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What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think about Author(s): David Dunning, Ziva Kunda and Sandra L. Murray Source: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1999), pp. 79-82 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449531 . Accessed: 14/06/2014 22:05 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Psychological Inquiry. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 185.2.32.152 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 22:05:42 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think about

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What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think aboutAuthor(s): David Dunning, Ziva Kunda and Sandra L. MurraySource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1999), pp. 79-82Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449531 .

Accessed: 14/06/2014 22:05

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to PsychologicalInquiry.

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Page 2: What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think about

Psychological Inquiry Copyright C 1999 by 1999, Vol. 10, No. 1, 79-82 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

AUTHORS' RESPONSE

What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think About

David Dunning Department of Psychology

Cornell University

Ziva Kunda Department of Psychology

University of Waterloo

Sandra L. Murray Department of Psychology

State University of New York-Buffalo

Looking over the 11 thoughtful commentaries on our three target articles, we were each struck by the re- markable consensus among this diverse set of experts on motivational approaches to social cognition. There is little disagreement among the commentators and ourselves about the past, present, and future of motiva- tional treatments of social psychological phenomena. There is little contention about the historical status of motivational approaches in social psychological re- search, although commentators do disagree somewhat on whether such approaches were ever out of favor (e.g., compare the comments of Brown and Marshall and of Snyder with those of Sherman and Sherman). More important, there is little disagreement about the present status of motivational approaches. With one exception, the commentators all share our view that motivation can and does affect cognition. (The excep- tion is when Fein et al. argue that the notion that moti- vation can affect cognition is useful but not unequivocally proven.)

Thus, it appears the debate over whether motivation influences judgment has been settled. As is evident from the commentators' shared reactions, the field has come to accept and endorse the importance of motiva- tional influences in social cognition. Most commenta- tors expressed this view in no uncertain terms. For example, Taylor and Hardin state that "the case for mo- tivated cognition is undeniable," and Sherman and Sherman assert "that motivations and cognitions criti- cally influence and constrain one another is certain." The commentaries also point to the wide range of do- mains in which such motivated influences have been demonstrated. Our own research focused on motivated thinking about the self, motivated use of stereotypes when forming impressions of others, and motivated

reasoning about one's intimate partners and relation- ships. The commentators note that motivation may also shape reactions to persuasive messages, social comparisons, and self-evaluations.

Having noted that past research has established the importance and prevalence of motivated cognition, the commentators all turn their attention to the future and contemplate what shape the "next generation" of re- search on motivated social cognition should take. What key questions should researchers focus on? What core principles or ideas should take center stage in work of this type? Two major themes emerge from the commentators' many valuable and provocative sug- gestions: It is necessary to gain deeper understanding of the interplay between motivation and cognition, and it is important to investigate what happens when peo- ple are driven by multiple, often conflicting motives si- multaneously. We too consider these issues central and wish to provide some thoughts as to why.

Integrating Motivation and Cognition

The first question concerns how one may inte- grate thinking about motivation with thinking about cognition. We agree with many of the commentators that it is fruitless to reify a motivation-cognition dis- tinction and then debate whether this or that social cognitive phenomenon is either motivational or cog- nitive in nature. Instead, we agree with several of the commentators that social judgment requires both motivation and cognition. At the very least, some- thing must jump-start the social cognitive machinery into thinking, and that is likely to be some sort of motivation, whether it be simple curiosity, or the

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DUNNING, KUNDA, & MURRAY

need to obtain some hedonically relevant informa- tion, or the desire to bolster the self (see Dunning, in press, for a review). To be sure, some theoreticians might demur in part from this assertion that motiva- tion always matters, stating that many social judg- ments just happen automatically, without an explicit goal or intention in mind (see Wegner & Bargh, 1998), but even these may serve some distal or un- conscious motive.

Indeed, as a few commentators have noted, the old cognition-motivation debate, in retrospect, was never a debate about whether social cognitive phenomena were purely cognitive in nature, and thus either did or did not require motives, but rather was one about which motive prevailed over social judgment (e.g., Sedikides). Those in the motivational camp asserted that people were energized by a self-affirmational mo- tive, one which they were especially skilled to fulfill. Those in the cognitive camp stated (albeit implicitly) that people were enervated by a motive to reach accu- rate and adaptive views of themselves and their social world. Unfortunately, people were only imperfectly skilled at fulfilling this goal. Thus, motives have al- ways mattered, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, in the theoretical analyses that psychologi- cal scholars brought to bear on their understanding of the social order.

But how do we integrate thinking about motiva- tional factors with thinking about cognitive ones? One way of doing so is to consider the ways in which motivation influences cognitive processes. In our view, there are three different points at which motiva- tion influences cognition. First, motivation instigates cognitive processes. When a person watches a job candidate stand up to start his or her job talk, the need to form an accurate and detailed impression will prob- ably start the cognitive gears turning. When a person feels particularly down on himself or herself, that feeling may prompt the person to turn on the Jerry Springer show to find someone that he or she feels su- perior to.

Second, motivation constrains the knowledge that people access and the conclusions they reach as they process social information. Much of our research has focused on this possibility. For example, Dunning's work suggests that the judgments that people reach about others are constrained by the motivation to retain flattering images of self. Similarly, Kunda and Sinclair's work suggests that the thoughts one acti- vates or inhibits in reaction to another person depend on whether that one is motivated to esteem or to dispar- age that person. Murray's work on intimate relations suggests that one's thoughts about one's significant others are constrained by the motivation to view those others as lovable and capable individuals.

Finally, motivation influences when cognitive ef- fort and deliberation is stopped. Sometimes, that influ-

ence is rather direct. If people need to know the answer to a question immediately, they will quickly reach an answer, regardless of whether it is favorable or unfa- vorable to them (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). At other times, the influence is rather indirect. If people's initial deliberations appear to be reaching a conclusion that is congenial to them, they are more likely to sus- pend their efforts than they are if the conclusion is aversive (Ditto & Lopez, 1992).

This tripartite portrayal of the influence of motiva- tion is echoed by many of the proposals that commen- tators provide on how to conceptualize the influence of motivation on cognition. For example, perhaps the best way to think about how motivation influences the instigation of social judgment is to consider Suls's terminology, that motivation importantly influences the exact question people ask of themselves at the time they start thinking. Furthermore, perhaps the best way to think about the constraining influences that social judgments place on the conclusions that people reach is to attempt to model them through par- allel-constraint-satisfaction models (e.g., Kunda & Thagard, 1996), as mentioned in passing by Kruglanski, with desired beliefs being cognitions that heavily constrain the shaping of other beliefs. Finally, the best way to conceptualize how motivations prompt the cessation of social thought may be to ex- pand on Chen and Chaiken's notion of the sufficiency principle.

Multiple Motives

It is obvious to note, but still worth saying, that tak- ing account of the role of motivation in social cogni- tion would help researchers to do a better job of describing social thought as it occurs in the real world. As one moves to the types of situations in which people sit in judgment of each other, one begins to appreciate the important impact that motivational forces have on social judgment. Nowhere is this impact more apparent than in the judgments people typically make the most frequently-namely, about their close relations and significant others. One's thoughts about one's parents, partners, siblings, and even the family pet are colored by a number of considerations that are not purely cog- nitive in nature. But more than that, as one moves to the real world and considers how judgments are made in it, one comes to two realizations about the role played by motivation in social cognition.

First, one begins to see that there is a long list of mo- tives that can influence social judgment. We have fo- cused largely on the need to affirm the self, with an additional emphasis (by Murray) that people wish to connect themselves with valued and valuable others. Other researchers have identified a host of additional motives that can come into play as people navigate

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AUTHORS' RESPONSE

their social worlds. Some of these motives are prompted by rather dispassionate requirements. For example, people can be motivated to reach decisions quickly because there simply is no time to do otherwise (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), or they need to arrive at some simple, coherent, and manageable conclusion about how their social worlds operate (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Other motivations are inspired by concerns for "sacred beliefs" that must be maintained above all else. In addition to the belief in one's own self-worth or that of one's intimates, these may include beliefs stemming from one's religion or ideology. Other motives center on improving oneself or one's lot in life, on managing the impressions others form of the self, on completing various tasks, or on regulating one's own and others' behavior (for more comprehen- sive inventories of the types of motives that influence social judgment, see Dunning, in press; Kunda, 1990; Pittman, 1998).

Second, and more intriguing for any next genera- tion of research on motivation, one sees that many dif- ferent motives can come into play for any one person in any given situation, with these motives often conflict- ing with one another. For example, the undergraduate student taking a practice version of the law school ad- missions test wants to get an accurate assessment of his or her current ability (the accuracy motive), yet wants to maintain some hope that he or she would do well (the affirmation motive), and also wants to pinpoint current weaknesses in his or her competence to avoid them in the future (the self-improvement motive). Or take the young man who is considering asking an at- tractive woman on a date. In addition to being moti- vated by the desire to spend time with this woman, he may be motivated by the self-enhancement need of proving his attractiveness and social skill. But, recog- nizing that he might face rejection, his need to protect his self-esteem and avoid potentially damaging situa- tions may also come into play. How will he resolve these conflicting goals? Or consider the teenager who wishes to make sure that her parents love her (the mo- tive for connectedness), but also has the need to rebel and establish her own identity (the motive toward au- tonomy). In such cases, which motive wins out in in- fluencing thought and behavior? How do people balance these competing and conflicting motivations?

We think that investigating the impact of multiple and competing motives will provide psychologists with a lot of value to say about social life. Indeed, thinking about past research, we can provide two ex- amples of how complicated but understandable por- trayals of human thought have arisen from thinking about competing motives. One example is provided in Murray's target article, which discusses the competi- tion people often feel about being connected with an- other person yet protecting one's self-esteem from rejection. According to Murray's data, that conflict is

settled in favor of different motives for people of high versus low self-esteem.

Another example of thinking through the implica- tions of competing motives was sketched out by Tesser (1988) in his model of self-evaluation maintenance. In this work, Tesser made two simple observations that ultimately conflict with each other. First, people wish to think of themselves as especially skilled and able among their peers. Second, they wish to surround themselves with laudable and enviable friends. But how can they satisfy both motivations? If one sur- rounds oneself with others of stellar skill and substan- tial accomplishment, how is one going to stand out as special? Or, if one decides to surround oneself with others who are clearly inferior, what is anyone else to say about one's judgment in friends? In his work, Tesser outlined the delicate dance that people perform in their choices of friends and in the importance they assign to various abilities and accomplishments in their attempt to balance the desire to think of them- selves and their friends as special.

Looking around at our acquaintances, and some- times into ourselves, we feel that there may be any number of similar dances that people perform as they attempt to balance the many competing motives that they hope to satisfy in their social thought and action.

Concluding Remarks

In sum, the last decade has seen substantial progress in research and theory on motivated cognition. The field has moved from debating whether motivation ever influences judgment to investigating the when and how of such influences. Social psychologists have begun accruing knowledge about how different mo- tives may affect diverse kinds of judgment, and they have begun exploring the consequences of such influ- ences. Despite, or perhaps thanks to, these substantial advances, many intriguing questions remain unan- swered. We hope progress on this front will continue in the coming decade.

Notes

Authors are listed in alphabetical order. The work of the authors was supported financially by National Institute of Mental Health Grant RO1 56072 to David Dunning, a Natural Sciences and Engineering Re- search Council of Canada Grant to Ziva Kunda, and a National Institute of Mental Health Bistart Grant (RO3 MH5753-01) to Sandra L. Murray.

Sandra L. Murray, Psychology Department, Park Hall, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260-4110. E-mail: [email protected]

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References

Ditto, P. H., & Lopez, D. F. (1992). Motivated skepticism: Use of dif- ferential decision criteria for preferred and nonpreferred conclu- sions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 568-584.

Dunning, D. (in press). On the motives underlying social cognition. In A. Tesser & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology, Vol. 1: Intrapersonal processes. New York: Blackwell.

Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: "Seizing" and "freezing." Psychological Review, 103, 263-283.

Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 480-498.

Kunda, Z., & Thagard, P. (1996). Forming impressions from stereo- types, traits and behaviors: A parallel-constraint-satisfaction theory. Psychological Review, 103, 284-308.

Neuberg, S. L., & Newsom, J. T. (1993). Personal need for structure: Individual differences in the desire for simple structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 113-131.

Pitnan, T. S. (1998). Motivation. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 549-590). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Tesser, A. (1988). Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of so- cial behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 181-227). New York: Academic.

Wegner, D. M., & Bargh, J. A. (1998). Control and automaticity in social life. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 446-498). New York: McGraw-Hill.

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