A Legacy of Dominance: Legitimacy & Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party

by

Broguen Whetstone

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Bachelor of Arts degree (Japanese Studies) Earlham College

Wednesday, March 21, 2012

Committee Members Jennifer Seeley (Assistant Professor of Politics) Chuck Yates (Professor of History)

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INTRODUCTION

To say that electoral success is the aim of any political party is an understatement. A

party that cannot gather votes and gain representation in government has no power and no

purpose. The ultimate goal of all parties is to dominate in politics and hold the seat of

government. For this reason many classic definitions of democracy focus on the importance of

alternation and power being passed among parties. This alternation or exchange of power can be

described as the transfer of political legitimacy from the electorate to parties—a slow trend that

can be measured across many elections and defines the power relationship between parties in any

given democratic-party system1. Legitimacy is passed from the electorate to a party, and a party

with high levels of legitimacy is able to gain the seat of government. Alternation in government

is so crucial to democracy that single-dominate party systems2 are exceedingly rare and of great

interest. Only Italy, as another modern industrialized democratic country with an equally long

standing single dominate party, is often spoken of on the same level as Japan. Both the Christian

Democratic Party (DC) of Italy and Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) enjoyed about 50

years of nearly uninterrupted power, but the legitimacy and stability of Italy’s political system

and government has been called into question more often and more seriously than Japan. This

has caused scholars, politicians, and this paper to ask a very simple yet crucial question—how?

How was the LDP able to retain and reclaim power, despite consistently low approval ratings,

1Initsmostbasicformapartysystemisallaspectsofinter‐partycompetitioninastateatagiventime.Inarrowthistomeantheexchange,orlackthereof,betweensetnumbersofdominantpartiesdecidedbytheelectorate.

2Apartysysteminwhichasinglepartyregularlywinsmoreseatsingovernmentthananyotherindividualparty,totheextentthatagovernmentcannotbeformedwithoutthatpartiesinclusion.Alsocalledaone‐dominantpartysystem.

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and a series of electoral and campaign reforms, designed with the express purpose of separating

LDP politicians from their bases of power?

I posit that despite these obstacles the LDP was able to retain a great deal of legitimacy

from the electorate, in part because of the existence of factions3. A party that is able to gather

and retain high levels of rational, charismatic, and traditional legitimacy will stay in power.

These three forms—rational, charismatic, and traditional legitimacy—are modified from Max

Weber’s (1962, 1968) “sources of legitimate authority.” For this paper rational legitimacy

represents a combination of voters’ assessment of how capable a party is of running a

government, and the self-interest of said voters. In other words a party that is deemed able to run

the government and enact policies that voters think will result in significant benefits for

themselves, will receive high levels of rational legitimacy. Rational legitimacy is particularly

dissimilar to charismatic legitimacy, which is based of the popular cultural, religious, or moral

appeal of a party’s ideology. Charismatic legitimacy generally stems from a single party leader

with notable oratory and social skills and is therefore highly unstable. On the other hand,

traditional legitimacy is a measure of a party’s ability to recognize and utilize social norms and

structures. By replicating social norms parties are able to appear more familiar and easy to

identify with or accept, and within the LDP factions are important agents for the transfer of

traditional legitimacy. They, factions, are highly organized groups of politicians with strict

hierarchies under individual senior politicians who wield an immense amount of power who act

as micro parties. Matters that are usually handled by individual politicians, such as training

junior politicians, raising campaign funds, creating legislation, and deciding the next prime

3Politicalfactionsaresmallergroupswithinapartyrepresentingtheinterestofspecificgroups,individualpoliticians,ect.

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minister are under the strict control of the faction leadership. It is this strict hierarchy that is the

key to LDP success.

When judging and ranking parties, voters look for recognizable and familiar

characteristics that they can easily identify with. Factions provide clear hierarchies that not only

allow voters to distinguish the lines of power within the LDP, adding to the perception of the

party as stable, but by mirroring social conventions related to seniority and hierarchy found

throughout Japanese society, factions lent a sense of familiarity for the voters. While it is true

that the magnitude of scholarship on Japanese culture and society has used hierarchy and

seniority to the point of stereotyping and mimicking nationalist propaganda, it is precisely the

longevity and popular appeal of these touchstones that interests me. In addition, the generations

that would have experienced stricter adherence to deference to seniority and strict hierarchies

formed the majority of the voting population. This is inferred from Japan’s ageing society, with

the majority of the population since the late 70’s being over 60 years old, and trends of higher

political participation among the elderly. Krauss and Pekkanen (2011) describe the ‘life-cycle’ of

political participation as “…rising from a low in people’s twenties, through their thirties and

forties, and peaking in their fifties before falling in their sixties to about the same level as their

forties.”(33). This would create a large relatively stable voting base of older more conservative

voters who, in theory, would be more open to the transmission of traditional legitimacy.

To study general trends in legitimacy I will use, primarily, the absolute number of votes a

party received to avoid some of the institutional distortion that comes from simply using the

number of seats awarded. This type of measure, however, has no numerical way to discern the

type of legitimacy held by the party. But the assumption is that a dominant party will have a

mixture of all three types of legitimacy, and further analysis of public opinion will reveal

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individual levels. That is not to say that legitimacy can be exactly quantified, but rather generally

categorized as low, medium, or high. This approach places the electoral success squarely on the

shoulders of voters, and asserts that malapportionment4 alone cannot change the fact that no

party can hold the seat of government without voters voting for them. While simple, it is my firm

belief that voters are what decide the success or failure of parties as well as governments.

Legitimacy—rational, charismatic, and traditional—is not only a useful measure of a

party’s past political success but, due to its basis in distinctive cultural traits of a given society,

one could in theory use legitimacy to predict the success or failure of new parties. Tracing the

flow of legitimacy in past party systems, then comparing the parties and the societies in which

said parties are based has strong implications fro single-dominant party systems, insofar as they

are a supposed anomaly in the democratic world. The LDP in particular was not simply the

dominant party for over half a century, but a dominant party that remained relatively unchanged

in a time of rapid social and political transformation. Founded in a period of turbulence after the

end of the largest and most destructive war to date, when Japan was still reeling from the social,

cultural, and economic shock of its defeat, the LDP lasted through natural disasters, political

scandals on a global scale, financial explosion, and economic collapse. In fact it is their

miraculous recovery after the chaos of 1990—which ultimately led to their loss of power in

1994—that makes the LDP so important to the study of legitimacy in democracies dominated by

a single party.

4Asituationwhereapartyisawardedapercentageofseatsingovernmentthatisunequaltothepercentageofvotesitreceived.

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THE LOST DECADE

At the close of 1989 the Japanese government, having realized that the high rate of low

interest borrowing that had fueled the 80’s economy could no longer be sustained, raised interest

rates forcefully terminating the bubble and crashing the stock market. The brunt of this debt

crises was felt mainly by the banking sector, leading to mass bailouts and consolidation, and

large manufacturing companies like Sony and Toyota, who were forced to reevaluate the

traditional Japanese wage system with life-long employees. This led to a virtual halt of Japan’s

economic growth that in turn caused major upheaval in the political sector. This upheaval was

exacerbated by the constant exposure of scandals involving the campaign funds of the largest

LDP factions, which culminated in the shocking events in the 1994 national elections. For these

reasons the approximate decade from before 1991 through 2000 has been popularly dubbed the

“Lost Decade”. This term was originally used in a purely economic sense but as we will see the

chaos that overtook Japanese politics in this time has led to a much broader usage of the term.

In April 1994 Ozawa Ichirō, former Chief Secretary of the LDP, and his supporters

formed a group called Kaishin(Renovation), which sought to join together the various opposition

parties without the Social Democratic Party of Japan(SDPJ), the LDP’s only real rival since

1955(Hrebenar 2000, 153). This new party boasted an impressive number of former prime

ministers and popular politicians. But in many ways is was precisely this level of diversity and

potential leaders that would lead to the resulting coalitions downfall. Though Ozawa succeeded

in gathering eight parties into a coalition that toppled the LDP, from both houses and the

executive branch, in the 1994 national election, the resulting government was highly fragmented

and unstable. Less than a year after the first non-LDP Prime Minister in thirty-eight years,

Hosokawa Motohiro, took office was forced to resign following a scandal similar to the one that

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had caused the rifts in the LDP and led to the coalition (Hendry 1998, 188). In fact, the coalition

only managed to pass one significant act of legislation during their eleven months in power.

As soon as the coalition was in power they rushed to pass a set of four reforms

specifically aimed at toppling the LDO. The first and second reforms dealt with factions

specifically, while the third and fourth sets were a response to the financial scandals that had

been so prevalent. By changing the electoral system, adding more seats elected by proportional

representation and redrawing the old districts and converting and giving them a single member to

elect, the reformers hoped to ensure that parties would unite behind a single candidate in each

district rather than each faction running its own nominee. The source and distribution of

campaign funds, being the primary source of the scandals, were the subject of the third set of

reforms, which tightened regulations on public and private funding, and the fourth set, which

strengthened and extended the penalties of misbehavior to include “The candidates, their family

members, their office staff, and their campaign managers …”(Park 2001, 437). However,

confusion with the new rules, the retention of many outdated campaign regulations (Christensen

1998), the appearance of dozens of small parties, and the separation of may politicians, both LDP

and non-LDP, from their constituents by re-districting, created an atmosphere of utter chaos in

the following election. While many parties floundered to navigate the new political scene and

retain legitimacy with the Japanese public, the LDP not only regained power but, in a few years

produce some of the highest turnout rates in years and the most popular prime minister in

modern Japanese history—Koizumi Junichiro. This recovery is made all the more puzzling in

light of their 2010 landslide loss to the Democratic Party of Japan(DPJ). The sudden appearance

of this incredibly young party raises questions about the LDP and the future of Japanese politics.

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Many scholars wonder if we are seeing the rise of a new single-dominant party. The answer

would seem to lie in a detailed analysis of the LDP and the changes of the Lost Decade.

EXPLAINING THE LOST DECADE

When trying to make sense of the chaos that was Japan’s political sphere in the 1990’s

and the LDP’s stunning acrobatics in and out of power, it is important to first note the wealth of

scholarship devoted to that very subject. This section is intended as literature review aimed at

creating a scholarly context for my argument as a whole, and more importantly to give the reader

a better grasp of the diverging opinions on the puzzle of LDP dominance that is the larger

concern of this paper. Within the discipline of political science three categories have appeared

into which most authors writing on the subject of the LDP can be grouped—macro-political,

micro=political, and voters. These tree categories, based on groupings identified by Tani

Satomi(2002), tend to take related but apposing stances on the subject of political change in

Japan, often using similar data and investigating the same events and people. Fro example,

Christensen (1998) skeptically describes the electoral reforms as simply putting new wine in an

old bottle. By only changing one factor, the electoral system—new wine—, and not the strict and

archaic restrictions on campaign activities—old bottle—the nature of Japanese politics has

remained intact (Christensen 1998, 989). Kaihara (2007), however, believes that after 1994 the

power relationship between factions and the prime minister was changed forever leading to a

new era Japanese politics, despite the LDP returning to power. In addition to their position on

change these two authors also exemplify the variance between macro-political authors—

Christensen(1998)—and a micro-political approach—Kaihara(2007).

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Macro-political approach

Macro-political works focus on “broad contextual factors that affected the whole

political system of the nation,” i.e. socio-economic, international politics, or ideological trends

(Tani 2002, 97). In Christensen’s (1998) case the focus is the political landscape created by the

retention of certain laws, which made it politically unfeasible to campaign, based on issues(990).

While his approach is generally focused on one aspect of the environment through which

politicians must navigate, Kabashima and Steel (2010) take the opposite approach and discuss

the political environment that voters experienced. They use a variety of data sources to show a

trend of increased accountability and responsiveness beginning in the 1990’s due to the medias

role in influencing voters. Shifts life the importance of media-savvy politicians were accelerated

and exacerbated by socio-economic changes such as urbanization (Kabashima and Steel 2010).

The distinguishing mark of macro-political works is usually in the flow of causality—events are

the result of changes to the landscape in which we function.

Micro-political approach

In contrast, authors of the micro-political authors use microscopic factors such as the

actions and attitudes of political actors, specific institutional reforms, or the outcome of

individual elections to “…analyze events exclusively from a specific point of view.” (Tani 2002,

97). While many of the events and institutions analyzed are the same or similar to those used by

the macro-political authors, micro-political works present a more ‘chain-reaction’ type of

understanding. Curtis(1999) attributes the LDP’s loss of power in 1993 and subsequent return to

power in 1994 to the behavior of, and decisions made by, individual politicians and diet

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members. His theory is simple “Politicians have an autonomy of choice. … Decisions made by

individuals…are the direct cause of what happens in politics”(3-4). This category has no

common form of data or common style. Curtis(1999) uses a narrative style with qualitative data

such as individual interviews and descriptive analysis of events. Reed(2000) uses election results

and official statements to describe the effect of Komei’s(Clean Government Party; CGP) stance

and its supporters’ behavior on the 1999 gubernatorial, by, and party leadership elections. Both

authors focus on the chain-reaction where one act leads to another, which leads to another,

eventually culminating LDP dominance or failure, neither uses the same method.

Voters approach

Both macro and micro political approaches tend to focus on formal aspects of the

political sphere largely ignoring the significance of culture and political history to current events.

The voters approach focus on a single factor, but one that we view as cutting across all aspects

on politics. Works belonging to this category can be anything from describing the impact of

social factors on political landscape, to how voters react in a particular election. This approach

uses causal explanations focusing on voter behavior and political attitudes, which are shaped and

informed by cultural and social context in which parties, and voters interact. Surprisingly few

works in this category focus on the actual fall of the LDP in 1993, choosing instead to cover the

LDP’s recovery and Prime Minister Koizumi’s term in office. Kabashima and Imai (2002) use a

survey conducted in 2000 to study the effects of party leader evaluations from 1993-2000 on

voting behavior in the 2000 general election. They compared these results with two similar

surveys from 1979 to 1986 to show the increased importance of popular party leaders after 1993.

Chung (1998) has taken this fairly conventional approach and turned it on its head. Rather than

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studying how voters view parties, he discusses the effect of how parties evaluate voters on voting

behavior. He attributes the “lost decade” in politics to the misrepresentation of mutohai of ‘no-

party’ voters in Japan. Arguing that voters did not identify strongly with a particular party

because there was no party capable of earning their trust, not due to lack of interest in politics.

Essentially he posits that voters became disillusioned with the ruling coalition in 1994 and a

comparison between pre 1993 electoral behavior and electoral behavior since the collapse of the

‘55 system5 offers insight into the future of Japanese politics (Chung 1998, 225).

In this three-way conversation between macro-political, micro-political, and voter

oriented authors there is still an approach which has been largely underrepresented in modern

scholarship—voters as the direct cause of electoral success or failure. When voter behavior is

discussed it is generally as a reactionary light, or their perception of past events and

circumstances. While this is an important aspect it overshadows how voters and culture affect the

political sphere. I argue that voters are themselves the source of a party’s success or failure.

Through obvious means such as casting a vote, to the transfer of legitimacy which entails

acknowledging parties right to wield power and represent the electorate. If the basis of

democracy is political participation, and we accept that a party requires the validation of their

right to rule through the gathering of votes, it becomes apparent that voters are the source of

political legitimacy. The electorate will not follow a party they deem illegitimate or incapable.

Legitimacy rests with the electorate ad it passed to a party through voting. In the case of Japan,

the LDP was able to regain power in 1994 due to their ability to retain high levels of legitimacy.

5BecausetheLDPwasfirstfoundedandcametopowerin1955,theerafromthenuntil1993isoftencalledthe‘55systemorregimeandusedtodescribeatimeofincrediblestrongpoliticalpartybosseswhovirtuallyrantheLDPandthecountry.Issometimessatiricallyreferredtoashavinga1½partysystemindicatingtheLDP’scompletedominanceofnationalpolitics.

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BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LEGITIMACY

In this paper ‘Legitimacy’ will be defined as a qualitative connection between political

actors and voters—insofar as political actors are able to attract votes by appearing proper and

capable in the eyes of the public. Here,theterm"politicalactors"isusedtomeannotonly

partiesandpoliticiansbutalsoallnon‐voterpoliticallyactivegroupsandfigures(i.e.

koenkai6,lobbyists,andinterestgroups). This definition draws on Max Weber’(1968)

discussion of a ‘legitimate authority’. Though Weber, as a sociologist, discusses the orientation

of social relationships or conduct in regards to a legitimate authority, political parties and voters

can be understood as acting within a quasi-social sphere. Therefore, based on Weber’s

classifications, three forms of legitimacy—rational, charismatic, and traditional—have been

identified as playing a crucial role throughout the history of LDP; specifically traditional

legitimacy was central to the their return to power in 1994. Of significance at this stage are the

general qualities shared by all three forms of legitimacy, or the basic assumptions this paper will

be founded on.

For Weber(1962) the occurrence or creation of a legitimate authority depends on its

ability to take on the quality of ‘validity’:

… “validity” must therefore mean more than the mere regularity of the social conduct as determined by custom or self-interest. …only then will the content of a social relationship

6Knownas“localsupportgroups”inEnglishthesekoenkailocality‐basedgroupsthatbelongtoasinglepoliticianandworktogetthemelectedtothediet.Itshouldbenotedthatkoenkaiareneitherlocalparty‐branchesnorcampaignoffices,butratherserveamuchmoresocialpurpose.Infact,inordertoavoidcertainlegalitiestheyareusuallynotactiveduringofficialcampaignperiods,buthostvarioussocialandculturaleventsyearround,servingasameansofcommunicationbetweenpoliticiansandtheirconstituency.

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represent “authority,” if its conduct can be oriented approximately towards certain recognizable axioms [,and] the orientation towards these axioms includes at least the recognition that they are binding on the individual or the corresponding behavior constitutes a model worthy of imitation(71-2)

Weber’s ‘validity’ is something more than accepting a leader because whenever you interact

with them it happens to be in a senior/junior type of situation, or because a necessary part of your

survival relies on their leadership. That is not to say these are not also important foundations for

leadership, but the afore mentioned relationships must be recognized as satisfying many needs

before they can be widely accepted as valid. If we apply this to politics, the first assumption on

the transfer of legitimacy is the acknowledgement that a state and its institutions carry validity.

In other words a democracy must be functional in a way that inspires confidence and satisfies

more than the immediate self-interest of its citizens or simply go unchallenged because it has

always existed; and all citizens through the act of political participation must recognize these

functions. This is applied to parties and the transfer of legitimacy directly through the very

notion of campaigning. To become dominant a party must constantly search for common ground

and encourage assurance with its constituency. Also this common issue or quality that parties use

must be easily recognizable and perceived as meaningful. In comparing the legitimacy of

excluded parties in Israel and Italy, Levite and Tarrow (1983) state that the amount of influence a

political actor has the creation, or transfer of, legitimacy is dependant on “…their social bases

and political power, on the monopoly they exercise over cultural understandings, and how

national and international events and alignments impinge on domestic politics…” (297). This

emphasizes the assumption that legitimacy is outside of the direct control of the parties on whom

it is bestowed; but, factors within their control can be used to attract legitimacy, primarily social

and cultural norms or institutions.

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Since parties must actively gather legitimacy, and is in constant competition with other

parties for voter support then it can also be inferred that legitimacy has a finite quality and must

be transferred between parties by the electorate. In Japan this finite quality can be seen in the

vote distribution of the current political system, and legitimacy through the second postwar party

system has resembled a ‘zero-sum game’7. In the field of national politics it can be said that a

political party can only gain legitimacy at the expense of another party. This is further supported

by the arrangement of the current electoral system. Per eligible voter one vote is for a specific

candidate in a single-member district and one vote is for a party to be awarded seats based on

proportional representation.

7Azero‐sumgamesuchapokerisarrangedsothatoneperson’sgainisdirectlyproportionaltothelossesoftheotherplayers.

Figure1Political Party Support Rates Source: Kono, Takahashi, Hara 2010, 34

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In figure 1 the correspondence between a rise in LDP support and a fall in support for non-LDP

or non-partisan groups—particularly 1983—and the most obviously the switch that occurs in

1993, into 2008, where the rise in support to non-partisan and non-LDP groups is nearly directly

equal to the loss in LDP support. This is not to suggest that legitimacy is a precise quantitative

measure that can by itself predict a parties precise electoral success or failure, it is merely a

comprehensive descriptor of the relationship between parties and the electorate. In this respect,

the degree to which political parties carry legitimacy can range from almost non to strongly

institutionalized, as legitimacy is an artificially constructed and transient property of political

objects (Levite and Tarrow 1983, 297).

Next, in the transfer of legitimacy it is necessary that both parties and voters be aware of

their relationship, if not the specific characteristics that define it. Therefore, it is also assumed

that the general populace is sufficiently aware of and has access to information on a party’s

general ideology, stability, and internal structure/power relations. It should be noted that a

voter’s ability to decide a party’s level of legitimacy does not rely on an accurate understanding

of a party’s structure, ideology, or platform. The methods of informing voter opinions include

informal social medium—i.e. word of mouth, perception of general opinions—as well as formal

mass media and party literature. In fact, a majority of scholars have identified the lack of party

identification that stems from generally low levels of political knowledge and mistrust of politics

prevalent in Japanese society (Chung 1998; Flanagan et al. 1991; Kyōgoku 1987; Hrebenar

2000). Hrebenar(2000) discusses a series of surveys that measured the levels of political efficacy

and political knowledge of Japanese voters, that, when analyzed together “…the NHK

researchers discovered that almost half (i.e. 47 percent) of the Japanese population sampled

exhibited both low political knowledge and a low sense of political efficacy” and only 10% of

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the sample had high political knowledge and high efficacy (21). Based purely on these findings

one could infer that pure perception, rather than genuine understanding, of a party’s structure,

ideology, or track record is more important to the transfer of legitimacy.

Lastly, legitimacy has a strong connection with time, insofar as it takes time to secure

legitimacy, and it takes time for that legitimacy to be transferred to another party. The issue here

is the amount of time necessary for a given party to gain enough legitimacy to make a national

standing and be considered as a viable contender for political power. In the case of the LDP it

appeared as if a violent transfer of legitimacy occurred in 1993 when the LDP split internally;

and then again in 1996 when the LDP regained control of the executive and its dominance was

solidified with the collapse of Sakigake—the primary party unifying the opposition in 1993—in

1998. But, in reality it took thirteen years before any single party secured enough legitimacy to

be recognized as dominant and capable of contesting the LDP. Furthermore, because the bulk of

the coalition partners and their for coalition government were defectors from the LDP, its

legitimacy was not lost. Rather the party experienced a shift in popularity not legitimacy. Since

there are three types of legitimacy, only one of which is directly related to popularity, having a

high level of legitimacy does not necessarily mean having a high level of popularity. Gaunder

(2011) presents a strong argument that throughout its history the LDP was actually very

unpopular, but through its ability to manipulate its situation and the strong fragmentation of the

opposition, consistently won a majority or plurality of Diet seats and retain the seat of

government (14-23). Hrebenar (2000) also attributes oppositional failure until 1993 to the

perception that no party besides the LDP had enough capable of running the government (10-17).

This is an example of how rational legitimacy served to support the LDP before 1993.

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The following sections will outline the influence of each type of legitimacy through a

different era in Japanese politics. Beginning with the role of rational legitimacy during the ‘55

regime—see footnote 5—, then skipping forward to 2000 for a brief discussion on charismatic

legitimacy during Prime Minister Koizumi’s term in office, finally ending with the focus of this

paper traditional legitimacy and the LDP after 1993. With the exception of charismatic

legitimacy, I am using Hrebenar’s (2000) post-war party systems8 to define set time frames in

which each type of legitimacy was significant. That is not to say that other forms of legitimacy

were not at work throughout the full history of the LDP; but I have identified the primary form of

legitimacy at carried by the LDP in each era.

Therefore this paper divides the modern Japanese politics into to distinct party systems.

Japan’s First Post-war Party System (FPWPS) begins with in 1955 with the merger of the two

major conservative parties of the time, the Liberals and Democrats, to form the LDP. This is also

when the left and right wing factions of the Socialist party joined to create the Japan Socialist

Party (JSP). The resulting two-party system is generally seen as Japan’s first steps away from the

post war chaos and towards a mature democracy (Hrebenar 2000, 96). During this time the left-

wing JSP enjoyed a brief period of dominance over the LDP, which ended by 1958 in the House

of Representatives election resulting in the FPWPS as we know it. The dividing line between

Japan’s post party systems is the LDP’s fall from the majority party position in both houses and

loss of the prime minister’s office in 1993, and is characterized by the massive electoral reform

of 1994. This event marks the beginning of the Second Post-war Party System (SPWPS) that

8Hrebenar(2000)definesaparty‐systemas“…aparticularpatternofpartyorganizations,voteridentitieswiththevariousparties,andasetofelectoralsystemoutcomesandcharacteristicsthatmakeaneraunique.”andhasbrokenthepost‐WorldWarIIpoliticalsphereofJapanintotwodistinctperiods—theFirstandSecondPost‐warPartySystems(4).

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continues today. Though differentiated mostly by changes to the electoral systems in 1994, both

party systems show a great deal of continuity especially where the LDP and voting culture are

concerned.

RATIONAL LEGITIMACY: 1955-1993

The FPWPS is generally called the ‘55 regime, for the mentioned historical reasons, and

has three distinct characteristics that differentiate it from the SPWPS. First an electoral system

based on multimember districts9 and a single non-transferable vote10, weak prime ministers that

were subservient to their de facto relationship with faction leaders, and a one and one-half party

system.

This era is generally known, half jokingly, as having a one and one-half party system

because of the disparity in electoral success between the LDP and the other opposition parties. In

actuality there were around five permanent opposition parties at any given time. But the

sentiment is that no party was ever able to share power equally with the LDP. Despite only

winning a plurality11 in many elections, and several unsuccessful tries to unite the opposition

parties primarily by the United Social Democrats (Hendry 1998, 196), the LDP was never forced

to form a coalition government that gave any real power to an opposition party. This clear

9Describesasituationinwhicheachelectoraldistrictelectsmorethanonerepresentative;isoftenusedtoexplaintheemergenceoffactionsintheLDP.

10Voterscastasinglevoteforonecandidate,notaparty,intheirowndistrictandthetoptwocandidateswiththemostvotes,notnecessarilythemajorityofvotes,areelectedresultinginawinnertakeallscenario.

11Occursinmulti‐partysystemswhereonewinsanelectionwithoutatruemajority.i.e.A=37%B=42%C=21%ofthevote,butonlyBiselected.

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dominance, as well as the proliferation of factions in the FPWPS is usually attributed to

malapportionment12 caused by Japan’s electoral system. Until 1993 the lower house of Japan had

approximately 511 seats, which were elected from 129 multi-member districts with 2-6

candidates running in each district. Most scholars agree that this, in conjunction with the single

non-transferable vote, created an institutional incentive for parties to run as many candidates as

possible in a single district resulting in inter-party factionalism. This had two important

repercussions: first was an urban rural disparity where one rural vote had five times the value of

a single urban vote (Kaihara 2007, 763). The second was strong and highly independent faction

leaders that virtually controlled institutionally weak prime ministers. The single non-transferable

vote in particular also had a strong impact on voter behavior. Since you may only cast one vote

for one candidate and candidates do not need a majority to be elected voters are encouraged to

vote for candidates who have the greatest chance of winning. In other words a voter may dislike

the LDP and wish to vote for an opposition party but, since that party’s candidate stands a slim

chance of winning against the six LDP candidates, a voter may choose the lesser of two evils and

vote for a LDP candidate who belongs to a faction that more closely follows the voters ideology

or policy opinions. Also, a vote for a particular LDP factional candidate meant that should that

faction gain a majority of diet seats over the other factions, that faction’s leader will become the

prime minster. Interestingly due to the prevalence of scandal in the FPWPS, these faction leaders

were seen as corrupt and “Money was the fuel that kept the faction’s engine going.”(Park 2001,

435) but, despite such a negative image, and the levels of malapportionment, the fact remains

12Whenapartyisawardedmoreseatsingovernmentthanthepercentageofvotesreceivedi.e.winning37%ofthevoteandreceiving42%oftheseats.

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that the LDP consistently received more absolute votes that any other single party. This

phenomenon can be directly attributed to the strength of rational legitimacy in the LDP.

The definition for rational legitimacy borrows slightly from Weber’s concept of

legitimacy derived from ‘convention’ but, deviates towards a ‘rational choice’ type of model in

order to make the description more politically focused. ‘Convention’, as Weber describes it, can

be guaranteed on either a subjective basis—i.e. emotional surrender, belief in binding values, or

religious attitudes—or due to self-interest—i.e. expectation of a particular consequence or

outcome (Weber 1962, 75). The second guarantor, self-interest, relates much more closely to

rational legitimacy as it is used in this paper. However in defining rational legitimacy Weber’s

(1968) rational grounds for legitimacy, which is based purely on the legality of an authority (46).

The transfer of rational legitimacy from voters to parties rests on the voters’ self-interest in how

a party’s abilities are assessed, which borrows from rational choice theorists as apposed to

Weber who meant self-interest in the context of social groups. In a social group deviation from

the norm can result in disapproval and even exclusion, but in politics self-interest is related to

policy benefits or, more generally, political stability.

Because it relies more than either charismatic or traditional legitimacy on time in

government, rational legitimacy is relatively predictable. In simplest terms rational legitimacy

rational legitimacy is an evaluation of a party’s ability to govern and produce positive results in

civil society. It is a description of how dependable an electorate perceives a given party to be. In

most developed democracies alternation in power is the mechanism for creating equilibrium in

rational legitimacy among dominant parties. But Japan had not experienced such a change in

decades and the LDP has used this long tenure in government to establish itself “…as the party

responsible fro the great prosperity Japan has experienced…” (Hrebenar 2000, 13). In 1982

21

Yomiuri Shimbun conducted a poll to determine why voters supported the current cabinet despite

low approval ratings:

The most common response was “because it was an LDP cabinet” (44 percent). Other responses pertained to the cabinet’s “sense of stability” (16 percent), to trust in the prime minister (9 percent), and to appreciation for the cabinet’s actions, both domestic and foreign (15 percent). (Hrebenar 2000, 13)

In addition a 1990 Tokyo Shimbun poll revealed that 33% of respondents agreed that opposition

parties continued to lose elections because the electorate feared political instability; and when

asked why the LDP had retained power for so long by a Yomiuri Shimbun poll 48.8% responded

that there were no alternative parties (Hrebenar 2000, 13). This response was not meant literally,

at the time the poll was taken there were at least four national opposition parties; but rather it

reflects the lack of rational legitimacy given to those parties. The respondents felt that no party

was capable enough to take over running the government. According to Flanagan et al. (1991)

many Japanese voters viewed the LDP as a corrupt and arrogant party but “…a superior

alternative to a fumbling and fractious opposition” (439). This is highlighted by figure 2 that

shows the LDP consistently wining twice as many votes as any single opposition party. In this

chart LDP is shown as having won more than twice the number of votes than any other

opposition party, including the Social Democratic party their main opposition until 1993, and yet

rarely wining even 50% of the total number of votes. Support for the LDP despite wide spread

dislike is evidenced by the lack of rational legitimacy given to opposition parties; it is the relative

stability of this perception, according to Flanagan et al. (1991) that sustained the post war status

quo (439). In other words the LDP was able to retain a great deal of rational legitimacy due to

their long period in power, which gave precedence to the idea that they were the only capable

party.

22

In their article on subnational party switching, Caitlin Milzzo and Ethan Scheiner (2010)

attribute oppositional failure in the 1990’s to the pork-barrel nature of Japanese politics. They

posit that a leader’s perceived political power, or ability to deliver ‘pork’, influenced the strength

of the relationship between subnational and national politicians-the deciding factor for whether

or not both politicians defected from the LDP (Milzzo and Scheiner 2010). For subnational

politicians maintaining access to the central government is the driving force behind establishing

a connection to national politicians (Milzzo and Scheiner 2010, 149); and a common feature of

dominant parties is their ability to monopolize public resources (Giliomee 1999), it stands to

reason that politicians and voters alike would consider a party’s ability to retain access to those

resources and deliver adequate economic returns before giving said party any measure of rational

legitimacy. In dominant party systems where state-party blurring often occurs, the amount of

rational legitimacy any opposition party can garner is severely limited by the perception that the

0

10,000,000

20,000,000

30,000,000

40,000,000

50,000,000

60,000,000

70,000,000

1958

1960

1963

1967

1969

1972

1976

1979

1980

1983

1986

1990

1993

LiberalDemocraticParty

SocialDemocraticPartyofJapan

3rdLargestParty

TotalVotesPolled

Figure2NumberofvotespoledperpoliticalpartySource:MIC:StatisticBureau2008b

23

dominant party ultimately has the final say on where and how government resources are

allocated. In addition, a dominant party will have had an adequate amount of time in government

to establish fail-safes and institutional supports enabling it to better ride out periods of unrest and

low support, as well as capitalize on positive occurrences that draw in rational legitimacy. For

the LDP these fail-safes often take the form of institutions such as koenkai( non-party support

groups for individual politicians) and factions, which have long been seen as the source of LDP

longevity and tenacity.

Institutions, both formal and informal, are powerful mechanisms fro securing legitimacy.

Because they can be seen as playing both social and political roles, koenkai and factions bridge

the gap between parties and their constituents allowing a voter to more effectively interact with

their government. Scholars generally agree that, especially in the FWPS, vote mobilization

through well-established koenkai, keiretsu (industrial conglomerates, often associated with

certain national politicians), and standing connections to specific interest groups and sectors of

society, has been a powerful source of dominance that maintained the LDP through lean years

(Gaunder 2011, 17-18; Milzzo and Scheiner 2010, 151; Köllner 2006, 252; Krauss and Pekkanen

2010; Christensen 1998). These methods are known as ‘personal vote mobilization’ because they

are based on personal ties. But these ties follow a patron-client model based on self-interest—i.e.

the ‘patrons’ receive votes and support from the ‘clients’ who gain access to the central

government and it’s resources—and the transfer of rational legitimacy.

The transfer of rational legitimacy is based on the self-interests of the voters who assess

a party’s ability to run the government and return with ‘pork’ in the form of policy initiatives. In

order for a voter to asses a party and that party to prove its abilities it must have time in

government and ideally in a majority position, the mechanism for such transfer can be found in

24

the formal and informal institutions—koenkai, keiretsu, and factions— that provide clear and

culturally acceptable channels and in through parties alternating time in power. But in the case of

the FPWPS the LDP remained the only dominant party from 1955 until 1993 creating the

perception that they were the responsible for Japan’s economic growth and the only party

capable of running the government. The perception of stability and the availability party

institutions will become a recurring theme through out both post war party systems; often times

this perception will make up for the lack of charismatic legitimacy from the LDP’s image as a

corrupt and unpopular party. However, for a brief period the LDP does experience an increase in

charismatic legitimacy that will become crucial for current politics in Japan.

CHARISMATIC LEGITIMACY & KOIZUMI: 2000-2005

In general political leadership throughout Japan’s modern history “…depend[ed] less on

oratorical skills and charismatic personality than on strong links of personal allegiance and

reputation for loyalty and sincerity” (Hendry 1998, 199). In a time when the average term for a

prime minister was two and a half years, Koizumi held the position for over twice that length of

time. In the post-electoral reform years he is the most well known example of charismatic

legitimacy at work in Japanese politics. His strong and likeable media presence and style of

popular appeal directly to the public is what differentiates him from most other LDP leaders

throughout the first and second post-war party systems. Both before and after Koizumi leaders

gathered support based on their ability to rise through LDP ranks in a very pre-described fashion,

satisfying the needs of traditional legitimacy, as we will see later, and from their ability to

provide ‘pork’ to other politicians and constituents, an example of rational legitimacy. Koizumi’s

25

nearly six years in the national spotlight are an abnormality in the LDP but in recent years

charismatic legitimacy has come to play a more vital role in Japanese politics.

Weber (1968) describes charismatic legitimacy as a direct antithesis to rational and

traditional legitimacy because it outside of the every-day rules and routines, and its only basis is

personal charisma and strength and must be constantly provided to the following (22, 51-2).

Charismatic legitimacy is, therefore, a form of popularity based entirely on a party’s ability to

attract voters through the popular appeal of its ideology, the charisma of its leader(s), and/or the

devotion of its followers. Because it is usually tied to a single person or small group, charismatic

legitimacy is the least stable and most difficult of the three forms of legitimacy to share among a

whole party. Often issues of authenticity and succession cause the rapid loss of legitimacy from

the party. Taro Aso is the only LDP prime minister, to date, to openly try to mimic Koizumi’s

style of politics, and it was on his watch when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was first able

to defeat the LDP in both houses.

According to Köllner (2006) by loosening traditional clientelistic ties, between politicians

and specific industries or economic sectors, Koizumi was able to bring in large amounts of new

voters and restore the LDP’s electoral dominance (251). What has made this prime minister the

center of so much scholarly and public attention was this non-traditional approach to politics.

Unlike previous prime ministers Koizumi appealed to the voters directly; and through snappy

slogans and dramatizing politics he “…was able to capture the imagination of the Japanese

public…” (Köllner 2006, 251). This new power was something Koizumi himself was not afraid

to exercise often. Kaihara (2007) describes what he calls the most exciting postwar political

drama:

The privatization of the postal system was an issue on which Koizumi was ready to stake his political career. On August 8, 2005, … [t]he bills were defeated and Koizumi immediately decided to dissolve the Diet, as he had warned. In an ensuing September general election,

26

Koizumi did not nominate those who opposed the bill as the party’s electoral candidates. And he sent “shikyaku” (sniper) candidates to SMD[single-member districts]s where his opponents opted to run as independents. (754)

By asking the public to validate his proposed legislation through a general election, Koizumi

aggressively exercised his position as the source of charismatic legitimacy in the LDP. At its

peak Koizumi’s cabinet enjoyed approval ratings as high as 85% (McMillan 2001, P1).

Besides simple approval ratings and opinion polls, a good measure of wide spread

charismatic legitimacy is spikes in voter participation, particularly those that correlate to spikes

in approval ratings, which can be seen during Koizumi’s term. Japan has always enjoyed

relatively high levels of participation, when compared with other developed democracies, but

these numbers have been steadily decreasing. In 1996 participation hit an all time low at 59.7%;

however, in 2000—when Koizumi became the party leader and therefore was guaranteed the

prime minister-ship should the LDP win the majority—participation rose to 62.5%, and hit

67.5% for the infamous 2005 general election (MIC 2008a). However, charismatic legitimacy is

unstable. After Koizumi retired public support for his successors’ cabinets continued to fall,

culminating in the LDP’s landslide defeat in the 2009 lower house general election (Gaunder

2011, 22), and voter turnout was back down to 58.6% by 2008 (Masuyama 2008, 1030).

Kabashima and Imai (2002) found that compared with results from a similar survey conducted in

the late 70’s at Hokkaido University, voter evaluation of a party leader did have an increased

effect on the out come of the 2000 election. This correlation was, however, significant only in

the proportional representation districts ad for unaffiliated voters. In addition, evaluations of

Prime Minister Mori—Koizumi’s incredibly unpopular predecessor who became prime minister

by default when Prime Minister Obuchi suffered a stroke—were shown to have had little or no

impact in the single-seat constituencies (Kabashima and Imai 2002, 91) indicating the continued

importance of more traditional politics.

27

While Koizumi’s term in office is an interesting period in LDP history it illustrates two

very important characteristics of Charismatic legitimacy. First, due to its transient nature

charismatic legitimacy is inherently unstable. It is generally connected to the charisma of a single

leader or small group and based on popular appeal, which is by nature momentary and fleeting.

This instability leads to issues of authenticity when a successor must take over as we saw when

Prime Minister Aso attempted to use Koizumi’s style of political leadership right after his

retirement. Though in recent years Japanese politics has shown a shift towards a reliance on

charismatic legitimacy the LDP though the majority relied on more stable for such as rational

legitimacy and in particular traditional legitimacy to sustain it through its 60 years of political

dominance. I posit that despite these obstacles the LDP was able to retain a great deal of

legitimacy from the electorate, in part because of the existence of factions13. A party that is able

to gather and retain high levels of rational, charismatic, and traditional legitimacy will stay in

power.

FACTIONS & TRADITIONAL LEGITIMACY IN THE SECOND POST-WAR PARTY SYSTEM

At the outset of the discussion of legitimacies basic principles and assumptions was a

quote from Levite and Tarrow’s(1983) description of elites as an important foundation for any

party in securing legitimacy; two points of that description are returned to here: social bases and

monopoly over cultural understanding (297). Traditional legitimacy is based on a party’s

understanding of societal norms, and the electorate’s acceptance of the manner in which the

13Politicalfactionsaresmallergroupswithinapartyrepresentingtheinterestofspecificgroups,individualpoliticians,ect.

28

party has translated those norms; or, as Weber (1968) describes it “resting on an established

belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority

under them...”(46). The trust that everyone at every level of the hierarchy will act and exercise

authority, according to well-known and pre-established customs is the basis of traditional

legitimacy, and it is this adherence to convention that can create the perception of stability as

well as datedness—belonging to a past generation or time. It is this quality of traditional

legitimacy that has made factions a crucial aspect of the LDP’s structure and vote gathering

tactics. Levite and Tarrow (1983) determined that legitimacy is often greater fro the right-wing

parties than for left-wing parties, who are “…always suspected of maintaining loyalty to a

principle—if not actual organization—that transcends national boundaries…” (321). In contrast

right-wing parties, often the conservative side, are perceived as highly nationalistic and loyal to

traditional values (Levite and Tarrow 1983, 321). LDP platforms and slogans often reference

their role in the great economic recovery after World War II associating it with the ‘Meiji

Miracle14’ or reference traditional values and support for Japanese superiority. This sort of

ideological and value based appeal is especially important in conservative societies like Japan

(Gaunder 2011, 81-91; Hrebenar 2000, 25; Curtis 1999; Flanagan et al. 1991). Conservative

voters are often drawn to something familiar that fits easily with the rest of their values and

lifestyle.

In Japan there is a social convention of respect for seniority and hierarchical structures;

Scott Flanagan and Bradley Richardson recommend that models based on social networks are the

key to understanding Japanese voting behavior.

14TheMeijiMiracleispopularpropagandiststermfortheeventsofrapidsocialandtechnologicalchangeduringtheMeijiperiod(1868–1912).ItcorrespondswiththemodernizationandattemptedwesternizationofJapan.

29

Such a model appears to work for Japan, given the persistence of personal ties, the significance of the group in an individual’s life, and the ability of the group to enforce conformity among its members. Flanagan argues that Japanese voting behavior can be understood in terms of such traditional attitudes as the recommendation system (sub-sensei), feelings of obligation (giri), local district consciousness (jimoto), and supporter organizations (koenkai). (Hrebenar 2000, 19)

Because japans society emphasizes the ‘group’ and speaking through eh group, voter behavior in

Japan has a dissociative and passive quality. Rather than individuals where everyone person can

change the world, the emphasis is put on finding representative groups with knowledge and

connections to make relevant decisions and accurately represent your needs. For traditional

legitimacy in Japan this means that is not an individual him/herself that holds any real power, but

rather the representation of power inherent in the office or position they occupy. Weber (1968)

describes this as a:

…case of traditional authority, [where] obedience is owed to the person of the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is (within its sphere) bound by tradition. But here obligation of obedience is…a matter of personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations. (46)

In other words, it is not a person’s popularity, experience, or ability but the fact that they are

above you in the hierarchy that gives them power and respect. Anthropologists have long

stressed the importance of hierarchy to any society; in Japan its defining characteristics are age

and deference to seniority (Hendry 1998, 77). In 1973 the NHK Public Opinion Institute held a

series of polls to identify the value orientation of Japanese citizens. When asked, “What is the

most desirable form of political behavior for the general public?” 63% of respondents answered

“We should select and excellent politician and entrust political affairs to him”; to which the

researchers concluded that the Japanese concept of political participation is limited to voting

which is viewed more as a general social behavior (Hrebenar 2000, 18, 20). The same poll has

been conducted periodically since then and researchers found that not only has the overall sense

of political efficacy been declining but that views on participation, effective vs. ineffective, that

30

respondent formed during their youth tend to remain unchanged throughout their life (Kono,

Takahashi, Hara 2010, 30). Since Japanese voters have a relatively one-dimensional

understanding of political participation, a party’s ability to gather traditional legitimacy is

predicated on its ability to work through proper channels as approved by society—i.e. using

connections to various groups/organizations—and respect the social structures and norms—i.e.

comprehension of seniority/hierarchy. Rather than attempting to create ‘relationships’ with

voters directly the LDP has historically relied on the endorsements of smaller political actors,

interest groups, and support organizations to mobilize votes during general elections. This

system mirrors the societal norms found everywhere in Japan.

Nakane Chie is well known for her model of Japanese society, which has its roots in the

‘family system’. This model is recreated in figure 3.

The most basic unit of the family, according to Nakane, is the relationship between B and D-E,

but it is repeated at every level of the model. The family unit was comprised of a head who was

the ultimate authority—A—but delineated certain responsibilities and tasks to other members—

B & C—who were organized hierarchically with distinction un member levels based on age, sex,

and expectation of permanency in the house (Hendry 1998, 24-5). The relationship between

A

B

D E

C

F G

Figure3NakaneChie’ssimplemodelofJapaneseSocietySource:Hendry1998,86

31

members of the same strata have an underlying egalitarianism—F & G and B & C—and are in

many ways independent of each other with the only connection being a mutual superior. In this

system “Benevolence from a person in a superior role is to be reciprocated with deference and

loyalty form a partner in an inferior role” (Hendry 1998, 85) with the understanding that the

inferior will one day move up and take the superior’s place when the superior is also promoted.

The classic example of the family unit in Japanese civil society is the company, particularly in

the early post-war era, with informally ranked rival groups within firms, comprised of

individuals within a fixed hierarchy (Hendry 1989, 85). But this structure can be seen in both

rural and urban neighborhood organizations, yakuza—Japanese mafia/gangs—groups, and the

interaction between factions and voters, the focus of this section.

Neighborhood organization

Hendry (1998) describes neighborly interactions in rural communities as being primarily

between households or representatives of households rather than individuals, “…and people tend

to refer to one another as ‘the grandmother of House x’, or ‘ the father of House y’, and so

on”(60) which correspond to the lowest family units of Nakane’s model. For most village

meetings and communal activities a representative from each household was the only person

required to participate, and all communication between the village and city hall was through the

village head (Hendry 1989, 60-2). In more apparent terms, the family members—D&E and

F&G—are represented at the village meetings by the head of the family—B and C—who then

entrust the village head—A—to represent them at the district level and so on and so forth. An

anthropological study of a Tokyo neighborhood found that not only do the structures and

traditions associated with the village a feature of neighborhood organizations, but these traditions

32

were found in women’s and senior citizens’ groups, PTA’s, schools, volunteer fire brigades, and

a variety of special interest clubs (Hendry 1998, 68-70).

Yakuza groups

Iwai(1966) identifies the strong adherence to these traditional structures and norms as the

common characteristic between delinquent groups and fully-fledged Yakuza(Japanese mob)

organizations(204). Adelstein(2010) describes yakuza groups as pyramids with three distinct

tiers(67).

Young recruits pledge their allegiance to the oyabun(a father figure, of sorts), and the oyabun of the third tier reports to an oyabun above him, and so on. Alliances are made in ritual ceremonies, with yakuza paring off as equals(kyodai or brothers) or in teacher and disciple relationships.(Adelstein 2010, 67)

These smaller local factions are each managed by a corporate board, which controls the position

and title of every member and the status of each individual factions; the board chair is the most

powerful person in the organization and usually doubles as the head. For Iwai the superior-

inferior relationships and strict hierarchy is the core of these groups. Matters of succession,

which are informed by this hierarchy, are vital for the survival of the group; “…only those who

have shown complete loyalty to the group and devotion to their [leader] will be considered

eligible”(Iwai 1966, 206). In the yakuza structure ‘A’ is the board chair, ‘B’ and ‘C’

representatives for the corporate board, and ‘D’ through ‘G’ are the various local factions which

have no direct knowledge or interactions with each other except through their representatives. To

this model we can also add the idea that no all factions and board members are equal. Depending

on the number of local factions they have under their command and the size of those factions,

certain board members will stand a better change of succeeding to the ‘A’ position when it is

vacated.

33

This type of situation is exactly what is seen in factions. Where ‘A’ is the LDP’s party

presidency and ultimately the prime minister’s office when the party is in power. As with the

Yakuza groups succession is also a core issue at all levels of a faction, but even more so for the

faction leaders, who often begin grooming a successor well before they even run for the party

presidency. Succession has more recently come into play in koenkai due to the 1994 redistricting,

and an increase in the number of hereditary politicians that inherit the support groups of a father

or husband. What is important here and in both the yakuza and neighborhood organizations is not

so much who the successor is or how they got their but, the positions themselves. In all of the

previous examples, and as we will see later in the interactions between factions, koenkai, and

voters, those towards the bottom of the pyramid are only connect through their loyalty to a

superior, and communication between levels is carried out through representatives. These

channels of communications like the offices/positions are important because it does not matter

who holds them the organizations and still function and interact with each other as long as the

ones holding the office know the internal hierarchy and structure of each and therefore who

should contact who and how. It is precisely the prevalence of this structure that is easily

recognized by politicians and voters alike that allows traditional legitimacy to be transferred and

was the key to LDP success in the SPWPS.

The beginning of the Second Post-war Party System

Though discussions of Koizumi’s term in office took us well into to the SPWPS, to better

give a sense of the context that made traditional legitimacy so important to the LDP, a reminder

of the events that started the SPWPS—an internal split within the LDP and an overhaul of

Japan’s electoral system—is needed. Although ultimately it was Ozawa Hata and his faction—

34

the largest in the LDP—leaving to form an eight-party coalition government that toppled the

LDP in the 1993 elections, in 1994 after the new reforms took over both LDP and other parties

experienced even greater fragmentation as individual politicians and whole factions left to create

their own parties. The framers of the reform packages had hoped to create an electoral system

and political landscape that would not only encourage the emergence of a two-party system but

to ensure the fall of the LDP as the only dominant party. First, and probably the most infamous

reform package, was a complete renovate of Japan’s electoral system. The lower house,

comprising of 500 members is now elected from 300 single-member districts and 200

proportional representation districts using party lists. By splitting the seats the framers hoped to

encourage the consolidations of left and right wing parties behind single candidates in the single-

member districts and facilitate the emergence of new parties in the proportional representation

districts. This was supported by a section of the reforms on public funding which would give

parties public subsidies based on the percentage of votes received in a national election.

However, the reform that had the greatest impact on LDP factions, and caused the majority of

they chaos within and between parties, almost negligible. It created a Redistricting Committee

tasked with redrawing the electoral constituencies, primarily for the 300 single-member districts.

But, separated most politicians from their koenkai and other support bases and wreaked havoc

with the faction’s logistics. Now instead of three or four members of different factions fighting

for six seats, if parts of two or more districts were combined there were six or more politicians

from a variety of factions plus the members of other parties fighting for one seat.

Before beginning any discussion of factions in the LDP it is important to note that they

are not informal groups of politicians, but highly organized and disciplined assemblies (Bettcher

2005; Köllner 2004; Park 2001). Throughout most of the LDP’s history defection or switching

35

factions was rare “Once a politician was elected and joined a faction, his fate was usually tied to

the same faction until he died or retired.”(Bettcher 2005, 345). According to Park (2001) factions

develop strong group identities through mutual support and “…the norms shared by its

members”(442); at the faction general meetings, held weekly from noon to 1:00 p.m. on

Thursdays, coinciding with the opening of Main Diet sessions to maximize attendance, members

share information and negotiate endorsements to run in specific districts versus on the party list

strengthening group unity and confidence. In figure four we can see a version of Nakane’s model

for Japanese society that has been filled in with the various LDP positions and key support

Figure4ModelofLDPsupportstructure,modified½ofNakane’ssocialstructureofJapan

36

elements. In the LDP the highest position, ‘A’, is that of Party President. The president not only

becomes Prime Minister when the party is in power, distributing cabinet and various diet posts,

but is also responsible for assigning all other party positions including the three key party

posts—Secretary General, Chair of PARC, and Chair of the General Council. According to Park

(2001) “…faction leaders … collectively negotiate with one another over which faction will be

guaranteed control over the appointment of individuals to which posts … taking into account

their seniority, specialty, and electoral concerns”(445). It is generally accepted that only a faction

leader can occupy any of these posts and the leader of the largest faction is made the President.

At the next level, ‘B’ and ‘C’, each faction leader is supported by a group of Diet members that

form his faction. Each national politician has a network of koenkai and maintains connections

with sub national politicians through keiretsu. According to Milazzo and Scheiner (2010)

describe keiretsu as mutually beneficial for both national and subnational politicians; subnational

politicians mobilize their constituents at the local level to vote for the keiretsu leader in the

national election, in exchange they are provided a ‘pipeline’ to benefits in the national

government (151). While keiretsu are important to national politicians, koenkai bridge the gap

between the social and political spheres in Japan.

Koenkai are not party branches and have no overt party ties which is what allows them to

more easily bridge the gap between the political and civil spheres. Voters usually join a

politician’s koenkai due to some sort of personal connection; rather than because of their

devotion to a particular party; indeed there non-party status often allows voters who consider

themselves to supporters of a separate party or who wish to remain unaffiliated to show support

for LDP diet members (Krauss and Pekkanen 2011, 31-2). Interestingly, while scholars tend to

discuss a politician’s koenkai as a single monolithic organization, many times they are comprised

37

of several separate groups each of which are dedicated to individual politician; there are also

three different types of ‘organizing principles’ common to these groups: “…personal connection

to the Diet member, geography, and function (which commonly includes gender, age, occupation

or former occupation, and some interest or hobby)…”(Krauss and Pekkanen 2011, 37). A final

important feature of the Koenkai is that its members tend to be older, with the age distribution

mimicking the life-cycle expectations of political involvement in Japan. As figure 5 shows the

highest percent of membership is nearly always held by those in their sixties.

When this information is combined with the more conservative attitudes of the elderly (Kono,

Takahashi, Hara 2010) and the fact that Koenkai members are statistically a more stable source

of support for the party (Krauss and Pekkanen 2011, 33) a picture of traditional legitimacy

begins to form. In addition, despite a severe drop in the overall levels of efficacy in Japan,

Figure5Koenkaimembershipbyage,1972‐2005Source:KraussandPekkanen2011,92

38

koenkai membership has remained strong in the LDP as is shown in figure 6. Membership in the

‘90’s particularly only shows a slight dip from 1993 to 1996 levels which is interesting given the

levels of chaos in the political sphere. On can infer that in that chaos voters turned to traditional

sources of political stability such as koenkai and that these high figures played a crucial role in

returning the LDP to power in 1996.

The extreme chaos of 1996 was due in large part to the redistricting, which separated

most organizations from their candidates, rather than the changes to the new electoral system

itself. The obvious solution, as Christensen (1998) points out, was to strike alliances with other

faction members and trade support groups (993). This system, though more extreme, used the

hierarch structure already present in the LDP, with its levels of endorsements and support—

shown in figure 4—to maintain return LDP dominance in the lower house. In essence it was the

traditional adherence of hierarchical structures that allowed the LDP to remain intact and highly

organized, relative to the opposition parties. Voters, as with the pre-reform era, recognized this

adherence to tradition as making the LDP more capable, and cast their vote for the LDP; in the

Figure6LDPkoenkaimembershipratesSource:KraussandPekkanen2010,98

39

post-reform elections these structures continued to lend the LDP a sense of stability and

capableness. Köllner (2004) quotes self-proclaimed ‘electoral junkie’ Steven R. Reed:

…factions have become part of the cultural repertoire of politics in Japan. People know how to organize and run a faction and they will utilize this knowledge when facing analogous problems under new circumstances. Factions will evolve in new directions in the changed environment but will not disappear(96).

Factions, especially in the immediate post reform years played a crucial role not just

institutionally, gathering votes and support, but culturally by lending stability and some means of

organization to the chaos of Japanese politics. By mimicking traditional hierarchical structures

both within and outside of the party organ the LDP showed a stronger united front than the

opposition, which was highly fragmented and undisciplined. While note to the degree of

immediate post-reform years, the LDP still showed electoral dominance through absolute

number of votes, and was able to win over 50% of the seats in the House of Representatives from

1996-2005(MIC 2008e).

Figure7VotespolledperpoliticalpartySource:MIC2008

0

20000000

40000000

60000000

80000000

100000000

120000000

140000000

160000000

1996 2000 2003 2005

Totalnumberofvotespolled

LDP

2ndrunnerup

3rdrunnerup

40

As we can see in figure 7 while the LDP still remains unable to consistently gather a true

majority, in terms of number of votes, its dominance has remained clear through a majority of

the SPWPS, and has only recently been challenged by a single party—the DPJ. Such dominance

was made possible through LDP’s ability to effectively gather rational and traditional legitimacy

throughout their long run in power, and charismatic legitimacy during Prime Minister Koizumi’s

term in office. Through a lack of alternation or exchange of power between parties and constant

squabbling and infighting of smaller parties, the image that the LDP was the only party capable

of running the government. As rational legitimacy is passed on self-interests and the assessment

of how effectively a party can deliver policies that directly benefit their constituents the apparent

capabilities and resources available to a party create the basis for the transfer of legitimacy. The

institutions and control they were able to exercise over national resources, which gained them the

continued loyalty of many subnational politicians and various interests groups, furthered the

transfer of rational legitimacy to the LDP and supported their capable image. Likewise

traditional legitimacy is a measure of a party’s ability to recognize and utilize social norms and

structures to appear more familiar and acceptable. As I have shown within the LDP factions are

important agents for the transfer of traditional legitimacy. These highly organized groups of

politicians use strict hierarchies and are led by individual senior politicians; movement through

the ranks of a faction is quite straightforward and is based on assumptions of strict loyalty and

deference to immediate superiors. The hierarchy utilizes Nakane’s structure of Japanese society,

which is based on the idea of a large formal family, which, particularly in the FPWPS, could be

seen in most sectors of Japanese life. Asserting that when assessing parties voters look for

recognizable and familiar characteristics that they can easily identify with. Factions provide clear

hierarchies that not only allow voters to distinguish the lines of power within the LDP, adding to

41

the perception of the party as stable, but by mirroring social conventions related to seniority and

hierarchy found throughout Japanese society, factions lent a sense of familiarity for the voters.

Rational and traditional legitimacy have been powerful features of the Japanese politics well

before even the birth of the LDP and it is not until quite recently that charismatic legitimacy has

begun to play a more significant role. Charismatic legitimacy, which is based of the popular

cultural, religious, or moral appeal of a party’s ideology generally stems from a single party

leader with notable oratory and social skills and is therefore highly unstable. With in the LDP the

most common example of charismatic force was Prime Minister Koizumi; but recently

opposition parties, most notably the DPJ, have begun to utilize charismatic and media savvy

politicians to gain legitimacy. Legitimacy—rational, charismatic, and traditional—is not only a

useful measure of a party’s past political success but, due to its basis in distinctive cultural traits

of a given society, one could in theory use legitimacy to predict the success or failure of new

parties. Tracing the flow of legitimacy in past party systems, then comparing the parties and the

societies in which said parties are based has strong implications for single-dominant party

systems, insofar as they are a supposed anomaly in the democratic world.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

In 2008 the LDP won 305 of the 500 lower house seats, yet with in a year this number

plummeted to 119 and the DPJ took control of both houses with a startling majority (Masuyama

2009; 2010). After nearly sixteen years the aggressive reforms instituted by a fleeting coalition

government, finally seemed to be taking effect. Not only was the monolithic LDP out of the seat

of power, replaced by the relatively young Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), but also non-DPJ

42

opposition parties were on average receiving seats numbering in the single digits indicating the

onset of a true two-party system. Scholars and politicians had been predicting that by eliminating

the multimember districts and creating more seats elected from the party lists by proportional

representation, these reforms would create incentives fro smaller parties to combine and either

create two new catchall-parties or at least a single party that could challenge the LDP on fairer

grounds. Which is exactly what happened. In 2009 the DPJ, conglomeration of smaller parties

that had come together, took over both houses and the executive. Fast-forward to 2012; the DPJ

is still in control of the government with the LDP running a close second, and smaller opposition

parties quickly loosing more and more seats, yet current scholarship would indicate an overall

pessimistic bent. Rosenbluth (2011) states, “the DPJ’s “year in mishaps” illustrates the rich

layering of inter- and intra- party competition in Japan” which some fear might inevitable lead to

a renewal of LDP dominance (41-2). But, as the LDP has proved over and over again, a rocky

year in power doesn’t necessarily signal the death of a party. The transfer of legitimacy is a

relatively slow process that speaks to the strength of Japan’s political processes. While a more

in-depth study is necessary to determine the actual composition of the current party system,

uncertainties about prolonged DPJ dominance would seems to lie in a single undeniable fact

“The Japanese electorate had voted against the LDP on August 30, 2009, more than it had voted

for the DPJ”(Rosenbluth 2011, 49). In an era of global recession and in the aftermath of the

largest earthquake Japan has ever experienced the future is unsure. But recent scholarship into

the internal structure of the DPJ, though a cause of much concern to Political Science, is of

interest to the future of this paper.

In 2004 Patrick Köllner wrote an article comparing the factional structures of the DPJ and

LDP; he found a startling number of similarities between the two parties and was able attribute

43

every major difference to the DPJ’s youth and lack of time in government. LDP faction have had

decades to become deeply institutionalized in both the party and political sphere, this is a fact

recognized by most scholars of Japanese Politics. Due to the comparative youth and inexperience

of most DPJ politicians, factions tend to focus on information sharing and “conveying the feeling

of belonging to a group of like minded politicians”, but two highly organized factions are

moving to the foreground (Köllner 2004, 100). The Yuai kurabu faction mimics LDP factions

quite closely. It has its own office that keeps membership records, regular weekly meetings

(usually once a week), and internal regulations. The chairman leads the faction while the actual

management is taken care of by the faction’s general affairs manager (Köllner 2004, 99). Also

like the young LDP, DPJ factions are a result of the different parties that merged in 1996, and as

such factional identity is close related to party roots (Köllner 2004, 96). For many scholars these

structural similarities are cause for great concern, and they fear that this factionalism, rather than

creating safe channels for policy diversity and disagreement, will simply cause infighting and

tear the DPJ apart. However I must ask, “If the LDP survived such issues then why not the

DPJ” ?

As long as the party continues to vote as a cohesive whole to pass legislature, utilize their

popular position as the ‘new’ government of change in Japan, utilize their position as the ‘new’

government of change, and make use of certain political traditions to give voters straightforward

channels for participation, the future of gathering legitimacy from the Japanese public looks

bright. Because the transfer of legitimacy, especially rational and traditional, is so intrinsically

tied to the amount of time a party has spent in government, the DPJ should not be dismissed or

criticized after a mere two years in power. It took over a decade for the reforms instituted in

1994 to bear significant change. Thomas Carlyle Said “Democracy is cumbersome, slow and

44

inefficient, but in due time, the voice of the people will be heard and their latent wisdom will

prevail” which should be a lesson in patience to us all.

45

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