The stand-out development countrywide

during the past fortnight was the spectacu-

lar attack launched by Harakat al-Shabaab

al-Mujahedin (HSM) militants against the

Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi,

the largest asymmetric operation the

group has ever staged inside Kenya. The

incident, a Mumbai-style ‘assault and siege’

operation, was the realisation of an objec-

tive held by the Somali group since Ken-

yan military intervention in Somalia in

2011; from that time onwards, HSM has

been attempting to demonstrate to the

Kenyan government and people, as well as

the large foreign national presence here,

that this intervention—seen by the group

as violating the religious and political free-

dom of Somalia—would come with blow-

back.

With more than 60 people, the majority

civilians, dead and almost 200 injured—

and more expected to be found during the

ongoing forensic investigation—this is the

most serious instance of Islamist militancy

in Kenya since the 1998 bombing of the

US embassy, and is therefore a major coup

for HSM. However, it is unlikely that it

represents a decisive shift in the security

environment of Nairobi or the wider

country. Such high-impact acts of militan-

cy are rare for a variety of reasons, includ-

ing cost, likelihood of detection, and post-

incident governmental learning.

As such, we are highly unlikely to see fur-

ther such attacks even in the medium

term. Instead, it is much more probable

that HSM, after a period of quiet, will try

to launch more of the small-scale opera-

tions for which it is best known in this

country, which are easier and less risky,

but allow it to demonstrate a continued

presence in Kenya in spite of security

force actions to deny and disrupt them.

Evidence of this approach was already

visible during the period, with a HSM at-

tacks on police in the North East’s Man-

dera town shortly after the Westgate inci-

dent. Unusually for attacks on this nature

in the province, HSM publicly claimed

responsibility for the Mandera attack,

clearly to capitalise on attention they had

garnered during the Nairobi siege.

Also in the North East, two NGO facili-

ties were attacked with small arms in sepa-

rate incidents in Dadaab, although they

were both attributed not to HSM but to

armed criminals. Yet that in itself is prob-

lematic, as part of a recent increase in the

willingness of non-HSM local actors to

use violence to settle social and commer-

cial grievances, particularly in relation to

the presence of non-local Kenyans.

INSO Kenya is Supported

By

Confidential - NGO use only

No copy, forward or sale

© INSO 2013

COUNTRY SUMMARY

REPORT:

16-30 Sept 2013

The International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) is a registered charity in England & Wales

no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737

KEY POINTS

HSM attack of unpre-

cedented scale on West-

gate shopping centre in

Nairobi

Elevated level of HSM

activity in North Eastern

in wake of Nairobi at-

tack

Armed criminality targe-

ting NGOs in Dadaab

INDEX

Nairobi 2

North East 6

Coast 9

Rift Valley 10

Map References 11

INSO Info Page 12

KENYA Issue 21

Page 2 The INSO Report - Kenya

Nairobi Metropolitan Region

Armed Siege of Westgate Shopping Centre

In the past fortnight, for the first time since 1998, Nairobi

found itself the scene of a major instance of Islamist militan-

cy, when more than a dozen al-Shabaab militants launched a

Mumbai-style assault and siege against the upmarket Westgate

shopping centre on September 21st.

At approximately 1240hrs on Saturday, during the peak com-

mercial period, 10-15 militants armed with assault rifles and

grenades stormed into the shopping centre through its three

Total Incidents 377

NGO Incidents 12

main entrances, firing coolly but randomly at civilians—

although subsequently allowing those who could demonstrate

they were Muslims to go free.

Before the first group of governmental security responders

arrived, more than two hours later, many of the more than 60

fatalities (of which one was a Kenyan NGO staff member), and

175 non-fatal casualties, had already been inflicted. Many oth-

ers also remained trapped inside, including staff and/or family

from four NGOs, having managed to hide themselves inside

shops, bathrooms or other locations in the building. And by

this time, the attackers are believed to have already taken doz-

ens of hostages.

KDF-Led Breach Operation

Thus began a three day siege inside the complex, which, in

spite of repeated attempts by a KDF-led force, could not be

broken. The attackers were understood to have holed up in

two separate locations—inside the large Nakumatt supermarket

on the ground floor, and in a premises on the second floor—

from where they effectively repealed multiple penetration at-

tempts over the coming days, using professional sniper and

Nairobi Met. Region Cont.

small unit tactics to do so.

The first minor success scored by the KDF-led force, which

was backed up by foreign military advisors, were the release

of three hostages on Monday. However, by this time it was

also becoming clear to the security forces that the assailants

were much better prepared, both tactically and logistically,

than had been initially thought, meaning that this minor suc-

cess was unlikely to translate into a decisive end to the stand-

off. Security force suspicions from that time that the attack-

ers had in fact pre-placed equipment such as weaponry, am-

munition and explosives were ultimately validated; a vehicle

was later found in the basement car park that had been there

for more than a month, and used as an armoury for the at-

tackers during the siege.

As such, by Monday afternoon, the KDF had determined to

use stronger tactics to get inside and end the situation. To

start with, the force lit a generator located to the rear on fire

on Monday afternoon, to divert the assailants’ attention while

attempting to breach at the front of the complex. This is not

thought to have succeeded, and this led to much of the de-

struction inside the Nakumatt.

On Tuesday, with the siege into its fourth day and no defini-

tive gains made in penetrating the Nakumatt stronghold, the

Kenyan military made a fateful decision. After considering

and abandoning other options, the army is believed to have

decided to rig and detonate an explosive device which col-

lapsed the ceiling and upper floors of the Nakumatt on the

attackers, none of whom are thought to have survived.

While the government stated, on September 30th, that they

believe there were no hostages remaining at the end of the

siege after all, this is impossible to believe and inconsistent

with what was understood during the siege, with Red Cross

estimates at the time of writing suggesting that 39 people re-

main missing. This number may fall, but it is extremely un-

likely that it will fall to zero.

Parsing HSM’s Responsibility

That being said, there remains significant opacity regarding

even some of the basic details of the incident, including the

number and fate of the attackers, their national origins, and the

precise group responsible.

On the latter subject, while al Shabaab has claimed responsibil-

ity, what this means in practice remains unclear. It is likely that

al Qaeda, with whom al Shabaab has rhetorically (and in some

ways, operationally) aligned itself, were involved at the manage-

ment level, perhaps assisting in training, target selection and

operational protocols such as filtering out Muslims.

Similarly, it is likely that the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), also

known as al-Hijra, played some role, either indirect or more

immediate. On the one hand, it is believed that at least some of

the attackers were non-Somali Kenyans, which, if true, would

strongly point to MYC involvement in the recruitment stage at

the very least, given their central role in recruitment for al Sha-

baab within Kenya. However, it is also probable that the MYC

was more directly involved, for example in facilitating weaponry

and operatives in Nairobi, and even perhaps at the operational

management level.

However, at its core this is understood to have been an al Sha-

baab operation, launched in a manner consistent with their es-

tablished operational parameters inside Kenya. It is moreover

faithful to their oft-asserted strategic intent with regard to the

Kenyan government; since KDF military intervention in Soma-

lia in 2011, al Shabaab has consistently stated that it is seeking

to strike inside Kenyan territory for the purpose of demonstrat-

ing costs to this military mission. And this was precisely the

message communicated via public channels by senior HSM fig-

ures as the Westgate incident was ongoing.

In this way, the underlying message HSM intended to com-

municate with this attack is identical to that of its previous but

smaller kinetic operations in Kenya. All that differed, therefore,

in this operation was the scale of its ambition—an ambition

that, through a high degree of tactical sophistication (even with

simple weaponry), information security, and willingness to tar-

get civilians, was powerfully realised.

Absence of Forewarning

Most significantly, the attack seems to have come out of the

Page 3 The INSO Report - Kenya

Nairobi Met. Region Cont. 2

blue, with no real forewarning on the part of domestic or

foreign security agencies. While reports are circulating at the

time of writing that there was some prior knowledge of an

impending attack, this was very generic information about

HSM intent vis-à-vis Kenya, and would not have allowed for

any specific operational response by the security forces. As

such, as so often with large attacks such as this, there appears

to have been no meaningful detection of the operation all the

way up until it was launched on the morning of the 21st.

Nairobi’s Security Environment

Even if the information had been somewhat less generic, the

nature of Nairobi’s security environment makes it very diffi-

cult to take concrete security precautions in the absence of

highly specific information of an impending attack. The city,

a wealthy economic and political hub which is also home to

highly deprived areas within city limits, is also just hours away

from the Somali border. As such, since the KDF interven-

tion in Somalia, Nairobi has existed in a kind of inverse

‘Goldilocks Zone’, where there are sufficient threats from

HSM that the environment cannot be called truly permissive,

but where there is sufficient normal life to make operational

responses to general threat warnings of HSM intent extreme-

ly difficult to implement.

Absent a total shutdown of much of the city—an inconceiva-

ble measure—the most plausible response to general threat

warnings would have been to detail multiple armed teams at

major facilities throughout the city, such as hotels, shopping

centres and governmental complexes. However, it can be

very difficult for governments to take such decisions, because

of concerns over causing popular panic, and because of the

financial and logistical implications of such a decision

(especially for Kenya’s badly under-resourced security sector).

The is particularly the case if the threat warning is not time-

bound.

As such, the best the government can do in this inverse

‘Goldilocks Zone’ is to focus on pre-attack detection and

disruption. Indeed, since 2011 the government has had an

excellent record in detecting and disrupting HSM activity in

the national capital; about half a dozen major HSM operations

had been defeated, as well as some minor ones, missing just

three significant kinetic incidents (two IEDs and a grenade at-

tack) during 2012.

However, it is not possible to stop every attack. And equipped

with that knowledge, al Shabaab is likely to have specifically

chosen to use simple weaponry, thereby lowering the chance of

being detected, as well as to have chosen a soft target such as

the Westgate, where superficial and ineffective security

measures, such as simplistic sweeps of bags with metal-

detecting wands, and cars with mirrors on wheels, would not

offer any credible defence against a highly motivated and well-

trained groups of militants.

Security Force Response

After such a game-changing incident as this, the response by the

security forces will be multi-faceted. For one, they have already

begun search and arrest operations in eastern parts of the city

where HSM and affiliated networks are long known to have a

presence. On the 28th, APTU led an operation in Majengo to

arrest MYC-affiliated youths, arresting 38, and further such op-

erations in eastern Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa can be ex-

pected.

Furthermore, an enormous expansion of security force weapon-

ry, gear and vehicles has begun, in what it still a nascent process

but which is expected to be the single largest up-grade to Ken-

ya’s police and security force capabilities in the past two dec-

ades. A numerical expansion of the police was already in the

pipeline after the March elections, but it is expected that this

process will be quickened, all pointing towards a much more

visible, operational capable security sector. This may include

private security companies too, who are now pushing for a

change to the current law that prevents them using firearms or

wearing body armour.

The Humanitarian Community Response

Many NGOs are currently asking themselves the question of

what this attack means for them, and their presence in Kenya.

Page 4 The INSO Report - Kenya

Nairobi Met. Region Cont. 3

Much of the answer depends on whether this was an outlier

in the prevailing security environment, or instead marks the

beginning of a new trend of such large-scale, civilian-focused

militancy in urban Kenya.

For INSO, the answer is the former. Large-scale operations

like this are expensive—probably somewhere between

$50,000-$100,000—and are therefore necessarily a rarely used

weapon in the arsenal of groups such as al Shabaab, particu-

larly in an area of secondary importance to them such as

Kenya is. Furthermore, attacks such as this have a high

chance of failure through detection, given the scale of activi-

ties needed to prepare and implement them. The history of

such large plots in Nairobi demonstrates this; of the estimat-

ed half dozen since 2011, this is the first to have gotten

through. It is, by contrast, much easier to launch a small-

scale attack, such as a hit-and-run grenade or SAF attack,

without being detected. As a result, low-impact operations

tend to be high-frequency for militant groups like al Shabaab,

just as high-impact operations tend to be low-frequency.

Moreover, the powerful shock this will have delivered to the

government—in terms of re-evaluating its defence prepared-

ness and the scale of the threat posed by HSM—will have

been expected by HSM; groups in their strategic position usual-

ly know that in the wake of such an effective, high-casualty at-

tack, it is much better to rest on your laurels for a time, rather

than attempt another.

Much more likely, therefore, than an attempt at a further large

attack, is that—after a period of quiet to protect against the

governmental response to the Westgate incident—al Shabaab

will engage in a number of smaller, easier operations. These

would allow them to demonstrate their sustained presence in

Kenya, in gloating defiance of post-Westgate governmental ef-

forts, without the attendant risks of losing money and men to a

security sector eager to score a retaliatory win against them.

Indeed, some of this has already been seen in the North East

during the period, with an attacks on a police target in Mandera

(see North Eastern for further details), which was publicly

claimed by al Shabaab in a way not common for the group be-

fore the Westgate incident.

As such, the threat environment for NGOs in Nairobi in the

wake of this attack is highly likely to default to its pre-attack

paradigm; that is, of widespread armed criminality and infre-

quent low-level HSM activity in the eastern districts of the city.

Page 5 The INSO Report - Kenya

North Eastern Province Total Incidents 390

NGO Incidents 35

For one, the targeting profile in these incidents is somewhat

different from the typical pattern of HSM’s kinetic activity.

For example, the perpetrators did not target public locations

frequented by non-local Kenyans, such as tea shops or restau-

rants—an established HSM targeting pattern—but instead

focused their efforts on economic targets.

Also of note, to the best of our knowledge there was no com-

munication from HSM to the targeted NGO of an impending

attack, a fact which is inconsistent with known parameters of

their behaviour vis-à-vis the NGO community (although there

is not a strong history of this to draw on in the North East).

In Somalia, HSM typically writes a letter to an NGO or makes

a public statement, warning of its displeasure and demanding

a change in behaviour or location, before they would choose

the kinetic option.

Moreover, a HSM assault can be expected to be more deadly.

While the attack on the 26th demonstrated little regard for

human life, neither was it a determined attempt to kill NGO

staff. The assailants did not use great deal of ammunition,

Humanitarian Community Incidents

This reporting period witnessed one of the most serious attacks

upon an NGO in Dadaab since INSO commenced operations,

when, on September 26th, an unknown group of men attacked

an NGO compound in Dadaab’s IFO 1 camp using small arms

and explosive devices. Lasting approximately ten minutes, the

attack primarily targeted the mess hall where a number of staff

were watching television, though residential tents and rooms

were also hit. Fortunately, no NGO staff members were seri-

ously injured as a result of the incident.

On September 29th a second, somewhat similar attack occurred,

targeting an NGO construction site in Dagahaley in the early

evening. A grenade was thrown into the site, where a non-local

construction company sub-contracted by a local company to

build a primary school for an NGO was working. In the inci-

dent, five non–local Kenyan builders were injured, with no

NGO staff were onsite at the time of the incident.

HSM Authorship?

Seen in the light of the HSM attacks on Nairobi’s Westgate

shopping centre, and on Wajir and Mandera police positions

during the fortnight (discussed below), these events are very

concerning. However, while HSM involvement in these inci-

dents is possible, it is very unlikely. Instead, both incidents are

much more likely to have been driven by community or crimi-

nal considerations.

Page 6 The INSO Report - Kenya

North Eastern Cont.

their explosive devices did not fragment, and they did not

enter the compound to press the attack. The attack on the

29th did inflict significant casualties, but again, this disregard

for the welfare of its targets does not exclude non-HSM ac-

tors from potential responsibility, and the tactical simplicity

of the incident also points away from HSM.

Non-HSM Kinetic Activity in Dadaab

Instead, it is much more likely that both of these attacks were

community or criminally driven, because of the presence of

non-local Kenyans and their social and commercial activities.

Socially, non-locals are mostly non-Muslims, and local dis-

pleasure has previously been publicly communicated over

such issues as the playing of loud music and concerns about

sexual relations with local women.

The attack on the 26th is likely connected to this dynamic.

However, it is notable that there was no communication of

grievance from the local community immediately prior to the

attack on the 26th (either through letters, meetings or demon-

strations), indicating that it was probably the work of a small,

independent and perhaps professionally criminal section of it.

Commercially, the Dadaab camps have a history of criminally

motivated kinetic attacks on both NGOs and non-local busi-

nesses, mostly in response to dissatisfaction with things like

contract and employment choices, anti-corruption measures,

and commercial competition.

For example, an attack that took place in January of this year

against an NGO then operating in IFO 1, injuring one staff

member, is believed to have been programme-related. Simi-

larly, grenade attacks on non-local Kenyan contractors, in

Hagadera in 2012 and Dagahaley in 2011, were understood to

be about commercial competition. The limited socio-political

sway and significance of non-local private sector companies

in Dadaab, when compared to the UN/NGO community for

example, reduces the potential blowback on their assailants

and therefore makes them much easier to strike.

The incident on the 29th—primarily affecting a non-local

company, although involving an NGO—exhibited strong

similarities to this pattern of criminally motivated attacks.

Implications for NGOs

Yet, the potential emergence of a pattern of contractual or em-

ployment dispute resolution through violence is arguably a de-

velopment of equal concern to HSM targeting, and would, giv-

en the frequency of such disputes in Dadaab, present a signifi-

cant risk to NGOs operating in the camps, and particularly to

their non-local staff.

Formerly, while widely thought a permanent possibility, the use

of violence during contractual or employment disputes was

more sporadic in Dadaab; the Dadaab camps have a large

NGO residential footprint, mostly non-local Kenyan staff who

have lived alongside refugees since the 1990s, for the most part

without incident. From the start of 2013 up to August this

year, only a single instance of such use of violence was record-

ed.

However, three occurrences have been observed since the start

of August, each with key characteristics in common: non-local

Kenyan presence in the camps and sensitivity over contractual/

employment issues. As such, there has been a notable increase

in this type of activity in the past two months, even if during

this period other disputes between NGOs and the local com-

munity—some involving prolonged tension and sizeable dis-

turbances—did not erupt into actual violence.

While incidents of violent direct action against NGOs are so far

isolated to those humanitarian organisations operational in IFO

1 and may very well be unique to that camp, their specific pro-

grammatic cause remains unclear. This lack of clarity regarding

a specific driver is concerning, and emphasises the need for

other organisations, particularly those operating in IFO 1, to

take prudent steps to minimise potential vulnerability.

While it is too early in this nascent trend to say that this repre-

sents a definitive change in the security environment faced by

NGOs, the community would be well advised to review its ac-

ceptance strategies, both generally and as they pertain to resi-

dential compounds, ensuring that, amongst other things, music

and television is kept to acceptable volumes and times; that

alcohol is not overtly consumed; and that staff maintain posi-

tive and appropriate relations with the refugee and host com-

Page 7 The INSO Report - Kenya

North Eastern Cont. 2

munities, particularly with local women.

In addition to acceptance, NGOs should also review security

in residential compounds more generally. This would include

ensuring the presence of first aid kits and trained responders;

developing reaction plans to armed attacks on camps, cover-

ing a variety of scenarios and drilling staff on them; ensuring

the wide dissemination of emergency numbers, particularly

the nearest deployable police units; and developing the physi-

cal security of compounds, particularly in regard to maximis-

ing cover from view.

HSM Activity in Mandera

On September 26th at 0240hrs, HSM operatives attacked the

Central AP Camp in Mandera using small arms, RPGs and

grenades. During a 30 minute gun battle, they killed one po-

lice officer and wounded two, incurring one casualty them-

selves. One of the wounded officers later succumbed to his

wounds. The attack caused considerable destruction to the

camp, seriously damaging two buildings and destroying a

large number of cars. Not long afterwards, HSM claimed the

attack on Twitter.

Elements of the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) conducted a

seemingly punitive operation on the afternoon of the 26th,

assaulting a number of people in the Miraa market and forci-

bly closing businesses. Following on from suspicions that

the perpetrators of the 26th escaped to Ethiopia, the Ethiopi-

an security forces have reinforced their border crossing

points and are conducting checks of guest houses and visitors

in villages and towns close to the border.

There was considerable apprehension in Mandera in the lead

up to the attack, which came on the back of a series of HSM

operations in Mandera in September, predominantly focused

on the town, but also including an attack on a police post in

remote Harer-Hosle. That campaign caused serious damage

to public confidence in the security forces and local govern-

ment officials. Furthermore, police actions in the wake of

earlier attacks, which included arresting a number of taxi

drivers only to release them for a fee, served only to reduce

their standing further. Anecdotal reporting from the area

indicates that, as a result, many members of the public are re-

luctant to cooperate with the police, fearing either extortion

attempts or that that they themselves will come under suspi-

cion.

It is very likely that one of the primary aims of this attack was

to reinforce the impact of Westgate. HSM attacks in Mandera

spiked sharply in September, witnessing six in the course of the

month, against an average of one per month in 2013, excepting

the election period in March. It is unclear if this increased op-

erational focus on the town is coincidental or has a direct con-

nection to Westgate. The attack on the 26th was widely reported

in the international media however, somewhat adding to the

sense of insecurity in Kenya, thus achieving the aim outlined

above.

Located right on the Kenya-Somali border, Mandera is proba-

bly the easiest major town that HSM can strike in Kenya. The

movement has active service units operating around nearby

Bulo Xawa/Garbahaarey and it enjoys considerable support

amongst sections of the Marehan clan in neighbouring Gedo

Region. Thus HSM units can conduct hit and run attacks

against security forces with relative ease, using tactics honed

against SNA and ENDF forces and exploiting the border to

prevent pursuit. Furthermore, the daily cross border flow of

goods and people between Mandera and Bulo Xawa allow for

easy infiltration to carry out more asymmetric attacks.

It remains to be seen however, if HSM can maintain its opera-

tional focus on Mandera into the medium term. It is under

some pressure in Gedo, which may distract it from less immedi-

ate targets, though the organisation may well maintain their fo-

cus, aiming to further reinforce a Kenyan sense of insecurity.

While the campaign is ongoing, attacks on police stations in

Mandera town, or in remote areas, will present the most risk to

NGOs; as will police responses, such as nervous gunfire or pu-

nitive police operations. IEDs and targeted killings, while a risk,

have so far caused little in the way of collateral damage.

Page 8 The INSO Report - Kenya

Coast Province Total Incidents 132

NGO Incidents 1

regard to combatting this Islamist militancy in the Coast,

which ultimately contributes to al Shabaab’s numbers inside

Somalia, is weakness in the judicial system. This is thought to

be the reason why some leading Islamists have been killed

rather than captured in recent years, and this fate is likely to

be shared by Makaburi, once the immediate focus on the

Westgate and its authors dies down. However, as in Nairobi

such kinetic actions against the group is unlikely to lead to its

death—perhaps instead galvanising the group’s anti-state

agenda.

Security Force Activity

Away from Westgate-related developments, September has

seen the security forces continue their focus on drug-related

activity impacting the Coast. There have been a number of

arrests of criminals for drug-dealing in Kilifi, and seizure

there, in Mombasa, and in Kwale, in the past six weeks. The

security forces take a very intolerant approach to this sort of

activity, making it worth avoiding if one is enjoying some

coastal holiday time.

Coastal Fallout from Westgate Incident

With the militant assault on the Westgate mall in Nairobi, it is

likely that post-incident security focus will also turn to the

Coast, where the Muslim Youth Centre (or al-Hijra), an affiliate

of al Shabaab, has long maintained a presence. While there is

no conclusive proof of these suspicions thus far, the Centre, or

MYC, is believed to have been involved in the Westgate inci-

dent in some capacity; either indirectly—through recruitment—

or more directly through facilitation and use of its urban Ken-

yan infrastructure, which is focused on Muslim-majority parts

of Nairobi and Mombasa, by the attack team.

Already in Nairobi, an ATPU-led operation in an MYC area on

September 28th led to the arrest of 38 individuals, and it is likely

that the security forces are looking to their existing profiles of

the group to identify individuals of interest in Mombasa too. In

this port city, the north-eastern district of Kisauni has a well-

established MYC presence, with significant numbers of Ken-

yans from across the country known to have been radicalised in

the district’s mosques and to have subsequently crossed over to

Somalia to fight on behalf of al Shabaab. Indeed, the only Is-

lamist figure in Kenya to have spoken out in support of the

Westgate incident has been the cleric popularly known as Maka-

buri, an MYC-affiliated man self-identified as sympathetic al

Shabaab and al Qaeda, who is partly based in this part of the

city.

What such operations might mean in practice remains unclear,

as much of the problem that the security forces have had with

Page 9 The INSO Report - Kenya

Rift Valley Province Total Incidents 277

NGO Incidents 10

Going forward, the current pastoralist conflict in the North

Rift has not led to significant alteration of the security envi-

ronment in the region, with the latest attacks largely taking

place in the traditional hotspots. However, the onset of de-

layed dry spells will likely alter regional security dynamics, like-

ly leading to an increase in roadside banditry as affected com-

munities seek alternative livelihoods to augment depleting

livestock numbers.

For the past one month, cattle rustling activities have been

largely concentrated in the four counties of the North Rift:

West Pokot, Samburu, Baringo and Turkana. These counties

also continue to register the majority of inter-communal clashes

in the region, mostly revolving around cattle theft, with other

conflict-prone counties such as Elgeyo Marakwet and Trans-

Nzoia progressively registering a decreasing percentage of all

the incidences recorded in the region in the past one year.

During the past fortnight, the three main protagonists in the

conflict—the Pokot, Samburu and Turkana—each carried out

the same number of raids, at three each. All the attacks were

targeted against settlements occupied by rival communities, and

focused on the region’s rustling-prone areas, such as Pokot

North, Samburu North, Turkana South and East Baringo—

where different communities border with each other.

However, the latest attacks don’t represent a significant escala-

tion in pastoralist conflict in the North Rift. Rather, they serve

to highlight the persistent nature of the conflict in the region, as

well as highlighting the emerging trend in pastoralist conflict;

that of minors herding livestock being abducted or killed during

such raids. As an example, the attack against Pusol village in

West Pokot by the Turkana on September 17th, and the two

attacks perpetrated by the Samburu at Nalingangor village and

against a settlement near Baragoi town on September 28th, all

together resulted in the killing of three teenage girls. A teenage

Samburu boy and girl were also shot and critically injured in

Baragoi Division on the 18th and 27th respectively, in attacks

perpetrated by Turkana raiders.

Page 10 The INSO Report - Kenya

Legend

Data sources - Administrative boundaries: OCHA; Incidents reported: INSO.

Mapping - With the kind assistance of ACTED

Data, designations and boundaries contained on the maps included in this report are not guaranteed to be error-

free and do not imply acceptance by INSO.

Map References

The INSO Report - Kenya Page 11

CONTACTS & INFORMATION NOT INCLUDED THIS PERIOD:

Western, Eastern, Central and Nyanza Provinces

These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you

have any information that would help us better understand

the dynamics, please contact your local INSO Kenya office.

ADVISORY BOARD:

INSO Kenya is overseen by an NGO Advisory Board.

If you have any questions or feedback, good or bad, let

them know on: advisory.ken@ngosafety.org

REGISTRATION:

NGOs can register up to five persons to each of INSO

mailing lists. For a registration form please contact-

registration.ken@ngosafety.org

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (NAIROBI)

Central Regional Safety Analyst: Rory Brown,

central.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 288 409

Central Counterpart: Julius Kiprono,

central2.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 289 730

NORTH REGION OFFICE (DADAAB)

NEP Regional Safety Analyst: Sean McDonald,

north.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 289 571

NEP Counterpart: Abdullahi Dimbil,

north2.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 288 392

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (NAIROBI)

INSO Kenya Director: Neil Barriskell,

director.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 729 205 005

Admin: Christine Kariuki,

admin.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 295 203

COMMON ACRONYMS

ACG - Armed Criminal Group AOG - Armed Opposition Group

AP - Administration Police ATPU - Anti-Terrorism Police Unit

GoK - Government of Kenya GSU - General Service Unit (Police)

HSM - Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen IAF - Irregular Armed Forces

IDF - Indirect Fire IED - Improvised Explosive Device

IO - International Organisation KDF - Kenyan Defence Forces

KPR - Kenyan Police Reserve KWS - Kenya Wildlife Service

MRC - Mombasa Republican Council MY - Mombasa Youth

NMI - Nyuki Movement for Independence NYS - National Youth Service

RDU - Rapid Deployment Unit (Police) RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade

RTA - Road Traffic Accident SF - Security Forces

TTP - Tactics, Techniques & Procedures UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

www.ngosafety.org

Circulation of this report for non-commercial

purposes is permissible only with prior

permission.

Please contact director.ken@ngosafety.org INFO

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