Wittgenstein's Tractatus and the Problem

WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

W I T T G E N S T E I N ' S T R A C T A T U S AND T H E P R O B L E M

O F A P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L L A N G U A G E

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The interpretation of the objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus as phenome-nological objects has been highly influential in recent years. Merill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka hold the view, that the objects Wittgenstein has in mind in the Tractatus are "objects of acquaintance" in Russell's sense. J As "objects of acquaintance", according to HintikkaJ Hintikka, tractarian objects are sense data, i.e. objects or contents of sensation. Pears, Zemach and Cook reject the possi-bility that tractarian objects may be private sense data, but instead regard them as non-private phenomena, i.e. sensory qualities and objects? In both cases, elementary sentences would be formulated in a purely phenomenological language. Consequently, ordinary language would be ultimately analysable into (and truth-functionally dependent on) a phenomenological language.

Indeed, in PhilosophicaIRemarks I, 1 Wittgenstein mentions a phenomenological language as his "former goal" in philosophy and gives as examples of his former conception of objects the "visual table" and the "expected knocks at the door" (Philosophical Remarks III, 36). But, as McGuinness has pointed out, 3 in neither passage does Wittgenstein make clear whether he is talking about the period of the Tractatus, or that beginning with Some Remarks on Logical Form (1929), where he has given up the requirement of logical independence of elementary propositions in favour of the admission of phenomenological qualities as basic constituents of the world 4. In that period Wittgenstein explicitly regards the world as a world of sense data, 5 whereas the Tractatus does not contain any explicit statement as to whether sense data or phenomena are to be counted as objects. In the Tractatus, there is also no explicit

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claim that the analysis of language ends on a level in which acquaintance with simple objects is the basis for learning the meanings of words.

This paper has two aims. In sections I and II, I will examine the textual evidence in the writings of Wittgenstein which are thought to favour the interpretation of tractarian objects as phenomenological

objects. There, I try to show that Russell's influence has been much more indirect: phenomenological entities seem to be a possible model for tractarian objects, but the Tractatus does not contain any endorsment

of such a model. In sections III and IV, I consider two possible explanations for this result. One possible explanation is the thesis, put forward by Anscombe, McGuinness, Ishiguro and Mikel, that the concept

'object' in the Tractatus is defined by logical concepts alone. There, I argue that this interpretation is based on a misunderstandig of the conceptual structure of the Tractatus. The Tractatus should be seen as a system of implicit definitions in which neither logical nor ontological concepts have priority. This in turn is a result of Wittgenstein's own view of logic: logic in the sense of the Tractatus is concerned with the structures of language and reality that can be known a priori. In section IV, I try to show that this conception of logic explains why it cannot be said in the Tractatus whether the ultimate constituents of reality are phenomenological ones, or whether analysis of language ultimately ends

with a phenomenological language.

L Objects and sense data

Retrospective reports on Wittgenstein's attitude towards the theory of sense data in the Tractatus period are confusingly contradictory. According to Desmond Lee, Wittgenstein regarded tractarian objects as sense data, such as colours and points in visual space. 6 According to

Frank Ramsey's unpublished notes, Wittgenstein regarded objects as something given in experience, but not as sense data, sense data being logical constructions, which are not contained in anything we know. 7 In Notebooks 1614-1916 Wittgenstein seems to regard points in visual space

as examples of simple objects in the technical sense (6.5. 1915; 24. 5. 1915), and also thinks it possible, that minima sensibilia such as patches in the visual field are simple objects (18.6.1915). In the Notebooks,

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Wittgenstein also mentions material points in physics as possible

examples for objects in the sense of simple components of material bodies

(20.6.1915). Cook has pointed out that material points differ from objects in the Tractatus in the respect that physical points (point masses) appear only in theoretical calculations, but not in the world. 8 This difference

between physical points and tractarian objects makes it clear that Wittgenstein's search for possible examples of objects in the Notebooks

does not represent a final solution to the problem of the character of objects. Nevertheless, Hintikka/Hintikka defend the thesis that points in visual space in the Tractatus are still counted among the objects as the basic constituents of facts and states of affairs.

According to Hintikka/Hintikka, in Tractatus 2.0131 Wittgenstein uses the spacial object, the patch in the visual field, the sound and the object of the sense of touch as examples of objects in the technical sense, in the same way as they appear in 2.013. 9 But the wider context of these passages does not support this interpretation. The fact that objects cannot appear outside of states of affairs is compared in 2.0121 with the fact that objects in space cannot appear outside of space. The same logical relation holds between the sentences 2.013 und 2.0131: The fact that each object is in a"space" of possible states of affairs is compared to the fact that each spacial object must have a place in space, a patch in the visual field must have a colour, and so on. What Wittgenstein explains in 2.0131 is not the concept of an object, but the concept of a space of possible states of affairs, and in this explanation he makes use of analogies, rather than examples. This leaves it open whether spacial objects, patches in the visual field, etc. belong to the objects in the technical sense of the Tractatus.

Following Hintikka/Hintikka, 5.552 implies that sense data are the

kind of experience which is necessary in order to be able to understand a proposition, and which is required for a proposition to have meaning) ~ But in 5.552, Wittgenstein only considers the kind of experience needed for understanding logic (which is not the same as understanding

meaningful sentences, since in the view of the Tractatus the sentences of logic are not meaningful11). Wittgenstein characterizes this as an

experience "that there is something", which is not an experience of certain

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qualities of existing objects, i.e. not an experience of what something is

like. Therefore, according to Wittgenstein logic is prior to any experience

in the traditional sense. The experience required for understanding logic

does not seem to be an experience of what the ultimate constituents of

reality are. In that case, the idea that understanding logic requires a certain

kind of experience does not pin down the tractarian objects to sense data.

In a similar way, 4.123 provides no conclusive support o f the

Hint ikkas ' view. There Wittgenstein calls colours "objects" , but

immediately afterwards points out that here "object" is not used in the

technical sense, but in order to designate anything that possesses "internal properties", i.e. properties which it is impossible not to have. Not only

objects in the tractarian sense, but also facts and states of affairs have

internal properties (4.122-4.1221). Accordingly, no conclusions can be drawn as to whether colours can count among objects in the technical

sense on the basis of this passage alone.

There is a hint in a retrospective remark of Wittgenstein that he considered colours as possible candidates for tractarian objects. In the

Philosophical Investigations (I, 58) he uses the example o f "Red exists"

to throw light on the Tractatus conception of names, saying that names are that which cannot stand in connection with "X exists". Similarly,

according to Moore 's report on Wittgenstein's lectures 1930-1933, Wittgenstein regarded sentences mentioning one of the primary colours

red, green, blue or yellow as examples of elementary sentences in the

sense of the Tractatus.~2 In contrast to that, two passages which Hintikka/

Hintikka cite as further evidence seem to exclude colours from the realm of tractarian objects; (1) As Anscombe and Griffin have pointed out, in

2.0251 Wittgenstein regards the state of being coloured as a "form" of

objects, i.e. as a possibility of objects to appear in states of affairs. More

generally, Wittgenstein holds the view that material properties are only

constituted through the configuration of simple objects (2.0231), and that objects are therefore colourless (2.0232)? 3 Colours seem not to

belong to the realm of objects, but rather to play a role at the level of

states of affairs. (2) Ansombe argues that colours violate the condition

that (elementary) states of affairs are logically independent of other

(elementary) states of affairs, and that elementary sentences are logically

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independent of other elementary sentences (2.062; 4.211). Wittgenstein

regards this in turn as a consequence of the requirement of the

determinateness of meaning of a sentence, which is the central motivation

for the Tractatus view of language and the world (2.021-2.0212). In

6.3751 he says that, due to the logical structure of colour, it cannot be

the case, that two colours at the same time are present at the same place

of visual space. For that reason, he explicitly draws the conclusion that

sentences mentioning colours are not elementary sentences. Cook has

proposed a possible solution, suggesting that colours themselves can be

composed of elementary shades of colour. On that level, a certain point

in visual space having a certain shade of colour does not exclude the

same point having other shades of colour. 14 Similarly, Canfield holds the

thesis that objects in the Tractatus can be conceived of as phenomena like shades of colour. ~5 Wittgenstein himself, in Some Remarks on Logical

Form, endorses the possibility of an analysis of colours into more basic shades of colour. ~6 This possible solution for the problem of colour

incompatibilities marks a move away from the conception of objects as

sense data towards a less-specialised view of objects as phenomena.

H. Objects and phenomena Within the phenomenologicaI paradigm, Pears, Zemach and Cook

have developed an alternative to the Hintikkas' interpretation. They hold the view that tractarian objects belong to the category of phenomena,

but not to the category of sense data. This sharp distinction between

phenomena and sense data may rest partly on a misunderstanding of the

Hintikkas' interpretation. For one thing, Pears regards privacy as an essential feature of sense data.17 This does not exactly correspond to the

Hintikkas' understanding of sense data. They have pointed out that, for

Moore and Russell, privacy is not an essential feature of sense data~8:

sense data in the conception of Moore and Russell include not only private

aspects of sensation, but also sensible qualities and even properties of

surfaces. 19 Similarly, Cook has pointed out that even for Mach sense

data are not private: Machian sense data are the neutral stuff out of which

both the material world and the contents of consciousness are built up? ~

Cook's and Zemach's arguments against sense data are based on

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another consideration. They point out that sensa data are complex objects, having a certain extension in visual or physical space. 2~ But, for one

thing, the complexity of sense data in the "classical" conception of sense

data clearly does not rule out the possibility that simple constituents of sense perception may exist that are devoid of internal structure, such as

points in visual space or shades of colour. More important, Wittgenstein in the Notebooks explicitly does not exclude the possibility that minima

sensibilia, such as patches in the visual field, despite of their complexity,

are to be counted as simple objects, being the simplest components distinguishable in perception (18.6.1915). As long as they are epistemologically simple, the central difficulty for private sense data

therefore does not seem to be their complexity, but (as in the case of primary colours in the visual field) the problem of logical independence of elementary states of affairs and elementary sentences.

Nevertheless, Pears, Zemach and Cook offer a clear alternative to the Hintikkas' interpretation, in that they exclude private sense data from the realm of objects, which the Hintikkas don't. But, is there any conclusive textual evidence to the effect that tractarian objects must be non-private phenomena in the sense of Pears, Zemach and Cook? In 2.0123-2.01231, where Pears sees evidence for the claim that objects can be known by acquaintance, 22 Wittgenstein expresses himself more cautiously: I f I know an object, then I know its internal properties; in

order to know an object, I have to know its internal properties. This is remarkably different from the claim Pears ascribes to Wittgenstein, viz. the claim that we do in fact know the internal properties of objects in the sense of the Tractatus. More important for Wittgenstein's view of phenomena is 5.631. There, Wittgenstein refers to the human body as part of the world as we find it. Pears draws the conclusion that, for Wittgenstein, the world as we find it consists of (non-private) phenomena,

and that, as a consequence, the objects, being the ultimate constituents of the world, are also phenomena. This gives rise to two objections. (1) In 5.631 the human body is conceived of as being composed of limbs,

i.e. phenomenologically distinguishable parts. Here, the complexity of the phenomenological object rules it out as an object in the technical

sense of the Tractatus. (2) Whereas the first conclusion-- that the world

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as we find it consists of phenomena - - is a natural consequence of 5.631,

the second conclusion - - that objects are phenomena - - is problematic.

The world and objects, as Wittgenstein states in the first sentences of the Tractatus, belong to fundamentally different ontological categories: The

world is a whole of facts or states of affairs, not of objects. The world as we find it, therefore, consists of facts, not of objects, and the phenomeno log ica l character of facts does not guaran tee the

phenomenological character of the objects that constitute these facts. The same objection applies to two of Zemach's arguments for the

phenomenological character of objects. One argument is based on 5.62- 5.63, where Wittgenstein calls the world "my world" and equates "world" with "life". 23 This only means that the world, as a whole of facts (not of objects), is something experienced in life. The other argument centers on Wittgenstein's idea, that all experience is contingent, and that everything that we see could actually be different from how it is (5.634). 24 Here one might object, that, for Wittgenstein, it is the facts that can be different, while the objects remain the same in all possible states of affairs (2.0271). In this sense, objects are the "substance of the world" (2.021). The experience Wittgenstein talks about in 5.634 is therefore an experience of facts (which alone could be different), not an experience of objects.

Perhaps the most powerful argument for the phenomenological character of tractarian objects is Zemach's thesis that Wittgenstein rejects

scientific realism and, therefore, the existence of unobservable, non- phenomenological entities. 25 But, in 6.371-6.372, Wittgenstein does not consider the problem of the existence of unobservable entities, he only argues against the idea that causal connections are of logical necessity. Here, Wittgenstein denies the reality of causal relations, not the reality of unobservable entitities. Even when, in 6.343-6.35, Wittgenstein says that through their logical apparatus scientific laws talk about objects in the world, this does not imply, that all real entities are phenomenological ones. He merely states the conditions necessary for scientific laws to be

meaningful sentences: like all meaningful sentences, when completely analysed, they must talk about simple objects. This is also made clear in

the parallel passage in the Notebooks, where Wittgenstein discusses the

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role of variables in mathematical physics. There, he makes clear that the

completed physical sentence nevertheless refers to things, relations etc.

(20.6.1915). The question here is not to determine the qualitative characteristics of simple objects, but rather whether the sentences of

physics have reference at all.

Cook mentions the Notebook entry of 9.11.1916, where Wittgenstein says "All experience is world (...)-.26 Again, the concept of experience seems to be connected not with the concept of object, but with the concept of world. A closer connection between experience and objects can be found in in 5.5561, cited by Cook and Pears27: "The empirical reality is limited by the whole of objects". But, for Wittgenstein, "reality" is the "holding and not holding of states of affairs" (2.06). That is why he does not say that empirical reality consists of the whole of objects. Empirical reality, the complete holding and not holding of states of affairs, is limited by the existing objects, because the internal properties of objects determine which states of affairs are possible (2.01231-2.0124). This limiting function of the internal properties of objects does not imply,

that the objects themselves are empirical or phenomenological.

I lL 'Object' as a logical concept? Does this mean that empirical or phenomenological objects have to

be excluded from the realm of objects in the sense of the Tractatus? McGuinness holds the view that objects in the Tractatus are not concrete objects at all; nor are they, according to him, properties of concrete

objects, because in that case there would be something simpler than simple objects. In his interpretation, objects are nothing we have experience of or acquaintance with. 28 The strongest evidence for this

claim is the fact, that tractarian objects can only be named (3.221; see also Notebooks, 26.5.1915, 27.5.1915 and Philosophical Investigations

I, 46). But this does not exclude the possibility that one, in principle, can know an object, in the sense that one can know its internal properties, i.e. acquire knowledge of the states of affairs an object may enter into (2.0123-2.01231 ). External propertie s, also mentioned in 2.0123 -2.01231, can analogously be conceived of as those possibilities for entering into

states of affairs that are actually realized. That would explain the fact

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that, following 4.023, objects can also, in principle, be described according to their external properties. This ability to describe internal

and external properties leaves open the possibility that objects might be

objects of acquaintance or phenomena. In that respect, the Tractatus

seems to contain neither positive nor negative ontological commitments.

One explanat ion for Wi t tgens te in ' s si lence regarding the phenomenological character of objects could be that he regarded 'object ' as a purely logical concept. According to Anscombe, the concept of object for Wittgenstein is a purely "formal" concept, defined by the syntactical role of names in elementary sentences. 29 In a similar vein, Ishiguro holds the view that the concept of object for Wittgenstein is definable with the

help of logical concepts alone: an object is whatever is designated by the subject term in a completely analysed sentence. 3~ McGuinness gives another logical definition of the concept of object, using Wittgenstein's definition sameness of signs as the possibility to substitute signs in all contexts (3.341; 3.344): as the same sign, for Wittgenstein, always designates the same object (5.553), an object can be defined as the reference of all signs which are mutually substitutable for each other in completely analysed sentences? ~ Finally, Mikel makes explicit an assumption implicitly contained in all these interpretations: 'object ' in the Tractatus is used like a variable, designed to stand for whatever may be the ultimate endpoint in the analysis of language. 32

It is true that, in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein talks about simple objects in the way suggested by Ishiguro: "But how am I imagining the simple? Here all I can say is always" 'x ' has reference .... (6.5.1915). A few days

later, he says: "It need appear only as a prototype, as a variable in our sentences - - that is the simple thing that we mean and look for." (11.5.1915). This seems to suggest that, in fact, 'object' for Wittgenstein is a concept defined by logical concepts alone. But, in the Notebook

entry of 30.5.1915, he gives a negative answer to the the question "is 'name' so to speak a logical concept?". There, he says that names signalise

"what is common to a single form and a single content", i.e. names refer to objects. Here, an ontological component enters into the definition of 'name' . A similar conceptual structure can be found in the Tractatus.

According to 3.201 and 3.203, objects are those entities, to which names

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("simple signs") in completely analysed sentences refer. But in 3.202, names are defined as the simple signs used in a sentence. This presupposes

that the sentence sign itself is used, i.e. is a meaningful sentence (3.5-4).

Meaningful sentences, for Wittgenstein, are pictures of possible states of affairs (2.201; 3-3.02), which means that they are pictures of possible

concatenations of objects (2.01). In this way, 'object' and ' state of affairs' enter into the definition of the concept 'meaningful sentence'.

The definitions suggested by Anscombe, Ishiguro and McGuinness are affected by this conceptual structure. Although it is true that, following Anscombe, objects can be defined through the syntactical role of names, the concept of name is not a purely logical concept, but, in turn,

presupposes the concept of object. Moreover, if the definitions proposed by Ishiguro and McGuinness are understood in a literal sense, they are clearly wrong. Not all subject terms of completely analysed sentences stand for objects: subject terms in mathematical or logical sentences do not refer to mathematical or logical objects (4.441; 5.4; 6.02). For the same reason, not all mutually substitutable signs in completely analysed sentences are names of objects: mutual ly substitutable signs in mathematics or logic do not have reference at all. In order to get a correct definition of the concept of object, the definitions suggested by Ishiguro

and McGuinness have to be relativised to meaningful sentences, which excludes mathematical and logical sentences (cf. 5.534; 6.1263). But then, the interdependence of logical_ and ontological concepts shows up again: the concepts 'state of affairs' and 'object ' enter into the definition of meaningful sentences.

Consequently, in Wittgenstein's view, neither 'name' nor ' meaningful sentence' is a merely logical concept. The Traetatus (and in the same way the Notebook entries of May 1915) is built on a system of implicit definitions in which neither logical nor ontological concepts have priority. Therefore, Wittgenstein's silence as to the phenomenological character of objects cannot be explained through an interpretation of 'object' as a concept defineable by logical concepts alone.

IV. Objects and Wittgenstein's conception of logic Nevertheless, Wittgenstein regards the sentences of the Tractatus in

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a certain sense as sentences of logic. For example, in 2.012-2.0121, where he sets forth the theory of internal properties of objects, he points out

that, "in logic", nothing can be by chance. Again, in 6.22 he talks about

the "logic of the world", and in 6.12 about the "formal - - logical - - properties of the world". In this conception of logic, logical and

ontological concepts are inseparable. According to 6.124, sentences of logic represent the structure of the world, in that they presuppose that names have reference and elementary sentences meaning. In the Notebooks, he puts forward the question: "can we manage without simple objects in LOGIC?" (9.5.1915). As Wittgenstein makes clear in an early Notebook entry (22.1.1915), and again in Tractatus 5.4711, sentences of

logic describe the nature of all description and therefore the nature of the world, the nature of all states of affairs, or the nature of being. In these passages, the structure of the world is tied inseparably to the structure of language with a view to the question of which conditions must be met for a sentence to have meaning. The inseparable connection between logical and ontological concepts in the Notebooks and the Tractatus can therefore be seen as a consequence of a semantic approach to the problems of logic.

That Wittgenstein holds no positive or negative assumptions as to the phenomenological nature of objects seems to be directly connected

with this special conception of logic. At the very beginning of the Notebooks (22.8,1914), and again in Tractatus 5.473, Wittgenstein says that "logic must take care of itself". As a consequence of this, the kind of self-evidence which plays a prominent role in Russells epistemology in Wittgenstein's view is unnecessary in logic (Tractatus 5.4731 and

Notebooks 8.9.1914). In this sense, according to Wittgenstein, logic is a priori (5.4731). Correspondingly, the central question around which the Notebooks turn is: "Is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what does it consist in?" (1.6.1915). In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein makes clear that the irrelevance of self-evidence holds in the first instance for the question of subject-predicate form and relational forms: Whether

elementary sentences have such forms cannot be shown through experience (3.9.1914). In the same Notebook entry, Wittgenstein also points out that the same holds for the question, whether a point in visual

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space is a simple object: according to him, no evidence can decide this

question. This clearly shows that, for him, the question of whether objects

are sense data or not cannot be answered through experience. But, due

to the a priori character of logical sentences, as Wittgenstein points out

in the Tractatus, we cannot say in logic: "this and that is in the world,

but that is not" (5.61). His argument is most emphatically expressed in a

passage from the Notebooks (17.6.1915 ): "It is, A PRIORI, clear that in

analysis we must arrive at simple components (. . .) . This question is a

logical one and the complexity of spatial objects is a logical complexity

( . . .) . And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple

indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing. It does not go against

our feeling, that we cannot analyse PROPOSITIONS so far as to mention

the elements by name; no, we feel that the WORLD must consist of elements." Thus, the a priori character of logic allows for the possibility

that we are in fact unable to carry analysis to the point where we can grasp the nature of the simple constituents of the world.

The asc r ip t ion o f o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s as to the

phenomenological character of objects therefore seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of the sentences of the Tractatus. The

fact that Wit tgenstein holds no implici t commitments as to the

phenomenological character of objects or to the phenomenological

character o f elementary sentences seems to be connected with two fundamental points concerning the logical structure of the Tractatus.

First, there is no primacy of logical over ontological concepts or vice

versa: the Tractatus can be seen as a system of implicit definitions

comprising both logical and ontological concepts. And second, the

Tractatus contains only those (positive or negative) commitments as to the structure both of descriptions and the world, which can be stated a

priori; in this sense, the sentences of the Tractatus are to be seen as

sentences of logic.

I N S T I T U T E OF P H I L O S O P H Y

H U M B O L D T U N I V E R S I T Y

D-10099 BERLIN GERMANY

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N O T E S

~. HintikkaJ Hintikka (1986, pp. 51-77). 2 Pears (1987, pp. 90-97); Zemach (1990, p. 35); Cook (1994, pp. 31-40).

3. McGuinness (1981, p. 62).

4. Wittgenstein (1929, pp. 162-165).

5 Lee (1980, p. 79). 6. Lee (1980, p. 120). 7. Item #004-21-02 in the Pittsburgh Ramsey archives, cited in Hintikka/

Hintikka (1986, p. 77). 8 Cook (1994, p. 40). 9. Hintikka/Hintikka (1986, p. 74). to. Hintikka/Hintikka (1986, pp. 56 and 71).

N. Cf. Tractatus 6.121. ~2 Moore-(1963, pp. 297-299). ~3. Anscombe (1965, p. 111); Griffin (1965, pp. 44and 55). 14. Cook (1994, pp. 37-39). 15. Canfield (1972, pp. 207-213).

,6. Wittgenstein (1929, p. 168). 17. Pears (1987, p. 64).

ts. Hintikka/Hintikka (1986, 71-72). ~9. Cf. Moore (1922); Russell (1918). 20. Cook (1994, pp. 19 and 42).

2~. Cook (1994, p 34); Zemach (1990, p. 39). 22. Pears (1987, p. 107). 23. Zemach (1990, p. 35). 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid.

,.6. Cook (1994, p. 31). 27. Cook (1994, p. 31); Pears (1987, p. 107).

28 McGuinness (1981,p. 72). 29. Anscombe (1965, pp. 82, 99 and 123).

3o Ishiguro (1990, pp. 25-26).

3~ McGuinness (1981,pp. 65-66). 32. Mikel (1998, pp. 385-388).

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Canfield, J. V. 1972. "A Model Tractatus Language", The Philosophical Forum 4, pp. 199-217.

Cook, J. W. 1994. Wittgenstein's Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Griffin, J. 1965. Wittgenstein'sLogicalAtomism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hintikka, M. B./Hintikka, J. 1986. Investigating Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell,

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Lee, D. (ed.) 1980. Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1932, from the notes of J. King and D. Lee, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

McGuinness, B. 1981, "The So-called Realism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus", in Perspectives on the Philosophy ofWittgenstein, ed. I. Block, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 60-73.

Mikel, A. 1998. "Objects and Possible Worlds in the Tractatus", Philosophia 27, pp. 383-403.

Moore, G. E. 1922. "The status of sense data", in Philosophical Studies, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

Moore, G. E. 1963. Philosophical Papers, George Allen & Unwin, London/ Macmillan, New York.

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Russell, B. 1918. "The relation of sense-data to physics", in Mysticism andLogic, Longmans, London.

Wittgenstein, L. 1929. "Some Remarks on Logical Form", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 9, pp. 162-71.

Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Wittgenstein, L. 1961. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. E Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

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Wittgenstein, L. 1979. Notebooks 1914~1916, second edition, ed. G. H. v. Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Basil Blackwell. Oxford.

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Wittgenstein's Tractatus and the Problem