WILL THE EU GET A REAL PRESIDENT? - FIIA · Semi-presidentialism between parliamentarism and presidential rule Political systems are usually divided into parlia-mentary systems, parliament-centred

WILL THE EU GET A REAL PRESIDENT?

Teija Tiilikainen BRIEFING PAPER 65, 7 October 2010

65

THE EU’S POLITICAL SYSTEM AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE

OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN EUROPE

• The EU’s political system comes very close to a semi-presidential systemwhich represents acombinationofpresidentialpowerandparliamentaryaccountability.

• Thecontoursofsemi-presidentialismhavebecomeaccentuatedboththroughthedeepeningandextension of parliamentary rule and through the simultaneous reinforcement of the EuropeanCouncil.

• For the time being the lack of party government forms a special characteristic of the Union’sparliamentarydimension.

• TwomainoptionsdominatewhatcomestothefuturedevelopmentoftheUnion’spoliticalsystem:either theUnionwilldeepen itssemi-presidential rulebymoving intoarealpartygovernment.Developmenttowardsatruepresidentialregimerepresentsthesecondoption,withthesubordinationoftheCommissiontoonesingleheadofexecutive,thepresident.ThismodelwouldmergethecurrentpresidenciesoftheCommissionandtheEuropeanCouncilintoonesingleEUpresidency.

WILL THE EU GET A REAL PRESIDENT?

Teija Tiilikainen

Director

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Briefing Paper 65

7 October 2010

THE EU’S POLITICAL SYSTEM AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN EUROPE

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3

AtfirstglancetheEU’spoliticalsystemdoesn’tseemtocorrespondtoanycontemporarytypeofregime.ThereisadirectlyelectedEuropeanParliament(EP),butthewayofconstructingrelationsofpowerandaccountabilitybetweentheparliamentandthethreebodieswithexecutivepowers,theCommission,theEuropeanCouncil or theCouncil, complicates thepicture. The Commission’s accountability to theEuropean Parliament has been confirmed in thefounding treaties ever since their conclusion. Butwhat is thevalueof sucharulewhenthereseemsto be a muchmore powerful executive emergingbeyond the reach of any EU-level accountability,namelytheEuropeanCouncil?

Thekeyargumentofthisbriefingpaper isthattheEU’spoliticalsystemcomessurprisinglyclosetooneparticulartypeofregime.Itisaquestionofasemi-presidentialsystemwhichrepresentsacombinationof presidential power and parliamentary account-ability.TheUnion’s dual executive is formedby aparliamentarycabinet,theCommission,ontheonehandandapresidentialbody, theEuropeanCoun-cil,ontheother.ThecontoursofthissystemwereessentiallystrengthenedthroughthechangestakingplaceintheLisbonTreaty.

How is the division of labour usually arrangedbetweenthetwopartsofsuchadualexecutiveandwhatkindsoffactorsmightshaketheirco-existence?WhatkindsofpressurestomodifytheEUsystemarelikelytooccurnext?

Semi-presidentialism between

parliamentarism and presidential rule

Political systems are usually divided into parlia-mentarysystems,parliament-centredsystemsandsystems characterized by a separation of powersbetweenthekeypoliticalbodies.1Thethirdcategorycoincides with presidentialism, while semi-presi-dentialismisaformfallingbetweenparliamentarismontheonehandandaseparationofpowerssystemontheother.

Asemi-presidential systemcombinesaparliamen-tarysystemformedbyaprimeministerandacabinetaccountabletotheparliamentwithapresidentgain-inghisorher legitimacy fromasourceotherthanthe parliament. According to theman behind theoriginal concept, Maurice Duverger (1980), semi-presidentialismimpliesthatthepresidentiselectedbyuniversalsuffrage,hasquiteconsiderablepowersandfacesaprimeministerandministerswhopos-sessexecutiveandgovernmentalpowerandcanstayinofficeonlyiftheparliamentdoesn’tshowopposi-

1 For an analysis ofmajor political systems, seeDUvErgEr,

M (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential

government. European Journal of Political Research 8: 165-

187; Lijphart, A. (ed.), Parliamentary versus presidential

government. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1992; Sartori,

G. Comparative constitutional engineering: An inquiry

into structures, incentives and outcomes. Basingstoke:

Macmillan,1994.Siaroff,A.(2003),Comparativepresidencies:

The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and

parliamentarydistinction.European Journal of Political Research

42,288-289.

A meeting of the European Council. Photo: Council of the European Union


wereabletodo.TheformulationoftheEC’spowersasthefunctionto“providetheUnionwiththenec-essary impetus for itsdevelopmentanddefine thegeneral political directions and priorities thereof”gives it a strong executive mandate, particularlywhencomplementedwiththepowersithasintheappointmentoftheCommissionandintheCfSp.

Oneessentialquestionhere,ofcourse,iswhetheracollectivebody liketheECcanbe identifiedastheholderofpresidentialpowersorwhether this roleshouldbelinkedinsteadtothePresidentoftheEC.ItisimmediatelyobviousthatingeneraltermstheEC’sroleseemstobesurprisinglycompatiblewiththegeneralcharacteristicsofsemi-presidentialism.3

TheEC isverymuch independentof theEP in thesensethatitcandefinetheguidelinesfortheUnion’spolicieswithouttakingintoaccounttheEP’sviewsorpoliticalconstellations.Inmostpolicyfieldstheimplementation of these guidelines is, however,firmlydependentontheparliamentarymachinerythatresidesintheCommissionandtheEP.Theotherside of the coin consists of the fact that theCom-missionisaccountabletotheEPandtotheEPonly.Insemi-presidential systemsthepresidentusuallyacquireshisorher legitimacy froma sourceotherthan the parliament, meaning that the presidentisdirectlyor indirectlyelectedbythepeople forafixed termofoffice.TheEC essentiallyacquires itslegitimacy from the member states, and politicalconsiderationsaboutwhether itspermanentpresi-dentshouldbeelectedthroughdirectvotemustbeunderstoodagainstthisbackground.

3 AccordingtoSartori(1994,132),thecharacteristicsofasemi-

presidentialsystemareasfollows:theheadofstateiselectedby

popularvoteeitherdirectlyorindirectlyforafixedtermofoffice.

Heor she shares executivepowerwithaprimeminister, thus

enteringadualauthoritystructurewhosethreedefiningcriteria

are:thepresidentisindependentofparliament,butcannotgovern

aloneordirectlyandthereforehisorherwillmustbeconveyed

andprocessedviahisorhergovernment;conversely,theprime

minister and his or her cabinet are president-independent in

thattheyareparliament-dependent: theyaresubjecteitherto

parliamentary confidence or no-confidence (or both), and in

eithercaseneedthesupportofaparliamentarymajority;thedual

authoritystructureofsemi-presidentialismallowsfordifferent

balancesandalsoforshiftingtheprevalenceofpowerwithinthe

executive,underthestrictconditionthatthe‘autonomypotential’

ofeachcomponentunitoftheexecutivedoessubsist.

tion to them. In contemporary thinking, all threecriteriahaveprovedflexible:differentwaysofelect-ingthepresidentcomeintoquestion,thecontentof‘considerable’ powers varies a great deal and evensystems like the Russian onewhere the presidentcanalsodismissthecabinethavebeenincludedinthesemi-presidentialistcategory.

Semi-presidentialismwhich, in earlier times,wasembodiedaboveall intheFrenchandFinnishcon-stitutions,hassuddenlybecomethemostcommonformofregimeinEuropeasmostoftheCentralandEastEuropeancountrieshaveadoptedthis typeofpoliticalsystemaftertheirrecentdemocratization.Whethersemi-presidentialismturnsintoaforceforstabilityorinstabilityinaregimeseemstodependonconditionsexternaltoit,suchasthepartyback-groundsof the twoheadsof executives (presidentandprimeminister)or thegeneral stabilityof theparty system. In the latter case, a semi-presiden-tialist rulemightbringmorestability to turbulentpoliticalconditions,whereasthefirstisexemplifiedintheFrenchsystemwhereasituationof‘cohabita-tion’typicallydecreasesthestabilityoftheregime.

A third alternative to a parliamentary or semi-presidential rulecanbe found, for instance, in theUStypeofpresidentialsystemwherethestatebodiesfunctionrelativelyindependentlyintheirownfieldoftheseparationofpowers.Insuchasystemthepar-liamentisexpresslyalegislatorandthefunctionsofcontrollingandsupervisingtheexecutivedon’texist.

The EU as a model of semi-presidentialism?

The EU’s political system consists firstly of a par-liamentarygovernmentwhere the cabinet, that isthe Commission, is accountable to the EuropeanParliament (EP). While the Council has generallybeen treatedas theotherpartof theUnion’sdualexecutive2, here Iwould suggest that this role beoffered to the newly institutionalized EuropeanCouncil(EC).DuetotheinstitutionalizationoftheEuropeanCouncilandthecreationofapermanentpresidency,thisbodyhastakenamuchfirmergripontheUnion’sexecutivepowersthanwhatthefor-mersummitmeetingsundertherotatingpresidency

2 Hix,S.The Political System of the European Union.London:

Palgrave,2005,31.


Thecontoursofsemi-presidentialismhavebecomeaccentuated both through the deepening andextension of parliamentary rule and through thesimultaneousreinforcementoftheEC.ThetwopartsoftheexecutivecometogetherintheEC,ofwhichthePresidentoftheCommissionisamember.TheEC’spresidentialistcharacteristicsarefurthermorestressedthroughitsroleintheappointmentofthelatter.InspiteofthefactthattheECcanneitherdis-misstheCommissionnoritspresident,itsproposalisstillkeyintheappointmentprocedure.4

There are, however, distortions in the EU’s semi-presidentialist system as the Council still hasimportantexecutivefunctionsaswell.Itwon’tlosethemall,butithastoberecognizedthattheLisbonTreatyactuallychangesthesituationintworespects.First,itstressestheCouncil’sroleastheEP’ssecondchamberbyspreadingtheordinarylegislativeproce-durewherebytheCouncilandtheEPactasthetwochambersofabicameralParliament.5Inotherfieldsof the Council’s executive competences, changes

4 An interesting combination of parliamentarism and

presidentialism characterizes the rules of nomination as the

EC,takingintoaccounttheEPelections(tEU,art.9D,7),shall

proposeacandidate forPresidentof theCommissionwhowill

thenbeelectedbytheEP(intheeventthatasufficientmajority

doesn’texist,theECmustcomeupwithanewproposal).

5 tEU art.9 C, 8 divides the Council’s competences into

legislativecompetencesandothersanddemandsthateachcouncil

meetingshallbedividedintotwopartsaccordingly.Asthetreaty

subordinatedanumberofnewlegislativefieldstotheordinary

legislativeprocedureit,defacto,decreasedtheCouncil’spower

overtheseissues.

havetakenplaceinfavouroftheEContheonehandandthenewHighRepresentativeforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyontheother.ItshouldbenotedthatbothintheEU’sexternalrelationsandtheareaoffreedom,securityandjusticetheECshalldefinethestrategicguidelines(tEU,art10bandtfEUart.61A) and, consequently, also provide the politicalframework for the Council’s action.The pluralityoffunctionsgiventotheHighRepresentativeagainemphasizeshisorherrole inthe leadershipof theCfSp.

TheEuropeanParliamentfunctionslikeaparliamentin the conditions of semi-presidentialism whereonlyonepartoftheexecutivefunctionsundertheruleofparliamentary accountability.TheEP facessome remarkable constraints evenwhen it comestothefulfilmentofthisrole.Theseconstraintsandthe challenges of the parliamentary anglewill bediscussednext.

Parliamentarism lacking political content?

FromtheEP’spointofview,theexistenceofadualexecutive implies that only one part of the execu-tive,namelytheCommission,isaccountabletotheEP.TheEC’srolevis-à-vistheEPfollowsmoretheseparationofpowerslogicastheEChas,ontheonehand, functionswhere it is independentof theEP(powerstoamendpartsofthetreatiesandpowersintheCfSp)and,ontheotherhand,powerswhereitishighlydependentontheEP’slegislativecapacity(generalleadershipofmajorpolicies).ThePresidentoftheECisobligedtoreporttotheEPaftereachECmeeting.

José Manuel Barroso, the President of the Commission and Herman van Rompuy, the President of the European Council. Photo: European People’s Party


TheparliamentarypartoftheEU’sregimefulfilsthenormalcriteriaofparliamentarismwith,however,a couple of significant exceptions. The principleof parliamentarismwas already confirmed in theinitialtreaties,whichentitledtheEPtodismisstheCommissioninavoteofcensure.Thevalidityoftheprinciplehasnotbeenseriouslyquestioned,butitsapplicabilityhasbeenseentobechallengedbythedemandaccordingtowhich itcanonlybeappliedto the entire Commission and not to individualmembers of it. In the recent treaty changes, anindirectpossibilityhasbeencreatedfortheEPto,ifnecessary,pushindividualcommissionerstoresign.ThisismadepossiblethroughaprovisionoriginallyincludedintheNiceTreaty(tEC,art.217),accordingtowhichthePresidentof theCommissioncanaskanindividualmemberoftheCommissiontoresign.The possibilities included in this provision werefinallymadevisibleintheinter-institutionalagree-mentbetween theBarroso iiCommissionand theEP(FrameworkagreementonrelationsbetweentheEuropeanParliamentandtheCommission.9.2.2010).ItwasconfirmedthatshouldtheEPdemandit,thePresidentoftheCommissionwillaskanindividualcommissionertoresign.

ConstantamendmentsinfavouroftheEP’sroleinthe process of appointing the Commission haveequally underlined the value of the principle ofparliamentarism.TheEP’sroleintheappointmentprocedure has been systematically strengthenedwith the Lisbon Treaty taking it still one crucialstepforward.InthistreatytheEPisgiventherighttoelecttheCommissionpresidentonthebasisofaproposalbytheEuropeanCouncil(tEU,art.9D.7).Thisproposalshallagaintakeintoaccounttheresults

ofEPelections.TheappointmentoftherestoftheCollegeshallbesubordinatedintoavoteofapprovalintheEuropeanParliament.

The EU’s government comprises many legal andinstitutional preconditions of parliamentary rule.Themajorconstraintwithanaturalpoliticalback-ground relates to the lack of a party government.The Commission owns the critical functions of apoliticalexecutiveandactsinlegalandinstitutionaltermsundertheformalaccountabilityoftheEP.Thepoliticalcontentofthisaccountability is,however,seriouslyhamperedbytheCommission’scharacterasanindependentbodywithoutthenormalcharac-teristicsofapartygovernment.6

In full-fledged terms of parliamentarism, parlia-mentaryruleat theEU levelwouldmeantheEP’scontrolof theCommission’spolitical agenda fromthepointofviewofthepoliticalprogrammebasedontheelectoralcampaignsoftherulingparties.Asthenormalpartypoliticalconnection is lacking inthe relationshipbetween theCommissionand theEP, this relationship canonlybeof a quasi-parlia-mentarynature.However,inthisrespecttoo,somemoveshavebeentakenawayfromtheCommission

6 Thecriticaltreatyprovisionshavemoreorlessremainedinthe

sameformsincetheMaastrichtTreaty.TheLisbonTreatydefined

theCommission’sindependenceinthefollowingway(tEU,art.

9D,3):“IncarryingoutitsresponsibilitiestheCommissionshall

be completely independent. Without prejudice to Article 9E

(2),themembersoftheCommissionshallneitherseeknortake

instructionsfromanyGovernmentorotherinstitution,bodyor

entity.”

The European Parliament approved the new European Commission by 488 votes to 137 in February 2010. Photo: European Parliament


asanindependentbodyinfurtheranceofitsroleasapartypoliticalexecutive.Thesechangeshave,aboveall,beendirectedattheroleoftheCommissionpresi-dent,whose chair becamehighlypartisan throughtheLisbonTreaty(tEU,art.9D,7),whichinpracticedemands that he or she should originate from thepartygroupthatwinstheelections.Thisrole,togetherwiththedutyofthepresidenttoaskacommissionertoresignatthebehestoftheEP,stresseshisorherroleasapoliticalguarantoroftheCommission.

Thispractice,amongothers,isdesignedtobalancethe lack of party government and derive the bestfromparliamentarismintheseconditions.TheEP’sapprovaloftheCommissionisprecededbyhearingsof the individual commissioners.This practice, aswellastheapprovalitself,ishighlycompatiblewiththe logicofparliamentaryaccountability.The lackofpoliticalprogrammes—eitherelectoralorforthecabinet—nevertheless leads to the parliamentaryapprovalbeingdirectedatthepersonalqualificationsand backgrounds of the candidate commissionersratherthanattheirpoliticalviews.ThisalsoremainsthemajorperspectiveoftheEP’scontroloftheCom-missionthroughouttheelectoralperiod.

What next?

Atagenerallevel,thecontoursofasemi-presidentialsystemseemtoprovideanalmostidealframeworkfor an analysis of the EU’s political system.Thissystemclearlyhaselementsofparliamentaryaswellaspresidentialrule,andtherelationsbetweentheEU institutionscorrespondsurprisinglywelltothepoliticallogicofsemi-presidentialism.

Inmoretraditionalsemi-presidentialsystems,thetwoheadsofexecutivescomingfromdifferentpoliti-calpartieshasbeenapttoincreasetensionsbetweenthe two executives. In the EU’s case, this risk islessenedduetothelackofpartygovernmentontheonehand,andthecollectivecharacteroftheUnionpresidencyontheother.ThePresidentoftheECis,

afterall,supposedtorepresenttheconsensualviewoftheEC.Tensionsoriginatinginanambiguousdivi-sionofpowersaremuchmorelikely,particularlyinissuesofoverlappingcompetencessuchasinitiatingpoliciesorrepresentingtheEUinexternalrelations.

TheEUcurrentlyrepresentsahybrid,evenofsemi-presidentialism,andifoneattemptedtoanticipatethedirectionofitsinstitutionaldevelopmentinthelongrun,onewouldhavetohazardaguessbetweentwomajoroptions.ThefirstoftheseisthattheUnionwill deepen its semi-presidential rule by movingintoa realpartygovernment.Thepartieswinningthe European electionswould form the ‘Commis-sion’,whichwouldbecomeapoliticalbody,whilearealoppositionwouldemergeintheEP.ThisoptionmightormightnotcoincidewiththesimultaneousdevelopmentoftheEuropeanCouncil inthedirec-tion of a normal presidency through the furtheraccentuationoftheroleofthepermanentpresident.

Development towards a true presidential regimewould represent the second option,with the sub-ordinationoftheCommissiontoonesingleheadofexecutive, thepresident.ThismodelwouldmergethecurrentpresidenciesoftheCommissionandtheEuropean Council into one single EU presidency.Theparliamentaryprinciplewoulddissipate as farasrelationsbetweentheEuropeanParliamentandtheCommissionareconcerned,andbothwouldplaytheirownroleintheEU’sseparationofpowers.

Teija Tiilikainen

Director

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

ISBN 978-951-769-278-6

ISSN 1795-8059

Cover photo: Council of the European Union

Layout: Tuomas Kortteinen

Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs 2010

www.upi-fiia.fi

Documents

WILL THE EU GET A REAL PRESIDENT? - FIIA · Semi-presidentialism between parliamentarism and presidential rule Political systems are usually divided into parlia-mentary systems, parliament-centred