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This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz]On: 08 October 2014, At: 11:54Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Civil WarsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fciv20
Violence and the Peace Process in Sri LankaKRISTINE HÖGLUNDPublished online: 08 Aug 2006.
To cite this article: KRISTINE HÖGLUND (2005) Violence and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka, Civil Wars, 7:2, 156-170, DOI:10.1080/13698280500422843
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698280500422843
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Violence and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka
KRISTINE HOGLUND
This article analyses the multiple forms of violence displayed in the Sri Lankan
peace process 2002–2005. It starts from the premise that as peace processes
begin violence does not immediately or automatically stop. Instead, violence
continues – both along the same lines and in new forms. Three types of violence
have been prominent in Sri Lanka’s peace process: 1) violence between the
LTTE and the government; 2) violence within the LTTE; and 3) violence
between the LTTE and other Tamil groups. The case demonstrates that violence
in peace processes is a complex phenomenon that requires analysis of both
the actors and their motives. In order to gauge the influence of violence
on the peace process, it is also important to understand how other actors
in the negotiation process perceive acts of violence. The main conclusion
is that violence has seriously questioned the legitimacy of the peace
process and the intentions of – in particular – the LTTE in pursuing the
peace effort.
In Sri Lanka, the ceasefire between the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) and the government has held for more than three years, formally stopping
the civil war for the longest period since its inception. Nonetheless, violence has not
come to a complete end and the threat of a return to full-fledged war has been
looming parallel to the peace process.
This article starts from the premise that as peace processes begin violence does
not immediately or automatically stop. Instead, violence continues – both along the
same lines and in new forms. While much violence pass without any major
disruption, violence sometimes poses a serious threat to the peace negotiations by
undermining trust between the parties and support for the peace initiative.1
What modes of violence have been common during the peace process in
Sri Lanka? What impact has continued violence had on the effort to negotiate a
political solution to the violent conflict? This article analyses the multiple forms
of violence displayed in the peace process 2002–2005. Three types of violence have
been prominent: (1) violence between the LTTE and the government; (2) violence
within the LTTE; and (3) violence between the LTTE and other Tamil groups.
The Sri Lankan case demonstrates that violence in peace processes is a complex
phenomenon that requires analysis of both the actors and their motives. In order to
gauge the influence on the peace process, perhaps even more important is how the
violence is perceived by other actors in the negotiation process. The main conclusion
is that violence has seriously questioned the legitimacy of the peace process and the
intentions of – in particular – the LTTE in pursuing the peace effort.
Civil Wars, Vol.7, No.2 (Summer 2005), pp.156–170ISSN 1369-8249 print/ISSN 1743-968X online
DOI: 10.1080/13698280500422843 q 2005 Taylor & Francis
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This article does not provide a complete overview of violence in the Sri Lankan
peace process, but seeks to outline the most pertinent forms of violence. Moreover,
while the article focuses primarily on violent conflict behaviour, it is acknowledged
that important conflict behaviour has also been seen in the political arena.
The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) – both
Singhalese nationalist parties – have been strongly opposed to peace negotiations
with the LTTE and have been behind large demonstration with militant overtures.
These parties are spoilers in the peace process, but have not used political violence
to disrupt the peace negotiations and are therefore not subjects of this study.
VIOLENCE AND PEACE PROCESSES2
Previous research on the role of violence in peace processes has – to a large extent –
focused on the nature of that particular violence. Conflict theory commonly portrays
violent conflict as a contest between two well-defined organisations, and has
subsequently assumed that those actors carry out most of the violence during an
armed conflict. This assumption is clearly challenged by the research on violence
during peace negotiations. Instead, this literature brings to light the wide range of
actors that are perpetrators of violence, and the numerous and disparate motives that
these actors have. Once negotiations begin, new conflicts arise between and within
parties. These conflicts can stem directly from the peace effort itself that is likely to
create new motivations for violence. It has often been assumed that violence in the
context of peace negotiations is largely committed by actors opposed to peace.
However, Adrian Guelke puts forward an important point by suggesting that it
makes ‘more sense to place the violence in a much wider context of conflict over the
rules of political competition among all the contending parties, including parties
engaged in the quest for a negotiated settlement’.3 Thus, those committing violence
may be interested in reaching a peace agreement, but not an agreement under which
their power dissipates.
The most thorough study into the nature and attributes of violence during peace
processes, thus far, is The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes by John Darby.4
Darby has sought to identify the various issues pertaining to violence during a peace
process. He examines the problems related to violence and security that often become a
matter for negotiation during the peace talks and in the post-accord period. Issues that
often appear as items on the negotiation agenda, are the release of political prisoners,
disarmament, and the reform of police and military institutions.5 In addition, three
sources of violence are discussed: the state, militants, and the community.
The ‘violence by the state’ category highlights the fact that the state itself often is
an important source of violence during the conflict, and remains so during the
negotiation process. An example of a problem faced by the state, is the security
threat posed by security personnel opposed to reform.6 Other scholars have done
further research on the problems specifically related to the state during the peace
negotiations leading up to agreement and in the post-accord phase. They argue
that violence by actors related to the state has been an overlooked issue in the conflict
VI OLENCE AND T HE PEACE PROCESS 157
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resolution literature and point to three groups within the state that are likely to be
perpetrators, or instigators, of violence: the military, militia groups associated with
the state, and decision makers opposed to the peace negotiations.7
Darby’s second category, ‘violence by militants’, builds on Stephen J. Stedman’s
conception of spoilers. According to Stedman, spoilers are ‘leaders and parties who
believe that peace emerging from negotiations threaten their power, worldview, and
interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it’.8 These parties are
dissatisfied with the peace deal that has been signed and will pose a serious threat to
the peace process. The characteristics of the spoiler can be categorised according to:
(1) if the spoiler has signed or not signed the peace agreement (position); (2) if there
is one spoiler, or several spoilers (number); (3) the goals and commitments of the
spoiler (type); (4) if the spoiler-behaviour stems mainly from the leadership or the
followers (locus). Stedman argues that each spoiler characteristic requires a different
set of strategies by the third parties concerned with the management of these actors.
In recent literature on war termination, the threat of spoilers has been commonly
referred to as one of the key issues that have to be dealt with if peace is to prevail.9
However, the concept itself has also received plenty of criticism. For instance, it has
been argued that the motivations and commitment of actors can only be decided after
they have already carried out their spoiler activities, thus questioning the possibilities
for identifying and managing spoilers.10 Stedman has also been criticised for putting
too much weight on international actors as those most suited to manage violence.11
However, in spite of its shortcomings, the notion of spoilers serves as an important
analytical concept to draw attention to the threat of violence by opponents to peace.
With Stedman’s typology as a point of departure, John Darby constructs a
categorisation of militant groupings that use violence. He distinguishes between
‘dealers’, ‘mavericks’, ‘opportunists’, and ‘zealots’. The most important addition to
Stedman’s work is the development of the rationale behind the violence. Darby
argues that some factions might use violence for tactical reasons, while others might
be out to destroy the peace process entirely. There might be those that have lost faith,
sometimes temporarily, in the negotiation option, and who probe for a return to
political violence. Violence may also be the result of conflict within a group,
referred to by Darby as ‘family feuding’.12
Other scholars have added to the motivations for violence. Timothy Sisk, for
example, argues that actors in the South African peace process used violence for
three different reasons: ‘. . .to halt or reverse the process, . . . to prevent
marginalisation, . . . or to, destabilise the opponent’.13 An interesting finding refers
to the timing of violence. Sisk demonstrates that increases in violence during the
South African transition usually coincided with critical moments in the negotiation
process.14 Thus, violence is not merely a response to the failure of peace negotiations
but also an indication that negotiations are going well, thus threatening the interest
of those actors opposed to a peace settlement.
Darby’s final category, ‘violence by the community’, points to the legacies of
years of violent conflict. Countries undergoing a transition from war to peace have
become familiar with violence as a solution to problems. In combination with
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the accessibility of arms in these societies, the end result is often a sharp rise in
violent crime and violence on the streets. Criminal networks are frequently
developed by militant organisations during the conflict to help fund the armed
struggle. The networks often remain as the conflict reaches a conclusion, and are
likely to facilitate an increase in crime. Confrontations on the streets reflect the
underlying tensions and hatred in societies coming out of violent conflict. The
tensions do not automatically subside, but are commonly aggravated and find new
manifestations, as a settlement comes into sight.15 Violence – whether criminal or
political, public or private – can never be completely eliminated from society.
However, situations characterised by excessive criminal violence are not compatible
with our perception of peace. Thus, criminal violence can also pose a serious threat
to the legitimacy of an otherwise nascent peace process.
To summarise: during a negotiation process, violent acts can be committed
by actors that are involved as well as those who are not involved in the peace talks.
The purpose behind the violence will also differ, ranging from those actors who resort
to violent behaviour for tactical gains, to those whose aim is to wreck the peace
process altogether. Thus, research on the characteristics and types of violence has
made an important contribution to the field by furthering our understanding of the
motives and goals of the violence-makers. Rather than adhering to the simplistic
notion that primarily two homogenous actors in the conflict commit violence, it
emphasises the numerous variations in intent of the perpetrators. The implication
is that we have to widen our range of study by including actors of all sorts to fully
understand the impact of violence on peace negotiations.
VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA 2002 – 2005
The armed conflict in Sri Lanka between the Tamil rebels LTTE and the Singhalese-
dominated government began in 1983 when LTTE stepped up its actions after anti-
Tamil violence had spread across the island. However, the conflict had been
simmering for years with recurring spates of violence between the Singhalese
majority and the Tamil minority. In the state-building process that followed
independence in 1948, demands for a separate Tamil state in the north and east of the
country gained support in response to reforms that favoured the Singhalese over the
other ethnic groups in the country.16
The armed conflict in Sri Lanka has been severe in terms of casualties with 64,000
deaths as a commonly cited figure. In the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka, a
civil war has played out between a strong rebel group and the government forces, a
situation in which civilians seldom have been spared. Political assassinations, and
bombings of public building and transport, have been commonplace, in particular in
the capital Colombo. Another feature of LTTE’s violence campaign has been the use
of suicide bombers.
Political violence has been a prevalent feature of Sri Lankan politics since the
early 1970s.17 Besides the armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam, there have
been armed uprisings by the left-wing Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in 1971 and
VI OLENCE AND T HE PEACE PROCESS 159
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1987–89.18 Violence has pervaded both individual, social and political relations and
has been established ‘as a legitimate mode of political behaviour, whether by the state
or anti-state forces’.19
Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to solve the conflict between the
LTTE and the government.20 The current peace process came underway after the
election in 2001 that brought Ranil Wickremasinghe and the United National Party
(UNP) to power. Under the auspices of Norway, the parties signed a ceasefire
agreement in February 2002. The peace process produced six rounds of negotiations
between the government and the LTTE, before the LTTE withdrew from the peace
talks in April 2003. Since then, the peace process has been stalled, although there
have been efforts to reinitiate the negotiation process.21
The ceasefire in February 2002 was signed between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan
government. In the agreement the parties agreed to abstain from any ‘offensive
military operations’. Moreover, the forces were separated and buffer zones created
between government-controlled and rebel-held areas. Other Tamil paramilitary
groups that had been working together with the Sri Lankan government, were to
disarm. A strong emphasis was put on creating the conditions conducive for peace
negotiations: ‘the Parties have agreed to . . . refrain from conduct that could
undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit of this Agreement. . .’.22
To oversee the ceasefire, the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was set
up. The mission is headed by Norway and has a Nordic composition, including
monitors from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. SLMM has its
headquarters in Colombo and is organised in six districts (Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya,
Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara). Combined with the six district offices there
are local monitoring committees with representatives from the LTTE and the
government. The task of SLMM is to investigate alleged violations and to monitor
compliance with the agreement. In addition, the monitoring committees have sought
to solve conflicts over the implementation of the agreement at the local level.
The ceasefire led to immediate gains in the security situation. Within months, the
A9 highway to Jaffna opened and the security barriers in Colombo were dismantled,
allowing the free movement of goods and people over the entire island.
This constituted a vast improvement for the general public, in particular in the
war-torn areas in the north and the east. The result was an upsurge in social and
economic activity in the country. However, the optimism that characterised the
situation on the ground in the first year of the peace process, has gradually been
replaced by growing frustration.
The SLMM has published monthly information concerning complaints about
ceasefire violations and their rulings on these. Complaints about ceasefire violations
encompass several disparate types of actions, including the illegal carrying of arms,
movement in the zone of separation, and hostile acts against the civilian population.
The ceasefire violation complaints for LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka
(GOSL), respectively, are presented in Figure 1 below.
The vast majority of the complaints have been against the LTTE. Correspond-
ingly, most rulings of ceasefire violations have also been against the LTTE.
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However, the SLMM has been criticised for not taken a strong enough stance against
the violations committed by the Tamil rebels.23 An overwhelming number of
complaints have concerned child recruitment and abduction of adults. For instance, of
the 1,955 complaints against the LTTE during year 2003, 670 were related to child
recruitment. The second largest category was abduction of adults, numbering 348
cases. Most complaints against the government side concerned harassment carried out
by the military and police forces.
FIGURE 1
CEASEFIRE COMPLAINTS
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2002
-03
2002
-05
2002
-07
2002
-09
2002
-11
2003
-01
2003
-03
2003
-05
2003
-07
2003
-09
2003
-11
2004
-01
2004
-03
2004
-05
2004
-07
2004
-09
2004
-11
2005
-01
Months
No
of C
ompl
aint
s
LTTEGOSL
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The rationale behind the ceasefire was that negative peace had to prevail in order
for durable peace to be built. Remembering previous attempts at solving the conflict,
both the LTTE and the government were concerned about the other party taking
advantage of the situation by using the pause in fighting to rearm and regroup. For this
reason, both parties sought to negotiate from a position of military strength. Thus, the
ceasefire agreement does not prohibit the procurement of arms or continued
recruitment for the LTTE and the government forces. Indeed, since the ceasefire in
2002, both parties have continued to build up their respective military strength.24
A particular sensitive issue has been the LTTE’s efforts to develop its air capabilities,
which has resulted in vigorous opposition by the Sri Lankan government and India.
The following section presents three forms of violence present in Sri Lanka
during the peace process since the ceasefire agreement in 2002: (1) violence between
the LTTE and the government; (2) violence within the LTTE; and (3) violence
between the LTTE and other Tamil groups.
Violence Between the Government and the LTTE
Since the ceasefire agreement, there have been few instances of direct confrontation
between LTTE cadres and the Sri Lankan forces. Generally, both parties have shown
a great restrain and have controlled their forces on the ground.
However, there have been some notable confrontations which could have
resulted in an escalation, but where the parties have refrained from retaliating.
For instance, in July 2002 a Sri Lankan Army soldier was shot dead in a buffer zone
between government-held and LTTE-controlled areas in the Jaffna peninsula.
The LTTE and the government have also been involved in several confrontations at
the sea. The conflict has had an unusual naval dimension through the LTTE’s elite
force the ‘Sea Tigers’, that have been used to attack the Sri Lankan Navy.
In February 2003, LTTE members committed suicide after a weapons inspection by
the SLMM off Delft Island. In March 2003, the Sri Lanka Navy intercepted and sunk
a LTTE merchant ship on the grounds that she was transporting weapons, which
would have constituted a breach against the ceasefire. These incidents were followed
by attacks carried out on a Chinese trawler and a troop transport ship off
Trincomalee in March 2003, allegedly carried out by the LTTE.25 However, these
serious incidents did not result in renewed fighting between the parties.
There have also been several instances where the LTTE has challenged the
government at the local level. This was particularly notable in the Trincomalee and
Ampara districts during 2002. One incident occurred in the beginning of October
2002 in connection with a demonstration in the Ampara district. During the
demonstration the gathered crowd of 500 to 1,000 people attempted to force itself into
the camp of the Special Task Force of the Sri Lankan Police (STF). The police opened
fire, killing seven and injuring several others. According to the police and some
observers, members of the LTTE were among the attackers. However, the SLMM
was not able to firmly prove the involvement of the rebels.26 The same month,
the LTTE held six government soldiers hostage after the police had arrested two
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rebels carrying arms in government-held areas (which was not allowed under
the CFA).
There have also been some high-profile acts of violence between the government
and the LTTE which could be seen as tactical attempts by the parties to show their
strength against one another. For instance, on 31 May 2005 a senior army
intelligence operative was shot and killed in Colombo – allegedly by the LTTE.
While this was not the first killing of security personnel since the ceasefire, he was
certainly the most high-ranking military to be assassinated.
Violence Within the LTTE
The LTTE gained prominence as the leading Tamil rebel group in the second half of
the 1980s.27 Several other Tamil paramilitary groups have existed parallel to the
LTTE, but was marginalised through internal fighting between the Tamil groups.
Since its formation in 1976, the leader Velupillai Prabakharan has headed the
LTTE with strict discipline and challenges to LTTE’s dominance have been
thwarted with force.
In March 2004, a faction led by the military commander of the east, Karuna
Amman, broke away from the LTTE to create a new Tamil party in the east. In wake
of the split, the LTTE command in Vanni launched attacks on the Karuna faction.
Heavy fighting ensued, which killed and displaced a large number of people.
Karuna’s forces were defeated and Karuna himself went into hiding. The LTTE has
insisted that Karuna’s departure was one by individual choice rather than symptom
of larger strands of dissent in the east. Several explanations for the split have been
proposed. It is generally held that the Tamils in the east fear being marginalised,
since the leadership of the LTTE traditionally has been drawn from the north. This is
also in line with Karuna’s own rationale for the split. In an interview shortly after the
breakaway, he stated that ‘fighters from the east were not being treated properly by
the northern-based leadership’.28
Karuna’s revolt against the LTTE leadership came as a surprise both to the
Sri Lankan government and the Norwegian facilitators. Initially, the government did
not take a clear stance in the conflict, but chose to regard it as an internal matter of
the LTTE. For instance, they refused to negotiate a separate ceasefire with Karuna.
The Norwegian mediators also made reference to the conflict between the Tamil
rebels as being an internal question of the LTTE; they have seen their task as only to
mediate between the LTTE and the government.29 The Norwegians applied the same
argument in regard to the government crisis in 2003.
The result of the split has been a violent struggle for political turf in the east.
Elements believed to be loyal to Karuna have attacked LTTE members and civilians
sympathetic of the LTTE in order to undermine their strength in the east. These
killings have also spread to Colombo. In retaliation, the LTTE has hit back at
pro-Karuna elements. An upsurge of violence happened in July 2004, when a dozen
people were killed in Batticaloa and surroundings. The eastern part of Sri Lanka was
severely hit by the tsunami in late December 2004, and in the first period after the
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devastating catastrophe the killings came to a halt. However, during the spring of
2005 the tensions have been further aggravated.
The LTTE has accused the government forces of being implicated in some of
these killings. In March 2005, it was revealed by journalist Amanatha Perera that
there was some truth to these allegations. He found evidence that the Tamil rebels
supporting Karuna had a base on government-held territory, on the border to the
north-east, from which they have been launching attacks.30
This internal feuding has led to high-profile killings. Most importantly, in
February 2005, LTTE’s political leader in the east, E. Kaushalyan, was assassinated.
The attack was carried out in a government-held area, allegedly by elements loyal to
Karuna. The incident was widely condemned by the international community. The
Sri Lankan government also condemned the incident, however, ‘the proximity of
army camps . . . add(ed) to suspicions of military connivance in the killing’.31
The split within the LTTE and the subsequent internal feuding had several
important consequences. First of all, the breakaway by the Karuna faction seriously
called into question LTTE’s claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil
people.32 The existence of parallel Tamil paramilitary groups gives evidence of the
divisions within the Tamil community. However, the split within LTTE also
questions the extent of support for the leadership within the movement. On part of
the government, it can be assumed that the split has caused concerns about how well
the LTTE actually can control their own cadres. In this sense the bargaining position
of the LTTE has been weakened vis-a-vis the government.
Violence Between the LTTE and Other Tamil Groups
In Sri Lanka, a substantial part of the violence during the peace process has been carried
out by the LTTE against other Tamil groups. In the 2001 election, the Tamil National
Alliance (TNA) was formed and includes parties such as Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF) and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). TNA recognised the
LTTE as speaking for the Tamil cause and has since then functioned as a political
surrogate of the LTTE. There are also several other Tamil groups that have fought
against the LTTE alongside the government forces. These groups, including Eelam
People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front
(Varathar) EPRLF(V), and People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam
(PLOTE), disarmed under the 2002 ceasefire. Members of these organisations have
been specifically targeted by the LTTE during the peace process.
Thus, violence has been carried out against Tamil groups that have worked for
the Sri Lankan security forces and that disarmed in accordance with the ceasefire
agreement. Therefore they had a reduced chance of defending themselves.
The problem has been exaggerated by the fact that the LTTE under the ceasefire has
been able to move more freely in areas under government control. According to
Human Rights Watch (HRW), attacks against rival Tamil paramilitary groups
increased in May and June 2003 after the LTTE had suspended its participation in
the peace talks. For instance, in the period February 2002 to August 2003, 51 people
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associated with Tamil groups were reported killed or missing.33 In July 2004, the
EPDP claimed that since the ceasefire in 2002, 125 of their members have been
killed by the LTTE.34 In 2004 there was a murder attempt at the leader of EPDP,
Douglas Devanada. The LTTE has also intimidated and attacked academics and
journalists that have voiced criticism against the organisation.
In a similar vein, there was considerable violence against Tamil candidates in the
general election in 2004. Election related violence has been a widespread
phenomenon in Sri Lanka.35 Notably, there have been high-profile incidents during
elections. During the presidential election campaign in 1994, Gamini Dissanayake,
the candidate of the main opposition party United National Party (UNP), was killed
in a suicide bomb attack carried out by the LTTE. President Chandrika Kumaratunga
lost her eye as a result of an attack by the LTTE in the run-up to the presidential
election in 1999.
The election in 2004 was a result of a crisis between the government
incumbent government and the opposition, mainly the Sri Lanka Freedom Party
(SLFP) and Janatha Vimukti Permuna (JVP). In particular, the President and her
party SLFP were dissatisfied with the concession made by the UNP government
to the LTTE. The crisis was unleashed in November 2003 when President
Kumaratunga took over three important ministerial posts (Defence, Media and
Information, and the Interior) and suspended the parliament. Three months later,
she dissolved the parliament and announced a general election to take place on 2
April 2004.
The general election of April 2004 was no exception in terms of large-scale
violence, although it was generally reported as more peaceful than preceding
elections. However, compared to previous elections, a significant difference was that
the vast majority of violations took place in the Eastern province. 36 In total, 2,303
incidents were recognised and five people were killed in election related violence.37
There were specific arrangements to allow the people in the LTTE-held areas, to cast
their votes at polling stations on the border between LTTE-held and government-
controlled areas. This constituted a significant improvement for voters in the rebel-
held territory.
However, the LTTE would not allow candidates from other parties than the
closely aligned TNA to campaign in rebel-controlled areas. Political activists of
other parties were particularly targeted: a Tamil candidate of the UNP in Batticaloa
and an EPDP activist were killed. Local election monitors were also attacked. These
attacks, along with an environment characterised by intimidation and threat
seriously undermined the electoral process in the east and north. It was generally
believed that the LTTE was behind most of the violence. The result was that several
candidates from the other parties resigned ahead of election day.38
Generally, the Sri Lankan government – both the one led by Ranil
Wickremasinghe and the one under Mahinda Rajapakse that came to power in the
2004 election – has done little in response to the killings of their allies. Although the
new government to a larger extent has condemned the killings, this has led to few
concrete results.39
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The LTTE has also carried out human rights abuses against the Tamil population.
In particular, the LTTE has continued the practice of forced and voluntary recruitment
of child soldiers. By October 2004, UNICEF had documented 3,516 cases of child
recruitment during the peace process.40 This is a flagrant human rights violation which
has received heavy criticism from the international community and human rights
organisations. In spite of the criticism, the LTTE seems to believe that the continued
recruitment is necessary for them to preserve their strength and position in the north
and the east.41 In 2003, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government signed an Action
plan for Children Affected by War. However, in spite of the important provisions
made in the action plan – such as the establishment of transit centres and
rehabilitation for child soldiers released by the rebels – it has only led to minor
improvements in these areas. On the contrary, child recruitment seems to be on the
rise. The increased movement allowed after the ceasefire agreement, has made it
possible for the LTTE to reach beyond the territories of their control for new recruits.42
After the LTTE dissident group led by Karuna was defeated in April 2004, a large
number of child soldiers were released as the forces disbanded. However, this only
resulted in a new recruitment drive by the LTTE in the east.
The continued human rights abuses carried out by the LTTE have weakened
support from the international community. However, the forced and continued
recruitment has to be seen in light of the perceived need by the LTTE to maintain its
strength in the east and north, both during the negotiation process and in case of a
prospective agreement.
CONCLUSIONS
The ceasefire agreement of February 2002 dramatically changed the security
situation in Sri Lanka. As noted, regular fighting between the LTTE and government
forces ceased and there have been improvements in many areas of human rights.
In this sense, the ceasefire and the peace process has opened up space for a political
solution to the conflict.
However, the ceasefire has also opened up new ways of pursuing and
maintaining the conflict lines. For instance, both parties are still building up their
military strength and are recruiting new troops. The freedom of movement granted
under the ceasefire allowed the LTTE to open political offices in government
controlled-areas. While this is a necessary step in an eventual transformation of the
LTTE into a viable political actor, the new-won freedom has been used for less
benign reasons. For instance, one result is that extortion, intimidation and forced
recruitment has expanded beyond the areas of LTTE control.
Moreover, since the ceasefire, violence has to some extent taken on new shapes.
As seen in other peace processes, it is in the interest of both parties not to be associated
with ceasefire violations. In Northern Ireland, for instance, concerns about the
ceasefire and the Mitchell principles43 resulted in a change in violence tactics by the
paramilitary groups – for instance from punishment shootings to punishment
beatings – so that the violence would not be seen as breaches of the ceasefire.44
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During peace processes, key players often carry out political assassinations,
bomb explosions and other deeds to challenge a nascent peace. Armed conflict
commonly experiences the rise of organised groups, warlords, and politicians that
gain a position of power and profit from war-related activities. These actors will only
accept peace on terms under which their investments and privileges are not severely
threatened. So-called spoiler violence can be directed towards the opponent, in order
to instil fear and undermine political support for the peace process. However,
violence to destabilise a peace process may also target moderates within the own
group, also referred to as ‘internal feuding’. All these types of spoiler violence have
accompanied the Sri Lankan peace process.
The violence in the east poses one of the most serious challenges to the peace
process in Sri Lanka. This is not surprising given the ethnical mix in the region.
Compared to the north, where the Tamils make up a clear majority, in the east, the
Tamil constitute only 40 per cent of the population. In this context it is important to
point out that members of the Muslim community, in particularly in the east, have
also been targets of extortion and intimidation. The LTTE seems determined to
maintain their dominance in the region, and are prepared to use violence to do so.
The government, on its part, seems prepared to take advantaged of the situation by
accepting spoiler violence that weakens the LTTE.
Peace deals are commonly negotiated between parties that have less than a
favourable record in human rights. This raises difficult dilemmas for the
international actors involved in peace making. The human rights community have
been critical of the fact that human rights have only been accorded a marginal role in
the peace process. Norway and the SLMM have been severely criticised for not
being harder on the LTTE, but have allowed the rebels to be involved in the peace
process in spite of their continued violence and human rights abuses, without any
repercussions. Indeed, the continued violence has seriously undermined the
legitimacy of the SLMM. However, from the point of view of Norway as the
facilitator to the peace talks, it is important to maintain a working relationship with
the LTTE in order to be able to put constructive pressure on the rebels.
What implications have the violence had for the peace negotiations in Sri Lanka?
Overall, the continued violence by the LTTE has questioned the intentions of the
organisation regarding its stated goal of reaching peace and democracy. According
to analyst Jehan Perera: ‘[t]he negative impact of the LTTE’s ceasefire violations
goes beyond the specific incidents themselves. It becomes very difficult for any
Sri Lankan government to push ahead with the peace process at the same time that
clear and regular LTTE violations of it are taking place.’45
The violence by the LTTE can partly be understood in light of the asymmetrical
nature of the conflict, a common characteristic of internal armed conflict.46 The LTTE
is the weaker side, in the sense that the government has a legitimate claim to power
and in normal times a monopoly on the use of violence. In such a situation, violence is
one of the few tools that the weaker party has to put pressure on, and extract
concessions from, the government. From this perspective, violence is an inevitable
part of the negotiation process. However, the problem is that the government sees
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LTTE challenges against the government as a lack of commitment toward the peace
process, regardless of the motives behind the violence.
Moreover, the violence against other Tamil groups, the hard clampdown on the
Karuna faction, and violence against civilians are partly a result of the LTTE’s struggle
to remain internally strong, in order to do well in the negotiations with the government.
However, the violence toward the Tamil community seriously put in doubt their claim
to represent the Tamil people and their commitment to genuine peace.
The failure of the government to deal with violence and human rights abuses, and
its alleged complicity in some of them, also questions the intentions of the
government. In terms of reaching a political solution to the armed conflict, the
political crisis and the subsequent election that brought a new government to power,
clearly constituted an important shift in the peace process. The attempt by
the government to reinitiate peace talks with the LTTE, has been inhibited by the
dependence of the government on parties such as the JVP that are opposed to any
concessions to the LTTE.
In many cases we have seen that violence has brought the parties back to the
negotiation table and has made them more determined in their efforts to purse a peace.
Not so in Sri Lanka. Instead, continued violence has undermined trust between the
parties and raised opposition against the peace process.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Camilla Orjuela, at the Department of Peace and Development Research atGoteborg University, and Isak Svensson at Department of Peace and Conflict Research, UppsalaUniversity, for useful comments on the draft of this article.
NOTES
1. For studies on the impact of violence on peace processes, see for instance the work by John Darby,The Effect of Violence on Peace Processes (Washington DC: USIP Press 2001); Kristine Hoglund,Violence in the Midst of Peace Negotiations: Cases from Guatemala, Northern Ireland, South Africaand Sri Lanka (Uppsala: Universitetstryckeriet, 2004); Andrew Kydd, and Barbara F. Walter,‘Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence’, International Organization 56/2 (Spring2002) pp.263–96; Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, InternationalSecurity 22/2 (Fall 1997) pp.5–53.
2. This section is adopted from the author’s doctoral thesis ‘Violence in the Midst of PeaceNegotiations: Cases from Guatemala, Northern Ireland, South Africa and Sri Lanka’.
3. Adrian Guelke, South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle (London/ New York: I.B.Tauris 1999) p.183.
4. Darby builds his conclusion on five case studies carried out by area experts within the ‘Coming out ofViolence’ research group. See more in John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (eds.) The Management ofPeace Processes (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000). A summary of each case has been integrated intoDarby’s volume. The cases are: Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Israel–Palestine, South Africa, and theBasque conflict.
5. Darby, The Effect of Violence on Peace Processes (note 1) pp.66–75.6. Ibid. pp.39–45.7. Kristine Hoglund, and I.W. Zartman, ‘Violence by the State: Official Spoilers and their Allies’ in
John Darby (ed.) Violence and Reconstruction (South Bend, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Pressforthcoming 2005).
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8. Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’ (note 1) p.5.9. Roy Licklider, ‘Obstacles to Peace Settlements’ in C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (eds.)
Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington DC: US Instituteof Peace Press 2001); Thomas Ohlson, Power Politics and Peace Policies: Intra-State ConflictResolution in Southern Africa (Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Univ. 1998); StephenJohn Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elisabeth M. Cousens (eds.) Ending Civil Wars: TheImplementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002).
10. Marie-Joelle Zahar, 2003.‘Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes’ in John Darby andRoger Mac Ginty (eds.) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict Violence and Peace Processes(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003).
11. Stedman has addressed this critique in several publications. See Stephen John Stedman, ‘PeaceProcesses and the Challenges of Violence’ in Darby and Mac Ginty, Contemporary Peacemaking(note 10) and Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, Ending Civil Wars (note 9) pp.11–14.
12. DarbyD, The Effect of Violence on Peace Processes (note 1) pp.50–61.13. Timothy D. Sisk, ‘The Violence-Negotiation Nexus: South Africa in Transition and the Politics of
Uncertainty’, Negotiation Journal 9/1 (1993) p.83.14. Ibid. p.84.15. Darby (note 1) pp.61–65. Relatively few studies, thus far, have investigated the relationship between
war, peace and criminal violence. However, an increasing number of scholars have taken an interestin the topic; see, for instance, Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Post-Accord Crime’ in John Darby (ed.) Violenceand Reconstruction (South Bend, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press forthcoming 2005). There are alsoseveral case specific studies on crime in post-war societies. On South Africa, see, for instance,Antoniette Louw, ‘Surviving the Transition: Trends and Perceptions in Crime’, Social IndicatorsResearch 41 (1997) pp. 137–168 and Mark Shaw, Crime and Policing in Post-Apartheid SouthAfrica: Transforming Under Fire (Cape Town/Johannesburg: David Philip 2002). In Dane Archerand Rosemary Gartner, ‘Violent Acts and Violent Times: A Comparative Approach to PostwarHomicide Rates’, American Sociological Review 41/6 (1976) pp.937–963, it is found that homiciderates increased substantially in countries that had taken part in combat during international conflict.They explain this interesting finding by the so-called legitimisation of violence hypothesis, whichsuggest that war legitimises, rather than prohibits the use of violence. The effects of the violence-legitimisation appear to continue after the war has ended, and become an integral feature of the post-war society.
16. In Sri Lanka, approximately 74 per_cent population are Singhalese, while the Tamils make up some18 per_cent. There is also the ethnically distinct group of Muslims, constituting 7 per_cent.
17. For an overview of the causes and impact of violence in Sri Lanka, see Gamini Samaranayake,‘Political Violence in Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach’, Terrorism and Political Violence 9/2(Summer 1997) pp.99–199 and Samaranayake, Gamini, ‘Patterns of Political Violence andResponses of the Government in Sri Lanka, 1971–1996’, Terrorism and Political Violence 11/1(Spring 1999) pp.110–122. See also Jayadeva Uyangoda and Janaka Biyanwila (eds.) Matters ofViolence: Reflections on Social and Political Violence in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social ScientistsAssociation 1997).
18. On JVP, see Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution?’ 3rd edn. (Kandy: Institute ofFundamental Studies, 2001). The JVP is a Maoist-Nationalist party that represents an extreme-nationalist Sinhalese view in Sri Lanka.
19. Jayadeva Uyangoda, ‘Militarization, Violent State, Violent Society: Sri Lanka’ in K. Rupesinghe andK. Mumtaz (eds.) Internal Conflicts in South Asia (Oslo/ London: PRIO/SAGE 1996) p.121.
20. See K.M. de Silva, and G.H. Peiris (eds.) Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka: Past Failures and FutureProspect (Kandy/Washington DC: International Centre for Ethnic Studies/USIP 2000); KetheshLoganathan, Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict (Colombo: CEPRA,Faculty of Law 1996); Robert I. Rotberg (ed.) Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War andReconciliation. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 1999); Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.)Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons (London: International Alert 1998).
21. For analyses of the initiation and developments of the current peace initiative, see for instance RajatGanguly, ‘Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroad between Peace and War’, Third WorldQuarterly 25/5 (July 2004) pp.903–18; Kristine Hoglund, and Isak Svensson, ‘The Peace Process inSri Lanka’, Civil Wars 5/4 (Winter 2003) pp.103–18; Liz Philipson, ‘Negotiating Processes in SriLanka’ in ibid. A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Recollection, Reinterpretation &Reconciliation (Colombo: Marga Institute 2001).
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22. The ceasefire agreement (CFA) is available online at for instance Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission(SLMM), , www.slmm.lk . .
23. See for instance 2. ‘In the Shadows of Sattahip: The Many Faces of Peace’ inn Special Report:University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna 2002); ‘Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the TamilTigers in Sri Lanka’, Human Rights Watch 16/13 (2004e); Ingrid Samset, ‘Whose Mission? Limitsand Potentials of the SLMM’, lines/ (2004).
24. Ganguly, ‘Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict’ (note 21),x pp.910–11.25. SLMM Press Release, 2 April 2003.26. SLMM Press Release, 10 Oct. 2002.27. On LTTE, see S M.R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas, 3rd edn.
(Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Bookshop 2002); Swamy, M.R. Narayan, Inside an Elusive Mind:Prabhakaran (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications 2003) and Manoj Joshi, ‘On the Razor’s Edge:The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19/1 (1996) pp. 19–42.
28. AFP Interview, ‘Tamil Tiger Renegade Vows no Return to War in Sri Lanka’, Agence France Press(AFP), 9 March 2004. On various explanations, see Ganguly (note 21) pp.913–14.
29. The Norwegian government maintained the same position during the government crisis in Nov. 2003.30. Jehan Perera, ‘The Joint Funding Mechanism: Why Human Rights Protections Have to Be
Emphasises‘, 21 March 2005 available online , www.peace-srilanka.org . .31. Jehan Perera, ‘Averting a Return to Pre-Tsunami Impasse’, National Peace Council, 14 Feb. 2005,
available online , www.peace-srilanka.org . .32. See, for instance Ganguly (note 21) p.914 and Jehan Perera, ‘Root Causes of LTTE Need to Be
Addressed’, 8 March 2004, available online , www.peace-srilanka.org . .33. Human Rights Watch,2 Sri Lanka: Political Killings During the Ceasefire (2003).34. Jehan Perera, ‘The Remedy for Killings during the Peace Process’, 26 July 2004, available online at
, www.peace-srilanka.org . .35. Sri Lanka is an electoral democracy and competitive elections have been held regularly. However, the
armed conflict has led to serious flaws in the electoral processes. On election-related violence, seePeople’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL)2. Chronology of Political Violence in SriLanka During Election Times (2004b). On Sri Lanka’s electoral system, see Benjamin Reilly,Benjamin, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management(Cambridge: CUP 2001).
36. The two main organisations monitoring violence in connection to the election were Centre forMonitoring Election Violence (CMEV) and People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL).There were also international monitors in Sri Lanka during the elections, for instance the EuropeanUnion.
37. Final Report on Election Related Violence, General Election - April 2004. (Colombo: Centre forMonitoring Election Violence (CMEV) 2004c); Final Report on Parliamentary General Election,2nd April 2004 (PAFFREL/MFFE 2004d).
38. Final Report on Parliamentary General Election, 2nd April 2004, p.8, and CMEV Final Report onElection Related Violence (note 37) p.5.
39. Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka End Killings and Abductions of Tamil Civilians (2005); JehanPerera, ‘The Remedy for Killings during the Peace Process’, 26 July 2004 available online at, www.peace-srilanka.org . .
40. ‘Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka’, Human Rights Watch 16/13(2004e) p.3
41. Ibid.42. Ibid. p.1643. The Mitchell principles constituted a set of principles of democracy and non-violence that the parties
had to commit to, to be allowed to participate in the peace negotiations.44. Roger Mac Ginty and John Darby, Guns and Government: The Management of the Northern Ireland
Peace Process (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002) p.89.45. Jehan Perera, ‘Spoilers Step Up Campaign while President Dreams Again’, 11 April 2005, available
online at , www.peace-srilanka.org . .46. I. William Zartman (ed.) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil War. (Washington DC:
Brookings Institute 1995).
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