking days

thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the

insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the

checks. And despite petitioners insistent plea of innocence, the respondent court is not in


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error for affirming his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks

Law.

3. Pursuant to the policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which took

effect on November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner should now be modified to a

fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the checks that were dishonored.

The penalty imposed on him is modified so that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted.

MANUEL NAGRAMPA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 146211

August 6, 2002

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails his conviction for estafa in

Criminal Case No. Q-90-15797 and for 2 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.

22 (Bouncing Checks Law) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-15798 and Q-90-15799.

FACTS

On July 28, 1989, Manuel Nagrampa purchased a Yutani Poclain Backhoe

Excavator Equipment for P200,000 from FEDCOR & paid the down payment of

P50,000 in cash. To cover the balance, he issued Check No. 473477 postdated

August 31, 1989 and Check No. 473478 postdated September 30, 1989 in the

amount of P75,000 each. The checks were drawn against the Security Bank and

Trust Company. Upon the assurance of FEDCORs salesman that the checks were

good, FEDCOR delivered the equipment to Nagrampa.

FEDCOR presented the checks for payment on February 22, 1990; however, they

were dishonored on the ground that petitioners account had already been closed.

FEDCOR demanded payment from petitioner in a letter dated March 19, 1990; but

the latter failed to pay.

Hence, the above cases were filed against petitioner with the trial court. During his

cross-examination, Santander denied that the equipment was returned to FEDCOR.


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Felix Mirano testified that he had been a signature verifier of Security Bank for 12

years. He brought with him the signature card for petitioners account, the same

account against which the subject checks were drawn. He identified the signatures

appearing on Checks Nos. 473477 and 473478 to be those of the petitioner, andexplained that petitioners account had been closed in May 1985.

For his part, petitioner testified that he had an agreement with Corseno Bote wherein

he would replace the 2 checks with cash if the backhoe would be in good running

condition. However, after 5-7 days of use, the backhoe broke down. Such fact was

reported to Ronnie Bote, and the backhoe was thus repaired. After 1 day of using it,

the backhoe broke down again. Petitioner again reported the matter to Ronnie Bote,

who told him that the equipment should be brought to the latters office for repair. As

evidence of the return of the equipment, petitioner presented a letter dated October

3, 1989 addressed to Electrobus Consolidated, Inc., requesting the release of the

backhoe to Ronnie Bote for repair, with the latters alleged signature appearing at

the bottom thereof. After a week, petitioner demanded from Ronnie Bote the return

of the backhoe, the P50,000 cash and the 2 postdated checks, but to no avail. On

cross-examination, he admitted that during the pendency of the case he paid, upon

the advice of his counsel, the amount of P15,000, which he handed to FEDCORs

counsel Atty. Orlando Paray.

On September 30, 1993, the trial court found petitioner guilty of 2 counts of violation

of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. Upon noticing that the trial court did not

resolve the issue of petitioners liability for estafa, the CA issued a resolution

ordering the return of the entire records of the case to the trial court for the latter to

decide the estafa case against petitioner.

On February 8, 1999, the trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of estafa. Thus, petitioner also appealed said decision to the CA.


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On July 21, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court finding

petitioner guilty of estafa and violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

ISSUES:

1. WON petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22.

2. If so, may the penalty be modified by retroactively applying Vaca v. CA and Lim v.

People so that petitioner only need to pay a fine instead of serving imprisonment?

3. WON petitioner should be convicted for estafa.

HELD:

1. Two distinct acts are punished under Sec.1 of B.P. Blg. 22:

(a)The making or drawing & issuance of any check to apply on account or for value,

knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in, or

credit with, the drawee bank; and

(b)The failure to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount

of the check if presented within a period of 90 days from the date appearing thereon,

for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

In the 1st situation, the drawer knows of the insufficiency of funds to cover the check

at the time of its issuance. The check involved is worthless at the time of issuance,

since the drawer has neither sufficient funds in, nor credit with, the drawee bank atthe time.

While in the 2nd situation, the drawer has sufficient funds at the time of issuance but

fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within 90 days from the date

appearing on the check. The check involved in the second offense is good when


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issued, as the drawer has sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank when

issued.

In both instances, the offense is consummated by the dishonor of the check for

insufficiency of funds or credit.

It is clear from the allegations in the information that petitioner is charged with the

1st type of offense under B.P. Blg. 22. Its elements are as follows:

(a) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(b) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does

not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of such

check in full upon its presentment; and

(c) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of

funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid

cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The fact that the checks were presented beyond the 90-day period provided in Sec.

2, B.P. Blg. 22 is of no moment. It was held in Wong vs CA that the 90-day period is

not an element of the offense but merely a condition for the prima facie presumption

of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds:

Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the

account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Sec.186 of the Negotiable

Instruments Law, a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable timeafter its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of

the loss caused by the delay. By current banking practice, a check becomes stale

after more than 6 months (180 days).


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In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that such prima facie presumption is

intended to facilitate proof of knowledge, and not to foreclose admissibility of other

evidence that may also prove such knowledge; thus, the only consequence of the

failure to present the check for payment within the 90-day period is that there arisesno prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution

may still prove such knowledge through other evidence.

In this case, FEDCOR presented the checks for encashment within the 6-month

period from the date of issuance of the checks, and would not therefore have been

considered stale had petitioners account been existing. Although the presumption of

knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise, such knowledge was sufficiently

proved by the unrebutted testimony of Mirano to the effect that petitioners account

with the Security Bank was closed for more than 4 years prior to the issuance of the

2 checks in question.

Thus, the CA did not err in its affirmation of the trial courts decision convicting

petitioner of violations of B.P. Blg.22.

2. No.

According to Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 clarifying AC No. 12-2000; thus:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove

imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the

application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment forviolators of B.P. Blg. 22.

AC No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal

provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and

the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of


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negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more

appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the

circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.

Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, AC No.12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.

In this case, petitioner manifested utter lack of good faith or wanton bad faith when

he issued the subject postdated checks even though he had no more account with

the drawee bank, having closed it more than 4 years before he drew and delivered

the checks. Hence, he cannot avail himself of the benefits under AC No. 12-2000.

3. Yes.

The crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Art. 315 of the RPC, as amended, has

the following elements:

(a) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the

time the check was issued;

(b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and

(c) damage to the payee thereof.

Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check

in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation and it should

be either prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of fraud. The offender must be able

to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of thecheck, or the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with

his money or property had there been no check issued to him.

The existence of the first two elements in the case at bar is not disputed.


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Damage as an element of estafa may consist in (1) the offended party being

deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation; (2) disturbance in

property right; or (3) temporary prejudice.

In this case, the deprivation of the property of FEDCOR is apparent. Undoubtedly,

the reason why FEDCOR delivered the backhoe to petitioner was that the latter paid

the P50,000 down payment and issued 2 postdated checks in the amount of

P75,000 each.

Petitioners claim that he returned the equipment was not duly proved; he never

presented as witness the agent who allegedly received the equipment from him.

Moreover, he admitted that he never wrote FEDCOR about the return of the

allegedly defective backhoe to Ronnie Bote; neither did he go to FEDCOR to claim

the return of the equipment or of the cash down payment and the two checks. Such

admissions belie his allegation that he returned the equipment to FEDCOR.

Besides, on cross-examination he admitted that during the pendency of the case, he

paid Santander, through FEDCORs lawyer, on two separate occasions in the total

amount of P15,000 upon the advice of his own lawyer that he had to pay because

he was guilty.

Such payment to FEDCOR negates his claim that he returned the backhoe; it may

even be tantamount to an offer of compromise. Under Sec. 27 of Rule 130 of the

Rules on Evidence, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is an implied admission

of guilt.