Transcript
Page 1: 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conferencepurl.slwa.wa.gov.au/slwa_b2948314_1.pdf · 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference 30 November to 2 December, 2010 The Duxton Hotel,

The Proceedings of the

1st Australian Counter Terrorism

Conference

30 November to 2 December, 2010

The Duxton Hotel, Perth, Western Australia

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Proceedings of the

1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference

Published By

secau – Security Research Centre

School of Computer and Security Science

Edith Cowan University

Perth, Western Australia

Edited By

Dr Anne Aly

secau – Security Research Centre

School of Computer and Security Science

Edith Cowan University

Perth, Western Australia

[email protected]

Copyright 2010, All Rights Reserved

ISBN 978-0-7298-0684-8

CRICOS Institution Provider Code 00279B

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Table of Contents

The Internet as Ideological Battleground 1

Anne Aly

Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based Upon

Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60)

& Rhodesia (1964-1979) 7

Bill Bailey

The Malarkey of Money Transfers: Overlooking E-Bay whilst the

Hawaladars are Hunted 15

David M. Cook and Timothy Smith

The Piracy and Terrorism Nexus: Real or Imagined? 24

Karine Hamilton

Review: Disillusionment with Radical Social Groups 31

Kira J. Harris

Moral Disengagement: Exploring Support Mechanisms for Violent

Extremism Among Young Egyptian Males 40

Dr Paul S Lieber, Dr Yael Efreom-Lieber and Dr (LTC) Christopher Rate

The Emergent Challenges for Policing Terrorism: Lessons from Mumbai 45

Simon O‟Rourke

“Make A Bomb In Your Mums Kitchen”: Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation

of „White Moors‟ and Home Grown Jihadists 54

Robyn Torok

Countering Home-Grown Terrorists in Australia: An Overview of Legislation,

Policy and Actors Since 2001 62

Michael G Crowley

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Proceedings of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference

Conference Foreword

Welcome to the 1st Australian Counterterrorism Conference proceedings. This is the inaugural

conference to be held as part of the secau Congress. The conference brings together academics and

practitioners in a forum to discuss emerging trends in terrorism and counterterrorism and, more

broadly, their implications for human security.

The range of papers presented in these proceedings attests to the diversity of the field of

counterterrorism studies. Since the devastating terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in

2001, terrorism and counterterrorism studies have attracted much attention. There has been a

staggering 400 percent increase in publications on terrorism and related fields since 2001. Yet, the

field is still developing as an area of academic interest and will no doubt continue to develop as the

international community faces new threats and novel challenges to peace and stability.

As a relatively new field of study, counterterrorism draws from the disciplines of psychology,

political science, international relations, defence studies, media studies and security. These

proceedings include papers that cover such diverse areas of interest as piracy and terrorism, terrorist

recruitment, group psychology, policing, terrorism laws, terrorist operations and the use of new

technologies.

All submitted papers were subject to a double blind peer review process. Of the 11 papers submitted

9 were accepted for final presentation and subsequent publication. This year the best paper award is

sponsored by the Western Australian Police. The award will be presented on the night of the

Congress dinner.

I take this opportunity to thank the contributors to these proceedings who have devoted their time

and professionalism. I would also like to thank the conference committee and the paper reviewers for

their efforts in ensuring that the proceedings are of a high standard.

I trust that you will enjoy reading the papers in these proceedings and that they will inspire your

thoughts about terrorism, its challenges and indeed, its resolutions.

Dr Anne Aly

Conference Chair

Conference Organising Committee

Conference Chair: Dr Anne Aly

Congress Chair: Professor Craig Valli

Executive Chair: Professor Murray Lampard

Track Chair: Dr Andrew Woodward

Track Chair: Dr Trish Williams

Track Chair Dr Dave Brooks

Track Chair: Dr Christopher Bolan

Committee Member: David Cook

Committee Member: Peter Hannay

Committee Member: Patryk Szewczyk

Committee Member: Ken Fowle

Congress Organiser: Lisa McCormack

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The Internet as Ideological Battleground

Anne Aly

secau – Security Research Centre

School of Computer and Security Science

Edith Cowan Univesity

Perth, Western Australia

a [email protected]

Recent global events that have brought to light the use of new technologies by terrorist groups have focused attention

on the role of the internet in the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals and groups towards a violent extremism. In

2007, the case of Abdul Basheer, a law graduate in Singapore arrested for attempting to join the Taliban in

Afghanistan drew attention to the use of the Internet as a source of inspiration and information for would be

terrorists. More recently Sydney man Belal Khazaal became the first person to be convicted on the charge of making

a document connected with assisting in a terrorist act after using material already available on the internet to develop

his own publication "The Rules of Jihad - Short Judicial Rulings and Organisational Instructions For Fighters And

Mujahideen Against Infidels". Both cases point to the developing role of the Internet in the process of radicalisation

and suggest that the Internet has become an important tactical tool in the terrorists‘ repertoire. The role of the Internet

in radicalisation and the extent to which it contributes to the process through which latent beliefs translate into

violent actions is not fully understood. However, with the developing strand of terrorism studies that deals with the

diffusion of intent as an integral component of counter terrorism efforts has come an understanding of terrorism as a

battle of words and ideas. Nowhere is this more evident than on the internet.

RADICALISATION

Radicalisation may be described as a process by which individuals progress from a passive or inactive belief in a

particular political, social or ideological dogma to extreme or violent action. Several theories have been put forward

to describe this progression, particularly in the context of radical or extreme Islamism. Many draw on the

behavioural sciences for theoretical models of how terrorist groups indoctrinate and influence members. The

combined works of Kuran (1998), Sustein (2002) and Koker and Yordan (2006), for example, place group pressure

as fundamentally sustaining the dynamics of terrorist groups. According to Koker and Yordan (2006)

Terrorist organisations are pressure groups with an inner hard core of activists and an outer ring of non-

activists. By definition, hardcore activists seek recruits by propagating their views in order to win more

support for their particular cause. Recruits, who tend to be non-activists at the time of recruitment, increase

the organisation‟s power base. The resulting collectivity professes support for a specific cause, forming a

pressure group.

Despite an increased awareness and understanding of radicalisation, the reasons why some individuals become

radicalised to violence remain ambiguous. Experts on terrorism are still at odds with regards to any kind of

psychological predilection for terrorism and have concluded that it is difficult, if not impossible to, profile terrorists.

The absence of any viable psychological profile of terrorists, suggests Payne (2009, p.116), is indicative of the

limited success of al Qaeda propaganda which he contends has ―failed to mobilize the masses, or to control any

significant territory‖. Yet, most scholars are in agreement that terrorism relies on the circulation and proliferation of

key messages that construct the world in terms of a battle between good and evil: where Islam is under threat of

annihilation at the hands of Western forces and where ―They [the West] are aiming to destroy us [Islam] ... we are

under attack, we are being destroyed‖ (Aly 2007, p.36).

The counter terrorism responses of Western nations reflect a concern with the ideological battleground and

recognition of the need to incorporate measures that address four dimensions of security:

1. Monitoring threat through intelligence and evidence assessment;

2. Neutralising capability through disruption tactics

3. Crisis management and;

4. Defusing intent by addressing the personal and environmental factors that contribute to radicalisation.

Since the terrorist bombings of the London public transport system in 2005, the UK has responded to the threat of

‗homegrown‘ terrorism by introducing measures aimed at preventing radicalisation through social reform. In March

2009, the United Kingdom‘s Home Office revealed Contest 2: The United Kingdom‟s Strategy for Countering

International Terrorism, a reinvigorated version of the original Contest strategy developed in 2003. The strategy

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emphasises a preventative approach to the threat of home-grown terrorism and highlights the challenge for

democratic societies to maintaining the delicate balance between democratic freedoms and national security. The

strategy also recognises the importance of soft approaches designed to prevent radicalisation by engaging vulnerable

members of Muslim communities. These measures such as addressing disadvantage and inequality and actively

engaging with Muslim communities are framed by an understanding that radicalisation is more likely to thrive

among the disadvantaged and disenfranchised. A similar approach was taken by the Netherlands which has adopted a

strategy that focuses on polarisation and isolation of individuals and groups as key indicators of a dispensation

towards radicalisation. Likewise, the United States Government‘s National Strategy for Homeland Security (October,

2007) recognises community engagement and outreach as significant elements of counter-radicalisation. In Australia

also, community engagement and social harmony feature strongly as mechanisms for combating radicalisation to

violent Islamist ideologies. The Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting our Community

released in 2010 consists of four key elements: Analysis, Protection, Response and Resilience. Resilience refers to

―building a strong and resilient Australian community to resist the development of any form of violent extremism

and terrorism on the home front‖. Typically resilience relates to crisis management and defensive activities.

However, in the White Paper it is used to refer to a soft counter terrorism approaches that emphasises community

harmony and targets groups vulnerable to radical or extremist influences.

EXTREMIST CONTENT ON THE INTERNET

Among Muslims in Australia, the term ‗Sheikh Google‘ has become a popular slogan to describe the trend for

Muslims in diasporic communities to seek religious guidance on the internet. The use of the term belies a complex

set of issues relating to Muslim identity in secular states like Australia (see for example Aly, 2007) but also reflects

the ubiquity of the internet in all matters of everyday life; religion included.

A simple Google search on the internet using the term ‗mujahideen‘ yields well over 1 million returns. Sifting

through the various conservative think tanks, blogs and policy documents takes only minutes and the discerning user

is quickly and easily able to access a plethora of extremist content: terrorist propaganda videos; graphic videos of

beheadings and other terrorist operations; and ‗how to‘ manuals such as ―The preparatory manual of explosives‖;

―Illustrated Manual of Sniper Skills‖; and the ―Organic Chemistry of Explosives‖ all of which are freely available

through the Unjustmedia website.

Extremist websites on the internet vary in their content, purpose and origin ranging from sympathetic websites

dedicated to ‗inciting believers‘ to those run by militant Islamist groups that openly advocate the use of violence.

Some websites use propaganda to validate the terrorist cause in religious, political and ideological terms. These

websites promote conspiracy theories but do not openly endorse the use of violence. Regardless of where extremist

websites sit on the spectrum of sympathy for the terrorist cause to the open call for armed conflict, all present a

worldview that is embedded in a construction of oppositional forces of good versus evil, honour versus dishonour

and Muslim versus the West. The audience is compelled to take a side: to be either with us or against us. Being with

us offers potential recruits to the terrorist cause incentives of honour through martyrdom.

One website features biographical narratives of ―Prominent Martyrs of Iraq‖. The story of Abu Umair As Suri al

Halabi, known as the Ascetic Worshipper, is a typical example of the kind of propaganda used to woo new recruits

with the promise of renown, religious absoluteness and martyrdom. An abridged version of this narrative appears

below:

Martyrdom is a privilege bestowed on only the greatest of the Ummah‟s sons. In Iraq, many brothers are desperately

waiting their opportunity to carry out martyrdom attacks because these type of operations can not be controlled by

the occupiers.

Abu Umair, may Allah have mercy on him, came to the theatre of Jihad alone where he met the martyr Abu Khattab

Al-Yemeni Al-Hindi Al-Hijazee, who we will talk about later insha‟Allah. Together they travelled to the city of

Fallujah, the city of Honor and Jihad and resided with one of the Sheikhs who used to help the Arab Mujahideen.

However Allah destined that he should become a Martyr, and he talked with me about his intense desire to join our

ranks. I replied to him: “Do you pledge to us to die (for the sake of Allah), for we do not accept but the one who

seeks martyrdom.” That day he laughed and said: “I am searching for it, I intensely desire it, do we aim for anything

other than that? Then I gave them an appointment and moved them to the house of Abi Abdullah Ash-Shami.

Indeed, a group of audacious and daring brothers had gathered in that house. These brothers were marked by

shining light on their faces; they used to select their words carefully so as not to hurt others. They were indeed

brothers for the sake of Allah, whom you could sit with to increase your Faith. When mentioning Allah, you would

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feel their souls humble before them, the Qur‟an in their hands, with smiles upon their faces, they would pray day and

night seeking to get closer to their Lord.

While this hero was waiting for the moment that Allah would cure the breasts of the believers, an intelligence

battalion identified a crucial target being the general headquarters for the Polish army in Karbala city. The heroes

took a look around the place until they found a security hole in the facility. A building located near a sub-street had

been erected to house the unbelievers' servants and as they became more comfortable, they let their guard down and

a gap in security resulted.

With that, Abu Umayr al-Suri, his brother Abu Zubayr al-Kuwaiti and another brother set off to execute the plan.

Abu Umayr broke through the gates and struck the towers that had been raised high in the sky and mixed with the

impure blood. Soon after, Abu al-Zubayr drove a truck filled with five tons of explosives into his target. The number

of casualties for the enemy was estimated in the hundreds but alas, this was suppressed in the media, one of the

enemy‟s best tools.

Narratives found on similar websites that aim to promote public support for terrorists causes by constructing

appealing to the concept of violence and death as a pathway to achieving martyrdom adhere to a strict format. In this

format the narrative typically presents the qualities of the martyr as:

The martyr is always devout and his religion unquestionable;

He is not from among the poor, the uneducated or the disenfranchised;

He demonstrates absolute submission to Allah and an intense desire to fulfil the greatest possible

demonstration of his piety

He makes contact of his own accord, is never selected, recruited or radicalised but is ‗destined‘ to join the

ranks of martyrdom

Internet sites maintained by terrorist or extremist groups can be broadly classified into three categories:

1. Media sites

2. Organisation sites

3. Interactive sites.

Media sites are typically online television and newspaper resources that offer videos and reports of aggression

against Muslim populations in Palestine and Iraq. The Arab television network al Manar (based in Lebanon) for

example, produces and broadcasts propaganda videos as part of its normal programming. Al Manar has been banned

in France, the United States, Spain and Germany for its anti- Semetic content and servicing issues have made it

unavailable to audiences in Australia, South America and Canada. Despite these bans and broadcasting issues, al

Manar videos and propaganda are freely available to audiences on the World Wide Web.

Propaganda videos are also disseminated on the popular video sharing site Youtube. JihadMedia TV is a channel

hosted on Youtube where users can view over one hundred videos ranging from messages and interviews by

prominent ‗jihadists‘ to videos produced by the Global Islamic Media Front that document ‗martyr operations‘ and

by Revolution Muslim.org that propagate the notion of war between Islam and the West. Among the videos available

to view are those that capture graphic footage of American soldiers being killed in Iraq, terrorist training videos,

propaganda videos that advertise the terrorists‘ cause and messages from prominent terrorists and religious figures.

In its first six months of operation, JihadMedia TV acquired almost 300 subscribers; an indication that the channel is

achieving some measure of success in reaching its intended audience.

Organisational sites are the official or unofficial websites of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Such sites are

open sites that offer news and information about the organisation‘s mission, its history and its ideology. Their format

is similar to news media websites but often also have links to their own media statements, publications and video

channels. These sites offer news blog, links to Youtube channels, lectures and statements by religious figures and

online journals.

Interactive sites are social networking sites such as bulletin boards and forums where discussions range from

everyday banal topics such as family life and education to religious or ideological discussions. These social

networking platforms offer access to an audience of like minded individual and groups through secure forums.

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THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET IN RADICALISATION

Notwithstanding the various radicalisation models that are available in the literature, there appears to be a dearth of

research devoted to exploring what actually motivates individuals and groups to seek out radical or extremist content

in the first place. Scholars and experts in terrorism agree that dissemination of the terrorists‘ message through

propaganda is a key factor in the progression of al Qaeda from a ‗base‘ to a global Islamist ideology. The extant

literature on the contemporary phenomenon of international terrorism concurs that the War on Terror is essentially an

information war where the ideological battlegrounds exist in cyberspace (see for example Aly 2009; Dauber 2009;

Payne 2009).

Several analyses have been offered regarding how terrorists use new technology including the internet to develop

their capability in terms of both financial and human capital (Dauber, 2009; Bergin et al, 2009). Apart from being a

central component of the terrorist media strategy, the utility of the internet for terrorists has expanded to encompass

tactical functions. In the contemporary terrorist environment in which psychological warfare plays an integral part,

having a presence on the internet is as critical to the terrorists‘ success as financial, tactical or organisational

capability. The internet offers a communicative space where terrorists can identify, recruit, indoctrinate and influence

potential members using the various utilities available on the internet.

From the perspective of the terrorists‘ audience, there is value in looking at the role of the audience as active agents

in the communicative process with a view to understanding the particular appeal of the internet.

Research into how the media serves the needs of audiences have yielded several classifications of user needs broadly

based on the informational and entertainment functions of the media. Contemporary approaches recognise the

following four needs (Katz et al, 1973, McQuail, 1983):

1. Information– relates to the cognitive needs and the desire for understanding which are served by the

surveillance function of the media;

2. Personal identity- relates to strengthening confidence and credibility and value reinforcement;

3. Social integration and social interaction- relates to personal relationships and the need to strengthen

social contact and affiliate with a group; and

4. Entertainment- relates to the need to escape and release tension.

This model is known as the uses and gratifications model and describes how use needs motivate media use. In

applying this model to the role of the internet in the radicalisation process, it is necessary to position internet use

within a broader context that takes into account the social realities that create needs in the first place and are

antecedent to internet usage. Aly (2009) identified the following factors that characterize the contemporary context

of Muslims and their media needs:

1. Transnationalism and the emergence of a Muslim diaspora;

2. The development of a shared identity among Muslims around the globe grounded in victimhood and

validated by the concept of the ‗ummah‘- a brotherhood that transcends boundaries of nationhood,

ethnicity or race;

3. A widely held perception among Muslims in the diaspora that the Western media is a complicit actor in

a conspiracy to undermine Islam and subsequent disengagement with the Western media as a source of

news and information; and

4. Access to new media.

5. The presence or perceived presence of a personal and communal crisis. This crisis is framed in terms of

an ideological battle for the survival of Islam and expressed in terms of a war (violent jihad) between

Islam and the West.

These five factors form the context in which Muslim media needs are constructed and which provide an antecedent

to media use. Such an approach positions terrorist propaganda on the internet in the context of a range of motivations

and needs. It suggests that exposure to propaganda alone cannot account for radicalisation in its entirety but that

propaganda may satisfy informational, personal identity or social integration needs.

At the same time context alone should also not be mistaken as the singular cause of radicalisation and efforts to

counter radicalisation should not be solely directed at the social situations of vulnerable individuals or groups. The

internet, through its various media functions, acts as a facilitator of needs both in terms of content (news,

information, propaganda, images, training manuals) and attributes (real time, interactive, consumptive, productive,

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participatory). The social situations of Muslims generate media needs that are gratified by different content and

functions of the internet. These content and functions are generated by the aims of terrorist organisations to identify,

inform, influence and indoctrinate potential members. The role of the internet in radicalisation lies in the presentation

of alternative realities and alternative truths through which people can engage with a social network where the

boundaries of belonging are set by terrorists. These boundaries are ideological belief but also common victimization,

common enemy and a shared hatred of the enemy.

The diagram below illustrates the internet radicalisation model showing the interface between context, user generated

needs, internet functionality and extremist generated content:

Figure 1. A Uses and Gratifications Model of Internet Radicalisation (Aly 2009)

The model of internet radicalisation distinguishes between four elements: the user or audience context; the use or

audience needs that motivate internet use; the internet content and functions that meet these needs; and the terrorist

groups‘ goals for which they generate internet content. These four elements present different aspects of internet

radicalisation that need to be addressed with different counter measures.

Arguably, terrorists have always made strategic use of the media and new technologies for publicising their cause,

influencing audiences and gaining potential recruits. The invention of the printing press presented Anarchist groups

in the 1800s and early 1900s with a communication mechanism for spreading their ideology across borders through

books, newspapers, pamphlets and journals. Widespread distribution of the Anarchist ideology and technological

advances in communications and transport meant that Anarchy was able to spread throughout Europe, America and

Asia. In the contemporary information age, almost all terrorist groups incorporate the use of media technologies as

an important and central component of their media strategies. Governments and agencies charged with countering

terrorism are facing a new challenge of countering extremist violence on the internet. The role of the internet in the

process of radicalisation is still not fully understood while the Australian government is exploring possible strategies

for combating violent extremism online. Within this context, technical solutions and legislative or policy options are

limited in their capacity to address the growing problem of internet radicalisation. Firstly such strategies tend to

target the producers of internet sites (often hosted in countries outside of Australia) and focus attention on content.

Secondly, the Hydra-like quality of internet terrorism means that cutting off one head will only grow more in its

place. An approach, which also attends to the terrorists‘ internet audience, would address the reasons why certain

people become attracted to the internet as a source of inspiration.

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While significant focus in counter terrorism strategies has been on social reform and to activities that engage Muslim

communities, attention could also focus on the motivations for seeking information or social networking functions on

the internet. In particular the trend towards seeking religious guidance and affirmation of religious identity using

Person to Person (P2P) and Person to Content (P2C) applications which allow users to participate in religious

discussion and offers charismatic leaders real time access to ready audiences needs addressing. Further exploration of

the role of the internet in religious identity would be a useful addition to the literature and to inform future strategies.

REFERENCES

Abu Ismail al- Muhajir, ―The Noble Lives of Abu Alhalabi, , Abu Hamza Alurdani, Abu Hurayra Al-hijazee and Saif

Al-Ummah,‖ Prominent Martyrs of Iraq. Available at

http://www.jihadunspun.com/features_prom_martyrs1.html (accessed 12 June 2009).

Aly, A (2009). ". ―The Terrorists‘ Audience: A Model of Internet Radicalisation.‖ Journal of Australian Professional

Intelligence Officers. Volume 17:1, pp. 3- 19

Aly, A (2007) ―Australian Muslims responses to the media discourse on terrorism: Pursuing public spheres in a

secular state.‖ Australian Journal of Social Issues, Volume 42:1, pp 27-40.

Bergin, A, Bte Osman, C Ungerer & NAM Yasin, (2009) ―Countering Internet Radicalisation in Southeast Asia,‖

Australian Strategic Policy Institute Special Report. Available at http//www.aspi.org.au

Dauber, C E (2009) ―Youtube War: Fighting in a world of cameras in every cell phone and Photoshop on every

computer‖, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Available at

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2010), Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting

our Community. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia

Home Office: Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, The United Kingdom‟s Strategy for Countering

International Terrorism. Available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-

search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf (accessed 12 June 2009)

Katz,E., M Gurevitch & H Haas, (1973) ―On the Use of the Mass Media for Important Things‖, American

Sociological Review ,Vol 38 (April 1973) pp. 164- 181

Koker, T, & CL Yordan, (2006) ―Microfoundations of Terrorism‖. Paper presented at the 2006 International Studies

Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA: March 25, 2006.

Kuran, T (1998) ―Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades‖. Journal of Legal

Studies Vol.27:2 (1998), pp 623-659.

McQuail, D (1983), Mass Communication Theory, 1st ed., London: Sage

Payne, K. (2009) ―Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror‖. Studies in Conflict and

Terrorism, Vol.32 (2009) p. 116.

Revolution Muslim n.d.,

http://revolutionmuslim.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=17

Sustein, C. R. Why They Hate US: The Role of Social Dynamics. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy Vol.

25:2 (2002) pp. 429-440.

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Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based upon

Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60),

Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979)

Bill Bailey

secau – Security Research Centre

School of Computer and Security Science

Edith Cowan University

Perth, Western Australia

b [email protected]

Abstract Pseudo gangs form the steely side of Hearts and Minds and were used with great effect in counter-insurgency

campaigns in Kenya (1952-60) Malaya (1948-60) and Rhodesia (1964-1979). Although the use of pseudo gangs was

not new to counter-insurgency tactics, with the British using a similar tactic in the Boer war (1899-1902), the use of

such gangs was certainly perfected during these later campaigns producing good results. The Kenya Police Special

Branch re-instigated this concept, developing its use during the „Emergency‟.

The principal concept was to „turn‟ or co-opt insurgents through a series of inducements to change sides and join the

counter insurgency as part of the Government forces but not as regular forces. Rather the co-opted kept their actual

identities or their „assumed‟ identities and return to the conflict areas as part of a „gang‟, which would be made to

appear as if it is still fighting for the insurgents. This „pseudo‟ gang would then rejoin or flush out the opposition and

either capture, gain further intelligence or eliminate them. Based on my ongoing PhD research into these three

campaigns, this paper will briefly outline an alternative model that could be developed for current conflicts against

insurgents.

Keywords Campaigns; counter-insurgency; ‗Emergency‘; gangs; hearts and minds; insurgents; Kenya; Malaya; pseudo gang;

Rhodesia; Special Branch.

INTRODUCTION

―Hearts and Minds‖ has become almost synonymous with counter insurgency policy transforming itself from a

concept into an actual strategy; however it is certainly not the panacea politicians or the press would like to think it

is. This paper will argue that for counter-insurgency campaigns to be successful they require ―the iron fist in the

velvet glove‖ to directly influence the insurgents. This means not only the capability, but also the ability, to sway the

minds of the insurgents over to the side of the security forces. The famous ―Hearts and Minds‖ phrase used by

General Templer, in the Malaya insurgency, is often quoted to convey the necessity of having a political dimension

as part of the counter-insurgency tactics that corresponds to the military one. "Essential though it is, the military

action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to

work safely with the population‖ (Galula, 1964, p. 63). However, as Charles Colson, chief counsel to President

Nixon, once said, "if you grab them by the balls, the hearts and minds will follow" the context is the same but moves

away from the much vaunted idea of ‗hearts and minds‘ as a soft approach, and the sole tactic in counter-insurgency,

and more to one where the control of the situation is more in the hands of the security forces. They must use ruthless

determination to achieve desired success and not pander to sentiment. Galula (2006) argues the central aim for a

successful counter-insurgency campaign is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.

Gaining support of the population can be interpreted many ways but rarely do ‗kind‘ acts achieve strategic successes.

The need for a more directed approach is one that is reviewed in this paper.

This paper forms part of my current PhD research examining previous counter- insurgency campaigns in an attempt

to identify what strategies and tactics were successful (why they worked) and how these proven approaches could be

used again in current conflicts. Although the research to date is primarily based on interviews with ex Kenyan

Policemen, a thread has emerged from these initial interviews concerning ‗pseudo gangs‘. I am undertaking further

interviews with other former combatants involved with the Kenya, Malayan and Rhodesian counter-insurgency

campaigns to analyse how these tactics developed in Kenya and Malaya evolved through the later campaigns. The

human sources used for this research are identified by their code to maintain anonymity.

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The ability to gain intelligence and to infiltrate the opponents camps is very much a sought after tactic within

conflicts; the use of spies has been much publicised over the centuries to achieve this. However, a method which has

been used, predominately by the British, in numerous counter insurgency campaigns over the years, and later by the

security forces in both Rhodesia and in South West Africa by the South African Defence Force (SADF), has been the

use of ‗turning‘ ex gang members so that they return to their erstwhile colleagues and deceive them in to believing

that they are still on their side; when in fact they have changed sides. This tactic has been labelled ‗pseudo gangs‘; by

those who implemented this tactic in Kenya and my recent research indicates this approach was far more successful

than many analysts have hitherto understood.

The concept of ‗Hearts and Minds‘ has become central to all discussions concerned with counter insurgency and

asymmetrical conflicts. Although this concept is often attributed to General Templer, during the Malayan conflict(

1948-1960. Lyndon B. Johnson, certainly was keen on using the phrase, often inverting it to ‗minds and hearts‘ when

discussing the war in Vietnam. Many think he took this from President Jon Adams‘s letter dated 18th

of February

1818:

The Revolution was affected(sic) before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts

of the people; a change in their religious sentiments of their duties and obligations.... This radical change in

the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution.

(Adams cited in Dickinson, 2009)

This quote by Adams clearly identified what was at stake, the support of the people. The overall concept has been

analysed further by many others such as David Charters in The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine,

1945-7 (Charters, 1989), Richard Stubbs Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla warfare (Stubbs, 1989) and Thomas

Mockaitis ―British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (Mockaitis, 1999); as well as in countless military documents. Susan

Carruthers analyses the total concept of the hearts and minds strategy, by highlighting British government ―attempts

to influence opinion about challenges to colonial rule in four counter-insurgency campaigns‖ as well as how the

propaganda war is fought by stigmatising opponents (Carruthers, 1995, p. 2). Clearly the hearts and minds approach

to counter-insurgency is not a new concept, nevertheless it is a concept that needs ongoing analytical refinement so

that it may be utilised effectively in contemporary and future counter-insurgency operations. By the same token the

hearts and minds concept must not be overplayed either as the ultimate panacea. Counter-insurgency operations

utilising a hearts and minds component will always need to be combined with security forces that are demonstrably

more than capable of winning due to their superior soldiering skills, fire power, logistical support and greater

resources to back up their campaign. The ability to convince the population that you will eventually win is an

essential part of the overall strategy, ―[the] counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does

not feel, protected against the insurgents‖ (Galula, 2006, p. 64).

The ability to convince insurgents to change sides is central to success if the insurgency is to be overcome. Therefore

convincing individual insurgents that changing sides is in their own best interests particularly if they wish to come

out of the conflict on the winning side. Evidence suggests that the desire to gain an advantage, or not to lose it, is

core to this concept of changing sides according to those that took part in these campaigns. The ability to ‗turn‘ an

insurgent was the key and was certainly the hall mark of the Selous Scouts during the Rhodesian campaign, which

will be discussed later in this paper:

. . . [T]he best recruiting method was to send another former insurgent

to visit him in hospital . . . and have a long conversation, dwelling in particular upon the

hardships the insurgents were experiencing in the bush . . . The process of turning insurgents

was eased considerably by the knowledge that they could be hanged as violators of the Law

and Ord Maintenance Act. He would then be examined thoroughly by members of the Selous

Scouts to ensure his loyalty―not to the government of Rhodesia, but to the members of the

unit itself. The insurgent also would be offered a cash lump sum for joining the Selous Scouts

(together with receiving the same salary as a soldier, with the funds being paid by

Special Branch), and if possible, his family would be moved to the Selous Scouts base, where

they received free rations, housing, education, and medical care. (Reid-Daly, 1999, pp. 106-

107)

KENYA

The Mau Mau ‗Emergency‘ in Kenya was declared by the British colonial government in 20 October 1952. The

roots of the conflict began much earlier and had been brewing for a number of years between the Kikuyu and the

settlers over land issues and rights (Furedi, 1989). However it was not considered to be serious by the Colonial

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Government until deaths occurred on several settlers farms in 1952. The police force was then increased threefold

with the addition of five British army battalions, as well as one full Kings African Rifles (KAR), plus the backing of

the Royal Air Force (Lonsdale, 1990, p. 394). The military were employed as an aid to the civil power; as described

by Huw Bennett, in his paper on the Mau Mau Emergency (Bennett, 2007).

The capacity to control the psychological sphere of influence became crucial to fighting the Emergency. John

Lonsdale develops a series of interesting themes concerning the ‗mind games‘ involved stating that the Mau Mau

insurgents took over the minds of the white settlers, when the intention should have been very much the opposite, but

clearly there was a great deal of fear amongst the settler population as they were greatly outnumbered by the

indigenous population. The thrust of the ―hearts and minds‘ policy should have been to dominate the local

population i.e. the African (Lonsdale, 1990, p. 394). General Erskine‘s strategy in Kenya involved three key

elements. Firstly, secure what were called the ‗Reserves‘ in the tribal areas by securing them from attack and

intimidation; this was called ‗villagisation‘ in Malaya. Secondly, round up as many known Mau Mau as they could,

which they did as part of ―Operation Jock Scott‖. Thirdly, take the offensive to the terrain in which the insurgents

were operating (Melshen, 2007, p. 675). It is this last aspect that is of interest and needs to be assessed and analysed

as this became central to the campaign with development of psychological warfare and the use of what would

become known as ‗Pseudo gangs‘ as part of this strategy.

It is this issue associated with mind games that opens the way for the development of the concept of co-opting or

turning known insurgents to betray their own comrades and become a pseudo gang. The argument over the word

Mau Mau is an important one in this debate as it centres on the very nature of the conflict and how this was fought

out in the ‗minds ‘of those involved. The demonising of your enemy is not new and runs throughout history, however

in post World War II world order this had now become a key element in the ability to retain the support of the

‗colonised‘ population; who were starting to shun the notion of external control over their lives and their country.

Leakey takes the confusion over the word Mau Mau even further by describing the organisation as a pseudo religious

one, set up to replace the imposition of Christianity upon the Kikuyu (Leakey, 2004, p. 42); stating their zeal turned

the adherents into ―fanatical, murdering maniacs‖ (Leakey, 2004, p. 51), which certainly added fuel to the

propaganda war which was being conducted in both the British and Kenyan press. Furthermore, the pseudo links to

religion may be borne out by the research that indicates a ready acceptance by the captured insurgents to redeem

themselves by accepting de-oathing ceremonies (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).

The other aspect that needs to be assessed was that in both insurgences, Kenya and Malaya, the perpetrators of the

insurgency attacked those that they thought supported the Colonialists, an aspect developed very succinctly by

Leakey(Leakey, 2004). The divisions within the Kikuyu tribe were ruthlessly exploited allowing the colonial security

forces to harness any support against the Mau Mau to their advantage and turn their own people against them. Once

again this laid the foundation for the idea of pseudo gangs to take hold as a tactic. This would appear to have been

crucial in the ability to gain the upper hand and start to dominate the campaign, after the advantage had been lost

following the general surge from the Mau Mau post operation ―Jock Scott‖ 10th

of Oct 1952. ―The operation to arrest

120 of the known leaders of the Mau Mau had seriously back fired and in fact had caused the insurgency to blow out

of control rather than nipping it in the bud as had been envisaged‖ (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).

The other critical element is the role played by the colonial police force, Deflem, articulates their unique position

within the campaign structure, especially under the indirect rule concept adopted by the Colonial office. The Police,

together with the Kenya regiment, were crucial to counter insurgency tactics (Deflem, 1994, p. 47; Husain, 2009;

Kitson, 1960; Smith, 2005). Beckett develops this theme further, pointing out how important their detailed

knowledge was in the overall strategy (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985; Kitson, 1960). Bennett also deals with use of force

elements and the criticality of command and control of those forces on the ground (Bennett, 2007). All of these

factors indicated the important role the Colonial Police force played in being able to dominate the counter insurgency

because of their local knowledge of language and customs.

In Kenya a certain Captain Kitson, an intelligence officer who was attached to Kenya Police Special Branch

developed an idea together with Ian Henderson and a few others (including a respondent in this current research)

about trying to infiltrate the Mau Mau . There is considerable dispute as to how the idea morphed into the full use of

‗Pseudo gangs‘, however Captain Kitson played a central role and details the gradual evolution of the strategy in his

book (Kitson, 1960; 1990).

THE PSEUDO GANGS

What is of particular interest to the research is what tactics used by the Colonial forces were decisive in winning their

campaigns. Turning captured Mau Mau into instruments that could be used to counter the enemy was certainly

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significant in this campaign, destabilising the enemy. Once they were captured a series of inducements were used to

get them to lead a ‗party‘ back to where their former colleagues were operating and infiltrate them. By using this

tactic, Police Special Branch (SB) infiltrated the gangs, sometimes for quite some time, gleaning valuable

intelligence (Franklin, 1996; Kitson, 1960). The ability to capture additional potential collaborators was very

appealing too as it would diminish the opposition and dishearten them once they found out that there erstwhile

comrades had joined the ranks of their foes. This destabilisation tactic became a valuable tool as it dejected the Mau

Mau gangs creating distrust amongst them which caused many to change sides ―self preservation...he thought that the

white man was going to win eventually and it was better to be on the winning side than the Kikuyu‖(respondent K-2,

2010, Bailey, 2012)

There were a substantial number of Kikuyu, who were on the side of the Colonial forces and in fact made up what

was called the Kikuyu Guard, who were opposed to the demands of the rest of their tribe who had joined the Mau

Mau. The ability of the some members of the Colonial forces to speak the language, in this case Kikuyu, was core to

being able to achieve this aim of infiltrating the Mau Mau. Although the white members were not usually part of

pseudo gang, at times they took a gamble and did join the fray. Amazingly enough this seems to have worked with

little adverse reaction from the Mau Mau gangs. This could be because it was so unexpected and therefore did not

raise suspicions or perhaps, as has been pointed out, the gangs were often high on Khat or alcohol and did not really

know who was who in the gloom of the forests (respondent K-1, 2010, Bailey, 2012). Nonetheless it was the use of

ex-members of the Mau Mau that made the difference and allowed the Security forces to gain a substantial upper

hand.

―There is only one way we are going to beat the Mau Mau, and that‘s to have gangs disguised as Mau Mau to go into

the forests and live as Mau Mau and destroy them in their lairs‖ (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012). Working

closely with Ian Henderson of the Kenya Police, the respondent was involved with establishing ‗pseudo-gangs‘

within a specialised unit formed in Special Branch called the Special Bureau.‖ (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).

There were only six of them in the unit at the start: four Europeans and two Africans, only one of which was a

Kikuyu the other was Wa-Kamba. This was the start of a very valuable tool in the arsenal of tactics against the

insurgents because they were able to gather valuable intelligence pin-pointing the active Mau Mau gangs which was

vital to the campaign. The idea blossomed once it was found that it was not that difficult to turn captured Kikuyu and

send them back in with Kenya Police handlers or Kenya Regiment, as they spoke Kikuyu; to ensure they did not

vanish back into the forests and developed as a tactical strategy (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).

It was essential that the right people were turned and that meant selecting them carefully, according the Kitson there

was also a distinct methodology to be followed to achieve success

Briefly it is that three separate factors have to be brought into play in order to make a man change his

allegiance. First, he must be given an incentive that is strong enough to make him want to do so. This is the

carrot. Then he must be made to realize that failure will result in something very unpleasant happening to

him. This is the stick. Third, he must be given a reasonable opportunity of proving both to himself and to his

friends that there is nothing fundamentally dishonorable about his action.(Kitson, 1960, pp. 171-172)

The lessons learnt from Kenya and transferred to the Rhodesia campaign remained the domain of the Special Branch

(SB), which seems to be behind this in Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia, even though pseudo gangs were run from

within the army unit of the Selous Scouts, SB were the puppet masters maintaining control over the intelligence

gathered and used.

Although Kitson points out in his book that all the men who were used from the Kenyan Regiment spoke Swahili,

this in fact was not the language required(Kitson, 1960, pp. 120-121). My informants have indicated that in fact there

were very few white officers in the Kenya Police that spoke Kikuyu , Swahili yes, but not Kikuyu, and that is why

Ian Henderson was so important to the success of the ‗pseudo gangs‘ as he did speak Kikuyu; as did others and that

drove the operation who were drawn from predominately the Kenya Regiment (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).

The Kenyan Regiment was drawn from the settler population, hence their ability to speak local dialects such as

Kikuyu, Meru, Kamba, Luo and Kalenjin

MALAYA

The ―Emergency‘ in Malaya started in 1948 and was serious from the start unlike in Kenya with ruthless attacks on

rubber plantations, core to the war in Korea, which were well planned and executed by the Communist insurgents.

Furthermore the idea that this was a further push by International Communism against the West was taken as a very

grave threat. The Communist insurgents were well trained and had been at the back bone of defeating the Japanese.

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Now they were keen to take power reaping their reward and transform Malaya into a communist state. Initial reports

sent to London stated ―there were five thousand active fighters and 250,000 Min Yuen1 supporters in towns and

villages‖ (Barber, 1972, p. 25). There is no doubt the conflict here was far more severe than in Kenya and could

easily be described as a ‗civil war‘ from the start even though Kenya received far more press (Carruthers, 1995, p.

72).

The strategies that were developed in Malaya, separating the insurgents from their support base in the villages, and to

a large extent copied in Kenya, are continually cited by Joes as successful for counter insurgency campaigns (Joes,

2004, p. 232; Thompson, 1974). Joes and Beckett agree with this interpretation. Beckett develops the discussion

further stating that General Templer (often cited as the architect of ‗hearts and minds‘ (Beckett, 2001, p. 102) was

able to develop this strategy and to build up the critical elements that are necessary to prosecute this type of

approach: allowing the police to set up a Special Branch(SB) operation to concentrate solely on the insurgents. The

evidence analysed thus far indicates the importance of SB to the setting up of strategies to defeat the insurgents.

According to Roy Fellows the Malay Police accounted for more of the enemy, Communist Terrorists and Insurgents,

than any other force. (Follows & Popham, 1990)

Templer created a combined intelligence unit together with a staff intelligence training school; establishing a new

psychological warfare section in addition to the creation of ‗safe villages‘ which was the back bone of the strategy to

deny the rebels succour from the local population, ―the shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and

the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us‖ (Beckett, 2001, p. 102). But the development of

pseudo type gangs seems to have been very much determined by Special Branch who used every opportunity to

manipulate any captured ‗communist terrorists‘ (CT‘s), as they were known, to turn them against their erstwhile

comrades using them in a similar way to Kenya. At this stage it has not been possible to positively identify cross

fertilisation between Kenya and Malaya with the use of pseudo gangs as such, although similarities indicate this

might have occurred.

The full quote by General Templer is worth noting when he says ―the answer lies not in pouring more troops into the

jungle, but rests in the hearts and minds of the people. Winning ‗hearts and minds‘ requires understanding the local

culture.‖ (Charters & Tugwell, 1989, p. 195). It is very much this ability that comes to the fore when the running of

the pseudo type gangs is considered; the ability to understand the culture. Furthermore the ability to speak the local

language was key to the success of this type of operation in all counties, as it allowed direct conversation rather than

one that is carried out through an interpreter where there is always the chance of misinterpretation or bias creeping

in.

An important characteristic based upon the evidence indicates that there is a need for the turned ‗insurgent or

terrorist‘ to identify with the his new found allies to the point of almost becoming more anti than those they have

joined, ―they could only justify their escape from Communism by being personally involved in the struggle against

it-which is why time after time they begged to lead patrols back into the jungle to attack their former

comrades‖(Barber, 1972, p. 196).

Cline discusses the challenge of using ‗turned‘ insurgents, highlighting how using pseudo gangs creates a dilemma

when it comes to winning the psychological battle and that is the treatment of those that have changed sides. It is

paramount that all those who change sides are treated well, so that this becomes common knowledge; so that

changing sides has very positive benefits for those that chose this route. However, there was a need to keep their

identities secret or else they risk retribution from their former comrades, which did take place in many cases(Cline,

2005). This obviously presented a tactical quandary, which was only addressed with limited success. Within tribal

societies news travels fast, which will always make using pseudos a moral dilemma. ―Intelligence has to come from

the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not feel safe until the insurgent‘s

power has been broken‖(Galula, 1964, p. 96). The ability to create safe havens is central to gaining the trust of the

population.

RHODESIA

It is clear that the concept of pseudo gangs was one that was built up from previous campaigns and finding the direct

link with Kenya or Malaya has been difficult but as many of those that had been in these early campaigns; either

1 Min Yuen was the name used for the Communists. The.Min Yuen were more than just supporters. The Min Yuen

collected ―Taxes‖ from the villagers and carried out assassinations. They were the ones who instilled fear into the

local population. The MRLA were the uniformed armed wing and the Min Yuen were the plain clothed and far more

sinister wing

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returned or immigrated to Rhodesia, the transfer of such successful tactics can be traced to 1966. This was certainly

the case in Rhodesia where those who had fought in both Kenya and Malaya returned to take part in the ‗bush war‘.

In fact Ron Reid Daly was in Malaya with ‗C‖ squadron of the Rhodesian SAS, and later returned home to head the

formation of the Selous Scouts, who used the pseudo gangs as a central part of their strategy with some well

documented successes. The concept of using pseudo gangs was however put forward first by Oppie Oppenheim of

the British South African Police (BSAP) in 1966 at a joint exercise run by the Special Branch, with army observers

using troops from various units. Some of the instructors were formerly in Kenya (Stiff, 1984, p. 48),thus establishing

a link between Kenya and Malaya.

The exercise did not meet with universal approval and it was to take several more years before the concept of using

pseudo gangs was to gain wider the acceptance of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) for the Rhodesian Security

Forces. Once again it was through Special Branch of the BSAP, that the merits of this type of activity were put into

operational use, this was 26th

of January 1973. A small team of six; four former insurgents and two African Police

Constables were dressed to appear as insurgents and were sent into the field to gather intelligence(Reid Daly, 1982,

pp. 24-26).

This tactic soon started to have positive results with the army now using this idea and developing it, but with the use

of Europeans leading the groups, who were made of both former insurgents and black soldiers that formed the bulk

of Selous Scouts; headed now by Major Ron Reid Daly. It was considered essential to have this level of control to

ensure discipline and channel intelligence succinctly. This unit was to go on to make this type of activity its hall

mark throughout the ‗Bush war‖ (Reid Daly, 1982). Special Branch continued to supply intelligence and the army

the men for the operations. The core to success of these pseudo operations was the ability to morph into becoming an

insurgent; knowing the language, customs and the terrain. The difficulty was to find such people however recruits

were sourced from those who had spent a life time in the bush, such as administrators, famers and park rangers(Stiff,

1984, p. 45).

Essentially the success of these units was underpinned by their ability to roam the bush gathering intelligence and

feeding this back to their handlers in the Special Branch. Rather than the pseudo gangs taking offensive action

themselves, which could lead to them being compromised, the Rhodesians would use what was called ‗Fire Force‘

This unit was predominately the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), which employed the limited helicopter capability

they possessed (due to sanctions) to drop small sticks of soldiers and engage the enemy based on the sound

intelligence they had gleaned from the ‗pseudo gangs‘. The role of the pseudos , according to Reid Daly, was ― to

infiltrate the tribal population and terrorist networks, pinpoint the terrorist camps and bases and then direct

conventional forces in to carry out the actual attacks‖(Stiff, 1984, p. 76)

The ‗pseudos‘ also had another important role other than intelligence gathering and offensive operations, and that

was destabilisation. As the opposing forces in the Rhodesian war were made up of competing groups, based upon

tribal loyalties, there was intense rivalry between these groups namely, Zimbabwe People‘s Revolutionary Army

(ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The more it could be made to appear that one

group was cheating on the other, particularly as they also represented differing revolutionary ideologies, the more

this caused resentment and retaliation. The Selous Scouts were very successful in achieving this in their operations

often posing as one group and attacking the other. This form of psychological warfare was very effective and created

paranoia amongst the insurgents. Stiff posits that as much as 68% of the insurgents killed during the ‗Bush War‘ in

Rhodesia can be attributed either directly or indirectly to the Selous Scouts(Stiff, 1984, p. 330). ―It is in men‘s minds

that wars of subversion have to be fought‖(Mockaitis, 1999, p. 186).

The ability to play these mind games is an essential component of asymmetrical warfare; the Rhodesians followed by

the South Africans became masters of this tactic.

CONCLUSION

‗Hearts and Minds‘ is therefore far more than just a political dimension of counter-insurgency Pseudo gangs clearly

represent part of what is a suite of operational tactics designed to convince, insurgents that their path is doomed to

failure and they would be better served joining the Government forces and affecting change from the inside rather

than being killed, maimed or imprisoned.

The use of ‗pseudo gangs‘ in Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia proved to be a very successful tactic despite recent

controversy over the use of such methods in contemporary insurgencies. These tactics have a proven track record

which should be taken into consideration for modern day conflicts.

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However the success of this tactic does attest to the requirement to have a political agenda as well as a military one.

As Robert Thompson states ―the ‗First Principle‘ of counterinsurgency warfare was that the government must have a

clear political aim‖(Thompson, 1974, p. 51). This statement can be tempered with a further remark: not only must

there be a clear political aim, it must be a shared political aim with those that form the back bone of the country, as

ultimately if they do not share this aim then any military victory will prove pyrrhic; as was ultimately the case in

Rhodesia.

My ethnographic data shows that language too plays a crucial role in the ability to harness the obvious advantages

that pseudo gangs can bring to combating the insurgents. However this clearly only works if you are able to converse

directly in the local language; as a local and not as an intruder. The lessons of Kenya and Malaya were put to very

good use in Rhodesia, with most of the Security Forces utilising their local skills and linguistic prowess to the full;

speaking both Shona of ZIPRA forces and Ndebele of the ZANLA forces. The ability to conduct an interrogation

directly in the same language as the captured person allows for a greater understanding of the intelligence being

gathered. The use of an interpreter greatly disadvantages the process, as one is never sure whether what has been

interpreted is correct or whether a further slant or nuance has been placed upon the words that were not in the

original tongue. Clearly the greater the number of the counter insurgents forces that speak the local language, the

greater the advantage to the security forces.

In the final analysis, as with all counter insurgencies there is never one single tactic but a series of multiple tactics

that operate at several levels as in multiple dimensional chess. The rules of the game continually change as the world

adopts new and altered moral restraints upon what it considers to be legitimate in its efforts to win. This does not

make the situation any easier for those charged with prosecuting the insurgency, but what is obvious is that the past

will always have lessons for the future and adapting these lessons is the difference between success and failure,

countering insurgency is no different in that regard. The success of pseudo gangs has been greatly underestimated

with a need for more research to portray the value of this tactic and allow modern day strategists the option of re-

evaluating whether or not they are still a potent tool in their arsenal for fighting counter-insurgencies.

REFERENCES

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previous campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya(1948-60) and Rhodesia ( 1964-1979) ( Unpublished doctoral

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Beckett, I. F. W. (2001). Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750.

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Beckett, I. F. W., & Pimlott, J. (1985). Armed forces & modern counter-insurgency: Taylor & Francis.

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Charters, D. (1989). The British army and Jewish insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47. London: Macmillan Press in

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The Malarkey of Money Transfers:

Overlooking E-Bay whilst the Hawaladars are Hunted

David M. Cook

1,2 and Timothy Smith

1

1Edith Cowan University,

2secau- Security Research Centre

Perth, Western Australia

[email protected], [email protected]

Abstract Informal Money Transfer systems represent one of several persistent loopholes in the fight against the War on

Terror. Terrorist groups and criminal networks continue to use the Hawala system, as well as other informal

transfer systems, to escape the regulatory and administrative control of formal international banking transactions.

In an age where global financial regulation is underpinned by international agreement through Basel and others, the

ongoing use of IVTs in Australia is cause for increasing concern. Yet Hawala is only half of the informal equation.

E-bay and its associated bedfellows outstrip Hawala transfers through the same commercial imperative that drives

the modern world, simply by doing business. This paper describes the escalating risk in Australian and International

money transfers, and the need for a reconsideration of the prevention strategies that conceal the support for terrorist

and criminal activities.

Keywords Hawala, Hawaladar, Informal Value Transfer, Non Government Organisations, Islamic Banking, money laundering,

prevent strategy, eBay, Paypal

Since September 11th

2001, there has been a large focus on limiting the financing of terrorism as key to successful

prevention of a critical event (Heng & McDonagh 2009, p.53). As former US President George Bush commented

only a month later ―the first shot in the war was when we started cutting off their money, because an al-Qaeda

organisation can‟t function without money‖ (Bush, 2001). As a result of this focus Informal Value Transfer Systems

were identified as a major hole in security for any country at risk of terror attacks. What followed was a united

international movement to register and regulate all informal remittance operators to mitigate the risk of a terrorist cell

gaining its finances through any such system (AUSTRAC, 2009). While any informal system is at risk of being

abused for the purpose of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, one of the largest and easiest money

laundering systems has been overlooked to the point where, upon realisation of this major and seemingly defenceless

security loophole, any informal system loses its commercial imperative.

The security weaknesses which the authors identify in this paper are not so focused on Hawala and Hundi money

transfers, but instead depict a lack of attention paid to the online auction site eBay and its preferred method of

payment transfer, PayPal. This paper will outline an escalating risk in Australian money transfers that incorporates a

review of both Hawala-style money transfers and online mechanisms. In doing so, the need to balance the focus on

Hawala against current security weaknesses with established remittance providers such as PayPal and Western Union

becomes a matter for closer consideration. A balanced approach to the security of different money transfer systems

requires an understanding of the manner in which both Hawala and PayPal contribute to money laundering and

terrorist financing (Malkin and Elizur 2002, p61).

Informal money transfers have been repeatedly linked to the funding of terrorist attacks. The twin towers attack on

September 11th saw more than $270,000USD sent through a variety of means including formal bank transfers,

Hawala remittances, and Western Union transfer branches (NCTAUS, 2004). Hawala money transfers or Hundi, as

they are commonly described in Southern Asia, involve both legal and illegal mechanisms that are so opaque to

financial scrutiny that Hawala is considered the black sheep of the money transfer family (Heng & McDonagh,

2009). This form of money transfer involves less cost in transfer fees because Hawaladars make many transactions in

their network, without physically transferring each transaction back and forth. Instead they use a familial network of

trust that remits individual amounts to users but may balance their payouts amongst fellow Hawaladars with far less

frequency (Levi, 2007).

In the modern Western context Hawala is considered less legitimate than Western banking and transfer systems.

Historically, Hawala is closely aligned with transactions that are of middle-Eastern and south Asian origin. Many of

the regular tithes and charity donations that are prescribed as part of the Muslim faith are sent via a Hawala

transaction. Again, Hawala transfers have been linked to terrorist operations, and as a result the act of donating

money for a charitable purpose has come under fire as an easy way to disguise transfers of large sums under the

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mask of international aid (Heng & McDonagh 2009, Navias 2002). Yet by comparison with Western transfer

constructs such as PayPal, Hawala transactions receive far more discredit and mistrust than their western

counterparts. This is an interesting phenomenon, since many well-known and well documented terrorist attacks use

money laundering and transfer systems other than or in addition to Hawala systems (Acharya 2009, AUSTRAC,

2007).

INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEMS

Informal Value Transfer Systems come in many different forms from many different cultures. Such systems include

the Chinese ‗Flying Money‘, the Sanskrit based ‗Hundi‘ which means collect, and the Arabic ‗Hawala‘ which means

change or transform and trust (Perkel, 2004). The most recognised of these systems is the Arabic Hawala system

which came to notoriety after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the shutdown of al-Barakaat due to allegations

of terrorism financing (Passas, 2006). These remittance systems were originally created and used due to a lack of

any formal banking avenues with which to conduct business. As a result of this the use of IVT‘s has become

traditional and is still used today. Wide spread use of IVT‘s is especially prevalent in countries that are in or

recovering from conflict, suffer from a weak banking system, political corruption, and usually have a history of

funding terrorism (Sharma, 2006).

Systems such as Hawala are very susceptible to criminal abuse due to their informal nature. The most prominent

abuse is the laundering of money which can occur through the use of these systems in two ways, as a result of the

primary function of the system (by the customer), and in order to settle accounts between operators (Razavy, 2005,

Maimbo, 2003). The primary function of a Hawaladar is to allow access to funds from a trusted colleague or family

member, i.e. another Hawaladar, in another country or town by accepting the funds from a member of the public.

The transfer is facilitated through a phone call, email, or text message to the other operator but no funds are

physically transferred (Perkel, 2004). Any outstanding debts between operators are settled at different intervals

depending on the difference, e.g. a larger debt may be settled on the day or within a week, but smaller differences are

usually settled every month. Settling accounts can occur through a number of different avenues yet two are the most

prominent, through trade, and through formal banking avenues via satellite (Maimbo, 2003). It is the settlement

through trade that constitutes money laundering and it appears to be common for the formal system to be used as a

precursor to settling through trade in other countries, as opposed to direct transaction of money which incurs a

transaction fee (Maimbo, 2003, Ballard, 2005, Razavy, 2005).

Within Australia, the government response to informal money transfers has crossed several key milestones in

mitigating the movement of funds likely to be used for either money laundering or terrorist funded activities.

AUSTRAC has systematically blanketed a ‗Know Your Customer‘ (KYC) policy (AUSTRAC, 2009) over those

involved in any kind of remittance services as well as monitoring those working in the area of Bearer Negotiable

Instruments (AUSTRAC, 2008). In December 2006 the agency stepped up its requirements for electronic funds

transfers including non-reportable fund transfers of small amounts. In June 2007 it institutionalised a system of

AML/CTF Compliance reporting, and by December of the same year had embedded customer identification

programs across all known transfer systems. These have built onto the FTR Act of 1988 and now include the

reporting of suspicious transaction reports (SUSTRs), Wire Transfers (IFTIs), and significant cash transactions

(SCTRs), (AUSTRAC, 2007).

Yet the notion of money laundering through the practice of over invoicing, under-invoicing and the use of eBay and

PayPal for goods noted as sold but never actually sent, remains almost impossible to regulate. Within this context,

the focus on Hawaladars over and above the focus on the substantially larger volume of known eBay/PayPal dealings

indicates a rather large elephant in the room (AGD, 2010). The Australian Federal Minister for Home and Justice

announced in April 2010 the intention to strengthen the reporting and identification for remittance providers,

including a closer scrutiny of the familial networks that underpin both Asian and Middle-Eastern informal transfer

arrangements (ibid, 2010). This strengthening of reporting still fails to prevent eBay transactions for fake goods that

are sold for large sums in order to fund terrorism (Daily Mail, 2006). The issue of whether the goods sold are not

genuine or whether the goods are even sent at all is irrelevant. The current Australian Government regulations have

no verification method to determine any aspect of the arrival or acceptance of goods. Whilst AUSTRAC can

determine that a cash amount has been transferred, it cannot determine acceptance or validity of goods sent in

consideration for each remittance.

The sale of goods through informal means or by mechanisms that encourage online shopping to a global audience is

not exclusively the domain of eBay. However eBay‘s dominance of the online shopping market, and its ownership of

money transfer systems like PayPal, make it a likely target for money launderers who effectively become amateur

remitting agents for the duration of each sale (eBay, 2009). EBay is quick to explain that they do not act as financial

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agents or remitting agents, yet their transfer arm PayPal clearly operates as an enabler for hundreds of thousands of

buyers and sellers for exactly the purpose of remitting payments. Whilst this activity is broadly overlooked as too

difficult to monitor, agencies such as Australia‘s AUSTRAC are increasingly demanding more identification and

reporting metrics about each individual remitter who uses a transfer system like Western Union (AUSTRAC 2009).

PayPal appears to escape the same scrutiny because either the amounts are too insignificant or the transaction claims

some sort of legitimacy based on the pretext of a sale of ‗goods‘ that can be identified through the formalised system

of trading known as eBay.

Despite the reinforced attention on remittance providers, the inability to classify individuals within the broader

context of using eBay and PayPal transactions as remittance providers has two effects. Firstly, the increased

reporting for remittance providers makes the informal remitting agents in shops increasingly divide into two camps.

In one camp resides agents such as Australia Post with highly procedural and robust internally regulated methods for

dealing with money transfers, and in the other camp sit ad hoc businesses whose main commercial activity might be

fast food, late night grocery supplies, or small ethnically focused travel services. For these businesses in the second

camp the opportunities to offer both regulated transfers as agents for Western Union and the possibility to assist a

customer using a familial-based networked informal transfer such as Hawala must present a difficult decision.

Secondly, as this renewed focus by AUSTRAC pursues registered remitters, the number of people likely to shift to

money laundering through multiple disguised purchases on eBay and then PayPal is likely to increase (AUSTRAC,

2009).

FEAR OF TERMINOLOGY

As mentioned previously, Hawala has been identified as a priority target for counter terrorism financing (CTF) action

which has manifestly produced an international movement to regulate Hawaladars (Borgers, 2009). As a result of

this international push Hawala has become a pejorative term, shifting from its previous position of legitimacy to one

of alignment with terrorist threat, criminal activity, or underhanded dealings. The central reasons for at least some of

this perception are; that Hawaladars do not keep records in the same way that banks and other money agencies, the

familial network of trust between international and interregional Hawaladars keeps records in private, and quite often

notations are destroyed after debts are settled (Razavy, 2005).

The Hawala link to terrorism has developed a certain global notoriety that has travelled right down to alternative

remittance operators. This effect has been repeatedly demonstrated to the authors when casually enquiring about

Hawala at money transfer businesses in the Perth metropolitan area. When quizzed as to how their money transfer

service operates and whether it is anything like a Hawala system, most shop vendors‘ immediate reaction was that of

apprehension and nervousness. They generally stated that they thought Hawala was illegal in Australia and that they

know nothing about it, all the while presenting verbal and physical signs of reluctance and hesitation to continue

discussion on the matter. These anecdotal observations are merely part of the motivational pretext for some of the

inquiry that is pursued within this paper. The need for a more empirically rigorous investigation into street vendors

who might purport to offer informal money transfers is certainly acknowledged by the authors and forms one of the

key conclusions at the end of this paper. Nevertheless, there is alternate empirical evidence in the market depicting

various informal money transfer offerings that suggest that whilst Hawala (and its various aliases) operates beneath

the formalised catchment of most financial regulation in Australia, it does so in concert with other remittance

pathways. In the case of ethnic publications in print and online, the sample listed below in table 1 shows the

placement of Hawala and Western Union advertisements alongside each other, and in some cases operating within

the confines of the same business shop front.

HAWALA IN THE MARKET

At first glance, the existence of informal money transfers appears virtually non-existent in Australia. There is only

one single entry for an advertised Hawala dealer in the Australian Yellow Pages (Sensis, 2010) and no formal online

advertising for their existence in Australia. In contrast there are 20 advertised main offices for Western Union in the

Yellow Pages and more than 5000 Western Union agents actively operating in Australia (Western Union, 2010), any

of which could trade in an item (or pretend) and transfer money, and globally there are 70 million active PayPal

accounts (Parliament of Australia, 2009). Advertising for money transfers, other than formal services such as

Western Union, only shows up in foreign shops and markets operating in small precincts and cultural ghettos. There

are some mentions inside ethnic magazines printed in Australia such as the Middle East Times (Kuwait), Indomedia

(Indonesia), and the Punjab Express (India) that all refer to money transfer businesses (Community Relations

Commission, 2010). All of these put forward telephone numbers and none mention websites or in-print information

relating to their business. They remain informal insomuch as their information requires either face to face exchange

based upon telephone contact and referral.

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Formal advertising remains low, whilst word of mouth is the principal method of marketing amongst Hawala

agencies. Hawala business takes place by way of person to person contact. Michael Sanders‘ (2007, p. 792) account

of an American hawaladar working part time as a taxi driver in Washington is a useful descriptor for the informal

backgrounds that Hawaladars live by in Western nations such as the US, Australia and the UK. In these countries

there are typically no shops and no signage depicting the term ‗Hawala‘. Instead Hawaladars are blended into the

background, forming adjuncts to seemingly more legitimate shops and enterprises such as delicatessens, cafes and

bookshops (Rees, 2010). Yet despite this subterranean system that cloaks the informal movements of cash, there is a

convergence of sorts between these informal Hawala operations and the more institutionalised end of money

transfers as deployed by Western Union. Whilst the mainstream advertising pathways of Australian media seem

devoid from informal money transfer advertising, and seem only to focus on Western Union, the ethnic media papers

of Australia reveal a different story. Taking the newspaper listing from the Community Relations Commission of

New South Wales and examining each online newspaper, the authors discovered a total of 45 money transfer

advertisements. Of these 29 % were for Western Union. The remainder was of a less formal nature insomuch as the

advertisements included money transfers among a range of other non-financial services from a single vendor such as

groceries, travel services and fast food (Community Relations Commission, 2010). Table 1 depicts the various

money transfer agents that choose to advertise their wares through ethnic media within Australia.

The close grouping in ethnic publications of both Hawala-style transfers and formalized remittance systems such as

Western Union in Australia suggests that decisions about what type of transfer system takes place vary according to

each customer and the perceived risk of a transaction. At the informal adjunct end of the money transfer market

remitters will still look to Hawala-style transfers if they perceive there is no risk of prosecution. By contrast, Post

Offices in Australia will always default to their institutionalized alliance with Western Union and will follow

accepted mechanisms of reporting and identification to ensure compliance with AUSTRAC requirements.

No necessity for formal banking or finance qualifications

In Australia it is necessary for professions such as lenders, financiers, accountants, and nurses to adhere to certain

standards of qualification. For example in order to be considered an accountant it is necessary to complete a three

year undergraduate degree at least (MIT, 2010). Similarly to be a nurse and do the tasks a nurse is generally

responsible for you must have completed at least a three year Bachelor of Science in Nursing (ECU, 2010).

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Therefore without these qualifications you are unable to legally undertake such employment without proper

experience and recognition. So despite there being some notional adherence to Sharia governance and upstanding /

honorable recognition within the Muslim community, (peer, word of mouth, and or blood relations), the same

devotion to western standards and formal regulatory qualifications appears absent from those who act as Hawaladars.

But even with a standard of operation, there has still been a realization of increased risk as stated by the alternative

remittance company Western Union. In their 2010 annual investors report Western Union executives note that they

are beginning to realise the increased risk they are exposing themselves to by allowing their agents to operate

franchises without any formal qualifications (Western Union, 2010).

Hawaladars are not compelled to show any specific financial qualifications. Hawala operates under two important

umbrellas. The first is that Hawaladars build up trust with other Hawaladars over time and through repeated

transactions so that a bond of trust grows. Hawala account keeping is based upon shared trust rather than financially

regulated record keeping. The cement that bonds the numerous Hawaladars in to a trusted exchange network is

usually, or at least partly, based upon familial connections. Relatives or members of one‘s extended family ensure

that trust is kept at the highest level, and within the social codes of each Islamic community (El-Qorchi, 2002). The

second umbrella is that Hawala operates according to Sharia principles. In this sense Hawala is closely aligned with

formalized versions of Islamic Banking because it undertakes to prohibit usury and financial risk, or be used for

investments pertaining to non-Islamic vices such as alcohol, pornography or gambling (Khosrokhavar, 2009). The

Australian Government requires no formal training or qualifications for an individual or business to operate in the

area of remittances and money transfers, but does insist that each remitting party is registered and complies with the

existing regulations regarding record keeping and identification of clients (AUSTRAC, 2009).

The shift towards larger sums of money

What has for many years been depicted as low-level financial activity that allows for the remote payment of Zakat,

Islamic charity, and alms donation, now appears to facilitate the transfer of vast sums of money by NGO‘s for

disaster relief and humanitarian aid. According to Ballard (2003), the global scale of money transferred is

approximately $100,000 million per year, 60% of which flows into third world countries. It is also suggested that this

number could be underestimated by thousands of millions of dollars because many countries are incapable of making

accurate estimations about the informal/formal economic activity in their state. Maimbo (2003), states that

humanitarian aid and business transactions flowing from international sources into Afghanistan through Hawala

range from thousands up into the tens of millions to the point where Afghanistan‘s whole economy is reliant on

Hawala as its banking system. However large transfers are not restricted to conflict recovery or international

business, in fact it is quite common for Non-Government Organisations to use informal networks like Hawala to

allow access to aid funds for countries recovering from natural disasters due a loss of formal remittance avenues

(Weiss-Fagen & Bump, 2005).

It is clear that Hawala has morphed beyond the realms of mere Islamic charity and Zakat. This is reinforced by the

estimated level of remittances via IVT‘s globally, the complete economic dependence on Hawala in Afghanistan, the

extent to which NGO‘s make use of Hawala and its relative systems following disasters in order to allow access to

humanitarian aid when formal systems have failed, and the ease with which these systems are criminally abused

(Ballard, 2003, Maimbo, 2003, Weiss-Fagen & Bump, 2005, Rees, 2010)

At the other end of VT formalities, PayPal is keen to attract new transactional business amongst NGOs. Drawn by

the sheer volume of remittances, and the opportunity to enter into new market segments that are dominated by

Hawala, PayPal has developed a sister system called Webnow. This system is an offshoot of PayPal‘s Blackbaud

(2009), and is a remittance system and website combined into one unit so that NGOs can create a simple online

transaction system that is tailored for charities and NGOs so that it operates largely above the transnational fees and

charges of most IVTs. PayPal has recently (2009) moved to secure an EU (enforceable undertaking) with

AUSTRAC to ensure greater scrutiny with PayPal transactions. The key problem with this is that it targets the seller

and not the buyer. In a system where the possibility exists that goods never end up being sent, scrutiny of a seller

where the seller has established his or her legitimacy, (via means of multiple transactions and safe trading history), is

unlikely to deter future transactions where the buyer is sending the money. PayPal currently has no system for

scrutiny of ad hoc purchasing arrangements, except those transactions that are of such large amounts that they trigger

preset limits.

Hawala is likely to retain a firm foothold in countries where sophisticated financial infrastructure is reduced. In Iraq,

for example, the institutional banking system does not allow for the transfer of monies. In places where there is less

trust in the banking system, Hawala thrives (Altman, 2006). The growth of Islamic banking in general, coupled with

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the additional security of Islamic financial institutions and the commitment to Islamic banking secrecy and

confidentiality, ensures the continued expansion of Islamic funds management.

The flow of money

Regardless of whether describing a Hawala transfer, an eBay/PayPal remittance, or a Western Union transaction, the

flow of money between actors can take a variety of paths. In any of these cases, and particularly with respect to eBay

/ PayPal transactions, there is no formal mechanism for determining whether goods are dispatched or are authentic.

Genuine buyers have a mechanism for complaining, however non-genuine purchasers may pretend to receive goods

(or pretend to receive goods of a certain value), in order to effect the passage of funds in a normal manner. The sheer

volume of transactions and the global reach of eBay and PayPal make this vulnerability one which is persistent as

long as buyers remain free from the same scrutiny leveled at IVT agencies like Western Union.

Figure 1: The Flow of Money in typical IVT systems.

Source: Passas 2005 p 24.

CONCLUSION

Hawala transfers can still be exploited for the funding of terrorist organisations across international borders and

without institutionalised regulation at either end of the contract. Yet in a complex global system of countless

transactions the use of PayPal and eBay should share a commensurate amount of attention with other IVTs. The

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effort of AUSTRAC in Australia to institutionalise PayPal is commendable but largely ineffective against terrorist

laundering tactics where money is sent but no goods are transferred.

Concentrating on Hawala, whilst only glancing at eBay and PayPal is a dangerous misallocation of resources. Whilst

Hawala is undoubtedly more ethnically embedded in the broad global dispersion of al-Qaeda terrorist cells, one must

not overlook al-Qaeda‘s persistent penchant for using Western mechanisms, Western systems, and Western objects

to symbolically underpin their terrorist operations. PayPal and eBay are earmarked as controlled environments for

counter terrorist purposes. Yet given the ‗Goliath‘ status of eBay and PayPal in the global sense, and the recurring

ease with which PayPal users can send money worldwide, the notion that terrorists can transfer money in exchange

for ordinary goods that may or may not exist remains a colossal threat that dwarfs most others.

This paper has outlined the differences and similarities between a range of IVTs to raise the issue of neglected threats

from eBay and PayPal. The existing ‗prevent‘ strategies deployed by the Australian Government through AUSTRAC

and other agencies are successful in registering and collecting information about informal remittance providers. Yet

whether it is Western Union, Hawala, or PayPal, the over-riding concern is that all three of these systems represent

the ‗bread and butter‘ of informal cash movements. Where one becomes difficult the other becomes popular. Al-

Qaeda has demonstrated on repeated occasions that it can use all of these systems for funding its operations. Where

banking sophistication is low, IVTs turn to Hawala-based systems. Where internet becomes reliable, PayPal takes the

prominent role. Where operational complexity demands widespread secrecy, all three become the front-runners of an

IVT ‗mash up‘ (Medea Group, 2007). Using a combination of IVTs requires a layered approach to security.

Until eBay and PayPal are treated with the same intense scrutiny as other IVTs, there will always be a hole through

which money laundering and terrorist financing will be able to operate. The ‗Know Your Client‘ (KYC) strategy of

international banking, the adherence to enforceable undertakings, and the registration and information gathering of

IVT remittance operators is enormously important in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

However a holistic view needs greater emphasis on the registration, training and education of all remittance

providers. With informal IVT remitters there are two groups that are major participants in transfer systems, yet

remain largely invisible. The typical Western Union agent operating from ―Mandy‘s Late Night Snack Bar and

Kebabs‖ might also arrange Hawala transfers on the side. In truth she needs no formal training for either. Until

governments move past registration into the requirement for educational qualifications the proliferation of IVT

illegal transfers will continue to grow. Mandy might make tasty halal kebabs, but she could also enable better

financial practices to emerge from under the counter.

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The Piracy and Terrorism Nexus: Real or Imagined?

Karine Hamilton

Sellenger Centre

Edith Cowan University

Perth, Western Australia

[email protected]

Abstract The waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have been the location of a dramatic proliferation of

pirate activities in recent years. Security officials around the world are concerned about the risks posed by Somali

piracy to maritime shipping and to national security. These risks relate to the susceptibility of world trade shipments

to terrorist attack and to the emergence of an increasingly powerful Islamist movement in Somalia with connections

to global terrorist networks. Whilst Somali piracy has been the topic of growing media speculation, reliable

information about the phenomenon is scant. This paper reports on research conducted in Kenya where over 100

Somalis are being prosecuted for piracy. It aims to give insight into the motivations of Somali pirates and argues

that the weight of current evidence strongly suggests that piracy off the East African coast is strictly an economic

crime.

Keywords Piracy, Somalia, terrorism, maritime security

INTRODUCTION

Since 2008, piracy off the coast of Somalia has captured world headlines. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

reported 406 pirate attacks around the world in 2009, of which over half were conducted by Somalis (2009

Worldwide, 2010). In 2010, the number of Somali pirate attacks appears to have decreased slightly due to the impact

of international navy patrols off Somalia‘s coastline and also due to the use of better defences by vessels travelling

through effected waters (Pirates face, 2010). Nonetheless, Somali pirates are adjusting to naval patrols by launching

attacks in higher seas and the waters around Somalia are still the most pirate-risky in the world: 100 pirate attacks

and 27 hijackings were reported around Somalia during the first 6 months of 2010.

Most analysts and journalists have interpreted Somali piracy as an economic venture, however a significant number

have speculated that it is linked to terrorism. For example, two analysts recently wrote that ―piracy on the high seas is

currently becoming key tactics of terrorist groups – many of today‘s pirates are also terrorists with ideological bents

and a broad political agenda‖ (Hong and Ng, 2010). The sorts of maritime terrorist acts that have been hypothesised

include the use of ships as floating bombs to ram other vessels or carry explosives; attacks against ferry or cruise

ships to kill large numbers of civilians; jamming thin water passages to obstruct trade; and, causing deliberate

environmental catastrophes such as oil spills (Moller, 2009).

Both ‗piracy‘ and ‗terrorism‘ are terms that have been subject to ongoing debate about their definition and legal

meanings. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas defines piracy as any of the following acts (Moller, 2009, p. 17):

(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the

passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property

on board such ship or aircraft;

(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction

of any State.

On the other hand maritime terrorism refers to ―any illegal act directed against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew,

or against sea ports with the intent of directly or indirectly influencing a government or group of individuals‖

(Samuel Menefee cited in Valencia 2005, p. 79). These two definitions highlight that the key distinction between

piracy and maritime terrorism relates to motivation. Pirates are motivated by ―private ends‖, generally financial gain,

whilst maritime terrorists are politically motivated and they aim to influence government policy through the use or

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threat of violence. This paper argues that there is no substantial evidence to support claims that Somali pirates

maintain links, or lend support to, Somali terrorists. It draws on news reports of pirate and Islamic groups associated

with terrorism in Somalia, as well as research conducted in Kenya which involved interviewing imprisoned Somalis

accused of piracy and other key stakeholders. The first two sections of the paper provide background information

about the nature of statehood and Islamist politics in Somalia. The final section focuses on outlining the relationship

between piracy and Islamism and clarifying the motivations of pirates from Somalia.

SOMALIA: A FAILDED STATED

It is estimated that there are around 9 million people inhabiting Somalia: a semi-arid country made up of mostly

pastoralists and agriculturalists (Menkhaus, 2010). Somalia has always been one of the poorest countries in Africa

but its situation has increasingly deteriorated and for the last three years it has been ranked number one on the Failed

States Index (The Failed States Index, 2010). Most analysts link the emergence of Somali piracy with the Somali

state‘s disintegration during the early 1990s. In 1991 the ruling regime in Somalia was toppled and civil war began

(Stevenson, 2007). The civil war was an outcome of internal conflicts between different clan groups whose divisions

had been aggravated by many years and various forms of outside intervention in the country. During the colonial

period, different areas of Somalia were ruled by European powers including the British, Italians and the French.

Throughout its history Somalia has also been in conflict with its two neighbours, Ethiopia and Kenya, over certain

land areas dominated by ethnic Somalis. Somalia was also the site of superpower machinations during the Col War

period. As a result of the civil war in the early 1990s, Somalia lost a functioning central government and came to be

divided into distinct regions: Somaliland is the northernmost third that asserts its independence and is relatively

stable; adjacently Puntland maintains semi-autonomy; and at the bottom sits Jubaland.

Since the civil conflict in 1991, conflict, famine and a series of failed international interventions have created

disastrous humanitarian conditions in Somalia. The situation is particularly serious in the south-central region of the

country. Most recently, 1.5 million Somalis have become internally displaced and hundreds of thousands have either

been killed or have sought asylum in neighbouring countries due to fighting in south-central Somalia (2010

UNHRC). The fighting in this region is predominantly between the western-backed Transitional Federal

Government, deeply beleaguered and located in the capital city Mogadishu, and the forces of Islamic groups led by

Shabaab: a grouped openly aligned with Al Qaeda and the focus of American policies associated with the War on

Terror.

In contrast to the south-central areas, Somaliland and Puntland are relatively stable and are run by functioning

administrations. Somaliland seceded in 1991 though its independence has never received formal international

recognition. Somaliland is economically booming and is one of the most democratic areas in Africa (Economic

success, 2007). Neighbouring, Puntland is an autonomous zone that was created in 1999 and is not as functional as

Somaliland but also has a booming commercial economy, especially in the port city of Bosaso where large numbers

of livestock and people come and go between Somalia and the Gulf countries.

Understanding the different regions of Somalia is significant because piracy is not a Somali-wide phenomenon. It is

planned and operated from particular areas. For example, the ports of Somaliland have never had hijacked ships

anchored in them and pirate attacks launched from Somaliland shores have averaged 1 every two years since 1999

(Hansen, 2009). The administration in Somaliland has responded to pirate groups in their organisational phase and

have ultimately been successful in controlling piracy. On the other, Puntland is the area most strongly associated

with piracy. Authorities in Puntland had hired a British security organisation to train a coast guard, but the

involvement of a foreign group was locally unpopular and a Puntland coastguard never eventuated. Moreover,

Puntland authorities were unable to fund local law enforcement during 2008 which allowed criminal gangs like

pirates to operate and develop their resources. In short, piracy is specific to certain areas in Somalia and so far, these

areas have been quite separate from the emergence and dominance of the Islamic terrorist group Shabaab.

ISLAM IN SOMALIA: A “VEIL LIGHTLY WORN”

Somalia is the only country in the Horn of Africa that is nearly exclusively Islamic, over 99% of Somalis are Muslim

and most of them are of the Sunni sect (World Trade Press, 2010). Historically, the strand of Islam which took root

in Somalia differs significantly from other more rigid forms of Islam in the world, such as those associated with

Saudia Arabia and Al Qaeda (ie. Wahabbism).

Islam in Somalia has been described as a ―veil lightly worn‖ (Menkhaus, 2002, p. 111). It is part of everyday life and

family traditions in Somalia but there is no culture of religious zeal. Moreover, most Somalis view attempts to

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establish Islam as a form of governance in their country with suspicion or as an Arab intrusion that encroaches on

their independence. There is no natural affiliation between Somalis and Arabs but instead Somalis are touchy about

what they perceive to be patronising attitudes directed at them from Arabs. When contrasted to its neighbours, Kenya

and Ethiopia, Somalia has not generated an equivalent radical Islamic politics that has emerged in these countries.

Kenya and Ethiopia have much high numbers of Christians and religious divisions between Christians and Muslims

in these countries have given shape to more politically active and intense forms of Islam (Menkhaus, 2002). In

contrast, Somalis predominantly draw their political motivations from their clan identities and throughout Somalia‘s

history Islam has been secondary to clan relations and identities.

Despite this historical picture of Islam as a relatively apolitical cultural practice in Somalia, observers note that since

the fall of the Somali state in 1991 Islam has clearly taken a more visible role on the Somali political stage

(Menkhaus, 2002). Its appeal largely rests with people‘s discontent with existing political structures, the primacy of

the clan system, prevalence of corruption and repression, and limited job opportunities. In the initial phase of state

disintegration during the early 1990s, Islamic activists (Muslim brotherhood and later called al-Ittihad or AIAI and

made up of educated young men who had studied in the Middle East) tried to seize some strategic areas but were

easily defeated in some parts of Somalia and successful in others. Islamic forces that came to rule town and ports

were actually acknowledged by domestic and international observers as much fairer than other Somali militia forces

and they were also much more effective at providing locals with security.

Aside from AIAI, other Islamic activists also provided genuine humanitarian assistance to the Somali population and

a variety of Islamic institutions were able to step in and provide for people‘s needs including schooling, medical care,

and aid (Menkhaus, 2002). The other key developments of Islamism in Somalia during the 1990s was the emergence

of a system of local Sharia courts. These Islamic courts were formed by local businessmen and clan elders who

wanted to reinstate order following the loss of government and the rule of law. This rough sketch of Islam as it

emerged in Somalia over the 1990s is emphasising that its growth reflected local needs for alternatives to existing

authorities and for greater order and security. Its growth over this period did not reflect a hardline Islamic movement

that sought to impose an Islamic republic in Somalia or take on the West in part of a wider global jihad.

The September 11 attacks against America in 2001 however, generated much speculation amongst American policy-

makers and security analysts that Somalia represents a threat to world security due to its status as a failed state and

thus as a real or potential haven for global terror networks like Al Qaeda (Afyare Abdi Elmi, 2010). These concerns

appear to hold some legitimacy in light of the recent ascendancy of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group called Al Shabaab

(the youth), which currently controls most of south-central Somalia. South Central Somalia is supposed to be

governed by a Transitional Federal Government which was formed in 2004 during an internationally-sponsored

reconciliation conference. The TFG however, has always been weak and lacking in local legitimacy. One of the

TFG‘s main sources of disconnect from local communities in Mogadishu was its leader‘s (Abdullahi Yusuf) staunch

opposition to most forms of Islamic organisation, such as Islamic schooling and hospitals.

When American officials approached the TFG and asked it to help capture Al Qaeda operatives thought to be hosted

by local Islamic Somali groups, the TFG divided internally between those who agreed to America‘s request and

those who were opposed to it (Menkhaus, 2008). The TFG group who agreed to the request formed the Alliance for

the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, and they came into direct conflict with Islamic activists who

defeated the Alliance and effectively ended TFG rule. In the place of the TFG, the Islamic Courts Union (coalition of

various Islamic groups) arose and took control of Mogadishu and south-central Somalia in 2006. The ICU was

quickly recognised domestically and internationally as a highly successful administration in terms of the provision of

security and stability. Unfortunately, some of the ICU leadership were politically uncompromising and aggressive in

terms of their attitude to Somalia‘s long-standing enemy- Ethiopia. At the end of 2006, Ethiopia, with the backing of

America, responded by invading Somalia, removing the ICU and occupying Mogadishu. On the heels of Ethiopia‘s

invasion, the formerly banished Transitional Federal Government returned to Mogadishu to take over governance

whilst being propped up by Ethiopian military support.

Since 2007, the TFG has engaged in an ongoing battle with local Islamic opposition groups who are opposed to the

TFG and the intrusion of foreign parties, Ethiopia and America (Menkhaus, 2008). These battles have been

especially devastating for civilian communities who have been displaced in their hundreds of thousands, killed,

injured and now lack access to basic needs such as jobs, water, homes and food. Against this backdrop of foreign

intrusion, the Islamic group Al-Shabaab has arisen to prominence and this is the group which journalists and analysts

regularly speculate is connected to piracy. Al Shabaab was first created n 2003/4 and included a few hundred

militiamen who had been a hardline group within the Islamic Courts Union. The group was able to assert itself at the

forefront of the local insurgency against the Ethiopian presence. By the end of 2008, Al Shabaab had taken control

over most of south Somalia and soon after Ethiopian troops withdrew (January 2009).

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Since its original formation as a strictly local Islamic group in the early 2000s, some of Al-Shabaab‘s leaders have

gone on to declare their alliance with Al Qaeda (2007) and have hosted foreign Al Qaeda operatives (Menkhaus,

2008). The group though contains many non-committed militiamen who work for pragmatic, as opposed to

ideological or religious, reasons and many openly oppose dealings with Al Qaeda. Those Al Shabaab leaders who

maintain a connection with Al Qaeda are motivated by their internal weakness in Somalia: most Somalis are not

especially fond of Al Shabaab because of its social conservatism (its attempts to impose strict Islamic laws): Shabaab

has banned smoking, watching soccer during the World Cup, moustaches, bras, music (Hartley, 2010). Shabaab is

also association with a foreign power, which has created the view amongst Somalis that it is a puppet for outside

interests. Unlike other Islamic groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, Shabaab is not so much in a position of

political control or influence in Southern Somalia which is still run by clan authorities. Al-Shabaab cemented its

standing as an international terrorist group when it carried out bombings in Uganda during the recent World Cup,

which killed over 70 people in an Ethiopian restaurant and a sports arena (Al-Qaida-linked militants; Gyezaho &

Dixon, 2010). The group claimed that the attacks were directed against Ethiopia and were also retaliation for the

presence of Ugandan peace keeping forces who were defending the TFG.

ISLAMISTS AND PIRATES IN SOMALIA

Any connection between pirates and terrorism must account for the nature of Islam in Somalia as outlined above.

Even though certain elements within Shabaab are increasingly aligning their objectives with Al Qaeda, the affiliation

between the two groups is loose. On the whole, the rise of Shabaab and its use of violence internally and abroad

largely relates to Somalia‘s domestic and regional conflicts rather than to the conflict between America and Al

Qaeda. Hence even in the event that a connection between piracy and Shabaab was confirmed, it would not

automatically relate to the global war on terror.

Regardless, a connection between pirates and terrorism has never been clearly established. Geographically, pirates

and Islamists are largely based separately from each other. The Shabaab operates in south-central Somalia and the

pirates are mostly based further along the coast, especially around Puntland in northern Somalia. The occasions that

pirates and Islamists have had contact have shown that any relationship between them is one of dispute and

confrontation. The period during which the Islamic Courts Union came to power in Mogadishu during 2006

effectively ended piracy in the region. The ICU publicly outlawed piracy and declared it as Haraam or anti-Islamic:

threatening death or amputation for any Somali caught in the act of piracy. The ICU initiated an offensive against

ports used by pirates which led to pirates being injured, expelled or left in hiding. Pirate attacks from the area had

averaged around 40 a year prior to the ICU and none were recorded whilst the ICU was in power (Freeman, 2008).

The Ethiopian intervention which terminated ICU enabled pirate groups to regroup.

There are other instances of open dispute between Islamists and pirates in Somalia. In 2008, pirates captured the

Sirius Star a super-tanker from Sauid Arab that was carrying 100 million dollars worth of crude oil. The Islamic

Courts Union condemned the capture as a ―major crime‖ (Karon, 2008). More vehemently a Shabaab leader

informed journalists that "Saudi is a Muslim country, and it is a very big crime to hold Muslim property … I warned

again and again, those who hold the ship must free it unconditionally or armed conflict should be the solution. If they

don't free the ship, we will rescue it by force" (Karon, 2008). One of the pirates involved clarified with a journalist

that: "Every Somali has great respect for the holy kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We have nothing against them but

unfortunately what happened was just business for us and I hope the Saudis will understand" (Freeman, 2008). The

Shabaab sent armoured vehicles loaded with armed fighters to the pirate‘s base, the port town Harardhere, and the

pirates fled to avoid direct confrontation. The incident highlights the economic motivations behind piracy and the

hostility between pirates and Islamists in Somalia.

More recently, in April of this year (2010), the chief pirate base Harardhere (located mid-way along the Somali

coast) was taken over by the Islamic group Hizbul Islam, which is Shabaab‘s main rival. Shabaab itself had tried to

take the port town but locals instead invited Shabaab‘s rival Hizbul Islam who proceeded to drive pirates out of the

town. A Hizbul Islam member was quoted: ―Piracy has become too much. It‘s an anti-Islamic business, and we

won‘t accept it … We want to bring law and order to that country of Somalia, and we want to show the good name of

Somalis‖ (Wadhams, 2010). Both Shabaab and Hizbul Islam were angered by recent pirate attacks on Indian ships

which had disrupted the flow of further Indian cargoes into Somalia; ships that had been an important source of

revenue by way of port tariffs in Islamic controlled ports. Essentially, Islamic groups want to rid coastal towns of

pirates in order to secure an important revenue stream in the form of ship tariffs. In the nearby coastal town in which

the pirate fled to, Hobyo, pirates were recently enlisted by local officials to act as an armed defence against Shabaab

and Hizbul Islam. Pirate leaders in Hobyo claim to have deliberately amassed a significant on land arsenal of

militiamen and weapons in order to ward off Shabaab and Hizbul Islam (Gettleman, 2010).

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While conducting research in Kenya where over 100 Somalis accused of piracy are currently imprisoned and

undergoing prosecution, I found general consensus that Somali piracy was unrelated to Islamic politics and was

instead strictly an economic crime (Kontorovich, 2010; Treves, 2009). The main aim of the research was to interview

imprisoned Somalis in order to understand their motivations for piracy, however all but one of them refused to admit

to engaging in piracy and instead claimed to be either fishermen or people smugglers. Almost all of the prisoners

interviewed came from Bosaso, which is Somalia‘s chief port city located in Puntland and is known for its fishing

and illegal immigrant industries. A small number of the pirates came from in or around Mogadishu. Aside from

these imprisoned Somalis accused of pirates, we spoke to other key stakeholders such as European Union personnel

and Kenyan police and judicial officials involved in prosecuting pirate cases.

In general, talking to Kenyans about the purpose of my research, it was obviously common knowledge that the

Somali community was financially benefitting from the pirate industry. Kenyans, and Somalis, were quick to point to

flash new residential homes known to be owned and inhabited by Somalis and explained that it was usual for

Somalis to buy whole apartment buildings at exorbitant prices and then demolish and rebuild from scratch. The

money financing these redevelopments was understood to partly come from piracy which was only ever spoken

about in terms of its obvious financial profits for Somalis.

People more directly involved with the prosecution of pirate cases in Kenya concurred. The police officer in charge

of investigating pirate cases in Kenya explained that ―these people are looking for money‖ (Personal communication,

June, 2010). A British naval officer stationed in Kenya stated that ―I would suspect that they [Somali pirates] see it as

business‖ (Personal communication, June, 2010). This Naval Officer and an EU appointed lawyer who liaised with

Kenyan judicial officials had both debriefed hostages after their release from Somali pirate captors and none had ever

indicated that their Somali captors are motivated by anything other than economic consideration. According to the

EU lawyer,

apparently some of the pirate guards are quite vocal about talking with the hostages and its frankly to get

them and their families out of Somalia and to another country, … I want to make this much and then I will

get out. (Personal communication, June, 2010)

In his role, he never came across a hostage who heard their Somali captors make reference to any ideological or

religious motivations for their actions, rather they confided to the hostages that they wanted to improve their lives.

The one Somali prisoner in Kenya who admitted to being a pirate during interviewing corroborated this picture by

stating that his chief concern was to get a proper education whilst he was in jail, principally he was keen to learn

English as the international language. He wanted to leave prison in a better position to make something of his life

and he was motivated by wanting a better life.

The navy officer who likewise had spoken to hostages post-release concurred that Somali pirates were quite talkative

about their motivations to their hostages and they never mentioned Islam or wider conflicts between East and West.

Instead, Somali captors told their hostages that ―they wanted to get x thousand, x one thousand dollars, uh false

documents cost this much, however there are so many members of my family‖ (Personal communication, June,

2010). In short, Somalis in communication with their hostages made it clear that they were seeking money in order to

better their lives. In terms of pirate attitudes towards their hostages, there was mistreatment but not of a systematic

directed kind, more along the lines of not allowing them to shower and keeping them in cramped living spaces.

Injuries and fatalities amongst hostages have been accidental. Whilst pirates treat their hostages badly as a way of

putting pressure of ransom payments, they are quiet strict about not harming the hostages and compromising ransom

payments. For these reasons, the individuals involved in prosecuting Somalis accused of piracy all took the view that

pirates were motivated by financial gain and that the phenomenon of piracy from Somalia was strictly an economic

crime.

CONCLUSION

Current knowledge about the nature of terrorism and piracy in Somalia all point toward the conclusion that the two

phenomenon are distinct from each other both in terms of geography and practice. Moreover the history of Shabaab,

the Islamic group most strongly associated with terrorism, shows that it emerged and developed quite separately

from piracy in Somalia. Shabaab‘s recent alliance with Al Qaeda remains disputed within the group itself which

means that establishing a clear connection between Somali pirates and Shabaab does not necessarily entail an

obvious link between piracy and the War on Terror. So far, Shabaab‘s agendas have clearly curtailed piracy

whenever it has come into a position of power within a pirate-active location. Overall, the two groups appear more in

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competition with each other over access to ports and money than they appear in any form of cooperation. The

research that I conducted in Kenya, whilst obviously restricted by the informal nature of my sources of information,

likewise indicated that Somali piracy is unrelated to terrorism and stems from financial ambitions.

REFERENCES

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Elmi, A. A. (2010). Revisiting United States policy toward Somalia. In M. S. Smith (Ed.), Securing Africa: Post-9/11

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Freeman, C. (2008, November 23). Pirates on Saudi oil tanker face ultimatum from Islamists. The Telegraph.

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Hansen, S. J. (2009). Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, misconception and remedies. Norwegian Institute

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Menkhaus, K. (2002). Political Islam in Somalia. Middle East Policy 9, 109-123.

Moller, B. (2009). Piracy, maritime terrorism and naval strategy. Retrieved January 20, 2010, from the Danish

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Pirates face new resistance as navies strike back, says IMB. (2010, 15 July). International Chamber of Commerce

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Review: Disillusionment with Radical Social Groups

Kira J. Harris

secau – Security Research Centre

School of Computer and Security Science

Edith Cowan University

Perth, Western Australia

[email protected]

Abstract Disengagement from radical social groups is a complex process initiated by the experience of a crisis, or

disillusionment causing a re-evaluation of involvement. This paper provides a review of the experiences that hinder

group involvement and increases the likelihood of disengagement. Utilising the categorisation by Klandersman

(2005) and Demant et al. (2008a), the factors are discussed under the themes of normative, affective, and

continuance. Normative factors rely on the ideological premise to ensure membership is viewed as a moral

obligation, while the affective factors incorporate the social and organisational aspects facilitating emotional

attachment to the group, and continuance factors are those influencing the cost and benefits of group involvement.

Commitment to radical social groups becomes vulnerable when the material, psychological and communal benefits

of membership are outweighed by the resources required for association and the inability to achieve desirable

outcomes.

Keywords Disengagement; Disillusionment; Extremism; Radical social groups

INTRODUCTION

Research on the defection from religious groups, cults, gangs and criminal organisations indicate similar contributing

factors to disengagement despite differing ideologies (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Fink & Hearne, 2008). The

operational definition of disengagement within this paper is characterised by Fink and Hearne (2008), and Bjørgo

and Horgan (2009) as a behavioural change resulting in the exit from a radical social group (characterised as secular

and cohesiveness, ethnocentric, totalitarian and with a propensity for violence), notwithstanding any cognitive shifts,

or deradicalisation. Models of disengagement by Skonovd (1979, April) and Ebaugh (1988) emphasise how members

experience a crisis or disillusionment causing doubts to arise and the re-evaluation of membership (Fink & Hearne,

2008; Mellis, 2007; Mushtaq, 2009; Wright, 1987). This cognitive opening begins the psychological process for

possible disengagement by allowing alternative viewpoints and lifestyles to be considered. As a break down in the

insulation from the outside world occurs, disengagement can be accelerated when combined with social and

economic support, education and counselling. As the initiating stage of the process, it is imperative to the study of

disengagement to identify the reasons for disillusionment caused by the incongruence between the individual‘s

expectations and the reality of membership, whereby the discrepancies between the two do not align forcing

membership to be viewed as less meaningful (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Dechesne, Janssen, & Van Knippenberg,

2000; Demant, Slootman, Buijs, & Tillie, 2008b). For some, the disillusionment gradually builds until the desire to

disengage exists, for others, there can be a singular catalytic event prompting a more abrupt psychological

disengagement. The aim of this paper is to identify and review the contributing factors towards disillusionment with

radical social groups in the literature.

CATEGORISING THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF DISENGAGEMENT

The process of disengagement is inherently complex and multi-layered, influenced by an amalgamation of issues and

personal factors compounding on the individual. Bjørgo (2002, June; 2005, 2009) discusses the causes of

disengagement in terms of ‗push‘ and ‗pull‘ factors; that is, negative social forces which make membership

unattractive, and factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative. The effects of push factors can be

difficult to predict as negative sanctions can lead members to disengage or have the converse effect by increasing the

group‘s solidarity and cohesiveness (Bjørgo, 2005). Demant et al. (2009) noted influences causing individuals to

defect involved complex psychological processes rarely operating in isolation, allowing both push and pull factors to

co-exist, and the difficulties in effectively measuring each factor. Building on Bjørgo‘s foundation, Klandermans

(2005) and Demant et al. (2008a, 2008b) compartmentalise individual disengagement factors into three components

– normative, affective, and continuance ( see Table 1.). These categorisations coincide with previous literature (Allen

& Meyer, 1990) focusing on the psychological states of organisational commitment where all categories are

influential in the decision to disengage, and its ensuing success. In short, strong affective commitment allows

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members to stay because they want to, strong continuance commitment encourages members to stay because they

need to, and strong normative commitment causes members to stay because they feel they ought to (Allen & Meyer,

1990).

Table 1

Normative, Affective and Continuance Factors Contributing to Disengagement

Normative: Affective: Continuance:

Ideology is no longer

appealing

Disappointment in movement Cost of membership

Change in individual‘s

viewpoint

Frustration with group

dynamics

Longing for ordinary life

Desired future is not

achievable

Disloyalty between members Negative social sanctions

Rejection of means to

achieve goals

Mutual competition,

contempt and distrust

between members

Competing social

relationships

Failing leadership

NORMATIVE

The normative factors rely on the ideological premise of the group to maintain commitment and ensure membership

is viewed as a moral obligation (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Klandermans, 1997). The ideology provides a constructed

model of beliefs, aims and ideas to direct one‘s goals, expectations and actions. It offers a set of ideals, principles or

symbols to explain how society should function, and for distinct radical social groups, combines a collectively

defined grievance, with a clear definition of those responsible – producing an ‗us against them‘ mentality and

fostering moral outrage (Klandermans, 1997). As an alternative ideology, the adopted beliefs can instigate collective

action for the intent to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing power system to uphold ideological values

(Dechesne et al., 2000; Demant et al., 2008a).

The alignment between individual and group ideologies is positively correlated with normative attachment, and

corresponding disengagement is an indication of failings in the group‘s ideology that makes membership and world-

view unattractive (Demant et al., 2008b). When no longer provided with a satisfying world-view, meaning to the

existing order, a desirable future or a means to achieve this future, the member has an increased susceptibility to

alternative options (Demant et al., 2008a). While the changes to the individual‘s perception and acceptance of the

group‘s ideological basis can lead to the rejection of radical views, it is more common for the changes in belief and

value systems to occur after disengaging from the group (Horgan, 2005).

Lose faith in ideology

The experience of self-doubt in aspects of the ideology can motivate the individual to view one‘s beliefs, and what

the group is fighting for, as morally or politically wrong (Horgan, 2005). A failure to provide meaning or response

to the member‘s concerns causes further doubts in the relevance of the group, as can the perceived lack of success in

achieving the ideologically stated goals. When the individual‘s needs and motives no longer coincide with what the

ideology is able to provide, the individual is more likely to disengage and deradicalise, or seek out an alternative

group more suited to the individual‘s needs (Demant et al., 2008b). A study of three separate radical movements by

Demant et al. (2008a) unveiled causes for the loss of faith in group ideologies; the changes in interpretation by the

consensus, inconsistencies between aims and ideals between members, and the inability to implement a politically

acceptable ideology that is radical enough for extreme members. As the movement evolves into a political influence,

the radical ideological beliefs previously imposed on members may be compromised to appeal to a greater audience

and gain greater community support. As a consequence, the member may find the ideological impetus for radical acts

no longer exists, or may view the group as ‗selling out‘ and seek an alternative radical group to engage with

(Noricks, 2009).

Rommelspacher (2006) argues interactions that disrupt the group‘s world-view, and provide alternative explanations

perceived as justifiable, can have a significant influence on the member‘s disengagement process. This cognitive

disruption can also be caused by interactions with others who do not comply with the ideology or conform to existing

stereotypes. The result of the inconsistencies between ideology and personal experience can alter the view of society

(or the segment of the community) as the enemy. For example, Johnny Clarry, the ex-Grand Imperial Wizard of the

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Ku Klux Klan refers to the meetings with African-American Reverend Wade Watts, where his expectations of the

‗enemy‘ were shattered, ―and then when Reverend Wade Watts was being kind to me - and he outsmarted me in that

debate, I started realising that maybe not all white people were superior to black people‖ (Denton & Jacoby, 2005,

Septemper 5). Despite attempts to demonise Watts, Clarry notes the conflict in his expectations and experiences

acted as a trigger to questioning his beliefs. This was also supported by Garfinkel‘s (2007) study where ethnocentric

beliefs were challenged by compassion from the despised out-group, conflicting with their endorsed stereotypes.

Although, as conveyed by Garfinkel (2007), this disruption only occurs if the recipient has the humility and courage

to accept previously held beliefs may be flawed.

The self doubt in the group‘s ideology can lead to questioning the validity of the group and if it is unable to address

these concerns through dialogue or attempts to address the grievance, the member is at risk of disengaging. However,

while normative factors may be perceived as deficient, interactions can be maintained due to affective and

continuance factors, as discovered by Photiadis‘ (1965) study of Mormon commitment and conformity. Participation

on a social level provided greater influence on commitment and conformity to group norms, independent of

ideological differences. Thus, despite doubts in the ideological basis for the group, disengagement can be

significantly inhibited by social and lifestyle benefits of commitment.

Frustration at lack of success

Socialisation into radical groups requires a high level of commitment and enforces a collective identity where group

ideology and goals are fused with the individual‘s identity (Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003). As a consequence, the

inability to distinguish between goals means success or failure is taken personally with emotional reactions of shame

and guilt. Failed radical attempts at altering the status quo, and the realisation that despite the personal sacrifice of

group commitment and acting in the most extreme, the desired goal is no closer, produces a demotivating effect and

uncertainty regarding the group‘s radical actions (Demant et al., 2008a; Fink & Hearne, 2008). Failure at achieving

ideological success generates a diminished sense of urgency and the realisation that initial aspirations associated with

membership are removed from day-to-day responsibilities of the adopted role. When the individual determines their

investment has been quite substantial, yet the goal remains a distant realisation, the probability of defection is

heightened (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Horgan, 2005; Wright, 1987).

The effects of failure have been measured in mainstream contexts with Snyder, Lassegard and Ford‘s (1986) study of

successful and unsuccessful university groups. Participants led to believe they had failed a task displayed less interest

in participating in future group activities and were less inclined to self-identify with the group, while the opposite

effect occurred for successful groups. The social distance between the individual and group failure serves as a

strategy to avoid negative evaluation and protects self-esteem. However, De Cremer and van Dijk‘s (2002) found

when negative feedback on group performance was provided, only those with salient personal identities (as opposed

to salient collective identities) would reduce contribution to the group, proposing group failure is only precursor to

disengagement for individuals without a salient group identity. When distancing is observed by core members, the

attempts to restore the self identity at the expense of the collective is viewed as a lack of commitment and disloyalty

(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). At this point, members with salient personal identities, and behave

with greater self-interest, are more likely to be rejected and/or expelled by group members with greater salient

collective identities (Branscombe et al., 1999).

Rejection of violence

Arguably, the most common reason for leaving radical social groups is the personal or indirect experiences of

violence due to extremist ideologies and hatred (Fink & Hearne, 2008; Horgan, 2005; Noricks, 2009). The

underlying reasons for rejecting violence can be of an ideological, strategic or organisational nature (Demant et al.,

2008a). The ideological rejection of violence includes the individual‘s attitudes and morals surrounding violence,

such as violence is inherently bad or creates undesired animosity. Strategically, violence is no longer seen as a

successful method to achieving desired outcomes, and finally, the influence of violence on the organisation, such as

in-group violence causing fragmentation within the movement. These violent stresses can lead to the rejection of

violence and the rejection of the social group, causing disillusionment and an increase propensity for disengagement.

While disengaging does not determine the violent behaviours of the individual, the rejection of violent means to

achieve ideological aims is considered part of the deradicalisation process.

Husain (2007) details the horror experienced with the death of an innocent life and the realisation of the violent

situation he had helped create. The halaqah endorsed the belief the life of a kafir is inconsequential in accomplishing

Muslim dominance and Husain experienced anxiety over the method of violence. Rommelspacher‘s (2006; as cited

in Demant et al., 2008a) study into German right-wing extremists found confrontation with violence caused some of

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the movement‘s members to rethink involvement because of the view ‗it was taken too far‘. Supporting the

experience of violence as a precipitating factor to disengagement includes the analysis of the Moluccan and

squatter‘s movements (Demant et al., 2008a), and gangs in America (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996), whereby the

personal confrontation with violence contributed considerably to the decline of group membership. Decker and Van

Winkle‘s (1996) interviews with ex-members from St Louis‘ street gangs found experiences of violence, directly or

indirectly, to be a consistent reason for disengagement, with the period immediately after the violent confrontation

being the most susceptible for cognitive shifts. However, intervention must be swift to prevent the solidarity imposed

by the gang‘s interpretation of the violence as favourable.

AFFECTIVE The affective factors are the social and organisational aspects facilitating or impeding emotional attachment to the

group, and are central to an individual‘s propensity to maintain affiliations even when ideological differences are

present. This affective attachment incorporates psychological investment to the group, emotional attachment to the

group‘s goals and values, as well as the individual‘s role (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Feeling competent and comfortable

in a role within the group is arguably the strongest antecedent to emotional attachment.

A positive correlation exists between affective attachment to the collective and the identification and involvement,

and conversely, disappointment with intra-group interactions can weaken commitment and willingness to participate

(Demant et al., 2008a; Klandermans, 1997). The failure in organisational capacity results in the group‘s inability to

fulfil social and cultural functions or utilise sufficient new sources (Demant et al., 2008a). Affective commitment is

subjected to dual processes; whereby reduction influences the member‘s perspective and highlights perceived

deficiencies in normative and continuance spheres, or the reduction may be a consequence of an existing deficit.

Failing group interaction

Radical social groups adopt various organisational structures; from fixed, hierarchal organisations with authoritarian

leaders, to fluid and decentralised networks, yet all are susceptible to negative organisational factors which influence

both maintenance and disengagement with intra-group relationships. Whether formally recognised or not, each

member is assigned status where leaders are viewed as ‗exemplary‘, and ethically and morally consistent with the

group‘s ideals and goals, and group members who do not uphold the prototypical characteristics are viewed as less

worthy, causing internal conflict (Demant et al., 2008a). Internal conflicts such as power plays, competition between

members and disloyalty can dishearten members, and rejection or receiving negative feedback from the collective

can cause personal uncertainty regarding acceptance (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Branscombe et al., 1999; Demant et

al., 2008a; Horgan, 2005). The antagonism within members can produce paranoia and, in terms of radical groups,

fears of infiltration from rival groups or authorities. The mutual competition, contempt and distrust can cause

disillusionment as the individual does not achieve the level of security expected when joining (Bjørgo & Horgan,

2009).

Rejection from the group can be perceived as a threat of expulsion, the removal of membership status, or the

unwillingness of the group to accept the individual as a prototypical member of the group (Branscombe et al., 1999).

The strength of identification with the group will determine the individual‘s reaction. Members low in identification

may disidentify in anticipation of further rejection, maintaining self-esteem by attaching a positive emotional

response to their non-prototypical identity and applying a self-categorisation into a group interpreted as a ‗better

match‘. Those high in identification are more likely to experience low self-esteem as they continue to admire

prototypical members and view themselves unfavourably (Branscombe et al., 1999). The interpretation of rejection

from the social group renders disengagement and intervention more practical for members with low identification.

Failing leadership

Jacob‘s (1987) interviews with voluntary religious defectors emphasised four sources for disillusionment with the

leader; physical abuse, psychological abuse, emotional rejection, and spiritual betrayal. The study indicated

psychological abuse and emotional rejection were the predominant causes of disillusionment, with rejection derived

from unfilled expectations of the spiritual god or the affective relationship between leader and follower. The spiritual

betrayal is linked to the leader not fulfilling expectations of a moral and pious lifestyle. As leaders are representative

of the prototypical member or presented as the ‗hero‘ for members to admire, inconsistencies between leaders and

group ideals, or the message propagated can lead to the interpretation of the ideology and methods to achieve goals

as insincere (Demant et al., 2008a; Rommelspacher, 2006; Wright, 1987). The double standards in lifestyle

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regulations between leaders and members can lead to resentment and cause doubts in the sacrifices required to

achieve group goals (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009).

Members can also become disillusioned by the inability of leaders to provide sufficient direction and focus, or adapt

to changing circumstances and inspire members (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al., 2008a; Fink & Hearne,

2008). A lack of leadership and political influence structurally can cause member‘s to doubt the group‘s capability to

achieve societal change (Demant et al., 2008a). While this may be a reason for departing the social group, it can also

cause members to seek out another, more radical, social group.

CONTINUANCE

Continuance commitment is the awareness of consequences and personal costs associated with leaving, and are

linked to the practical life circumstances making membership attractive or unattractive (Allen & Meyer, 1990;

Klandermans, 1997). Two factors influence the strength of continuance commitment: the degree of investment to the

role and group, and the perceived lack of viable alternatives. The individual interprets a profit associated with

maintaining participation, and a cost associated with leaving, thus, any changes to the social identity are viewed with

the knowledge of negative consequences and penalties (Becker, 1960; Demant, Wagenaar, & van Donselaar, 2009;

Klandermans, 1997). Demant et al. (2008a) proposes continuance factors only play a supporting role, providing

extra motivation to the normative and affective factors of disengagement. Only when practical life circumstances

become prominent and provide a negative variant, such as outside pressure and stigmatisation, does it have a direct

role in disengagement.

Maturation

Some radical social groups tend to consist of young participants and furthermore, Weinberg (2008) argues the longer

the organisation exists, the younger the recruits become. In comparison to the founding generation, Weinberg (2008)

suggests youthful members are less ideologically or religiously sophisticated, lack an understanding of the long term

purposes of the organisation, and are typically ‗looking for action‘. While street gangs and racist groups can reflect

this analysis, Weinberg‘s (2008) argument conflicts with Sageman (2004, 2005) and Horgan‘s (2008) study of

terrorism with the average age of Jihadis to be 26, and 25 for al-Qaeda – well past adolescence. The opposite is also

true for one percent motorcycle clubs as Veno (2003) asserts the average age in the 1980‘s was approximately 25

years old, but demographic changes has seen the average age rise to the late 30‘s.

Despite older cohorts, the effects of aging within a radical lifestyle are still influential in the practicality of group

involvement. Veno (2003) notes as members of the one percent motorcycle clubs age, participating in group

activities becomes increasingly difficult; for example the inability to handle the cultural symbol Harley-Davidsons,

opting for trikes or cars, or the inability to endorse ‗hard living‘ lifestyle of alcohol and partying. The isolation of the

groups from institutions can result in members avoiding medical treatment, and in the case of one percent motorcycle

clubs, years of harmful lifestyle choices can lead to medical conditions preventing further involvement in group

events and celebrations (Veno, 2003).

In consideration of youthful recruits, there are many advantageous – and disadvantages – to drawing on this

demographic. An advantage is their ability to devote themselves in terms of time and resources to the movement due

to the lack of restraints from familial or employment responsibilities (Demant et al., 2008a; Silke, 2003). There is

also the idealistic notion of having the ability to change the world and possess the energy to pursue group tasks

(Gendron, 2006). However, the problem faced by the group is maintaining this level of dedication as the youth

develop into more adult roles and identities. The importance of membership wanes as they no longer have the same

need for excitement, have less energy or crave a more subdued lifestyle (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al.,

2008a; Horgan, 2005). Not only is the maturation of an individual member influential on the group, but members

typically outgrow the movement and leave as an aggregate. For the group to exist after the members disengage, it

needs to recruit and replace with a younger cohort, posing more concerns regarding the attractiveness to a younger

generation.

Competing social relationships

The realisation that further radicalisation will require the permanent severance of interpersonal connections can

frighten members from furthering their involvement, particularly those with previous connections to society (Demant

et al., 2008a). However, those from minority groups are expected to experience a different process as the connection

to society is not felt as strongly as those from the majority (Demant et al., 2008a). It is more likely the lack of

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connection contributed to the first step in the radicalisation process for minorities, while it acts as the final barrier to

radicalisation for the majority. These social groups meet members‘ social and affective needs, and in some cases can

serve in place of primary or quasi-primary groups; for example, as a surrogate family (Wright, 1987). However,

when disillusioned with the group, external relationships increase in influence and place strain on the resources the

individual commits to the group. When associated with external people the radical trusts and respects, the interaction

can operate in opposition to the group and intervention can be initiated through ideological dialogue (Demant et al.,

2008a). The respect for these individuals increases the openness to alternative opinions and world-views and

encourages doubts and questioning of the group‘s ideology (Demant et al., 2008a).

Social groups are aware of the strain dyadic relationships can place on members‘ time and resources, and frequently

there are formal and informal regulations restricting two-person intimacy, or the world-view endorses attitudes to

counter the dyadic formation. For example, encouraging celibacy or sexual pluralism, or the attitude of the opposite

sex as inferior and a threat to group stability (Wright, 1987). Failure to do so can threaten membership in various

ways, such as one member of the dyad wants to leave and persuades the other, or as the relationship intensifies

greater emotional investments is placed in the dyadic relationship at the expense of other existing relationships.

Increased interaction with non-members can cause normative ambiguity due to the lack of reciprocity over shared

beliefs and the affirming of peaceful behaviours (Garfinkel, 2007). Family and partners are a source of support and

provide a sounding board for concerns and emphasise the plausibility of alternative and socially acceptable options

(Fink & Hearne, 2008). The establishment of a family external to the group also places demands on member to adopt

new responsibilities for both the spouse and children, Horgan and Bjørgo (2009) argue this is one of the strongest

motivations for the defection from radical social groups.

The reduction of insulation from the outside world can have negative implications for group relationships acting as

vehicles of meaning and values. By disrupting the meaningful interactions between a member and the group, the

dependent socialisation and commitment processes are interrupted (Wright, 1987). This provides a stimulus for

altering discredited perceptions of the larger society by removing group boundaries; therefore, minimising group

distinctions and undermining the importance of belonging to a unique social group. While it is proposed members

will seek affirming reactions from external social relationships when group relations no longer fulfil affective needs,

contextual factors of memberships need to be acknowledged, particularly, the argument of only members who join

the social group to fulfil social requirements are likely to drift to external relations if their needs are not met, and in

contrast, movements successful in meeting members affective requirements will cause members to leave for reasons

independent to unfulfilled affective needs (Wright, 1987).

External pressures and stigmatisation

Involvement with radical social groups and associated activities can cause emotional strain and be detrimental to

relationships and future opportunities. Those operating in a clandestine manner and experiencing threats of violence

or punitive actions by enemies or authorities can find themselves longing for a ‗normal‘ life; including lifestyle

factors unavailable while maintaining membership, such as marriage and beginning a family, and/or developing a

career, or living without fear (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Fink & Hearne, 2008; Horgan, 2005). While some members

perceive the notion of a normal way-of-life to be dull, the experiences of stigmatisation, social isolation and the

consumption by intense hatred can exhaust the individual leading to a break down or exhaustion.

A radical social identity can produce negative repercussions in other social contexts and influence the perception and

treatment from others outside the radical milieu. The individual identity that exists externally can be disregarded in

social situations where the expectation is to be assessed on individual characteristics or merits; such as employment

interviews (Branscombe et al., 1999). The stigmatisation may produce feelings of discrimination and disappointment

when the individual deems their radical identity as irrelevant or illegitimate to the context. The lack of opportunities

due to negative relationships with the community can increase dependency on the organisation, or may cause the

evaluation of the costs associated with maintaining the radical identity. For those encountering low identification

with their social group, this discrimination can emphasise intergroup heterogeneity and/or further disillusionment

with their membership (Branscombe et al., 1999).

BARRIERS TO DISENGAGEMENT

The decision to leave the radical collective behind is as significant and complex as joining with several factors

impeding the process. Devoting significant amounts of time and resources to the collective can result in the

perception of withdrawal as a personal failure. Taylor (1988, p. 168) refers to this as the concept ‗spiralling of

commitment‘ in radical groups, where previous investments and organisational pressures entrap the individual into

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remaining despite doubts. The barriers enforcing group commitment consist of three fundamental elements; (1)

ensuring the member‘s behaviour requires socio-psychological investments, (2) decisions reinforcing this investment

are advocated as the only feasible option, and (3) any efforts to avoid the investment only serve to consolidate the

entrapment of the member (Taylor, 1988). These barriers are designed to ensure the dominance of the radical

ideology, the individual‘s social dependence on the group and instil practical lifestyle barriers that make withdrawal

unattractive. Demant et al. (2008a) identifies examples of barriers in radical groups as the costs involved in

disengaging, fear of reprisals from the group, the loss of reputation and protection, and the marginal position

following disengagement. Disengaging from any social group can have negative repercussions in terms of the loss of

identity and community; however, the radical groups can produce additional and more severe consequences that need

to be considered by the individual.

SUMMARY

Social groups are a significant component in human interaction and the investment of time and resources, as well as

the emotional attachment, make departing a painful experience. The nature of radical social groups ensures members

are socially and psychologically invested and utilise socialisation practices to prevent withdrawal. As a consequence,

disengaging can have negative repercussions for the self-identity and well-being of the ex-member. The

aforementioned contributing factors to disillusionment in themselves may not be valid, solitary reasons for

disengaging; however, produce significant rationalising effects on the initial phase of doubt and help to overcome

socialisation barriers. Commitment is likely to wane when material, psychological and communal benefits of

membership are outweighed by the resources required for association and the inability to achieve desirable outcomes.

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Moral Disengagement: Exploring Support Mechanisms for Violent Extremism

among Young Egyptian Males

Dr Paul S Lieber, Dr Yael Efreom-Lieber and Dr (LTC) Christopher Rate

University of Canberra (Australia)

Calvary Hospital (Canberra, Australia),

US Army War College

[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract This study applied Bandura‟s (1986) eight mechanisms of moral disengagement to a sample of young, Egyptian

Muslim males (N=660). Findings uncovered two distinct scoring groups, likewise a statistically significant (p<.01)

relationship between higher reported levels of moral disengagement and age. For this sample, younger individuals

were likewise more apt to possess higher levels of moral disengagement. Findings argue for additional analyses

exploring these relationships, likewise employing counter-violence, communication interventions derived specifically

from Bandura‟s identified mechanisms.

Keywords Moral Disengagement, Extremism, Terrorism, Egypt

INTRODUCTION

By definition, ‗violent extremism‘ are acts of violence decisively perpetrated on civilian non-combatants for the

purposes of obtaining ideological, religious or political objectives (Borum, 2004). Under this definition, there are

many ‗root cause‘ explanations for violent extremism, psychological theories that examine broad environmental

factors (i.e. poverty and government restrictions, etc.) as individual motivations and factors for such acts (Atran,

2004; Krueger & Latin, 2003).

Investigating individualized attitudes and beliefs toward violent extremism can arguably help explain several key

behaviours underlying this ideology, most notably strong support for the use of violent tactics to achieve various,

violent aims. While no one theory nor perspective can singlehandedly explain the variability and complexity of

violent extremism, existing research, however, reasons that understanding human social cognitive processing can

help decipher key pieces in this salient puzzle (Bandura, 1990). Toward this end, there is a glaring need to better

understand individual and mass support for violent methods, data which can be used toward developing alternative

and effective, non-lethal means for persuading people to think and act otherwise.

To develop effective persuasion campaigns against violence involves understanding how people come to believe that

violence against ‗some people‘ is acceptable and justified in the first place. Echoing this philosophy, Bandura‘s

(1986) social-cognitive theory of moral disengagement posits that the use of violence and aggression may be directly

related to an individual‘s tendency to disengage from their own moral standards and guidelines (Paciello et al.,

2008). Meaning that, in general, people knowingly monitor their own conduct, refraining from actions that result in

self-criticism and/or a violation of personal standards (Bandura, 1986).

To explain, engaging in behaviour inconsistent with one‘s personal values and/or principles is generally highly

uncomfortable, often resulting in intense feelings of guilt and remorse. Still, individuals with fluid ethics and/or

values do commit atrocities, and experience no self-censure or sense of wrongdoing while doing so (Bandura et al.,

2001). This dismissal is derived via an active and gradual process of learning to disengage internal self –sanctions,

of selectively distorting social cognitive information for the purposes of justifying violence (Bandura, 1990).

Bandura (2001) suggests eight social-cognitive mechanisms at work by which an individual may disengage from

his/her own personal moral agency. These mechanisms centre around three primary areas: 1) elements connected to

actual violent behaviour; 2) the consequences of violence; and 3) personal responsibility for violence and the targets

of violent actions. All eight mechanisms allow a person to effectively eliminate any guilt or reproach from engaging

in violent acts (see Table 1). Under this rubric and taken together, individuals who endorse high levels of moral

disengagement are also and logically more likely to support the use of violence plus engage in aggressive and violent

behaviour themselves (McAlister et al., 2006; Paciello et al., 2008).

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Table 1. Eight Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement

Mechanism of Moral Disengagement Definition

1. Moral Justification Detrimental conduct justified as serving socially

worthy and moral purposes

2. Euphemistic Language Language that sanitizes harmful conduct

3. Advantageous Comparison Contrasting harmful conduct with highly flagrant

acts or atrocities

4. Displacement of Responsibility Ascribing blame for damage to other agents

5. Diffusion of Responsibility Obscuring and minimizing one‘s agentive role in

harm

6. Misrepresenting the Harm Distorting, minimizing or disbelieving the harmful

effects

7. Ascription of Blame Blaming the victim for their own plight

8. Dehumanization Stripping people of human qualities or investing

them with demonic attributes

Bandura‘s explanation is not new to this problem set; moral disengagement has – for over two decades - been

theoretically applied to understand terrorism and political violence (Bandura, 1990). However, only a handful of

these studies directly measured rates of moral disengagement in the populations exposed to terrorism and violence

(McAlister et al., 2006).

JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS STUDY

In particular, few studies examine the processes of moral disengagement among male Muslim populations. This

population is particularly critical to current investigation, given their status as a prime recruitment base by many

violent extremist groups (Borum, 2004). Not surprisingly, existing research finds groups such as Al Qaeda, Lebanese

Hezbollah and the Irish Republican Army knowingly infusing mechanisms of moral disengagement into their mass

communication efforts to promote and justify violent methods (Sarma, 2007; Weimann, 2008). In his analysis of

over 5,000 terrorist websites, Weimann (2008) discovered that much of the rhetoric espoused by these groups

directly taps into Bandura‘s eight mechanisms of moral disengagement. Aly (2010) echoed these sentiments,

uncovering a correlation between social identity and violent or extremist behaviour as the premise for anti-terrorism

campaigns in some Arab countries.

Thus, a closer assessment of levels of moral disengagement among male Muslim populations can provide useful,

tangible information about how susceptible this audience might be to terrorist appeals for the use of violence.

Bandura‘s theory suggests ways of countering mechanisms, of helping ‗reengage‘ peoples‘ lost sense of moral

agency and/or personal self sanctions.

Various demographic and attitudinal variables collected in tandem might further assist in reasoning how a larger

population is likely to advocate for violent method use. Ethical discrepancies, Lieber (2005) uncovered, are likely to

emerge from traditional drivers such as age, education, gender and political ideology.

This knowledge can subsequently be applied in designing valid campaigns and messages aimed at countering

terrorist propaganda. In sum: better understanding of which segments of a population are most vulnerable to moral

disengagement can engender more effective counter-messaging toward at-risk populations.

METHODS

Structured phone interviews were given to a convenience sample of 660 Muslim Egyptian males between the ages of

15-30 years old (M=24 years old). The interviews were administered between the dates of 10, June 2009 to 28, June

2009. All measures were translated into Arabic, and subsequently back translated by professional translators (native

Arabic speakers). Interviews were likewise administered by fully- trained interviewers and native Arabic speakers.

All participants were recruited on a volunteer basis, with interviews lasting n average of 26 minutes each. The self-

report measures analysed for this study were part of a broader research project investigating Arab male opinions and

attitudes on a variety of topics.

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Participants

45% of the sample had attended some university and/or completed a graduate degree. 53% reported working in a full

time job, with 41% of this group self-identifying as students and/or apprentice status. Approximately 87% of the

sample identified themselves as ‗middle class.‘ All participants lived in one of five major Egyptian cities including

Cairo (30%), Al-Gharbia (15%), Al-Menyah (16%), Al-Sharqiyah (20%), and Al-Behera (18%).

Measures

Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement: A modified version of the Mechanism of Moral Disengagement Scale

(Bandura et al., 1996) was administered to the participants. The original scale was modified for use with an adult

Muslim population and included 21 items from the original scale. Original items and verbiage on education were

removed to remain developmentally appropriate for the target sample. All items were scored on a 1 to 3 scale, with 1

indicating ‗disagree,‘ 2 corresponding to ‗neutral‘ and 3 ‗agree.‘ For the sampled population, the Moral

Disengagement Scale was found to possess adequate internal reliability (Cronbach‘s alpha=.74), suggesting that

scale items were appropriately highly inter-correlated with each other. A total score for Moral Disengagement was

calculated by summing across the items and calculating its average. Higher scores indicate higher levels of

Bandura‘s notion of moral disengagement.

Attitudes against violence: Participant attitudes on violence were measured via nine items gauging level of support

for violence against civilian non-combatants. This Attitudes Against Violence Scale explored individual beliefs in

the effectiveness of violence such as, ―Violence against civilians is the only way for Muslims to fight against

powerful countries,‖ ―Violence against civilians is justified as a punishment for non-believers,‖ and ―Violence

against civilians is effective in protecting the interests of Muslims.‖ Said questions were rated on a scale of 1-5, with

1 indicating ‗completely agree‘ and 5 ‗completely disagree.‘ For the following sample, the Attitudes Against

Violence Scale was found to possess adequate internal reliability (Cronbach‘s alpha=.68), suggesting scale items

were appropriately highly inter-correlated with each other. A total score for Attitudes Against Violence was

calculated by summing across the items and calculating its average. Higher scores indicate lower levels of Bandura‘s

notion of support for violence.

RESULTS

Zero-Order Correlations

For this sample, mechanisms of moral disengagement were strongly and negatively correlated to attitudes against

violence (see Table 2). Additionally, moral disengagement was negatively correlated with age, such that younger

participants endorsed higher levels of moral disengagement. However, neither moral disengagement nor attitudes

against violence were correlated with level of education, job status or social class. This finding is consistent with

previous research indicating younger individuals tend to have higher rates of moral disengagement (Paciello et al.,

2008).

Table 2. Zero Order Correlations of Moral Disengagement, Attitudes Towards Violence, and Demographic Variables

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4

1. Moral

Disengagement

1.53 0.31 -- -.23** -.10* -.02

2. Attitudes

Towards Violence

4.19 0.69 -.23** -- .15** .05

3. Age 23.6 5.17 -.10* .15** -- .45**

4. Level of

Education

5.5 1.41 -.02 .05 .45** --

**p<.01. *p<.05.

Multivariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

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Two groups (‗high‘ and ‗low‘) were formed stemming from total scores on the Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement

Scale. The ‗low‘ levels of moral disengagement group included 344 respondents, the ‗high‘ one 316. Additionally,

three age groups were formed: a) participants 15-20 years old (N=216); b) 21-25 years old (N=184); and c) 26-30

years old (N=260). A 3x2 ANOVA was run for the attitudes against violence measures, with age and moral

disengagement entered as grouping variables.

Results of the 3x2 ANOVA found the overall model (F [5, 654]=14.46; p<. 01), main effects of moral

disengagement, and age group all significant. This joint finding suggests that – for this sample of Egyptian Muslim

males - both age and moral disengagement significantly impact attitudes against the use of violence. More

importantly, there is a significant interaction between age and moral disengagement on attitudes against violence (F

[5, 654]=15.84; p<. 01; Eta Squared=.05).

In particular and in the ‗high‘ moral disengagement group, younger participants (15-20 year old and 21-25 year old)

were significantly more likely to support the use of violence as compared to their older peers (26-30 year old group).

In contrast, there were no significant differences uncovered in the ‗low‘ group among these same variables.

Meaning, in the ‗low‘ moral disengagement group, all age groups reported a consistent attitude strongly opposing the

use of violence. This finding suggests that younger individuals that endorse higher levels of moral disengagement

are also more likely to support the use of violent methods and strategies, such as attacks on civilians. Therefore and

for this sample, it is a combination of youth and social cognitive processes of moral disengagement that may partially

explain the tendency to support the use of violence toward achieving certain goals.

DISCUSSION

While a snapshot analysis, this study uncovered tangible signs of the potency of moral disengagement among a

vulnerable population. A startling although perhaps unsurprising link between moral disengagement and age points

to a glaring reality of the ability of media and/or peers to engender strong held beliefs capable of nurture even at

younger ages. In specific, how a calculated marriage between ideology and/or message construct can exponentially

increase the effectiveness and adoption rates of both. When this marriage produces violent extremism, the results can

literally be both fatal and tragic.

Moreover, this study reasons for a better infusion of proven social science theory and practice when analysing,

creating communication interventions toward countering violent extremism. Analysed studies uncover a systematic,

successful use of moral disengagement to advocate for, sustain violent extremist action and recruiting. In turn,

messaging to counter these tactics must adopt the same rigor and commitment.

Future research potential on this topic is near endless. Experimental research design derived from these findings can

produce valuable insights on the ability of strategic communication to increase or decrease moral disengagement

mechanisms within vulnerable populations. More importantly, provide clear links between theory and practice on a

topic of enormous global importance.

REFERENCES

Aly, Anne (2010). A Study of Audience Responses to the Media Discourse About the „Other‟: The Fear of Terrorism

Between Australian Muslims and the Broader Community. New York: Edwin Mellen Press.

Atran, S. (2004). Mishandling suicide terrorism. The Washington Quarterly, 27 (3) 67-90.

Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanisms of moral disengagement. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies,

ideologies, theologies, states of mind (pp. 161-191). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Prentice Hall.

Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G.V., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the

exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 364-374.

Bandura, A., Caprara, G. Brabaranelli, C., Pastorelli, C., & Regalia, C. (2001). Social-cognitive self regulatory

mechanisms governing transgressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50 (1) 125-135.

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Borum, R. (2004). Psychology of terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida.

Krueger, A., & Latin, D. (2007). Kto kogo? A cross country study of the origins and targets of terrorism.

Unpublished manuscript.

Lieber, P. S. (2005). Ethical considerations of public relations practitioners: An empirical analysis of the TARES

test, Journal of Mass Media Ethics. 20(4): 288-304.

McAlister, A., Bandura. A., & Owen, S. (2006). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in support of military force:

The impact of Sept. 11. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 25 (2), 141-165.

Paciello, M., Fida, R., Tramontano, C., Lupinette, C., & Caprara, G. (2008). Stability and change of moral

disengagement and its impact on aggression and violence in late adolescence. Child Development, 79 (5) 1288-1309.

Sarma,K. (2007). Defensive Propaganda and IRA Political Control in Republican Communities. Studies in Conflict

and Terrorism, 30, 1073 – 1094.

Weimann, G. (2008). The psychology of mass-mediated terrorism. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(1) 69-86.

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The Emergent Challenges for Policing Terrorism: Lessons from Mumbai

Simon O‘Rourke

secau – Security Research Centre

School of Computer and Security Science

Edith Cowan University

Perth, Western Australia

[email protected]

Abstract On November 26, 2008 ten armed terrorists from Lashka-e-Toiba utilised military assault style tactics to attack a

number of establishments including restaurants and hotels in the city of Mumbai, India. This new attack paradigm

indicated a significant shift in tactics from the placement of improvised explosive devices or deployment of suicide

bombers, and contains valuable lessons for contemporary law enforcement particularly with regard to intelligence,

response, and media management. There are few agencies currently geared to deal with the sheer scope of an event

involving trained terrorists well versed with small team tactics, heavily armed and equipped conducting operations

in any major city. This attack paradigm clearly presents unique challenges to police who will be tasked to respond to

these types of incidents, particularly given the training and weaponry that will be deployed against them.

Keywords Mumbai, India, Terrorism, Pakistan, Police, Assault Rifles, Planning, Technology, Media, Social Networking,

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Active Shooter.

INTRODUCTION

On November 26, 2008 ten armed terrorists from the group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) utilised military assault style

tactics to attack a number of establishments, including restaurants and hotels in the city of Mumbai, India. The name

of the group translates to Army of the Righteous, and it was formed in the Kunar province of Afghanistan in 1989

with a mandate to Islamise Indian administered Kashmir, and the wider region (Duraphe, 2009). This incident

resulted in the deaths of at least 172 people, and struck at the economic and social hub of India, thereby generating

significant media interest (Rabasa et al., 2009).

This attack paradigm indicated a significant shift in tactics from the placement of improvised explosive devices or

deployment of suicide bombers, and contains valuable lessons for contemporary law enforcement (N.Y.P.D.

Intelligence Division, 2008). Globally there are few policing agencies currently geared to deal with an event of this

nature occurring in a major metropolitan city. According to Rabasa et al. (2009, p.1) this incident was significant due

to the sheer scale and complexity of the elements involved. This methodology clearly presents unique challenges to

police who will be the first to respond to these types of incidents, particularly given the training and weaponry that

will be deployed against them. This paper will not review the attack itself in detail, as both government and private

reports referenced have provided an excellent overview of the incident. This paper will focus on the emergent

challenges for policing organisations resulting from this incident.

EVOLUTION OF TERRORIST ATTACK PARADIGMS

Terrorist tactics have continually evolved from the 1970‘s when groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine took hostages and made demands, generating media coverage for their cause. Information and

communications technology at the time required terrorist groups to undertake protracted operations in order to ensure

that their media and publicity objectives were met. Terrorists were dependent upon conventional media entities for

the achievement of such, a vulnerability that no longer exists in the contemporary networked world.

The events at the Munich Olympics in 1972 during which the terrorist group Black September took hostages,

resulted in a significant loss of life during an attempted rescue. This terrorist operation resulted in the creation of

specialised police and military hostage rescue units, culminating in the Iranian Embassy Siege in London famously

resolved 5 May, 1980 when the British 22nd

Special Air Service Regiment stormed the embassy and rescued the

hostages.

This paradigm whereby hostages are taken and the media utilised to articulate terrorist demands to a global audience

continued to determine the police response to terrorism. This was challenged with the emergence of the suicide

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bomber, as police were no longer afforded the opportunity to isolate the individual or group and negotiate a

resolution. Police are now confronted with individuals and groups who place devices either on their person or in situ,

then detonate them without making any demands. Islamist proponents like Abu Mus'ab al-Suri who advocate using

this approach posit that the greater the loss of life and atrocity committed, the greater the subsequent media coverage

(Lia, 2007). It could be argued that the transition from siege situations also corresponds with the increasing media

capability invested in the individual, who is now empowered by the evolving communications technology.

Suicide bombers or the placement of explosive devices by terrorists have targeted civilians in Bali, Madrid and

London. However, the direct attack method used in Mumbai may indicate yet another possible evolution in terrorist

tactics. It is clear that terrorist groups possess analytical capability and can adapt to tactics employed by law

enforcement. This is evidenced by the attempts to get chemical explosives onboard aircraft in component form,

rather than as an assembled unit in response to tightened aircraft security restrictions. Mumbai demonstrated the

continuing threat that exists when tactics from the battlefield are employed even more effectively against urban

targets, not located in the conflict zone. This brings them into direct conflict with patrolling police officers who are

not as well equipped and trained for this role, as the soldiers these tactics were designed to defeat.

ATTACK ON MUMBAI

The former city of Bombay, now known as Mumbai is the capital of the Indian state of Maharashta. It is one of the

most densely populated urban cities in the world with a population of approximately 20 million. It is a city of

contrasts from the eminently wealthy to the slums, founded on reclaimed land and still home to a commercial fishing

fleet, which is how those who attacked were able to navigate so close to the India coast unnoticed by security forces.

It was this accessibility from the sea in such close proximity to vast numbers of foreigners and India‘s wealthy and

famous that sealed its‘ selection by the terrorists (Rabasa et al., 2009). Mumbai had been attacked before in July

2006, when terrorists bombed a train and killed 209 people. The scope of the most recent attack reveals the potential

synthesis of terrorist attack profiles and presents significant challenges for all law enforcement agencies. Mumbai is

the commercial and entertainment epicentre of India, home to the world‘s third largest stock exchange and the

Bollywood entertainment industry producing film and television programs (Rabasa et al., 2009). It was into this

vibrant mix of people and culture that ten armed terrorists entered on the night of 26 November, 2008 and

commenced multiple attacks against defenceless civilians, whom they deliberately and methodically murdered.

This assault style strategy was described by the New York City Police (2008, p.4) as, ―a major shift in traditional

terrorist tactics‖. This approach resulted in police being confronted with multiple active shooter locations. The term

‗active shooter‘ is used in police and law enforcement agencies to describe a particular situation, whereby rapid

response to the incident and close containment of the offender are paramount. This required a shift in training and

deployment from the traditional incident cordon and contain approach, due to the propensity for the offender to

continue killing and seriously injuring those targeted until physically contained or prevented from doing so by

responding officers.

To address multiple active shooter locations, including large hotels containing thousands of people, required a large

scale well coordinated police response. The ability to deal with an incident like Mumbai would test the resources of

most contemporary policing organisations, and would require significant increases in planning, resourcing and

training to meet effectively. This requires intimate knowledge of potential targets that lie within the jurisdiction of

the relevant agency. Such a database needs to expand beyond the traditional critical infrastructure, like mass transit

points and power stations and water supplies. Policing agencies now need to compile data pertaining to hotels and

similar in order to ensure they are can regain the initiative at an incident. According to Rabasa et el. (2009, p.3) the

terrorists demonstrated intricate knowledge of the layout of the hotels and buildings. They utilised including areas

not normally accessed by the public, giving rise to the inference that the operation was meticulously planned. This

contrasts with the view posited by McElroy (2008) who cites an unnamed British official as highly critical of the

command and control and planning undertaken prior to the deployment of the India National Security Guards,

hostage rescue team. This negated their effectiveness as the terrorists were able to use service access facilities and

the Indian Commandos went in virtually blind.

The police in Mumbai were confronted with multiple incidents and were initially unable to ascertain the overall

picture. The attacks occurred over a 60 hour period and were reported widely on by the world‘s media organisations.

In a report published by the RAND corporation Rabasa et al. (2009, p.3) acknowledge that the careful planning

undertaken prior to the Mumbai attacks. This was due to the complexity of the operation undertaken by the terrorists,

which challenged the resources of the responding police to contain them and protect the public. The challenge now

exists for policing organisations to ensure that operational practices continue to evolve to meet these types of threats,

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in order to anticipate and be prepared. Ganguly (2008) supports this and further advocates that changes are needed to

improve intelligence collection and the policing of large urban cities.

RESPONDING TO AN ACTIVE SHOOTER

Prior to the Columbine High School shooting in the United States in 1999, law enforcement would adhere to the

principle of isolate, cordon, contain and negotiate. The term ‗active shooter‘ was coined following this event and is

now used to describe a law enforcement approach whereby initial responding officers seek to directly engage the

shooter, thereby denying them time to kill or harm further unarmed civilians (Pastor, 2010, p.136). The active

shooter approach whilst extremely high risk to the officers involved was not designed to meet the threat posed by an

attacking terrorist group. The emergent threat from Mumbai is that responding police may be confronted with

multiple trained active shooters who are better armed and operating with the sole aim of inflicting maximum

casualties on the civilian population.

Criminal activities including the Bank of America shootout in Los Angeles in 1997 where Los Angeles Police

(LAPD) officers were confronted by heavily armed offenders following a bank robbery illustrate the scope of the

challenge. The responding officers were only armed with 9mm handguns and 12 gauge shotguns against criminals

with fully automatic .308 calibre (7.62mm) assault rifles and full body armour, which defeated most of the police

rounds fired. This situation resulted in changes to LAPD policy and AR-15 rifles are now carried by most patrol

vehicles to ensure that officers have the capability to protect themselves and the public should a similar event occur.

The fear and uncertainty created during the hunt for the Washington sniper in 2002 and media frenzy during the

event showcased the pressure that law enforcement agencies operate under during major incidents. The loss of ten

lives and the fear generated in the community as citizens were murdered going about their normal daily business

created uncertainty and distrust. Whilst neither of these events were perpetrated in the name of a terrorist group they

still reveal the challenges facing law enforcement from criminals most of whom will seek to escape where possible.

Unless the responding officers are trained and equipped appropriately it is highly likely that they will be unable to

protect themselves or the community. Reliance upon a police tactical team even in those jurisdictions where police

are armed can only be effective if that capability can respond to multiple threats within a very short time. The LAPD

experience illustrated the difficulties facing patrol officers armed with handguns when confronting criminals who are

armed with high powered assault rifles. The ability for LAPD patrol officers to effectively contain such a threat is

now provided by the semi automatic rifles carried in each patrol vehicle. This enables those officers initially

responding to establish a cordon, and in circumstances of imminent jeopardy to take action and limit the loss of

civilian lives.

Terrorist groups operating like those in Mumbai go beyond the threat posed by heavily armed criminals and can

overwhelm traditional police responses. Rabasa et al. (2009, p.6) cite testimony from the surviving terrorist to

illustrate that his mission was to kill as many people as possible. This approach means that until actually stopped by

police the terrorist will continue killing. This threat is now realised even by those jurisdictions where the police are

not traditionally armed, and instead are reliant upon a small cadre of highly trained officers to provide specialist

firearms response akin to the UK model.

However, the threat posed by the Mumbai experience has caused the UK to review policy and upgrade the capability

and amount of ammunition carried by armed officers, in order to allow them to effectively confront the threat.

Former UK Security Minister Lord West is quoted by the Gardner (2010) as saying:

These people like the Mumbai terrorists, are a bit like soldiers, they do fire and support, move

forward, all they want to do is kill as many as possible, with slightly heavier weapons than our police

have and therefore you have to give heavy weapons to the police and train them how to do it.

Lord West succinctly describes the challenge facing police who will be the first to respond to such an incident.

Rabasa et al. (2009, pp., 4-5) identify the assault rifles carried by the terrorists in Mumbai as AK-56 a Chinese

variant of the ubiquitous Russian Ak-47. This was used in combination with improvised explosive devices and hand

grenades to create a situation whereby police commanders were unable to discern the overall picture of what they

were facing, thereby negating their ability to plan and deploy appropriately. According to Ganguly (2008) the Indian

government were unprepared to deal with an incident like Mumbai and took nine hours to deploy the National

Security Guards to the scene in order to engage the terrorists.

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According to Page (2008) the state of the equipment issued to the police in Mumbai helped to explain why ten

terrorists managed to exert influence over a city of nearly 18 million people for more than sixty hours. Page (2008)

supports this assertion quoting Maxwell Pereira a former Dehli joint police commissioner who commented on the

state of police resources, ―These casualties could have been prevented if they‘d been properly equipped‖.

MEDIA MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

Policing organisations utilise the media to convey messages to the public and detail response to incidents of public

interest. As such the public image of these agencies can be adversely affected, when media entities take a particular

denunciatory frame regarding police activities. This approach can reduce public confidence and limit the flow of

information coming into the police. In order to address this most police agencies now have media units staffed by

former journalists and experienced advisors. This has resulted in a very open approach, whereby police actively

engage the media and this strategy is effective with regard to most traditional crime types. However, such an

approach is inherently problematic when this template is applied to terrorist incidents like Mumbai. Live feeds and

reports from incident scenes where police commanders answer operational questions that refer to timeframes, future

intentions, and deployment or response strategies now have the potential to provide terrorists with advanced warning

and allow them to alter their tactics in response.

This was identified by McElroy (2008) who asserts that an Indian cabinet minister publically announced the

timeframe for deployment of commandos to the incident scene, information that was of significant value to the

terrorists. This will require police organisations to develop new media strategies and train their staff and

management accordingly. Such an approach will need to be undertaken in close partnership with government, to

ensure that the political response is cognisant of the challenges involved.

Relationships with the conventional media have historically presented policing agencies with challenges and

opportunities during major incidents. However, in addition to the challenges posed by the events themselves, law

enforcement is now confronted with terrorists who are accessing real time intelligence data regarding the police

response and deployment via the media. The 24/7 news cycle generates intense competition between media entities

and can adversely affect responsible reporting. The excessive competition between Indian media agencies is seen by

Acharya, et al. (2008, p.42) to have resulted in behaviour that was focused on the business of news rather than the

responsbile delivery of information to the community. This focus on the measures undertaken by the Indian

authorities provided a wealth of information to the terrorists and also informed them about those they held hostage.

Most media entities now stream live video and photographs from incident scenes via the Internet enabling anyone

with a connection to remotely access the data stream. This facilitates real time analysis from a location removed from

the incident site resulting in the provision of actionable intelligence to the terrorists themselves. It can be inferred

from the situation in Mumbai and ongoing communications between team members, and their base in Pakistan that

intelligence was been fed back to the team whilst they were still carrying out attacks, thereby enabling them to negate

the effectiveness of responding police (N.Y.P.D. Intelligence Division, 2008, p.5).

Mumbai clearly illustrated that contemporary policing agencies need to be aware of the operational space that they

now operate within. This space makes use of ubiquitous communications technology, allowing those involved to

change their tactics in response to police deployment. Advances in social networking technology are creating an

environment where video from an incident can be uploaded in real time. Social media and networks like You Tube,

Facebook and Twitter allow the uploading of photos and video with the potential for anyone to access. This can

readily identify police tactics like those in Mumbai when commandos began fast-roping onto the roof of the hotels.

Whilst the terrorists could not physically see what the commandos were doing, the media coverage provided their

controllers with a live feed of the incident. This allowed the terrorists to identify the likely approach routes of the

commandos based upon their physical entry points the building and respond accordingly. The intercepted phone calls

between the terrorists in Mumbai and their controllers in Pakistan clearly detailed the assessment of the tactics being

used against them and directed a response. One intercept released by the Indian Government (2008, p.54) detailed

instructions passed to the terrorists:

Keep in mind that the hostages are of use only as long as you do not come under fire because of their

safety. If you are still threatened, then don‘t saddle yourself with the burden of the hostages,

immediately kill them.

This view is also supported by Rabasa et al. (2009, p.7) who posits that the terrorists received tactical advice based

upon what their handlers were able to discern and analyse from the live media feeds at the scene. During a protracted

incident like Mumbai police commanders will need to gain an effective picture of the overall incident. According to

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Acharya, Mendal, & Mehta, (2008, p.6) the planning of the Mumbai attack was designed to create confusion and

negate any effective response by Indian authorities. Following the Mumbai attacks the NYPD deployed members to

the scene to liaise with Indian investigators and provide intelligence that the NYPD could use to plan its response to

a similar incident in New York City. According to information obtained by the NYPD Intelligence Division (2008,

p.42) the terrorists involved made excellent use of information and communications technology:

They carried blackberries, compact disks with high-resolution satellite images such as Google Earth

maps, and had multiple cell phones with interchangeable SIM cards that would be hard to track.

Once on the scene they removed cell phones from hostages and used them to stay in contact with one

another.

This use of multiple cell phones and Internet access technology would require significant resources to intercept,

translate and analyse. It would however, present a unique opportunity to intercept communications and discern future

intention.

INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS

In order for a terrorist or extremist group to mount a similar attack to that staged in Mumbai they would need access

to the requisite weaponry and the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies (Binnie & LeMiere, 2008). It

could be argued that such a group would also need to operate below the law enforcement radar, unless such and

attack was to be funded by crime. Changes in society are necessitating new paradigms for the collection and analysis

of intelligence needed to support national security operations, and guide public policy (Sullivan, 2008). Predictive

analysis or warning intelligence is needed to allow policing agencies to take action prior to a terrorist incident.

However, the production of this class of intelligence is inherently difficult. It requires engagement with policy

makers in order for the assessment and discussion of differing hypotheses regarding emergent challenges, prior to

determining policy responses. This engagement will facilitate a broader strategic approach, rather than the prevailing

policy of demands for immediate intelligence (Sullivan, 2008).

Traditional intelligence practices from the Cold War are not well suited to meeting the challenges posed by the

dynamic nature of contemporary terrorism. This new environment contains a manifold of non-state actors, cultures

and political objectives fed by an extremist ideology, that is spread via new communications technologies (United

States Government, 2006). Accordingly, it could be argued that no organisation is better suited to enhancing

domestic intelligence capabilities than local policing agencies. Intricate knowledge of local communities, offenders,

crime types and patterns of behaviour make local police highly attuned to the environment they patrol. However,

such agencies are limited in their ability to isolate and dedicate resources solely for counter-terrorism due to fiscal

and resource constraints, thus limiting their ability to focus purely on intelligence (Riley, Treverton, Wilson, &

Davis, 2005).

Evans (2005) posits that whilst intelligence should be the primary strategic consideration for addressing terrorism, it

can only be effective if delivered in such a manner as to meet the needs of its customers. In order for intelligence to

be advantageous, the organisation producing it must have the capacity to discern the challenges that the future may

hold. Such intelligence, when provided to policy makers, has the capacity to improve their decision making process,

resulting in the initiation of action that is more likely succeed. It is this ability to take action as a result of an

intelligence product relevant to the particular situation, that is the ultimate outcome for the intelligence community

(United States Government, 2008).

In order to remain effective in the future the producers of analytical intelligence products, including the police, will

need to understand and anticipate the needs of those who use them. This will necessitate a shift from the production

of a traditional list of intelligence requirements to a more mission orientated focus designed to assist decision makers

in achieving objectives (United States Government, 2008). Quiggin (2007, p.50) defines this as, ―The final all-source

intelligence product of actionable knowledge provided to government to anticipate or reduce uncertainty in its

pursuit or protection of international political, economic and security objectives‖.

The primary task of the contemporary intelligence agency is the provision of quality analytical product to decision

makers. However, its production is reliant upon the human cognitive element, which is often overlooked as attention

and subsequent funding is drawn to the impressive technical hardware that intelligence agencies can deploy (Wastell,

Clark, & Duncan, 2006). Technical collection systems like satellites, which can demonstrate a clear capability and

are supported by excellent marketing, will normally always be funded as a priority. However, Treverton (cited in

Quiggin, 2007, p.92) argues that more resources should be provided to analysis in order to increase the processing

capability as funding for such is deficient in most policing agencies. This results in a failure to recruit, train and

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mentor high quality analysts, which Zegart (2007) posits was the case for FBI intelligence analysts prior to 9/11, but

has now improved due to the FBI integrating intelligence into its core mission.

It is this human element, which technology cannot replicate that is so crucial to successfully discerning key

information. The intelligence community has also identified significant challenges posed by the need to recruit, train

and retain the best and brightest in the current employment market. Conditions and remuneration will need to be

adjusted in line with the private sector to ensure they remain a competitive employer (United States Government,

2008). Once trained these analysts may be able to recognise key fragments of intelligence termed indicators.

Discernable indicators or warnings may be produced at any time in the terrorist ‗Event Horizon‘ as discussed by

Sullivan & Wirtz (2008, p.18) who classify this as the time between the conception and execution of a terrorist

operation. This will necessitate analysts being able to indentify targets and modes of attack and information about

those involved from just about any point along the ‗Event Horizon‘ where the indicator is first recognised.

Whilst conventional military operations take time to build up and deploy assets thereby providing discernible

indicators, the activities of terrorists are more subtle and harder to predict. Whilst not advocating that the future can

be successfully predicated, Quiggin acknowledges that the role of intelligence is to scan the horizon, and provide

warning about future challenges in such a manner as to allow decisions to be made and action taken. According to

Robert Bowie a former deputy director of the CIA actionable intelligence is, ―knowledge and analysis designed to

assist action‖ (May, 1984, p.3). Whilst structural and bureaucratic change occurs across police and intelligence

agencies, it is the ability of these agencies to successfully adapt at a sufficient rate to meet the shifting global

challenges that is essential (Zegart, 2007). Cultural impediments can significantly hamper efforts to adapt.

Individuals within the organisation can becoming institutionalised and insist on doing things a particular was because

that‘s the way they have always been done, thereby ensuring that newer members adhere to this mantra (Zegart,

2007). This can be alleviated over time by targeted recruitment practices in order to ensure that the intelligence team

is sufficiently diverse, and contains a range of highly skilled members who are not afraid to question the status quo

and challenge unsubstantiated opinion (Quiggin, 2007).

Counter-terrorism analysts require an intricate understanding of the environment, which facilitates such activity, and

may need to become experts regarding specific groups or geographic regions. Such levels of competency will take

years to acquire, and cannot be taught in a short course (Best, 2003). Therefore the retention of such skills is essential

if intelligence organisations are to be able to achieve their mission. Cooper (2005) identifies that analytical success

cannot be achieved by the wishes of senior command or the issuance of instructions, it can only be achieved by the

correct selection, training and mentoring of the individuals who are assigned to that role. Intelligence agencies need

to be able to acknowledge their limitations and decline requests when necessary, or else run the risk of overloading

their analytical workforce thereby reducing the quality of the product (Cooper, 2005).

Problems can emerge when analysts are not provided with access to data from other agencies. This can be caused by

IT systems that cannot communicate or restrictions placed on the sharing of information by particular agency to

protect sources. If it is not able to be accessed and aggregated into the final product, then critical decisions are being

made with incomplete information (Cooper, 2005). The culture of competitive analysis in which intelligence is

examined in isolation without input from other agencies has also impaired the ability of the wider intelligence

community to address the current challenges (AFCEA Intelligence Committee, 2005).

Harris (2004) advocates team based analytical gaming and scenario based approaches to analysis. The ability for

intelligence agencies to deploy small teams of specialists against a dynamic networked adversary could prove pivotal

in the current threat environment. There is an identified need to encourage personal initiative and lateral thinking,

thereby ensuring that the resultant analytical product is not tailored to reflect the cultural biases or beliefs inherent in

the particular group or organisation (Harris, 2004). According to Sullivan & Wirtz (2008) the military model of

intelligence preparation of the battlefield can be adapted for law enforcement use, resulting in a new approach termed

intelligence preparation for operations (IPO). This approach consists of a four-step process including situational

recognition, analysis, divining course of action and rehearsals. This model is also designed to bridge the divide

between deliberate and emergency response planning as it provides multiple scenarios, thereby allowing

commanders to work up a variety of responses and assess the suitability of each. Senior commanders or government

officials need sufficient lead time to allow the decisions they make to be effectively implemented. This lead time is

dependent upon the direction given to the intelligence unit to conduct strategic assessment, otherwise the decision

making process will be directed to an extent by the unforseen crisis (Quiggin, 2007).

Whilst the term intelligence can be applied to almost any context, Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) advocates its

application to the national security arena pertaining to the activities that are of interest to national governments.

Quiggin (2007) posits that intelligence is better described as a craft, rather than a scientific endeavour. Such

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explanation places intelligence into a domain whereby skills are learnt under guidance from an experienced

practitioner, until sufficiently developed to the level whereby the individual can defensibly state their position based

upon credible analysis. The future will require intelligence analysts who are globally aware and capable of

understanding the potential domestic effects of events occurring well beyond their geographical or jurisdictional

borders. This is particularly pertinent for policing agencies as analysts who can project beyond the immediate

operational sphere into the strategic realm are an extremely rare commodity. Continual rotation of staff is an ongoing

issue in many government agencies, and prevents the development of knowledge and experience required to

effectively counter emergent threats. This expertise can‘t be replicated by technology, which is just a tool to be used

by the analyst to enhance their capabilities.

Quiggin (2007) adopts the position that unless a paradigm shift occurs the future for intelligence analysis is not a

positive one. He bases this on a lack of parity between the analysts and technical collection resources in terms of

funding as well as an adoption of the military approach, which is not always suited to domestic missions. This

outlook is further compounded by the culture of secrecy, difficulty in accessing classified material (stove-piping),

and finally a lack of ongoing training resulting from culture that is unwilling to change. This lack of training is

highlighted numerous times by Quiggin (2007) and whilst a contributing factor to intelligence failures, it is seldom

identified as a such in subsequent inquires. Whilst it is acknowledged by Grabo (2004), Kam (2004) and Khalsa

(2004) that there are challenges in identifying relevant data, all are of the view that it is achievable if a sound

methodology is followed and historical lessons noted. However, all acknowledge the difficulties that the current

terrorist threat presents. When attempting to evaluate and identify potential data the, ―ability to perceive or attempt to

perceive what others are thinking‖ (Grabo, 2004, p.47) is critically important.

Viewing the potential event from the terrorist perspective can allow the analyst to identify the critical points along

the event horizon that could provide intelligence about a pending attack. The approach taken to collecting data needs

to be able to highly flexible in order to meet the dynamic nature of the threat posed by extremists. Traditional strict

hierarchal structures, working routines and methodologies may not keep pace with technology and therefore may

prove ineffective (Clark, 2004, p.160). The difficulties faced when endeavouring to produce intelligence assessments

in times of stable international relations are significant but as Quiggin (2007, p.95) identifies they are magnified

when attempting to produce, ―accurate assessments on multiple targets in a fast changing fluid and violent

environment‖. However Zegart (2007) is of the opinion that the lack of another attack on U.S. soils since 9/11 is not

attributable to an increase in the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community.

CONCLUSION

The ability to acquire real time intelligence from the media during a terrorist incident by those involved poses

significant challenges for police responding to and managing the incident. This will extend to the physical access

allowed to the media who may have greater assets that the police at the incident scene and the information that is

provided to the media. This combined with the sheer scope of the challenge of managing multiple crime scenes and

confronting unknown offenders also requires training and preparation. It is this training in high stress situations that

needs to go beyond that traditionally practiced, and introduce simultaneous and seamless interaction by those at the

tactical and strategic levels who are able provided with actionable intelligence product. This will require a new

paradigm of policing response to address including the appropriate resourcing of equipment and training. Rabasa et

al. (2009, p.10) support this asserting that in order for responding police to be effective they need to have the

equipment and training necessary to allow them to engage or contain the terrorists. Such deployments will need to be

supported by a 24/7 intelligence capability.

REFERENCES

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Attacks.pdf.

AFCEA Intelligence Committee. (2005). Making Analysis Relevant: It's More than Connecting the Dots. Retrieved

from http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/documents/finalanalysiswp.pdf

Best, R. A. J. (2003). Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress. Retrieved 28 September 2007. from

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation/21217.pdf.

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“Make A Bomb In Your Mums Kitchen”: Cyber Recruiting And Socialisation

of „White Moors‟ and Home Grown Jihadists

Robyn Torok

Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism

Macquarie University

Sydney, Australia

[email protected]

The times have changed, and we must design a method of confrontation, which is in accordance

with the standards of the present time.

Al- Suri, Inspire Magazine 2010, p. 53

If you have the right to slander the Messenger of Allāh, we have the right to defend him. If it is part of your freedom

of speech to defame Muĥammad, it is part of our religion to fight you.

Shaykh Anwar Al-Awlaki, Inspire Magazine 2010, p. 26

Abstract As a consequence of the war on terror, al-Qaeda and associated jihad groups have evolved and made increasing use

of internet technologies for cyber recruitment. Recently, there has been an increasing focus on recruiting home

grown terrorists who can more easily escape the scrutiny of cross border entries. Case study analysis indicates that

links do exist between cyber tools, radicalisation and terrorism, however, the strength and nature of these

relationships is generally unclear. Evidence does seem to support that cyber tools are most significant in the initial

phases of recruitment and radicalisation. Coupled with this is the strong evolution of the use of cyber tools from

hosted jihad websites to the use of social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace as well as forums such as

Yahoo groups. Additionally, al-Qaeda‟s latest development is an online magazine that contains a wide range of

material from inspirational narratives to practical bomb making techniques. It is argued that these links between

evolving cyber tools and cyber recruitment/radicalisation must be taken as a serious threat with possible responses

outlined.

Keywords al-Qaeda, terrorist recruitment, cyber recruiting, internet terrorism, radicalisation, social networking

INTRODUCTION

Since 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, al-Qaeda and other Islamic jihad groups(1) have been very adept at

evolving to the changing shifts caused by continual attacks to its base of operations resulting in restrictions in their

ability to operate openly. One of the primary areas of adaptation is in the use of internet technology to support a

number of its strategic and operational objectives that include recruiting, fundraising, strategic direction and research

(McNeal, 2007). In addition, internet technology also opens up a worldwide audience able to access extremist views

and form networks, all in a ubiquitous and virtually untraceable environment (O‘Rourke, 2007). Importantly, the

internet provides an essential media battlefield as part of their terrorism strategy as al-Qaeda‘s Dr. al-Zawahiri states:

‗We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media

battle for the hearts and minds of our umma‘ (Michael, 2009, p. 142). Therefore, it is this battle for hearts and minds

that will be addressed.

As the title of this paper suggests, the focus of this paper is on how al-Qaeda attempts to use cyber technologies to

recruit and engage home grown terrorists and also create converts to radical Islam, known as ‗White Moors‘

(Michael, 2009). Initially, the focus will be on why this specific target group is so important as part of al-Qaeda‘s

strategy to target the West. Subsequently, it is imperative to examine how the internet is an important part of that

strategy, a strategy that complements the cultural notion of terrorism as theatre (Cowen, 2006). A number of case

studies will then be presented followed by proposed responses.

TARGETS: WHY “WHITE MOORS” AND HOME GROWN JIHADISTS?

Research by Weimann (2008) on the target audiences of terrorist websites indicates that their intended audience is

actually very broad and includes potential recruits, the international community and its enemies. However, the focus

on potential recruits is an important aspect and often involves more culturally sophisticated planning coupled with

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more tech savvy skills in its implementation. Key aspects include the use of colour, latest multimedia technologies,

professional finish and interactivity (McNeal, 2007). Many of these sites are targeted at younger males, with reports

in the United Kingdom (UK) indicating terrorist groups specifically targeting male university undergraduates and

even secondary students (Mendez, 2008). Furthermore, it is the disaffected and the alienated that are especially

vulnerable to the ‗seductive‘ efforts of recruiters (Murphy, 2007). These groups include diasporic communities

(Awan, 2007) as well as first and second generation Muslims who are ‗citizens in name but not culturally or

socially.‘ (Leiken, 2005, p. 123). Nevertheless, it is this ‗citizen in name‘ aspect that is important, just like the ring of

Roman citizenship gave freedom to travel throughout the Roman Empire, likewise a ‗Western‘ passport gives greater

freedom to travel throughout the Western world. This is especially important given that some of those travelling on

Middle-Eastern, North African or Asian passports are coming under increasing scrutiny given their regional

reputations for terrorist activity, radicalism and training activities (Michael, 2009).

However, now it is this freedom to travel throughout Europe and the West that is causing concern for both European

and US officials (Leiken, 2005; Michael, 2009). For this reason ‗White Moors‘ and home grown jihadists can be

considered prized recruits. Coupled with this, there is the increasing individualisation of the concept of jihad as part

of a global resistance (Michael, 2009). One of al-Qaeda‘s most notable strategists, al-Suri, has articulated the power

of the internet as a key tool in promoting individual terrorism (Michael, 2009). It is therefore critical to look at the

dynamics of how the internet is used as such an important strategic tool in promoting home grown terrorism.

STRATEGY: INTER(N)ETWORKS

Strategically, al-Qaeda is forming a vast series of internet networks (inter(N)etworks). They provide a platform to

reach a worldwide audience while giving leaders much greater control over their message compared to other more

traditional media (print, television) (Anderson, 2003; Conway, 2006). Moreover, the internet platform allows

terrorists groups to release large unlimited, uncensored amounts of propaganda, inspire supporters, target recruits and

undermine Western media credibility (Conway, 2006; Lachow & Richardson, 2007; Maher, 2007). Lachow and

Richardson (2007) argue that terrorist groups have become experts at manipulating public opinion and undermining

media credibility by providing well presented ‗news‘ services that are on par with the those of much larger and well

established organisations. In terms of recruiting, the danger lies in the ability to expose potential recruits to large

amounts of information quickly, and in an interesting multimedia format (Conway, 2006). What is most striking

about the strategic use of internet technologies is the ‗paradigm shift‘ they create by redirecting power from the state

to individual members and society as a collective (Weimann, 2008, p. 83). In conceptualising how and why these

new forms of terrorism are so internet dependent (Anderson, 2003), we can borrow some insights from social

network research.

Insights from Social Network Research

As a consequence, at least in part, of using internet technology, terrorist groups have become more network oriented

in their structures which allows actors to communicate free from space or organisational constraints at a very low

cost (Conway, 2006). Social network theory is concerned with connections between actors rather than actors in

isolation (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Matusitz, 2008). One of the foundational tenets of network

research is that actors are part of an interconnected social network that has the potential to both constrain and create

new behaviours (Brass, et al., 2004). Matusitz (2008) argues that there are many similarities between terrorist

networks in antiquity (Jewish resistance to the Roman Empire) and modern day cyber networks. In particular is the

‗Chain of trust‘, where individuals are introduced and then required to display certain attitudes and behaviours

(Matusitz, 2008, p. 189). This is particularly the case with more interactive internet media such as chat rooms and

social networking sites. Table 1 below summaries some important insights from interpersonal networks which are

also relevant to cyber networks.

Table 1: Antecedents and Consequences of Interpersonal Networks (Based on Brass, et al., 2004, p. 796-798)

Antecedents Consequences

Actor similarity – interactions tend to be among

similar people (aims, interests).

Attitude similarity – interaction among similar

actors creates similar attitudes

Personality – personality does affect social

network patterns.

Power – central network positions are associated

with power and influence

Social network research indicates that similar people tend to find each other (Table 1). Al-Qaeda and other groups

endeavour to make that process as easy as possible. Consider also the impact of personality, with a disaffected youth

networking with a strong radical terrorist recruiter. Most importantly, as a consequence of such interactions (whether

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cyber or personal) is a change in attitude which in turn can impact on behaviour, especially when being directed by

more central network actors. The question we turn to is, how have terrorist groups made the ability for similar actors

to connect much easier?

Explosive Growth of Online Jihad

From an insignificant cyber presence pre-9/11, al-Qaeda now has a very strong cyber network that uses cutting edge

technology (Murphy, 2007). This exponential growth in websites (Awan, 2007) has led to a matching growth in

potential recruitment opportunities (McNeal, 2007). In one of the most comprehensive research studies on online

terrorist websites, Weimann (2008, p. 75) reported that the number of terrorist websites grew from about 12 in 1998

to over 5300 at the end of 2006. What is perhaps even more disconcerting is the rapid rise of English speaking

websites (over 100 reported in late 2007) (Michael, 2009, p. 143). Such a shift reflects attempts to create ‗White

Moors‘ from disaffected youth who can now easily access hundreds of English language sites, interact and be

targeted by jihad recruiters (Jenkins, 2010). This new threat is perhaps one of the most pervasive cyber threats we

face.

Which Is The Greater Threat: Cyber Terrorism Or Cyber Recruitment And Socialisation?

While acknowledging that the risk of cyber terrorism and hacking is very real, many scholars argue that the risk of

cyber terrorism is overemphasised (Kohlmann, 2006; Lachow & Richardson, 2007; Lewis, 2005). While we should

certainly not play down the threat of cyber terrorism into ‗cyber graffiti‘ as Lewis (2005, p. 113) does, we need to

avoid the other extreme of overstating ‗science-fiction scenarios‘ (Kohlmann, 2006, p. 116). Kohlmann (2006)

argues that the Unites States (US) online war on terror has been defensive and technology focussed, concentrating on

protecting critical infrastructure. While the importance of cyber security should never be understated nor taken for

granted, neither should be the dangers of unabated propaganda and cyber recruitment strategies (Lachow &

Richardson, 2007). In answer to the question of which is the greater threat, in absolute terms, this is difficult to

answer. However, in relative terms, cyber recruitment and socialisation is perhaps a greater threat, simply for the

reason that we take cyber terrorism seriously and seek to constantly prevent attacks, while some Western nations are

lagging behind in response to cyber recruitment and socialisation.

Recruitment Cyber Tools

In this section, cyber tools will be divided into three sections: Hosted sites, which include sites created and hosted by

terrorist groups; Non-hosted sites, which look at exploiting free network sites such as social networking and message

boards, and thirdly the focus will be on al-Qaeda‘s latest strategy – the online Inspire magazine.

Hosted sites

Terrorist created web sites convey their cause as defenders of the Islamic faith against the ‗crusades‘ of the West

(Lewis, 2005). These web sites are primarily an information tool used to challenge hegemonic Western views with

those of their minority cause (Awan, 2007; Lewis, 2005). One of the key strategies for forwarding their propaganda

goals is through the creation of ‗alternative‘ news sources (Awan, 2007, p. 397). An impression of legitimacy is

created through media savvy and high quality presentation (Awan, 2007). McNeal (2007) gives several examples of

these ‗news‘ services that include jehad.net (al-Qaeda‘s perspective on the war in Afghanistan), and azzam.com

which features jihad biographies and encourages others to join the cause. Although these web sites are a tool for

cyber recruitment, they are disadvantageous in that they rely on potential recruits seeking out and finding these sites.

A better strategy for al-Qaeda and other jihad groups is to use well established Western sites (non-hosted sites) that

already have a much larger online audience.

Non-hosted sites

Based on an in depth longitudinal study, Weimann (2008) argues that Yahoo has now become one of al-Qaeda‘s key

recruiting and operational tools. Key features used include the use of email and related chat functions as well as

Yahoo groups based on common interests (Weimann, 2008). It is these e-groups that have become a focal point of al-

Qaeda‘s strategy. Not only are they present on Yahoo, but also on major social networking sites that include

MySpace and Facebook(2). These groups pose an increased risk because they are legal, easy to create and

manipulate, allow for discussion, interaction and transfers of data files. Furthermore, in congruence with social

network research it provides an easy avenue for those with similar interests to connect (Weimann, 2008).

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These e-groups can range from hate groups to sophisticated recruiting forums. Radical hate groups can quickly

expand with Oboler (2008) giving the example of an anti-Israeli hate group growing to over 48000 members in just

18 months. More disturbingly, some e-groups are run and managed by leading al-Qaeda recruiters. Kohlmann (2008)

provides an example of the now disbanded Muntada al-Ansar (The Supporters Forum) which featured high level

recruiters from a number of Islamic Terrorist organisations. In fact, this forum was considered a ‗virtual

matchmaking service for budding Islamic militants searching for a path to jihad‘ (Kohlmann, 2008, p 8). Other

affiliated terrorist groups have also clearly stated their intention to use social networking sites like Facebook as a

media tool for the cause of jihad (Shaidle, 2009). As a further illustration, Anwar al-Awlaki, who was raised as an

‗all American boy‘ and has since fled to Yemen, held an account on Facebook with a large following of disaffected

youth before his account was finally shut down (Hamill, 2010). Additionally, Anwar was also an avid user of the

multimedia site YouTube where he had posted over 5000 videos (Hamill, 2010).

New strategies: Inspire magazine

Al-Qaeda‘s latest cyber tool is a colourful, professionally produced online magazine called Inspire which was

released in 2010. The first part of the title of this paper is a paraphrase of an Inspire article ―Make a bomb in the

kitchen of your mom‖ which gives detailed written instructions and illustrations on how to make a bomb using

simple materials as part of open source jihad. Overall, the magazine has varied content that includes messages, words

of encouragement, strategic advice, news, exhortations on giving to the poor (challenging Western capitalism),

campaigns, and articles from prominent leaders such as Usama Bin Laden and al-Suri. Although the web site has

been shut down, the magazine was not difficult to find and could easily be circulated as a simple portable document

file (PDF) through chat rooms and social groups. This magazine would no doubt find appeal among disaffected

youth.

(COUNTER) CULTURE: TERRORISM AS THEATRE

The internet is more than simply a propaganda tool, it is an essential mechanism for imparting and transferring the

culture and ideology of the journey that terrorists take toward jihad (Awan, 2007).

Perhaps one of most fundamental aspects of this cultural identity is that of ‗terrorism as theatre‘ (Awan, 2007;

Cowen, 2006). Reflecting on the tragic events of 9/11, London and Bali, the media coverage presented a ‗spectacle‘

designed to strike fear into the heart of Western civilisation. These events are critical to al-Qaeda‘s strategy because

‗The act of political violence itself is still the best way to obtain publicity, not simply the circulation of information

via the Internet.‘ (Anderson, 2003, p. 30). Terrorism as theatre is well suited to the internet where uncensored videos

can be posted which contain events of graphic violence. These events include: IED (improvised explosive device)

attacks and beheadings of Western hostages (Awan, 2007). Additional spectacles are provided by the testimonials of

suicide bombers that exploit the use of overt graphic imagery (McNeal, 2007). Thus, internet technology allows for

maximum psychological impact on the enemy, current supporters and potential recruits (Weimann, 2008).

A further distinction also needs to be made in terms of the culture of terrorism as theatre. Equally important,

terrorists conceptualise themselves as a counter-culture, a resistance movement, seeking freedom from ‗Western

Crusaders‘. Terrorists gain support for this concept by exploiting Western spectacles of violence (Awan, 2007).

These include graphic images and videos of civilian casualties, violent videos posted by US marines and images of

prisoner abuse. In addition, al-Qaeda is also keen to exploit controversies that support a Western/Muslim split such

as the New York Mosque controversy and the associated threats from a Pastor to burn the Qur‘an (Thomas, 2010).

What raises concern here is that the disaffected youth being targeted also feel that they are a minority counter culture.

Consequently, jihad recruiters seek to build a common interest and affinity with these youth in congruence with the

antecedents of social network research.

CASE STUDIES

How successful have these aforementioned strategies for al-Qaeda‘s jihad? It is important to examine briefly a

number of key case studies that involved the internet for recruitment or socialisation. Firstly, there are some

important caveats to our understanding of the effectiveness of cyber recruitment strategies. The ability to study the

effect of cyber tools on potential and new converts is exceedingly difficult. There is also the possibility that cyber

recruitment tools are simply ‗preaching to the converted‘ rather than causing any significant change (Awan, 2007, p.

400). More research is needed in this area including better methods of inquiry coupled with new conceptual models.

Data, in the vast majority of cases, can only be gathered ‗post fact‘, as a result of police investigations and court

action.

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In terms of statistics on home grown terrorism, the best evidence to date is a recent RAND corporation report on US

domestic radicalisation. Upon investigating cases of domestic radicalisation between 9/11 and the end of 2009,

Jenkins (2010) reported 46 cases totalling 125 persons. However, only 81 of these were indicted (Jenkins, 2010).

Although these figures are relatively small, Jenkins (2010) did report a rising trend in the number of cases and

individuals, particularly in 2009. These statistics do give some support for the effectiveness of al-Qaeda‘s cyber

recruitment tools, especially given that Jenkins (2010) report cites that many jihadists actually began their journey on

the internet as a place to connect with other disaffected and discontented individuals. To gain further insights, the

role of the internet in four home grown terrorist case studies from around the world will be explored.

Case Study 1: Madrid Train Bombings 2004 and London Bombings 2005

A brief account of these cases presented by Awan (2007) illustrates that the Madrid bombers were inspired by online

Iraqi jihad texts in an attempt to cause Spain‘s withdraw from Iraq. Hussein Oman (Defendant – London Bomb

Trial) admitted to investigators that while having no direct al-Qaeda contacts, regularly visited their web sites,

viewed their videos and read their propaganda (Awan, 2007). Both these case studies lend support for cyber tools in

inspiring and sustaining home grown terrorists.

Case Study 2: Foiled Plot of 17 Canadian Muslims 2004

Surveillance of an online chat room and subsequent investigation led to the arrest of 17 Canadian Muslims (Awan,

2007). Contact through internet chat and a common anti-Western discourse seemed to be an important antecedent to

the plot which then took on more conventional means including face-to-face contact (Awan, 2007). This case

supports the internet as an important recruitment/contact point for disaffected youth to begin a path of radicalisation.

Case Study 3: Five Young British –Muslims Charged Under the 2000 UK terrorism Act

2004

Five young British-Muslims had not yet committed an act of terrorism, yet they were charged in relation to the large

amount of material downloaded from extremist websites (Livingstone, 2007). Furthermore, surveillance of the

groups internet chat logs indicated that they were well and truly on the path to radicalisation (Livingstone, 2007).

Maher (2007, p. 144) cites the judge‘s decision on their path to radicalisation:

You were intoxicated by the extremist nature of the material that each of you collected, shared and

discussed – the songs, the images and language of violent jihad. So carried away by that material were you

that each of you crossed the line.

What is interesting about this case is that the youths had no specific plans of a terrorist threat, and it was still unclear

how they planned to carry out their jihad; all that was clear was that these youths had made a deliberate decision to

take the path of jihad (Livingstone, 2007). This case clearly links cyber recruitment tools to radicalisation, but is

(fortunately) unable to provide further details to links with actual terrorist acts.

Case Study 4: Adam Gadahn 1995 Onwards

Michael‘s (2009) fascinating case study of Adam Gadahn gives perhaps one of the best insights into the power of the

aforementioned cyber tools to begin the disaffected on their path to radicalisation and ultimately jihad. Gadahn is a

prime example of a ‗White Moor‘ convert. Raised in the US, Gadahn eventually moved to the Middle East and rose

to the highest ranks of al-Qaeda, becoming a vital part of their media strategy (Michael, 2009). Gadahn was not

raised as a Muslim but as an agnostic with a non-practicing Jewish Father and Fundamentalist Christian

grandparents. Interestingly, it was when a disaffected Gadahn moved in with his Christian grandparents that he had

access to the internet and started down a new path. It was here that he was attracted to Islam, and finding their online

discussions intriguing finally converted. Having been attracted to more radical online discussion sites, Gadahn

continued his journey with fellow radicals at a local mosque. From here he began his epic rise to the al-Qaeda

leadership ranks.

Evidence from these case studies combined with Jenkins (2010) study lends potent support for the effectiveness of

cyber tools for recruitment as a starting point on the path to jihad for home grown terrorists and ‗White Moors‘.

Studies also support the use of cyber tools to socialise and sustain radicalisation. Nevertheless, it is also important to

point out that these cases also involved human contact at some later stage. The level of overall internet influence

from recruitment to terrorist action still remains unclear. Nonetheless, we must ask how we can respond to the threat

of cyber recruitment in attracting youths on the path to jihad terrorism.

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WHERE TO FROM HERE?

Given the spate of terrorist attacks on Western soil using home grown terrorists, McNeal (2007) argues that one thing

is certain; we can no longer do nothing. In tackling cyber recruitment, there are a number of serious challenges faced

by governments and law enforcement. With terrorist hosted sites, it is easy for groups to simply change Internet

Service Providers (ISP‘s) if they are shut down. This then becomes problematic to track down again (Awan, 2007).

Compounding this challenge is the fact that some (US) companies provide domain names and host these sites while

often ignoring the nature of the content (McNeal, 2007). As an alternative McNeal (2007) suggests bypassing the

ISP‘s and shutting down the domain name (such as jihad.net) which has often been purchased from a US company.

This step could only be taken once a site was identified as a terrorist affiliated site.

Even if it was possible to shut down terrorist hosted sites, groups could and already have shifted to legal sites such as

Yahoo groups, Facebook and MySpace. Such discussion groups often waiver their rights from liability indicating

that the material on the site does not reflect the views of administrators (Awan, 2007). Moreover, users can have

multiple identities, fraudulent identities and shifting identities making them very hard to trace. This quandary was

demonstrated in a case where an Australian Jewish woman was threatened by a Hezbollah terrorist on Facebook

leaving police to admit the near impossible nature of tracking down the perpetrator (Kerbaj, 2008). A further

problem is that administrators of the site are often slow to act. A prime illustration is the eventual banning of Abu

Izzadeen‘s (jihadist) Facebook profile only after amassing a significant following (Mendez, 2008).

Frustrated with Facebook‘s (and others) lack of action on this issue, there has been the emerging phenomena of

private ‗activist‘ groups, most notably the Jewish Internet Defence Force (JIDF). This group became prominent after

legally conducting a takeover(3) and then subsequently shutting down an Israeli hate group (Oboler, 2008). This

move was orchestrated after 18 months of inaction by Facebook and a rapid growth in the size of the group.

Overall, responses can be categorised into two broad areas. First, there are attempts to challenge the socialisation

process. A case in point is Livingstone‘s (2007, p. 151) proposed ‗web-engagement strategy‘ which relies on

countering terrorist truth claims in attempting to reduce the support and evidence to follow along a radicalised path.

Second, there is the traditional approach of intelligence gathering and intervention. As a recommendation of his

report on domestic terrorism, Jenkins (2010) supports the continual and judicial use of cyber monitoring and

surveillance in order to disrupt and uncover terrorist recruitment and operations. Perhaps a combination of both

strategies would be useful, nonetheless, what is clearly evident is that internet intelligence operations need to

continue and develop in their counter terrorist sophistication.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the evolving threat of cyber recruitment targeting home grown terrorists. Cyber tools and

strategies continue to develop and evolve in an attempt to better hone in and attract disaffected Western youth. What

is particularly concerning about this trend is that evidence from case studies does provide tentative support to the

dangers of these cyber tools at least in initiating, and in other cases sustaining, the path of jihad. Al-Qaeda and other

jihad groups are increasingly making use of legal social networking sites that also allow users high levels of control

and interactivity making targeting these sites more difficult. The latest al-Qaeda online magazine, Inspire,

demonstrates just how adept they have become at continually trying to develop better cyber recruitment strategies by

producing high quality, media savvy and seductive propaganda that specifically target potential ‗White Moors‘.

These emerging threats need to be the subject of intelligent action responses that continue to monitor and intervene

as early as possible before individuals travel too far down the path of radicalisation, hatred and terrorism.

NOTE

(1) There are other spelling variations for al-Qaeda such as al-Qa‘ida and al-Qi‘idah. Although al-Qaeda is the

primary focus of this paper, the principles apply to related and affiliated Islamic jihad groups.

(2) Facebook has a membership of over 500 million users world-wide with 50% logging on in any one day

(http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics). This equates to approximately 1 in every 14 of the

world‘s population.

(3) This manoeuvre was conducted by emptying the group of its members. Once all the members were removed, the

group could be shut down (Oboler, 2008).

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REFERENCES

Anderson, A. (2003). Risk, Terrorism, and the Internet. Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 16(2), 24-33.

Awan, A. N. (2007). Virtual jihadist media. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 10(3), 389-408.

Brass, D. J., Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H. R., & Tsai, W. (2004). Taking Stock of Networks and Organizations: A

Multilevel Perspective. The Academy of Management Journal, 47(6), 795-817.

Conway, M. (2006). Terrorism and the Internet: New Media—New Threat? Parliamentary Affairs, 59(2), 283-298.

Cowen, T. (2006). Terrorism as Theater: Analysis and Policy Implications. Public Choice, 128(1/2), 233-244.

Hamill, J. (2010, 26 September). Web Watch: How the internet cultivated the new Bin Laden, Herald Scotland.

Retrieved October 10, 2010, from http://www.heraldscotland.com/comment/guest-commentary/web-watch-

how-the-internet-cultivated-the-new-bin-laden-1.1057480

Jenkins, B. M. (2010). Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since

September 11, 2001. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Kerbaj, R. (2008, April 5). Jewish woman threatened through Facebook. News.com.au, (April 5, 2008). Retrieved

October 10, 2010, from http://www.news.com.au/technology/would-be-friend-a-facebook-terrorist/story-

e6frfrnr-1111115980877

Kohlmann, E. F. (2006). The Real Online Terrorist Threat. Foreign Affairs, 85(5), 115-124.

Kohlmann, E. F. (2008). Al-Qa`ida‘s ―MySpace‖: Terrorist Recruitment on the Internet. CTC Sentinel, 1(2), 8-9.

Lachow, I., & Richardson, C. (2007). Terrorist Use of the Internet: The Real Story. JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly(45),

100-103.

Leiken, R. S. (2005). Europe's Angry Muslims. Foreign Affairs, 84(4), 120-135.

Lewis, J. A. (2005). The Internet and Terrorism. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of

International Law), 99 (March 30-April 2), American Society of International Law, 112-115.

Livingstone, D. (2007). Taking on the Radicals. Index on Censorship, 36(4), 148-153.

Maher, S. (2007). Road to Jihad. Index on Censorship, 36(4), 144-147.

Matusitz, J. (2008). Similarities between terrorist networks in antiquity and present-day cyberterrorist networks.

Trends in Organized Crime, 11(2), 183-199.

McNeal, G. S. (2007). Cyber Embargo: Countering the Internet Jihad. (German). [Conference Paper]. Case Western

Reserve University School of Law, 39(3), 789-826.

Mendez, D. (2008, February 15). Facebook and Terrorism: a love hate relationship, Tech.Blorge [Technology News].

Retrieved October 10, 2010, from http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/02/15/facebook-and-

terrorism-a-love-hate-relationship-2/

Michael, G. (2009). Adam Gadahn and Al-Qaeda's Internet Strategy. Middle East Policy, 16(3), 135-152.

Murphy, C. (2007). The Internet: Midwife of Global Radicalism?: High-Tech Savvy Mushrooms from First

Primitive Web Site. Science & Spirit, 18(1), 36-39.

O‘Rourke, S. (2007). Virtual Radicalisation: Challenges for Police. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 8th

Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference, Perth.

Oboler, A. (2008). The rise and fall of a Facebook hate group. First Monday, 13(11).

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Shaidle, K. (2009, January 7). Facebook Jihad Right Side News. Retrieved October 10, 2010, from

http://www.rightsidenews.com/200901073240/world/terrori sm/facebook-jihad.html

Thomas, G. (2010, August 26). Radical Islamists Try to Exploit Islamophobia, Voice of America. Retrieved October

10, 2010, from http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Radical -Islamists-Try-to-Exploit-Islamophobia-

101592048.html

Weimann, G. (2008). The Psychology of Mass-Mediated Terrorism. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(1), 69-86.

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Countering Home-Grown Terrorists in Australia: An Overview of Legislation,

Policy and Actors Since 2001

Michael G Crowley

School of Law and Justice

Edith Cowan University

Perth, Western Australia

[email protected]

Abstract This article explores the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and policy in Australia. In particular it explores how

legislation facilitated prosecution and conviction of persons involved in home-grown terrorism, including analysis of

investigation and prosecution policy surrounding the ul-Haque and Haneef cases. Particular attention is given to the

terrorism trials involving Benbrika & Ors and Elomar & Ors. What makes these trials intriguing is the fact that most

of those convicted could be more easily described as more vulnerable than menacing. Sentencing of those convicted

was cognate with no policies for rehabilitation. The small number of convictions under the legislation when

considered against the increased funding of counter-terrorism, loss of traditional rights and privileges and

Australia‟s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq raises issues about adequate policy setting in this area.

Keywords Attempt offences, counter-terrorism legislation, Benbrika, Elomar, sentencing terrorism, terrorists.

INTRODUCTION

Following the events of 11 September 2001, the Australian Government moved swiftly to legislate to counter

potential terrorist acts within Australia. To date there have been more than 40 pieces of legislation that relate directly

or indirectly to terrorism. The aim and purpose of terrorism legislation are twofold: to act as a deterrent and to

prevent future terrorist acts. This legislation formed an important component of counter-terrorism policy because it

not only focused on preventing a terrorist act taking place, but convicted terrorists were to be severely punished. The

disjunction between the traditional criminal law principles of attempt offences and modern counter-terrorism

legislation becomes obvious in the Benbrika and Elomar trials where no terrorist act occurred. This lack of a

completed terrorist act is a consistent fact in the conduct of all 21 persons convicted in Australia since 2001.

Furthermore, a consideration of the background and relationships of the respective accused in these two criminal

trials provide insights into radicalism and motive. What is important for those involved in combating potential

terrorists within Australia is the nature of the evidence that underpinned these two convictions and the lack of policy

on combating radicalisation of vulnerable persons. This is particularly important as there is a growing concern

supported by research that demonstrates an increase in home-grown terrorism (Porter & Kebbell, 2010).

BACKGROUND

The counter-terrorism legislation should not be viewed in isolation. It represents a component of counter-terrorism

policy that includes international obligationsi, international treaties

ii, international

iii and domestic co-operation

iv, wide

reaching legislationv, policy revision

vi and significant domestic expenditure. The Australian Government has

increased defence spending some 59% since 2001 to $21.8 billion (Michaelson, 2010, 24). Michaelsen further notes:

More than $16 billion have been spent in extra defence, counter-terrorism and foreign aid by 2010-11. Over

the same period, ASIO‘s budget has increased by 655%, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) budget by

161percent, ASIS by 236 percent and the Office of National Assessments by 441 percent. Most recently, the

Government has announced a $200 billion package of aviation security measures to better protect our air

transport system from terrorist attack, And the White Paper provides $69 million for introducing biometric-

based visa systems to reduce the risk of terrorists, criminals and other persons of concern entering Australia

undetected. (Michaelson, 2010, 24)

.

The policy support for counter-terrorism legislation and expenditure has been aided by the killing of 100 Australians

in overseas terrorist attacks and Australian soldiers have been killed and injured fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.

These events maintain the on-going perceived risk of terrorism to Australians abroad and by implication at home.

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LEGISLATION

The Commonwealth of Australia has created a single set of terrorism offences under the Section 100 of the Criminal

Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code). The objective was to create offences:

Designed to prevent, discourage and punish behaviour which falls within a wide range of human activity,

and which is commonly described as terrorism: broadly, the use of violence or a threat of violence in pursuit

of some political, ideological or religious cause. (Criminal Code, s.100)

Furthermore, anti-terrorism legislation defines a terrorist act widely, encompassing industrial and political dissent.vii

In 2005 these powers were extended to include organisations that advocate the doing of a terrorist act.viii

The key

provision in the Criminal Code is:

Division 101 -- Terrorism

101.1 Terrorist acts

(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in a terrorist act.

Penalty: Imprisonment for life...

101.2 Providing or receiving training connected with terrorist acts

(1)...

(2)...

(3) A person commits an offence under this section even if:

(a) a terrorist act does not occur; or

(b) the training is not connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person in, or

assistance in a specific terrorist act; or

(c) the training is connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person in, or assistance

in more than one terrorist act...ix

The policy imperatives were allowing an early opportunity at which the facts can be submitted establishing a prima

facie case and providing cogent punishment of persons convicted of terrorism offences. For the former point this

represents a winding back of the traditional law on attempt offences. Traditionally, the common law viewed attempt

offences as unfinished offences and distinguished between acts that were preparatory and acts that were sufficient to

amount to attempt (Bronitt & McSherry, 2005). In other words, for an accused to commit an offence it had to be

proved that an accused intended to commit a crime by engaging in conduct that is more than preparatory such that

the acts must be proximate (not remote) from the completed act (Bronitt & McSherry, 2005). This amounts to an

extension of criminal liability from what an accused did to what an accused tried to do; or under Division 101 of the

Criminal Code above what an accused may have contemplated. The result is that the authorities can arrest well

before completion of the anticipated crime. Historically, this has led to appeal cases determining how far police can

throw their net in attempting to prevent crime.x However, this does appear to be the case with terrorism appeals in

Australia. The policy underpinning this legislation is to allow authorities to act well before any damage is done or

even a target is chosen so as to limit potential death or injury to civilians.

In addition, the Australian Government can now classify an organisation as a terrorist organisation. This means that

its members may have, by being members of a proscribed organisation, committed an offence (Criminal Code, s. 102

1). Furthermore, federal legislation has tossed aside traditional common law rights such as a right to silence,

unrestricted access to a lawyer of choice and freedom of speech (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act

1979 (Cth) ss.34G, 34TA and 34NVAA).

INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION

Whereas the investigation and prosecution of those involved in terrorism offences as in the Benbrika and Elomar

trials were largely uneventful that has not always been the case with terrorism investigations and prosecutions since

2001. Two examples stand out. The first is the failed prosecution of Izhar ul-Haque which raised serious concerns

about the conduct of Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers and Australian Security Intelligence Officers (ASIO)

cumulating in The Street Review – A Review of Interoperability between the AFP and its National Security Partners

(Street Report). The report noted that the prosecution failed,

…when evidence essential to the Crown‘s case was ruled inadmissible in pre-trial hearings. NSW Supreme

Court Justice Michael Adams was highly critical of the manner in which the AFP and ASIO had dealt with the

suspect, and it was on these grounds that he determined critical evidence inadmissible. (Street Report, 1.5 [1])

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Justice Adams in Izar ul-Haque noted, amongst other criticisms:

The precise boundaries of the term ―oppressive...conduct‖ are uncertain. Some assistance is afforded by the

other conduct mentioned in para 84(1)(a). For the purposes of this case, however, it is not necessary to

approach the boundaries of the term. In my view, the conduct of ASIO, in particular by officers B15 and

B16, was well within the meaning of the phrase. In substance, they assumed unlawful powers of direction,

control and detention. It was a gross interference by the agents of the state with the accused‘s legal rights as

a citizen, rights which he still has whether he be suspected of criminal conduct or not and whether he is a

Muslim or not. Furthermore, the conduct was deliberately engaged in for the purpose of overbearing the

accused in the hope that he would co-operate. It involved using a part of his parents‘ home to hold him

incommunicado for the purposes of an interview under cover of a warrant which the officers knew well did

not justify any such conduct but which I think they rightly believed neither the accused nor his family

understood. Whatever ―oppressive‖ means for the purposes of s84, I do not doubt that the conduct of the

ASIO officers falls well within it (R v Izar ul-Haque, [95]).

And later:

The evidence of the ASIO conduct, considered alone, would be sufficient to establish oppressive conduct

within the section. But the oppression was continued, in my view, by the conduct of the AFP. Mr Gordge‘s

presence at the interviews was a clear signal to the accused of the inextricable link between ASIO and the

AFP and an implicit reminder that he should not depart from anything already said. The conversations with

him at the end of the interview on 7 November and when he came to AFP headquarters on 10 November

continued the thrust of the message communicated by ASIO at the first meeting: co-operate or else. (R v Izar

ul-Haque , [98])

It needs to be remembered that those investigating potential terrorism offences have wider powers than in

investigating other criminal offences. To start with the terrorism provisions are drafted widely picking up persons

who not only commit a terrorist act but do anything that can be linked to a potential terrorist act. The latter gives a

wide subjective discretion to authorities. Combined with this discretion are powers requiring compliancexi

,

production of documents and informationxii

and silencing of persons questioned about terrorism matters or being

investigated about terrorism mattersxiii

. On two occasions the checks and balances that are supposed to protect

citizens from unwarranted prosecution have failed. Damian Bugg AM QC, former Commonwealth Director of Public

Prosecutions (CDPP) in a press release dated 12 October 2007 noted in regard to the failure of the CDPP to follow

policy in the Dr Haneef prosecution:

The Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth provides that there be a prima facie case with reasonable

prospects of conviction for a prosecution to be instituted or continued. The DPP‘S role is to provide advice on

whether the evidence establishes reasonable prospects of conviction in accordance with that policy.

The advice given in this case did not address that test.xiv

His successor Christopher Craigie SC has nonetheless in a Directors speech on 12 November 2009 at the Heads of

Prosecutions Agencies of the Commonwealth (HOPAC) conference affirmed CDPP compliance with government

policy directions:

…the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth commences by recognising that not all suspected criminal

offences must automatically be subject of prosecution…The initial consideration in the exercise of this

discretion is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the institution or continuation of a prosecution…a

decision whether or not to prosecute must clearly not be influenced by:

a. The race, religion, sex, national origin or political associations, activities or beliefs of the alleged offender

or any other person involved…

b. …

c. Possible political advantage or disadvantage to the Government or any political group or party or…xv

.

While not seemingly involved in the initial issues surrounding the questioning and detention of Izhar ul-Haque, it

would be fascinating to hear what the CDPP‘s advice was upon receiving the AFP brief especially as there were

several attempts to bring the matter before the High Court of Australia on an extraterritoriality issue. In essence,

challenging the constitutional validity of proscribing the conduct of Australian citizens overseas for conduct

unconnected with Australia (Nolan, 2008, 175-90). The Street Review recommended greater co-operation between

CDPP, ASIO and AFP. However, Nolan doubts whether greater interoperability and information sharing will

―remedy the problematic investigative methods as exposed by Justice Adams‖ (Nolan, 2008, 183). Furthermore and

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also noted in Nolan‘s article, the Street Report noted at 6:

1.6 The outcome of the ul-Haque matter has demonstrated that the preconditions to criminal prosecution need

to be taken into consideration by all of Australia‘s national security agencies in the conduct of their operations

if the full range of preventative measures, including prosecution, is to remain available to combat terrorism.

Of some concern for policy makers is the not unsurprising difference of opinion on some issues involving the

behaviour of ASIO agents towards ul-Haque between Justice Adams in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and

Ian Carnell, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security in regard to trespass, coercive interviewing, kidnapping

and false imprisonment of ul-Haque (Nolan, 2008, 187). While Justice Adams was concerned with legal rights and

the law, Ian Carnell claimed national security imperatives in the war on terror (Nolan, 2008, 187).xvi

Furthermore, there is a structural problem arising from different statutory authorities combating terrorism. This was

identified in the Street Report at 6:

1.8 The Committee recognises that ASIO and the AFP have different statutory mandates. Both agencies,

and State and Territory police jurisdictions, have a clear mandate to prevent terrorist activity. In responding

to potential national security threats the ASIO mandate is broadly focused, whereas the AFP and its state

and territory counterparts are generally focused on the demands of criminal investigations and potential

prosecutions. It is critical that effective and accountable processes exist to reconcile any overlaps or

conflicts in organisational mandates and priorities.

IMPLICATIONS

Another way to review the success or otherwise of counter-terrorism policy and legislation is to consider who has

been convicted. In Victoria in 2009 and NSW in 2010 two large criminal trials concluded with those convicted

receiving lengthy sentences of imprisonment. Overall, some 22 men were accused of various terrorism related

offences.

In the Victorian matter - Benbrika & Ors 13 men were accused of offences against Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth

Criminal Code in December 2006. One, Izzydeen Atik pleaded guilty in July 2007 and the other 12 went to trial

commencing in February 2008. On 15 and 16 September 2008 seven were convicted of knowingly being members of

a terrorist organisation and some of other offences. Four were acquitted and in one case the jury could not reach a

verdict.

The prosecution needed to convince a jury that each of the accused was a member of a terrorist organisation together

were planning to commit a terrorist act. The evidence consisted of:

Attendance at religious classes,

Talk of being involved in violent jihad,

The existence of a jemaah to hold money for the group members,

482 intercepted telephone conversations,

Inconclusive evidence of trips away to training camps,

Stealing a car to fund the groups activities,

Internet access to websites - beheading of hostages – jihadi literature – terrorist handbooks…including for

example in Haddara‘s computer two copies of a publication called ‗AL-Battar Bimonthly Publication No 22‘

– a military or quasi-military training guide or manual – found in two files, a Word document file and a PDF

file called ‗22.doc‘ and ‗22.pdf‘ respectively – in zip archive file, ‗10.11.04 b22.zip‘ – in‗Other/‘ – at end of

a chain of limbs directed to Haddara‘s business.xvii

The final evidence related to Benbrika‘s activities with an undercover policeman who demonstrated the use of

explosives. There was no evidence that other members of Benbrika‘s group knew or were involved in these activities.

It should also be noted that internet access by one member of the group may have little or no significance on the

criminality of other members. However, if there is regular contact between group members who among other things

share internet derived materials these materials assume greater significance if they relate to terrorism. Courts are also

careful to distinguish ‗benign‘ material, for example; Arab language classes and American movies from images

extolling the virtues of 11 September 2001, images of Osama bin Laden and/or praising his activities in relation to

warfare, extremely gruesome images including beheadings and executions of foreign prisoners.(R v Mulahalilovic

[2009] [16 – 17].

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Table 1, The Benbrika Men, sets out background data and resultant sentences for those convicted in Benbrika & Ors.

Of particular interest is the age difference between Benbrika and the followers. The educational background and

resultant qualifications are mediocre for the followers. Furthermore several of the followers have suffered a family

crisis in the years leading up to arrest.

name

age at sentence born Married/

children

education Prior character Penalty

Max/sent/non-

parole (yrs/mths)

Add 1184 days of

Pre-trial custody

Benbrika 48

Religion after

arriving here –

religious

advisor

1941 -

Algiers

1989 -

Australia

Yes/7 Aviation engineer –

religious leader here

good 25/15/12

Aimen

Joud

24 1984 no Did not finish school –

supervisor fathers blding

bus.

good

good references

25/8/7.6

Fadl

Sayadi

28 Lebanon

1983 - here

Yes/no Left yr 10 minor priors

good references

25/8/6

Abdullah

Merhi

23 Melbourne Yes/1 Left yr 11 – completing

electrical apprentice ship

good

good references

10/6/4.6

Ahmed

Raad

25

Death of

brother –

religion -

Benbrika

Australia Yes/1 Left yr 11 unsuccessful

TAFE

good

good references

25/8/7.6

Ezzit

Raad

26

Death of

brother –

religion -

Benbrika

Australia Yes/2 electrician good

good references

25/6/5.6

Amer

Haddara

29

Mecca 2004 –

tour leader

2005

Australia no Computer systems Dip –

VU

good

good references

10/6/4.6

Table 1: The Benbrika Men

In the Brenrika trial and subsequent sentencing hearing none of the accused gave evidence which meant no

explanation/justification was given by those convicted of their reasons for being involved with Benbrika. This had a

direct impact on sentencing wherein the sentencing judge noted that rehabilitation played little or no part.

What is clear is that motive was clearly inferred from the telephone intercepts. Porter and Kebell (2010, 8) noted that,

‗Benbrika and his group showed later isolation within the Muslim community, breaking away from the local

mosque‘. This isolation was also noted in a lack of attachment to the wider community with Benbrika covertly

recorded saying: ‗...I don‘t believe in this country. I don‘t believe in this law. Which all this believe, no Allah but

Allah, no Allah no other law of. This is the meaning of no Allah but Allah‘ (Porter and Kebbell, 2010, 8). In terms of

group dynamics Benbrika increased the sense of collective identity of the group by use of inclusive first person

pronouns (Porter and Kebbell, 2010, 9).

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In the New South Wales matter, Elomar & Ors, nine men were accused of a series of terrorism related offences in

late 2005. Shortly before the trial three men pleaded guilty and one was at that stage found to be unfit to plead. He

subsequently recovered sufficiently to plead guilty. The remaining five were found guilty by a jury in October 2009

of conspiring to do a terrorist act. The difference between this trial and the Benbrika trial is that here the accused

were charged with conspiracy to commit a terrorist act. A conspiracy offence requires proof of the existence of an

agreement to do an illegal act, here to commit a terrorist act. Because criminal agreements are rarely written, the

existence of the agreement is proved by evidence that is termed overt acts.

In Elomar & Ors the evidence relied upon was:

Ammunition,

Laboratory equipment,

Training camps,

Purchase of chemicals,

Internet derived instructional material and some hard copies about explosives, eavesdropping and

gun use,

Internet derived material of an extremist or fundamentalist matter. With some evidence of hard

copies being distributed amongst some members of the group,

Telephone conversations,

Fingerprints, and

Meetings.

The evidence in this matter was more substantial and revealing. Although there was no target, the evidence was more

consistent with what would be expected of a terrorist group planning to carry out a terrorist act. The dynamics of the

Elomar group are also different. Here the ages are collectively higher with less difference between the leader and the

followers. The same can be said in regard to qualifications and educational background.

Table 2 below, The Elomar Conspirators, sets out background data on the Elomar group including the sentences

handed down following conviction.

name age at

sentence

born married/children education Prior

character

Penalty

max/sent/non-

parole (yrs/mths)

Mohamed

Elomar

44 Lebanon

1977 -

Australia

Yes/6 Trade qual – family

bus.

good Life/28/21

Khalid

Cheiko

36

Took to

religion in

20‘s

Lebanon Yes/1 Left yr 11 Life/27/20

Abdul

Hasan

40

Culturally

isolated

Bangladesh

1990? -

Australia

Yes (convert)/4 Poor work history –

basic

English/limited

Arabic

good Life/26/19.6

Moustata

Cheikho

32

1995 –

religion -

Influence of

Khalid

Cheiko

Australia

Attended LeT

training camp

Pakistan

Yes/1 Did not finish

mechanics trade –

gun licence till

ASIO..

good Life/26/19.6

Mohammed

Jamal

26

Drugs/OH at

school –

religion via

brother

Australia No – male family

cannot visit him

Yr 10 & computer

skills

good Life/23/17.3

Table 2: The Elomar Conspirators

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As in the Benbrika Case, in Elomar & Ors none of the accused gave evidence at trial or during sentencing

proceedings. Motive was derived primarily from intercepted telephone recordings. In regard to motive Justice

Whealy noted:

First, each was driven by the concept that the world was, in essence, divided between those who adhered

strictly and fundamentally to a rigid concept of the Muslim faith, indeed, a medieval view of it, and to those

who did not, Secondly, each was driven by the conviction that Islam throughout the world was under attack,

particularly at the hands of the United States and its allies. In this context, Australia was plainly included.

Thirdly, each offender was convinced that his obligation as a devout Muslim was to come to the defence of

Islam and other Muslims overseas. Fourthly, it was the duty of each individual offender, indeed a religious

obligation, to respond to the worldwide situation by preparing for violent jihad in this country, here in

Australia (R v Elomar & Ors, 2010, [56])

However, while there was evidence of members in both groups taking on roles both groups were poor role models

for future groups considering how to successfully commit a terrorist act. While the evidence demonstrates the

Elomar group were more advanced in preparation, having ammunition and bomb-making materials, their efforts

were described by counsel representing one terrorist on sentencing as; ―…they were amateurish and ineffective.

Thirdly, it was argued that the offender's (Touma‘s) cognitive and other skills were lessened to a degree by the limit

of his intellectual capacity…‖(R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 1475 (24 October 2008) [105]). The lack of skills

demonstrated by these individuals was recognised with Justice Bongiorno who also sounded a warning:

Overseas experience of terrorist activity with which we are all unfortunately now effective

operatives...terrorist acts ... in modern times are often carried out by amateurs... (R v Benbrika & Ors [67]).

CONCLUSION

The fact that the Benbrika men and Elomar conspirators are Muslim, alone with the just about all of those convicted

as terrorists in Australia might suggest Muslims are a threat to the Australian community. This is not supported by

Australian Government statistics that indicate that less than two percent of the Australian population is Muslim. But

more importantly, they have widespread origins coming from Turkey, Lebanon, Bosnia, Kosovo, Herzegovina,

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Indonesia, Somalia and the Sudan for a start. Historically, not all these

populations have friendly histories. Furthermore, with Christians, not all Muslims practice their faith.

If lack of successful terrorist attacks on Australian soil is used as a guide than counter-terrorism legislation and

policy have been successful. However, the problems in the Haneef and ul-Haque matters combined with the overt

radicalisation of those involved in the Benbrika and Elomar matters suggest underlying problems with our legislation

and policy. For example, the different mandates applying to statutory authorities involved in counter-terrorism

(Street Report).

Because the background, community involvement and motives of home-grown terrorists who have been convicted

are difficult to detect beyond possible religious fervour, a concerted policy of counter-terrorism counter-

radicalisation is needed if the potential risk to the Australian community is going to be effectively reduced.

Legislation is not a shield and policy makers need to accept its use as a blunt weapon of deterrent and punishment is

more akin to the underlying attitudes of terrorists rather those traditionally associated with a democratic state. What

is needed is targeted education and counter-radicalisation policies that can provide an in-built resilience akin to a

shield against potential home-grown terrorist attacks.

Notes

i For example, following the events of 11 September 2001, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution

1373 that included: ‗all States shall…prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts … providing any form of

support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts… Ensure that any person who participates

in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to

justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious

criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such

terrorist acts. ‘ Retrieved October 7, 2010 from

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement

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ii For example: International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; International Convention for

the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 9 December 1999, UN Doc.A/Res/54/109 (1999), in

force 10 April 2002). iii

For example: Australia has signed an international treaty with Europol to facilitate transnational sharing of

intelligence and access to crime-specific training and expertise. Europol is the European Union Law Enforcement

Intelligence Agency which aims to improve the effectiveness and co–operation of the competent authorities in the

Member States in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of

organised crime. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-

liaison/europol.aspx iv For example: National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements and National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Retrieved

October 7, 2010 from

http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/NAtionalSecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doingNational_C

ounter-Terrorism_Arrangements v For example in 2002: Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, Suppression of the Financing of

Terrorism Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombing) Act 2002, Border Security

legislation Amendment Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002. Retrieved

October 7, 2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/legis/cth vi Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia/Protecting Our Community,

Commonwealth of Australia 2010. vii

s.100 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). viii

ss.102.1, 102.1(2) Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). ix

Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html x See, for example: DPP v Stonehouse [1977] 2 All ER 909 especially Lord Diplock at 916, 919, 920; Lord Solmon

at 927 and Lord Edmund-Davis at 934 ; Alister v Regina (1984) 154 CLR 404 and Knight v Regina (1992) 175 CLR

495. xi

See, for example; s. 201A of Schedule 2 Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) requiring assisting authorities to access

computer systems. xii

See, for example; Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 (Cth) and Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) xiii

See, for example; s. 34F(8) Australian Security Intelligence Act 1979 (Cth) which provides for incommunicado

detention without notice; and s.104.5(3) Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) concerned with interim control orders which

can impose restrictions on communicating or associating with specified individuals; s105.41 Criminal Code Act 1995

(Cth) concerned with disclosure offences and s.34ZS Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth)

Secrecy relating to warrants and questioning. xiv

Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Media/Releases/20071012-Haneef.pdf xv

Retrieved October 7, 2010 from Http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Director/Speeches/20091112cc-Prosecution-

Independence (7/10/2010). The policy can be read in full. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from

http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy xvi

See also: Justice Adams in R v ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC 1251 and Ian Carnell, Inspector-General of Intelligence

and Security, Report of Inquiry Into the Actions Taken by ASIO in 2003 in Respect of Mr Izhar ul-Haque and

Related Matters (12 November 2008). Retrieved October 13, 2010 from http://www.igis.gov.au/statements.cfm xvii

Haddara argued no evidence he ever read these materials: (R v Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No 28) [2008] VSC 336

(16 June 2008) at [42].

REFERENCES

Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia/Protecting Our Community,

Commonwealth of Australia 2010. Retrieved November 14, 2010 from

http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/counter_terrorism/docs/counter-terrorism_white_paper.pdf

Bronitt, S & McSherry B., (2005) Principles of Criminal Law (2nd

ed.). Sydney: Thomson Lawbook.

Carnell, I. (2008) Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Report of Inquiry Into the Actions Taken by ASIO

in 2003 in Respect of Mr Izhar ul-Haque and Related Matters (12 November). Retrieved October 13, 2010 from

http://www.igis.gov.au/statements.cfm

Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, Directors Speeches. Retrieved October 7, 2010, from

http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Director/Speeches/20091112cc-Prosecution-Independence.

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Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions Prosecution Policy. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from

http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy

Michaelson, C. (2010). Terrorism in Australia:

An Inflated Threat. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from

http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol6no2Michaelsen.pdf

Media Releases on Haneef. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from

http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Media/Releases/20071012-Haneef.pdf

National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements and National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Retrieved October 7, 2010

from

http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/NAtionalSecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doingNational_C

ounter-Terrorism_Arrangements

Nolan, M. (2008) Counter-Terrorism Interviewing and Investigative Interoperability: R v ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC

1251, Case Commentary. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, July, 175-190.

Porter, L.E., & Kebbell, M.R (2010) Radicalisation in Australia: Examining Australia‘s Convicted Terrorists.

Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, iFirst article, 1 – 20.

Street Report. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/~/media/afp/pdf/t/the-

street-review.ashx

United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1373. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://daccess-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement

Legislation and International Conventions

Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth)

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss.34G, 34F(8), 34TA, 34NVAA and s.34ZS.

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss.100, 102.1, 102.1(2), s.104.5(3) , s105.41 Retrieved October 7, 2010 from

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html

Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) s. 201A of Schedule 2

Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 (Cth)

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; International Convention for the Suppression

of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 9 December 1999, UN Doc.A/Res/54/109 (1999), in force 10 April 2002).

Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002,

Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombing) Act 2002, Border Security legislation Amendment

Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002. Retrieved October, 7, 2010 from

http://www.austlii.edu.au/legis/cth

Cases

Alister v Regina 154 CLR 404 (1984).

DPP v Stonehouse 2 All ER 909 [1977].

Knight v Regina 175 CLR 495 (1992).

Regina v Benbrika & Ors VSC 21 at 1 [2009].

Regina v Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No 28) [2008] VSC 336 (16 June 2008).

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71 | P a g e

Regina v Elomar & Ors, 2010.

Regina v Mulahalilovic NSWSC 1010 (30 January 2009) [2009].

Regina v Touma NSWSC 1475 (24 October 2008) [2008].

Regina v Izare ul-Haque NSWSC 1251 [2007].


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