Vigilant State 4 Producer-Consumer Linkage INTELLIGENCE and

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Vigilant State 4 1 Nature of surprise Why does the experience make us no less vulnerable ? R.K. Betts 4 surprise types >>>>>

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Vigilant State 4 Producer-Consumer Linkage INTELLIGENCE and R.K. Betts King of Surprise Attack Studies Vigilant State 4 1 Nature of surprise Why does the experience make us no less vulnerable ? R.K. Betts 4 surprise types >>>>> 1.1 If ? - Falklands 1.2 When ? - Barbarossa 1.3 Where ? France 1940 1.4 Type? Pearl Harbor 1941 Vigilant State 4 Betts also stresses -- The need to move beyond the consumer (to implement and disseminate down) consumers prefer to accept low probability rather than risk mobilisation (Stalin 1941) 2. Michael Handel - Paradoxes Vigilant State 4 2.Michael Handels 5 paradoxes a)As a result of the great difficulties in differentiating between signals and noise in strategic warning, both valid and invalid information must be treated on a similar basis. In effect, all that exists is noise, not signals. Vigilant State 4 2.Michael Handels 5 paradoxes b)The greater the risk [involved in the attack], the less likely it seems, and the less risky it become. In fact, the greater the risk the smaller it becomes. Vigilant State 4 2.Michael Handels 5 paradoxes c)The sound of silence. A quiet international environment can act as background noise which, by conditioning observes to a peaceful routine, covers preparations for war. Vigilant State 4 2.Michael Handels 5 paradoxes d)The greater the credibility of an intelligence agency over the course of time, the less its reports and conclusions are questioned: therefore the greater the risk in the long run of over-relying on its findings Vigilant State 4 2.Michael Handels 5 paradoxes e)Self-negating prophecy. Information on a forthcoming enemy attack leads to counter-mobilisation which, in turn, prompts the enemy to delay or cancel his plans. It is thus impossible even in retrospect to know whether counter- mobilisation is justified or not. 3. The Nature of Warning Jimmy Carter Bobby Ray Inman Vigilant State 4 3. Nature of Warning capabilities partial warning intentions full warning intel analytical bureaucracy is a barrier each level must confirm each level is a filter which applies normal presumptions also a time lag (in the Gulf analysts are removed) Vigilant State Consumer behaviour decision-makers also analyse, yet different very short reports only a % of the day short attention = presumptions/mind cages policy makers own process and blend intuition Ike and bomber gap 1950s - demands raw data policy-makers can be very ignorant about intel Jimmy Carter secret = true! Vigilant State Power of policy commitments to policies - Nehrus pro- China policy apparent failure problem 4. Modelling Problems The Concept Vigilant State 4 4. Psychological/Modelling Problems To help to manage data Without models just a sea of data With models presumptions and stereotypes Vigilant State 4 What sorts? a) Behavioural Barbarossa - Pearl Harbor b) Racial - Hong Kong - Oxygen breathing torpedo, Zero - MI2 vs MO2 c) Institutional - Yom Kippur War and the Concept 5. Improvement and Reform Vigilant State 4 5. Improvement train to recognise presumptions demand alternative analyses make all presumptions clear search for awkward info do more quantitative analysis stress intention protect individuals against group pressure pluaralisms lower the warning threshold Vigilant State 4 6 Betts Surprise Attack is Inevitable? Surprise explained by many factors Collection Bureaucratic Psych - Consumer Implementation problems Problems are cumulative and multiply each other out Rooted in the nature of the machine and in human understanding Fixing one pathology creates another ? 7. Producer-Consumer Linkage Vigilant State 4 7. New Consumer-Production Linkage Intelligence information and insights that do not assist action remain lifeless Richard Haas - Director PPS US SD How to remain close to a policy maker but tell them they should be paying attention to not what they want to hear ? Vigilant State 4 Carmen A. Medina asks > Is all counter-terrorist intelligence tactical? What happens when the secret services become the cutting edge of action and so are consumers? IT means policy-makers are reading raw traffic Analyst now market only unique insights into well- understood problems ? Are analysts integrated into centres e.g. CTCs doing individual integrated task the new model? Predicts a network centred model as the future Old-fashioned DI people find it scary Vigilant State 4 8. Conclusion We can make improvements to the chain But it is the fact that it is a chain? The Handel paradoxes remain Is alliance the answer not on Iraq!!! Technology probably makes surprise attack easier Deception more widely practised States must harden against surprise attack? 9/11 was about security rather than intelligence?