WARRIOR'S RAGE: 1st ID Museum 5 September Presentation

7/29/2019 WARRIOR'S RAGE: 1st ID Museum 5 September Presentation

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TheBattleof73Easting:AStudyinLeadership,CompetenceandMobile

ArmoredFirepowerinAction.PresentationtotheFirstInfantry

DivisionMuseumatCantigny,

5September2012

DouglasMacgregor,PhD

Colonel(ret)U.S.Army

+1703

975

6954

WarriorsRage:TheGreatTankBattleof73EastingNavalInstitutePress,2009


2/10

Pin(theIraqiRepublicanGuard)withtheir

backsagainstthesea,then,goinandwipe

themoutOncetheyregonebepreparedtocontinuetheattacktoBaghdad.

GeneralNorman

Schwarzkopf,

November1990.

AttackIraqipoliticalmilitaryleadership

andcommand

and

control;

gain

and

maintainairsuperiority;severIraqisupply

lines,destroychemical,biologicaland

nuclearcapability;destroyRepublicanGuardforcesintheKuwaitiTheater;liberate

Kuwait.

U.S.CentralCommandOperations

Order91001,17January1991

TheMission:FindandDestroythe

RepublicanGuard!


3/10

ThirdU.S.

Army

Personnel

Command

estimates

VIICorpswilltake20,000casualtiesinthefirstfive

daysoffightingtheIraqiArmy.

RichardSwain,LuckyWar.ThirdArmyinDesertStorm,page205

TheWhiteHousehadbeenaccustomedoverthe

yearstothemilitarycominginwithverylargeforce

requirementsforcontingencyplans.Thiswas

clearlypartlyoutofcaution,buttherewasalsothe

perceptionat

times

it

was

to

dissuade

the

Presidentfromaction.

RobertM.Gates,DeputyNationalSecurity

Advisor,1990,TheGeneralsWar,page154.

IfSaddam

withdraws

with

most

of

his

forces

intact,wehaventreallywon.

BrentScowcroft,NationalSecurityAdvisor,

1991fromAWorldTransformed,page473.

Expectationsin19901991:

ConventionalWisdom


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GettingReadyfortheFight:

LessonsinLeadership

Gettherightpeopleintotherightleadership

positionsandtherestwilltakecareofitself.(Natural

bornleaders!)

Cavalryunitsorarmoredreconnaissanceoutfitsare

likedeep

sea

sharks

that

have

to

swim

to

eat

and

live.Aslongasanarmoredcavalryunitisinmotion,it

findsanddevoursitsenemy.Oncelaunchedinto

action,itmustnotstop!

Inthe

fast

paced

action

of

mobile,

armored

combat,

disciplinemustbeaformofhabit(BattleDrill). Armoredwarfareishairtriggerfast,lethal,and

unforgiving.Themarginbetweenvictorand

vanquishedcan

be

afraction

of

asecond.

Waitingforordersisdeadly.

Relentlesspreparationforoffensiveoperations

suppressesthesoldiersnaturalinclinationstofear

andhomesickness.


5/10

PLHARPS

PLBECKS

PLDIXIE

OBJ

GATES

OBJ

MAYOBJ

MERREL

OBJ

FEUCHT

Limit

of

Advance

on

24

Feb.

1991at 1700hours

LimitofAdvanceon24Feb.1991

at1000

hours

LimitofAdvanceon23Feb.1991

at1500hours

RedfoxForward

Reconnaissance

Element

CougarBattlegroup(Main

Body)

TheAdvanceintoIraq23

24February1991:

Note:Distancefrom

SaudiBorder

to

edge

ofRepublicanGuard

SecurityZonewas

roughlyequaltothe

distancefrom

Washington,DCto

Philadelphia,

Pennsylvaniaor

123

miles.

RepublicanGuardCorps


6/10

GhostTroop

EagleTroop

FoxTroop

HawkCompany

II

XX

I

TheBattle:26February1991:

Directionof

Movementtoward 73

Easting

TenKilometer

Zoneofattack.

BoxFormation

wasten

kilometers

deep.

Fragmentaryorder(FRAGO)0522hourstotheregiment:2ndACR[ArmoredCavalryRegiment]

attacksEasttofixTawalkana MechanizedDivision;onorder,1ID[1st InfantryDivision]passesthrough2ndACRtocontinuetheattackEastacknowledge,over!

Versus

CougarBattle

Group

Combat

Power

Soldiers 1,100

M1A1AbramsTanks 42

ArmoredFightingVehicles(Bradley) 41

155mmSelfPropelledHowitzers 8

4.2MortarsmountedinM113s 6

M113A2 12

RepublicanGuard

Brigade

Combat

Power

Soldiers 2,100to2,300(estimated)

T72Tanks 70(tanksfromretreatingunitsmixed

induringfighting)

ArmoredFightingVehicles(alltypes) 80+

ArtillerySystems(alltypes) 20+

Trucks 4050

Versus


7/10

Eagle

Troop

1607hrs

E2

MINES

MINES

3rd AD

2nd Cavalry

3T72

13BMP

29T72

2T55

11BMP

3MTLB

1SA13

1T72

1

BMP

3AD

XX

2ACR

17 T72

18 BMP

00

05

1059 68 73EASTING

2/2

II3/2

EagleTroop

consolidatesalong

73Easting 1643hrs.

Ghost

3

rd

Platoon

ScoutsMove

forward1615hrs.

2nd PlatoonTanks

attackat1630.

EagleTroop

Punchestothe73Easting 1618hrs.

Situationbetween

1600and1700hours

3T72s

Ghost

Troop

1600hrs

EagleTroop

1630hrs

Eagle

Troop

1645hrs

Ghost

Troop

1610hrs

XX

Cougar3

Cougar3

051618hrsCougar

attacksEasttoward

70Easting


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GhostTroop

EagleTroop

FoxTroop

ll

HawkCompany

2ndSquadron

3rdSquadronIronTroop

FortyminutesafterEagleTroop

attacks,IronTroopattacksto73Easting, thenfallsbackbehind70

Easting,LimitofAdvance.

Note:CaissonBatterysGun

Platoonswerepositioned

immediatelybehindGhost

andEagleTroops.

ActualCougar

Deploymentalong

the73Eastingfrom1643

to

0600

hrs

2ndCavalrys

LimitofAdvance

1700hrs 26Febto

0600hrs 27Feb

alongthe

70

Easting

HeavyBlackLine

MarksCougar

Squadrons

PositionsAlongthe

73Eastingafter1700hours26

February

3rdArmoredDivisionZone

ofAttack

N

E

73Easting


9/10

28February1991

Thegate'sclosedWhatisn'tescapingisheavytanks,whatisn't

escapingisartillerypiecesI'mtalkingaboutthegatethatclosedonthe

warmachinethatisoutthere.

GeneralNormanSchwarzkopf,CDR,U.S.Central

Command,28February1991

27March1991

Inaddition,thegeneral(Schwarzkopf)saidintheinterview,majorRepublicanGuardunitshad"buggedout"beforethemainattackbyAmericanforces andcrossedtheEuphratesRiver Whentheshootingstopped,

the

general

said,

he

was

"suckered"

by

Iraqi

military

commanderswhoaskedforandreceivedpermissiontoflyhelicopters

overIraq.

PatrickE.Tyler,AftertheWar;SchwarzkopfSays TruceEnabled

IraqistoEscape,TheNewYorkTimes, 27March1991.7October1994

80,000IraqitroopsincludingtwoveteranRepublicanGuarddivisionsmoveSouthtowardKuwaitiBorder.MadeleineK.AlbrighttellstheUN

SecurityCouncilIraqmightsoonhavesome60,000troopsand1,000

tankspoisedtoattackKuwait.U.S.respondsputting36,000troopson

planesandsettinganother160,000inmotion.

TheOutcome:


10/10

Thedistantrearofanarmyengagedinbattleisnotthebestplacefromwhich

tojudgecorrectlywhatisgoingoninfront.

GeneralU.S.Grant,1863

Thereisonlyonetacticalprinciplewhichisnotsubjecttochange.Itistouse

themeansathandtoinflictthemaximumamountofwound,death,and

destructionontheenemyintheminimumamountoftime."

GeneralGeorgeS.PattonJr.,1942

Lessonsfromthe73Easting

Observed,butnotlearned:

"ThecasualtiesarethelowestinanyArmyvehicles,despitehowoftentheAbrams

(Tank)istargeted about70%ofthemorethan1,100tanksusedinIraqhavebeen

struckbyenemyfire,mostlywithminordamage.

SteveKomarow,USAToday,30March2005,page3.TheAmericanpeopledontfullyrealizewhatsgoingon,saidthe27yearoldStaffSergeantfromBuffalo,NewYork.Theyjustknowbackhomewhatthehigherups

heretellthem.Butthehigherupsdontgoanywhere,andactuallytheyonlygoto

thesafeplaces,placeswithalittlebitofgunfire.JoshuaPartlow,IDontThinkThisPlaceisWorthAnotherSoldiersLife,

TheWashingtonPost, 27October2007,pageA10.

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WARRIOR'S RAGE: 1st ID Museum 5 September Presentation