What Does it Mean to Question?

Interchange, Vol. 36/4, 405-430, 2005.© Springer 2006

What Does it Mean to Question?

MARGARET E. BÉRCICity University of New York

BRYANT GRIFFITHTexas A & M University – Corpus Christi

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is two fold: first, to teaseout the meaning inherent in the correlativity of the question andanswer process and second, to suggest a philosophical answer tothe question “What does it mean to question?” in the context ofteacher education. To that end, we want to claim that R.G.Collingwood’s “Logic of Question and Answer” is a valuable tool infilling the gap in scholarship concerning the art of questioning.While research into the activity of teaching often emphasizes therole and effectiveness of questioning, these studies have largelyfocussed on the strategies and results of the practice ofquestioning. We argue that they place too little emphasis onmaking sense of the process itself and that more time should bespent on the Logic of Question and Answer. To accomplish our goal,in Collingwoodian form, we will contextualize an example of howthe understanding of the question and answer complex informs thepractice of teacher education in the specific area of the SocialStudies Methods Course.

KEYWORDS: Question and answer, R.G. Collingwood, philosophyof education, epistemology, presuppositions, relationalunderstanding, teacher education, reflective practice, social studiesteaching.

ProlegomenonIn 1979, Douglas Adams published The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy.It instantly became a cult classic. Adams introduced us to “DeepThought,” a computer that was given the assignment to find theultimate answer to the “Great Questions of Life, the Universe andEverything.” After seven and a half million years of work, “DeepThought” declared, in infinite majesty and calm, that the awaitedanswer was “42.” Of course, no one understood the answer. Thecomputer assured the assembled intelligentsia that the reason that noone understood the answer was that no one present had ever known

DOI: 10.1007/s10780-005-8166-2

406 MARGARET E. BERCI and BRYANT GRIFFITH

what the exact question was. Once the question was actually known themeaning of the answer would become clear (1996, p.128). In thiswhimsical manner, Adams provided a glimpse into how authenticknowledge is constructed. The assumption Adams made was that thereis an important correlativity between question and answer. MarshallMcLuhan also commented on this correlativity, when he suggested thatthe problem today is not that we do not have the answers, but that wedo not have the questions.

This article modestly hopes to encourage thinking about whyquestioning needs thinking about. The objective for the inquiry is totease out the meaning inherent in the correlativity of the question andanswer process and to suggest a philosophical answer to thephilosophical question: What does it mean to question? Stating thepurpose of the inquiry in this manner does not mean that the focus is onencouraging thought or finding the right questions. Instead, we want tofocus on thinking about the process of the action of questioning itself.Our discussion will be contextualized in the field of teacher education,as questioning is at the heart of teaching and learning. For those bothon the outside, and the inside, of teacher education, methods coursesdefine the preparation of teachers. It is in those settings that a studentof teaching, well versed in her own subject matter (what to teach),discovers the techniques of how to teach. We want to argue, however,that not only is it within the methods course that there exists both thenecessary and sufficient condition for learning how to teach, but that itis also where one discovers “Why we teach, the way we do.” Viewing themethods courses in this manner is one key to making teacher educationvibrant and forceful and allows for modifications in how we address thechallenge to teach teachers in ways that are not superficial. It canredefine the role of teacher educators.

The creation of knowledge is a collaborative effort between manyparties, among them, philosophers, theorists, and practitioners.Philosophers bring the questions to the discussion, theorists providepossible ways to answer the questions, and the practitioners experimentwith the various answers provided by the theorists in the effort to bringabout a positive change in a particular area. On various levels and invarious ways, philosophers, theorists, and practitioners are all engagedin a collaborative dialogue on the questioning activity. It is unfortunatethat synergism of this sort is not often found in the classroom and thatthe teacher is expected to practice her art of teaching and learning byassuming all three perspectives, while in many cases not possessing thephilosophical understandings to do so. Theory and practice are

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO QUESTION? 407

important components of teacher education. We argue that without thephilosophical however there is a gap in understanding what it is toknow and how we come to know.

Lately, philosophy has often been marginalized in education circlesby the doubts cast upon its capacity to solve problems such as, how toeducate educators for efficacy and efficiency. Therefore, for a disciplinewhose original purpose was to wonder, to question, there can be foundno higher aim than to return to an inquiry into the foundation forquestioning by starting from its own questioning of that activity. AsMichael Meyer points out: “What is a philosophical problem if not aquestion whose answer is its own thematization? What is the rigor (andnot the method) of philosophy, if not the explication of this question-answer nexus?” (1995, p. 64).

This paper offers a more inclusive way to understand a difficult yetessential part of an argument of how we come to know and learn.

Literature on the Practical Aspect of QuestioningThe school subject of the Social Studies and the methodologies of itsvarious disciplines claim that it is essential for students to becomeeffective citizens. The ultimate goal of all teachers, of all subjects, andof all classroom curricula is to focus on knowledge that is desirable andnecessary to this end (See: NCSS, 2001; Western Protocol, 2000). Yet,since the first study of classroom behaviour in 1912, it has been theactivity of teachers’ questioning-asking behaviour that has remainedessential and essentially unchanged. Research into the activity ofteaching has therefore placed large emphasis on the role andeffectiveness of questioning in stimulating thinking and learning.(Christenbury & Kelly, 1983; Gall, 1970, 1984; Gallagher & Aschner,1963, 1983; Dillon, 1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Klinzig & Klinzig-Eurich,1985; Wilen, 1982, 1984; Wilen & Clegg, 1986). Numerous studiesindicate that much has been revealed about the role of questioning inthe context and enterprise of teaching; however, the bulk of the researchhas focussed on the strategies and results of the practice of questioningplacing little emphasis on making foundational sense of the processitself.

Teacher educators continually stress Thomas R. McDaniel’sconvictions that: in large measure good teaching is good questionasking; that as a primary tool in their pedagogical repertoire, the art ofasking truly effective questions – questions that motivate, evaluate, andkeep the thinking process alive – is an art every teacher should master.


Every past and current text used in the various discipline basedmethods courses in teacher education programs contains at least onechapter devoted to the practice of questioning, demonstrating the firmbelief that: “Teachers need to think of questioning as a tool to ensurethat students are attentive, thinking, and reflecting” (Duplass, 2004, p.323). Such a generalized objective indicates that the question for anystudent of teaching is therefore, not whether To question or not toquestion? rather, How good a questioner can I be?

Theoretical Research on the Questioning ActivityIn the context of the theoretical, there do exist a relatively smallnumber of projects that moves the research from the singular focus onskill acquisition. Macmillan and Garrison (1988) proposed an image ofteaching based upon an erotetic concept of teaching. They analysedteaching as a question-answering activity and developed their theoryfrom that analysis. Their theory helps to clarify areas of educationaldecision-making and criteria for successful teaching as well asunderscores the theory-leadenness of all inquiry. In a study that borderson the purely philosophical, Michael Meyer coined the term,problematalogy (1995), and created a theory of how questioning works– what directs questioning, that is, what gives it meaning.

It is building on such tradition that the present inquiry aims toexamine what it means to question and at the same time give renewedpurpose to philosophy. Keeping with the strong assertion that themethodology of the teacher educator is philosophical teaching, theinquiry into this goal leads to suggest that it is not enough to study theapplications and strategies of the question-answer activity. Theeducator, at any level, must also be encouraged to take on the role of thephilosopher, in order to understand in a deeper sense, in a philosophicalsense, the conceptual framework(s) that predicates the activity. Byevoking the philosopher self, the teacher concerns herself not solely withthe more superficial goal of accumulating files full of strategies; ratherwith the meaningful activity of understanding the nature of what she isteaching and of the processes she uses to teach it.

Why R.G. Collingwood? An Approach to the Discussion

One way to accomplish this task is to take on the challenge to tease outthe nature of the Logic of Question and Answer. As such thephilosophical basis for the present discussion is founded on


Collingwood’s idea that experience and thought is a single force, the twofaces of a coin, and that of the two facets, thought is the chief drivingforce. Collingwood’s work has focussed on finding the right philosophicalprocesses to guide the individual to live a better life in whatever contextshe or he chooses. In his quest, he explored the idea of the Logic ofQuestion and Answer. The choice to pursue Collingwood’s ideas from theperspective of educators of teachers of the Social Studies, grew out ofpersonal affinity with his thoughts based on research into his publishedand unpublished works, the secondary sources and upon a recognitionof the relevance of the work to teacher education. The exploration of theLogic of Question and Answer is particularly useful for furthering thegoals of the philosophy of education and fills the gap in scholarshipconcerning the art of questioning. It presents an idea that is of centralimportance to teacher education. In this paper, we will use idea ratherthan concept because the word idea connotes a desire for a philosophicaldiscussion. As an idea, it is equated with a form of knowledge and notonly with a tool of knowledge. To use idea and thereby elevate it tophilosophy means that it is universal, necessary, and that it is not onlya part of a particular philosophy but also the whole of it. In the presentcontext, it elevates the education of teachers to a philosophical activity.

The present inquiry will strive to provide a platform forCollingwood’s voice and present a hermeneutic interpretation ofCollingwood ex Collingwood. The research and writing isautobiographical and therefore there is an interactive aspect in themethodology encapsulated in the commonality of experience that wehave established with Collingwood in our contexts of teacher educators.The part of the paper that presents the ideas of Collingwood does so, byloosely mimicking a dialogue between Collingwood as teacher, and theinterlocutor(s). This is possible because there can exist the experienceof a strong “spiritual intercourse between individuals who have nooutward contact whatever” (Collingwood, 1916, p. 161). To achieve thiseffect, Collingwood’s words, mutates mutandis, are at times directlyquoted, at times paraphrased, is set into the text rather thandemarcated. The intention is to allow the dialogue to flow seamlessly.Our part as interlocutors (supported by the words and thoughts of otherthinkers) serves the dialogue by grounding it in the philosophy, theory,and practice of teacher education. As an a priorito presenting thearguments that install the idea of the Logic of Question and Answer inits rightful place, alongside the theoretical and practical literature onthe idea of question there is a need to make explicit the gap in thescholarship that it purports to fill.


Arguments of the Logic of Question and AnswerCollingwood’s metaphysical / epistemological argument forunderstanding the important aspect of how students of teaching makeuse of the question-answer sequence to learn and create knowledge restson three suppositions. First, question and answer are inseparablephases of a single activity, the activity of coming to know. Second, aquestion is an indeterminate proposing of alternative statements whileits answer is the determination of a correct alternative. Third,knowledge is not propositional but interrogative. These suppositionswould suggest: that knowledge is not to be identified with the answersto questions but with the question-answer process and that there is aneed to move away from a trend that has ignored this idea of thequestioning process when pursuing a foundation for the creation ofknowledge.

Having set the parameters for the dialogue and positioned it in theliterature, we take up the challenge to question questioning, andinitiate, as promised, our dialogue with Collingwood. We begin theinterchange by discussing with our mentor, the different positions onhow we come to understand the role of our presuppositions in anyinquiry. To explore presuppositions is to turn (return) to “a majorconcern of researchers and teacher educators: a teacher’s capacity todetermine (right) courses of action and the dispositions and processesthat presumably underlie that capacity” (Buchmann, 1988). Suchpurposeful determination comes not from simply knowing the rules foraction but from a personal knowledge of the reason why those actionsare paramount.

An Idea of an Idea: A Dialogue

Instrumental Understanding VersusRelational Understanding

Interlocutor: The Logic of Question and Answer largely concernsitself with self-epistemology, the foundations of how individuals discoverthe questions, answers, and presuppositions that form the complete unitof thought concerning how we know ourselves and how we ourselvescome to know what it is to know. It demonstrates that we think not ina series of movements from one proposition to another, but in a seriesof questions, each following the other in the right order.

These ideas can provide a guide for educators who organize teachereducation and must strive to do so based on the nature of knowledge


and relational understandings rather than on a certain kind ofinstrumental understanding. In the present context, the concept ofinstrumental understanding is delineated to mean the possession andapplication of “rules-without-reason” (Taylor, 1991a, 1991b). The termtechnical rationality also refers to this type of context-free view ofknowledge in which knowledge is the cultivation of the pursuit ofinformation that is alienated from the knower (Schön, 1983, p. 21).Education based on this perspective can prevent independentinterpretation and thinking. In contrast, relational understandingprovides a meaningful context for understanding concepts and theirrelationships and is the result of understanding the process of knowing(Skemp, 1976, pp. 20-26). This is the more sophisticated form ofcontextualized knowing; it is a way of knowing rather than simply a setof skills to be used (Magolda, 1999). What other issues are inherent inthis type of understanding?

The Problems of Instrumental UnderstandingCollingwood: One way to improve our understanding of some

things is to figure out why they malfunction or break down. This is alsoone way to access an argument against instrumental understanding.The whole of Collingwoodian epistemology refutes the belief that thefully conscious mind is like a tabula rasa upon which is recorded thedata transmitted to it by the other senses. From this perspective: Eachfact is what it is irrespective of all others. The relations of each to therest do nothing to affect their nature, for each is wholly closed withinitself and is knowable as a perfectly isolated atom (Collingwood, 1924,p. 232). On every occasion, the object is separated from the subject,(Collingwood, 1924, p. 259) and the position is summed up in thenegative formula that knowledge can make no difference to its object(Collingwood, 1939/1970, p. 44); that the known is not affected by beingknown. This would also imply that the knower makes no difference tothe known. Knowledge is a simple act of intuiting or a simpleapprehending an independent reality (Collingwood, 1939/1970, p. 25).This image of knowledge is static and in the end passive; it sees allknowledge as simple intuition and apprehension, the simple co-presenceof mind and its object.

Interlocutor: It is clearly an unjust representation, as this type ofunderstanding completely ignores, or at least underestimates, theactive, restless, questioning aspects of knowledge (Smith, 1975, p. 23).


It fragments the process of how we come to know. It ignores the benefitsof the unity and integration of knowledge (Benson, Glasberg, & Griffith,1998,) an idea upon which classical education was based. It also fails torecognize the wonder that is inherent in human beings and in thehuman condition.

Collingwood: Yes, the true representation of the human conditionrecognizes that from the time we are born to the time we die ourexperience is characteristically one of engagement and earnest concern,as manifest in our complex and often changing interests and needs.Because of our involvement with life, with various forms of experience,problems arise, and questions emerge as needing answers; the world isencountered not as a body of truths to be discovered, but rather as acomplex of questions to be answered (Collingwood, 1939/1970, chapterV).

Interlocutor: For the constructivist educator, who takes to heartMargaret Mead’s words that: “we are now at a point where we musteducate our children in what no one knew yesterday, and prepare ourschools for what no one knows yet,” education under the rubric ofinstrumental understanding is not an option (cited in Jacobsen, 1999,p. 33). What we need is a new kind of knowledge creation other than theinstrumental.

Metaphysical Solution to InstrumentalityCollingwood: Knowledge is obviously more than content, it is a

complex activity consisting of the assertions together with consciousreflection on, or thinking about the questions that the assertions aremeant to answer. The questioning activity is not an activity of achievingcompresence with, or apprehension of, something; it [is] not preliminaryto the act of knowing; it [is] one half (the other half being answering thequestion) of an act which in its totality [is] knowing (Collingwood,1939/1970, p. 26).

Interlocutor: This would indicate that questions arise because ofexperiences and the concern is not so much with personality per se aswith the relationships of that personality with its experiences. WhenPlato described thinking as a “dialogue of the soul with itself,” he meantthat conscious reflection was a process of question and answer, and thatthe primacy had to be with the activity of questioning. This is why one


of the prime considerations is to acknowledge that knowledge is bothwhat is known and the act of knowing.

Collingwood: The mind, as thought, is not an entity but a processof thinking in which there is a series of questions that lead to thoughtdevelopment. One form of question develops into another form thatrequires still another. The knowledge one acquires depends on whatquestions one is asking; so that a person who is asking questions of onekind learns one kind of thing from an experience, which to anotherperson reveals something different, to a third something illusory, andto a fourth nothing at all (Collingwood, 1939/1970, p. 25). Knowledge isa scale from ignorance through opinion to knowledge, or again fromassumption, through opinion and understanding to reason. Eachquestion moves what is known from a lower to a higher form ofknowledge yet incorporates in it parts of the other question below it(Collingwood, 1924).

Interlocutor: This process is therefore dependent upon the activityof question and answer, and each answer to a question represents acoming to know more fully and consciously. A visual presentation of theprocess of coming to know would be a spiral since each question, whichrepresents a form of knowledge, also incorporates relations of degree,kind, distinction, and opposition.

Collingwood: Certainly, the higher of any two adjacent formsoverlaps the lower because it includes the positive content of thelower…it only fails to include the lower in its entirety because there isalso a negative aspect of the lower, which is rejected by the higher(Collingwood, 1933/1950, p. 90).

Interlocutor: Thus, the negative aspect that is rejected becomesthe part of the previous question that presents an inconsistency.However, inconsistencies are often an important spur to furtherthinking. Because the fundamental cognitive situation is one of inquiryand problem solving, there needs to be developed a working process foranalyzing the basic structural features of what comes to be called high-grade thinking, like history, science, and philosophy, that is, thinkinginvolved in the solving of problems (Smith, 1975, pp. 22-27). Thisinvolves thought about thought and thinking about thinking. However,the Logic of Question and Answer does not distinguish a question from


a problem. Instead, it stipulates that a problem sets a task that can beexpressed in the form of a question (Somerville, 1989, p. 538). This ideaof question better serves the purposes of constructivist educators thandoes the idea of problem. A problem implies that there is a singlesolution while a question may open up the possibilities for wonder anddiversity of thought.

Collingwood: Not all questions pose further thought. In the lowestof low-grade thinking, as in art and religion, which asserts itself infeeling and faith, we are wholly unaware that every thought we findourselves thinking is the answer to a question (Collingwood, 1940/1957,p. 36). We are only aware of a perception or a feeling that is not yetidentified.

Interlocutor: Of course, this poses a metaphysical-epistemologicaldilemma: it is not possible to make statements about reality withoutfirst having a theory for arriving at truth; and, a theory of truth cannotbe developed without first having a concept of reality (Knight, 1989, p.27). The dilemma can be addressed if we admit that a question (thetheory) cannot be separated from the answer (the concept of reality).The critics, who include educational theorists, declare that it isunfruitful to justify educational goals and procedures with metaphysicalarguments and have rejected the metaphysicians’ interests as irrelevantsince, they claim, any question raised by the metaphysicians reachbeyond experience; therefore, their answers cannot be proven eithertrue or false by empirical methods of verification. Instead, these criticsturned to the needs of society in order to justify educational programsthat teach specific skills. This approach is inadequate because itemphasizes only the social side of a person’s nature. It ignores the innerbeing; the individual who makes the significant decisions based on theposition she has adopted on the metaphysical-epistemologicalcontinuum.

The argument for the inclusion of the philosophical, reflectiveperspective is a reaction and rebellion against a state of being that theCollingwoodian thinker identifies as the "maladie du siecle"(Collingwood, 1924, p. 22), and the contemporary critic, Charles Taylor,refers to as the "malaise of modernity" (1991a, 199b). This problem ismanifested by: the submergence of the individual in a system; thedehumanizing practice of reducing people to numbers that can easily bemanipulated and controlled; the tendency to regard the individual as a


means of commercial or political end; our preoccupation with triviality;and our deliberate state of mental unawareness which is encouraged bymany social agencies, including the school.

For the Collingwoodian, as well as for Taylor, the questionconfronting us is how to overcome the anomaly that has led us to aposition of increased control over the forces of nature and yet a lack ofcontrol over ourselves and lack of determination or the will to solveproblems. The answer begins with the understanding that this is sobecause we do not have a clear sense of the issue and upon whatquestions they rest. We are in possession of skills, but do notunderstand the process that brings control over nature and control overourselves together.

The Idea of “The Logic of Question and Answer”Collingwood: It is important to remember, that the Logic of

Question and Answer is an idea that was developed in the field, for asa philosopher, historian, archeologist, there were countless occasions tostudy and interpret thought from the past. There was sensitivity to thedifficulty involved in correctly understanding and interpreting thatthought from the past (Collingwood, 1939/1970, chapter IV). Ashistorian, archeologist, there is a recognition that a full understandingof some artifact or historical text required not only knowing the artifactper se, or having a faithful copy of the text, but knowing the question towhich that artifact, or text was a response. I began by observing thatyou cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spokenor written statements, even though he has spoken or written withperfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In orderto find out his meaning you must already know what the question was(a question in his mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to whichthe thing he has said or written was meant as an answer (Collingwood,1939/1970, p. 31). Any one can understand any philosopher’s doctrinesif he can grasp the questions which they are intended to answer(Collingwood, 1939/1970, p. 55).

Interlocutor: These are words that closely equate with those ofHans George Gadamer:

A person who seeks to understand must question what lies behindwhat is said. He must understand it as an answer to a question. Ifwe go back behind what is said, then we inevitably ask questionsbeyond what is said. We understand the sense of the text only by


acquiring the horizon of the question that, as such necessarilyincludes other possible answers. Thus, the meaning of a sentenceis relative to the question to which it is a reply; that is, itnecessarily goes beyond what is said in it. The logic of the humansciences is, then, as appears from what we have said, the logic ofthe question. (1999, p. 370)

Collingwood: In An Essay on Metaphysics (1940/1957, pp. 23-32), thecomponents of this question and answer correlativity is summed up infive propositions:

1. Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer toa question.

2. Every question involves a presupposition.3. The logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend on the

truth of what is supposed, or even upon its being thought true,but only on its being supposed.

4. A presupposition is either relative or absolute.5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions

The exposition begins with a claim that every statement that anybodyever makes is made in answer to a question. It is this relation betweena statement and the question from which it arises that constitutes the“correlativity of question and answer.” To say that a question “does notarise” is the ordinary English way of saying that it involves apresupposition, which is not in fact being made (Collingwood, 1940/1957,p. 26).

Interlocutor: This correlativity of question and answer can be moreclearly understood by treating question and answer as parts of thesingle activity of inquiry rather than as separate, static linguisticentities. Although they are interdependent, question and answerrepresent different degrees of knowledge (Frey, 1987, pp.33-34; Mink,1969, p. 131). On a certain level, question and answer are correlativeterms like “cause” and “effect,” but the intention is obviously somethingmore profound, is it not?

Collingwood: Yes, the question is the initial stage of an inquirywhile the answer is the concluding stage. An inquiry begins withuncertainty or doubt; this stage is the “suspension of assertion”(Collingwood, 1924, pp.78-79). A question, however, is not a doubt.


Interlocutor: But, questioning is frequently entangled withdoubting. Doubts do motivate questions, and doubtfulness is usedinterchangeably with questionableness; but doubting X strictly meansentertaining a view that not-X is the case, while questioning X meansaiming at any sort of new interpretation of X. To question is the sameas thinking (Smith, 1992, pp.129-130). This suspension of assertion isan essential moment in the activity of coming to know, one which isneglected by most epistemologists. It is a pause to survey alternatives.During the pause, we step back from the alternatives, in one sense, butare not indifferent to them, and are really asking about them andwhether any of them might become the answer, we seek; we have withinourselves possible paths for future action. Through this metaphysicalattitude, we can consider together different supposals, alternatives,hypotheses, or possibilities, which cannot exist simultaneously inactuality (For a unique application to education see: Eisner, 1997).

Collingwood: It is difficult to understand this aspect ofquestioning if we cut the question off from its answer. When weseparate it from its answer the question becomes a state of blankignorance, total bewilderment; this entails that in answering a questionwe move directly from complete ignorance to total knowledge. However,this conception of the question must be rejected since, asking a questionimplies contemplating alternatives. A question that offers noalternatives is a bogus question. The technique of knowing proper, orwhat is called scientific method, depends on replacing questions which,being vague or confused, are unanswerable, by real questions, orquestions which have a precise answer (Collingwood, 1942/1966, 11.2,p. 74).

One interpretation of this is that the question is an indeterminatestatement, that is, a statement containing incompatible alternatives;the answer to a question is its determination, that is, the simultaneousaffirmation of one alternative and denial of those that conflict with it.Supposal and assertion are not two independent chapters in the historyof mind; they are two opposite and correlative activities, which form thesystole and diastole of knowledge itself (Collingwood, 1924, p. 77). Theunion of the two is found in the act of questioning. Consequently,knowledge does not proceed from ignorance to total knowledge; it movesfrom partial knowledge, or knowing that there are alternative answersto a question, to a more complete and determinate knowledge of whichalternative is the correct answer.


Interlocutor: Following this line of thinking, given the question, acorrect answer does not follow as a matter of logic. Nevertheless, whatcounts as a possible answer does, for to understand the question is toknow what would count as a possible answer to it. By contrast, if onehas not heard the question, one might have to guess it from the answer,especially detailed answers to how and why questions. An answer doesnot suggest its question in the way a question may suggest the answer(Somerville, 1989, p. 538). This would appear to be the case with theanswer of “42” given by “Deep Thought,” an answer that could notsuggest a possible question, even though we know that it is part of thecomplex of a question and answer. (It is in this context that we findourselves constantly reminding our students of the importance offormulating the right questions.)

Collingwood: By right is meant the answer, which enables us toget ahead with the process of questioning and answering; right does notmean, true (Collingwood, 1939/1970, p. 37). Only when one knows whatquestion has been asked can one say the answer is intelligible, that is,that the answer satisfactorily fits the question.

Interlocutor: This way of viewing the thoughts or statements ofsomeone has very interesting implications for the understanding of anythinker’s ideas either as they are in themselves or as they are inrelation to positions held by other thinkers (Nordberg, 1977, pp.73-75;see also: Connelly, 1984, pp. 137-157).

In order to clarify this implication for students of teaching we needonly to situate ourselves in two overlapping contexts: teacher andstudent. In the context of teacher as questioner, it is not as importantthat the questions be true, but that the questioner know the truth of thequestion being asked. Even deliberately false assumptions can be usefulto a line of questioning in some circumstances. In the context of studentas questioner, the act of questioning communicates what the questionerassumes by the act of asking the question. For a question to be genuineor sincere, the presumptions must be true. The questioner must beignorant of the answer, be in a state of curiosity, and have a desire toknow the answer. She or he must believe not only that she or he isasking the right question, but also have faith that the answer can beknown. He or she must have the courage and will, not only to ask, butalso to receive the answer.


The Role of Presuppositions in the“Logic of Question and Answer”

Collingwood: Inquiry, therefore, is essentially a process ofquestioning. But we must recognize that no question ever arises invacuum. A question has a special relation to the presupposition fromwhich it directly arises: Whenever anybody states a thought in words,there are a great many more thoughts in [her] mind than are expressedin [her] statement (Collingwood, 1940/1957, p. 21). All questioning orwanting to know has its ground in something presupposed; for unless Ihad inkling that there is more to be had than I already know, I could noteven begin to systematically seek what I do not know. Within eachquestion, which in its capacity as question is not knowing, there is somekind of knowing otherwise the question could not arise in the first place.A question looks back as well as forward. To ask any question, even thesilliest or most irresponsible, we must already possess information. Amind which did nothing but question could not even frame its questions;the questions which it asked would be mere marks of interrogation, theempty form of questioning, questioning which asked nothing(Collingwood, 1924, p. 79).

Interlocutor: This line of thinking aligns with J.T. Dillon’s appliedexplanation of what happens during the questioning activity. Dillon(1990) suggests that there are three ordered elements to the act:assumptions, questions, and answers, where presuppositions are theassumptions the questioner makes before asking the question. Theformulation of questions depend on how they are put into words, andanswers are the response that may or may not give direct answer to aquestion and in fact an answer may evade the question with an answerthat has nothing to do with the question, or are distorted by providinginformation which is inaccurate. If a teacher wants to become a goodquestioner, then, she must not ask a structured set of questions in aspecific way. She or he must instinctively understand the best sort ofquestion to ask, and more importantly, to listen to the answer he or shereceives. Clearly, presuppositions control the logic of questions andanswers. From another perspective, in order to understand why ourstudents make the statements they do, teacher educators must have asense of who the students are and from what autobiographical contexttheir statements originate.

Questioning therefore always requires a body of information; to aska question is to presuppose something. Macmillan and Garrison who


make use of Hintikka / Aqvist version of the theory of erotetic logicbased on intentionality, are particularly good on demonstrating how thisconcept helps us see what is happening in the act of teaching. Theyexplain that throughout the question-answer sequence there is apossibility and desirability for the discovery of all presuppositions thatmust be satisfied or rejected if an answer is to be justified (1988, pp. 81-99). However, if this contemporary argument is to be moved furtherthen the distinction between two types of presuppositions must bemade: a relative presupposition, of which there can be many, asMacmillan and Garrison explore, and an absolute presupposition, ofwhich there is only one per question.

Collingwood: The distinction becomes necessary since besidesbeing the answer to a particular question, a statement can be logicallyefficacious in that it suggests or “gives rise to” another question(Collingwood, 1939/1970, p. 37).

Interlocutor: Hence, a presupposition can give rise to a question,which has an answer; this answer, in turn, can give rise to anotherquestion, which has an answer, which gives rise to another question andso forth. This chain of questions can go on indefinitely, but for theargument that a question and answer complex taken as a whole musthave something from which it originates. Thus, while a question andanswer complex can pro-gress indefinitely, it cannot re-gressindefinitely. In order to avoid infinite re-gress, we distinguish a relativefrom an absolute presupposition (Frey, 1987, p.37)

Collingwood: A relative presupposition is related to two questionsas the answer of one and the presupposition that gives rise to another.Because a relative presupposition answers a question, it is verifiable.One calls a relative presupposition into question by raising the questionit purports to answer (Collingwood, 1940/1957, p. 29).

Interlocutor: Then one verifies this relative presupposition byshowing that it is the correct answer to the question. The right answeris one that is logically efficacious, one that generates further goodquestions (Frey, 1987, pp. 36-38).


Collingwood: On the other hand, an absolute presupposition,while it gives rise to a chain of questions and answers, can never be theanswer to a question: it stands, relatively to all questions to which it isrelated, as a presupposition, never as an answer (Collingwood,1940/1957, p. 31). An absolute presupposition is the solid ring of thoughtupon which all of a person’s actions and thoughts hang. They are thefundamental rules that bind together our historical-autobiographicalconcepts and allow us to formulate new relative presuppositions. Anabsolute presupposition is the foundation upon which the possibility ofall intellectual activity rests.

Interlocutor: All philosophers grapple with this entity and havediscussed it using various terms: a priori, pre-judgment, tacitknowledge, implicit understanding and more recently as a “blink”(Gladwell, 2005). All refer to something beforehand as a foundation, asa basis for knowing. This identification of an absolute presuppositionadvances Jean-Paul Sartre’s idea that “man first of all exists,encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himselfafterwards” (1946, p. 4). This statement, in effect, declares that personsare free to become the kind of person they propose. The essence theycreate is a product of their choice and will; a product that varies fromindividual to individual and depends on each individual’s uniqueabsolute presupposition.

How the Logic of Question and Answer Informs thePractice of Teacher Education

What can the educator of teachers learn from this discussion betweenCollingwood and his interlocutors? The short answer is many things.For our purposes let us revisit the most relevant aspects of our dialogue,tease out some of Collingwood’s comments that most speak to educators,and suggest through an example how they might come into play. Let usalso state clearly that this analysis is not intended to represent all ofCollingwood’s views on this subject. Instead, we are attempting to gleanfrom him what, in our opinion, might be of immediate use to both abeginning and a practising teacher.

We know that the Logic of Question and Answer is a process not anevent. For Collingwood this simple statement characterizes the natureof mind. Thinking without beginning or end. We also learned that everystatement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question,and that the relation between a statement and the question from which


it arises constitutes the “correlativity of question and answer.”Therefore, what educators need to emphasize as they teach, is neitherthe singular importance of the question nor the answer, but thecorrelativity between the two. Collingwood told us that knowledge ismuch more than content, it is a complex activity consisting of theassertions together with conscious reflection on, or thinking about thequestions that its assertions are meant to answer. To this endquestioning and it’s correlative act of answering are what is known intotality, as knowing. Collingwood also told us that every questioninvolves a proposition (1940/1957, pp. 23-32). While every questionpresupposes a prior question, the act of knowing is not mere questioningit must be accompanied by the process of answering.

Let us continue to refer to Collingwood as he weaves the variousaspects of the Logic of Question and Answer into the process of learning.Inquiry is a process of questioning. We must recognize that no questionever arises in vacuum. Whenever anybody states a thought in words,there are many other thoughts in [her/his] mind than are expressed in[her/his] statement (Collingwood, 1940/1957, p. 21). Unless I had aninkling that there is more to be had than I already know, I could noteven begin to systematically seek what I do not know. Within eachquestion, there is some kind of knowing; otherwise, the question couldnot arise in the first place. A question looks back as well as forward. Toask any question, even the silliest or most irresponsible, we mustalready possess information. A mind which did nothing but questioncould not even frame its questions; the questions which it asked wouldbe mere marks of interrogation, the empty form of questioning,questioning which asked nothing (Collingwood, 1970/1939, p. 79).

Where does this lead our educator? We believe that the answer tothat question lies in the realization that teaching and learning are aprocess based on the totality of these ideas. We believe that all teachingshould begin with the realization that knowledge is a philosophicalprocess in which each question is tied logically to its a priori and thatquestions and answers are joined by the philosophical presuppositionswhich form the basis of our knowledge about ourselves and ourunderstanding of the world.

According to Wiggins and McTighe, when we understand, we “canexplain, can interpret, can apply, have perspective, can empathize, andhave self-knowledge” (1998, p. 44). The benefit to be had from teasingout the nature of the Logic of Question and Answer is the possession ofa metaphysical base that incorporates ways we reach our goals ofunderstanding and helps to frame the inquiry challenges that we, as


teacher educators, set for our students of teaching. However, unlike inthe many highly structured systems of thought on how we come toknow, the individual does not get lost. If existence comes before fullconsciousness, then knowledge must begin with the subjective. Throughthe exploration of the relative presuppositions that bind together allthose who educate, the student of teaching can identify her personalabsolute presupposition. When the teacher questions her actions in theclassroom, she will find that in each instance her answers rest upon herunique absolute presupposition. It also becomes apparent that relativepresuppositions are subject to conflicts and strains, can collapse underthese strains and are then replaced by another complex. It becomesnecessary to continually reflect on the relative presuppositions as theyarise in action and experience. Only after such investigation can theeducator turn to the question of the other, her pupil; to the meaning ofthe other and examine how she encounters the other to become awareof just exactly what is her relationship with her charges (Trouther,1969). David Carr (1998) also notes that philosophical processes areintrinsic to an educator’s work and that teacher preparation programsmust have a role for philosophy in both the theoretical educationalstudies and in the methods courses. However, the difficult question ishow to induct teachers into a philosophical inquiry. An understandingof the Logic of Question and Answer can nurture the current emphasison this type of reflective practice by providing the foundationalunderstanding for a possible answer to the question: “How do weapproach the activity of reflective practice?”

The Logic of Question and Answer provides insights that can alsoserve as guides to new educational goals that provide teachers with theability to have deep feelings for, or to derive significant meanings from,the experiences that they undergo. Educators who are, and must alwaysremain, lifelong learners must be aware of the need to draw informationfrom themselves by means of skillfully leading themselves to theirauthentic questions. These are questions that arise naturally as they goabout their work, and which bring about more self-understanding andless reliance on external authority. To know is embedded in anunderstanding of the presuppositions of questions. Moreover, they mustlearn to discriminate between a significant and trivial question, andacknowledge that this will depend upon their skill in raising authenticquestions. Unlike trivial questions, significant questions are those thatlead to further inquiry. Another way to say this is that they mustrecognize the right answer, in order to advance the question-answer


process. If an answer to a question is considered to be a right answerthen it will open the inquiry to further questions.

For the teacher, who reflects upon an experience and asks thequestion: What is it that I have here? and an answer presents itself;then the next question will undoubtedly be: What am I going to do aboutit? The relative presuppositions that formed the question and answercomplex results in the inquiry, and the presuppositions that areuncovered, lead to further the teacher’s practice. Those who aim to teachmust come to realize that any unexamined experiences, values andideas all too often threaten their efficacy and development. Teachereducation must not neglect the metaphysical understandings inherentin the goal of reflective practice and must promote the need and methodfor the examination of the presuppositions, relative and absolute, whichare the foundation for understanding who is the person, that is teacher.

An Application of the Logic of Question and Answer:An Example

Our second aim in this paper was to suggest a philosophical answer tothe question: What does it mean to question? Philosophy is not a self-contained operation; it does not need to be done by people calledphilosophers. Philosophy in a sense is a very odd kind of discipline thatdoes not have its own remit and in most aspects; it is pretty well uselessand hopeless unless it is done with other disciplines. Collingwood oftenmade this point in his writings and by example in the various academicpositions he held at Oxford. Without making an apology for philosophyin general and philosophy of education in particular, we wish to furtherconnect the Logic of Question and Answer to teacher education,especially in a personal approach to the art of teaching the SocialStudies, in which teachers must question their most basic assumptionsabout things like democracy, citizenship, multiculturalism, diversity.

The metaphor of teaching as art, and the teacher as artist asopposed to a craftsperson, is a more viable one in the light of thepresent discussion. The artist must have a certain specialized formor skill, which is called technique. He acquires his skill just as acraftsman does, partly through personal experience and partlythrough sharing in the experience of others who thus become histeachers. The technical skill which he thus acquires does not itselfmake him an artist; for a technician is made an artist is born.(Collingwood, 1938/1945, p. 26)


Teacher as artist does not simply apply ideas in the classroom but sheinterprets ideas by the use of intellect through imaginary experiencesand the questioning of those experiences in reflection.

In many respects, this view also serves the goal to revitalize thesubject of the Social Studies by promoting a single component of a modelfor transforming the Social Studies classroom. The current SocialStudies programs based on imposed standards, traditional textbooks,and the lecture model do not adequately prepare students to be active,involved, independent and thinking citizens in the 21st century (Seif,2004). Gagnon (2003) reports that standards based education does notsufficiently address the ideas that students need in order to understandwhat it means to be productive citizens in a democratic society. Oneapproach to be considered is Wiggins’ and McTighe’s (1998) “backwarddesign” model. It represents a constructivist application of thetheoretical framework that rests on the Logic of Question and Answer,albeit one that they do not formally acknowledge.

Bérci incorporates an application of the backward design to modela methodology, a best practice, for the teaching of the Social Studiesthat connects the philosophical with the practical. She first constructsa road map for her students that identifies the destination(s) or the "BigIdea (s)" that represents what, how, and why to teach the subject. BigIdeas are powerful, long-lasting concepts or generalizations that willhelp students consider new ideas and examine their beliefs. During thecourse she spirals through the six facets of Wiggins’ and McThighe’smodel for understanding each Big Idea and stresses the fact thatplanned teaching of Big Ideas requires teacher insight into philosophicaltheories and processes that are inherent in them. The six facets ofunderstanding assume a practical structure for reflection based oneffective ways of raising important questions that allows the student toloop back and forth across the six facets. These six facets are:explanation, interpretation, application, perspective, empathy, and self-knowledge.

Students confront an idea or an experience that needsinterpretation; they apply the ideas to personal experiences and explainwhat they have learned and link it to content knowledge. They moveback and forth between interpreting ideas and presenting arguments forwhy, how, and what of it. They each develop a hypothesis based on theevidence, and on prior beliefs. They follow up by constructing anarrative under which the hypothesis can be tested. After a thoroughgroup discussion of their narrative, they rethink the originalinterpretation and question it as needed. In this way, they engage in a


philosophic and practical inquiry that is an intelligent trial and error.As facilitator of this knowledge construction, Bérci assess the processrather than the product of the activity to determine whetherunderstanding has occurred.

This backward design approach allows the instructor to start withthe statement that represents the answer and have students work atidentifying and verifying the authentic relative series of questionsconcerning the Big Idea that need unpacking. In the process, they alsoidentify, through evidence and logical arguments, the relativepresuppositions that are inherent in their hypothesis. The reflectiveactivity on each Big Idea, adds to understanding, a knowing better anddeeper, the absolute presupposition - the philosophy on which all theirbeliefs rest. This is a process for all the Big Ideas that we wish toexamine with our students of teaching, including: “Good teaching isgood question asking” and “Every statement that anybody ever makesis made in answer to a question.” Such a process allows the teacher asartist to be educated – to be drawn out.

EpilegomenaThrough a personal understanding of the philosophical foundations ofthe process of question and answer, teacher educators can demonstratethat understanding by guiding the student of teaching to probe aparticular experience in a specific and deep way to find her own,individualized, absolute presupposition and thereby draw conclusionsabout approaches to teaching. Those who educate teachers can also usethese presuppositions to find alternate pathways to help pre-service andin-service teachers to become reflective, caring and efficaciousindividuals in and outside of the classroom. It offers up the philosophicalfoundations for action learning and research.

Britzman acknowledges that “learning to teach means coming toterms with particular orientations toward knowledge, power andidentity” (1991, p.11), and that:

For those who leave this world to enter teacher education, theirfirst culture shock may well occur with the realization of theoverwhelming complexity of the teacher’s work. However, whatoccurs as well is the startling idea that the taking up of an identitymeans suppressing aspects of the self. So at first glance, becominga teacher may mean becoming someone you are not. (Britzman,1991, p. 4)

By undertaking the quest for the absolute presupposition that guide heror his personal and educational decisions, the teacher can develop a


vision of what it means to know and can bring about a rapprochementof one’s inner and teacher self.

The Logic of Question and Answer affirms that prior knowledge andinterest guide teaching, learning and the advancement of knowledgeand overall inquiry. For those who educate, the understanding of theprocess is the a priori in the sense that such understandings helpdetermine, in advance, what questions and, therefore, what answersmake sense, as well as what sense they make. Understanding what itmeans to question, in the manner discussed, is the prolegomenon to allinquiry and aims at creating and sustaining conditions under whichknowledge is possible, rather than at knowledge acquisition directly.“Questioning is the cutting edge of knowledge” (Collingwood, 1924, p.78; Griffith & Benson, 1991, p. 14). The idea presented here has thepotential to transform teacher education. It encourages and gives ajustification for the need to shift away from the singular focus onmastering content and recipes, toward an ongoing, unifying,autobiographically specific self -questioning of the student of education’sthoughts and actions. Research must now be undertaken to use themethods courses to help students of teaching to understand what sortsof questions and processes are typical in the Social Studies classroom.Studies should focus on synthesizing those questions with those beingasked in the courses that teach the content areas of the Social Studies,such as history, geography, economics, philosophy, geography,anthropology, and political science.

Authors Contact Address:City University of New YorkCollege of Staten IslandDepartment of Education2800 Victory BoulevardStaten Island, NY 10314U.S.A.EMAIL: [email protected]

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What Does it Mean to Question?