International Journal of Drug Policy 16 (2005) 104–107

Response

Where have all the flowers gone? Gone to opium everyone.When will they ever learn, when will they ever learn?

Cindy Fazey∗

Liverpool University, Department of Sociology, Social Policy& Social Work, Eleanor Rathbone Buildings,Bedford Street South, Liverpool, L69 72A, UK

Received 25 November 2004; received in revised form 16 December 2004; accepted 16 January 2005

They have not gone, and in this author’s opinion, theynever will, in one form or another.Farrell & Thorne (2005)are concerned to formally evaluate the effectiveness of theenforcement ban on the growing of the opium poppy inAmttw

iptiaaSbmicuitacmapct

government. In most cases any money will have been “hard”or “soft” ear-marked. “Soft” ear-marking is when a donorgovernment says generally where it wants its money spent,such as in the field of drug control, say, for supply eradication

rd”undthen

y bes notat aver-mes.allyd.ors.ary.ortanttateer ofis topancy

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fghanistan in 2001. They agree with many authors, com-entators and actual surveyors of the poppy cultivation areas

hat the ban actually happened and was effective insofar ashe opium production in the areas controlled by the Talibanas effective.However, the authors are a little naı̈ve as to why the Tal-

ban stopped production. They put this down to internationalressure and the then United Nations International Drug Con-

rol Programme (UNDCP), now UNODC. Why this is naı̈ves because the political clout of UNDCP at the time was virtu-lly nil. The UN and its agencies have no power of their own;ny power they exercise derives entirely from UN Membertates. Only if it is known that there are powerful countriesehind the stance of the UNDCP or another agency on anyatter—and those countries are also willing to put money

nto programmes to achieve their ends—will any recipientountry take notice. Virtually all UN agencies could come

or the support of police and customs initiatives. With “haear-marking, however, a donor country says that it will fa specific project in a clearly defined area of interest andvets the project closely before going for approval. It mathat former colonial powers, or a major super-power doewant to be seen exerting too much influence or just thcountry does not have the mechanisms for distributing oseas aid and overseeing the implementation of programFor whatever reason the limited power, or lack of it, actupossessed by the UN and its bodies must be understoo

The brutal fact is that the UN is owned by its major donIt is not its own master; all powers are derivative, not primThis does not mean that it does not have a useful and improle to play in many situations, but we must not oversits power as an independent organisation, or the powits bodies and agencies. The point of this explanationdemonstrate that there may be a considerable discre

nder the sobriquet of errand boys. In many cases, the UNs the mechanism for distancing countries from the influencehat they wish to exert. It is an arm’s length arrangement forid. In this sense, the UN’s aid and development programmes

triesular

ance,rugby

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between appearance and reality. It may appear that UNDCPhad a role in negotiating with the Taliban, the reality wasdifferent. In effect, it could negotiate, but not settle.

The authors say, “In 1997 the then head of UNDCP, PinoA thee il-l Tal-i lac-c CP,w for-m D),t or-m to if

d.

an be seen as a form of money laundering. Donor counay want to support developing countries in some particspect, which can be anything from more open governopulation control, preservation of cultural heritage or dontrol, but want to do so without being directly identifiedhe beneficiaries on the ground, as opposed to the cou

∗ Tel.: +44 151 928 3441; fax: +44 151 949 0067.E-mail address:cindy@fazey.demon.co.ukn.

955-3959/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserveoi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2005.01.006

rlacchi, brokered a deal with the Taliban. In return forlimination of opium poppy, the UN would provide $25 m

ion per year for ten years in development assistance toban areas.” This reflected a naivety on behalf of Pino Arhi, then newly appointed as Executive Director of UNDho believed that he could do what he liked without theal authority of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CN

echnically the UNDCP’s controlling authority, or the infal authority of the UNDCP’s major donors, who, de fac

C. Fazey / International Journal of Drug Policy 16 (2005) 104–107 105

not de jure ultimately control the CND. Arlacchi was badlymistaken, as he was to find to his cost. He was constrained bythe policies of the major donors. He thought that he was fol-lowing the policy that the USA wanted, which was the erad-ication of opium in Afghanistan. But the USA did not wantthis at that time. The USA was not even the UNDCP’s largestdonor, although by virtue of being the only super-power, itwas able to wield much power in the UN by a stick-and-carrotdiplomacy: it would threaten to cut off future funding to theUN on the one hand, while making half-promises to pay offpast arrears to ease the UN’s perpetual funding crisis. Thesesorts of tactics kept most agencies in line with what the USAwanted.

The abolition of opium growing in Afghanistan was not ahigh priority for the USA in the late 1990s. Arlacchi made thegrave error of believing the rhetoric of the “war on drugs”,with its unrealistic and unattainable goal of a “drug-free”world, and by 2008 “Member States should have made realprogress in eliminating or reducing significantly crops ofopium, coca and cannabis” (Annan, 1998). This was stated atopening session of the Special Session of the General Assem-bly on illicit drugs. But at the same Assembly, the MemberStates were not quite so keen for such a commitment andchanged the wording in their Political Declaration to committhemselves to working with UNDCP “to develop strategiesw il-l theoC ne-t e toe for-e ssedq eryn this,t y ofi hichA

thel op-e eil-l heret esti-m , andU velt ulti-v tiono doa fi-n thisfi

s tok hem-s elop-m rmi-n ll asc UN

did not finance because the UN did not have the money fromany major donor. No country was interested.

Nevertheless, the authors claim that the Taliban produced“the most effective drug control enforcement of moderntimes”.Themost effective control of production in moderntimes? Only if the control and elimination of Turkish produc-tion in 1971 is excluded. It is worth noting that Nixon’s “waron drugs” began against the Mexicans with Operation Inter-cept. Instead of stopping the drug trade it caused a diplomaticdisaster and was quietly dropped (Epstein, 1990). Turkey wasnot the largest producer of opium (accounting for only 3–8%of world production) but was the next target for the war ondrugs. The advantage of targeting Turkey was that she was aNATO ally of the US and needed US arms, so pressure couldbe put on her to stop the illicit opium trade. A coup d’etatin 1971 by the military forces determined that arms and aidmattered more than the opium farmers. The farmers received$35 million in compensation and Nixon got his decisive vic-tory against the heroin drug trade. Two important points tonote are that the army was in control of the country and thatthe country covered 300,0002 miles with a population of 58million as opposed to Afghanistan’s 250,0002 miles but witha population of only 17 million. A more densely populatedcountry is usually more easily surveyed.

On a smaller scale possibly successful attempts to erad-i estP t 15y ion.B ent.T o de-p heat,o inallyv higha n in-d

inL andc weenJ Hafeza esw iump h Is-l t ofr icedt vedi at hec lingL ld’si atedi rawo han$ nabiso ver,o d ben d wass

ith a view to eliminating or reducing significantly theicit cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant andpium poppy by the year 2008” (Political Declaration, 1998).learly this subtle but significant change did not fully pe

rate Arlacchi’s awareness. Of course the USA would likliminate illicit drug production, but there are many otherign policy goals that supersede this, as we have witneuite dramatically in recent years. In foreign policy, evation has a hierarchy of wants and needs. Apart from

he USA resented—and indeed would never permit—ants resources to be committed without prior consent, wrlacchi did not have.The UNDCP may have “pledged aid in locating

argest poppy fields” but this could only be done in coration with the USA through the latter’s satellite surv

ance system, which had already established exactly whe fields were anyway. On top of that, annual harvestation is done through American satellite photographsNDCP/UNODC ground surveys using Afghans to tra

o the poppy fields and produce estimates of opium cation, which are then used to confirm the interpretaf the photographs. If the USA had really wanted tonything about eradication, it would have provided theance. It not doing so speaks volumes for its priorities ineld.

Indeed, the UNDCP clearly had not got the resourceeep up its side of the alleged bargain. The authors telves give the game away here. “Although some devent projects were begun in Afghanistan, they were teated in 2000 due to lack of financing from the UN, as weontinuing extensive poppy cultivations,” they say. The

cate opium production in the Dir Valley of the North Wrovince of Pakistan were begun in 1985. For the nexears $35 million were spent, mainly in supply reductetween 1994 and 2002 a further $14 million were sphe result is that there is no viable alternative crop and sopulation has taken place. Of the alternative crops of wnions and tomatoes, only wheat can be said to be margiable. The others reach the market too late: they are sond mature that the market price is too low to sustain austry. But this represents one valley, not a country.

Another recent example occurred in 1991–1992ebanon, when the Syrian army destroyed all opiumannabis crops in the Bekaa Valley as part of a deal betames Baker, then US Secretary of State, and Presidentl-Assad (Fazey, 1992). The valley, 75 miles long and 8 milide, was previously planted with 12,500 acres of opoppies and 40,000 acres of cannabis to fund Hizbolla

amic fundamentalists. The annual yield was about 50aw opium and 1000 t of hashish. The fields went unpolhroughout Lebanon’s civil war, but the Syrian army mon after the Gulf War, when Baker suggested to Assad thould improve relations with the US and Europe by tackebanon’s role in supplying a significant part of the wor

llegal drugs market. About 80% of the crops were eradicn 1991 and the rest in 1992. As a result, the price ofpium in Beirut rose from $70 a tonne in 1990 to more t500 a tonne in 1992 and there was a shortage of cann the illegal British market for several months. Howether producers soon filled the gaps in supply. It shouloted that the area where drug production was eliminatemall, easily policed and under army control.

106 C. Fazey / International Journal of Drug Policy 16 (2005) 104–107

The result of the Turkish suppression of productionwas the expansion of opium production in Laos, VietNam, Myanmar and Thailand (seeEpstein, 1990; Jaubert& Jaubert, 1974; Kruger, 1980; Newsweek Staff, 1974).Moreover, the effect of the Taliban’s year-long ban oncultivation had no impact on world markets, for the supplyof opium during the ban was quite cynically manipulatedby the Taliban from the stockpile of illegal product amassedin Afghanistan through over-production in previous years.The 1999 harvest was a bumper one. The supply of herointo Europe, of which up to 80% comes from Afghanistan, didnot dry up. The key indicator of supply—prices—remainedunchanged. Had the ban been effective in reducing actualsupply, they would have gone up. Indeed, the ban on culti-vation may well have averted a glut of opium on the market,which would have caused prices to fall. As it was, wholesaleprices of heroin per kilogram in 2001 in Tajikistan, Pakistanand Iran were lower than in 1997. The only place wherethe price of opium increased was in Afghanistan itself,because they had not produced any themselves and therewas a growing home market. Afghan prices were up 10-fold(UNODCCP, 2002a, 2002b), now UNODC.

With opium production a major source of national and in-dividual Afghan income, there were sound commercial andeconomic reasons for the Taliban to institute a temporarys TheW theirt ecra-t sure,h hanh mar-k stedi routeo ntry( i-o s hasg l gasi tan.T pianSFt ibanr ervesi libanw for al ortedt n thec 01.

cy.A lkse n byo

gni-t ateg du-i do

this by stopping the opium harvest, no matter what the conse-quences for the Afghan people. So while this ploy achieved itscommercial goal of reducing the stockpile of opium, it failedto achieve its political goal. The Taliban was not recognised.

The Taliban regime was exceptionally brutal in enforcingthe ban, but we do not know if it would have extended it foranother year. They might have done because in 2001 theyblew up the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan, arrested relief agen-cies’ workers and charged them with spreading Christianity,ordered all Hindus to wear yellow badges for identification,so the repressive policy seemed set to get worse (Rashid,2001). But the September 11th New York World Trade Tow-ers bombings radically changed US policy and tactics.

The following year, 2002 the poppy harvest was on backtrack again. Much of the planting would have been done in2001, long before the Taliban finally overthrown. A rapid2-week assessment survey was launched in February 2002and confirmed the resumption of opium poppy cultivationon a large scale, despite a renewed ban issued in January2002 (UNODCCP, 2002a, 2002b). The 2002 opium poppyharvest yielded 3400 mt of opium, followed by 3600 mt thenext year (UNODC, 2003). In 2004, it had risen to 4200 mt(UNODC, 2004).

Brutalisation of a population is not an answer to the drugproblem. Production worldwide is out of control, and, in theo them

re-m thisq catest laimt par-t aos.I ppyfi e isn aminep en-t nce,w s ofi ri-e . Andw g int con-o ppyb ssiono at morep forf entsw f thef ignerd toriesu plel nylsa ep-t tent”

lowdown in supply. There were also political reasons.est was bringing pressure on the Taliban as a result of

reatment of women and their perpetration of cultural desions, such as the destruction of Buddhist icons. This presowever, was not very great in diplomatic terms. Even Afgeroin was not much of a concern to the USA because itsets were mainly in Europe. Besides, the USA had a venterest in a stable Afghanistan, because of the projectedf pipelines for natural gas and for oil through the couKleveman, 2003). A policy of overlooking human rights vlations as a quid pro quo for security of energy sourcereat longevity. There are vast supplies of oil and natura

n Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan but particularly in Kazakhshere are an estimated 34 billion barrels of oil in the Casea area alone and more of natural gas (Rashid, 2001). Tworench security analysts,Brisard and Dasquie (2001)claim

hat the USA was concerned with consolidating the Talegime in order to obtain access to these oil and gas resn Central Asia. They say that the Americans and the Taere deep in discussion concerning oil and gas pipelines

ong time. Indeed they suggest that the Americans supphe Taliban because it represented a stabilising force iountry and that discussions only broke off in August 20

In other words, geopolitics is the main driver of polifter the Al Qaida attacks of 9/11—a month after tanded—the USA moved to secure a stable Afghanistather means.

But what the Taliban wanted above all else was recoion by the international community that it was the legitimovernment of Afghanistan. It could do this by finally sub

ng the whole of the country, but it also thought that it could

pinion of this author, only demand reduction can easeisery of those who become dependent on drugs.“What if?” the authors ask. “What if the Taliban had

ained in power?” But they do not thoroughly exploreuestion. Experience from previous attempted bans indi

hat production simply moves elsewhere. The authors chat there was no displacement of production lookingicularly at Pakistan, the Iranian border, Myanmar and Ln Myanmar, Kunh Sa had already turned his opium poelds over to SLORC (for political reasons for which therot the space to elaborate on) and had gone into amphetroduction. Already by 2001 production was shifting to c

ral Asia, as a UN report indicates. “Kyrgyzstan, for instaas, prior to 1974, one of the world’s largest supplier

llicit opium.” (UNODCCP (2002a)). They had the expence and know-how, so could easily increase productionhat of North Korea? There are reports of opium growin

his country to prop up or at least support the ravaged emy. Further, even if we could eradicate the opium poy whatever means, be it by brutal authoritarian supprer the dispersion of a fungus such asPleospora papaverace

hrough the poppy fields, there are always chemical, andowerful, substitutes. Already there is a small market

entanyls in Russia. Two enterprising Russian PhD studere recently caught supplying a local market with one o

entanyls. “Fentanyl and its analogues are a class of desrugs which have been synthesised in clandestine laborasing common, commercially available chemicals and sim

aboratory equipment. The biological effects of the fentare indistinguishable from those of heroin, with the exc

ion that the fentanyls may be hundreds of times more po

C. Fazey / International Journal of Drug Policy 16 (2005) 104–107 107

(WHO, 1991). It may not be in the interest even of the heroinuser for the poppy fields to be eradicated if they are to be re-placed with drugs that may be hundreds of times more strong.

History shows that market forces dominate. For example,the suppression of opium growing in Turkey in 1971 and thedismantling of the French Connection distribution networkto the USA resulted in a shift of opium production to Laosand Viet Nam, both former colonies of France, which haditself used the opium trade to fund the costs of colonial rule.Similarly, opium production burgeoned in Myanmar (Burma)when production in Thailand was seriously reduced.

The conclusions to be drawn from all this seem obvious.The Taliban leaders were not sincere about eradication any-way. They had a vested interest in enforcing a temporary haltto cultivation so as to lower their opium stockpile and controlprices more effectively. They hoped they could put a spin onthe propaganda to achieve the political goal of recognition,but failed. Meanwhile, even a cursory study of the history ofillicit drugs suggests that fighting the so-called war on drugsfrom the supply side is doomed to failure.

What if the Taliban had remained in power? Given its’leaders brutality and cynicism, they would most likely haveencouraged opium growing again, as well as domestic pro-duction of heroin from it—as has happened without them.Not to have done so would have been to cede the markett iumr crop.T ticala pe ofc

one.W

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o central Asian neighbours at the very least. Illicit opemains Afghanistan’s easiest and most lucrative cashhe country needs to advance dramatically in both polind economic terms for its new leaders to have any hohanging that.

Where have all the flowers gone? Gone to opium everyhen will they ever learn, when will they ever learn?

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