Views of the Political World

American Geographical Society

Views of the Political WorldAuthor(s): Stephen B. JonesSource: Geographical Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 1955), pp. 309-326Published by: American Geographical SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/211806 .

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The Geographical Review

VOLUME XLV July, 1955 NUMBER 3

VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL WORLD* STEPHEN B. JONES

He had a special picture of the world, and every fact had to fit that fancied picture. As he believed, so the world must be; but, in fact, it was a picture of another world.'

M j ODERN man, Lewis Mumford once said, is like a dog that can smell all the smells in the world at once. A dog in such a plight, if he were of excitable temperament, would undoubtedly soon

have a nervous breakdown. Many men have taken that route of escape. Others have sought another solution: to adopt systems of thought that sift and order the vast amount of communication that assaults the senses every day. Indeed, such systems are indispensable. Without them no busy person could ever make a decision. But we need only look at the totalitarian states to see what can happen when system hardens into dogma.

Every thinking person has thought filters through which he channels the current of communication. One such filter is geographical. Even the most ignorant person has his idea of geography, inaccurate and incomplete though it may be. Witness the book-club clerk who filed letters from Brussels, Brazil, and Syria under "miscellaneous islands." One's sense of geographical space may be local, regional, or world-wide.2 It is safe to say that the man of affairs in any civilized land has a world-wide outlook, and, increasingly, so does the man in the street. But does it represent the world as it reafly is?

* This paper was prepared as part of a study of national power sponsored by Yale University and the Office of Naval Research. All opinions expressed are the responsibility of the author, not of the spon- sors. The paper is derived in part from some material contributed by the author to the chapter on political geography in "American Geography: Inventory & Prospect" (edited by P. E. James and C. F. Jones, published for the Association of American Geographers by Syracuse University Press, I954). Thanks are given to Professors Derwent Whittlesey and Saul B. Cohen for their many helpful comments.

,General Heinz Guderian, referring to Hitler. Quoted in Chester Wilmot: The Struggle for Europe (London, i952), p. 622.

2 Derwent Whittlesey: The Horizon of Geography, Annals Assti. of Amer. Geogrs., Vol. 3 5, I945,

pp. I-36.

P DR. JONES, well known for his writings in the field of political geography, is professor of geography at Yale University.

Copyright 1955, by the American Geographical Society of New York



3IO THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

Our topic is "views of the political world." In this, the first of two related papers, we deal with two main groups of such views. One is derived fronm facts of physical geography to which political interpretations are given, the other from human geography. The second paper, which is to appear in a future issue of this journal, deals with global views derived from strategic ideas.

We do not attempt encyclopedic coverage but simply select examples to show how the world has been viewed and what consequences may follow. That we associate certain men with certain ideas does not necessarily mean

that they originated these ideas. Most of them are men who played an important part in codifying the idea or adapting it to political purposes. Some men we name took the bold step of plotting a global idea on the map, a step that has caused many a fuzzy theory to fall flat on its face. We are some- times forced to criticize the efforts of these pioneers but do not mean to disparage them.

Although this paper obviously is academic, it may be more than a mnere

melange stirred up by a professor for his own satisfaction. Practical men hold global views, though they may not verbalize them, and in the light of their views they make important decisions. The whole direction of a nation's effort may be determined by the global thought filters of its leaders. A global view is more than just a filing system for information. Necessarily it beconmes a system of evaluation. As such it may also be a system of distortion. One man s view of the world may shunt all information labeled "Asia" or "Africa" into a compartment marked "Unimportant." Another's may be

built up of stereotypes such as the languid tropics, the frozen north, and a

Dixie long since gone witth the wind. Hartshorne3 has shown the need for global views and stated a problem:

In an age of global political relations and global wars, . the political geographer is required to keep constantly in mind the world as a whole. But practical difficulties make it well-nigh impossible for him to study the whole pattern of world relationships at one time. Since these relationships must be seen as they are on the sphere, even the map, the geographer's distinctive tool, fails him in this purpose. Nor does the globe replace the flat map, since it is impossible to see more than half the globe at any one moment.

The problem of visualizing spherical relationships is real, and maps have

led to stereotyped views of a world that never was,4 but the practical diffi-

Richard Hartshorne: Political Geography, is American Geography: Inventory & Prospect,

edited by P. E. James and C. F. Jones (published for the Association of American Geographers by Syracuse

University Press, 1954), pp. I67-225, reference on p. I86.

4 S. W. Boggs: Cartohypnosis, Scieitific M1owhtly, Vol. 64, 1947, pp. 469-476.



VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL WORLD 3II

culty that Hartshorne mentions is not the only one. Memory, imagination, and training may overcomne the limitations of maps and globes. The plethora of data about the world is the basic practical difficulty. But this brings us back to where we started. It is the plethora of data that impels us to seek global systems, while at the same time it makes them imperfect. Paradoxi- cally, it is the practical difficulty of studying "the whole pattern of world relationships at one tinme" that compels us "to keep constantly in mind the world as a whole."

ZONES AND CLIMATIC REGIONS

One of the most enduring global views is that of latitudinal zones. This way of looking at the earth had much reality in classical times. Not only were the main climatic and vegetational zones of the ecumene latitudinal, but so were the major landforms and the great sea that classical civilization bordered. One could tell much about a land in the Greco-Roman world simply by knowing its zonal position. But there were many features that did not fit into this form. Greek history is more readily cast into Europe-Asia and intercity conflict. Nevertheless, the zones were a realistic basal pattern.

Today the zones are a much poorer approximation to the world we know, but they still influence thinking. As recently as I94I, the United States Army Quartermaster had three standard issues of clothing and equipment, Temper- ate, Torrid, and Frigid, and the limits of their use were lines of latitude.5 Learned as well as unlearned men still blandly classify a most diversified third of the earth as "the tropics." This has its counterpart in the casual disregard of "the Polar Regions." The widespread use of pole-centered maps in recent years has not really changed common thinking. Even one so flexible in thought as Spykman6 could say that a cylindrical projection of conven- tional aspect was adequate for "the representation of the importance of the position of such northern areas as Canada, Greenland, Iceland, and Alaska in the communications of both war and peace."

A modern improvement on the zonal concept is the climatic region. As every geographer knows, world maps of climatic regions are available that give substantial detail with considerable reliability. Such maps, however, are not well known among social scientists in general and have had little influence on the world picture in the minds of most laymen.

Our interest here is in the climatic map as a view of the political world.

5James and Jones, op. cit. [see footnote 3, above], p. 490. 6 N. J. Spykman: The Geography of the Peace (New York, I944), p. i8.



3I2 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

The best-known interpreter of climate is Ellsworth Huntington.7 Obviously, human energy and the level of civilization are major factors in politics and power. To be sure, the fragmentation of Europe must be set off against its energizing climate and high level of civilization, and Japan's poverty of natural resources must be set off against the climate that Huntington considered the most stimulating in Asia. Indeed, the main problem presented by Huntington's work and by studies of climate and man in general is how much weight to assign to the climatic factor.

Markham8 applied climatic theories more specifically to national states. He emphasized the importance of heating and envisioned a significant role for air conditioning. The former is necessary for the poleward spread of civilization; the latter may permit an equatorward movement and offset the rise in temperatures now apparently taking place.

Criticisms of the views of Huntington, Markham, and others who make climate the basic world pattern have been numerous. Only the most opti- mistic would deny the importance of climate altogether. Certainly there are cold and dry limits of widespread agriculture. Although great cities and great powers exist where local food supply is inadequate and conceivably could arise where no food is produced at all, there seems no reason to think that such booming cities as Murmansk, Igarka, and Fairbanks will be the Mos- cows and New Yorks of the future, unless climate changes markedly which is to support rather than refute the basic importance of climate. But accepting the underlying importance of climate is not the same as making climate the measure of all things, and particularly all things political. One can only conclude that the physical and mental effects of climate, though real, are still imperfectly known and their political interpretation is still guesswork.

THE EASTERN AND WESTERN HEMISPHERES: FACT OR FICTION?

The discovery of America emphasized the inadequacy of the latitudinal zones as a master pattern. The Atlantic is a longitudinal break of first mag- nitude in the lands of the world. Although the familiar zones can be traced after a fashion in the winds and picked up on the American shore, the watery break is too immense to be considered a mere irregularity. Furthermore, with Da Gama's voyage the "torrid zone" lost much of its reputation as a barrier. The oceans became highways, imposing new patterns of thought.9

7 See especially his "Civilization and Climate" (New Haven and London, I9I5) and "Mainsprings

of Civilization" (New York and London, I945). 8 S. F. Markham: Climate and the Energy of Nations (London, I942), especially Chapter I2.

9 Cf. Whittlesey, op. cit. [see footnote 2, above], pp. 9-I4.



VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL WORLD 3 I3

The pattern of continents and oceans revealed by the great voyages had for its derivative the concept of eastern and western hemispheres. The names given these hemispheres show that, in effect, the world was flat, with the Atlantic splitting the middle. This view dominated American thought through the nineteenth century, was significant until World War II, and is still extant. In earlier days it had considerable validity. Neither George Wash- ington nor Abraham Lincoln had to worry about the Pacific. It was what Britain and France did on the Atlantic that mattered. To the European powers the Indian Ocean was an arena of importance, but what happened there was always secondary to what happened in Europe. China and Japan sought to preserve a regional sanctum in a corner of the world, eating not of the fruit of the tree of world-wide space sense.

The awakening of East Asia and the quickening of the political pulse of the Pacific did not undermine faith in the existence of the hemispheres. "Eastern" and "western" continued to be used, though they are obviously misnomers when applied to the Pacific. Americans have held a curious faith in the virtues of westward movement. Isolationism toward Europe could be combined with expansionism in the Pacific. The elusive "four hundred million customers" of China have had greater magnetism than the more prosperous peoples of Europe. Defensively, both oceans seemed wide enough to most Americans. The emergence of the Far East put the United States near the center of a flat, rectangular world, split north and south through Asia. This America-centered, Mercator world literally became standard in the United States. The writer recalls his astonishment at his first sight of a Japanese school map, split down the Atlantic and centered on Japan! The American view of the world was reinforced by the seemingly solid position of Britain in the Indian Ocean, a part of the world of little interest to Ameri- cans. Even World War II did not entirely eradicate this view. The Indian Ocean remained largely a British responsibility, and relatively few Ameri- cans served there.

The concept of the hemispheres appealed to many American pacifists. American pacifists were of a number of stripes of opinion, but for some the belief was akin to that of a housewife in a respectable, middle-class suburb who leaves her doors unlocked while she goes to the store. American pacifists were genuinely revolted by the thought of war, but the luxury of a sup- posedly safe location permitted many to believe that peace could be had without payment.

The hemisphere concept provided a geographical rationale for isolationism. Isolationism in the United States is more an instinct than a political



3I4 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

movement. Many professed internationalists unconsciously react as isolationists on some issues. Isolationism has found a stronghold among certain groups in the Middle West,'0 but the belief that the Middle West is the isolationist stronghold only because of location is untenable. One can readily name isolationists from seaboard states, and, if interior location alone is sufficient, why could the America First Committee establish no successful chapters in Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, or West Virginia?"

The importance of the Western Hemisphere concept is shown in the steps taken by Roosevelt in dealing with "nonintervention." The trade of surplus destroyers for island bases in the western Atlantic was an adroit stroke, pleasing the believers in hemisphere defense while aiding the British to hold their homeland, a base far more important than any island near the American shore. The first American activities against German submarines were limited to the western Atlantic. Conveniently, Iceland could be brought into the Western Hemisphere by applying the doctrine that the boundary follows the widest channel.'2 The prewar conscription act limited the service of conscripts to the Western Hemisphere.

Even after the United States became a full belligerent, the idea of the Western Hemisphere retained hold. It no doubt underlay the willingness to consider a permanent American base in West Africa. Of all transatlantic areas, this seems, on a Mercator map, most obviously related to Western Hemisphere defense or, looked at the other way, the minimum extension of Ainerican commitments toward Europe. Fortunately, the view has prevailed that it is sounder strategy to support France and Britain than to make the West African coast the foremost commitment.'3

The importance of the hemisphere concept just before the war is evi- denced by Spykman's magnum opus, which is mainly a critique of hemispheric defense.'4 Spykman's book repeatedly mentions "the Western Hemisphere," "the New World," or "the Americas." The book was in proof when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and rendered its thesis

academic, for the time at least. A first chapter on power politics and war and

Io Samuel Lubell: The Future of American Politics (New York, I952), pp. I3I-I32; and Hartshorne,

op. cit. [see footnote 3, above], pp. I78-I79.

II W. S. Cole: America First (Madison, I95 3 ), p. 3 I .

I2 Vilhjalmur Stefansson: What Is the Western Hemisphere? Foreignt Affairs, Vol. I9, I940-I94I,

pp. 343-346; reference on p. 345. I3 Cf. S. B. Jones: Africa and American Security, Yale Inist. of IJiterijatl. Stuidies Memoraniduimn No. 17,

New Haven, I945, PP. I8-19.

I4 N. J. Spykman: America's Strategy in World Politics (New York, I942).



VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL WORLD 3 I 5

a conclusion on the postwar outlook were added before publication.'5 These, more than the main text, swept the book to popularity and disputation. Yet, if we are right in thinking that the hemispheric view persists, the main text has not lost all utility.

Spykman concluded that neither hemisphere nor "quarter-sphere" (North and Middle Amnerica) defense is feasible, if both military strategy and resources are considered. The Western Hemisphere as a defensive unit, con- signed to the grave by Spykman, has had a rebirth in the provocative work of Seversky.16 His thesis, that strategic bombardment from North American bases should be the main reliance of the United States, is tied to a pole- centered view of the world in which Latin America becomes the reserve. We will return to this topic in the second paper.

PANREGIONS

One of the more fruitful shoots of the hemispheric concept has been Pan-Americanism. Although the Americas are neither a cultural nor an economic unit, they have enough common history and common interests to maintain considerable solidarity, especially vis-a-vis Europe.

Pan-Americanism appealed to Haushofer as a glittering example of geopolitical thinking. His chief contribution to the art of the global view was the concept of panregions.17 German geopoliticians believed that three main panregions were possible: Pan-America, Pan-Asia, and Eurafrica. The last could be dominated by Germany. Russia might create a panregion by ac- quiring India. The British and other overseas empires were panregions of a sort but obviously interfered with the creation of the major panregions the geopoliticians envisaged.'8 The panregions of Haushofer served two main geopolitical objectives: the attainment of great space, which is necessary for a great power, and autarky. The regions were laid out in longitudinal belts to provide the resources of all climates and were large enough that self- sufficiency in food and most minerals seemed possible. Whittlesey points out that none of the panregions could be formed without war not even Pan- America if it were to be a controlled economic unit. In all of them there are

'5 Frederick S. Dunn, Director of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, personal communication.

I6 Alexander de Seversky: Air Power: Key to Survival (New York, I950), especially map facing p. 3I2.

'7 Karl Haushofer: Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen (Weltpolitische Biicherei, Vol. 2I, Berlin, I93 I). " Derwent Whittlesey: Haushofer: The Geopoliticians, itn Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by

E. M. Earle (Princetoni, I943), pp. 388-4II, reference on pp. 400-404.



3 i6 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

physical obstacles to easy communication by land, so that the contiguity one seems to see on the map is deceptive.'9

Spykman, having concluded that the Western Hemisphere was not a feasible strategic unit, made specific recommendations for postwar policies.20 The shortcomings of the League of Nations caused him to doubt the wisdom of another world-wide organization for collective security. Regional leagues, whose members would have common interests, seemed wiser. He proposed

three such leagues, with the United States a member of each: European, Far

Eastern, and Pan-American. Though the East Indies, Australia, and New

Zealand were included in the Far Eastern organization, one notes the absence

of a league for South Asia. Spykmnan regarded these leagues as balance-of-

power systems and explicitly recommended that the United States keep free

of "one-sided" alliances which would prevent it from shifting its weight.

As everyone knows, a world-wide security organization was again estab-

lished, but provision for regional arrangements was written into its charter.

What has come to be is neither Haushofer's nor Spykman's plan. The Soviet

Union has formed a bloc that might be called a panregion, but with China

instead of India as the other major member. Instead of regional leagues,

within which the United States could act as a balancer of power, there are

regional alliances or alliance groups: NATO, OAS, ANZUS, SEATO, and

the alliances with Japan and Nationalist China.

MAN AS THE MEASURE

The dualism of physical and human geography is an artificial one. There

are few uninhabited lands, and no mnan has yet escaped from the earthly

habitat. Theoretically, one should reach the same result from both "nature

first" and "man first" approaches. But the human mind has difficulty

grasping wholes of such complexity as the earth, so there is likely to be a

difference between global generalizations approached from physical and from

human data. Zones, climates, and hemispheres set up one kind of thought

train. Population, race, and culture set up another, and the twain may never

meet. If we start with man himself, the first facts of note are his numbers and

his distribution. The population map gives a global view that summarizes

much that was and is and probably will be the nature of the world. With the

population map as text, geography and history can preach a sermon about

climate, soil, natural resources, society, government, and technology.

'9 Ibid., P. 40I. 20 Spykman, op. cit. [see footnote I4, above], PP. 457-472.



VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL WORLD 3I7

To begin one's geographical thinking with the poptilation map has much to recommend it. To stop there has no virtue at all. Basic though the population map is, it is a springboard and nothing more. Trewartha, in his methodological study of population geography,2' grants "gross patterns of distribution" only a third-order rank. We tend to be satisfied with numbers. During World War II, the fond hopes held for China's manpower were largely illusory. Yet that same manpower, better equipped and organized, proved formidable in Korea. Notestein22 has emphasized the manpower potential of the Soviet Union but points out that only because it is effectively linked with abundant resources does it make the Soviet Union a great power.

Mackinder, in his first paper on political geography,23 pointed out the difference between "man settling" and "man travelling." The population map shows "man settling" and is no more the whole story than is a map of climatic regions. In this early paper Mackinder called attention to the two main densely populated areas Europe and Monsoonal Asia. He then turned to the dry belt between them, extending from the Sahara to the Gobi, and showed the historical significance of the crossing and outflanking of this barrier.

Mackinder never lost sight of the population pattern of the world. In his book of IgI9,24 he briefly restated the global view of his I890 paper. The emphasis in this book, asin the paper of I904 that was ancestral to it,25 is on "man travelling," on the seaman and the landsman and their relative mobility. Yet the power base is never forgotten, and, in the famous three- line dictum, the Heartland commands the world only because its sparsely populated expanses are linked with populous East Europe.26

The population map comes up in modified fashion in Mackinder's final version of his global pattern. In this paper27 Mackinder extends the arid belt into a "mantle of deserts and wildernesses," including eastern Siberia ("Lenaland"), Alaska, the Canadian Shield, and the arid and semiarid western United States. On each side of this "mantle of vacancies" live a thousand

2I G. T. Trewartha: A Case for Population Geography, Annals Assr. of Amer. Geogrs., Vol. 43, I953, pp. 7I-97; reference on p. 88.

22 F. W. Notestein: Some Implications of Population Change for Post-War Europe, Proc. Amner. Philos. Soc., Vol. 87, I943-I944, pp. I65-I74; reference on p. I73.

23 H. J. Mackinder: The Physical Basis of Political Geography, Scottish Geogr. Mag., Vol. 6, I890,

pp. 78-84. 24 Idem: Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York, I9I9 and I942), pp. I03-I07 (I9I9 edit.). 25 Idem: The Geographical Pivot of History, Geogr. Jouirn., Vol. 23, I904, pp. 42I-444.

26 Ideni: Democratic Ideals and Reality [see footnote 24, above], p. i86 (I9I9 edit.). 27 Idemn: The Round World and the Winning of the Peace, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2I, I942-I943, pp.

595-605. Reprinted with modifications in H. W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, edits.: Compass of the World (New York, I944), pp. I6I-I73.



3 I 8 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

million people, forming "a balanced globe of human beings. And happy,

because balanced and thus free." Weigert28 puts it mildly enough when he

says that this balance "is too neat and perfect to be true." One's view of the world's population can be highly emotional. Americans

have tended to class as scarcely human "the teeming populations of Asia," an

attitude that made the early Japanese victories the more incomprehensible to

us. The current American population growth is generally regarded as

"healthy and vigorous." France's nearly stationary numbers have been con-

sidered a mark of decadence, but methods to stabilize population are widely

approved for Japan and India. These amusing but hardly amazing contra-

dictions are of course related to racial and cultural prejudices.

Man's numbers are not his only observable characteristic. Another pri-

mary fact is race. The political significance of race arises, to be sure, more

frorn what it is imagined to be than from what it is. That racial differences,

real or imaginary, are potent in politics needs no elaboration. Oversimplified

and unrealistic racial doctrines are thought filters for many. The global

patterns of race in many minds bear little resemblance to anthropological

reality. Some show only two categories, ourselves and the inferior breeds.

Others are drawn in three contrasting colors, white, black, and yellow.

Trained anthropologists, on the other hand, are reluctant to commit to

paper any world map of races. In fact, there seenis no consensus among

anthropologists as to what race really mneans or how races are to be deter-

mined.29

one of the best-known racial geographies is that -of Griffith Taylor,

which has been set forth in several of his publications.30 Employing the

theory that successive races have migrated centrifugally from inner Eurasia

into the three "peninsulas" of Europe-Africa, America, and Malaya-Australia,

Taylor is able to map the races of the world. Few physical anthropologists

are ready to accept this complete solution of their problem. Taylor's races

form an evolutionary series, and he is willing to concede a slight average

biological superiority to the latest of them, the Alpine-Mongol. He is no

racialist, however, and racial factors play no leading part in his political

geography.3_

28 H. W. Weigert: Heartland Revisited, in New Compass of the World, edited by H. W. Weigert,

Vilhjalmur Stefansson, and R. E. Harrison (New York, I949), pp. 80-go, reference on p. 88. 29 H. V. Vallois: Race, in Anthropology Today (International Symposium on Anthropology),

prepared under the chairmanship of A. L. Kroeber (Chicago, I953), pp. I45-I62.

30 For example, "Environment and Race" (London, I927), and "Racial Geography," in "Geography

in the Twentieth Century," edited by Griffith Taylor (New York and London, I95I), pp. 433-462.

3' Griffith Taylor: Our Evolving Civilization (Toronto, I946), especially Chapters 3 and 4 and

Part 4.



VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL WORLD 3I9

CULTURAL REALMS

The global pattern of culture is more fundamental, politically, than that of race. Racial friction is cultural. Cultural friction with no racial factor is commnon. Belief in one's cultural superiority is widespread and is held by persons who would never look down upon another man because of his color. The work of missionaries, educators, and many businessmen in foreign lands is based upon a sincere belief that their way of life, their culture, or at least some part of it, should be spread throughout the world.

PA-C I F C oao rea affected

'the New Worldl Revoiuyion"

EOGRREV., JULY '55 LII Transitional territory in the taiga

FIG. i-"Culture Worlds," adapted from end-paper map in R. J. Russell and F. B. Kniffen: Culture Worlds (New York, ii), by permission of the publisher, The Macmillan Company.

Anthropologists have not been eager to publish world maps of culture, for excellent reasons. It has so far proved impossible to map a physical comi- plex such as climate in a way acceptable to all. Culture is far more complex

\ 64 I R -

than climate. A maP of "culture worlds" has been published by two geographers (Fig. I ).32 In fairness, it should be stated that the map was drawn for a general textbook. Eurasia on this Russell-Kniffen map shows some resemblance to Mackinder's i 890 pattern. Except for the Arctic fringe, it is divided into European, Dry, and Oriental culture worlds. The Americas, except for the Arctic fringe, are a separate culture world. There are also African and Pacific culture worlds.

Toynbee 33 speaks of societies rather thani cultures, but the difference, i hois usage, is not great. He has not mapped his societies, but he lists five important living ones: Western Christian, Orthodox Christian, Islamic,

32 R. J. Russell and F. B. Kniffen: Culture Worlds (New York, I95I), end-paper map. 33 A. J. Toynbee: A Study of History, Vol. I (abridgement by D. C. Somervell; New York and

London, I946), p. 8.



320 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

Hindu, and Far Eastern. There are minor groups on the margins or as en- claves. Toynbee's scheme has political facets a society customarily experi- encing a "time of troubles" with many wars and perhaps being consolidated into a "universal state." Such universal states have usually come by force and have prolonged rather than rejuvenated the life of the society.

How far one can go with the political interpretation of such global views is hard to say. Detailed studies of individual cultures made by anthropologists

have certainly proved useful to administrators, but such studies do not yet add up to a global view. Broad generalizations like Toynbee's and great cultural realms like those shown on the Russell-Kniffen map may have significance in the long haul, but they cannot be readily translated into terms of current affairs. The relationships of politics to general culture must be known much more fully.

One of the most important of cultural phenomena is the contact of cultures. It is concomitant to the rise of empires and a factor in theirfall. Contact with Western culture led to both the closing and the reopening of Japan. Cultural contact is so diverse in kind and degree that it is difficult to map. Russell and Kniffen made the attempt, showing the major areas affected by "the New World Revolution." Their attempt cannot be called a success, as a critical perusal of their map will show. Nevertheless, the concept is important, and more accurate maps may some day be produced.

POLITICAL ECONOMY

Related to the contact of cultures is Whittlesey's concept of "the exploitable world."34 "The real test of exploitability," writes Whittlesey, "is eco-

nomic subservience rather than political dependence." His map represents the exploitable world at the period of publication. But the exploitable world

has had different limits in other periods. It expanded rapidly after the voyages of Columbus and Da Gama. It shrank in the Americas as the colonies gained their political and, more slowly, economic independence. It spread in Africa and with the economic subjection of China. Currently what might be called

the "old" exploitable world that based primarily on the sea power of mari-

time Europe is shrinking, while a new exploitable world may be rising on the borders of the Soviet Union. This shift would not have pleased Mac- kinder, but it would not have surprised him.

Whittlesey's map of the exploitable world has a band in the tropics and

subtropics, but the inclusion of China, Mongolia, and Korea shows that

34 Derwent Whittlesey: The Earth and the State (New York, I939), pp. 80-8I.



VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL WORLD 32I

climate cannot be more than a partial explanation. Tropical climate, or its indirect effects, may retard escape from economic subservience.

The concept of the exploitable world reaches public consciousness under the more familiar term "imperialism." To a large extent, this word is a stereotype today, at least as applied to the "old" exploitable world. Its hold on American thinking is a lingering effect of the American Revolution. It is true that such uprisings as those in Kenya have a basis in genuine grievances aggravated by the slowness of reform. Nevertheless, old-style imperialism is disappearing. It is noteworthy that the general area called the exploitable world by Whittlesey is now known as "the underdeveloped areas." Except for the Balkans, Staley's map of underdeveloped areas35 is remarkably similar to Whittlesey's map of the exploitable world. The shift of political aim indicated by the change of terms is significant, even though practice may not keep up with good intentions.

THE MATERIAL BASE

The industrial era, with its insatiable demands for fuels and raw materials, has led a number of geologists, geographers, and others to view the political world as a pattern of natural resources and resource utilization. One well- known worker in this field is Brooks Emeny. Emeny presented in graphic form the raw-material positions of the major powers and showed by maps the dependence of the United States upon foreign sources. Griffith Taylor's political geography includes environmental factors, among them the resources of nations. His maps and diagrams have appeared in several publications.37 One of his political formulations is the "dynograph," with axes representing coal, oil, steel, hydroelectric production, and population.38 A detailed study of energy resources was prepared under the direction of N. B. Guyol for the Department of State.39 The maps of energy consumption bear a clear resemblance to maps of "the exploitable world" and "the underdeveloped areas," which is of course not unexpected. On the other hand, energy production, as distinguished from consumption, is high in a few underdeveloped countries that produce oil, and energy potentials from water power are remarkably high in some lands of the rainy tropics.

35 Eugene Staley: The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (Council on Foreign Relations, New York, I954), end-paper map.

36 Brooks Emeny: The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York, I934).

37 Taylor's work is well summarized in "Our Evolving Civilization" [see footnote 3I, above]. 38 Ibid., p. 264.

39 "Energy Resources of the World," U. S. Dept. of State Publ. 3428, I949.




Ackerman40 has approached the question of resources from a somewhat different angle, combining its study with an estimate of levels and possibilities of development. There is thus a relationship to "underdevelopinent." He distinguishes on a map "advanced dynamic centers" (chiefly in Europe and North Ami-ierica), "intermediate regions" and areas "capable of development" (some having high, some low, ratios of population to resources), and areas "relatively incapable of development" (arid and polar lands). An addi- tional feature is an "unstable zone" extending from the Mediterranean across southern Eurasia to Japan.

These studies of the material base of civilization and of national power provide food for thought and a basis for estimation. But it is obvious that they do not provide final answers. They are essential ingredients for the political stew of the industrial era but must be stirred in the pot with other factors manpower, skills, capital, leadership, and the like.4'

POLITICAL CONTROL

The common political map is a stereotype. It leads us to believe that the world is neatly divided into countries, and that a country is all alike inside. The neat division is still incomplete, however.42 A good many boundaries are still poorly defined. There is no agreement on the seaWard extensions of sovereignty. Antarctic claims are in dispute. As for the apparent internal uniformity, there are both regional and political contrasts within a country. The political differences among countries are of course profound.

Efforts have been made to map some of the internal and external political variations. In 1926, Manfred Langhans43 attempted to map the degrees of self-government among the peoples of the world. His basic plan was objective. He set up eight classes of self-rule in internal and external affairs, ranging from full self-rule in both to complete dependence in both. Political boundaries were followed, but subdivisions, such as the American "terri- tories, were recognized. The application of the system, however, was not always objective. The lingering effects of war appear in the treatment of some German-speaking areas. Alsace is shown as in effect a colony of France. To fit the system to Soviet realities proved difficult: customary ideas of autonomy are not applicable to the Soviet Union. The difficulty of making

40 E. A. Ackerman: Japan's Natural Resources and Their Relation to Japan's Economic Future

(Chicago, I953), map as front end paper, discussion in Chapter 2I.

4' S. B. Jones: The Power Inventory and National Strategy, World Politics, Vol. 6, I953-I954, pp.

42I-452.

42 Hartshorne, op. cit. [see footnote 3, above], pp. I82-I83, and the references cited therein. 43 Karte des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes der V6lker, Petermaiuns Mitt., Vol. 72, I926, pp. I-9 and map.



VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL WORLD 323

the system fit the fact shows also in the colonies of indirect rule, for indirect rule can range from genuine to sham.

Hartshorne deliberately sought to break from political boundaries and formal government and to map the realities of political control.44 Harts- horne's map can readily be criticized in detail. He took the risk of using such terms as "permanently colonial" and "passive acceptance," which time has made unfitting in many places. "Passive acceptance" now seems strange for Burma, Java, and Indochina. The Gold Coast, moving toward self-government, cannot be called "permanently colonial." The long-suffering word "colonial" seems stretched beyond its elastic limit to include regions as unlike as Nigeria and the interior of Australia. In spite of such defects, the Hartshorne map was a worth-while experiment, worth repeating, mutatis inutandis, for a series of epochs.

STATE BEHAVIOR

The study of behavior is at least as old as the Book ofJob. Psychologists popularized the word "behavior" many years ago. Currently, social scientists are happy over a new term, "the behavioral sciences," which ties in with the hopes for interdisciplinary research fostered by teamwork during World War II. A new view of the political world, built on knowledge of individual and group behavior, may be a-borning. Attempts have already been made to view the world on this basis. We can now see that they were premature, but in science there are always premature births for every full-term delivery.

Van Valkenburg, in I939, published a map of the world based upon a presumed cycle of state behavior.45 At the risk of distorting his views by overcompression, we may say that young states (or, perhaps more accurately, governments) are engaged in internal organization, adolescent states are aggressive, mature states are contented with what they have, and senile states are likely to disintegrate. There is no prescribed length for the periods. Rejuvenation is possible, which suggests that the physiographic cycle as well as the biological life cycle was in the author's mind.

It is easy to criticize Van Valkenburg's cycle and map. One may ask if Egypt is currently in the last stages of senility or the first stages of youth, or if its desire to control the Sudan is a sign of adolescence. Russia was ex- pansionist-an adolescent trait from the time of Ivan IV to World War I. Without apparently ever being mature, it became senile. Obviously, much

44 Richard Hartshorne: The Politico-Geographic Pattern of the World, Anlnals Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Soc. Sci., Vol. 2I8, I94I, PP. 45-57; map on P. 46.

45 Samuel Van Valkenburg: Elements of Political Geography (New York, I939), p. 6.




needs to be done before we are ready to generalize about state behavior on a more scientific basis.

Hartshorne 6 has used the term "maturity" for a type of behavior in respect to territory but denies all organismic or cyclical connotations. A state conceivably could come into being mature, as Hartshorne uses the term, or never reach that condition. He defines his concept as follows: "A state is geo- politically mature when it has established a raison d'etre that is so thoroughly accepted by the peoples of all its different regions that they accept without question the inclusion of their regions as integral parts of the state-area." Possibly a further clause should be added, that there are no areas outside the state that are considered irredenta.

Hartshorne wisely did not publish a map of mature and immature states. The present writer has set this as a problem for students, with results inter- esting but hardly publishable. A few states seem unquestionably mature, and a good many are clearly immature, but those in intermediate positions are hard to assign, even if transitional categories are recognized. The concept may nevertheless have utility, provided we always remember that it refers to behavior in respect to territory and not necessarily to other political behavior. One essential for peace in a multistate world is the territorial maturity of its most powerful members. Even a world federation needs a core of mature states, in sufficient number to keep immature states from over- throwing the government or using it for their own aggrandizement.

On the other hand, the maturity concept might lead to smugness, a "North Atlantic" view of the world, which ignores the fact that most of the world does not consist of mature states and that the mature states do not possess a comfortable surplus of power. Citizens of mature states may fail to

understand those of states that are immature. There may be a tendency to

think of maturity as a "Nordic" trait, though Uruguay is very likely mature and Japan satisfies Hartshorne's original criterion.

CIRCULATION PATTERNS

Mackinder, as we have seen, began his career as a political geographer with a paper that distinguished between "man settling" and "man travelling." Interest in circulation a term introduced by the French to comprise the manifold movements of men and things has continued, though most geographers have regarded man settling as the primary fact, man traveling as a

derivative. In the modern world, circulation has become so rapid, complex,

46 Richard Hartshorne: The Concepts of "Raison d'etre" and "Maturity" of States; Illustrated from

the Mid-Danube Area, Atinals Assn. oJ Amer. Geogrs., Vol. 30, I940, pp. 59-60 (abstract).



VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL WORLD 325

and quantitatively important that more and more attention is being paid to it. Boggs in I94I urged new cartographic studies of circulation.47 He published examples of travel-speed and transport-cost maps. Gottmann has made

circulation one of the two main forces in his system of political geography.48 The present writer, developing this and other themes, has suggested that

movement is the link between geography and political science.49 Ullman has

recently argued that the real dichotomy in geography is not between physical

and human geography or between systematic and regional but between the

geography of sites and the geography of spatial interaction.50 Fairgrieve combined man settling and man traveling in his system of

political geography.5' He emphasized "the northern belt of settlement and

movement," which included the densely peopled parts of Europe, Asia, and

North America and the sea lanes connecting them. Fairgrieve probably erred in regarding locations on continuous routes as markedly superior to what we prejudge by the term "dead ends." Los Angeles, largest of our Western cities, is more of an end, alive rather than dead, than a point on a through route. The limitation on the development of Cape Town is the size and productivity of its hinterland, not the fact that routes to it "lead nowhere at

the southern end." Maritime circulation, the mobility and capacity of ships, and the unity

of the oceans are of course major factors in sea power, to which we shall turn in the second paper. Staley, in his trenchant critique of isolationist illusions,52 showed the fallacy of thinking of continents as isolable units of

transportation, sea freight being so much cheaper than land freight. But the movement of freight by sea is not the principal form of human contact. Contiguity is a real factor in the interpersonal contacts that are fundamental to politics. The continents are thus by no means merely a frame for the oceans.

The Air Age of course has its corps of zealous prophets and interpreters, as well as those who remind us that "plus ga change, plus c'est la meme chose."

47 S. W. Boggs: Mapping the Changing World: Suggested Developments in Maps, Annals Assui. of Amer. Geogrs., Vol. 3I, I94I, pp. II9-I28.

48Jean Gottmann: La politique des etats et leur geographie (Paris, I952), Chapter 8. See also his "Geography and International Relations," World Politics, Vol. 3, I950-I95I, pp. I53-I73, and "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at Analysis," ibid., Vol. 4, I95I-I952, pp. 5I2-5I9.

49 S. B. Jones: A Unified Field Theory of Political Geography, Annials Assn. of Amer. Geogrs., Vol.

44, I954, pp. III-I23. 50 E. L. Ullman: Geography as Spatial Interaction, Annals Assn. of Amer. Geogrs., Vol. 44, I954,

pp. 283-284 (abstract). 51James Fairgrieve: Geography and World Power (8th edit., New York, I941), pp. 337-346. 52 Eugene Staley: The Myth of the Continents, Foreign Affairs, Vol. I9, I940-194I, pp. 48I-494.

Reprinted with modifications in Weigert and Stefansson, Compass of the World [see footnote 27, above' pp. 89-I08.




To emphasize the world-encircling character of the atmosphere, maps have

been drawn showing no surface features but cities. Van Zandt53 prints such

a map but points out that the bulk of the world's population and resources is found in the so-called land hemisphere centered on northwestern Europe.

Since, in general, air routes connect places where people live, the land

hemisphere becomes the "principal hemisphere" for flying.

STEPPINGSTONE TO STRATEGY

"Man travelling" encompasses "man fighting." "Circulation" is a broad

enough term to cover the guided missile and the intercontinental rocket. "Communications dominate war," wrote Mahan54 a statement as poten-

tially misleading, however, as most other aphorisms concerning strategy.

In the present paper we have examined a number of views of the political

world. One group has been reserved for the second paper: the global strategic views of such men as Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, and Seversky. The

division was made primarily to keep within limits of length, but there is a

logic to it. Most of the views examined in the present paper are basically

combinative. One may reject certain interpretations and evaluations, but

therc is no incongruity in combining climate, culture, resources, govern-

nient, et cetera into a composite view. Actually, this is what many of our

authors have done. It is only for ease of analysis that we have taken items

out of their intellectual contexts. When we turn to global strategies, we find

ourselves dealing with systems that are more nearly complete in themselves

and less combinative. If you add Mahan and Seversky, the sum is zero. Also,

these systems are more manipulative, less contemplative. Mackinder's

"airy cherub" whispered to statesmen. Circulation, then, is a steppingstone to

strategy, but on the other side of the river grows a different grass.

53J. P. Van Zandt: The Geography of World Air Transport (America Faces the Air Age, Vol. I,

Washington, D. C., I944), pp. 4-7; map on p. 7. 54 A. T. Mahan: The Problem of Asia (Boston, I900), p. 125.



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Views of the Political World