Williams Relativismo

8/12/2019 Williams Relativismo

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Mind ssociation

Bernard Williams' RelativismAuthor(s): Jack W. MeilandSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 88, No. 350 (Apr., 1979), pp. 258-262Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Mind Association

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DISCUSSIONSBernardWilliams'RelativismJACK W. MEILAND

Many writers n relativism ointout the alleged inconsistencies f thatposition and move immediately n to other ubjects,even thoughrela-tivism s admittedon all sides to be widely held today in one formoranother and would thus seem to merit more extendedconsideration.Bernard Williamshas taken a muchmore serious attitude han this,byfirstmaking the usual criticisms nd then trying o find the truth nrelativism'. n this paper, I want to clarify nd criticizeWilliams' viewson the truth n relativism s a wayof bringing ut whatI take to be thetruth bout relativism.Williams' versionof the usual chargesof self-contradictions set forthin his book Morality,where he attackswhat he calls 'vulgar relativism'in the followingway. Vulgar relativism olds 'that right means (canonly be coherently nderstood s meaning) rightfor a given society ;that right fora given society is to be understood n a functionalistsense; and that therefore)t is wrongfor people in one society o con-demn, interfere ith, etc., the values of another ociety. This is 'theanthropologist'sheresy' in its most distinctive nd most influentialform, ccording o Williams,but it is absurd. Whatever ts results, heview s clearlynconsistent,ince t makes a claim n its third roposition,about what is right nd wrong in one's dealingswith other societies,which uses a nonrelativeense of right not allowed forin the firstproposition' ibid. p. 2I).In his laterpaper, 'The Truth in Relativism',Williams says of thisvulgarrelativism: This view s nothardto refute; twas perhapsworthdiscussing, ince it is widelyheld,but to dispose of t certainly oes nottakeus veryfar.'2 n particular,t does not show us whether ll forms frelativismre self-refuting.ome forms frelativismmightbe not onlyconsistentbut also mighteven be plausible. And in this later paperWilliamssetsout to find uch a form.This is done in a generalizedwayby letting S' stand for 'a systemof belief' and then distinguishingbetween realconfrontations'nd 'notionalconfrontations'etween uchsystems.There is a realconfrontationetweenSI and S2 at a giventimeif there s a group at thattime for whom each of SI and S2 is a realoption .. S2 sa realoptionfor group f ithert s their or t spossiblefor hemtogo overto S2; wheregoingoverto S2 involves, irst,hat tispossiblefor hem o ivewithin, rhold, S2and retain heirhold onreality,and, second,to theextent hatrational omparison etweenS2 and theirI Bernard Williams,Morality: An Introductiono Ethics New York: HarperTorchbooks,972), p. 20.2 BernardWilliams, The TruthinRelativism',ProceedingsftheAristotelianSociety,75 (I974-5), p. 226.

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BERNARD WILLIAMS' RELATIVISM 259present utlook s possible,they ould acknowledge heir ransitiono S2in thelightofsuch comparison' ibid. pp. 22I-222). Then he sets forthas follows hevariety f relativismwhichhe finds oherent nd, at leastfor thical ystems fbelief, orrect:foronewhose ownS doesnotstandin real confrontation ith another , questionsofappraisalof thatotherS 'do notgenuinely rise' ibid.p. z26).Let us call thispositionappraisalrelativism'.Exactly what is the advantagewhich appraisal relativismhas overvulgar relativism?t might eem that the advantage ies in this: vulgarrelativismmakesappraisals nd thereby ontradictstself,whileappraisalrelativismvoids such contradictiony avoidingmaking ny appraisals.This can be filled ut in thefollowingway.Vulgarrelativism oldsthat ocondemn hesystem f belief fanothersociety s wrong.And in thussayingthatthiscondemnations wrong,vulgarrelativisms appraising-for wrong' s an appraisalword. This iswherevulgarrelativism uns into difficulty.or it uses this appraisalword in an absoluteway and hence contradictstself.But ifrelativismwereinsteada doctrine bout theconditionsunderwhichappraisal canor should take place, its actually making appraisalswould be avoidedand thereforeo wouldthechargeofself-refutation.o saythatgenuinequestionsof appraisal ariseonly n cases of real options s to talkabouttheconditions f appraisalofan S but not to appraisethatS in any way.However, do notthink hat hiscomparison etween hetwoforms frelativism s sound. It is true thatappraisalrelativism oes notappraisesystems fbelief, s vulgarrelativism oes. But appraisalrelativism oesappraise. It appraises appraisals, some as genuine and others as notgenuine. The difference etweenthe two forms of relativism ies inanotherdirection.Vulgar relativism eems to failbecause it makes themeanings hemselves fappraisalwordsrelativetothe needs ofsocieties)and thenuses an appraisalword (the word 'wrong')with an absoluterather hana relativemeaning.Appraisalrelativism, n the otherhand,does not allegethatmeaningsofappraisalwordsarerelative, nd itusesan appraisal word-the word 'genuine'-in an unabashedly absolutesense.Thus, it does notmix absoluteand relativemeanings ogethernone doctrine nd avoids self-contradiction.But now a new questionarises. If appraisalrelativism oes not holdthemeaningsofappraisalwords to be relative, hen n whatway is it aform f relativism?Well,what makesanydoctrine form frelativism?One featurewhich makesa doctrine form frelativisms that t allegessomething o be relative o something lse. We have seen thatthis s soin the case ofvulgarrelativism, heremeanings rerelativized osocietalneeds. Appraisal relativism ulfils his requirement oo. Specifically,tmakes the activity f genuinely ppraising n S relative o (dependentupon) certain conditions-the nature of one's own S, the social andeconomicconditionsof the time,and so on. Appraisal relativism oldsthatnotevery can be genuinely ppraisedby people holding differentS, and thatsuch appraisal s dependentupon thesesortsofconditions.Notice also thatappraisalrelativismwould lead to something f thesame results s vulgarrelativism. ne purposeofvulgarrelativisms to



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26o JACK W. MEILAND:serve as an argument gainst nterfering ith other ocieties. Appraisalrelativism as a somewhat aralleluse for ome cases that s, withrespectto some S's). Suppose thatSk is a belief ystemwhichJones annotgenu-inely appraise. Then Sk is not a systemwhich Jonescan be justified njudgingto be defective r nferioro his own. And hence Sk s not a systemwhichJones ouldbe ustifiedn nterferingith nthebasis of uch udge-ments.Of course,this s notto say thatJones ouldn't nterfere ith hatsociety;it is onlyto say thatJoneswould lack any rational basis fordoingso.Let us now evaluate appraisal relativism y turning o the crucialconcept of 'real option'. From the standpointof a belief systemSI,another elief ystem 2 is a real option f t is possible for he holdersofSI 'to go over to' S2. To geta bettergripon thisnotion of real option',let us turn mmediatelyoWilliams'examples:

In this sense many Ss whichhave been held are not real optionsnow. The life ofa Greek BronzeAge chief, r a medievalSamurai,and the outlooksthat go withthose, are not real options for us:there s no way of livingthem.... Even Utopian projects amonga small band ofenthusiastsould notreproduce hat ife:stillmore,the projectof re-enactingt on a societal scale in the context ofactual modern ndustrial ifewould involve one of those social orpoliticalmistakes,n facta vast illusion ibid. p. 224).Thus, one condition f an S beinga realoptionfor omeone s that tbepossiblefor hatpersonto live' thatS. Later,Williamsgoes on tostateasecond condition:

But from he standpoint am now considering, o raise seriouslyquestions in the vocabularyof appraisal about this culturecon-sidered as a concrete historicalrealitywill not be possible for areflective erson. n thecase ofsuch Ss, to stand nmerelynotionalconfrontations to lack the relationto our concernswhich alonegives any pointofsubstance o appraisal: theonlyreal questionsofappraisalare aboutrealoptions ibid. p. 225).This secondcondition mphasizes relations o our concerns'.It is certainlyrue that the life of a medievalSamuraiis not one thatcould be livedtoday. t can be livedonlywithin societyhavingcertaininstitutionsnd values. But does it followthatwe cannot legitimately('genuinely') appraisethe belief-systemf a medievalSamurai?Such alife, accordingto Williams lacks 'the relation to our concerns whichalone gives any pointor substanceto appraisal'.But imagine business-man whose ideal is to contribute o the economicand materialdevelop-ment of one's society. Thus, various inventors, xplorers, nd entre-preneurs re his heroes.Upon reading James Clavell's novel Shogun,which gives a superb and sympathetic ortraitof Japanese Samurailife and ideals,' our businessman ondemns he Samuraiforconcerninghimself olelywithduty, oyalty, nd honour,thus makingno contri-

I JamesClavell,ShogunNew York: Atheneum, 975).



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BERNARD WILLIAMS' RELATIVISM 26ibutionwhatsoevero theeconomicdevelopment fJapan.The business-man feels thatthe Samurai is a parasitewhose domination f Japanesemedieval societyblocks efforts oward improvement f the materialsituation. This is a judgementwhich our businessmanmightwell sharewith Communist.) believethat his s a case inwhich he belief-systembeing evaluated does have a relationto the evaluator'sconcernseventhough that belief-systems not a real optionforthe evaluator. f so,then this s a case in whichWilliams'two conditions onflict. he con-ditionwhichtalks boutrelation o our concerns s fulfilled hilethatofthe possibility f goingover' to the form f lifebeing evaluated s notfulfilled.We must look more closelyat Williams' first onditionforgenuineappraisal. Given that the businessman n our society cannot live theSamurai life,what is 'non-genuine' about his appraisal of that life?Williams implydoes nottellus, but we should consider everalobviouspossibilities.Notice, first, hat this conditionfor genuine appraisalrequires nly hat he S being appraisedbe a real option. t is not requiredthat the appraiserhave adopted thatS, even if only for a time. So wecan rule out various possibilities n thisbasis alone. Sometimes peoplesay thatone cannotevaluatethatwhichone has notexperienced neself.They saythis specially boutforms f ife:one canevaluate n S properlyonly fromthe inside'. But clearlythis is not whatWilliams s saying,sincehe does notrequirethatone have adoptedthe S beingevaluated.A more likely lternatives this: our concern n evaluating he S isexpressedbythequestion Should we adopt thisotherS in place ofourpresentS?' Such a questionwould be idle withrespect o Ss which wecannot adopt, that is, which are not real options.This interpretationnicely ies togetherWilliams'twoconditions, he first boutrealoptionsand thesecond aboutour concerns.But ifthis s whatWilliams means,then his conditions s statedare not strongenough.He must add thefurtheronditionhat n S canbegenuinely ppraised nly f heappraiseris activelyconsidering doptingthat S in place of his own. Yet thisstrengthenedondition s fartoo strong.For itwould ruleout a liberal'scondemning he Nazi belief-system. he liberal is certainlynot con-sideringbecominga Nazi, when he condemnsthe Nazi belief-system.This conditionwouldprevent he iberal's ppraisalfrom einga 'genuineappraisal'.And this s, tomymind,totally ounterintuitive.PerhapswhenWilliamsspecifies hatthe S being appraisedbe a realoption,he means thatthis S must be partofthe appraiser'sworldandthereby hares n someof theproblems nd concerns hat heappraiser'sS tries o dealwith. think hat his s a plausible wayofconstruing hatWilliamssays,but I do notbelieve that the real option'condition hendoes the ob required. t is quite possiblethata certainmonasticwayoflife in the ninthcenturywas responding o the same concernsas, say,thoseto whichthepresent-day en monk'sway of liferesponds. f so,thenthecontemporaryppraiser houldbe able to appraise n a genuineway thatninthcenturyway of lifebecause he is able to appraise in agenuine way theZen monk'swayof life. The concerns re the same inbothcases, and hencegenuine appraisal s possible n both cases.



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262 JACK W. MEILAND: RELATIVISMI believe that Williams is right n saying thatthereis a differencebetween genuine appraisal and 'notionalappraisal', and in sayingthat

genuine ppraisaltakesplace when and onlywhenthe S beingappraisedhas some relation o our concerns.These concernsprovidethe reasonand occasion for ppraisal otakeplace at all; after ll,we do not appraiseevery conceivableS, nor even every actual (past or present)S. Theseconcerns also provide some of the criteria-especially criteria ofimportance-on whichapprais4l s based. But to say that thereare Ssthatcannotbe appraised because we cannot adopt themseems to meincorrect or he reasons givenabove.There is another, nd I believebetter,wayofrescuing elativismromthe particularcharge of self-contradiction ade by Williams againstvulgarrelativism.We have seenthat hischarge riseswhenthe relativistmakes appraisals. Williamsattempts o rescue the relativist y havinghim talk nstead bouttheconditions ormakinggenuine ppraisals.Butwe can alsorescuethe relativistyhavinghimtalk boutthe mpossibilityof makingnon-relativized ppraisals of Ss. Relativists ypically laimthat udgements,knowledge, ven truth, re relative o conceptualandevaluativeframeworks;nd theyoftenpointout that there s no wayofstepping utsideevery rameworkomake a 'non-framework-dependent'evaluation. n orderto achieve an appraisalwhichhas absoluteratherthanrelative uthority, ne would have to step outside all frameworksand then udge some one of these frameworkso be corrector valid.And,therelativistsay,one cannotdo this.Now, mypointhere s nottoarguefor his sortofrelativism ut onlyto show that n taking his ine,the relativist oes not appraise any particularS. He thus avoids self-contradictionf the type n question.This strategy oes not relyon anydubious conditions bout genuineappraisalanid s more n line withthekind of positionthat relativists ave, since Kant and Hegel, tendedtotake. And like the othertwoforms f relativism iscussedhere, t castsdoubt on the absolute legitimacy f appraisals of belief-systemstherthan our own.UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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