What the US Can Do about Apartheid

What the US Can Do about ApartheidAuthor(s): George M. HouserSource: Africa Today, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Mar., 1966), pp. 4-6+16Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184699 .

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IF ONE COMI'ARES the statements made by American sp)okesmen now in the UN with those seven or

eight years ago, it is obvious that there has been a shift for the better. Blut during this same period, the injustices of the apar-theid regime have not only increased, but have become better known by the world. . . .Whereas a decade ago the US was abstaining on resolutions in the UN asking for South Africa to re- consider its aparthei(d policy and to observe the UN Charter, now the US will condemn apartheid but will abstaiin or vote negatively on any form of economic sanctions.

I have read carefully the testimony of Governor G. Mennen Williams and Mr. Alexander Trowbridge [of the Commerce Department]. They fall within the policy of "reluctant concern." They point to some of the positive actions the US has taken stuch as the arms ban; disapproval of American performers appearing before segregated aUdiences; . . . cancelling opera- tional calls at Souith African ports by US naval ships and aircraft. This is fine as far as it goes, but it doesn't begin to meet the crisis.

the US be on? Will the South African struggle esca- late into a major world issue? It well could. With the independence of Bechuanaland, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, attacks may well come from the borders, as well as inside. Does the US have to wait for this to happen before making clear its policy in action, not just words? There will be no question where the sym- pathies of the Communist powers will be in this con- flict. Where will the US be? Will the US take the view that South Africa is a bulwark against the spread of Communism in Africa? Will the US take the view that the rebels in South Africa are under Communist domination, and are therefore our ene- mies 9

I earnestly hope the struggle in South Africa is not violent. To avoid bloodshed, however, the US and other powers must recognize their responsibilities nnowV. I would not claim that the unilateral policies that I shall recommend would magically change things in South Africa. But they would help strengthen the resolve of other countries; they would win universal acclaim in the non-white world; they would help to

George M. Houser

Excerpts from testimony given before the House Sub-Committee on Africa, March 15, 1966

The United States has a divided mind in its policy toward South Africa. On the one hand, eloquent con- demnatory statements are made about apartheid....

But on the other hand, it is pointed out that South African ports are "highly useful" to the US Navy, that the tracking station facilities are "important," that American business provides a "useful channel of communication with influential South African private and official circles," that disinvestment "might harden South African policies," that in any event American disinvestment would have no effect on the South Afriican econioirly. . a

It is not true to maintain that the US can't do anything about apartheid. Rather, the will to do something effec- tive is absent....

The oflicial US position on economic involvement in South Africa is: "We neither encourage nor dis- courage investmiient." This, at a time when practically 80 percent of the people of South Africa have no voice in government, when non-white political movements ar e banned, when there may be as many as 8,000 political prisoners, when writers who describe torture u.sed to gain confessions are imprisoned and editors who dare to print such stories are faced with possible in7iprisonmellt. . .

If a baLttle comes in South Africa, which side will

save the soul of our own country. My specific recommendations are based on the posi-

tion that the United States should begin the process of disengagements with South Africa. Both morally and strategically, disengagement represents a sound policy for the US....

The United States can make unmistakably clear an anti-apartheid policy by moving rapidly toward disengagement. This would do very little harm to the American economy. Collective disengagement would undoubtedly be an outgrowth of this policy. There- fore, I suggest the following specific' action for the United States now.

1. The United States should disengage itself from thte South African economy.

Disengagement should begin where there is great- est involvement: in the economic sphere, which is significant, as Mr. Trowbridge pointed out in his testimony. US investments, according to his figures, amount to at least $600 million. We think his estimate conservative-two years ago South Africa claimed more than $800 million from the dollar zone. We shall nonetheless stick by the Department of Commerce figures for the sake of argument. Six huildred million dollars is 11 percent of all foreign investment in

4 AFRACI TODAY



South Africa. Some 240 American firms are repre- sented by these holdings. The average rate of profit, according to 1963 Department of Commerce figures, was 17.1 percent, a sum exceeded only by gains from investment in West Germany. US exports to South Africa last year approached half a billion ($438 million) and imports were $225 million. Thus there was a favorable balance amounting to more than $200 million.

This involvement indicates both that adopting a policy of discouraging trade and investment may find resistance, and that such a course would have significant effects.

Our reasons for recommending this policy are as follows:

(a) Our present trade and investment helps the South African economy and encourages the architects of apartheid. . . . In 1964, South Africa exported 18 percent of her goods to the US. Between 17 and 19 percent of South African imports in recent years were from the US. This is second only to Britain in South Africa's total volume of trade. Furthermore, the South African imports from the US were in eco- nomically strategic commodities. For example, one notes almost $12 million in petroleum and petroleum products in the first eleven months of 1965; over $15 million in chemical elements and compounds (one wonders if any of this can be used for explosives); almost $125 million in- non-electric machinery, and over $83 million in transport equipment (can any of this possibly be converted for military use?)....

(b) Our present trade and investment in South Af- rica discourages the opponents of apartheid....

(c) Our present trade and investment in South, Af- rica invlolves American business in a basic betrayal of d(emocratic standards. . .

In his statement Mr. Trowbridge defended Ameri- can business involvement in apartheid by saying that "the maintenance of a significant business commu- nity in South Africa may provide a useful channel of commtunication with influential South African private anid official circles."

We ask for proof. When has such a significant dialogue taken place? How did it affect non-whites for the better? Year by year we see US involvAnent be- coming more obvious and year by year we see in- creases in political and social repressions. What a curious dialogue must be taking place! . . .

(d ) Ending trade iweith, and investment in South Afeica wt ould not essentiall;y hurt the US. Investments are only 1 percent of our total foreign investments. Our trade with South Africa amounts to only 2 percent of total foreign trade....

To im7plemnent a policy of disengagement we suggest the follow1in?g:

First, as in the Rhodesian crisis, let the Govern- ment call leading businessmen involved in South Af- rican trade and investment together and ask compli- acn e with a governmental policy of disengagement, emphasizing that continued trade with South Africa is contrarvy to the US national interests. Some would

comply, some would not; but at least a policy would be set.

Second, the bulk of US exports to South Africa should be placed under the provisions of the Export Control Act. At the moment the principal control of trade with the Republic is the license system of the Munitions Board, falling under the State Dopartment. We riecommend that tr ade with South Africa be placed, like that with Bulgaria for example, under a licensing system operated by the Department of Com- merce in order to prevent the export of all goods and commodities that might be used in the defense of the regime. Defense of the regime should be broadly in- terpreted as including many of the Government's non-militarv activities.

Third, legislation should be passed making it ille- gal for US firms abroad to practice racial discrimination.

Fourth, could a system be devised of taxing com- panies continuing to do business in South Africa, per- haps by a special levy on dividends of the parent body in the US, the proceeds to be used to aid victims of apartheid ?

Fifth, financial disengagement with South Africa, to be successful, involves coordinating action with other countries. Therefore, we recommend that steps such as those above be carried out with other countries, and that the UN be the forum for planning joint strategy.

2. The United States sho?u,ld eliminate altogether the quota for South African sugar.

It is shameful that this Congress and this Admin- istration cotuld have, a few short months ago, agreed to increase subsidies to South African sugar pro- ducers. The annual quota was raised from 20,000 metric tons to 48,000 tons-and that was a compro- mise with the Administration, which had recommend- ed a quota of 96,000 tons.

No South African sugars were imported into the US before 1962. But between 1966 and 1971, South Africa will be the tenth largest quota sugar exporter to America. I might note that a considerably larger movement of this commodity enters this country (183,837 tons in 1964) in the non-quota category.

Even more amazing is that, in order to meet our quotas, South Africa has occasionally imported sugar from the Dominican Republic and elsewhere. . .

We strongly feel that, to use the words of Ptublic Law 89-331, 89th Congress, ". . . the continuation of a quota or a part thereof . . . would be contrary to the national interest of the United States," and that the President consequently ought to withhold or sus- pend the South African sugar quota.

3. The Untited States s7hould. prov,ide political as.ylum. for South Africans against aparth eid.

The US is unique among Western nations in having provided no official legal statuls for those seeking political asylulm. In some cases, special acts of Congress have been passed to permit refulgees fr om tyranny to rseside in the US; in other cases, a rather demean-

MAlR( CI 1966 5



ing procedure involving deportation or the threat of deportation has been played out....

Refugees from Eastern Europe and China . . . are favored, but only as irnmigrants-and not as a special category of refugees from political persecution. I note, however, that the Federal Government does make special funds available through the Sttate De- partment, which then in turn contracts with agencies, to facilitate the smooth flow of such political refugees to these shores.

South Africans, however, do not benefit from such Federal generosity and concern....

We recommend that the same kind of aid extended to political refugees from East Europe be similarly applied to opponents of apartheid and racism. We would like to see Federal money earmarked for South African immigrants to this country and passed through to religious and secular groups specializing in refugee programs, and we would like to see relaxa- tion of immigration laws permitting more refugees to come. 4. The US should give maximum assistance to the former High Commission Territories, in concert with other countries, enabling them to maintain some independence from South Africa.

These countries (:Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland), soon to be independent, are committed to non-racial democracy. The Assistant Secretary of State has commented that: "The degree to which they are successful in establishing themselves on this basis could have in time a significant impact on racial pat- terns in South Africa." We therefore should not rest with following developments in these countries with sympathetic interest and mere appointment of Con- suls, welcome though that measure is.

We would recommend that: (a) For Basutoland and Swaziland, the US should

insist upon freedom of travel of nationals and visitors through or over South Africa and Mozambique to and from these countries.

(b) For the three territories the US Government should join with the UJnited Kingdom in diplomatic initiatives to assure the sovereignty of the territories, and make it clear that any violation would be considered an unfriendly act.

(C) Regarding Bechuanaland, the US should co- operate with the Uniited Kingdom in undertaking feasibility studies of the Okavango Swamp scheme and note the possibility of establishing communica- tions between that high-potential area and Zambia and South West Africa.

5. The United States s7hould categorically demand the righ;t to practice integration in its own South Af- rican facilities.

This means that on principle the United States can not accept apartheid, either in dealing with non- whites in South Africa, or as regards American personnel serving in South Africa....

We recommend thatL: (a) Every American-sponsored event be looked up-

on as integrated, in line with US Government policy. (b) Qualified Negro personnel be assigned to some

posts in South Africa. (c) American officials be directed to pay South

African employees without discrimination. If non- whites do not hold the same jobs as whites, they should be paid whatever a white man would earn for doing the same work.

6. The United States should remove the tracking stations from South Africa.

The tracking stations in South Africa are an em- barrassment to the US. Since they are strategically important to the US, they certainly should be located in a country that is much less controversial than is South Africa. Because of the strategic character of the tracking stations, information about them is not made public. Highly competent scientists from whom I have received information say that they see no essential scientific reason that the tracking stations must be in South Africa. Therefore, disengagement through removal of the tracking stations should be undertaken without delay.

7. The United States Atomic Energy Commission should cease cooperation with the South African Atomic Energy Board.

In mid-1965 South Africa inaugurated its first nuclear reactor at Pelindaba, near Pretoria. At that time the following facts came out: (a) many South African staff members had been trained at Oak Ridge; (b) Oak Ridge supplied a consultant for the Pelin- daba reactor; (c) the director of Oak Ridge was an honored guest at the inaugural ceremonies; (d) the United States supplied the enriched uranium to start the reactor; and (e) nine American organizations were involved in the project, the major contractor being Allis Chalmers.

Public announcements have assured all concerned that the South African reactor is not capable of pro- ducing fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons. But in such a highly secret field as this represents, suspicions are easily aroused. Why should the United States be so helpful to South Africa in such a sensitive project?

We recommend a Congressional investigation about the extent of US involvement in the Pelindaba project to gain assurances that fissionable material for weapons is indeed impossible.

8. The United States should lodge a strong diplomatic protest each time South Africa refuses to grant visas to Americans on racial grounds or because of their viewvs on integration.

Many Americans are refused visas to South Africa. It is most unusual for a Negro American to be per- mitted to enter South Africa. Any American who is a known participant in civil rights activities here would probably be iefused a visa to South Africa. Yet there seems to be no limitation on white South Afri-

(Continuted on page 16)

6 AFRICA TODAY



and higher civil serva:nts (some of which range from 25 to 40 times the average salary of an African work- er) would seem to indicate that the latter view pre- vails.

In addition, the Government's paper on African Socialism is not conclusive on this point. On the one hand, it argues that "the historical setting that in- spired Marx has no counterpart in independent Ken- ya"; and on the other hand, it adds that "Kenya has the special problem of eliminating classes that have arisen largely on the basis of race." The Govern- ment's general policy will be to plan development "so as to prevent the emergence of antagonistic classes." The implication is that classes are inevitable and ac- ceptable, and, as long as they are not based on race, do not have to be antagonistic. Nevertheless, although it is a necessary policy, filling the existing upper levels of the class structure with Africans (in place of Europeans and Asians) will require enormous ef- forts to improve the living standards of those at the lower levels, if antagonism is to be prevented. It is in this area that basic political conflicts may emerge in the future, as the 10,000 jobs requiring university education and paying starting salaries of at least $2,250, and the other 100,000 jobs requiring secondary education or special skills, begin to fill up with Afri- cans; the Left may find the seeds of antagonism some- where in the remaining 95 percent of the working population.

In writing about Pio Pinto's socialism, Joseph Murumbi, Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs, per- haps anticipated the ideological battleground on which Pinto's former colleagues will be confronted by those who now have isolated them from power and who are solidly in command of the Government. "Pio always felt a guilt complex with regard to poverty," Mu- rumbi wrote in the commemorative booklet, "and he sought through his Socialist principles to be of prac- tical assistance and in his own way to help eliminate poverty and human suffering. He was quick to react to injustice. If such were the qualities of this patriot and he was branded as a Communist for his actions, then I must say to his accusers that their perception of political dogmas is indeed distorted." When and if the Left in Kenya produces an organization and a policy, both will have to be sophisticated and in- formed-anything less will leave them overly vulner- able to the political branding that Pinto himself received.

Thlis article is being simultaneously published in Transition (Kampala)

APARTHEID: Continued from page 6 cans with the most vicious racist views coming to the United States.

The South African Government even refuses tran- sit visas to some Americans merely wishing to cross a section of South Africa to go to one of the former High Commission Territories such as Basutoland.

This has even led to distinguished American scholars' being prohibited from essential research, or from discharging responsibilities toward institutions in the Territories. 9. The United States shlotld contribute generously to the newly-established United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa.

This Fund was set up by action of the General As- sembly in its 20th session. The purpose is to provide a channel through which governments can contribute for: (a) legal defense to prisoners charged under re- pressive legislation in South Africa; (b) relief of dependents of persons persecuted by the South Afri- can Government for opposition to apartheid; (c) education of prisoners and their children; (d) relief for South African refugees.

There are between five and ten thousand political prisoners in South Africa at present (the number fluctuates). It is estimated that there are at least 20,000 dependents of prisoners. The need for legal defense and aid to dependents is estimated at between six and seven hundred thousand dollars in 1966. This is based on a food allowance of less than $9.00 a month per family, educational needs of children and of prisoners, plus legal defense.

Last year, on the basis of a UN resolution asking for voluntary contributions to private funds, twelve countries gave about $300,000. This must be increased through the UN Trust Fund. 10. The US should plan speedy implewnentatiTvn of thi e International Court decision on Southtl West Africa.

The United States' continffency planning in antici- pation of the International Court of Justice's decision in the South West Africa case, to assist the speedy implementation of the Court's decision if it favors the complainants, should include the foliowlng: (a) continuing contact with the British to coordinate policy; (b) cooperation with, and assistance to, the OAU and its members in UN strategy; (c) preparing to take action in the Security Council under Article 94 of the UN Charter, if necessary, to implement the Court's decision, and encouraging other members of the Security Council to support such action; (d) con- sidering means by which the international commtunity can share the economic burden of sanetions against South Africa if they are employed to implement the Court's decision.

AFR ICA TODAY 21 1 East 43rd Street New York, N.Y. 10017

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What the US Can Do about Apartheid