The Proceedings of the
1st Australian Counter Terrorism
Conference
30 November to 2 December, 2010
The Duxton Hotel, Perth, Western Australia
Proceedings of the
1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference
Published By
secau – Security Research Centre
School of Computer and Security Science
Edith Cowan University
Perth, Western Australia
Edited By
Dr Anne Aly
secau – Security Research Centre
School of Computer and Security Science
Edith Cowan University
Perth, Western Australia
Copyright 2010, All Rights Reserved
ISBN 978-0-7298-0684-8
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Table of Contents
The Internet as Ideological Battleground 1
Anne Aly
Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based Upon
Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60)
& Rhodesia (1964-1979) 7
Bill Bailey
The Malarkey of Money Transfers: Overlooking E-Bay whilst the
Hawaladars are Hunted 15
David M. Cook and Timothy Smith
The Piracy and Terrorism Nexus: Real or Imagined? 24
Karine Hamilton
Review: Disillusionment with Radical Social Groups 31
Kira J. Harris
Moral Disengagement: Exploring Support Mechanisms for Violent
Extremism Among Young Egyptian Males 40
Dr Paul S Lieber, Dr Yael Efreom-Lieber and Dr (LTC) Christopher Rate
The Emergent Challenges for Policing Terrorism: Lessons from Mumbai 45
Simon O‟Rourke
“Make A Bomb In Your Mums Kitchen”: Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation
of „White Moors‟ and Home Grown Jihadists 54
Robyn Torok
Countering Home-Grown Terrorists in Australia: An Overview of Legislation,
Policy and Actors Since 2001 62
Michael G Crowley
Proceedings of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference
Conference Foreword
Welcome to the 1st Australian Counterterrorism Conference proceedings. This is the inaugural
conference to be held as part of the secau Congress. The conference brings together academics and
practitioners in a forum to discuss emerging trends in terrorism and counterterrorism and, more
broadly, their implications for human security.
The range of papers presented in these proceedings attests to the diversity of the field of
counterterrorism studies. Since the devastating terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in
2001, terrorism and counterterrorism studies have attracted much attention. There has been a
staggering 400 percent increase in publications on terrorism and related fields since 2001. Yet, the
field is still developing as an area of academic interest and will no doubt continue to develop as the
international community faces new threats and novel challenges to peace and stability.
As a relatively new field of study, counterterrorism draws from the disciplines of psychology,
political science, international relations, defence studies, media studies and security. These
proceedings include papers that cover such diverse areas of interest as piracy and terrorism, terrorist
recruitment, group psychology, policing, terrorism laws, terrorist operations and the use of new
technologies.
All submitted papers were subject to a double blind peer review process. Of the 11 papers submitted
9 were accepted for final presentation and subsequent publication. This year the best paper award is
sponsored by the Western Australian Police. The award will be presented on the night of the
Congress dinner.
I take this opportunity to thank the contributors to these proceedings who have devoted their time
and professionalism. I would also like to thank the conference committee and the paper reviewers for
their efforts in ensuring that the proceedings are of a high standard.
I trust that you will enjoy reading the papers in these proceedings and that they will inspire your
thoughts about terrorism, its challenges and indeed, its resolutions.
Dr Anne Aly
Conference Chair
Conference Organising Committee
Conference Chair: Dr Anne Aly
Congress Chair: Professor Craig Valli
Executive Chair: Professor Murray Lampard
Track Chair: Dr Andrew Woodward
Track Chair: Dr Trish Williams
Track Chair Dr Dave Brooks
Track Chair: Dr Christopher Bolan
Committee Member: David Cook
Committee Member: Peter Hannay
Committee Member: Patryk Szewczyk
Committee Member: Ken Fowle
Congress Organiser: Lisa McCormack
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The Internet as Ideological Battleground
Anne Aly
secau – Security Research Centre
School of Computer and Security Science
Edith Cowan Univesity
Perth, Western Australia
Recent global events that have brought to light the use of new technologies by terrorist groups have focused attention
on the role of the internet in the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals and groups towards a violent extremism. In
2007, the case of Abdul Basheer, a law graduate in Singapore arrested for attempting to join the Taliban in
Afghanistan drew attention to the use of the Internet as a source of inspiration and information for would be
terrorists. More recently Sydney man Belal Khazaal became the first person to be convicted on the charge of making
a document connected with assisting in a terrorist act after using material already available on the internet to develop
his own publication "The Rules of Jihad - Short Judicial Rulings and Organisational Instructions For Fighters And
Mujahideen Against Infidels". Both cases point to the developing role of the Internet in the process of radicalisation
and suggest that the Internet has become an important tactical tool in the terrorists‘ repertoire. The role of the Internet
in radicalisation and the extent to which it contributes to the process through which latent beliefs translate into
violent actions is not fully understood. However, with the developing strand of terrorism studies that deals with the
diffusion of intent as an integral component of counter terrorism efforts has come an understanding of terrorism as a
battle of words and ideas. Nowhere is this more evident than on the internet.
RADICALISATION
Radicalisation may be described as a process by which individuals progress from a passive or inactive belief in a
particular political, social or ideological dogma to extreme or violent action. Several theories have been put forward
to describe this progression, particularly in the context of radical or extreme Islamism. Many draw on the
behavioural sciences for theoretical models of how terrorist groups indoctrinate and influence members. The
combined works of Kuran (1998), Sustein (2002) and Koker and Yordan (2006), for example, place group pressure
as fundamentally sustaining the dynamics of terrorist groups. According to Koker and Yordan (2006)
Terrorist organisations are pressure groups with an inner hard core of activists and an outer ring of non-
activists. By definition, hardcore activists seek recruits by propagating their views in order to win more
support for their particular cause. Recruits, who tend to be non-activists at the time of recruitment, increase
the organisation‟s power base. The resulting collectivity professes support for a specific cause, forming a
pressure group.
Despite an increased awareness and understanding of radicalisation, the reasons why some individuals become
radicalised to violence remain ambiguous. Experts on terrorism are still at odds with regards to any kind of
psychological predilection for terrorism and have concluded that it is difficult, if not impossible to, profile terrorists.
The absence of any viable psychological profile of terrorists, suggests Payne (2009, p.116), is indicative of the
limited success of al Qaeda propaganda which he contends has ―failed to mobilize the masses, or to control any
significant territory‖. Yet, most scholars are in agreement that terrorism relies on the circulation and proliferation of
key messages that construct the world in terms of a battle between good and evil: where Islam is under threat of
annihilation at the hands of Western forces and where ―They [the West] are aiming to destroy us [Islam] ... we are
under attack, we are being destroyed‖ (Aly 2007, p.36).
The counter terrorism responses of Western nations reflect a concern with the ideological battleground and
recognition of the need to incorporate measures that address four dimensions of security:
1. Monitoring threat through intelligence and evidence assessment;
2. Neutralising capability through disruption tactics
3. Crisis management and;
4. Defusing intent by addressing the personal and environmental factors that contribute to radicalisation.
Since the terrorist bombings of the London public transport system in 2005, the UK has responded to the threat of
‗homegrown‘ terrorism by introducing measures aimed at preventing radicalisation through social reform. In March
2009, the United Kingdom‘s Home Office revealed Contest 2: The United Kingdom‟s Strategy for Countering
International Terrorism, a reinvigorated version of the original Contest strategy developed in 2003. The strategy
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emphasises a preventative approach to the threat of home-grown terrorism and highlights the challenge for
democratic societies to maintaining the delicate balance between democratic freedoms and national security. The
strategy also recognises the importance of soft approaches designed to prevent radicalisation by engaging vulnerable
members of Muslim communities. These measures such as addressing disadvantage and inequality and actively
engaging with Muslim communities are framed by an understanding that radicalisation is more likely to thrive
among the disadvantaged and disenfranchised. A similar approach was taken by the Netherlands which has adopted a
strategy that focuses on polarisation and isolation of individuals and groups as key indicators of a dispensation
towards radicalisation. Likewise, the United States Government‘s National Strategy for Homeland Security (October,
2007) recognises community engagement and outreach as significant elements of counter-radicalisation. In Australia
also, community engagement and social harmony feature strongly as mechanisms for combating radicalisation to
violent Islamist ideologies. The Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting our Community
released in 2010 consists of four key elements: Analysis, Protection, Response and Resilience. Resilience refers to
―building a strong and resilient Australian community to resist the development of any form of violent extremism
and terrorism on the home front‖. Typically resilience relates to crisis management and defensive activities.
However, in the White Paper it is used to refer to a soft counter terrorism approaches that emphasises community
harmony and targets groups vulnerable to radical or extremist influences.
EXTREMIST CONTENT ON THE INTERNET
Among Muslims in Australia, the term ‗Sheikh Google‘ has become a popular slogan to describe the trend for
Muslims in diasporic communities to seek religious guidance on the internet. The use of the term belies a complex
set of issues relating to Muslim identity in secular states like Australia (see for example Aly, 2007) but also reflects
the ubiquity of the internet in all matters of everyday life; religion included.
A simple Google search on the internet using the term ‗mujahideen‘ yields well over 1 million returns. Sifting
through the various conservative think tanks, blogs and policy documents takes only minutes and the discerning user
is quickly and easily able to access a plethora of extremist content: terrorist propaganda videos; graphic videos of
beheadings and other terrorist operations; and ‗how to‘ manuals such as ―The preparatory manual of explosives‖;
―Illustrated Manual of Sniper Skills‖; and the ―Organic Chemistry of Explosives‖ all of which are freely available
through the Unjustmedia website.
Extremist websites on the internet vary in their content, purpose and origin ranging from sympathetic websites
dedicated to ‗inciting believers‘ to those run by militant Islamist groups that openly advocate the use of violence.
Some websites use propaganda to validate the terrorist cause in religious, political and ideological terms. These
websites promote conspiracy theories but do not openly endorse the use of violence. Regardless of where extremist
websites sit on the spectrum of sympathy for the terrorist cause to the open call for armed conflict, all present a
worldview that is embedded in a construction of oppositional forces of good versus evil, honour versus dishonour
and Muslim versus the West. The audience is compelled to take a side: to be either with us or against us. Being with
us offers potential recruits to the terrorist cause incentives of honour through martyrdom.
One website features biographical narratives of ―Prominent Martyrs of Iraq‖. The story of Abu Umair As Suri al
Halabi, known as the Ascetic Worshipper, is a typical example of the kind of propaganda used to woo new recruits
with the promise of renown, religious absoluteness and martyrdom. An abridged version of this narrative appears
below:
Martyrdom is a privilege bestowed on only the greatest of the Ummah‟s sons. In Iraq, many brothers are desperately
waiting their opportunity to carry out martyrdom attacks because these type of operations can not be controlled by
the occupiers.
Abu Umair, may Allah have mercy on him, came to the theatre of Jihad alone where he met the martyr Abu Khattab
Al-Yemeni Al-Hindi Al-Hijazee, who we will talk about later insha‟Allah. Together they travelled to the city of
Fallujah, the city of Honor and Jihad and resided with one of the Sheikhs who used to help the Arab Mujahideen.
However Allah destined that he should become a Martyr, and he talked with me about his intense desire to join our
ranks. I replied to him: “Do you pledge to us to die (for the sake of Allah), for we do not accept but the one who
seeks martyrdom.” That day he laughed and said: “I am searching for it, I intensely desire it, do we aim for anything
other than that? Then I gave them an appointment and moved them to the house of Abi Abdullah Ash-Shami.
Indeed, a group of audacious and daring brothers had gathered in that house. These brothers were marked by
shining light on their faces; they used to select their words carefully so as not to hurt others. They were indeed
brothers for the sake of Allah, whom you could sit with to increase your Faith. When mentioning Allah, you would
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feel their souls humble before them, the Qur‟an in their hands, with smiles upon their faces, they would pray day and
night seeking to get closer to their Lord.
While this hero was waiting for the moment that Allah would cure the breasts of the believers, an intelligence
battalion identified a crucial target being the general headquarters for the Polish army in Karbala city. The heroes
took a look around the place until they found a security hole in the facility. A building located near a sub-street had
been erected to house the unbelievers' servants and as they became more comfortable, they let their guard down and
a gap in security resulted.
With that, Abu Umayr al-Suri, his brother Abu Zubayr al-Kuwaiti and another brother set off to execute the plan.
Abu Umayr broke through the gates and struck the towers that had been raised high in the sky and mixed with the
impure blood. Soon after, Abu al-Zubayr drove a truck filled with five tons of explosives into his target. The number
of casualties for the enemy was estimated in the hundreds but alas, this was suppressed in the media, one of the
enemy‟s best tools.
Narratives found on similar websites that aim to promote public support for terrorists causes by constructing
appealing to the concept of violence and death as a pathway to achieving martyrdom adhere to a strict format. In this
format the narrative typically presents the qualities of the martyr as:
The martyr is always devout and his religion unquestionable;
He is not from among the poor, the uneducated or the disenfranchised;
He demonstrates absolute submission to Allah and an intense desire to fulfil the greatest possible
demonstration of his piety
He makes contact of his own accord, is never selected, recruited or radicalised but is ‗destined‘ to join the
ranks of martyrdom
Internet sites maintained by terrorist or extremist groups can be broadly classified into three categories:
1. Media sites
2. Organisation sites
3. Interactive sites.
Media sites are typically online television and newspaper resources that offer videos and reports of aggression
against Muslim populations in Palestine and Iraq. The Arab television network al Manar (based in Lebanon) for
example, produces and broadcasts propaganda videos as part of its normal programming. Al Manar has been banned
in France, the United States, Spain and Germany for its anti- Semetic content and servicing issues have made it
unavailable to audiences in Australia, South America and Canada. Despite these bans and broadcasting issues, al
Manar videos and propaganda are freely available to audiences on the World Wide Web.
Propaganda videos are also disseminated on the popular video sharing site Youtube. JihadMedia TV is a channel
hosted on Youtube where users can view over one hundred videos ranging from messages and interviews by
prominent ‗jihadists‘ to videos produced by the Global Islamic Media Front that document ‗martyr operations‘ and
by Revolution Muslim.org that propagate the notion of war between Islam and the West. Among the videos available
to view are those that capture graphic footage of American soldiers being killed in Iraq, terrorist training videos,
propaganda videos that advertise the terrorists‘ cause and messages from prominent terrorists and religious figures.
In its first six months of operation, JihadMedia TV acquired almost 300 subscribers; an indication that the channel is
achieving some measure of success in reaching its intended audience.
Organisational sites are the official or unofficial websites of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Such sites are
open sites that offer news and information about the organisation‘s mission, its history and its ideology. Their format
is similar to news media websites but often also have links to their own media statements, publications and video
channels. These sites offer news blog, links to Youtube channels, lectures and statements by religious figures and
online journals.
Interactive sites are social networking sites such as bulletin boards and forums where discussions range from
everyday banal topics such as family life and education to religious or ideological discussions. These social
networking platforms offer access to an audience of like minded individual and groups through secure forums.
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THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET IN RADICALISATION
Notwithstanding the various radicalisation models that are available in the literature, there appears to be a dearth of
research devoted to exploring what actually motivates individuals and groups to seek out radical or extremist content
in the first place. Scholars and experts in terrorism agree that dissemination of the terrorists‘ message through
propaganda is a key factor in the progression of al Qaeda from a ‗base‘ to a global Islamist ideology. The extant
literature on the contemporary phenomenon of international terrorism concurs that the War on Terror is essentially an
information war where the ideological battlegrounds exist in cyberspace (see for example Aly 2009; Dauber 2009;
Payne 2009).
Several analyses have been offered regarding how terrorists use new technology including the internet to develop
their capability in terms of both financial and human capital (Dauber, 2009; Bergin et al, 2009). Apart from being a
central component of the terrorist media strategy, the utility of the internet for terrorists has expanded to encompass
tactical functions. In the contemporary terrorist environment in which psychological warfare plays an integral part,
having a presence on the internet is as critical to the terrorists‘ success as financial, tactical or organisational
capability. The internet offers a communicative space where terrorists can identify, recruit, indoctrinate and influence
potential members using the various utilities available on the internet.
From the perspective of the terrorists‘ audience, there is value in looking at the role of the audience as active agents
in the communicative process with a view to understanding the particular appeal of the internet.
Research into how the media serves the needs of audiences have yielded several classifications of user needs broadly
based on the informational and entertainment functions of the media. Contemporary approaches recognise the
following four needs (Katz et al, 1973, McQuail, 1983):
1. Information– relates to the cognitive needs and the desire for understanding which are served by the
surveillance function of the media;
2. Personal identity- relates to strengthening confidence and credibility and value reinforcement;
3. Social integration and social interaction- relates to personal relationships and the need to strengthen
social contact and affiliate with a group; and
4. Entertainment- relates to the need to escape and release tension.
This model is known as the uses and gratifications model and describes how use needs motivate media use. In
applying this model to the role of the internet in the radicalisation process, it is necessary to position internet use
within a broader context that takes into account the social realities that create needs in the first place and are
antecedent to internet usage. Aly (2009) identified the following factors that characterize the contemporary context
of Muslims and their media needs:
1. Transnationalism and the emergence of a Muslim diaspora;
2. The development of a shared identity among Muslims around the globe grounded in victimhood and
validated by the concept of the ‗ummah‘- a brotherhood that transcends boundaries of nationhood,
ethnicity or race;
3. A widely held perception among Muslims in the diaspora that the Western media is a complicit actor in
a conspiracy to undermine Islam and subsequent disengagement with the Western media as a source of
news and information; and
4. Access to new media.
5. The presence or perceived presence of a personal and communal crisis. This crisis is framed in terms of
an ideological battle for the survival of Islam and expressed in terms of a war (violent jihad) between
Islam and the West.
These five factors form the context in which Muslim media needs are constructed and which provide an antecedent
to media use. Such an approach positions terrorist propaganda on the internet in the context of a range of motivations
and needs. It suggests that exposure to propaganda alone cannot account for radicalisation in its entirety but that
propaganda may satisfy informational, personal identity or social integration needs.
At the same time context alone should also not be mistaken as the singular cause of radicalisation and efforts to
counter radicalisation should not be solely directed at the social situations of vulnerable individuals or groups. The
internet, through its various media functions, acts as a facilitator of needs both in terms of content (news,
information, propaganda, images, training manuals) and attributes (real time, interactive, consumptive, productive,
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participatory). The social situations of Muslims generate media needs that are gratified by different content and
functions of the internet. These content and functions are generated by the aims of terrorist organisations to identify,
inform, influence and indoctrinate potential members. The role of the internet in radicalisation lies in the presentation
of alternative realities and alternative truths through which people can engage with a social network where the
boundaries of belonging are set by terrorists. These boundaries are ideological belief but also common victimization,
common enemy and a shared hatred of the enemy.
The diagram below illustrates the internet radicalisation model showing the interface between context, user generated
needs, internet functionality and extremist generated content:
Figure 1. A Uses and Gratifications Model of Internet Radicalisation (Aly 2009)
The model of internet radicalisation distinguishes between four elements: the user or audience context; the use or
audience needs that motivate internet use; the internet content and functions that meet these needs; and the terrorist
groups‘ goals for which they generate internet content. These four elements present different aspects of internet
radicalisation that need to be addressed with different counter measures.
Arguably, terrorists have always made strategic use of the media and new technologies for publicising their cause,
influencing audiences and gaining potential recruits. The invention of the printing press presented Anarchist groups
in the 1800s and early 1900s with a communication mechanism for spreading their ideology across borders through
books, newspapers, pamphlets and journals. Widespread distribution of the Anarchist ideology and technological
advances in communications and transport meant that Anarchy was able to spread throughout Europe, America and
Asia. In the contemporary information age, almost all terrorist groups incorporate the use of media technologies as
an important and central component of their media strategies. Governments and agencies charged with countering
terrorism are facing a new challenge of countering extremist violence on the internet. The role of the internet in the
process of radicalisation is still not fully understood while the Australian government is exploring possible strategies
for combating violent extremism online. Within this context, technical solutions and legislative or policy options are
limited in their capacity to address the growing problem of internet radicalisation. Firstly such strategies tend to
target the producers of internet sites (often hosted in countries outside of Australia) and focus attention on content.
Secondly, the Hydra-like quality of internet terrorism means that cutting off one head will only grow more in its
place. An approach, which also attends to the terrorists‘ internet audience, would address the reasons why certain
people become attracted to the internet as a source of inspiration.
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While significant focus in counter terrorism strategies has been on social reform and to activities that engage Muslim
communities, attention could also focus on the motivations for seeking information or social networking functions on
the internet. In particular the trend towards seeking religious guidance and affirmation of religious identity using
Person to Person (P2P) and Person to Content (P2C) applications which allow users to participate in religious
discussion and offers charismatic leaders real time access to ready audiences needs addressing. Further exploration of
the role of the internet in religious identity would be a useful addition to the literature and to inform future strategies.
REFERENCES
Abu Ismail al- Muhajir, ―The Noble Lives of Abu Alhalabi, , Abu Hamza Alurdani, Abu Hurayra Al-hijazee and Saif
Al-Ummah,‖ Prominent Martyrs of Iraq. Available at
http://www.jihadunspun.com/features_prom_martyrs1.html (accessed 12 June 2009).
Aly, A (2009). ". ―The Terrorists‘ Audience: A Model of Internet Radicalisation.‖ Journal of Australian Professional
Intelligence Officers. Volume 17:1, pp. 3- 19
Aly, A (2007) ―Australian Muslims responses to the media discourse on terrorism: Pursuing public spheres in a
secular state.‖ Australian Journal of Social Issues, Volume 42:1, pp 27-40.
Bergin, A, Bte Osman, C Ungerer & NAM Yasin, (2009) ―Countering Internet Radicalisation in Southeast Asia,‖
Australian Strategic Policy Institute Special Report. Available at http//www.aspi.org.au
Dauber, C E (2009) ―Youtube War: Fighting in a world of cameras in every cell phone and Photoshop on every
computer‖, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Available at
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2010), Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting
our Community. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia
Home Office: Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, The United Kingdom‟s Strategy for Countering
International Terrorism. Available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-
search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf (accessed 12 June 2009)
Katz,E., M Gurevitch & H Haas, (1973) ―On the Use of the Mass Media for Important Things‖, American
Sociological Review ,Vol 38 (April 1973) pp. 164- 181
Koker, T, & CL Yordan, (2006) ―Microfoundations of Terrorism‖. Paper presented at the 2006 International Studies
Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA: March 25, 2006.
Kuran, T (1998) ―Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades‖. Journal of Legal
Studies Vol.27:2 (1998), pp 623-659.
McQuail, D (1983), Mass Communication Theory, 1st ed., London: Sage
Payne, K. (2009) ―Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror‖. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, Vol.32 (2009) p. 116.
Revolution Muslim n.d.,
http://revolutionmuslim.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=17
Sustein, C. R. Why They Hate US: The Role of Social Dynamics. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy Vol.
25:2 (2002) pp. 429-440.
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Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based upon
Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60),
Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979)
Bill Bailey
secau – Security Research Centre
School of Computer and Security Science
Edith Cowan University
Perth, Western Australia
Abstract Pseudo gangs form the steely side of Hearts and Minds and were used with great effect in counter-insurgency
campaigns in Kenya (1952-60) Malaya (1948-60) and Rhodesia (1964-1979). Although the use of pseudo gangs was
not new to counter-insurgency tactics, with the British using a similar tactic in the Boer war (1899-1902), the use of
such gangs was certainly perfected during these later campaigns producing good results. The Kenya Police Special
Branch re-instigated this concept, developing its use during the „Emergency‟.
The principal concept was to „turn‟ or co-opt insurgents through a series of inducements to change sides and join the
counter insurgency as part of the Government forces but not as regular forces. Rather the co-opted kept their actual
identities or their „assumed‟ identities and return to the conflict areas as part of a „gang‟, which would be made to
appear as if it is still fighting for the insurgents. This „pseudo‟ gang would then rejoin or flush out the opposition and
either capture, gain further intelligence or eliminate them. Based on my ongoing PhD research into these three
campaigns, this paper will briefly outline an alternative model that could be developed for current conflicts against
insurgents.
Keywords Campaigns; counter-insurgency; ‗Emergency‘; gangs; hearts and minds; insurgents; Kenya; Malaya; pseudo gang;
Rhodesia; Special Branch.
INTRODUCTION
―Hearts and Minds‖ has become almost synonymous with counter insurgency policy transforming itself from a
concept into an actual strategy; however it is certainly not the panacea politicians or the press would like to think it
is. This paper will argue that for counter-insurgency campaigns to be successful they require ―the iron fist in the
velvet glove‖ to directly influence the insurgents. This means not only the capability, but also the ability, to sway the
minds of the insurgents over to the side of the security forces. The famous ―Hearts and Minds‖ phrase used by
General Templer, in the Malaya insurgency, is often quoted to convey the necessity of having a political dimension
as part of the counter-insurgency tactics that corresponds to the military one. "Essential though it is, the military
action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to
work safely with the population‖ (Galula, 1964, p. 63). However, as Charles Colson, chief counsel to President
Nixon, once said, "if you grab them by the balls, the hearts and minds will follow" the context is the same but moves
away from the much vaunted idea of ‗hearts and minds‘ as a soft approach, and the sole tactic in counter-insurgency,
and more to one where the control of the situation is more in the hands of the security forces. They must use ruthless
determination to achieve desired success and not pander to sentiment. Galula (2006) argues the central aim for a
successful counter-insurgency campaign is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.
Gaining support of the population can be interpreted many ways but rarely do ‗kind‘ acts achieve strategic successes.
The need for a more directed approach is one that is reviewed in this paper.
This paper forms part of my current PhD research examining previous counter- insurgency campaigns in an attempt
to identify what strategies and tactics were successful (why they worked) and how these proven approaches could be
used again in current conflicts. Although the research to date is primarily based on interviews with ex Kenyan
Policemen, a thread has emerged from these initial interviews concerning ‗pseudo gangs‘. I am undertaking further
interviews with other former combatants involved with the Kenya, Malayan and Rhodesian counter-insurgency
campaigns to analyse how these tactics developed in Kenya and Malaya evolved through the later campaigns. The
human sources used for this research are identified by their code to maintain anonymity.
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The ability to gain intelligence and to infiltrate the opponents camps is very much a sought after tactic within
conflicts; the use of spies has been much publicised over the centuries to achieve this. However, a method which has
been used, predominately by the British, in numerous counter insurgency campaigns over the years, and later by the
security forces in both Rhodesia and in South West Africa by the South African Defence Force (SADF), has been the
use of ‗turning‘ ex gang members so that they return to their erstwhile colleagues and deceive them in to believing
that they are still on their side; when in fact they have changed sides. This tactic has been labelled ‗pseudo gangs‘; by
those who implemented this tactic in Kenya and my recent research indicates this approach was far more successful
than many analysts have hitherto understood.
The concept of ‗Hearts and Minds‘ has become central to all discussions concerned with counter insurgency and
asymmetrical conflicts. Although this concept is often attributed to General Templer, during the Malayan conflict(
1948-1960. Lyndon B. Johnson, certainly was keen on using the phrase, often inverting it to ‗minds and hearts‘ when
discussing the war in Vietnam. Many think he took this from President Jon Adams‘s letter dated 18th
of February
1818:
The Revolution was affected(sic) before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts
of the people; a change in their religious sentiments of their duties and obligations.... This radical change in
the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution.
(Adams cited in Dickinson, 2009)
This quote by Adams clearly identified what was at stake, the support of the people. The overall concept has been
analysed further by many others such as David Charters in The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine,
1945-7 (Charters, 1989), Richard Stubbs Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla warfare (Stubbs, 1989) and Thomas
Mockaitis ―British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (Mockaitis, 1999); as well as in countless military documents. Susan
Carruthers analyses the total concept of the hearts and minds strategy, by highlighting British government ―attempts
to influence opinion about challenges to colonial rule in four counter-insurgency campaigns‖ as well as how the
propaganda war is fought by stigmatising opponents (Carruthers, 1995, p. 2). Clearly the hearts and minds approach
to counter-insurgency is not a new concept, nevertheless it is a concept that needs ongoing analytical refinement so
that it may be utilised effectively in contemporary and future counter-insurgency operations. By the same token the
hearts and minds concept must not be overplayed either as the ultimate panacea. Counter-insurgency operations
utilising a hearts and minds component will always need to be combined with security forces that are demonstrably
more than capable of winning due to their superior soldiering skills, fire power, logistical support and greater
resources to back up their campaign. The ability to convince the population that you will eventually win is an
essential part of the overall strategy, ―[the] counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does
not feel, protected against the insurgents‖ (Galula, 2006, p. 64).
The ability to convince insurgents to change sides is central to success if the insurgency is to be overcome. Therefore
convincing individual insurgents that changing sides is in their own best interests particularly if they wish to come
out of the conflict on the winning side. Evidence suggests that the desire to gain an advantage, or not to lose it, is
core to this concept of changing sides according to those that took part in these campaigns. The ability to ‗turn‘ an
insurgent was the key and was certainly the hall mark of the Selous Scouts during the Rhodesian campaign, which
will be discussed later in this paper:
. . . [T]he best recruiting method was to send another former insurgent
to visit him in hospital . . . and have a long conversation, dwelling in particular upon the
hardships the insurgents were experiencing in the bush . . . The process of turning insurgents
was eased considerably by the knowledge that they could be hanged as violators of the Law
and Ord Maintenance Act. He would then be examined thoroughly by members of the Selous
Scouts to ensure his loyalty―not to the government of Rhodesia, but to the members of the
unit itself. The insurgent also would be offered a cash lump sum for joining the Selous Scouts
(together with receiving the same salary as a soldier, with the funds being paid by
Special Branch), and if possible, his family would be moved to the Selous Scouts base, where
they received free rations, housing, education, and medical care. (Reid-Daly, 1999, pp. 106-
107)
KENYA
The Mau Mau ‗Emergency‘ in Kenya was declared by the British colonial government in 20 October 1952. The
roots of the conflict began much earlier and had been brewing for a number of years between the Kikuyu and the
settlers over land issues and rights (Furedi, 1989). However it was not considered to be serious by the Colonial
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Government until deaths occurred on several settlers farms in 1952. The police force was then increased threefold
with the addition of five British army battalions, as well as one full Kings African Rifles (KAR), plus the backing of
the Royal Air Force (Lonsdale, 1990, p. 394). The military were employed as an aid to the civil power; as described
by Huw Bennett, in his paper on the Mau Mau Emergency (Bennett, 2007).
The capacity to control the psychological sphere of influence became crucial to fighting the Emergency. John
Lonsdale develops a series of interesting themes concerning the ‗mind games‘ involved stating that the Mau Mau
insurgents took over the minds of the white settlers, when the intention should have been very much the opposite, but
clearly there was a great deal of fear amongst the settler population as they were greatly outnumbered by the
indigenous population. The thrust of the ―hearts and minds‘ policy should have been to dominate the local
population i.e. the African (Lonsdale, 1990, p. 394). General Erskine‘s strategy in Kenya involved three key
elements. Firstly, secure what were called the ‗Reserves‘ in the tribal areas by securing them from attack and
intimidation; this was called ‗villagisation‘ in Malaya. Secondly, round up as many known Mau Mau as they could,
which they did as part of ―Operation Jock Scott‖. Thirdly, take the offensive to the terrain in which the insurgents
were operating (Melshen, 2007, p. 675). It is this last aspect that is of interest and needs to be assessed and analysed
as this became central to the campaign with development of psychological warfare and the use of what would
become known as ‗Pseudo gangs‘ as part of this strategy.
It is this issue associated with mind games that opens the way for the development of the concept of co-opting or
turning known insurgents to betray their own comrades and become a pseudo gang. The argument over the word
Mau Mau is an important one in this debate as it centres on the very nature of the conflict and how this was fought
out in the ‗minds ‘of those involved. The demonising of your enemy is not new and runs throughout history, however
in post World War II world order this had now become a key element in the ability to retain the support of the
‗colonised‘ population; who were starting to shun the notion of external control over their lives and their country.
Leakey takes the confusion over the word Mau Mau even further by describing the organisation as a pseudo religious
one, set up to replace the imposition of Christianity upon the Kikuyu (Leakey, 2004, p. 42); stating their zeal turned
the adherents into ―fanatical, murdering maniacs‖ (Leakey, 2004, p. 51), which certainly added fuel to the
propaganda war which was being conducted in both the British and Kenyan press. Furthermore, the pseudo links to
religion may be borne out by the research that indicates a ready acceptance by the captured insurgents to redeem
themselves by accepting de-oathing ceremonies (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).
The other aspect that needs to be assessed was that in both insurgences, Kenya and Malaya, the perpetrators of the
insurgency attacked those that they thought supported the Colonialists, an aspect developed very succinctly by
Leakey(Leakey, 2004). The divisions within the Kikuyu tribe were ruthlessly exploited allowing the colonial security
forces to harness any support against the Mau Mau to their advantage and turn their own people against them. Once
again this laid the foundation for the idea of pseudo gangs to take hold as a tactic. This would appear to have been
crucial in the ability to gain the upper hand and start to dominate the campaign, after the advantage had been lost
following the general surge from the Mau Mau post operation ―Jock Scott‖ 10th
of Oct 1952. ―The operation to arrest
120 of the known leaders of the Mau Mau had seriously back fired and in fact had caused the insurgency to blow out
of control rather than nipping it in the bud as had been envisaged‖ (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).
The other critical element is the role played by the colonial police force, Deflem, articulates their unique position
within the campaign structure, especially under the indirect rule concept adopted by the Colonial office. The Police,
together with the Kenya regiment, were crucial to counter insurgency tactics (Deflem, 1994, p. 47; Husain, 2009;
Kitson, 1960; Smith, 2005). Beckett develops this theme further, pointing out how important their detailed
knowledge was in the overall strategy (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985; Kitson, 1960). Bennett also deals with use of force
elements and the criticality of command and control of those forces on the ground (Bennett, 2007). All of these
factors indicated the important role the Colonial Police force played in being able to dominate the counter insurgency
because of their local knowledge of language and customs.
In Kenya a certain Captain Kitson, an intelligence officer who was attached to Kenya Police Special Branch
developed an idea together with Ian Henderson and a few others (including a respondent in this current research)
about trying to infiltrate the Mau Mau . There is considerable dispute as to how the idea morphed into the full use of
‗Pseudo gangs‘, however Captain Kitson played a central role and details the gradual evolution of the strategy in his
book (Kitson, 1960; 1990).
THE PSEUDO GANGS
What is of particular interest to the research is what tactics used by the Colonial forces were decisive in winning their
campaigns. Turning captured Mau Mau into instruments that could be used to counter the enemy was certainly
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significant in this campaign, destabilising the enemy. Once they were captured a series of inducements were used to
get them to lead a ‗party‘ back to where their former colleagues were operating and infiltrate them. By using this
tactic, Police Special Branch (SB) infiltrated the gangs, sometimes for quite some time, gleaning valuable
intelligence (Franklin, 1996; Kitson, 1960). The ability to capture additional potential collaborators was very
appealing too as it would diminish the opposition and dishearten them once they found out that there erstwhile
comrades had joined the ranks of their foes. This destabilisation tactic became a valuable tool as it dejected the Mau
Mau gangs creating distrust amongst them which caused many to change sides ―self preservation...he thought that the
white man was going to win eventually and it was better to be on the winning side than the Kikuyu‖(respondent K-2,
2010, Bailey, 2012)
There were a substantial number of Kikuyu, who were on the side of the Colonial forces and in fact made up what
was called the Kikuyu Guard, who were opposed to the demands of the rest of their tribe who had joined the Mau
Mau. The ability of the some members of the Colonial forces to speak the language, in this case Kikuyu, was core to
being able to achieve this aim of infiltrating the Mau Mau. Although the white members were not usually part of
pseudo gang, at times they took a gamble and did join the fray. Amazingly enough this seems to have worked with
little adverse reaction from the Mau Mau gangs. This could be because it was so unexpected and therefore did not
raise suspicions or perhaps, as has been pointed out, the gangs were often high on Khat or alcohol and did not really
know who was who in the gloom of the forests (respondent K-1, 2010, Bailey, 2012). Nonetheless it was the use of
ex-members of the Mau Mau that made the difference and allowed the Security forces to gain a substantial upper
hand.
―There is only one way we are going to beat the Mau Mau, and that‘s to have gangs disguised as Mau Mau to go into
the forests and live as Mau Mau and destroy them in their lairs‖ (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012). Working
closely with Ian Henderson of the Kenya Police, the respondent was involved with establishing ‗pseudo-gangs‘
within a specialised unit formed in Special Branch called the Special Bureau.‖ (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).
There were only six of them in the unit at the start: four Europeans and two Africans, only one of which was a
Kikuyu the other was Wa-Kamba. This was the start of a very valuable tool in the arsenal of tactics against the
insurgents because they were able to gather valuable intelligence pin-pointing the active Mau Mau gangs which was
vital to the campaign. The idea blossomed once it was found that it was not that difficult to turn captured Kikuyu and
send them back in with Kenya Police handlers or Kenya Regiment, as they spoke Kikuyu; to ensure they did not
vanish back into the forests and developed as a tactical strategy (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).
It was essential that the right people were turned and that meant selecting them carefully, according the Kitson there
was also a distinct methodology to be followed to achieve success
Briefly it is that three separate factors have to be brought into play in order to make a man change his
allegiance. First, he must be given an incentive that is strong enough to make him want to do so. This is the
carrot. Then he must be made to realize that failure will result in something very unpleasant happening to
him. This is the stick. Third, he must be given a reasonable opportunity of proving both to himself and to his
friends that there is nothing fundamentally dishonorable about his action.(Kitson, 1960, pp. 171-172)
The lessons learnt from Kenya and transferred to the Rhodesia campaign remained the domain of the Special Branch
(SB), which seems to be behind this in Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia, even though pseudo gangs were run from
within the army unit of the Selous Scouts, SB were the puppet masters maintaining control over the intelligence
gathered and used.
Although Kitson points out in his book that all the men who were used from the Kenyan Regiment spoke Swahili,
this in fact was not the language required(Kitson, 1960, pp. 120-121). My informants have indicated that in fact there
were very few white officers in the Kenya Police that spoke Kikuyu , Swahili yes, but not Kikuyu, and that is why
Ian Henderson was so important to the success of the ‗pseudo gangs‘ as he did speak Kikuyu; as did others and that
drove the operation who were drawn from predominately the Kenya Regiment (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012).
The Kenyan Regiment was drawn from the settler population, hence their ability to speak local dialects such as
Kikuyu, Meru, Kamba, Luo and Kalenjin
MALAYA
The ―Emergency‘ in Malaya started in 1948 and was serious from the start unlike in Kenya with ruthless attacks on
rubber plantations, core to the war in Korea, which were well planned and executed by the Communist insurgents.
Furthermore the idea that this was a further push by International Communism against the West was taken as a very
grave threat. The Communist insurgents were well trained and had been at the back bone of defeating the Japanese.
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Now they were keen to take power reaping their reward and transform Malaya into a communist state. Initial reports
sent to London stated ―there were five thousand active fighters and 250,000 Min Yuen1 supporters in towns and
villages‖ (Barber, 1972, p. 25). There is no doubt the conflict here was far more severe than in Kenya and could
easily be described as a ‗civil war‘ from the start even though Kenya received far more press (Carruthers, 1995, p.
72).
The strategies that were developed in Malaya, separating the insurgents from their support base in the villages, and to
a large extent copied in Kenya, are continually cited by Joes as successful for counter insurgency campaigns (Joes,
2004, p. 232; Thompson, 1974). Joes and Beckett agree with this interpretation. Beckett develops the discussion
further stating that General Templer (often cited as the architect of ‗hearts and minds‘ (Beckett, 2001, p. 102) was
able to develop this strategy and to build up the critical elements that are necessary to prosecute this type of
approach: allowing the police to set up a Special Branch(SB) operation to concentrate solely on the insurgents. The
evidence analysed thus far indicates the importance of SB to the setting up of strategies to defeat the insurgents.
According to Roy Fellows the Malay Police accounted for more of the enemy, Communist Terrorists and Insurgents,
than any other force. (Follows & Popham, 1990)
Templer created a combined intelligence unit together with a staff intelligence training school; establishing a new
psychological warfare section in addition to the creation of ‗safe villages‘ which was the back bone of the strategy to
deny the rebels succour from the local population, ―the shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and
the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us‖ (Beckett, 2001, p. 102). But the development of
pseudo type gangs seems to have been very much determined by Special Branch who used every opportunity to
manipulate any captured ‗communist terrorists‘ (CT‘s), as they were known, to turn them against their erstwhile
comrades using them in a similar way to Kenya. At this stage it has not been possible to positively identify cross
fertilisation between Kenya and Malaya with the use of pseudo gangs as such, although similarities indicate this
might have occurred.
The full quote by General Templer is worth noting when he says ―the answer lies not in pouring more troops into the
jungle, but rests in the hearts and minds of the people. Winning ‗hearts and minds‘ requires understanding the local
culture.‖ (Charters & Tugwell, 1989, p. 195). It is very much this ability that comes to the fore when the running of
the pseudo type gangs is considered; the ability to understand the culture. Furthermore the ability to speak the local
language was key to the success of this type of operation in all counties, as it allowed direct conversation rather than
one that is carried out through an interpreter where there is always the chance of misinterpretation or bias creeping
in.
An important characteristic based upon the evidence indicates that there is a need for the turned ‗insurgent or
terrorist‘ to identify with the his new found allies to the point of almost becoming more anti than those they have
joined, ―they could only justify their escape from Communism by being personally involved in the struggle against
it-which is why time after time they begged to lead patrols back into the jungle to attack their former
comrades‖(Barber, 1972, p. 196).
Cline discusses the challenge of using ‗turned‘ insurgents, highlighting how using pseudo gangs creates a dilemma
when it comes to winning the psychological battle and that is the treatment of those that have changed sides. It is
paramount that all those who change sides are treated well, so that this becomes common knowledge; so that
changing sides has very positive benefits for those that chose this route. However, there was a need to keep their
identities secret or else they risk retribution from their former comrades, which did take place in many cases(Cline,
2005). This obviously presented a tactical quandary, which was only addressed with limited success. Within tribal
societies news travels fast, which will always make using pseudos a moral dilemma. ―Intelligence has to come from
the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not feel safe until the insurgent‘s
power has been broken‖(Galula, 1964, p. 96). The ability to create safe havens is central to gaining the trust of the
population.
RHODESIA
It is clear that the concept of pseudo gangs was one that was built up from previous campaigns and finding the direct
link with Kenya or Malaya has been difficult but as many of those that had been in these early campaigns; either
1 Min Yuen was the name used for the Communists. The.Min Yuen were more than just supporters. The Min Yuen
collected ―Taxes‖ from the villagers and carried out assassinations. They were the ones who instilled fear into the
local population. The MRLA were the uniformed armed wing and the Min Yuen were the plain clothed and far more
sinister wing
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returned or immigrated to Rhodesia, the transfer of such successful tactics can be traced to 1966. This was certainly
the case in Rhodesia where those who had fought in both Kenya and Malaya returned to take part in the ‗bush war‘.
In fact Ron Reid Daly was in Malaya with ‗C‖ squadron of the Rhodesian SAS, and later returned home to head the
formation of the Selous Scouts, who used the pseudo gangs as a central part of their strategy with some well
documented successes. The concept of using pseudo gangs was however put forward first by Oppie Oppenheim of
the British South African Police (BSAP) in 1966 at a joint exercise run by the Special Branch, with army observers
using troops from various units. Some of the instructors were formerly in Kenya (Stiff, 1984, p. 48),thus establishing
a link between Kenya and Malaya.
The exercise did not meet with universal approval and it was to take several more years before the concept of using
pseudo gangs was to gain wider the acceptance of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) for the Rhodesian Security
Forces. Once again it was through Special Branch of the BSAP, that the merits of this type of activity were put into
operational use, this was 26th
of January 1973. A small team of six; four former insurgents and two African Police
Constables were dressed to appear as insurgents and were sent into the field to gather intelligence(Reid Daly, 1982,
pp. 24-26).
This tactic soon started to have positive results with the army now using this idea and developing it, but with the use
of Europeans leading the groups, who were made of both former insurgents and black soldiers that formed the bulk
of Selous Scouts; headed now by Major Ron Reid Daly. It was considered essential to have this level of control to
ensure discipline and channel intelligence succinctly. This unit was to go on to make this type of activity its hall
mark throughout the ‗Bush war‖ (Reid Daly, 1982). Special Branch continued to supply intelligence and the army
the men for the operations. The core to success of these pseudo operations was the ability to morph into becoming an
insurgent; knowing the language, customs and the terrain. The difficulty was to find such people however recruits
were sourced from those who had spent a life time in the bush, such as administrators, famers and park rangers(Stiff,
1984, p. 45).
Essentially the success of these units was underpinned by their ability to roam the bush gathering intelligence and
feeding this back to their handlers in the Special Branch. Rather than the pseudo gangs taking offensive action
themselves, which could lead to them being compromised, the Rhodesians would use what was called ‗Fire Force‘
This unit was predominately the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), which employed the limited helicopter capability
they possessed (due to sanctions) to drop small sticks of soldiers and engage the enemy based on the sound
intelligence they had gleaned from the ‗pseudo gangs‘. The role of the pseudos , according to Reid Daly, was ― to
infiltrate the tribal population and terrorist networks, pinpoint the terrorist camps and bases and then direct
conventional forces in to carry out the actual attacks‖(Stiff, 1984, p. 76)
The ‗pseudos‘ also had another important role other than intelligence gathering and offensive operations, and that
was destabilisation. As the opposing forces in the Rhodesian war were made up of competing groups, based upon
tribal loyalties, there was intense rivalry between these groups namely, Zimbabwe People‘s Revolutionary Army
(ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The more it could be made to appear that one
group was cheating on the other, particularly as they also represented differing revolutionary ideologies, the more
this caused resentment and retaliation. The Selous Scouts were very successful in achieving this in their operations
often posing as one group and attacking the other. This form of psychological warfare was very effective and created
paranoia amongst the insurgents. Stiff posits that as much as 68% of the insurgents killed during the ‗Bush War‘ in
Rhodesia can be attributed either directly or indirectly to the Selous Scouts(Stiff, 1984, p. 330). ―It is in men‘s minds
that wars of subversion have to be fought‖(Mockaitis, 1999, p. 186).
The ability to play these mind games is an essential component of asymmetrical warfare; the Rhodesians followed by
the South Africans became masters of this tactic.
CONCLUSION
‗Hearts and Minds‘ is therefore far more than just a political dimension of counter-insurgency Pseudo gangs clearly
represent part of what is a suite of operational tactics designed to convince, insurgents that their path is doomed to
failure and they would be better served joining the Government forces and affecting change from the inside rather
than being killed, maimed or imprisoned.
The use of ‗pseudo gangs‘ in Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia proved to be a very successful tactic despite recent
controversy over the use of such methods in contemporary insurgencies. These tactics have a proven track record
which should be taken into consideration for modern day conflicts.
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However the success of this tactic does attest to the requirement to have a political agenda as well as a military one.
As Robert Thompson states ―the ‗First Principle‘ of counterinsurgency warfare was that the government must have a
clear political aim‖(Thompson, 1974, p. 51). This statement can be tempered with a further remark: not only must
there be a clear political aim, it must be a shared political aim with those that form the back bone of the country, as
ultimately if they do not share this aim then any military victory will prove pyrrhic; as was ultimately the case in
Rhodesia.
My ethnographic data shows that language too plays a crucial role in the ability to harness the obvious advantages
that pseudo gangs can bring to combating the insurgents. However this clearly only works if you are able to converse
directly in the local language; as a local and not as an intruder. The lessons of Kenya and Malaya were put to very
good use in Rhodesia, with most of the Security Forces utilising their local skills and linguistic prowess to the full;
speaking both Shona of ZIPRA forces and Ndebele of the ZANLA forces. The ability to conduct an interrogation
directly in the same language as the captured person allows for a greater understanding of the intelligence being
gathered. The use of an interpreter greatly disadvantages the process, as one is never sure whether what has been
interpreted is correct or whether a further slant or nuance has been placed upon the words that were not in the
original tongue. Clearly the greater the number of the counter insurgents forces that speak the local language, the
greater the advantage to the security forces.
In the final analysis, as with all counter insurgencies there is never one single tactic but a series of multiple tactics
that operate at several levels as in multiple dimensional chess. The rules of the game continually change as the world
adopts new and altered moral restraints upon what it considers to be legitimate in its efforts to win. This does not
make the situation any easier for those charged with prosecuting the insurgency, but what is obvious is that the past
will always have lessons for the future and adapting these lessons is the difference between success and failure,
countering insurgency is no different in that regard. The success of pseudo gangs has been greatly underestimated
with a need for more research to portray the value of this tactic and allow modern day strategists the option of re-
evaluating whether or not they are still a potent tool in their arsenal for fighting counter-insurgencies.
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The Malarkey of Money Transfers:
Overlooking E-Bay whilst the Hawaladars are Hunted
David M. Cook
1,2 and Timothy Smith
1
1Edith Cowan University,
2secau- Security Research Centre
Perth, Western Australia
[email protected], [email protected]
Abstract Informal Money Transfer systems represent one of several persistent loopholes in the fight against the War on
Terror. Terrorist groups and criminal networks continue to use the Hawala system, as well as other informal
transfer systems, to escape the regulatory and administrative control of formal international banking transactions.
In an age where global financial regulation is underpinned by international agreement through Basel and others, the
ongoing use of IVTs in Australia is cause for increasing concern. Yet Hawala is only half of the informal equation.
E-bay and its associated bedfellows outstrip Hawala transfers through the same commercial imperative that drives
the modern world, simply by doing business. This paper describes the escalating risk in Australian and International
money transfers, and the need for a reconsideration of the prevention strategies that conceal the support for terrorist
and criminal activities.
Keywords Hawala, Hawaladar, Informal Value Transfer, Non Government Organisations, Islamic Banking, money laundering,
prevent strategy, eBay, Paypal
Since September 11th
2001, there has been a large focus on limiting the financing of terrorism as key to successful
prevention of a critical event (Heng & McDonagh 2009, p.53). As former US President George Bush commented
only a month later ―the first shot in the war was when we started cutting off their money, because an al-Qaeda
organisation can‟t function without money‖ (Bush, 2001). As a result of this focus Informal Value Transfer Systems
were identified as a major hole in security for any country at risk of terror attacks. What followed was a united
international movement to register and regulate all informal remittance operators to mitigate the risk of a terrorist cell
gaining its finances through any such system (AUSTRAC, 2009). While any informal system is at risk of being
abused for the purpose of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, one of the largest and easiest money
laundering systems has been overlooked to the point where, upon realisation of this major and seemingly defenceless
security loophole, any informal system loses its commercial imperative.
The security weaknesses which the authors identify in this paper are not so focused on Hawala and Hundi money
transfers, but instead depict a lack of attention paid to the online auction site eBay and its preferred method of
payment transfer, PayPal. This paper will outline an escalating risk in Australian money transfers that incorporates a
review of both Hawala-style money transfers and online mechanisms. In doing so, the need to balance the focus on
Hawala against current security weaknesses with established remittance providers such as PayPal and Western Union
becomes a matter for closer consideration. A balanced approach to the security of different money transfer systems
requires an understanding of the manner in which both Hawala and PayPal contribute to money laundering and
terrorist financing (Malkin and Elizur 2002, p61).
Informal money transfers have been repeatedly linked to the funding of terrorist attacks. The twin towers attack on
September 11th saw more than $270,000USD sent through a variety of means including formal bank transfers,
Hawala remittances, and Western Union transfer branches (NCTAUS, 2004). Hawala money transfers or Hundi, as
they are commonly described in Southern Asia, involve both legal and illegal mechanisms that are so opaque to
financial scrutiny that Hawala is considered the black sheep of the money transfer family (Heng & McDonagh,
2009). This form of money transfer involves less cost in transfer fees because Hawaladars make many transactions in
their network, without physically transferring each transaction back and forth. Instead they use a familial network of
trust that remits individual amounts to users but may balance their payouts amongst fellow Hawaladars with far less
frequency (Levi, 2007).
In the modern Western context Hawala is considered less legitimate than Western banking and transfer systems.
Historically, Hawala is closely aligned with transactions that are of middle-Eastern and south Asian origin. Many of
the regular tithes and charity donations that are prescribed as part of the Muslim faith are sent via a Hawala
transaction. Again, Hawala transfers have been linked to terrorist operations, and as a result the act of donating
money for a charitable purpose has come under fire as an easy way to disguise transfers of large sums under the
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mask of international aid (Heng & McDonagh 2009, Navias 2002). Yet by comparison with Western transfer
constructs such as PayPal, Hawala transactions receive far more discredit and mistrust than their western
counterparts. This is an interesting phenomenon, since many well-known and well documented terrorist attacks use
money laundering and transfer systems other than or in addition to Hawala systems (Acharya 2009, AUSTRAC,
2007).
INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEMS
Informal Value Transfer Systems come in many different forms from many different cultures. Such systems include
the Chinese ‗Flying Money‘, the Sanskrit based ‗Hundi‘ which means collect, and the Arabic ‗Hawala‘ which means
change or transform and trust (Perkel, 2004). The most recognised of these systems is the Arabic Hawala system
which came to notoriety after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the shutdown of al-Barakaat due to allegations
of terrorism financing (Passas, 2006). These remittance systems were originally created and used due to a lack of
any formal banking avenues with which to conduct business. As a result of this the use of IVT‘s has become
traditional and is still used today. Wide spread use of IVT‘s is especially prevalent in countries that are in or
recovering from conflict, suffer from a weak banking system, political corruption, and usually have a history of
funding terrorism (Sharma, 2006).
Systems such as Hawala are very susceptible to criminal abuse due to their informal nature. The most prominent
abuse is the laundering of money which can occur through the use of these systems in two ways, as a result of the
primary function of the system (by the customer), and in order to settle accounts between operators (Razavy, 2005,
Maimbo, 2003). The primary function of a Hawaladar is to allow access to funds from a trusted colleague or family
member, i.e. another Hawaladar, in another country or town by accepting the funds from a member of the public.
The transfer is facilitated through a phone call, email, or text message to the other operator but no funds are
physically transferred (Perkel, 2004). Any outstanding debts between operators are settled at different intervals
depending on the difference, e.g. a larger debt may be settled on the day or within a week, but smaller differences are
usually settled every month. Settling accounts can occur through a number of different avenues yet two are the most
prominent, through trade, and through formal banking avenues via satellite (Maimbo, 2003). It is the settlement
through trade that constitutes money laundering and it appears to be common for the formal system to be used as a
precursor to settling through trade in other countries, as opposed to direct transaction of money which incurs a
transaction fee (Maimbo, 2003, Ballard, 2005, Razavy, 2005).
Within Australia, the government response to informal money transfers has crossed several key milestones in
mitigating the movement of funds likely to be used for either money laundering or terrorist funded activities.
AUSTRAC has systematically blanketed a ‗Know Your Customer‘ (KYC) policy (AUSTRAC, 2009) over those
involved in any kind of remittance services as well as monitoring those working in the area of Bearer Negotiable
Instruments (AUSTRAC, 2008). In December 2006 the agency stepped up its requirements for electronic funds
transfers including non-reportable fund transfers of small amounts. In June 2007 it institutionalised a system of
AML/CTF Compliance reporting, and by December of the same year had embedded customer identification
programs across all known transfer systems. These have built onto the FTR Act of 1988 and now include the
reporting of suspicious transaction reports (SUSTRs), Wire Transfers (IFTIs), and significant cash transactions
(SCTRs), (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Yet the notion of money laundering through the practice of over invoicing, under-invoicing and the use of eBay and
PayPal for goods noted as sold but never actually sent, remains almost impossible to regulate. Within this context,
the focus on Hawaladars over and above the focus on the substantially larger volume of known eBay/PayPal dealings
indicates a rather large elephant in the room (AGD, 2010). The Australian Federal Minister for Home and Justice
announced in April 2010 the intention to strengthen the reporting and identification for remittance providers,
including a closer scrutiny of the familial networks that underpin both Asian and Middle-Eastern informal transfer
arrangements (ibid, 2010). This strengthening of reporting still fails to prevent eBay transactions for fake goods that
are sold for large sums in order to fund terrorism (Daily Mail, 2006). The issue of whether the goods sold are not
genuine or whether the goods are even sent at all is irrelevant. The current Australian Government regulations have
no verification method to determine any aspect of the arrival or acceptance of goods. Whilst AUSTRAC can
determine that a cash amount has been transferred, it cannot determine acceptance or validity of goods sent in
consideration for each remittance.
The sale of goods through informal means or by mechanisms that encourage online shopping to a global audience is
not exclusively the domain of eBay. However eBay‘s dominance of the online shopping market, and its ownership of
money transfer systems like PayPal, make it a likely target for money launderers who effectively become amateur
remitting agents for the duration of each sale (eBay, 2009). EBay is quick to explain that they do not act as financial
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agents or remitting agents, yet their transfer arm PayPal clearly operates as an enabler for hundreds of thousands of
buyers and sellers for exactly the purpose of remitting payments. Whilst this activity is broadly overlooked as too
difficult to monitor, agencies such as Australia‘s AUSTRAC are increasingly demanding more identification and
reporting metrics about each individual remitter who uses a transfer system like Western Union (AUSTRAC 2009).
PayPal appears to escape the same scrutiny because either the amounts are too insignificant or the transaction claims
some sort of legitimacy based on the pretext of a sale of ‗goods‘ that can be identified through the formalised system
of trading known as eBay.
Despite the reinforced attention on remittance providers, the inability to classify individuals within the broader
context of using eBay and PayPal transactions as remittance providers has two effects. Firstly, the increased
reporting for remittance providers makes the informal remitting agents in shops increasingly divide into two camps.
In one camp resides agents such as Australia Post with highly procedural and robust internally regulated methods for
dealing with money transfers, and in the other camp sit ad hoc businesses whose main commercial activity might be
fast food, late night grocery supplies, or small ethnically focused travel services. For these businesses in the second
camp the opportunities to offer both regulated transfers as agents for Western Union and the possibility to assist a
customer using a familial-based networked informal transfer such as Hawala must present a difficult decision.
Secondly, as this renewed focus by AUSTRAC pursues registered remitters, the number of people likely to shift to
money laundering through multiple disguised purchases on eBay and then PayPal is likely to increase (AUSTRAC,
2009).
FEAR OF TERMINOLOGY
As mentioned previously, Hawala has been identified as a priority target for counter terrorism financing (CTF) action
which has manifestly produced an international movement to regulate Hawaladars (Borgers, 2009). As a result of
this international push Hawala has become a pejorative term, shifting from its previous position of legitimacy to one
of alignment with terrorist threat, criminal activity, or underhanded dealings. The central reasons for at least some of
this perception are; that Hawaladars do not keep records in the same way that banks and other money agencies, the
familial network of trust between international and interregional Hawaladars keeps records in private, and quite often
notations are destroyed after debts are settled (Razavy, 2005).
The Hawala link to terrorism has developed a certain global notoriety that has travelled right down to alternative
remittance operators. This effect has been repeatedly demonstrated to the authors when casually enquiring about
Hawala at money transfer businesses in the Perth metropolitan area. When quizzed as to how their money transfer
service operates and whether it is anything like a Hawala system, most shop vendors‘ immediate reaction was that of
apprehension and nervousness. They generally stated that they thought Hawala was illegal in Australia and that they
know nothing about it, all the while presenting verbal and physical signs of reluctance and hesitation to continue
discussion on the matter. These anecdotal observations are merely part of the motivational pretext for some of the
inquiry that is pursued within this paper. The need for a more empirically rigorous investigation into street vendors
who might purport to offer informal money transfers is certainly acknowledged by the authors and forms one of the
key conclusions at the end of this paper. Nevertheless, there is alternate empirical evidence in the market depicting
various informal money transfer offerings that suggest that whilst Hawala (and its various aliases) operates beneath
the formalised catchment of most financial regulation in Australia, it does so in concert with other remittance
pathways. In the case of ethnic publications in print and online, the sample listed below in table 1 shows the
placement of Hawala and Western Union advertisements alongside each other, and in some cases operating within
the confines of the same business shop front.
HAWALA IN THE MARKET
At first glance, the existence of informal money transfers appears virtually non-existent in Australia. There is only
one single entry for an advertised Hawala dealer in the Australian Yellow Pages (Sensis, 2010) and no formal online
advertising for their existence in Australia. In contrast there are 20 advertised main offices for Western Union in the
Yellow Pages and more than 5000 Western Union agents actively operating in Australia (Western Union, 2010), any
of which could trade in an item (or pretend) and transfer money, and globally there are 70 million active PayPal
accounts (Parliament of Australia, 2009). Advertising for money transfers, other than formal services such as
Western Union, only shows up in foreign shops and markets operating in small precincts and cultural ghettos. There
are some mentions inside ethnic magazines printed in Australia such as the Middle East Times (Kuwait), Indomedia
(Indonesia), and the Punjab Express (India) that all refer to money transfer businesses (Community Relations
Commission, 2010). All of these put forward telephone numbers and none mention websites or in-print information
relating to their business. They remain informal insomuch as their information requires either face to face exchange
based upon telephone contact and referral.
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Formal advertising remains low, whilst word of mouth is the principal method of marketing amongst Hawala
agencies. Hawala business takes place by way of person to person contact. Michael Sanders‘ (2007, p. 792) account
of an American hawaladar working part time as a taxi driver in Washington is a useful descriptor for the informal
backgrounds that Hawaladars live by in Western nations such as the US, Australia and the UK. In these countries
there are typically no shops and no signage depicting the term ‗Hawala‘. Instead Hawaladars are blended into the
background, forming adjuncts to seemingly more legitimate shops and enterprises such as delicatessens, cafes and
bookshops (Rees, 2010). Yet despite this subterranean system that cloaks the informal movements of cash, there is a
convergence of sorts between these informal Hawala operations and the more institutionalised end of money
transfers as deployed by Western Union. Whilst the mainstream advertising pathways of Australian media seem
devoid from informal money transfer advertising, and seem only to focus on Western Union, the ethnic media papers
of Australia reveal a different story. Taking the newspaper listing from the Community Relations Commission of
New South Wales and examining each online newspaper, the authors discovered a total of 45 money transfer
advertisements. Of these 29 % were for Western Union. The remainder was of a less formal nature insomuch as the
advertisements included money transfers among a range of other non-financial services from a single vendor such as
groceries, travel services and fast food (Community Relations Commission, 2010). Table 1 depicts the various
money transfer agents that choose to advertise their wares through ethnic media within Australia.
The close grouping in ethnic publications of both Hawala-style transfers and formalized remittance systems such as
Western Union in Australia suggests that decisions about what type of transfer system takes place vary according to
each customer and the perceived risk of a transaction. At the informal adjunct end of the money transfer market
remitters will still look to Hawala-style transfers if they perceive there is no risk of prosecution. By contrast, Post
Offices in Australia will always default to their institutionalized alliance with Western Union and will follow
accepted mechanisms of reporting and identification to ensure compliance with AUSTRAC requirements.
No necessity for formal banking or finance qualifications
In Australia it is necessary for professions such as lenders, financiers, accountants, and nurses to adhere to certain
standards of qualification. For example in order to be considered an accountant it is necessary to complete a three
year undergraduate degree at least (MIT, 2010). Similarly to be a nurse and do the tasks a nurse is generally
responsible for you must have completed at least a three year Bachelor of Science in Nursing (ECU, 2010).
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Therefore without these qualifications you are unable to legally undertake such employment without proper
experience and recognition. So despite there being some notional adherence to Sharia governance and upstanding /
honorable recognition within the Muslim community, (peer, word of mouth, and or blood relations), the same
devotion to western standards and formal regulatory qualifications appears absent from those who act as Hawaladars.
But even with a standard of operation, there has still been a realization of increased risk as stated by the alternative
remittance company Western Union. In their 2010 annual investors report Western Union executives note that they
are beginning to realise the increased risk they are exposing themselves to by allowing their agents to operate
franchises without any formal qualifications (Western Union, 2010).
Hawaladars are not compelled to show any specific financial qualifications. Hawala operates under two important
umbrellas. The first is that Hawaladars build up trust with other Hawaladars over time and through repeated
transactions so that a bond of trust grows. Hawala account keeping is based upon shared trust rather than financially
regulated record keeping. The cement that bonds the numerous Hawaladars in to a trusted exchange network is
usually, or at least partly, based upon familial connections. Relatives or members of one‘s extended family ensure
that trust is kept at the highest level, and within the social codes of each Islamic community (El-Qorchi, 2002). The
second umbrella is that Hawala operates according to Sharia principles. In this sense Hawala is closely aligned with
formalized versions of Islamic Banking because it undertakes to prohibit usury and financial risk, or be used for
investments pertaining to non-Islamic vices such as alcohol, pornography or gambling (Khosrokhavar, 2009). The
Australian Government requires no formal training or qualifications for an individual or business to operate in the
area of remittances and money transfers, but does insist that each remitting party is registered and complies with the
existing regulations regarding record keeping and identification of clients (AUSTRAC, 2009).
The shift towards larger sums of money
What has for many years been depicted as low-level financial activity that allows for the remote payment of Zakat,
Islamic charity, and alms donation, now appears to facilitate the transfer of vast sums of money by NGO‘s for
disaster relief and humanitarian aid. According to Ballard (2003), the global scale of money transferred is
approximately $100,000 million per year, 60% of which flows into third world countries. It is also suggested that this
number could be underestimated by thousands of millions of dollars because many countries are incapable of making
accurate estimations about the informal/formal economic activity in their state. Maimbo (2003), states that
humanitarian aid and business transactions flowing from international sources into Afghanistan through Hawala
range from thousands up into the tens of millions to the point where Afghanistan‘s whole economy is reliant on
Hawala as its banking system. However large transfers are not restricted to conflict recovery or international
business, in fact it is quite common for Non-Government Organisations to use informal networks like Hawala to
allow access to aid funds for countries recovering from natural disasters due a loss of formal remittance avenues
(Weiss-Fagen & Bump, 2005).
It is clear that Hawala has morphed beyond the realms of mere Islamic charity and Zakat. This is reinforced by the
estimated level of remittances via IVT‘s globally, the complete economic dependence on Hawala in Afghanistan, the
extent to which NGO‘s make use of Hawala and its relative systems following disasters in order to allow access to
humanitarian aid when formal systems have failed, and the ease with which these systems are criminally abused
(Ballard, 2003, Maimbo, 2003, Weiss-Fagen & Bump, 2005, Rees, 2010)
At the other end of VT formalities, PayPal is keen to attract new transactional business amongst NGOs. Drawn by
the sheer volume of remittances, and the opportunity to enter into new market segments that are dominated by
Hawala, PayPal has developed a sister system called Webnow. This system is an offshoot of PayPal‘s Blackbaud
(2009), and is a remittance system and website combined into one unit so that NGOs can create a simple online
transaction system that is tailored for charities and NGOs so that it operates largely above the transnational fees and
charges of most IVTs. PayPal has recently (2009) moved to secure an EU (enforceable undertaking) with
AUSTRAC to ensure greater scrutiny with PayPal transactions. The key problem with this is that it targets the seller
and not the buyer. In a system where the possibility exists that goods never end up being sent, scrutiny of a seller
where the seller has established his or her legitimacy, (via means of multiple transactions and safe trading history), is
unlikely to deter future transactions where the buyer is sending the money. PayPal currently has no system for
scrutiny of ad hoc purchasing arrangements, except those transactions that are of such large amounts that they trigger
preset limits.
Hawala is likely to retain a firm foothold in countries where sophisticated financial infrastructure is reduced. In Iraq,
for example, the institutional banking system does not allow for the transfer of monies. In places where there is less
trust in the banking system, Hawala thrives (Altman, 2006). The growth of Islamic banking in general, coupled with
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the additional security of Islamic financial institutions and the commitment to Islamic banking secrecy and
confidentiality, ensures the continued expansion of Islamic funds management.
The flow of money
Regardless of whether describing a Hawala transfer, an eBay/PayPal remittance, or a Western Union transaction, the
flow of money between actors can take a variety of paths. In any of these cases, and particularly with respect to eBay
/ PayPal transactions, there is no formal mechanism for determining whether goods are dispatched or are authentic.
Genuine buyers have a mechanism for complaining, however non-genuine purchasers may pretend to receive goods
(or pretend to receive goods of a certain value), in order to effect the passage of funds in a normal manner. The sheer
volume of transactions and the global reach of eBay and PayPal make this vulnerability one which is persistent as
long as buyers remain free from the same scrutiny leveled at IVT agencies like Western Union.
Figure 1: The Flow of Money in typical IVT systems.
Source: Passas 2005 p 24.
CONCLUSION
Hawala transfers can still be exploited for the funding of terrorist organisations across international borders and
without institutionalised regulation at either end of the contract. Yet in a complex global system of countless
transactions the use of PayPal and eBay should share a commensurate amount of attention with other IVTs. The
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effort of AUSTRAC in Australia to institutionalise PayPal is commendable but largely ineffective against terrorist
laundering tactics where money is sent but no goods are transferred.
Concentrating on Hawala, whilst only glancing at eBay and PayPal is a dangerous misallocation of resources. Whilst
Hawala is undoubtedly more ethnically embedded in the broad global dispersion of al-Qaeda terrorist cells, one must
not overlook al-Qaeda‘s persistent penchant for using Western mechanisms, Western systems, and Western objects
to symbolically underpin their terrorist operations. PayPal and eBay are earmarked as controlled environments for
counter terrorist purposes. Yet given the ‗Goliath‘ status of eBay and PayPal in the global sense, and the recurring
ease with which PayPal users can send money worldwide, the notion that terrorists can transfer money in exchange
for ordinary goods that may or may not exist remains a colossal threat that dwarfs most others.
This paper has outlined the differences and similarities between a range of IVTs to raise the issue of neglected threats
from eBay and PayPal. The existing ‗prevent‘ strategies deployed by the Australian Government through AUSTRAC
and other agencies are successful in registering and collecting information about informal remittance providers. Yet
whether it is Western Union, Hawala, or PayPal, the over-riding concern is that all three of these systems represent
the ‗bread and butter‘ of informal cash movements. Where one becomes difficult the other becomes popular. Al-
Qaeda has demonstrated on repeated occasions that it can use all of these systems for funding its operations. Where
banking sophistication is low, IVTs turn to Hawala-based systems. Where internet becomes reliable, PayPal takes the
prominent role. Where operational complexity demands widespread secrecy, all three become the front-runners of an
IVT ‗mash up‘ (Medea Group, 2007). Using a combination of IVTs requires a layered approach to security.
Until eBay and PayPal are treated with the same intense scrutiny as other IVTs, there will always be a hole through
which money laundering and terrorist financing will be able to operate. The ‗Know Your Client‘ (KYC) strategy of
international banking, the adherence to enforceable undertakings, and the registration and information gathering of
IVT remittance operators is enormously important in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
However a holistic view needs greater emphasis on the registration, training and education of all remittance
providers. With informal IVT remitters there are two groups that are major participants in transfer systems, yet
remain largely invisible. The typical Western Union agent operating from ―Mandy‘s Late Night Snack Bar and
Kebabs‖ might also arrange Hawala transfers on the side. In truth she needs no formal training for either. Until
governments move past registration into the requirement for educational qualifications the proliferation of IVT
illegal transfers will continue to grow. Mandy might make tasty halal kebabs, but she could also enable better
financial practices to emerge from under the counter.
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The Piracy and Terrorism Nexus: Real or Imagined?
Karine Hamilton
Sellenger Centre
Edith Cowan University
Perth, Western Australia
Abstract The waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have been the location of a dramatic proliferation of
pirate activities in recent years. Security officials around the world are concerned about the risks posed by Somali
piracy to maritime shipping and to national security. These risks relate to the susceptibility of world trade shipments
to terrorist attack and to the emergence of an increasingly powerful Islamist movement in Somalia with connections
to global terrorist networks. Whilst Somali piracy has been the topic of growing media speculation, reliable
information about the phenomenon is scant. This paper reports on research conducted in Kenya where over 100
Somalis are being prosecuted for piracy. It aims to give insight into the motivations of Somali pirates and argues
that the weight of current evidence strongly suggests that piracy off the East African coast is strictly an economic
crime.
Keywords Piracy, Somalia, terrorism, maritime security
INTRODUCTION
Since 2008, piracy off the coast of Somalia has captured world headlines. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
reported 406 pirate attacks around the world in 2009, of which over half were conducted by Somalis (2009
Worldwide, 2010). In 2010, the number of Somali pirate attacks appears to have decreased slightly due to the impact
of international navy patrols off Somalia‘s coastline and also due to the use of better defences by vessels travelling
through effected waters (Pirates face, 2010). Nonetheless, Somali pirates are adjusting to naval patrols by launching
attacks in higher seas and the waters around Somalia are still the most pirate-risky in the world: 100 pirate attacks
and 27 hijackings were reported around Somalia during the first 6 months of 2010.
Most analysts and journalists have interpreted Somali piracy as an economic venture, however a significant number
have speculated that it is linked to terrorism. For example, two analysts recently wrote that ―piracy on the high seas is
currently becoming key tactics of terrorist groups – many of today‘s pirates are also terrorists with ideological bents
and a broad political agenda‖ (Hong and Ng, 2010). The sorts of maritime terrorist acts that have been hypothesised
include the use of ships as floating bombs to ram other vessels or carry explosives; attacks against ferry or cruise
ships to kill large numbers of civilians; jamming thin water passages to obstruct trade; and, causing deliberate
environmental catastrophes such as oil spills (Moller, 2009).
Both ‗piracy‘ and ‗terrorism‘ are terms that have been subject to ongoing debate about their definition and legal
meanings. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas defines piracy as any of the following acts (Moller, 2009, p. 17):
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property
on board such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any State.
On the other hand maritime terrorism refers to ―any illegal act directed against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew,
or against sea ports with the intent of directly or indirectly influencing a government or group of individuals‖
(Samuel Menefee cited in Valencia 2005, p. 79). These two definitions highlight that the key distinction between
piracy and maritime terrorism relates to motivation. Pirates are motivated by ―private ends‖, generally financial gain,
whilst maritime terrorists are politically motivated and they aim to influence government policy through the use or
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threat of violence. This paper argues that there is no substantial evidence to support claims that Somali pirates
maintain links, or lend support to, Somali terrorists. It draws on news reports of pirate and Islamic groups associated
with terrorism in Somalia, as well as research conducted in Kenya which involved interviewing imprisoned Somalis
accused of piracy and other key stakeholders. The first two sections of the paper provide background information
about the nature of statehood and Islamist politics in Somalia. The final section focuses on outlining the relationship
between piracy and Islamism and clarifying the motivations of pirates from Somalia.
SOMALIA: A FAILDED STATED
It is estimated that there are around 9 million people inhabiting Somalia: a semi-arid country made up of mostly
pastoralists and agriculturalists (Menkhaus, 2010). Somalia has always been one of the poorest countries in Africa
but its situation has increasingly deteriorated and for the last three years it has been ranked number one on the Failed
States Index (The Failed States Index, 2010). Most analysts link the emergence of Somali piracy with the Somali
state‘s disintegration during the early 1990s. In 1991 the ruling regime in Somalia was toppled and civil war began
(Stevenson, 2007). The civil war was an outcome of internal conflicts between different clan groups whose divisions
had been aggravated by many years and various forms of outside intervention in the country. During the colonial
period, different areas of Somalia were ruled by European powers including the British, Italians and the French.
Throughout its history Somalia has also been in conflict with its two neighbours, Ethiopia and Kenya, over certain
land areas dominated by ethnic Somalis. Somalia was also the site of superpower machinations during the Col War
period. As a result of the civil war in the early 1990s, Somalia lost a functioning central government and came to be
divided into distinct regions: Somaliland is the northernmost third that asserts its independence and is relatively
stable; adjacently Puntland maintains semi-autonomy; and at the bottom sits Jubaland.
Since the civil conflict in 1991, conflict, famine and a series of failed international interventions have created
disastrous humanitarian conditions in Somalia. The situation is particularly serious in the south-central region of the
country. Most recently, 1.5 million Somalis have become internally displaced and hundreds of thousands have either
been killed or have sought asylum in neighbouring countries due to fighting in south-central Somalia (2010
UNHRC). The fighting in this region is predominantly between the western-backed Transitional Federal
Government, deeply beleaguered and located in the capital city Mogadishu, and the forces of Islamic groups led by
Shabaab: a grouped openly aligned with Al Qaeda and the focus of American policies associated with the War on
Terror.
In contrast to the south-central areas, Somaliland and Puntland are relatively stable and are run by functioning
administrations. Somaliland seceded in 1991 though its independence has never received formal international
recognition. Somaliland is economically booming and is one of the most democratic areas in Africa (Economic
success, 2007). Neighbouring, Puntland is an autonomous zone that was created in 1999 and is not as functional as
Somaliland but also has a booming commercial economy, especially in the port city of Bosaso where large numbers
of livestock and people come and go between Somalia and the Gulf countries.
Understanding the different regions of Somalia is significant because piracy is not a Somali-wide phenomenon. It is
planned and operated from particular areas. For example, the ports of Somaliland have never had hijacked ships
anchored in them and pirate attacks launched from Somaliland shores have averaged 1 every two years since 1999
(Hansen, 2009). The administration in Somaliland has responded to pirate groups in their organisational phase and
have ultimately been successful in controlling piracy. On the other, Puntland is the area most strongly associated
with piracy. Authorities in Puntland had hired a British security organisation to train a coast guard, but the
involvement of a foreign group was locally unpopular and a Puntland coastguard never eventuated. Moreover,
Puntland authorities were unable to fund local law enforcement during 2008 which allowed criminal gangs like
pirates to operate and develop their resources. In short, piracy is specific to certain areas in Somalia and so far, these
areas have been quite separate from the emergence and dominance of the Islamic terrorist group Shabaab.
ISLAM IN SOMALIA: A “VEIL LIGHTLY WORN”
Somalia is the only country in the Horn of Africa that is nearly exclusively Islamic, over 99% of Somalis are Muslim
and most of them are of the Sunni sect (World Trade Press, 2010). Historically, the strand of Islam which took root
in Somalia differs significantly from other more rigid forms of Islam in the world, such as those associated with
Saudia Arabia and Al Qaeda (ie. Wahabbism).
Islam in Somalia has been described as a ―veil lightly worn‖ (Menkhaus, 2002, p. 111). It is part of everyday life and
family traditions in Somalia but there is no culture of religious zeal. Moreover, most Somalis view attempts to
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establish Islam as a form of governance in their country with suspicion or as an Arab intrusion that encroaches on
their independence. There is no natural affiliation between Somalis and Arabs but instead Somalis are touchy about
what they perceive to be patronising attitudes directed at them from Arabs. When contrasted to its neighbours, Kenya
and Ethiopia, Somalia has not generated an equivalent radical Islamic politics that has emerged in these countries.
Kenya and Ethiopia have much high numbers of Christians and religious divisions between Christians and Muslims
in these countries have given shape to more politically active and intense forms of Islam (Menkhaus, 2002). In
contrast, Somalis predominantly draw their political motivations from their clan identities and throughout Somalia‘s
history Islam has been secondary to clan relations and identities.
Despite this historical picture of Islam as a relatively apolitical cultural practice in Somalia, observers note that since
the fall of the Somali state in 1991 Islam has clearly taken a more visible role on the Somali political stage
(Menkhaus, 2002). Its appeal largely rests with people‘s discontent with existing political structures, the primacy of
the clan system, prevalence of corruption and repression, and limited job opportunities. In the initial phase of state
disintegration during the early 1990s, Islamic activists (Muslim brotherhood and later called al-Ittihad or AIAI and
made up of educated young men who had studied in the Middle East) tried to seize some strategic areas but were
easily defeated in some parts of Somalia and successful in others. Islamic forces that came to rule town and ports
were actually acknowledged by domestic and international observers as much fairer than other Somali militia forces
and they were also much more effective at providing locals with security.
Aside from AIAI, other Islamic activists also provided genuine humanitarian assistance to the Somali population and
a variety of Islamic institutions were able to step in and provide for people‘s needs including schooling, medical care,
and aid (Menkhaus, 2002). The other key developments of Islamism in Somalia during the 1990s was the emergence
of a system of local Sharia courts. These Islamic courts were formed by local businessmen and clan elders who
wanted to reinstate order following the loss of government and the rule of law. This rough sketch of Islam as it
emerged in Somalia over the 1990s is emphasising that its growth reflected local needs for alternatives to existing
authorities and for greater order and security. Its growth over this period did not reflect a hardline Islamic movement
that sought to impose an Islamic republic in Somalia or take on the West in part of a wider global jihad.
The September 11 attacks against America in 2001 however, generated much speculation amongst American policy-
makers and security analysts that Somalia represents a threat to world security due to its status as a failed state and
thus as a real or potential haven for global terror networks like Al Qaeda (Afyare Abdi Elmi, 2010). These concerns
appear to hold some legitimacy in light of the recent ascendancy of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group called Al Shabaab
(the youth), which currently controls most of south-central Somalia. South Central Somalia is supposed to be
governed by a Transitional Federal Government which was formed in 2004 during an internationally-sponsored
reconciliation conference. The TFG however, has always been weak and lacking in local legitimacy. One of the
TFG‘s main sources of disconnect from local communities in Mogadishu was its leader‘s (Abdullahi Yusuf) staunch
opposition to most forms of Islamic organisation, such as Islamic schooling and hospitals.
When American officials approached the TFG and asked it to help capture Al Qaeda operatives thought to be hosted
by local Islamic Somali groups, the TFG divided internally between those who agreed to America‘s request and
those who were opposed to it (Menkhaus, 2008). The TFG group who agreed to the request formed the Alliance for
the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, and they came into direct conflict with Islamic activists who
defeated the Alliance and effectively ended TFG rule. In the place of the TFG, the Islamic Courts Union (coalition of
various Islamic groups) arose and took control of Mogadishu and south-central Somalia in 2006. The ICU was
quickly recognised domestically and internationally as a highly successful administration in terms of the provision of
security and stability. Unfortunately, some of the ICU leadership were politically uncompromising and aggressive in
terms of their attitude to Somalia‘s long-standing enemy- Ethiopia. At the end of 2006, Ethiopia, with the backing of
America, responded by invading Somalia, removing the ICU and occupying Mogadishu. On the heels of Ethiopia‘s
invasion, the formerly banished Transitional Federal Government returned to Mogadishu to take over governance
whilst being propped up by Ethiopian military support.
Since 2007, the TFG has engaged in an ongoing battle with local Islamic opposition groups who are opposed to the
TFG and the intrusion of foreign parties, Ethiopia and America (Menkhaus, 2008). These battles have been
especially devastating for civilian communities who have been displaced in their hundreds of thousands, killed,
injured and now lack access to basic needs such as jobs, water, homes and food. Against this backdrop of foreign
intrusion, the Islamic group Al-Shabaab has arisen to prominence and this is the group which journalists and analysts
regularly speculate is connected to piracy. Al Shabaab was first created n 2003/4 and included a few hundred
militiamen who had been a hardline group within the Islamic Courts Union. The group was able to assert itself at the
forefront of the local insurgency against the Ethiopian presence. By the end of 2008, Al Shabaab had taken control
over most of south Somalia and soon after Ethiopian troops withdrew (January 2009).
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Since its original formation as a strictly local Islamic group in the early 2000s, some of Al-Shabaab‘s leaders have
gone on to declare their alliance with Al Qaeda (2007) and have hosted foreign Al Qaeda operatives (Menkhaus,
2008). The group though contains many non-committed militiamen who work for pragmatic, as opposed to
ideological or religious, reasons and many openly oppose dealings with Al Qaeda. Those Al Shabaab leaders who
maintain a connection with Al Qaeda are motivated by their internal weakness in Somalia: most Somalis are not
especially fond of Al Shabaab because of its social conservatism (its attempts to impose strict Islamic laws): Shabaab
has banned smoking, watching soccer during the World Cup, moustaches, bras, music (Hartley, 2010). Shabaab is
also association with a foreign power, which has created the view amongst Somalis that it is a puppet for outside
interests. Unlike other Islamic groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, Shabaab is not so much in a position of
political control or influence in Southern Somalia which is still run by clan authorities. Al-Shabaab cemented its
standing as an international terrorist group when it carried out bombings in Uganda during the recent World Cup,
which killed over 70 people in an Ethiopian restaurant and a sports arena (Al-Qaida-linked militants; Gyezaho &
Dixon, 2010). The group claimed that the attacks were directed against Ethiopia and were also retaliation for the
presence of Ugandan peace keeping forces who were defending the TFG.
ISLAMISTS AND PIRATES IN SOMALIA
Any connection between pirates and terrorism must account for the nature of Islam in Somalia as outlined above.
Even though certain elements within Shabaab are increasingly aligning their objectives with Al Qaeda, the affiliation
between the two groups is loose. On the whole, the rise of Shabaab and its use of violence internally and abroad
largely relates to Somalia‘s domestic and regional conflicts rather than to the conflict between America and Al
Qaeda. Hence even in the event that a connection between piracy and Shabaab was confirmed, it would not
automatically relate to the global war on terror.
Regardless, a connection between pirates and terrorism has never been clearly established. Geographically, pirates
and Islamists are largely based separately from each other. The Shabaab operates in south-central Somalia and the
pirates are mostly based further along the coast, especially around Puntland in northern Somalia. The occasions that
pirates and Islamists have had contact have shown that any relationship between them is one of dispute and
confrontation. The period during which the Islamic Courts Union came to power in Mogadishu during 2006
effectively ended piracy in the region. The ICU publicly outlawed piracy and declared it as Haraam or anti-Islamic:
threatening death or amputation for any Somali caught in the act of piracy. The ICU initiated an offensive against
ports used by pirates which led to pirates being injured, expelled or left in hiding. Pirate attacks from the area had
averaged around 40 a year prior to the ICU and none were recorded whilst the ICU was in power (Freeman, 2008).
The Ethiopian intervention which terminated ICU enabled pirate groups to regroup.
There are other instances of open dispute between Islamists and pirates in Somalia. In 2008, pirates captured the
Sirius Star a super-tanker from Sauid Arab that was carrying 100 million dollars worth of crude oil. The Islamic
Courts Union condemned the capture as a ―major crime‖ (Karon, 2008). More vehemently a Shabaab leader
informed journalists that "Saudi is a Muslim country, and it is a very big crime to hold Muslim property … I warned
again and again, those who hold the ship must free it unconditionally or armed conflict should be the solution. If they
don't free the ship, we will rescue it by force" (Karon, 2008). One of the pirates involved clarified with a journalist
that: "Every Somali has great respect for the holy kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We have nothing against them but
unfortunately what happened was just business for us and I hope the Saudis will understand" (Freeman, 2008). The
Shabaab sent armoured vehicles loaded with armed fighters to the pirate‘s base, the port town Harardhere, and the
pirates fled to avoid direct confrontation. The incident highlights the economic motivations behind piracy and the
hostility between pirates and Islamists in Somalia.
More recently, in April of this year (2010), the chief pirate base Harardhere (located mid-way along the Somali
coast) was taken over by the Islamic group Hizbul Islam, which is Shabaab‘s main rival. Shabaab itself had tried to
take the port town but locals instead invited Shabaab‘s rival Hizbul Islam who proceeded to drive pirates out of the
town. A Hizbul Islam member was quoted: ―Piracy has become too much. It‘s an anti-Islamic business, and we
won‘t accept it … We want to bring law and order to that country of Somalia, and we want to show the good name of
Somalis‖ (Wadhams, 2010). Both Shabaab and Hizbul Islam were angered by recent pirate attacks on Indian ships
which had disrupted the flow of further Indian cargoes into Somalia; ships that had been an important source of
revenue by way of port tariffs in Islamic controlled ports. Essentially, Islamic groups want to rid coastal towns of
pirates in order to secure an important revenue stream in the form of ship tariffs. In the nearby coastal town in which
the pirate fled to, Hobyo, pirates were recently enlisted by local officials to act as an armed defence against Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam. Pirate leaders in Hobyo claim to have deliberately amassed a significant on land arsenal of
militiamen and weapons in order to ward off Shabaab and Hizbul Islam (Gettleman, 2010).
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While conducting research in Kenya where over 100 Somalis accused of piracy are currently imprisoned and
undergoing prosecution, I found general consensus that Somali piracy was unrelated to Islamic politics and was
instead strictly an economic crime (Kontorovich, 2010; Treves, 2009). The main aim of the research was to interview
imprisoned Somalis in order to understand their motivations for piracy, however all but one of them refused to admit
to engaging in piracy and instead claimed to be either fishermen or people smugglers. Almost all of the prisoners
interviewed came from Bosaso, which is Somalia‘s chief port city located in Puntland and is known for its fishing
and illegal immigrant industries. A small number of the pirates came from in or around Mogadishu. Aside from
these imprisoned Somalis accused of pirates, we spoke to other key stakeholders such as European Union personnel
and Kenyan police and judicial officials involved in prosecuting pirate cases.
In general, talking to Kenyans about the purpose of my research, it was obviously common knowledge that the
Somali community was financially benefitting from the pirate industry. Kenyans, and Somalis, were quick to point to
flash new residential homes known to be owned and inhabited by Somalis and explained that it was usual for
Somalis to buy whole apartment buildings at exorbitant prices and then demolish and rebuild from scratch. The
money financing these redevelopments was understood to partly come from piracy which was only ever spoken
about in terms of its obvious financial profits for Somalis.
People more directly involved with the prosecution of pirate cases in Kenya concurred. The police officer in charge
of investigating pirate cases in Kenya explained that ―these people are looking for money‖ (Personal communication,
June, 2010). A British naval officer stationed in Kenya stated that ―I would suspect that they [Somali pirates] see it as
business‖ (Personal communication, June, 2010). This Naval Officer and an EU appointed lawyer who liaised with
Kenyan judicial officials had both debriefed hostages after their release from Somali pirate captors and none had ever
indicated that their Somali captors are motivated by anything other than economic consideration. According to the
EU lawyer,
apparently some of the pirate guards are quite vocal about talking with the hostages and its frankly to get
them and their families out of Somalia and to another country, … I want to make this much and then I will
get out. (Personal communication, June, 2010)
In his role, he never came across a hostage who heard their Somali captors make reference to any ideological or
religious motivations for their actions, rather they confided to the hostages that they wanted to improve their lives.
The one Somali prisoner in Kenya who admitted to being a pirate during interviewing corroborated this picture by
stating that his chief concern was to get a proper education whilst he was in jail, principally he was keen to learn
English as the international language. He wanted to leave prison in a better position to make something of his life
and he was motivated by wanting a better life.
The navy officer who likewise had spoken to hostages post-release concurred that Somali pirates were quite talkative
about their motivations to their hostages and they never mentioned Islam or wider conflicts between East and West.
Instead, Somali captors told their hostages that ―they wanted to get x thousand, x one thousand dollars, uh false
documents cost this much, however there are so many members of my family‖ (Personal communication, June,
2010). In short, Somalis in communication with their hostages made it clear that they were seeking money in order to
better their lives. In terms of pirate attitudes towards their hostages, there was mistreatment but not of a systematic
directed kind, more along the lines of not allowing them to shower and keeping them in cramped living spaces.
Injuries and fatalities amongst hostages have been accidental. Whilst pirates treat their hostages badly as a way of
putting pressure of ransom payments, they are quiet strict about not harming the hostages and compromising ransom
payments. For these reasons, the individuals involved in prosecuting Somalis accused of piracy all took the view that
pirates were motivated by financial gain and that the phenomenon of piracy from Somalia was strictly an economic
crime.
CONCLUSION
Current knowledge about the nature of terrorism and piracy in Somalia all point toward the conclusion that the two
phenomenon are distinct from each other both in terms of geography and practice. Moreover the history of Shabaab,
the Islamic group most strongly associated with terrorism, shows that it emerged and developed quite separately
from piracy in Somalia. Shabaab‘s recent alliance with Al Qaeda remains disputed within the group itself which
means that establishing a clear connection between Somali pirates and Shabaab does not necessarily entail an
obvious link between piracy and the War on Terror. So far, Shabaab‘s agendas have clearly curtailed piracy
whenever it has come into a position of power within a pirate-active location. Overall, the two groups appear more in
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competition with each other over access to ports and money than they appear in any form of cooperation. The
research that I conducted in Kenya, whilst obviously restricted by the informal nature of my sources of information,
likewise indicated that Somali piracy is unrelated to terrorism and stems from financial ambitions.
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Review: Disillusionment with Radical Social Groups
Kira J. Harris
secau – Security Research Centre
School of Computer and Security Science
Edith Cowan University
Perth, Western Australia
Abstract Disengagement from radical social groups is a complex process initiated by the experience of a crisis, or
disillusionment causing a re-evaluation of involvement. This paper provides a review of the experiences that hinder
group involvement and increases the likelihood of disengagement. Utilising the categorisation by Klandersman
(2005) and Demant et al. (2008a), the factors are discussed under the themes of normative, affective, and
continuance. Normative factors rely on the ideological premise to ensure membership is viewed as a moral
obligation, while the affective factors incorporate the social and organisational aspects facilitating emotional
attachment to the group, and continuance factors are those influencing the cost and benefits of group involvement.
Commitment to radical social groups becomes vulnerable when the material, psychological and communal benefits
of membership are outweighed by the resources required for association and the inability to achieve desirable
outcomes.
Keywords Disengagement; Disillusionment; Extremism; Radical social groups
INTRODUCTION
Research on the defection from religious groups, cults, gangs and criminal organisations indicate similar contributing
factors to disengagement despite differing ideologies (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Fink & Hearne, 2008). The
operational definition of disengagement within this paper is characterised by Fink and Hearne (2008), and Bjørgo
and Horgan (2009) as a behavioural change resulting in the exit from a radical social group (characterised as secular
and cohesiveness, ethnocentric, totalitarian and with a propensity for violence), notwithstanding any cognitive shifts,
or deradicalisation. Models of disengagement by Skonovd (1979, April) and Ebaugh (1988) emphasise how members
experience a crisis or disillusionment causing doubts to arise and the re-evaluation of membership (Fink & Hearne,
2008; Mellis, 2007; Mushtaq, 2009; Wright, 1987). This cognitive opening begins the psychological process for
possible disengagement by allowing alternative viewpoints and lifestyles to be considered. As a break down in the
insulation from the outside world occurs, disengagement can be accelerated when combined with social and
economic support, education and counselling. As the initiating stage of the process, it is imperative to the study of
disengagement to identify the reasons for disillusionment caused by the incongruence between the individual‘s
expectations and the reality of membership, whereby the discrepancies between the two do not align forcing
membership to be viewed as less meaningful (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Dechesne, Janssen, & Van Knippenberg,
2000; Demant, Slootman, Buijs, & Tillie, 2008b). For some, the disillusionment gradually builds until the desire to
disengage exists, for others, there can be a singular catalytic event prompting a more abrupt psychological
disengagement. The aim of this paper is to identify and review the contributing factors towards disillusionment with
radical social groups in the literature.
CATEGORISING THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF DISENGAGEMENT
The process of disengagement is inherently complex and multi-layered, influenced by an amalgamation of issues and
personal factors compounding on the individual. Bjørgo (2002, June; 2005, 2009) discusses the causes of
disengagement in terms of ‗push‘ and ‗pull‘ factors; that is, negative social forces which make membership
unattractive, and factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative. The effects of push factors can be
difficult to predict as negative sanctions can lead members to disengage or have the converse effect by increasing the
group‘s solidarity and cohesiveness (Bjørgo, 2005). Demant et al. (2009) noted influences causing individuals to
defect involved complex psychological processes rarely operating in isolation, allowing both push and pull factors to
co-exist, and the difficulties in effectively measuring each factor. Building on Bjørgo‘s foundation, Klandermans
(2005) and Demant et al. (2008a, 2008b) compartmentalise individual disengagement factors into three components
– normative, affective, and continuance ( see Table 1.). These categorisations coincide with previous literature (Allen
& Meyer, 1990) focusing on the psychological states of organisational commitment where all categories are
influential in the decision to disengage, and its ensuing success. In short, strong affective commitment allows
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members to stay because they want to, strong continuance commitment encourages members to stay because they
need to, and strong normative commitment causes members to stay because they feel they ought to (Allen & Meyer,
1990).
Table 1
Normative, Affective and Continuance Factors Contributing to Disengagement
Normative: Affective: Continuance:
Ideology is no longer
appealing
Disappointment in movement Cost of membership
Change in individual‘s
viewpoint
Frustration with group
dynamics
Longing for ordinary life
Desired future is not
achievable
Disloyalty between members Negative social sanctions
Rejection of means to
achieve goals
Mutual competition,
contempt and distrust
between members
Competing social
relationships
Failing leadership
NORMATIVE
The normative factors rely on the ideological premise of the group to maintain commitment and ensure membership
is viewed as a moral obligation (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Klandermans, 1997). The ideology provides a constructed
model of beliefs, aims and ideas to direct one‘s goals, expectations and actions. It offers a set of ideals, principles or
symbols to explain how society should function, and for distinct radical social groups, combines a collectively
defined grievance, with a clear definition of those responsible – producing an ‗us against them‘ mentality and
fostering moral outrage (Klandermans, 1997). As an alternative ideology, the adopted beliefs can instigate collective
action for the intent to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing power system to uphold ideological values
(Dechesne et al., 2000; Demant et al., 2008a).
The alignment between individual and group ideologies is positively correlated with normative attachment, and
corresponding disengagement is an indication of failings in the group‘s ideology that makes membership and world-
view unattractive (Demant et al., 2008b). When no longer provided with a satisfying world-view, meaning to the
existing order, a desirable future or a means to achieve this future, the member has an increased susceptibility to
alternative options (Demant et al., 2008a). While the changes to the individual‘s perception and acceptance of the
group‘s ideological basis can lead to the rejection of radical views, it is more common for the changes in belief and
value systems to occur after disengaging from the group (Horgan, 2005).
Lose faith in ideology
The experience of self-doubt in aspects of the ideology can motivate the individual to view one‘s beliefs, and what
the group is fighting for, as morally or politically wrong (Horgan, 2005). A failure to provide meaning or response
to the member‘s concerns causes further doubts in the relevance of the group, as can the perceived lack of success in
achieving the ideologically stated goals. When the individual‘s needs and motives no longer coincide with what the
ideology is able to provide, the individual is more likely to disengage and deradicalise, or seek out an alternative
group more suited to the individual‘s needs (Demant et al., 2008b). A study of three separate radical movements by
Demant et al. (2008a) unveiled causes for the loss of faith in group ideologies; the changes in interpretation by the
consensus, inconsistencies between aims and ideals between members, and the inability to implement a politically
acceptable ideology that is radical enough for extreme members. As the movement evolves into a political influence,
the radical ideological beliefs previously imposed on members may be compromised to appeal to a greater audience
and gain greater community support. As a consequence, the member may find the ideological impetus for radical acts
no longer exists, or may view the group as ‗selling out‘ and seek an alternative radical group to engage with
(Noricks, 2009).
Rommelspacher (2006) argues interactions that disrupt the group‘s world-view, and provide alternative explanations
perceived as justifiable, can have a significant influence on the member‘s disengagement process. This cognitive
disruption can also be caused by interactions with others who do not comply with the ideology or conform to existing
stereotypes. The result of the inconsistencies between ideology and personal experience can alter the view of society
(or the segment of the community) as the enemy. For example, Johnny Clarry, the ex-Grand Imperial Wizard of the
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Ku Klux Klan refers to the meetings with African-American Reverend Wade Watts, where his expectations of the
‗enemy‘ were shattered, ―and then when Reverend Wade Watts was being kind to me - and he outsmarted me in that
debate, I started realising that maybe not all white people were superior to black people‖ (Denton & Jacoby, 2005,
Septemper 5). Despite attempts to demonise Watts, Clarry notes the conflict in his expectations and experiences
acted as a trigger to questioning his beliefs. This was also supported by Garfinkel‘s (2007) study where ethnocentric
beliefs were challenged by compassion from the despised out-group, conflicting with their endorsed stereotypes.
Although, as conveyed by Garfinkel (2007), this disruption only occurs if the recipient has the humility and courage
to accept previously held beliefs may be flawed.
The self doubt in the group‘s ideology can lead to questioning the validity of the group and if it is unable to address
these concerns through dialogue or attempts to address the grievance, the member is at risk of disengaging. However,
while normative factors may be perceived as deficient, interactions can be maintained due to affective and
continuance factors, as discovered by Photiadis‘ (1965) study of Mormon commitment and conformity. Participation
on a social level provided greater influence on commitment and conformity to group norms, independent of
ideological differences. Thus, despite doubts in the ideological basis for the group, disengagement can be
significantly inhibited by social and lifestyle benefits of commitment.
Frustration at lack of success
Socialisation into radical groups requires a high level of commitment and enforces a collective identity where group
ideology and goals are fused with the individual‘s identity (Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003). As a consequence, the
inability to distinguish between goals means success or failure is taken personally with emotional reactions of shame
and guilt. Failed radical attempts at altering the status quo, and the realisation that despite the personal sacrifice of
group commitment and acting in the most extreme, the desired goal is no closer, produces a demotivating effect and
uncertainty regarding the group‘s radical actions (Demant et al., 2008a; Fink & Hearne, 2008). Failure at achieving
ideological success generates a diminished sense of urgency and the realisation that initial aspirations associated with
membership are removed from day-to-day responsibilities of the adopted role. When the individual determines their
investment has been quite substantial, yet the goal remains a distant realisation, the probability of defection is
heightened (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Horgan, 2005; Wright, 1987).
The effects of failure have been measured in mainstream contexts with Snyder, Lassegard and Ford‘s (1986) study of
successful and unsuccessful university groups. Participants led to believe they had failed a task displayed less interest
in participating in future group activities and were less inclined to self-identify with the group, while the opposite
effect occurred for successful groups. The social distance between the individual and group failure serves as a
strategy to avoid negative evaluation and protects self-esteem. However, De Cremer and van Dijk‘s (2002) found
when negative feedback on group performance was provided, only those with salient personal identities (as opposed
to salient collective identities) would reduce contribution to the group, proposing group failure is only precursor to
disengagement for individuals without a salient group identity. When distancing is observed by core members, the
attempts to restore the self identity at the expense of the collective is viewed as a lack of commitment and disloyalty
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). At this point, members with salient personal identities, and behave
with greater self-interest, are more likely to be rejected and/or expelled by group members with greater salient
collective identities (Branscombe et al., 1999).
Rejection of violence
Arguably, the most common reason for leaving radical social groups is the personal or indirect experiences of
violence due to extremist ideologies and hatred (Fink & Hearne, 2008; Horgan, 2005; Noricks, 2009). The
underlying reasons for rejecting violence can be of an ideological, strategic or organisational nature (Demant et al.,
2008a). The ideological rejection of violence includes the individual‘s attitudes and morals surrounding violence,
such as violence is inherently bad or creates undesired animosity. Strategically, violence is no longer seen as a
successful method to achieving desired outcomes, and finally, the influence of violence on the organisation, such as
in-group violence causing fragmentation within the movement. These violent stresses can lead to the rejection of
violence and the rejection of the social group, causing disillusionment and an increase propensity for disengagement.
While disengaging does not determine the violent behaviours of the individual, the rejection of violent means to
achieve ideological aims is considered part of the deradicalisation process.
Husain (2007) details the horror experienced with the death of an innocent life and the realisation of the violent
situation he had helped create. The halaqah endorsed the belief the life of a kafir is inconsequential in accomplishing
Muslim dominance and Husain experienced anxiety over the method of violence. Rommelspacher‘s (2006; as cited
in Demant et al., 2008a) study into German right-wing extremists found confrontation with violence caused some of
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the movement‘s members to rethink involvement because of the view ‗it was taken too far‘. Supporting the
experience of violence as a precipitating factor to disengagement includes the analysis of the Moluccan and
squatter‘s movements (Demant et al., 2008a), and gangs in America (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996), whereby the
personal confrontation with violence contributed considerably to the decline of group membership. Decker and Van
Winkle‘s (1996) interviews with ex-members from St Louis‘ street gangs found experiences of violence, directly or
indirectly, to be a consistent reason for disengagement, with the period immediately after the violent confrontation
being the most susceptible for cognitive shifts. However, intervention must be swift to prevent the solidarity imposed
by the gang‘s interpretation of the violence as favourable.
AFFECTIVE The affective factors are the social and organisational aspects facilitating or impeding emotional attachment to the
group, and are central to an individual‘s propensity to maintain affiliations even when ideological differences are
present. This affective attachment incorporates psychological investment to the group, emotional attachment to the
group‘s goals and values, as well as the individual‘s role (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Feeling competent and comfortable
in a role within the group is arguably the strongest antecedent to emotional attachment.
A positive correlation exists between affective attachment to the collective and the identification and involvement,
and conversely, disappointment with intra-group interactions can weaken commitment and willingness to participate
(Demant et al., 2008a; Klandermans, 1997). The failure in organisational capacity results in the group‘s inability to
fulfil social and cultural functions or utilise sufficient new sources (Demant et al., 2008a). Affective commitment is
subjected to dual processes; whereby reduction influences the member‘s perspective and highlights perceived
deficiencies in normative and continuance spheres, or the reduction may be a consequence of an existing deficit.
Failing group interaction
Radical social groups adopt various organisational structures; from fixed, hierarchal organisations with authoritarian
leaders, to fluid and decentralised networks, yet all are susceptible to negative organisational factors which influence
both maintenance and disengagement with intra-group relationships. Whether formally recognised or not, each
member is assigned status where leaders are viewed as ‗exemplary‘, and ethically and morally consistent with the
group‘s ideals and goals, and group members who do not uphold the prototypical characteristics are viewed as less
worthy, causing internal conflict (Demant et al., 2008a). Internal conflicts such as power plays, competition between
members and disloyalty can dishearten members, and rejection or receiving negative feedback from the collective
can cause personal uncertainty regarding acceptance (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Branscombe et al., 1999; Demant et
al., 2008a; Horgan, 2005). The antagonism within members can produce paranoia and, in terms of radical groups,
fears of infiltration from rival groups or authorities. The mutual competition, contempt and distrust can cause
disillusionment as the individual does not achieve the level of security expected when joining (Bjørgo & Horgan,
2009).
Rejection from the group can be perceived as a threat of expulsion, the removal of membership status, or the
unwillingness of the group to accept the individual as a prototypical member of the group (Branscombe et al., 1999).
The strength of identification with the group will determine the individual‘s reaction. Members low in identification
may disidentify in anticipation of further rejection, maintaining self-esteem by attaching a positive emotional
response to their non-prototypical identity and applying a self-categorisation into a group interpreted as a ‗better
match‘. Those high in identification are more likely to experience low self-esteem as they continue to admire
prototypical members and view themselves unfavourably (Branscombe et al., 1999). The interpretation of rejection
from the social group renders disengagement and intervention more practical for members with low identification.
Failing leadership
Jacob‘s (1987) interviews with voluntary religious defectors emphasised four sources for disillusionment with the
leader; physical abuse, psychological abuse, emotional rejection, and spiritual betrayal. The study indicated
psychological abuse and emotional rejection were the predominant causes of disillusionment, with rejection derived
from unfilled expectations of the spiritual god or the affective relationship between leader and follower. The spiritual
betrayal is linked to the leader not fulfilling expectations of a moral and pious lifestyle. As leaders are representative
of the prototypical member or presented as the ‗hero‘ for members to admire, inconsistencies between leaders and
group ideals, or the message propagated can lead to the interpretation of the ideology and methods to achieve goals
as insincere (Demant et al., 2008a; Rommelspacher, 2006; Wright, 1987). The double standards in lifestyle
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regulations between leaders and members can lead to resentment and cause doubts in the sacrifices required to
achieve group goals (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009).
Members can also become disillusioned by the inability of leaders to provide sufficient direction and focus, or adapt
to changing circumstances and inspire members (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al., 2008a; Fink & Hearne,
2008). A lack of leadership and political influence structurally can cause member‘s to doubt the group‘s capability to
achieve societal change (Demant et al., 2008a). While this may be a reason for departing the social group, it can also
cause members to seek out another, more radical, social group.
CONTINUANCE
Continuance commitment is the awareness of consequences and personal costs associated with leaving, and are
linked to the practical life circumstances making membership attractive or unattractive (Allen & Meyer, 1990;
Klandermans, 1997). Two factors influence the strength of continuance commitment: the degree of investment to the
role and group, and the perceived lack of viable alternatives. The individual interprets a profit associated with
maintaining participation, and a cost associated with leaving, thus, any changes to the social identity are viewed with
the knowledge of negative consequences and penalties (Becker, 1960; Demant, Wagenaar, & van Donselaar, 2009;
Klandermans, 1997). Demant et al. (2008a) proposes continuance factors only play a supporting role, providing
extra motivation to the normative and affective factors of disengagement. Only when practical life circumstances
become prominent and provide a negative variant, such as outside pressure and stigmatisation, does it have a direct
role in disengagement.
Maturation
Some radical social groups tend to consist of young participants and furthermore, Weinberg (2008) argues the longer
the organisation exists, the younger the recruits become. In comparison to the founding generation, Weinberg (2008)
suggests youthful members are less ideologically or religiously sophisticated, lack an understanding of the long term
purposes of the organisation, and are typically ‗looking for action‘. While street gangs and racist groups can reflect
this analysis, Weinberg‘s (2008) argument conflicts with Sageman (2004, 2005) and Horgan‘s (2008) study of
terrorism with the average age of Jihadis to be 26, and 25 for al-Qaeda – well past adolescence. The opposite is also
true for one percent motorcycle clubs as Veno (2003) asserts the average age in the 1980‘s was approximately 25
years old, but demographic changes has seen the average age rise to the late 30‘s.
Despite older cohorts, the effects of aging within a radical lifestyle are still influential in the practicality of group
involvement. Veno (2003) notes as members of the one percent motorcycle clubs age, participating in group
activities becomes increasingly difficult; for example the inability to handle the cultural symbol Harley-Davidsons,
opting for trikes or cars, or the inability to endorse ‗hard living‘ lifestyle of alcohol and partying. The isolation of the
groups from institutions can result in members avoiding medical treatment, and in the case of one percent motorcycle
clubs, years of harmful lifestyle choices can lead to medical conditions preventing further involvement in group
events and celebrations (Veno, 2003).
In consideration of youthful recruits, there are many advantageous – and disadvantages – to drawing on this
demographic. An advantage is their ability to devote themselves in terms of time and resources to the movement due
to the lack of restraints from familial or employment responsibilities (Demant et al., 2008a; Silke, 2003). There is
also the idealistic notion of having the ability to change the world and possess the energy to pursue group tasks
(Gendron, 2006). However, the problem faced by the group is maintaining this level of dedication as the youth
develop into more adult roles and identities. The importance of membership wanes as they no longer have the same
need for excitement, have less energy or crave a more subdued lifestyle (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al.,
2008a; Horgan, 2005). Not only is the maturation of an individual member influential on the group, but members
typically outgrow the movement and leave as an aggregate. For the group to exist after the members disengage, it
needs to recruit and replace with a younger cohort, posing more concerns regarding the attractiveness to a younger
generation.
Competing social relationships
The realisation that further radicalisation will require the permanent severance of interpersonal connections can
frighten members from furthering their involvement, particularly those with previous connections to society (Demant
et al., 2008a). However, those from minority groups are expected to experience a different process as the connection
to society is not felt as strongly as those from the majority (Demant et al., 2008a). It is more likely the lack of
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connection contributed to the first step in the radicalisation process for minorities, while it acts as the final barrier to
radicalisation for the majority. These social groups meet members‘ social and affective needs, and in some cases can
serve in place of primary or quasi-primary groups; for example, as a surrogate family (Wright, 1987). However,
when disillusioned with the group, external relationships increase in influence and place strain on the resources the
individual commits to the group. When associated with external people the radical trusts and respects, the interaction
can operate in opposition to the group and intervention can be initiated through ideological dialogue (Demant et al.,
2008a). The respect for these individuals increases the openness to alternative opinions and world-views and
encourages doubts and questioning of the group‘s ideology (Demant et al., 2008a).
Social groups are aware of the strain dyadic relationships can place on members‘ time and resources, and frequently
there are formal and informal regulations restricting two-person intimacy, or the world-view endorses attitudes to
counter the dyadic formation. For example, encouraging celibacy or sexual pluralism, or the attitude of the opposite
sex as inferior and a threat to group stability (Wright, 1987). Failure to do so can threaten membership in various
ways, such as one member of the dyad wants to leave and persuades the other, or as the relationship intensifies
greater emotional investments is placed in the dyadic relationship at the expense of other existing relationships.
Increased interaction with non-members can cause normative ambiguity due to the lack of reciprocity over shared
beliefs and the affirming of peaceful behaviours (Garfinkel, 2007). Family and partners are a source of support and
provide a sounding board for concerns and emphasise the plausibility of alternative and socially acceptable options
(Fink & Hearne, 2008). The establishment of a family external to the group also places demands on member to adopt
new responsibilities for both the spouse and children, Horgan and Bjørgo (2009) argue this is one of the strongest
motivations for the defection from radical social groups.
The reduction of insulation from the outside world can have negative implications for group relationships acting as
vehicles of meaning and values. By disrupting the meaningful interactions between a member and the group, the
dependent socialisation and commitment processes are interrupted (Wright, 1987). This provides a stimulus for
altering discredited perceptions of the larger society by removing group boundaries; therefore, minimising group
distinctions and undermining the importance of belonging to a unique social group. While it is proposed members
will seek affirming reactions from external social relationships when group relations no longer fulfil affective needs,
contextual factors of memberships need to be acknowledged, particularly, the argument of only members who join
the social group to fulfil social requirements are likely to drift to external relations if their needs are not met, and in
contrast, movements successful in meeting members affective requirements will cause members to leave for reasons
independent to unfulfilled affective needs (Wright, 1987).
External pressures and stigmatisation
Involvement with radical social groups and associated activities can cause emotional strain and be detrimental to
relationships and future opportunities. Those operating in a clandestine manner and experiencing threats of violence
or punitive actions by enemies or authorities can find themselves longing for a ‗normal‘ life; including lifestyle
factors unavailable while maintaining membership, such as marriage and beginning a family, and/or developing a
career, or living without fear (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Fink & Hearne, 2008; Horgan, 2005). While some members
perceive the notion of a normal way-of-life to be dull, the experiences of stigmatisation, social isolation and the
consumption by intense hatred can exhaust the individual leading to a break down or exhaustion.
A radical social identity can produce negative repercussions in other social contexts and influence the perception and
treatment from others outside the radical milieu. The individual identity that exists externally can be disregarded in
social situations where the expectation is to be assessed on individual characteristics or merits; such as employment
interviews (Branscombe et al., 1999). The stigmatisation may produce feelings of discrimination and disappointment
when the individual deems their radical identity as irrelevant or illegitimate to the context. The lack of opportunities
due to negative relationships with the community can increase dependency on the organisation, or may cause the
evaluation of the costs associated with maintaining the radical identity. For those encountering low identification
with their social group, this discrimination can emphasise intergroup heterogeneity and/or further disillusionment
with their membership (Branscombe et al., 1999).
BARRIERS TO DISENGAGEMENT
The decision to leave the radical collective behind is as significant and complex as joining with several factors
impeding the process. Devoting significant amounts of time and resources to the collective can result in the
perception of withdrawal as a personal failure. Taylor (1988, p. 168) refers to this as the concept ‗spiralling of
commitment‘ in radical groups, where previous investments and organisational pressures entrap the individual into
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remaining despite doubts. The barriers enforcing group commitment consist of three fundamental elements; (1)
ensuring the member‘s behaviour requires socio-psychological investments, (2) decisions reinforcing this investment
are advocated as the only feasible option, and (3) any efforts to avoid the investment only serve to consolidate the
entrapment of the member (Taylor, 1988). These barriers are designed to ensure the dominance of the radical
ideology, the individual‘s social dependence on the group and instil practical lifestyle barriers that make withdrawal
unattractive. Demant et al. (2008a) identifies examples of barriers in radical groups as the costs involved in
disengaging, fear of reprisals from the group, the loss of reputation and protection, and the marginal position
following disengagement. Disengaging from any social group can have negative repercussions in terms of the loss of
identity and community; however, the radical groups can produce additional and more severe consequences that need
to be considered by the individual.
SUMMARY
Social groups are a significant component in human interaction and the investment of time and resources, as well as
the emotional attachment, make departing a painful experience. The nature of radical social groups ensures members
are socially and psychologically invested and utilise socialisation practices to prevent withdrawal. As a consequence,
disengaging can have negative repercussions for the self-identity and well-being of the ex-member. The
aforementioned contributing factors to disillusionment in themselves may not be valid, solitary reasons for
disengaging; however, produce significant rationalising effects on the initial phase of doubt and help to overcome
socialisation barriers. Commitment is likely to wane when material, psychological and communal benefits of
membership are outweighed by the resources required for association and the inability to achieve desirable outcomes.
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Moral Disengagement: Exploring Support Mechanisms for Violent Extremism
among Young Egyptian Males
Dr Paul S Lieber, Dr Yael Efreom-Lieber and Dr (LTC) Christopher Rate
University of Canberra (Australia)
Calvary Hospital (Canberra, Australia),
US Army War College
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Abstract This study applied Bandura‟s (1986) eight mechanisms of moral disengagement to a sample of young, Egyptian
Muslim males (N=660). Findings uncovered two distinct scoring groups, likewise a statistically significant (p<.01)
relationship between higher reported levels of moral disengagement and age. For this sample, younger individuals
were likewise more apt to possess higher levels of moral disengagement. Findings argue for additional analyses
exploring these relationships, likewise employing counter-violence, communication interventions derived specifically
from Bandura‟s identified mechanisms.
Keywords Moral Disengagement, Extremism, Terrorism, Egypt
INTRODUCTION
By definition, ‗violent extremism‘ are acts of violence decisively perpetrated on civilian non-combatants for the
purposes of obtaining ideological, religious or political objectives (Borum, 2004). Under this definition, there are
many ‗root cause‘ explanations for violent extremism, psychological theories that examine broad environmental
factors (i.e. poverty and government restrictions, etc.) as individual motivations and factors for such acts (Atran,
2004; Krueger & Latin, 2003).
Investigating individualized attitudes and beliefs toward violent extremism can arguably help explain several key
behaviours underlying this ideology, most notably strong support for the use of violent tactics to achieve various,
violent aims. While no one theory nor perspective can singlehandedly explain the variability and complexity of
violent extremism, existing research, however, reasons that understanding human social cognitive processing can
help decipher key pieces in this salient puzzle (Bandura, 1990). Toward this end, there is a glaring need to better
understand individual and mass support for violent methods, data which can be used toward developing alternative
and effective, non-lethal means for persuading people to think and act otherwise.
To develop effective persuasion campaigns against violence involves understanding how people come to believe that
violence against ‗some people‘ is acceptable and justified in the first place. Echoing this philosophy, Bandura‘s
(1986) social-cognitive theory of moral disengagement posits that the use of violence and aggression may be directly
related to an individual‘s tendency to disengage from their own moral standards and guidelines (Paciello et al.,
2008). Meaning that, in general, people knowingly monitor their own conduct, refraining from actions that result in
self-criticism and/or a violation of personal standards (Bandura, 1986).
To explain, engaging in behaviour inconsistent with one‘s personal values and/or principles is generally highly
uncomfortable, often resulting in intense feelings of guilt and remorse. Still, individuals with fluid ethics and/or
values do commit atrocities, and experience no self-censure or sense of wrongdoing while doing so (Bandura et al.,
2001). This dismissal is derived via an active and gradual process of learning to disengage internal self –sanctions,
of selectively distorting social cognitive information for the purposes of justifying violence (Bandura, 1990).
Bandura (2001) suggests eight social-cognitive mechanisms at work by which an individual may disengage from
his/her own personal moral agency. These mechanisms centre around three primary areas: 1) elements connected to
actual violent behaviour; 2) the consequences of violence; and 3) personal responsibility for violence and the targets
of violent actions. All eight mechanisms allow a person to effectively eliminate any guilt or reproach from engaging
in violent acts (see Table 1). Under this rubric and taken together, individuals who endorse high levels of moral
disengagement are also and logically more likely to support the use of violence plus engage in aggressive and violent
behaviour themselves (McAlister et al., 2006; Paciello et al., 2008).
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Table 1. Eight Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
Mechanism of Moral Disengagement Definition
1. Moral Justification Detrimental conduct justified as serving socially
worthy and moral purposes
2. Euphemistic Language Language that sanitizes harmful conduct
3. Advantageous Comparison Contrasting harmful conduct with highly flagrant
acts or atrocities
4. Displacement of Responsibility Ascribing blame for damage to other agents
5. Diffusion of Responsibility Obscuring and minimizing one‘s agentive role in
harm
6. Misrepresenting the Harm Distorting, minimizing or disbelieving the harmful
effects
7. Ascription of Blame Blaming the victim for their own plight
8. Dehumanization Stripping people of human qualities or investing
them with demonic attributes
Bandura‘s explanation is not new to this problem set; moral disengagement has – for over two decades - been
theoretically applied to understand terrorism and political violence (Bandura, 1990). However, only a handful of
these studies directly measured rates of moral disengagement in the populations exposed to terrorism and violence
(McAlister et al., 2006).
JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS STUDY
In particular, few studies examine the processes of moral disengagement among male Muslim populations. This
population is particularly critical to current investigation, given their status as a prime recruitment base by many
violent extremist groups (Borum, 2004). Not surprisingly, existing research finds groups such as Al Qaeda, Lebanese
Hezbollah and the Irish Republican Army knowingly infusing mechanisms of moral disengagement into their mass
communication efforts to promote and justify violent methods (Sarma, 2007; Weimann, 2008). In his analysis of
over 5,000 terrorist websites, Weimann (2008) discovered that much of the rhetoric espoused by these groups
directly taps into Bandura‘s eight mechanisms of moral disengagement. Aly (2010) echoed these sentiments,
uncovering a correlation between social identity and violent or extremist behaviour as the premise for anti-terrorism
campaigns in some Arab countries.
Thus, a closer assessment of levels of moral disengagement among male Muslim populations can provide useful,
tangible information about how susceptible this audience might be to terrorist appeals for the use of violence.
Bandura‘s theory suggests ways of countering mechanisms, of helping ‗reengage‘ peoples‘ lost sense of moral
agency and/or personal self sanctions.
Various demographic and attitudinal variables collected in tandem might further assist in reasoning how a larger
population is likely to advocate for violent method use. Ethical discrepancies, Lieber (2005) uncovered, are likely to
emerge from traditional drivers such as age, education, gender and political ideology.
This knowledge can subsequently be applied in designing valid campaigns and messages aimed at countering
terrorist propaganda. In sum: better understanding of which segments of a population are most vulnerable to moral
disengagement can engender more effective counter-messaging toward at-risk populations.
METHODS
Structured phone interviews were given to a convenience sample of 660 Muslim Egyptian males between the ages of
15-30 years old (M=24 years old). The interviews were administered between the dates of 10, June 2009 to 28, June
2009. All measures were translated into Arabic, and subsequently back translated by professional translators (native
Arabic speakers). Interviews were likewise administered by fully- trained interviewers and native Arabic speakers.
All participants were recruited on a volunteer basis, with interviews lasting n average of 26 minutes each. The self-
report measures analysed for this study were part of a broader research project investigating Arab male opinions and
attitudes on a variety of topics.
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Participants
45% of the sample had attended some university and/or completed a graduate degree. 53% reported working in a full
time job, with 41% of this group self-identifying as students and/or apprentice status. Approximately 87% of the
sample identified themselves as ‗middle class.‘ All participants lived in one of five major Egyptian cities including
Cairo (30%), Al-Gharbia (15%), Al-Menyah (16%), Al-Sharqiyah (20%), and Al-Behera (18%).
Measures
Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement: A modified version of the Mechanism of Moral Disengagement Scale
(Bandura et al., 1996) was administered to the participants. The original scale was modified for use with an adult
Muslim population and included 21 items from the original scale. Original items and verbiage on education were
removed to remain developmentally appropriate for the target sample. All items were scored on a 1 to 3 scale, with 1
indicating ‗disagree,‘ 2 corresponding to ‗neutral‘ and 3 ‗agree.‘ For the sampled population, the Moral
Disengagement Scale was found to possess adequate internal reliability (Cronbach‘s alpha=.74), suggesting that
scale items were appropriately highly inter-correlated with each other. A total score for Moral Disengagement was
calculated by summing across the items and calculating its average. Higher scores indicate higher levels of
Bandura‘s notion of moral disengagement.
Attitudes against violence: Participant attitudes on violence were measured via nine items gauging level of support
for violence against civilian non-combatants. This Attitudes Against Violence Scale explored individual beliefs in
the effectiveness of violence such as, ―Violence against civilians is the only way for Muslims to fight against
powerful countries,‖ ―Violence against civilians is justified as a punishment for non-believers,‖ and ―Violence
against civilians is effective in protecting the interests of Muslims.‖ Said questions were rated on a scale of 1-5, with
1 indicating ‗completely agree‘ and 5 ‗completely disagree.‘ For the following sample, the Attitudes Against
Violence Scale was found to possess adequate internal reliability (Cronbach‘s alpha=.68), suggesting scale items
were appropriately highly inter-correlated with each other. A total score for Attitudes Against Violence was
calculated by summing across the items and calculating its average. Higher scores indicate lower levels of Bandura‘s
notion of support for violence.
RESULTS
Zero-Order Correlations
For this sample, mechanisms of moral disengagement were strongly and negatively correlated to attitudes against
violence (see Table 2). Additionally, moral disengagement was negatively correlated with age, such that younger
participants endorsed higher levels of moral disengagement. However, neither moral disengagement nor attitudes
against violence were correlated with level of education, job status or social class. This finding is consistent with
previous research indicating younger individuals tend to have higher rates of moral disengagement (Paciello et al.,
2008).
Table 2. Zero Order Correlations of Moral Disengagement, Attitudes Towards Violence, and Demographic Variables
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Moral
Disengagement
1.53 0.31 -- -.23** -.10* -.02
2. Attitudes
Towards Violence
4.19 0.69 -.23** -- .15** .05
3. Age 23.6 5.17 -.10* .15** -- .45**
4. Level of
Education
5.5 1.41 -.02 .05 .45** --
**p<.01. *p<.05.
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
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Two groups (‗high‘ and ‗low‘) were formed stemming from total scores on the Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
Scale. The ‗low‘ levels of moral disengagement group included 344 respondents, the ‗high‘ one 316. Additionally,
three age groups were formed: a) participants 15-20 years old (N=216); b) 21-25 years old (N=184); and c) 26-30
years old (N=260). A 3x2 ANOVA was run for the attitudes against violence measures, with age and moral
disengagement entered as grouping variables.
Results of the 3x2 ANOVA found the overall model (F [5, 654]=14.46; p<. 01), main effects of moral
disengagement, and age group all significant. This joint finding suggests that – for this sample of Egyptian Muslim
males - both age and moral disengagement significantly impact attitudes against the use of violence. More
importantly, there is a significant interaction between age and moral disengagement on attitudes against violence (F
[5, 654]=15.84; p<. 01; Eta Squared=.05).
In particular and in the ‗high‘ moral disengagement group, younger participants (15-20 year old and 21-25 year old)
were significantly more likely to support the use of violence as compared to their older peers (26-30 year old group).
In contrast, there were no significant differences uncovered in the ‗low‘ group among these same variables.
Meaning, in the ‗low‘ moral disengagement group, all age groups reported a consistent attitude strongly opposing the
use of violence. This finding suggests that younger individuals that endorse higher levels of moral disengagement
are also more likely to support the use of violent methods and strategies, such as attacks on civilians. Therefore and
for this sample, it is a combination of youth and social cognitive processes of moral disengagement that may partially
explain the tendency to support the use of violence toward achieving certain goals.
DISCUSSION
While a snapshot analysis, this study uncovered tangible signs of the potency of moral disengagement among a
vulnerable population. A startling although perhaps unsurprising link between moral disengagement and age points
to a glaring reality of the ability of media and/or peers to engender strong held beliefs capable of nurture even at
younger ages. In specific, how a calculated marriage between ideology and/or message construct can exponentially
increase the effectiveness and adoption rates of both. When this marriage produces violent extremism, the results can
literally be both fatal and tragic.
Moreover, this study reasons for a better infusion of proven social science theory and practice when analysing,
creating communication interventions toward countering violent extremism. Analysed studies uncover a systematic,
successful use of moral disengagement to advocate for, sustain violent extremist action and recruiting. In turn,
messaging to counter these tactics must adopt the same rigor and commitment.
Future research potential on this topic is near endless. Experimental research design derived from these findings can
produce valuable insights on the ability of strategic communication to increase or decrease moral disengagement
mechanisms within vulnerable populations. More importantly, provide clear links between theory and practice on a
topic of enormous global importance.
REFERENCES
Aly, Anne (2010). A Study of Audience Responses to the Media Discourse About the „Other‟: The Fear of Terrorism
Between Australian Muslims and the Broader Community. New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
Atran, S. (2004). Mishandling suicide terrorism. The Washington Quarterly, 27 (3) 67-90.
Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanisms of moral disengagement. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies,
ideologies, theologies, states of mind (pp. 161-191). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G.V., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the
exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 364-374.
Bandura, A., Caprara, G. Brabaranelli, C., Pastorelli, C., & Regalia, C. (2001). Social-cognitive self regulatory
mechanisms governing transgressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50 (1) 125-135.
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Borum, R. (2004). Psychology of terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida.
Krueger, A., & Latin, D. (2007). Kto kogo? A cross country study of the origins and targets of terrorism.
Unpublished manuscript.
Lieber, P. S. (2005). Ethical considerations of public relations practitioners: An empirical analysis of the TARES
test, Journal of Mass Media Ethics. 20(4): 288-304.
McAlister, A., Bandura. A., & Owen, S. (2006). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in support of military force:
The impact of Sept. 11. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 25 (2), 141-165.
Paciello, M., Fida, R., Tramontano, C., Lupinette, C., & Caprara, G. (2008). Stability and change of moral
disengagement and its impact on aggression and violence in late adolescence. Child Development, 79 (5) 1288-1309.
Sarma,K. (2007). Defensive Propaganda and IRA Political Control in Republican Communities. Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, 30, 1073 – 1094.
Weimann, G. (2008). The psychology of mass-mediated terrorism. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(1) 69-86.
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The Emergent Challenges for Policing Terrorism: Lessons from Mumbai
Simon O‘Rourke
secau – Security Research Centre
School of Computer and Security Science
Edith Cowan University
Perth, Western Australia
Abstract On November 26, 2008 ten armed terrorists from Lashka-e-Toiba utilised military assault style tactics to attack a
number of establishments including restaurants and hotels in the city of Mumbai, India. This new attack paradigm
indicated a significant shift in tactics from the placement of improvised explosive devices or deployment of suicide
bombers, and contains valuable lessons for contemporary law enforcement particularly with regard to intelligence,
response, and media management. There are few agencies currently geared to deal with the sheer scope of an event
involving trained terrorists well versed with small team tactics, heavily armed and equipped conducting operations
in any major city. This attack paradigm clearly presents unique challenges to police who will be tasked to respond to
these types of incidents, particularly given the training and weaponry that will be deployed against them.
Keywords Mumbai, India, Terrorism, Pakistan, Police, Assault Rifles, Planning, Technology, Media, Social Networking,
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Active Shooter.
INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 2008 ten armed terrorists from the group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) utilised military assault style
tactics to attack a number of establishments, including restaurants and hotels in the city of Mumbai, India. The name
of the group translates to Army of the Righteous, and it was formed in the Kunar province of Afghanistan in 1989
with a mandate to Islamise Indian administered Kashmir, and the wider region (Duraphe, 2009). This incident
resulted in the deaths of at least 172 people, and struck at the economic and social hub of India, thereby generating
significant media interest (Rabasa et al., 2009).
This attack paradigm indicated a significant shift in tactics from the placement of improvised explosive devices or
deployment of suicide bombers, and contains valuable lessons for contemporary law enforcement (N.Y.P.D.
Intelligence Division, 2008). Globally there are few policing agencies currently geared to deal with an event of this
nature occurring in a major metropolitan city. According to Rabasa et al. (2009, p.1) this incident was significant due
to the sheer scale and complexity of the elements involved. This methodology clearly presents unique challenges to
police who will be the first to respond to these types of incidents, particularly given the training and weaponry that
will be deployed against them. This paper will not review the attack itself in detail, as both government and private
reports referenced have provided an excellent overview of the incident. This paper will focus on the emergent
challenges for policing organisations resulting from this incident.
EVOLUTION OF TERRORIST ATTACK PARADIGMS
Terrorist tactics have continually evolved from the 1970‘s when groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine took hostages and made demands, generating media coverage for their cause. Information and
communications technology at the time required terrorist groups to undertake protracted operations in order to ensure
that their media and publicity objectives were met. Terrorists were dependent upon conventional media entities for
the achievement of such, a vulnerability that no longer exists in the contemporary networked world.
The events at the Munich Olympics in 1972 during which the terrorist group Black September took hostages,
resulted in a significant loss of life during an attempted rescue. This terrorist operation resulted in the creation of
specialised police and military hostage rescue units, culminating in the Iranian Embassy Siege in London famously
resolved 5 May, 1980 when the British 22nd
Special Air Service Regiment stormed the embassy and rescued the
hostages.
This paradigm whereby hostages are taken and the media utilised to articulate terrorist demands to a global audience
continued to determine the police response to terrorism. This was challenged with the emergence of the suicide
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bomber, as police were no longer afforded the opportunity to isolate the individual or group and negotiate a
resolution. Police are now confronted with individuals and groups who place devices either on their person or in situ,
then detonate them without making any demands. Islamist proponents like Abu Mus'ab al-Suri who advocate using
this approach posit that the greater the loss of life and atrocity committed, the greater the subsequent media coverage
(Lia, 2007). It could be argued that the transition from siege situations also corresponds with the increasing media
capability invested in the individual, who is now empowered by the evolving communications technology.
Suicide bombers or the placement of explosive devices by terrorists have targeted civilians in Bali, Madrid and
London. However, the direct attack method used in Mumbai may indicate yet another possible evolution in terrorist
tactics. It is clear that terrorist groups possess analytical capability and can adapt to tactics employed by law
enforcement. This is evidenced by the attempts to get chemical explosives onboard aircraft in component form,
rather than as an assembled unit in response to tightened aircraft security restrictions. Mumbai demonstrated the
continuing threat that exists when tactics from the battlefield are employed even more effectively against urban
targets, not located in the conflict zone. This brings them into direct conflict with patrolling police officers who are
not as well equipped and trained for this role, as the soldiers these tactics were designed to defeat.
ATTACK ON MUMBAI
The former city of Bombay, now known as Mumbai is the capital of the Indian state of Maharashta. It is one of the
most densely populated urban cities in the world with a population of approximately 20 million. It is a city of
contrasts from the eminently wealthy to the slums, founded on reclaimed land and still home to a commercial fishing
fleet, which is how those who attacked were able to navigate so close to the India coast unnoticed by security forces.
It was this accessibility from the sea in such close proximity to vast numbers of foreigners and India‘s wealthy and
famous that sealed its‘ selection by the terrorists (Rabasa et al., 2009). Mumbai had been attacked before in July
2006, when terrorists bombed a train and killed 209 people. The scope of the most recent attack reveals the potential
synthesis of terrorist attack profiles and presents significant challenges for all law enforcement agencies. Mumbai is
the commercial and entertainment epicentre of India, home to the world‘s third largest stock exchange and the
Bollywood entertainment industry producing film and television programs (Rabasa et al., 2009). It was into this
vibrant mix of people and culture that ten armed terrorists entered on the night of 26 November, 2008 and
commenced multiple attacks against defenceless civilians, whom they deliberately and methodically murdered.
This assault style strategy was described by the New York City Police (2008, p.4) as, ―a major shift in traditional
terrorist tactics‖. This approach resulted in police being confronted with multiple active shooter locations. The term
‗active shooter‘ is used in police and law enforcement agencies to describe a particular situation, whereby rapid
response to the incident and close containment of the offender are paramount. This required a shift in training and
deployment from the traditional incident cordon and contain approach, due to the propensity for the offender to
continue killing and seriously injuring those targeted until physically contained or prevented from doing so by
responding officers.
To address multiple active shooter locations, including large hotels containing thousands of people, required a large
scale well coordinated police response. The ability to deal with an incident like Mumbai would test the resources of
most contemporary policing organisations, and would require significant increases in planning, resourcing and
training to meet effectively. This requires intimate knowledge of potential targets that lie within the jurisdiction of
the relevant agency. Such a database needs to expand beyond the traditional critical infrastructure, like mass transit
points and power stations and water supplies. Policing agencies now need to compile data pertaining to hotels and
similar in order to ensure they are can regain the initiative at an incident. According to Rabasa et el. (2009, p.3) the
terrorists demonstrated intricate knowledge of the layout of the hotels and buildings. They utilised including areas
not normally accessed by the public, giving rise to the inference that the operation was meticulously planned. This
contrasts with the view posited by McElroy (2008) who cites an unnamed British official as highly critical of the
command and control and planning undertaken prior to the deployment of the India National Security Guards,
hostage rescue team. This negated their effectiveness as the terrorists were able to use service access facilities and
the Indian Commandos went in virtually blind.
The police in Mumbai were confronted with multiple incidents and were initially unable to ascertain the overall
picture. The attacks occurred over a 60 hour period and were reported widely on by the world‘s media organisations.
In a report published by the RAND corporation Rabasa et al. (2009, p.3) acknowledge that the careful planning
undertaken prior to the Mumbai attacks. This was due to the complexity of the operation undertaken by the terrorists,
which challenged the resources of the responding police to contain them and protect the public. The challenge now
exists for policing organisations to ensure that operational practices continue to evolve to meet these types of threats,
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in order to anticipate and be prepared. Ganguly (2008) supports this and further advocates that changes are needed to
improve intelligence collection and the policing of large urban cities.
RESPONDING TO AN ACTIVE SHOOTER
Prior to the Columbine High School shooting in the United States in 1999, law enforcement would adhere to the
principle of isolate, cordon, contain and negotiate. The term ‗active shooter‘ was coined following this event and is
now used to describe a law enforcement approach whereby initial responding officers seek to directly engage the
shooter, thereby denying them time to kill or harm further unarmed civilians (Pastor, 2010, p.136). The active
shooter approach whilst extremely high risk to the officers involved was not designed to meet the threat posed by an
attacking terrorist group. The emergent threat from Mumbai is that responding police may be confronted with
multiple trained active shooters who are better armed and operating with the sole aim of inflicting maximum
casualties on the civilian population.
Criminal activities including the Bank of America shootout in Los Angeles in 1997 where Los Angeles Police
(LAPD) officers were confronted by heavily armed offenders following a bank robbery illustrate the scope of the
challenge. The responding officers were only armed with 9mm handguns and 12 gauge shotguns against criminals
with fully automatic .308 calibre (7.62mm) assault rifles and full body armour, which defeated most of the police
rounds fired. This situation resulted in changes to LAPD policy and AR-15 rifles are now carried by most patrol
vehicles to ensure that officers have the capability to protect themselves and the public should a similar event occur.
The fear and uncertainty created during the hunt for the Washington sniper in 2002 and media frenzy during the
event showcased the pressure that law enforcement agencies operate under during major incidents. The loss of ten
lives and the fear generated in the community as citizens were murdered going about their normal daily business
created uncertainty and distrust. Whilst neither of these events were perpetrated in the name of a terrorist group they
still reveal the challenges facing law enforcement from criminals most of whom will seek to escape where possible.
Unless the responding officers are trained and equipped appropriately it is highly likely that they will be unable to
protect themselves or the community. Reliance upon a police tactical team even in those jurisdictions where police
are armed can only be effective if that capability can respond to multiple threats within a very short time. The LAPD
experience illustrated the difficulties facing patrol officers armed with handguns when confronting criminals who are
armed with high powered assault rifles. The ability for LAPD patrol officers to effectively contain such a threat is
now provided by the semi automatic rifles carried in each patrol vehicle. This enables those officers initially
responding to establish a cordon, and in circumstances of imminent jeopardy to take action and limit the loss of
civilian lives.
Terrorist groups operating like those in Mumbai go beyond the threat posed by heavily armed criminals and can
overwhelm traditional police responses. Rabasa et al. (2009, p.6) cite testimony from the surviving terrorist to
illustrate that his mission was to kill as many people as possible. This approach means that until actually stopped by
police the terrorist will continue killing. This threat is now realised even by those jurisdictions where the police are
not traditionally armed, and instead are reliant upon a small cadre of highly trained officers to provide specialist
firearms response akin to the UK model.
However, the threat posed by the Mumbai experience has caused the UK to review policy and upgrade the capability
and amount of ammunition carried by armed officers, in order to allow them to effectively confront the threat.
Former UK Security Minister Lord West is quoted by the Gardner (2010) as saying:
These people like the Mumbai terrorists, are a bit like soldiers, they do fire and support, move
forward, all they want to do is kill as many as possible, with slightly heavier weapons than our police
have and therefore you have to give heavy weapons to the police and train them how to do it.
Lord West succinctly describes the challenge facing police who will be the first to respond to such an incident.
Rabasa et al. (2009, pp., 4-5) identify the assault rifles carried by the terrorists in Mumbai as AK-56 a Chinese
variant of the ubiquitous Russian Ak-47. This was used in combination with improvised explosive devices and hand
grenades to create a situation whereby police commanders were unable to discern the overall picture of what they
were facing, thereby negating their ability to plan and deploy appropriately. According to Ganguly (2008) the Indian
government were unprepared to deal with an incident like Mumbai and took nine hours to deploy the National
Security Guards to the scene in order to engage the terrorists.
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According to Page (2008) the state of the equipment issued to the police in Mumbai helped to explain why ten
terrorists managed to exert influence over a city of nearly 18 million people for more than sixty hours. Page (2008)
supports this assertion quoting Maxwell Pereira a former Dehli joint police commissioner who commented on the
state of police resources, ―These casualties could have been prevented if they‘d been properly equipped‖.
MEDIA MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
Policing organisations utilise the media to convey messages to the public and detail response to incidents of public
interest. As such the public image of these agencies can be adversely affected, when media entities take a particular
denunciatory frame regarding police activities. This approach can reduce public confidence and limit the flow of
information coming into the police. In order to address this most police agencies now have media units staffed by
former journalists and experienced advisors. This has resulted in a very open approach, whereby police actively
engage the media and this strategy is effective with regard to most traditional crime types. However, such an
approach is inherently problematic when this template is applied to terrorist incidents like Mumbai. Live feeds and
reports from incident scenes where police commanders answer operational questions that refer to timeframes, future
intentions, and deployment or response strategies now have the potential to provide terrorists with advanced warning
and allow them to alter their tactics in response.
This was identified by McElroy (2008) who asserts that an Indian cabinet minister publically announced the
timeframe for deployment of commandos to the incident scene, information that was of significant value to the
terrorists. This will require police organisations to develop new media strategies and train their staff and
management accordingly. Such an approach will need to be undertaken in close partnership with government, to
ensure that the political response is cognisant of the challenges involved.
Relationships with the conventional media have historically presented policing agencies with challenges and
opportunities during major incidents. However, in addition to the challenges posed by the events themselves, law
enforcement is now confronted with terrorists who are accessing real time intelligence data regarding the police
response and deployment via the media. The 24/7 news cycle generates intense competition between media entities
and can adversely affect responsible reporting. The excessive competition between Indian media agencies is seen by
Acharya, et al. (2008, p.42) to have resulted in behaviour that was focused on the business of news rather than the
responsbile delivery of information to the community. This focus on the measures undertaken by the Indian
authorities provided a wealth of information to the terrorists and also informed them about those they held hostage.
Most media entities now stream live video and photographs from incident scenes via the Internet enabling anyone
with a connection to remotely access the data stream. This facilitates real time analysis from a location removed from
the incident site resulting in the provision of actionable intelligence to the terrorists themselves. It can be inferred
from the situation in Mumbai and ongoing communications between team members, and their base in Pakistan that
intelligence was been fed back to the team whilst they were still carrying out attacks, thereby enabling them to negate
the effectiveness of responding police (N.Y.P.D. Intelligence Division, 2008, p.5).
Mumbai clearly illustrated that contemporary policing agencies need to be aware of the operational space that they
now operate within. This space makes use of ubiquitous communications technology, allowing those involved to
change their tactics in response to police deployment. Advances in social networking technology are creating an
environment where video from an incident can be uploaded in real time. Social media and networks like You Tube,
Facebook and Twitter allow the uploading of photos and video with the potential for anyone to access. This can
readily identify police tactics like those in Mumbai when commandos began fast-roping onto the roof of the hotels.
Whilst the terrorists could not physically see what the commandos were doing, the media coverage provided their
controllers with a live feed of the incident. This allowed the terrorists to identify the likely approach routes of the
commandos based upon their physical entry points the building and respond accordingly. The intercepted phone calls
between the terrorists in Mumbai and their controllers in Pakistan clearly detailed the assessment of the tactics being
used against them and directed a response. One intercept released by the Indian Government (2008, p.54) detailed
instructions passed to the terrorists:
Keep in mind that the hostages are of use only as long as you do not come under fire because of their
safety. If you are still threatened, then don‘t saddle yourself with the burden of the hostages,
immediately kill them.
This view is also supported by Rabasa et al. (2009, p.7) who posits that the terrorists received tactical advice based
upon what their handlers were able to discern and analyse from the live media feeds at the scene. During a protracted
incident like Mumbai police commanders will need to gain an effective picture of the overall incident. According to
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Acharya, Mendal, & Mehta, (2008, p.6) the planning of the Mumbai attack was designed to create confusion and
negate any effective response by Indian authorities. Following the Mumbai attacks the NYPD deployed members to
the scene to liaise with Indian investigators and provide intelligence that the NYPD could use to plan its response to
a similar incident in New York City. According to information obtained by the NYPD Intelligence Division (2008,
p.42) the terrorists involved made excellent use of information and communications technology:
They carried blackberries, compact disks with high-resolution satellite images such as Google Earth
maps, and had multiple cell phones with interchangeable SIM cards that would be hard to track.
Once on the scene they removed cell phones from hostages and used them to stay in contact with one
another.
This use of multiple cell phones and Internet access technology would require significant resources to intercept,
translate and analyse. It would however, present a unique opportunity to intercept communications and discern future
intention.
INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS
In order for a terrorist or extremist group to mount a similar attack to that staged in Mumbai they would need access
to the requisite weaponry and the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies (Binnie & LeMiere, 2008). It
could be argued that such a group would also need to operate below the law enforcement radar, unless such and
attack was to be funded by crime. Changes in society are necessitating new paradigms for the collection and analysis
of intelligence needed to support national security operations, and guide public policy (Sullivan, 2008). Predictive
analysis or warning intelligence is needed to allow policing agencies to take action prior to a terrorist incident.
However, the production of this class of intelligence is inherently difficult. It requires engagement with policy
makers in order for the assessment and discussion of differing hypotheses regarding emergent challenges, prior to
determining policy responses. This engagement will facilitate a broader strategic approach, rather than the prevailing
policy of demands for immediate intelligence (Sullivan, 2008).
Traditional intelligence practices from the Cold War are not well suited to meeting the challenges posed by the
dynamic nature of contemporary terrorism. This new environment contains a manifold of non-state actors, cultures
and political objectives fed by an extremist ideology, that is spread via new communications technologies (United
States Government, 2006). Accordingly, it could be argued that no organisation is better suited to enhancing
domestic intelligence capabilities than local policing agencies. Intricate knowledge of local communities, offenders,
crime types and patterns of behaviour make local police highly attuned to the environment they patrol. However,
such agencies are limited in their ability to isolate and dedicate resources solely for counter-terrorism due to fiscal
and resource constraints, thus limiting their ability to focus purely on intelligence (Riley, Treverton, Wilson, &
Davis, 2005).
Evans (2005) posits that whilst intelligence should be the primary strategic consideration for addressing terrorism, it
can only be effective if delivered in such a manner as to meet the needs of its customers. In order for intelligence to
be advantageous, the organisation producing it must have the capacity to discern the challenges that the future may
hold. Such intelligence, when provided to policy makers, has the capacity to improve their decision making process,
resulting in the initiation of action that is more likely succeed. It is this ability to take action as a result of an
intelligence product relevant to the particular situation, that is the ultimate outcome for the intelligence community
(United States Government, 2008).
In order to remain effective in the future the producers of analytical intelligence products, including the police, will
need to understand and anticipate the needs of those who use them. This will necessitate a shift from the production
of a traditional list of intelligence requirements to a more mission orientated focus designed to assist decision makers
in achieving objectives (United States Government, 2008). Quiggin (2007, p.50) defines this as, ―The final all-source
intelligence product of actionable knowledge provided to government to anticipate or reduce uncertainty in its
pursuit or protection of international political, economic and security objectives‖.
The primary task of the contemporary intelligence agency is the provision of quality analytical product to decision
makers. However, its production is reliant upon the human cognitive element, which is often overlooked as attention
and subsequent funding is drawn to the impressive technical hardware that intelligence agencies can deploy (Wastell,
Clark, & Duncan, 2006). Technical collection systems like satellites, which can demonstrate a clear capability and
are supported by excellent marketing, will normally always be funded as a priority. However, Treverton (cited in
Quiggin, 2007, p.92) argues that more resources should be provided to analysis in order to increase the processing
capability as funding for such is deficient in most policing agencies. This results in a failure to recruit, train and
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mentor high quality analysts, which Zegart (2007) posits was the case for FBI intelligence analysts prior to 9/11, but
has now improved due to the FBI integrating intelligence into its core mission.
It is this human element, which technology cannot replicate that is so crucial to successfully discerning key
information. The intelligence community has also identified significant challenges posed by the need to recruit, train
and retain the best and brightest in the current employment market. Conditions and remuneration will need to be
adjusted in line with the private sector to ensure they remain a competitive employer (United States Government,
2008). Once trained these analysts may be able to recognise key fragments of intelligence termed indicators.
Discernable indicators or warnings may be produced at any time in the terrorist ‗Event Horizon‘ as discussed by
Sullivan & Wirtz (2008, p.18) who classify this as the time between the conception and execution of a terrorist
operation. This will necessitate analysts being able to indentify targets and modes of attack and information about
those involved from just about any point along the ‗Event Horizon‘ where the indicator is first recognised.
Whilst conventional military operations take time to build up and deploy assets thereby providing discernible
indicators, the activities of terrorists are more subtle and harder to predict. Whilst not advocating that the future can
be successfully predicated, Quiggin acknowledges that the role of intelligence is to scan the horizon, and provide
warning about future challenges in such a manner as to allow decisions to be made and action taken. According to
Robert Bowie a former deputy director of the CIA actionable intelligence is, ―knowledge and analysis designed to
assist action‖ (May, 1984, p.3). Whilst structural and bureaucratic change occurs across police and intelligence
agencies, it is the ability of these agencies to successfully adapt at a sufficient rate to meet the shifting global
challenges that is essential (Zegart, 2007). Cultural impediments can significantly hamper efforts to adapt.
Individuals within the organisation can becoming institutionalised and insist on doing things a particular was because
that‘s the way they have always been done, thereby ensuring that newer members adhere to this mantra (Zegart,
2007). This can be alleviated over time by targeted recruitment practices in order to ensure that the intelligence team
is sufficiently diverse, and contains a range of highly skilled members who are not afraid to question the status quo
and challenge unsubstantiated opinion (Quiggin, 2007).
Counter-terrorism analysts require an intricate understanding of the environment, which facilitates such activity, and
may need to become experts regarding specific groups or geographic regions. Such levels of competency will take
years to acquire, and cannot be taught in a short course (Best, 2003). Therefore the retention of such skills is essential
if intelligence organisations are to be able to achieve their mission. Cooper (2005) identifies that analytical success
cannot be achieved by the wishes of senior command or the issuance of instructions, it can only be achieved by the
correct selection, training and mentoring of the individuals who are assigned to that role. Intelligence agencies need
to be able to acknowledge their limitations and decline requests when necessary, or else run the risk of overloading
their analytical workforce thereby reducing the quality of the product (Cooper, 2005).
Problems can emerge when analysts are not provided with access to data from other agencies. This can be caused by
IT systems that cannot communicate or restrictions placed on the sharing of information by particular agency to
protect sources. If it is not able to be accessed and aggregated into the final product, then critical decisions are being
made with incomplete information (Cooper, 2005). The culture of competitive analysis in which intelligence is
examined in isolation without input from other agencies has also impaired the ability of the wider intelligence
community to address the current challenges (AFCEA Intelligence Committee, 2005).
Harris (2004) advocates team based analytical gaming and scenario based approaches to analysis. The ability for
intelligence agencies to deploy small teams of specialists against a dynamic networked adversary could prove pivotal
in the current threat environment. There is an identified need to encourage personal initiative and lateral thinking,
thereby ensuring that the resultant analytical product is not tailored to reflect the cultural biases or beliefs inherent in
the particular group or organisation (Harris, 2004). According to Sullivan & Wirtz (2008) the military model of
intelligence preparation of the battlefield can be adapted for law enforcement use, resulting in a new approach termed
intelligence preparation for operations (IPO). This approach consists of a four-step process including situational
recognition, analysis, divining course of action and rehearsals. This model is also designed to bridge the divide
between deliberate and emergency response planning as it provides multiple scenarios, thereby allowing
commanders to work up a variety of responses and assess the suitability of each. Senior commanders or government
officials need sufficient lead time to allow the decisions they make to be effectively implemented. This lead time is
dependent upon the direction given to the intelligence unit to conduct strategic assessment, otherwise the decision
making process will be directed to an extent by the unforseen crisis (Quiggin, 2007).
Whilst the term intelligence can be applied to almost any context, Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) advocates its
application to the national security arena pertaining to the activities that are of interest to national governments.
Quiggin (2007) posits that intelligence is better described as a craft, rather than a scientific endeavour. Such
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explanation places intelligence into a domain whereby skills are learnt under guidance from an experienced
practitioner, until sufficiently developed to the level whereby the individual can defensibly state their position based
upon credible analysis. The future will require intelligence analysts who are globally aware and capable of
understanding the potential domestic effects of events occurring well beyond their geographical or jurisdictional
borders. This is particularly pertinent for policing agencies as analysts who can project beyond the immediate
operational sphere into the strategic realm are an extremely rare commodity. Continual rotation of staff is an ongoing
issue in many government agencies, and prevents the development of knowledge and experience required to
effectively counter emergent threats. This expertise can‘t be replicated by technology, which is just a tool to be used
by the analyst to enhance their capabilities.
Quiggin (2007) adopts the position that unless a paradigm shift occurs the future for intelligence analysis is not a
positive one. He bases this on a lack of parity between the analysts and technical collection resources in terms of
funding as well as an adoption of the military approach, which is not always suited to domestic missions. This
outlook is further compounded by the culture of secrecy, difficulty in accessing classified material (stove-piping),
and finally a lack of ongoing training resulting from culture that is unwilling to change. This lack of training is
highlighted numerous times by Quiggin (2007) and whilst a contributing factor to intelligence failures, it is seldom
identified as a such in subsequent inquires. Whilst it is acknowledged by Grabo (2004), Kam (2004) and Khalsa
(2004) that there are challenges in identifying relevant data, all are of the view that it is achievable if a sound
methodology is followed and historical lessons noted. However, all acknowledge the difficulties that the current
terrorist threat presents. When attempting to evaluate and identify potential data the, ―ability to perceive or attempt to
perceive what others are thinking‖ (Grabo, 2004, p.47) is critically important.
Viewing the potential event from the terrorist perspective can allow the analyst to identify the critical points along
the event horizon that could provide intelligence about a pending attack. The approach taken to collecting data needs
to be able to highly flexible in order to meet the dynamic nature of the threat posed by extremists. Traditional strict
hierarchal structures, working routines and methodologies may not keep pace with technology and therefore may
prove ineffective (Clark, 2004, p.160). The difficulties faced when endeavouring to produce intelligence assessments
in times of stable international relations are significant but as Quiggin (2007, p.95) identifies they are magnified
when attempting to produce, ―accurate assessments on multiple targets in a fast changing fluid and violent
environment‖. However Zegart (2007) is of the opinion that the lack of another attack on U.S. soils since 9/11 is not
attributable to an increase in the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community.
CONCLUSION
The ability to acquire real time intelligence from the media during a terrorist incident by those involved poses
significant challenges for police responding to and managing the incident. This will extend to the physical access
allowed to the media who may have greater assets that the police at the incident scene and the information that is
provided to the media. This combined with the sheer scope of the challenge of managing multiple crime scenes and
confronting unknown offenders also requires training and preparation. It is this training in high stress situations that
needs to go beyond that traditionally practiced, and introduce simultaneous and seamless interaction by those at the
tactical and strategic levels who are able provided with actionable intelligence product. This will require a new
paradigm of policing response to address including the appropriate resourcing of equipment and training. Rabasa et
al. (2009, p.10) support this asserting that in order for responding police to be effective they need to have the
equipment and training necessary to allow them to engage or contain the terrorists. Such deployments will need to be
supported by a 24/7 intelligence capability.
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from http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/documents/finalanalysiswp.pdf
Best, R. A. J. (2003). Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress. Retrieved 28 September 2007. from
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Binnie, J., & LeMiere, C. (2008). In the line of fire - Could Mumbai happen again? Jane's Inteligence Review.
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Evans, S. M. (2005). Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Call for New Strategies and Tactics in Countering Criminal
Insurgency. Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 13(3), 262-279.
Ganguly, S. (2008). Delhi's Three Fatal Flaws. Retrieved 01 November 2010. from
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Gardner, F. (2010). Police in training for 'Mumbai-style' gun attack in UK. Retrieved 04 November 2010, 2010,
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11622218
Grabo, C. M. (2004). Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. Lanham: University Press of America
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Harris, J. W. (2004). Building Leverage in the Long War: Ensuring Intelligence Community Creativity in the Fight
Against Terrorism. In L. K. Johnson & J. J. Wirtz (Eds.), Strategic Intelligence :Windows Into Secret World. Los
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Indian Government. (2008). Mumbai Terrorist Attacks: Nov. 26-29, 2008. Retrieved 9 June 2010. from
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Kam, E. (2004). Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective. London: Harvard University Press.
Khalsa, S. (2004). Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytic Techniques. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press
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law-enforcement-sensitive-mumbai-attack-analysis/.
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Pastor, J. F. (2010). Terrorism and Public Safety Policing: Implications for the Obama Presidency. Boca Raton: CRC
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Quiggin, T. (2007). Seeing The Invisible: National Security in an Uncertain Age. Singapore: World Scientific
Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Rabasa, A., Blackwill, R. D., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Fair, C. C., Jackson, B. A., et al. (2009). The Lessons of
Mumbai. Retrieved 24 May 2010. from http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf.
Riley, K. J., Treverton, G. F., Wilson, J. M., & Davis, L., M. (2005). State and Local Intelligence in the War on
Terrorism Available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG394/index.html
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Annual ISA Convention. Retrieved 27 August 2008, from http://www.groupintel.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/04/isa2008_jps_novel_emerging.pdf
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of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 21(1), 13-25.
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Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 21(1), 13-25.
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Wastell, C., Clark, G., & Duncan, P. (2006). Effective Intelligence Analysis: The Human Dimension. Journal of
Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 1, 36-52.
Zegart, A. B. (2007). Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton: Princeton University Press
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“Make A Bomb In Your Mums Kitchen”: Cyber Recruiting And Socialisation
of „White Moors‟ and Home Grown Jihadists
Robyn Torok
Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism
Macquarie University
Sydney, Australia
The times have changed, and we must design a method of confrontation, which is in accordance
with the standards of the present time.
Al- Suri, Inspire Magazine 2010, p. 53
If you have the right to slander the Messenger of Allāh, we have the right to defend him. If it is part of your freedom
of speech to defame Muĥammad, it is part of our religion to fight you.
Shaykh Anwar Al-Awlaki, Inspire Magazine 2010, p. 26
Abstract As a consequence of the war on terror, al-Qaeda and associated jihad groups have evolved and made increasing use
of internet technologies for cyber recruitment. Recently, there has been an increasing focus on recruiting home
grown terrorists who can more easily escape the scrutiny of cross border entries. Case study analysis indicates that
links do exist between cyber tools, radicalisation and terrorism, however, the strength and nature of these
relationships is generally unclear. Evidence does seem to support that cyber tools are most significant in the initial
phases of recruitment and radicalisation. Coupled with this is the strong evolution of the use of cyber tools from
hosted jihad websites to the use of social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace as well as forums such as
Yahoo groups. Additionally, al-Qaeda‟s latest development is an online magazine that contains a wide range of
material from inspirational narratives to practical bomb making techniques. It is argued that these links between
evolving cyber tools and cyber recruitment/radicalisation must be taken as a serious threat with possible responses
outlined.
Keywords al-Qaeda, terrorist recruitment, cyber recruiting, internet terrorism, radicalisation, social networking
INTRODUCTION
Since 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, al-Qaeda and other Islamic jihad groups(1) have been very adept at
evolving to the changing shifts caused by continual attacks to its base of operations resulting in restrictions in their
ability to operate openly. One of the primary areas of adaptation is in the use of internet technology to support a
number of its strategic and operational objectives that include recruiting, fundraising, strategic direction and research
(McNeal, 2007). In addition, internet technology also opens up a worldwide audience able to access extremist views
and form networks, all in a ubiquitous and virtually untraceable environment (O‘Rourke, 2007). Importantly, the
internet provides an essential media battlefield as part of their terrorism strategy as al-Qaeda‘s Dr. al-Zawahiri states:
‗We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media
battle for the hearts and minds of our umma‘ (Michael, 2009, p. 142). Therefore, it is this battle for hearts and minds
that will be addressed.
As the title of this paper suggests, the focus of this paper is on how al-Qaeda attempts to use cyber technologies to
recruit and engage home grown terrorists and also create converts to radical Islam, known as ‗White Moors‘
(Michael, 2009). Initially, the focus will be on why this specific target group is so important as part of al-Qaeda‘s
strategy to target the West. Subsequently, it is imperative to examine how the internet is an important part of that
strategy, a strategy that complements the cultural notion of terrorism as theatre (Cowen, 2006). A number of case
studies will then be presented followed by proposed responses.
TARGETS: WHY “WHITE MOORS” AND HOME GROWN JIHADISTS?
Research by Weimann (2008) on the target audiences of terrorist websites indicates that their intended audience is
actually very broad and includes potential recruits, the international community and its enemies. However, the focus
on potential recruits is an important aspect and often involves more culturally sophisticated planning coupled with
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more tech savvy skills in its implementation. Key aspects include the use of colour, latest multimedia technologies,
professional finish and interactivity (McNeal, 2007). Many of these sites are targeted at younger males, with reports
in the United Kingdom (UK) indicating terrorist groups specifically targeting male university undergraduates and
even secondary students (Mendez, 2008). Furthermore, it is the disaffected and the alienated that are especially
vulnerable to the ‗seductive‘ efforts of recruiters (Murphy, 2007). These groups include diasporic communities
(Awan, 2007) as well as first and second generation Muslims who are ‗citizens in name but not culturally or
socially.‘ (Leiken, 2005, p. 123). Nevertheless, it is this ‗citizen in name‘ aspect that is important, just like the ring of
Roman citizenship gave freedom to travel throughout the Roman Empire, likewise a ‗Western‘ passport gives greater
freedom to travel throughout the Western world. This is especially important given that some of those travelling on
Middle-Eastern, North African or Asian passports are coming under increasing scrutiny given their regional
reputations for terrorist activity, radicalism and training activities (Michael, 2009).
However, now it is this freedom to travel throughout Europe and the West that is causing concern for both European
and US officials (Leiken, 2005; Michael, 2009). For this reason ‗White Moors‘ and home grown jihadists can be
considered prized recruits. Coupled with this, there is the increasing individualisation of the concept of jihad as part
of a global resistance (Michael, 2009). One of al-Qaeda‘s most notable strategists, al-Suri, has articulated the power
of the internet as a key tool in promoting individual terrorism (Michael, 2009). It is therefore critical to look at the
dynamics of how the internet is used as such an important strategic tool in promoting home grown terrorism.
STRATEGY: INTER(N)ETWORKS
Strategically, al-Qaeda is forming a vast series of internet networks (inter(N)etworks). They provide a platform to
reach a worldwide audience while giving leaders much greater control over their message compared to other more
traditional media (print, television) (Anderson, 2003; Conway, 2006). Moreover, the internet platform allows
terrorists groups to release large unlimited, uncensored amounts of propaganda, inspire supporters, target recruits and
undermine Western media credibility (Conway, 2006; Lachow & Richardson, 2007; Maher, 2007). Lachow and
Richardson (2007) argue that terrorist groups have become experts at manipulating public opinion and undermining
media credibility by providing well presented ‗news‘ services that are on par with the those of much larger and well
established organisations. In terms of recruiting, the danger lies in the ability to expose potential recruits to large
amounts of information quickly, and in an interesting multimedia format (Conway, 2006). What is most striking
about the strategic use of internet technologies is the ‗paradigm shift‘ they create by redirecting power from the state
to individual members and society as a collective (Weimann, 2008, p. 83). In conceptualising how and why these
new forms of terrorism are so internet dependent (Anderson, 2003), we can borrow some insights from social
network research.
Insights from Social Network Research
As a consequence, at least in part, of using internet technology, terrorist groups have become more network oriented
in their structures which allows actors to communicate free from space or organisational constraints at a very low
cost (Conway, 2006). Social network theory is concerned with connections between actors rather than actors in
isolation (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Matusitz, 2008). One of the foundational tenets of network
research is that actors are part of an interconnected social network that has the potential to both constrain and create
new behaviours (Brass, et al., 2004). Matusitz (2008) argues that there are many similarities between terrorist
networks in antiquity (Jewish resistance to the Roman Empire) and modern day cyber networks. In particular is the
‗Chain of trust‘, where individuals are introduced and then required to display certain attitudes and behaviours
(Matusitz, 2008, p. 189). This is particularly the case with more interactive internet media such as chat rooms and
social networking sites. Table 1 below summaries some important insights from interpersonal networks which are
also relevant to cyber networks.
Table 1: Antecedents and Consequences of Interpersonal Networks (Based on Brass, et al., 2004, p. 796-798)
Antecedents Consequences
Actor similarity – interactions tend to be among
similar people (aims, interests).
Attitude similarity – interaction among similar
actors creates similar attitudes
Personality – personality does affect social
network patterns.
Power – central network positions are associated
with power and influence
Social network research indicates that similar people tend to find each other (Table 1). Al-Qaeda and other groups
endeavour to make that process as easy as possible. Consider also the impact of personality, with a disaffected youth
networking with a strong radical terrorist recruiter. Most importantly, as a consequence of such interactions (whether
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cyber or personal) is a change in attitude which in turn can impact on behaviour, especially when being directed by
more central network actors. The question we turn to is, how have terrorist groups made the ability for similar actors
to connect much easier?
Explosive Growth of Online Jihad
From an insignificant cyber presence pre-9/11, al-Qaeda now has a very strong cyber network that uses cutting edge
technology (Murphy, 2007). This exponential growth in websites (Awan, 2007) has led to a matching growth in
potential recruitment opportunities (McNeal, 2007). In one of the most comprehensive research studies on online
terrorist websites, Weimann (2008, p. 75) reported that the number of terrorist websites grew from about 12 in 1998
to over 5300 at the end of 2006. What is perhaps even more disconcerting is the rapid rise of English speaking
websites (over 100 reported in late 2007) (Michael, 2009, p. 143). Such a shift reflects attempts to create ‗White
Moors‘ from disaffected youth who can now easily access hundreds of English language sites, interact and be
targeted by jihad recruiters (Jenkins, 2010). This new threat is perhaps one of the most pervasive cyber threats we
face.
Which Is The Greater Threat: Cyber Terrorism Or Cyber Recruitment And Socialisation?
While acknowledging that the risk of cyber terrorism and hacking is very real, many scholars argue that the risk of
cyber terrorism is overemphasised (Kohlmann, 2006; Lachow & Richardson, 2007; Lewis, 2005). While we should
certainly not play down the threat of cyber terrorism into ‗cyber graffiti‘ as Lewis (2005, p. 113) does, we need to
avoid the other extreme of overstating ‗science-fiction scenarios‘ (Kohlmann, 2006, p. 116). Kohlmann (2006)
argues that the Unites States (US) online war on terror has been defensive and technology focussed, concentrating on
protecting critical infrastructure. While the importance of cyber security should never be understated nor taken for
granted, neither should be the dangers of unabated propaganda and cyber recruitment strategies (Lachow &
Richardson, 2007). In answer to the question of which is the greater threat, in absolute terms, this is difficult to
answer. However, in relative terms, cyber recruitment and socialisation is perhaps a greater threat, simply for the
reason that we take cyber terrorism seriously and seek to constantly prevent attacks, while some Western nations are
lagging behind in response to cyber recruitment and socialisation.
Recruitment Cyber Tools
In this section, cyber tools will be divided into three sections: Hosted sites, which include sites created and hosted by
terrorist groups; Non-hosted sites, which look at exploiting free network sites such as social networking and message
boards, and thirdly the focus will be on al-Qaeda‘s latest strategy – the online Inspire magazine.
Hosted sites
Terrorist created web sites convey their cause as defenders of the Islamic faith against the ‗crusades‘ of the West
(Lewis, 2005). These web sites are primarily an information tool used to challenge hegemonic Western views with
those of their minority cause (Awan, 2007; Lewis, 2005). One of the key strategies for forwarding their propaganda
goals is through the creation of ‗alternative‘ news sources (Awan, 2007, p. 397). An impression of legitimacy is
created through media savvy and high quality presentation (Awan, 2007). McNeal (2007) gives several examples of
these ‗news‘ services that include jehad.net (al-Qaeda‘s perspective on the war in Afghanistan), and azzam.com
which features jihad biographies and encourages others to join the cause. Although these web sites are a tool for
cyber recruitment, they are disadvantageous in that they rely on potential recruits seeking out and finding these sites.
A better strategy for al-Qaeda and other jihad groups is to use well established Western sites (non-hosted sites) that
already have a much larger online audience.
Non-hosted sites
Based on an in depth longitudinal study, Weimann (2008) argues that Yahoo has now become one of al-Qaeda‘s key
recruiting and operational tools. Key features used include the use of email and related chat functions as well as
Yahoo groups based on common interests (Weimann, 2008). It is these e-groups that have become a focal point of al-
Qaeda‘s strategy. Not only are they present on Yahoo, but also on major social networking sites that include
MySpace and Facebook(2). These groups pose an increased risk because they are legal, easy to create and
manipulate, allow for discussion, interaction and transfers of data files. Furthermore, in congruence with social
network research it provides an easy avenue for those with similar interests to connect (Weimann, 2008).
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These e-groups can range from hate groups to sophisticated recruiting forums. Radical hate groups can quickly
expand with Oboler (2008) giving the example of an anti-Israeli hate group growing to over 48000 members in just
18 months. More disturbingly, some e-groups are run and managed by leading al-Qaeda recruiters. Kohlmann (2008)
provides an example of the now disbanded Muntada al-Ansar (The Supporters Forum) which featured high level
recruiters from a number of Islamic Terrorist organisations. In fact, this forum was considered a ‗virtual
matchmaking service for budding Islamic militants searching for a path to jihad‘ (Kohlmann, 2008, p 8). Other
affiliated terrorist groups have also clearly stated their intention to use social networking sites like Facebook as a
media tool for the cause of jihad (Shaidle, 2009). As a further illustration, Anwar al-Awlaki, who was raised as an
‗all American boy‘ and has since fled to Yemen, held an account on Facebook with a large following of disaffected
youth before his account was finally shut down (Hamill, 2010). Additionally, Anwar was also an avid user of the
multimedia site YouTube where he had posted over 5000 videos (Hamill, 2010).
New strategies: Inspire magazine
Al-Qaeda‘s latest cyber tool is a colourful, professionally produced online magazine called Inspire which was
released in 2010. The first part of the title of this paper is a paraphrase of an Inspire article ―Make a bomb in the
kitchen of your mom‖ which gives detailed written instructions and illustrations on how to make a bomb using
simple materials as part of open source jihad. Overall, the magazine has varied content that includes messages, words
of encouragement, strategic advice, news, exhortations on giving to the poor (challenging Western capitalism),
campaigns, and articles from prominent leaders such as Usama Bin Laden and al-Suri. Although the web site has
been shut down, the magazine was not difficult to find and could easily be circulated as a simple portable document
file (PDF) through chat rooms and social groups. This magazine would no doubt find appeal among disaffected
youth.
(COUNTER) CULTURE: TERRORISM AS THEATRE
The internet is more than simply a propaganda tool, it is an essential mechanism for imparting and transferring the
culture and ideology of the journey that terrorists take toward jihad (Awan, 2007).
Perhaps one of most fundamental aspects of this cultural identity is that of ‗terrorism as theatre‘ (Awan, 2007;
Cowen, 2006). Reflecting on the tragic events of 9/11, London and Bali, the media coverage presented a ‗spectacle‘
designed to strike fear into the heart of Western civilisation. These events are critical to al-Qaeda‘s strategy because
‗The act of political violence itself is still the best way to obtain publicity, not simply the circulation of information
via the Internet.‘ (Anderson, 2003, p. 30). Terrorism as theatre is well suited to the internet where uncensored videos
can be posted which contain events of graphic violence. These events include: IED (improvised explosive device)
attacks and beheadings of Western hostages (Awan, 2007). Additional spectacles are provided by the testimonials of
suicide bombers that exploit the use of overt graphic imagery (McNeal, 2007). Thus, internet technology allows for
maximum psychological impact on the enemy, current supporters and potential recruits (Weimann, 2008).
A further distinction also needs to be made in terms of the culture of terrorism as theatre. Equally important,
terrorists conceptualise themselves as a counter-culture, a resistance movement, seeking freedom from ‗Western
Crusaders‘. Terrorists gain support for this concept by exploiting Western spectacles of violence (Awan, 2007).
These include graphic images and videos of civilian casualties, violent videos posted by US marines and images of
prisoner abuse. In addition, al-Qaeda is also keen to exploit controversies that support a Western/Muslim split such
as the New York Mosque controversy and the associated threats from a Pastor to burn the Qur‘an (Thomas, 2010).
What raises concern here is that the disaffected youth being targeted also feel that they are a minority counter culture.
Consequently, jihad recruiters seek to build a common interest and affinity with these youth in congruence with the
antecedents of social network research.
CASE STUDIES
How successful have these aforementioned strategies for al-Qaeda‘s jihad? It is important to examine briefly a
number of key case studies that involved the internet for recruitment or socialisation. Firstly, there are some
important caveats to our understanding of the effectiveness of cyber recruitment strategies. The ability to study the
effect of cyber tools on potential and new converts is exceedingly difficult. There is also the possibility that cyber
recruitment tools are simply ‗preaching to the converted‘ rather than causing any significant change (Awan, 2007, p.
400). More research is needed in this area including better methods of inquiry coupled with new conceptual models.
Data, in the vast majority of cases, can only be gathered ‗post fact‘, as a result of police investigations and court
action.
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In terms of statistics on home grown terrorism, the best evidence to date is a recent RAND corporation report on US
domestic radicalisation. Upon investigating cases of domestic radicalisation between 9/11 and the end of 2009,
Jenkins (2010) reported 46 cases totalling 125 persons. However, only 81 of these were indicted (Jenkins, 2010).
Although these figures are relatively small, Jenkins (2010) did report a rising trend in the number of cases and
individuals, particularly in 2009. These statistics do give some support for the effectiveness of al-Qaeda‘s cyber
recruitment tools, especially given that Jenkins (2010) report cites that many jihadists actually began their journey on
the internet as a place to connect with other disaffected and discontented individuals. To gain further insights, the
role of the internet in four home grown terrorist case studies from around the world will be explored.
Case Study 1: Madrid Train Bombings 2004 and London Bombings 2005
A brief account of these cases presented by Awan (2007) illustrates that the Madrid bombers were inspired by online
Iraqi jihad texts in an attempt to cause Spain‘s withdraw from Iraq. Hussein Oman (Defendant – London Bomb
Trial) admitted to investigators that while having no direct al-Qaeda contacts, regularly visited their web sites,
viewed their videos and read their propaganda (Awan, 2007). Both these case studies lend support for cyber tools in
inspiring and sustaining home grown terrorists.
Case Study 2: Foiled Plot of 17 Canadian Muslims 2004
Surveillance of an online chat room and subsequent investigation led to the arrest of 17 Canadian Muslims (Awan,
2007). Contact through internet chat and a common anti-Western discourse seemed to be an important antecedent to
the plot which then took on more conventional means including face-to-face contact (Awan, 2007). This case
supports the internet as an important recruitment/contact point for disaffected youth to begin a path of radicalisation.
Case Study 3: Five Young British –Muslims Charged Under the 2000 UK terrorism Act
2004
Five young British-Muslims had not yet committed an act of terrorism, yet they were charged in relation to the large
amount of material downloaded from extremist websites (Livingstone, 2007). Furthermore, surveillance of the
groups internet chat logs indicated that they were well and truly on the path to radicalisation (Livingstone, 2007).
Maher (2007, p. 144) cites the judge‘s decision on their path to radicalisation:
You were intoxicated by the extremist nature of the material that each of you collected, shared and
discussed – the songs, the images and language of violent jihad. So carried away by that material were you
that each of you crossed the line.
What is interesting about this case is that the youths had no specific plans of a terrorist threat, and it was still unclear
how they planned to carry out their jihad; all that was clear was that these youths had made a deliberate decision to
take the path of jihad (Livingstone, 2007). This case clearly links cyber recruitment tools to radicalisation, but is
(fortunately) unable to provide further details to links with actual terrorist acts.
Case Study 4: Adam Gadahn 1995 Onwards
Michael‘s (2009) fascinating case study of Adam Gadahn gives perhaps one of the best insights into the power of the
aforementioned cyber tools to begin the disaffected on their path to radicalisation and ultimately jihad. Gadahn is a
prime example of a ‗White Moor‘ convert. Raised in the US, Gadahn eventually moved to the Middle East and rose
to the highest ranks of al-Qaeda, becoming a vital part of their media strategy (Michael, 2009). Gadahn was not
raised as a Muslim but as an agnostic with a non-practicing Jewish Father and Fundamentalist Christian
grandparents. Interestingly, it was when a disaffected Gadahn moved in with his Christian grandparents that he had
access to the internet and started down a new path. It was here that he was attracted to Islam, and finding their online
discussions intriguing finally converted. Having been attracted to more radical online discussion sites, Gadahn
continued his journey with fellow radicals at a local mosque. From here he began his epic rise to the al-Qaeda
leadership ranks.
Evidence from these case studies combined with Jenkins (2010) study lends potent support for the effectiveness of
cyber tools for recruitment as a starting point on the path to jihad for home grown terrorists and ‗White Moors‘.
Studies also support the use of cyber tools to socialise and sustain radicalisation. Nevertheless, it is also important to
point out that these cases also involved human contact at some later stage. The level of overall internet influence
from recruitment to terrorist action still remains unclear. Nonetheless, we must ask how we can respond to the threat
of cyber recruitment in attracting youths on the path to jihad terrorism.
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WHERE TO FROM HERE?
Given the spate of terrorist attacks on Western soil using home grown terrorists, McNeal (2007) argues that one thing
is certain; we can no longer do nothing. In tackling cyber recruitment, there are a number of serious challenges faced
by governments and law enforcement. With terrorist hosted sites, it is easy for groups to simply change Internet
Service Providers (ISP‘s) if they are shut down. This then becomes problematic to track down again (Awan, 2007).
Compounding this challenge is the fact that some (US) companies provide domain names and host these sites while
often ignoring the nature of the content (McNeal, 2007). As an alternative McNeal (2007) suggests bypassing the
ISP‘s and shutting down the domain name (such as jihad.net) which has often been purchased from a US company.
This step could only be taken once a site was identified as a terrorist affiliated site.
Even if it was possible to shut down terrorist hosted sites, groups could and already have shifted to legal sites such as
Yahoo groups, Facebook and MySpace. Such discussion groups often waiver their rights from liability indicating
that the material on the site does not reflect the views of administrators (Awan, 2007). Moreover, users can have
multiple identities, fraudulent identities and shifting identities making them very hard to trace. This quandary was
demonstrated in a case where an Australian Jewish woman was threatened by a Hezbollah terrorist on Facebook
leaving police to admit the near impossible nature of tracking down the perpetrator (Kerbaj, 2008). A further
problem is that administrators of the site are often slow to act. A prime illustration is the eventual banning of Abu
Izzadeen‘s (jihadist) Facebook profile only after amassing a significant following (Mendez, 2008).
Frustrated with Facebook‘s (and others) lack of action on this issue, there has been the emerging phenomena of
private ‗activist‘ groups, most notably the Jewish Internet Defence Force (JIDF). This group became prominent after
legally conducting a takeover(3) and then subsequently shutting down an Israeli hate group (Oboler, 2008). This
move was orchestrated after 18 months of inaction by Facebook and a rapid growth in the size of the group.
Overall, responses can be categorised into two broad areas. First, there are attempts to challenge the socialisation
process. A case in point is Livingstone‘s (2007, p. 151) proposed ‗web-engagement strategy‘ which relies on
countering terrorist truth claims in attempting to reduce the support and evidence to follow along a radicalised path.
Second, there is the traditional approach of intelligence gathering and intervention. As a recommendation of his
report on domestic terrorism, Jenkins (2010) supports the continual and judicial use of cyber monitoring and
surveillance in order to disrupt and uncover terrorist recruitment and operations. Perhaps a combination of both
strategies would be useful, nonetheless, what is clearly evident is that internet intelligence operations need to
continue and develop in their counter terrorist sophistication.
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the evolving threat of cyber recruitment targeting home grown terrorists. Cyber tools and
strategies continue to develop and evolve in an attempt to better hone in and attract disaffected Western youth. What
is particularly concerning about this trend is that evidence from case studies does provide tentative support to the
dangers of these cyber tools at least in initiating, and in other cases sustaining, the path of jihad. Al-Qaeda and other
jihad groups are increasingly making use of legal social networking sites that also allow users high levels of control
and interactivity making targeting these sites more difficult. The latest al-Qaeda online magazine, Inspire,
demonstrates just how adept they have become at continually trying to develop better cyber recruitment strategies by
producing high quality, media savvy and seductive propaganda that specifically target potential ‗White Moors‘.
These emerging threats need to be the subject of intelligent action responses that continue to monitor and intervene
as early as possible before individuals travel too far down the path of radicalisation, hatred and terrorism.
NOTE
(1) There are other spelling variations for al-Qaeda such as al-Qa‘ida and al-Qi‘idah. Although al-Qaeda is the
primary focus of this paper, the principles apply to related and affiliated Islamic jihad groups.
(2) Facebook has a membership of over 500 million users world-wide with 50% logging on in any one day
(http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics). This equates to approximately 1 in every 14 of the
world‘s population.
(3) This manoeuvre was conducted by emptying the group of its members. Once all the members were removed, the
group could be shut down (Oboler, 2008).
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REFERENCES
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Awan, A. N. (2007). Virtual jihadist media. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 10(3), 389-408.
Brass, D. J., Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H. R., & Tsai, W. (2004). Taking Stock of Networks and Organizations: A
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Conway, M. (2006). Terrorism and the Internet: New Media—New Threat? Parliamentary Affairs, 59(2), 283-298.
Cowen, T. (2006). Terrorism as Theater: Analysis and Policy Implications. Public Choice, 128(1/2), 233-244.
Hamill, J. (2010, 26 September). Web Watch: How the internet cultivated the new Bin Laden, Herald Scotland.
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Jenkins, B. M. (2010). Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since
September 11, 2001. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
Kerbaj, R. (2008, April 5). Jewish woman threatened through Facebook. News.com.au, (April 5, 2008). Retrieved
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Lewis, J. A. (2005). The Internet and Terrorism. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of
International Law), 99 (March 30-April 2), American Society of International Law, 112-115.
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Maher, S. (2007). Road to Jihad. Index on Censorship, 36(4), 144-147.
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McNeal, G. S. (2007). Cyber Embargo: Countering the Internet Jihad. (German). [Conference Paper]. Case Western
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101592048.html
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Countering Home-Grown Terrorists in Australia: An Overview of Legislation,
Policy and Actors Since 2001
Michael G Crowley
School of Law and Justice
Edith Cowan University
Perth, Western Australia
Abstract This article explores the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and policy in Australia. In particular it explores how
legislation facilitated prosecution and conviction of persons involved in home-grown terrorism, including analysis of
investigation and prosecution policy surrounding the ul-Haque and Haneef cases. Particular attention is given to the
terrorism trials involving Benbrika & Ors and Elomar & Ors. What makes these trials intriguing is the fact that most
of those convicted could be more easily described as more vulnerable than menacing. Sentencing of those convicted
was cognate with no policies for rehabilitation. The small number of convictions under the legislation when
considered against the increased funding of counter-terrorism, loss of traditional rights and privileges and
Australia‟s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq raises issues about adequate policy setting in this area.
Keywords Attempt offences, counter-terrorism legislation, Benbrika, Elomar, sentencing terrorism, terrorists.
INTRODUCTION
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the Australian Government moved swiftly to legislate to counter
potential terrorist acts within Australia. To date there have been more than 40 pieces of legislation that relate directly
or indirectly to terrorism. The aim and purpose of terrorism legislation are twofold: to act as a deterrent and to
prevent future terrorist acts. This legislation formed an important component of counter-terrorism policy because it
not only focused on preventing a terrorist act taking place, but convicted terrorists were to be severely punished. The
disjunction between the traditional criminal law principles of attempt offences and modern counter-terrorism
legislation becomes obvious in the Benbrika and Elomar trials where no terrorist act occurred. This lack of a
completed terrorist act is a consistent fact in the conduct of all 21 persons convicted in Australia since 2001.
Furthermore, a consideration of the background and relationships of the respective accused in these two criminal
trials provide insights into radicalism and motive. What is important for those involved in combating potential
terrorists within Australia is the nature of the evidence that underpinned these two convictions and the lack of policy
on combating radicalisation of vulnerable persons. This is particularly important as there is a growing concern
supported by research that demonstrates an increase in home-grown terrorism (Porter & Kebbell, 2010).
BACKGROUND
The counter-terrorism legislation should not be viewed in isolation. It represents a component of counter-terrorism
policy that includes international obligationsi, international treaties
ii, international
iii and domestic co-operation
iv, wide
reaching legislationv, policy revision
vi and significant domestic expenditure. The Australian Government has
increased defence spending some 59% since 2001 to $21.8 billion (Michaelson, 2010, 24). Michaelsen further notes:
More than $16 billion have been spent in extra defence, counter-terrorism and foreign aid by 2010-11. Over
the same period, ASIO‘s budget has increased by 655%, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) budget by
161percent, ASIS by 236 percent and the Office of National Assessments by 441 percent. Most recently, the
Government has announced a $200 billion package of aviation security measures to better protect our air
transport system from terrorist attack, And the White Paper provides $69 million for introducing biometric-
based visa systems to reduce the risk of terrorists, criminals and other persons of concern entering Australia
undetected. (Michaelson, 2010, 24)
.
The policy support for counter-terrorism legislation and expenditure has been aided by the killing of 100 Australians
in overseas terrorist attacks and Australian soldiers have been killed and injured fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.
These events maintain the on-going perceived risk of terrorism to Australians abroad and by implication at home.
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LEGISLATION
The Commonwealth of Australia has created a single set of terrorism offences under the Section 100 of the Criminal
Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code). The objective was to create offences:
Designed to prevent, discourage and punish behaviour which falls within a wide range of human activity,
and which is commonly described as terrorism: broadly, the use of violence or a threat of violence in pursuit
of some political, ideological or religious cause. (Criminal Code, s.100)
Furthermore, anti-terrorism legislation defines a terrorist act widely, encompassing industrial and political dissent.vii
In 2005 these powers were extended to include organisations that advocate the doing of a terrorist act.viii
The key
provision in the Criminal Code is:
Division 101 -- Terrorism
101.1 Terrorist acts
(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in a terrorist act.
Penalty: Imprisonment for life...
101.2 Providing or receiving training connected with terrorist acts
(1)...
(2)...
(3) A person commits an offence under this section even if:
(a) a terrorist act does not occur; or
(b) the training is not connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person in, or
assistance in a specific terrorist act; or
(c) the training is connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person in, or assistance
in more than one terrorist act...ix
The policy imperatives were allowing an early opportunity at which the facts can be submitted establishing a prima
facie case and providing cogent punishment of persons convicted of terrorism offences. For the former point this
represents a winding back of the traditional law on attempt offences. Traditionally, the common law viewed attempt
offences as unfinished offences and distinguished between acts that were preparatory and acts that were sufficient to
amount to attempt (Bronitt & McSherry, 2005). In other words, for an accused to commit an offence it had to be
proved that an accused intended to commit a crime by engaging in conduct that is more than preparatory such that
the acts must be proximate (not remote) from the completed act (Bronitt & McSherry, 2005). This amounts to an
extension of criminal liability from what an accused did to what an accused tried to do; or under Division 101 of the
Criminal Code above what an accused may have contemplated. The result is that the authorities can arrest well
before completion of the anticipated crime. Historically, this has led to appeal cases determining how far police can
throw their net in attempting to prevent crime.x However, this does appear to be the case with terrorism appeals in
Australia. The policy underpinning this legislation is to allow authorities to act well before any damage is done or
even a target is chosen so as to limit potential death or injury to civilians.
In addition, the Australian Government can now classify an organisation as a terrorist organisation. This means that
its members may have, by being members of a proscribed organisation, committed an offence (Criminal Code, s. 102
1). Furthermore, federal legislation has tossed aside traditional common law rights such as a right to silence,
unrestricted access to a lawyer of choice and freedom of speech (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act
1979 (Cth) ss.34G, 34TA and 34NVAA).
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
Whereas the investigation and prosecution of those involved in terrorism offences as in the Benbrika and Elomar
trials were largely uneventful that has not always been the case with terrorism investigations and prosecutions since
2001. Two examples stand out. The first is the failed prosecution of Izhar ul-Haque which raised serious concerns
about the conduct of Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers and Australian Security Intelligence Officers (ASIO)
cumulating in The Street Review – A Review of Interoperability between the AFP and its National Security Partners
(Street Report). The report noted that the prosecution failed,
…when evidence essential to the Crown‘s case was ruled inadmissible in pre-trial hearings. NSW Supreme
Court Justice Michael Adams was highly critical of the manner in which the AFP and ASIO had dealt with the
suspect, and it was on these grounds that he determined critical evidence inadmissible. (Street Report, 1.5 [1])
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Justice Adams in Izar ul-Haque noted, amongst other criticisms:
The precise boundaries of the term ―oppressive...conduct‖ are uncertain. Some assistance is afforded by the
other conduct mentioned in para 84(1)(a). For the purposes of this case, however, it is not necessary to
approach the boundaries of the term. In my view, the conduct of ASIO, in particular by officers B15 and
B16, was well within the meaning of the phrase. In substance, they assumed unlawful powers of direction,
control and detention. It was a gross interference by the agents of the state with the accused‘s legal rights as
a citizen, rights which he still has whether he be suspected of criminal conduct or not and whether he is a
Muslim or not. Furthermore, the conduct was deliberately engaged in for the purpose of overbearing the
accused in the hope that he would co-operate. It involved using a part of his parents‘ home to hold him
incommunicado for the purposes of an interview under cover of a warrant which the officers knew well did
not justify any such conduct but which I think they rightly believed neither the accused nor his family
understood. Whatever ―oppressive‖ means for the purposes of s84, I do not doubt that the conduct of the
ASIO officers falls well within it (R v Izar ul-Haque, [95]).
And later:
The evidence of the ASIO conduct, considered alone, would be sufficient to establish oppressive conduct
within the section. But the oppression was continued, in my view, by the conduct of the AFP. Mr Gordge‘s
presence at the interviews was a clear signal to the accused of the inextricable link between ASIO and the
AFP and an implicit reminder that he should not depart from anything already said. The conversations with
him at the end of the interview on 7 November and when he came to AFP headquarters on 10 November
continued the thrust of the message communicated by ASIO at the first meeting: co-operate or else. (R v Izar
ul-Haque , [98])
It needs to be remembered that those investigating potential terrorism offences have wider powers than in
investigating other criminal offences. To start with the terrorism provisions are drafted widely picking up persons
who not only commit a terrorist act but do anything that can be linked to a potential terrorist act. The latter gives a
wide subjective discretion to authorities. Combined with this discretion are powers requiring compliancexi
,
production of documents and informationxii
and silencing of persons questioned about terrorism matters or being
investigated about terrorism mattersxiii
. On two occasions the checks and balances that are supposed to protect
citizens from unwarranted prosecution have failed. Damian Bugg AM QC, former Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions (CDPP) in a press release dated 12 October 2007 noted in regard to the failure of the CDPP to follow
policy in the Dr Haneef prosecution:
The Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth provides that there be a prima facie case with reasonable
prospects of conviction for a prosecution to be instituted or continued. The DPP‘S role is to provide advice on
whether the evidence establishes reasonable prospects of conviction in accordance with that policy.
The advice given in this case did not address that test.xiv
His successor Christopher Craigie SC has nonetheless in a Directors speech on 12 November 2009 at the Heads of
Prosecutions Agencies of the Commonwealth (HOPAC) conference affirmed CDPP compliance with government
policy directions:
…the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth commences by recognising that not all suspected criminal
offences must automatically be subject of prosecution…The initial consideration in the exercise of this
discretion is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the institution or continuation of a prosecution…a
decision whether or not to prosecute must clearly not be influenced by:
a. The race, religion, sex, national origin or political associations, activities or beliefs of the alleged offender
or any other person involved…
b. …
c. Possible political advantage or disadvantage to the Government or any political group or party or…xv
.
While not seemingly involved in the initial issues surrounding the questioning and detention of Izhar ul-Haque, it
would be fascinating to hear what the CDPP‘s advice was upon receiving the AFP brief especially as there were
several attempts to bring the matter before the High Court of Australia on an extraterritoriality issue. In essence,
challenging the constitutional validity of proscribing the conduct of Australian citizens overseas for conduct
unconnected with Australia (Nolan, 2008, 175-90). The Street Review recommended greater co-operation between
CDPP, ASIO and AFP. However, Nolan doubts whether greater interoperability and information sharing will
―remedy the problematic investigative methods as exposed by Justice Adams‖ (Nolan, 2008, 183). Furthermore and
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65 | P a g e
also noted in Nolan‘s article, the Street Report noted at 6:
1.6 The outcome of the ul-Haque matter has demonstrated that the preconditions to criminal prosecution need
to be taken into consideration by all of Australia‘s national security agencies in the conduct of their operations
if the full range of preventative measures, including prosecution, is to remain available to combat terrorism.
Of some concern for policy makers is the not unsurprising difference of opinion on some issues involving the
behaviour of ASIO agents towards ul-Haque between Justice Adams in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and
Ian Carnell, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security in regard to trespass, coercive interviewing, kidnapping
and false imprisonment of ul-Haque (Nolan, 2008, 187). While Justice Adams was concerned with legal rights and
the law, Ian Carnell claimed national security imperatives in the war on terror (Nolan, 2008, 187).xvi
Furthermore, there is a structural problem arising from different statutory authorities combating terrorism. This was
identified in the Street Report at 6:
1.8 The Committee recognises that ASIO and the AFP have different statutory mandates. Both agencies,
and State and Territory police jurisdictions, have a clear mandate to prevent terrorist activity. In responding
to potential national security threats the ASIO mandate is broadly focused, whereas the AFP and its state
and territory counterparts are generally focused on the demands of criminal investigations and potential
prosecutions. It is critical that effective and accountable processes exist to reconcile any overlaps or
conflicts in organisational mandates and priorities.
IMPLICATIONS
Another way to review the success or otherwise of counter-terrorism policy and legislation is to consider who has
been convicted. In Victoria in 2009 and NSW in 2010 two large criminal trials concluded with those convicted
receiving lengthy sentences of imprisonment. Overall, some 22 men were accused of various terrorism related
offences.
In the Victorian matter - Benbrika & Ors 13 men were accused of offences against Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth
Criminal Code in December 2006. One, Izzydeen Atik pleaded guilty in July 2007 and the other 12 went to trial
commencing in February 2008. On 15 and 16 September 2008 seven were convicted of knowingly being members of
a terrorist organisation and some of other offences. Four were acquitted and in one case the jury could not reach a
verdict.
The prosecution needed to convince a jury that each of the accused was a member of a terrorist organisation together
were planning to commit a terrorist act. The evidence consisted of:
Attendance at religious classes,
Talk of being involved in violent jihad,
The existence of a jemaah to hold money for the group members,
482 intercepted telephone conversations,
Inconclusive evidence of trips away to training camps,
Stealing a car to fund the groups activities,
Internet access to websites - beheading of hostages – jihadi literature – terrorist handbooks…including for
example in Haddara‘s computer two copies of a publication called ‗AL-Battar Bimonthly Publication No 22‘
– a military or quasi-military training guide or manual – found in two files, a Word document file and a PDF
file called ‗22.doc‘ and ‗22.pdf‘ respectively – in zip archive file, ‗10.11.04 b22.zip‘ – in‗Other/‘ – at end of
a chain of limbs directed to Haddara‘s business.xvii
The final evidence related to Benbrika‘s activities with an undercover policeman who demonstrated the use of
explosives. There was no evidence that other members of Benbrika‘s group knew or were involved in these activities.
It should also be noted that internet access by one member of the group may have little or no significance on the
criminality of other members. However, if there is regular contact between group members who among other things
share internet derived materials these materials assume greater significance if they relate to terrorism. Courts are also
careful to distinguish ‗benign‘ material, for example; Arab language classes and American movies from images
extolling the virtues of 11 September 2001, images of Osama bin Laden and/or praising his activities in relation to
warfare, extremely gruesome images including beheadings and executions of foreign prisoners.(R v Mulahalilovic
[2009] [16 – 17].
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Table 1, The Benbrika Men, sets out background data and resultant sentences for those convicted in Benbrika & Ors.
Of particular interest is the age difference between Benbrika and the followers. The educational background and
resultant qualifications are mediocre for the followers. Furthermore several of the followers have suffered a family
crisis in the years leading up to arrest.
name
age at sentence born Married/
children
education Prior character Penalty
Max/sent/non-
parole (yrs/mths)
Add 1184 days of
Pre-trial custody
Benbrika 48
Religion after
arriving here –
religious
advisor
1941 -
Algiers
1989 -
Australia
Yes/7 Aviation engineer –
religious leader here
good 25/15/12
Aimen
Joud
24 1984 no Did not finish school –
supervisor fathers blding
bus.
good
good references
25/8/7.6
Fadl
Sayadi
28 Lebanon
1983 - here
Yes/no Left yr 10 minor priors
good references
25/8/6
Abdullah
Merhi
23 Melbourne Yes/1 Left yr 11 – completing
electrical apprentice ship
good
good references
10/6/4.6
Ahmed
Raad
25
Death of
brother –
religion -
Benbrika
Australia Yes/1 Left yr 11 unsuccessful
TAFE
good
good references
25/8/7.6
Ezzit
Raad
26
Death of
brother –
religion -
Benbrika
Australia Yes/2 electrician good
good references
25/6/5.6
Amer
Haddara
29
Mecca 2004 –
tour leader
2005
Australia no Computer systems Dip –
VU
good
good references
10/6/4.6
Table 1: The Benbrika Men
In the Brenrika trial and subsequent sentencing hearing none of the accused gave evidence which meant no
explanation/justification was given by those convicted of their reasons for being involved with Benbrika. This had a
direct impact on sentencing wherein the sentencing judge noted that rehabilitation played little or no part.
What is clear is that motive was clearly inferred from the telephone intercepts. Porter and Kebell (2010, 8) noted that,
‗Benbrika and his group showed later isolation within the Muslim community, breaking away from the local
mosque‘. This isolation was also noted in a lack of attachment to the wider community with Benbrika covertly
recorded saying: ‗...I don‘t believe in this country. I don‘t believe in this law. Which all this believe, no Allah but
Allah, no Allah no other law of. This is the meaning of no Allah but Allah‘ (Porter and Kebbell, 2010, 8). In terms of
group dynamics Benbrika increased the sense of collective identity of the group by use of inclusive first person
pronouns (Porter and Kebbell, 2010, 9).
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In the New South Wales matter, Elomar & Ors, nine men were accused of a series of terrorism related offences in
late 2005. Shortly before the trial three men pleaded guilty and one was at that stage found to be unfit to plead. He
subsequently recovered sufficiently to plead guilty. The remaining five were found guilty by a jury in October 2009
of conspiring to do a terrorist act. The difference between this trial and the Benbrika trial is that here the accused
were charged with conspiracy to commit a terrorist act. A conspiracy offence requires proof of the existence of an
agreement to do an illegal act, here to commit a terrorist act. Because criminal agreements are rarely written, the
existence of the agreement is proved by evidence that is termed overt acts.
In Elomar & Ors the evidence relied upon was:
Ammunition,
Laboratory equipment,
Training camps,
Purchase of chemicals,
Internet derived instructional material and some hard copies about explosives, eavesdropping and
gun use,
Internet derived material of an extremist or fundamentalist matter. With some evidence of hard
copies being distributed amongst some members of the group,
Telephone conversations,
Fingerprints, and
Meetings.
The evidence in this matter was more substantial and revealing. Although there was no target, the evidence was more
consistent with what would be expected of a terrorist group planning to carry out a terrorist act. The dynamics of the
Elomar group are also different. Here the ages are collectively higher with less difference between the leader and the
followers. The same can be said in regard to qualifications and educational background.
Table 2 below, The Elomar Conspirators, sets out background data on the Elomar group including the sentences
handed down following conviction.
name age at
sentence
born married/children education Prior
character
Penalty
max/sent/non-
parole (yrs/mths)
Mohamed
Elomar
44 Lebanon
1977 -
Australia
Yes/6 Trade qual – family
bus.
good Life/28/21
Khalid
Cheiko
36
Took to
religion in
20‘s
Lebanon Yes/1 Left yr 11 Life/27/20
Abdul
Hasan
40
Culturally
isolated
Bangladesh
1990? -
Australia
Yes (convert)/4 Poor work history –
basic
English/limited
Arabic
good Life/26/19.6
Moustata
Cheikho
32
1995 –
religion -
Influence of
Khalid
Cheiko
Australia
Attended LeT
training camp
Pakistan
Yes/1 Did not finish
mechanics trade –
gun licence till
ASIO..
good Life/26/19.6
Mohammed
Jamal
26
Drugs/OH at
school –
religion via
brother
Australia No – male family
cannot visit him
Yr 10 & computer
skills
good Life/23/17.3
Table 2: The Elomar Conspirators
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As in the Benbrika Case, in Elomar & Ors none of the accused gave evidence at trial or during sentencing
proceedings. Motive was derived primarily from intercepted telephone recordings. In regard to motive Justice
Whealy noted:
First, each was driven by the concept that the world was, in essence, divided between those who adhered
strictly and fundamentally to a rigid concept of the Muslim faith, indeed, a medieval view of it, and to those
who did not, Secondly, each was driven by the conviction that Islam throughout the world was under attack,
particularly at the hands of the United States and its allies. In this context, Australia was plainly included.
Thirdly, each offender was convinced that his obligation as a devout Muslim was to come to the defence of
Islam and other Muslims overseas. Fourthly, it was the duty of each individual offender, indeed a religious
obligation, to respond to the worldwide situation by preparing for violent jihad in this country, here in
Australia (R v Elomar & Ors, 2010, [56])
However, while there was evidence of members in both groups taking on roles both groups were poor role models
for future groups considering how to successfully commit a terrorist act. While the evidence demonstrates the
Elomar group were more advanced in preparation, having ammunition and bomb-making materials, their efforts
were described by counsel representing one terrorist on sentencing as; ―…they were amateurish and ineffective.
Thirdly, it was argued that the offender's (Touma‘s) cognitive and other skills were lessened to a degree by the limit
of his intellectual capacity…‖(R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 1475 (24 October 2008) [105]). The lack of skills
demonstrated by these individuals was recognised with Justice Bongiorno who also sounded a warning:
Overseas experience of terrorist activity with which we are all unfortunately now effective
operatives...terrorist acts ... in modern times are often carried out by amateurs... (R v Benbrika & Ors [67]).
CONCLUSION
The fact that the Benbrika men and Elomar conspirators are Muslim, alone with the just about all of those convicted
as terrorists in Australia might suggest Muslims are a threat to the Australian community. This is not supported by
Australian Government statistics that indicate that less than two percent of the Australian population is Muslim. But
more importantly, they have widespread origins coming from Turkey, Lebanon, Bosnia, Kosovo, Herzegovina,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Indonesia, Somalia and the Sudan for a start. Historically, not all these
populations have friendly histories. Furthermore, with Christians, not all Muslims practice their faith.
If lack of successful terrorist attacks on Australian soil is used as a guide than counter-terrorism legislation and
policy have been successful. However, the problems in the Haneef and ul-Haque matters combined with the overt
radicalisation of those involved in the Benbrika and Elomar matters suggest underlying problems with our legislation
and policy. For example, the different mandates applying to statutory authorities involved in counter-terrorism
(Street Report).
Because the background, community involvement and motives of home-grown terrorists who have been convicted
are difficult to detect beyond possible religious fervour, a concerted policy of counter-terrorism counter-
radicalisation is needed if the potential risk to the Australian community is going to be effectively reduced.
Legislation is not a shield and policy makers need to accept its use as a blunt weapon of deterrent and punishment is
more akin to the underlying attitudes of terrorists rather those traditionally associated with a democratic state. What
is needed is targeted education and counter-radicalisation policies that can provide an in-built resilience akin to a
shield against potential home-grown terrorist attacks.
Notes
i For example, following the events of 11 September 2001, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution
1373 that included: ‗all States shall…prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts … providing any form of
support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts… Ensure that any person who participates
in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to
justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious
criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such
terrorist acts. ‘ Retrieved October 7, 2010 from
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement
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69 | P a g e
ii For example: International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 9 December 1999, UN Doc.A/Res/54/109 (1999), in
force 10 April 2002). iii
For example: Australia has signed an international treaty with Europol to facilitate transnational sharing of
intelligence and access to crime-specific training and expertise. Europol is the European Union Law Enforcement
Intelligence Agency which aims to improve the effectiveness and co–operation of the competent authorities in the
Member States in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of
organised crime. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-
liaison/europol.aspx iv For example: National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements and National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Retrieved
October 7, 2010 from
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/NAtionalSecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doingNational_C
ounter-Terrorism_Arrangements v For example in 2002: Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombing) Act 2002, Border Security
legislation Amendment Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002. Retrieved
October 7, 2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/legis/cth vi Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia/Protecting Our Community,
Commonwealth of Australia 2010. vii
s.100 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). viii
ss.102.1, 102.1(2) Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). ix
Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html x See, for example: DPP v Stonehouse [1977] 2 All ER 909 especially Lord Diplock at 916, 919, 920; Lord Solmon
at 927 and Lord Edmund-Davis at 934 ; Alister v Regina (1984) 154 CLR 404 and Knight v Regina (1992) 175 CLR
495. xi
See, for example; s. 201A of Schedule 2 Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) requiring assisting authorities to access
computer systems. xii
See, for example; Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 (Cth) and Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) xiii
See, for example; s. 34F(8) Australian Security Intelligence Act 1979 (Cth) which provides for incommunicado
detention without notice; and s.104.5(3) Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) concerned with interim control orders which
can impose restrictions on communicating or associating with specified individuals; s105.41 Criminal Code Act 1995
(Cth) concerned with disclosure offences and s.34ZS Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth)
Secrecy relating to warrants and questioning. xiv
Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Media/Releases/20071012-Haneef.pdf xv
Retrieved October 7, 2010 from Http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Director/Speeches/20091112cc-Prosecution-
Independence (7/10/2010). The policy can be read in full. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from
http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy xvi
See also: Justice Adams in R v ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC 1251 and Ian Carnell, Inspector-General of Intelligence
and Security, Report of Inquiry Into the Actions Taken by ASIO in 2003 in Respect of Mr Izhar ul-Haque and
Related Matters (12 November 2008). Retrieved October 13, 2010 from http://www.igis.gov.au/statements.cfm xvii
Haddara argued no evidence he ever read these materials: (R v Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No 28) [2008] VSC 336
(16 June 2008) at [42].
REFERENCES
Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia/Protecting Our Community,
Commonwealth of Australia 2010. Retrieved November 14, 2010 from
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/counter_terrorism/docs/counter-terrorism_white_paper.pdf
Bronitt, S & McSherry B., (2005) Principles of Criminal Law (2nd
ed.). Sydney: Thomson Lawbook.
Carnell, I. (2008) Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Report of Inquiry Into the Actions Taken by ASIO
in 2003 in Respect of Mr Izhar ul-Haque and Related Matters (12 November). Retrieved October 13, 2010 from
http://www.igis.gov.au/statements.cfm
Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, Directors Speeches. Retrieved October 7, 2010, from
http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Director/Speeches/20091112cc-Prosecution-Independence.
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70 | P a g e
Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions Prosecution Policy. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from
http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy
Michaelson, C. (2010). Terrorism in Australia:
An Inflated Threat. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from
http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol6no2Michaelsen.pdf
Media Releases on Haneef. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from
http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Media/Releases/20071012-Haneef.pdf
National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements and National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Retrieved October 7, 2010
from
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/NAtionalSecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doingNational_C
ounter-Terrorism_Arrangements
Nolan, M. (2008) Counter-Terrorism Interviewing and Investigative Interoperability: R v ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC
1251, Case Commentary. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, July, 175-190.
Porter, L.E., & Kebbell, M.R (2010) Radicalisation in Australia: Examining Australia‘s Convicted Terrorists.
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, iFirst article, 1 – 20.
Street Report. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/~/media/afp/pdf/t/the-
street-review.ashx
United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1373. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement
Legislation and International Conventions
Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth)
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss.34G, 34F(8), 34TA, 34NVAA and s.34ZS.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss.100, 102.1, 102.1(2), s.104.5(3) , s105.41 Retrieved October 7, 2010 from
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html
Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) s. 201A of Schedule 2
Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 (Cth)
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 9 December 1999, UN Doc.A/Res/54/109 (1999), in force 10 April 2002).
Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002,
Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombing) Act 2002, Border Security legislation Amendment
Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002. Retrieved October, 7, 2010 from
http://www.austlii.edu.au/legis/cth
Cases
Alister v Regina 154 CLR 404 (1984).
DPP v Stonehouse 2 All ER 909 [1977].
Knight v Regina 175 CLR 495 (1992).
Regina v Benbrika & Ors VSC 21 at 1 [2009].
Regina v Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No 28) [2008] VSC 336 (16 June 2008).
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71 | P a g e
Regina v Elomar & Ors, 2010.
Regina v Mulahalilovic NSWSC 1010 (30 January 2009) [2009].
Regina v Touma NSWSC 1475 (24 October 2008) [2008].
Regina v Izare ul-Haque NSWSC 1251 [2007].