Venezuela's Electoral Autocracy, 1999-2019?

Venezuela’s Electoral Autocracy, 1999-2019?A Conversation, Chronology & Glossary

Alessandro Balteo Yazbeck, artist, BerlinBoris Muñoz, journalist, Caracas and Cambridge, MACristian Balteo Yazbeck, financial adviser, Barcelona

Alessandro Balteo Yazbeck. PresidentCandidate , 2002 (detai l). Shoes and red carpet. From the series Modern Entanglements, U.S. Interventions . Photo: def image

“With the lists, we found the people. We as a Communal Council know oursectors very well and if someone wasn't found at the polling station,

they had to be found at their homes, to be accompanied [to vote]”Sulgeidys Maitán, Chavista funct ionary of a consejo comunal , 23 de Enero

Quoted by Joseph Pol isczuk, “La maquinar ia roja cumpl ió,” El Universal ,Caracas, October 14, 2012

“This corruption cancels our will to vote, that’s why we have to vote against this corruption”

Ricardo Ríos, Vice President of the Central Univers i ty of Venezuela’sPension Fund “Corrupción electoral ,” TalCualDigi ta l ,

Caracas, October 23, 2012

2 Venezuela’s Electoral Autocracy, 1999-2019?

Boris Muñoz: Hugo Chávez’s permanent campaigning has redesigned political culture bycontrolling the media and the oil wealth distribution, but Chávez does not control the national agenda as tightly as he used to. He won his third presidential election by a 10 per-cent margin, after spending public funds hand over fist. In a normal situation this margin is a clear mandate, but not enough of one to advance the total transformation of a political and economic model that Chávez pursues.

While covering the presidential campaign, I attended the last Chavista rally. There I found a family asking how to get to Caracas’s biggest mall. They were excited to visit the capital to see their socialist leader, but after the rally they just wanted to spend their money at the major temple for consumerism.

Alessandro Balteo Yazbeck: For sure, peregrinating also includes spending their per diems—Chávez’s so-called revolution is full of contradictions. This last campaign was the most obscene display of electoral corruption, but it was not enough to push the opposi-tion to call fraud again. The opposition won many new voters and was looking forward toresisting Chávez in the December 2012 local elections. Even under vicious campaign disparities and power abuses, like systematic armed intimidation and assassinations, elections are the only alternative for the opposition to gain political participation. They have to resist the dismantling of all institutional structures by Chávez’s cronyism and the systematic undermining of his own tailored constitution.

Venezuela’s Electoral Autocracy, 1999-2019? 3

Thousands of buses hired to mobilize people into Caracas for the last Chavista rally of the 2012 presidential campaign. Mobile phone picture circulated via Twitter.

alienating at least 44 percent of the electorate. The electoral results inexorably lead to the last stages of the dismantling of all federal structures to centralize political, legislative, financial and military power in Chávez and his party via the Communal Councils, which are neither freely elected nor constitutionally regulated, but still cynically described as “grass- roots democracy.”

ABY: Chávez was first elected for a period of five years at the end of 1998, but he has been reelected up to 2019. Our legislation did not even allow for presidential reelection before he started changing the constitution and undermining the equilibrium of powers. If Chávez is fit to govern for the next presidential period he will complete 20 years of the most autocratic and criminal regime Venezuelans have experienced since 1958. Our previ-ous military dictatorship lasted only 10 years!

BM: There is no doubt about the government’s political crimes and corruption. Although I’m very hesitant to flatly call Chávez a dictator, it’s quite telling that during several months Chávez reigned via Twitter, from Havana, where he had first gone for cancer treatments in 2011. Back then, as today, Venezuela felt like The Wizard of Oz on acid. One government official told me over lunch: “It doesn’t matter how long Chávez lasts—whether months or years. To win, we have to take advantage of his presence for as long as we can. If Chávez himself can’t be president, whoever he designates will be the new Chávez for us.”

Cristian Balteo Yazbeck: It should be said that in Venezuela the most outrageous electoral irregularities normally occur during the cam-paign, up to Election Day, and before the recount starts. The vote count itself is not to be disputed, but the results are illegitimate for many other reasons. The last election confirms that after 14 years of so-called revolution, the regime is able to compulsorily mobilize 55 per-cent of the voters to support a government that implements massive electoral giveaways, dismantles the productive apparatus, under-mines civil liberties and foments violence.

A regime that has institutionalized a schism among its people and is willing to do whatever it takes to accomplish unspeakable goals,


Inflatable Chávez dummy before or after its performance. Photo by Twitter user @AlbertoRavell, June 12, 2012.

ABY: That is the Cuban model. The regime gets to appoint a successor at will. They enable the vice president to “govern” while the elected president is absent—in Havana—and unable to speak. Incidentally, the vice president and political heir, Nicolas Maduro, is the darling of the Castro brothers. Chávez appointed him during a TV broadcast before his last run to Cuba for an emergency surgery. It was a broadcast clumsily orchestrated to deny-power struggles inside the regime’s leadership.

Chávez has disappeared since then, except for a couple staged photographs. He did not even attend his constitutionally mandated inauguration ceremony; he made no public appearances from Havana. Venezuela is being run by a mischievous Chávez signature in red ink that comes to the country via diligent couriers: the so-called vice president Maduro, and the so-called president of the Legislative Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, whose duty it is to enact a constitutional mandate to call for elections in the case of presidential absence! Chávez’s cronies are again misinterpreting the constitution, to rule presidential elections unnecessary in the case of the president’s absence or incapacity. A Cuban model of hereditary autocracy has been exported as an experiment in Venezuela by the so-called socialists and communists of Latin America, with the complicity, support or silence of the international community.

CBY: But Chávez’s death is an issue they will have to deal with sooner or later; they can’t use his illness for entertainment forever. Chavismo’s worst enemy is its dependency on Chávez’s figure for electoral purposes. Although it is well funded and armed, the United Socialist Venezu-elan Party (PSUV), even with Chávez alive, could not stop a 24 percent increase in votes for the opposition, compared with the last presidential elections. Chávez can’t transfer his charisma to someone else to take on his legacy; the link between the electorate and its caudillo (charismatic military leader) will disappear with Chávez’s demise. Actually, the opposition leader, Capriles Radonski has strategically pos tioned himself to continue and improve Chávez’s social programs. But Chavistas won’t


Hugo Chávez sharing petroleum with Raul Castro (left), and with Hu Jintao (right). Photos: Bernardo Londoy and AVN.

underestimate Capriles’s charisma again. Basically, Capriles has to be very careful not to get politically disabled: imprisoned or killed if he is to run for the next presidential elections.

BM: Still the question remains: In the land of Chávez, who is the man behind the curtain?

ABY: The last presidential elections felt as if Capriles Radonski were run against a huge red curtain with Chávez’s face painted on it. I don’t think there is a man behind the curtain, but rather many. A cadre of politicians and corporations are profiting from Venezuelan oil revenues. China, Cuba, Brazil, and at least eight other Latin American and Caribbean governments are obviously backing the Caracas regime. Maybe without Chávez, there is no charismatic leader to play his role and the PSUV will lose power. Maybe the Cuban intelligence operatives will have to abandon the country and the Chinese will have to renegotiate most of their agreements and credits. But maybe Chávez will survive and live long enough to groom his successor and, oil prices permitting, Chavismo will reign up to mid-century.

BM: But let’s hope this is not Chávez-land. Let’s believe, for the sake of the conversation,that there are other forces in the country able to pull us out of this bad trip.


CBY: I was really hoping that Capriles’s 44 percent would consolidate a stable and unified opposition movement. But the abstention in the December 2012 local elections suggests a distrust in the Electoral Council and the Army as guarantors of the electoral system after the proven collaboration between the Army, the PSUV and the Communal Councils to legitimize the various practices called assisted voting. While we cannot say for sure what kind of “assistance” voters are offered in the booth, these practices render ballot secrecy dubious, to say the least. Chavista operatives have shamefully described, to the national press, how voters were summoned at their homes and stirred to vote—transported to the booths in buses, or worse. Can you imagine being summoned at your home door by a grumpy, armed biker to take you to a voting station? The PSUV is empowering the underworld, including them in partisan activities, capitalizing on an aberrant violence epidemic to instill fear in the electorate. And let’s not forget the gerrymandering and other electoral crimes Chávez implemented in the 2010 elections and will employ again in the next ones.

BM: There is no doubt that the government appealed to the fears of the most vulnerable in our society and that it largely controls the board overseeing the vote, which has shown active complicity with the constant abuses of the rules of the electoral game. The government-led gerrymandering is another execrable deception that the opposition has to overcome with votes, although with 44 percent of the electorate it can now push the government to change the National Electoral Council’s board, which is dominated by Chavistas by four to one.

Regarding the army, let me tell you a story: In the middle of August, I joined Capriles on tour of several forgotten towns and villages in Bolívar state, home to most of the country’s mining resources. At a checkpoint on the road out of Santa Rosa, National Guard soldiers surrounded the bus, rifles in hand, and ordered us to stop. A tall sergeant banged on the door and got on the bus. With an imperious gesture, he ordered everyone to close the windows. Capriles rose from his seat, with an outstretched hand. The sergeant rejected the proffered hand and ordered the candidate to sit down. For a moment, there was a tense silence. Then the sergeant addressed the candidate directly. “Listen: you’ve got to win these elections. We can’t continue living like this. The armed forces are still committed to democracy. So go ahead and make sure you win those elections.” And, with the same intensity as when he boarded the bus, the sergeant jumped out and ordered the caravan on its way. The only comment I heard on the bus afterward was still the incredulous affirmation, “This happens very frequently with public employees.”


ABY: The country is in desperate need of an alternative leader and they are pushing Capriles. After losing against Chávez in the last presidential elections, he was reelected as governor of Miranda, the second-most populous Venezuelan state (which includes much of Caracas), even as nearly all of the country landed in the hands of Chavistas. In 23 states, 20 Chavistas were elected governors, 11 of whom come from military back-grounds. Several of them are under investigation by U.S. authorities for their alleged collaboration with the FARC, the Colombian guerilla group.

CBY: The opposition went from 4.3 million votes in the presidential election of 2006 to 6.5 million votes with Capriles Radonski in 2012, an increase of 2.2 million (+51 percent). While cancer threatened Chávez, his incommensurable power advantages only increased his votes from 7.3 to 8.1 million, an improvement of less than 0.9 million votes (+11 per-cent). Considering that the total number of votes rose from 11.8 to 15 million (+27 per-cent), it is pretty clear that the opposition was capable of stealing voters from the govern-ment and attracting the majority of the new votes at the same time.

ABY: No one believes that Chávez will survive his cancer. The regime’s main problem now is that after 14 years of generalized violence and corruption, the opposition managed to organize its most serious and viable candidacy. Capriles almost outdid Chávez in his ability to give populist speeches; those 6.5 million votes are the real threat to the status quo in Caracas and Havana.

BM: Well, Capriles is a successful governor with a good record of delivering to people, but he doesn’t have the billions of dollars Chavistas had to mobilize voters, so I won't call him a populist.

CBY: I think Alessandro refers to the opposition campaign promising to improve Chávez’s wealth redistribution and its focus on showcasing “love” and pseudo-religious messages proposing that “the time has come” to alternate power. But do they really think that the so-called revolution believes in the alternation of power? That Venezuelans live in a democracy? “Democracy” is actually the main government propaganda line. But we know democracy is not only elections; other legitimate institutions and the reign of law are also fundamental and sadly missing.

BM: The opposition’s pragmatic alternative is to propose a viable leader in case of Chávez’s demise or loss of control. Chavistas are forbidden to publicly mention the word “transition,” but clearly the inner circle won’t relinquish power.


ABY: Chavismo infighting is inexorable, and let’s not forget that people’s love for their caudillo does not transfer easily to any of his minions: Maduro and Cabello have no cred-ibility and people know they have always profited from following Chávez. The announce-ment of the caudillo’s death will produce a crisis of governability independently of the legislative changes they will attempt; without Chávez, the PSUV will have trouble winning elections. That is why they are keeping Chávez’s health in secrecy. Not even Lula da Silva, the former Brazilian president, was able to see him in his last visit to Havana. The Cuban regime is controlling the situation; their economic survival is at stake. If they sent him back to Caracas, it must have been because all possible medical treatments were exhausted.

BM: Certainly they are dangerously trying to keep things going with no major changes, but the future also depends on what steps the Cuban and Venezuelan leadership will take from now on. There is an economic crisis looming and Chávez promised to deepen socialism by expanding the control of the State over key sectors such as banks and food. He can nationalize or expropriate part of these sectors, but in the long run it will add a heavy-weight to the enormous debt of the country. By deepening his control over the economy or not implementing corrective measures, Chavistas can push the economy off the cliff, especially as it seems like China is not lending any more money to them.

ABY: Chavismo’s ineptitude engineered several crises that complicated its ability to govern, but oil revenues and credits from China saved them big time in the past. Petrodol- lars make possible the impossible in Venezuela and that’s why Chavismo is still in power. Anyway, last year the opposition convinced 44 percent of voters about Capriles Radonski’s good intentions. People were sympathetic to the fact he promised continu-ity with some domestic and international policies. In small towns they affectionately call him Skinny because he campaigned everywhere in the coun-tryside running around, losing weight and and losing sneakers along the way. Incidentally, for decades now owning a pair of fancy sneakers could get you killed in Venezuela.

CBY: Sadly, the violence epidemic has deepened and expanded. Organized bands do express kidnappings. It seems like the State has given up

“Chavez with the underworld.” Bus graffiti during Chavista mobilization. Mobile phone picture circulated via Twitter during the last Chavista presidential rally in Caracas,


against crime. I don't know if by not controlling crime they think they will precipitate a growing diaspora of the opposition, or if they are just afraid to alienate influential parts of their constituency. In any case this wave of terror has political effects and the oppositio is making it its main issue to prove that no one in the country is safe independent of party association.

ABY: The Venezuelan Observatory of Violence, an academic organization funded by public universities, recently published the startling statistic that one police officer was killed a day during 2012, mainly to seize their weapons. Most of the more than half a million Venezuelan expats will attribute their fears of returning to, or even visiting the country, to the crime rate. For the Chavistas, this implies less opposition to worry about, as only 100,000 Venezuelans living abroad are registered to vote.

At this point Chavistas are really paralyzed when it comes to crime. For many years, they did not want to be seen as repressing needy people; Chávez’s violent speeches against the opposition over more than a decade only gave more legitimacy to crime. In the last Chávez rally (October 4, 2012)—the closing of his reelection campaign in Caracas—at least five motorcycles were stolen from the investigative police headquarters located several blocks from Chávez’s stage. These were not the only crimes committed during the public gathering; a police commissary was shot dead just after attending the rally, and there were at least two violent deaths by knife, between Chavistas. None of these things happen during opposition rallies, but why? One attendee told me that cocaine, marijuana and alcohol had been openly distributed to the Chavistas attending the closing rally. I could not believe him and his answer was, “Why not? There is money to pay for it and PSUV mafias control the traffic!”

BM: For that rally, the city collapsed with an influx of thousands of buses from all over the country. They were to be received by heavy rain and lots of liquor. I did not see hard drugs being distributed. During the chaotic rally, Chávez spoke briefly, exposed to tropical rain on his ceiling-less stage. The buses were a clear sign that the government was organizing the mobilization of voters on October 7.

CBY: With that lack of government authority and the kind of crime happening in the capital it is easier to understand what's going on very far away in the countryside or along the borders with Colombia.


Anonymous photos taken with mobile phones and tweeted during the last Chavista rally in Caracas, October 2012.

BM: Enrique Márquez, currently the only opposition board member of the National Elec-toral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, or CNE), said that while the electronic voting system was reliable, an environment of fear could have a negative impact on votes for the opposition. Márquez had no doubt that if people were free to vote, Capriles would win. But that was not the case. Márquez also said: “Some areas of the country are controlled by the guerrilla or armed groups that can intimidate the voters.”

CBY: At least 17 polling stations are in the hands of the guerrillas. How can you account for an election process in this situation? Even if it is not a big number of votes, what does this tell us about the legitimacy of the elections or the country’s sovereignty? Imagine how the people feel in those parts of the countryside and in many urban neighborhoods and shantytowns, where gang crime now rules under the banner of radical Chavista militancy. There are so many accounts of poor people afraid of voting or showing support for the opposition in certain areas, but this isn’t reflected in polls, nor in the international media, because of people’s self-censorship.

ABY: The traditional international observers groups that legitimized past elections have not been properly invited since 2006, when they criticized that presidential election process. Chávez reduced their role from professional observers to “companions” with limited access. It is obvious that the Organization of American States, the European Community and the Carter Center do not want to legitimate an election where they have no systematic access to polling stations, computer centers and other electoral offices.


CBY: Those “companions” had to sign an agreement not to publish their own reports independently, but submit them first to the CNE, which then decides whether or not to publish them. Again, four of five directors in the CNE were or had been members of the PSUV.

BM: Only Unasur and Mercosur were allowed as “companions.” These organizations are comprised by groups of associated Latin American governments with strong commercial ties to the Chávez regime. The Organization of American States and the European Union both have previously published reports critical of the CNE so they were not properly invited this time. Nonetheless, the Carter Center, after refusing to be a submissive “companion,” sent a small “study group” to follow up on their previous observations. Also the CNE accredited hundreds of international journalists.

ABY: But without real access and big numbers of observers they wont be able to grasp what is going on in the whole country and finally they can only reinforce the bottom-line propaganda message: Chávez was reelected, so he must be a democrat, right?

CBY: I don’t know if people outside the country are aware of the most anti-democratic messages. Chávez added threats to his regular melodramatic portrayal of himself as the fatherland’s heart. It's the classic tough love—You know I love you, but I'll kill you if you make me. He announced many times that he is the only guarantor of peace in Venezuela after the elections. He was shameless about proclaiming the threat of civil war if Capriles Radonski was elected. What kind of maniac advances such ideas when violent deaths have tripled since he got power?

BM: Chávez has starred in many melodramatic public moments: for example, tearfully begging Christ to let him live longer. But such scenes only reinforce polarization. As sociologist Tulio Hernández says, “Part of society prays for Chávez to get better, and the other part asks God’s forgiveness for wishing his death.”

ABY: His melodrama has been able to hide many truths. But I don’t think melodrama is working in Chávez’s favor any longer—cancer, or imminent death, are not very promising conditions for a caudillo. Besides I heard Capriles saying candidly enough during his presidential campaign that people in little towns are in need of love and his plan is to keep demonstrating his love and support. He is pretending to be a permanent candidate like Chávez has been, and sure enough, people have embraced him in Chávez’s virtual absence or ineptitude. He was also reelected Govenor of the capital region in December 2012, against all efforts of Chávez and his regime.


Hugo Chávez and his declared allies: Vladimir Putin, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Fidel Castro

CBY: Oh, love! I understand it was used a lot during the last campaigns but I’m just tired of having these elections where they appear to be competing for who’s the greatest preacher. Let’s talk about the issues, and be honest. We all know that money, not love, is the driving force in this decadent environment.

ABY: It is a cocktail of melodramas with economics. The Chávez campaign’s orgiastic spending, financed by Chinese credits, is one of the biggest issues when analyzing 2012 or the presidential election likely to come soon, if Chávez dies. Add 2.5 million public employees plus contractors voting under systematic threat. That makes for a dispropor- tionate permanent campaign that renders election results illegitimate. But where do they have objective and fair elections—in the U.S., Russia, Iran, Cuba?

CBY: It isn't black or white. Let’s take those examples you name. In the U.S. they have an archaic electoral college, and moreover, their system sometimes falls pray to local govern- ing authorities who exclude inconvenient minorities. Also, big corporations and private donors influence the outcome, preselecting their candidates by using their unlimited finan-cial resources. Nevertheless, the votes are counted—with some significant exceptions-and the incumbent can only tilt the campaign playing field in his favor to a small extent. In the Russian case, the incumbent dominates the campaign playing field, steals the votes and selectively punishes dissent. In the Iranian case, they steal the votes and they imprison, torture and kill big numbers of people for protesting. The Cuban case? Their only option is to elect representatives from a unique party (or family) in power for almost 50 years now.


Also they indoctrinate the population and kill or imprison dissenters with revolutionary zeal. And let’s not forget that Chávez’s relation with Castro’s Communist doctrine goes way back.

ABY: Well, then please concede with me that the common component adulterating all democratic systems is the control of elections via economics and different forms of propaganda. Not forgetting the traditional use of State violence against a country’s own citizens.

CBY: In the Venezuelan case, Chávez bought an expensive and accountable electronic voting system that was efficient in providing him with two important things: legitimacy on the international stage, and at the same time, doubt about the secrecy of the vote among public servants and contractors. For more than a decade, he somehow manipulated the candidacies or used propaganda and other violent strategies to control the voters and protesters, but the voting was accountable. For the last 14 years or so, the government strategy has been to exploit and propagandize Venezuelan democracy while building a militaristic authoritarian regime. For many years the opposition was weak and malleable, when not irresponsibly inept, so there was no risk of inviting a bunch of international observers that would come to have their roles fulfilled and then go back home to spread the “good news.” Chávez had as many elections and referendums as possible, during 14 years, to legitimate his regime. But when he had an adverse outcome, in 2007, he repeated the referendum in 2009. Remember? This was the unconstitutional constitutional amendment. Constitutionally, Chávez should not have been able to run for this third reelection—not to mention his terminal illness!

BM: After the 2012 election, and looking forward in the field of ideological leadership, we have to get real. Henrique Capriles Radonski is now 40 years old, and his campaign has proclaimed his policies to be center-left. They have to push that idea by showing a better understanding of the structural problems in Venezuela. The opposition is raising its own agenda and it has to offer solutions that go to the roots of the issues. That way Capriles can be placed beyond the immediate situations and compete again for the presidency given Chávez’s health.

ABY: I would not like to be in Capriles Radonski’s shoes. Conservative estimates from our universities point to one violent death every 30 minutes, and impunity is rampant: statistics suggest that only two of every 100 killers are caught. A journalist from New York who visited Venezuela in 2010 recently commented that his visit started with a briefing at


This picture was tweeted by Henrique Capriles Radonski on October 4, 2012. He always wears them for election days. He has been elected to office five times. The presidential campaign of 2012 was his first electoral defeat.

the U.S. Embassy: “You've been to Afghanistan? Yes. You've been to Iraq? Yes. Well, congratulations. This is the most dangerous place you've ever been.”

Walking around, like Capriles did, campaigning for reelection, as governor of one of the most violent Venezuelan states, is just crazy. Also, Miranda state is where the Chavista secret service apparatus has its strongest grip; people just feel underestimated if their phones are not tapped.

CBY: Let me translate the regime-preferred public joke: “In Venezuela there are no political prisoners but politicians imprisoned.” They chuckle at their political and electoral crimes. Capriles Radonski was already imprisoned by the Chávez regime, for four months in 2004, and finally judged innocent. He and his family are under obvious surveillance and he finally gave up having a mobile.

Click on arrows or page numbers to return to the conversation or the chronology.Annual violent death count: 1,709—a rate of 9 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants.


December 4, 1988—Presidential ElectionsVenezuelans elect the seventh president of their democratic era. The liberal Social Democrats (AD) and the conservative Christian Democrats (COPEI) obtain 92.84 percent of the votes. The bipartisan system that ruined the economy and established a demagogic and corrupt apparatus over the previous 20 years had failed to redistribute the oil wealth and educate the population. But with no viable alternatives and civic spirit still high, the abstention was only 18.08 percent.

Venezuela’s Electoral Autocracy—Chronology

All electoral data have been sourced from the CNE. See page 37 for sources of violent death data.

1989



February 27, 1989—Caracazo: Caracas Rises Up The most extensive riots in Venezuela’s history break out, after President Carlos Andrés Pérez imposes neoliberal policies recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Two weeks after Pérez takes office for the second time—he first served as president from 1974 to 1979—an increase in the heavily subsidized gas price initiates a three-day-long revolt, mainly in Caracas and its surrounding areas. Realizing that police forces are outnumbered and in many cases refuse to act against protesters, the govern-ment calls in the army.

Around 2,000 shops are reportedly looted during the incendiary events, which cause $400 million in losses. There is no consensus about the number of casualties caused by the army during these days and the curfew that follows. Government officials recognize 276 dead, mainly civilians, but other sources talk about 5,000 corpses that may have been buried in communal graves.

1992



February 4 and November 27, 1992—Chávez’s Coups d’étatsA coup d’état led by a group of young army officers takes place in five of Venezuela’s major cities. Each group gains control over their targets except for the Caracas contin-gent, where Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez fails in his effort to arrest President Pérez. The institutional military forces regain control—leaving 24 dead and 51 wounded—and all the rebels are imprisoned.

“Comrades: Unfortunately, for now, the objectives we set ourselves were not achieved in the capital city. That is, those of us here in Caracas did not seize power. Where you are, you performed very well, but now is the time to reflect. New opportunities will arise and the country has to head definitively towards a better future"—Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez, February 4, 1992, broadcasts live after his detention.

Seven months later, another Chávez-incited coup—this time led by officers from the Air Force— provokes an astonishing air battle in Caracas’s air space, but also fails to rally the support of their fellow officers and the vast majority of the population. This time, most of the rebels are able to flee the country.

1993

May 20, 1993—Pérez’s ImpeachmentAfter losing his own party’s support in Congress, President Pérez is impeached on charges of the embezzlement of 250 million bolívares, the equivalent of $17 million. The money was used to support the Nicaraguan presidency of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.

December 5, 1993—Presidential ElectionsFor the first time, Venezuelans face an election where four candidates have a real chance of getting elected. The rapid collapse of the bipartisan model is at its peak and the histori-cally dominant parties face two other forces that lack their structural organization but exceed them in fervor. The race is extremely close and none of the candidates receives the support of an absolute majority. Rafael Caldera, founder of the conservative Christian Democratic party, abandons COPEI to create Convergence, a coalition of centrist and leftist parties.

Caldera wins with 30.46 percent of the votes, while the candidates of the traditional parties get 23.60 percent (Acción Democrática) and 22.73 percent (COPEI). Andrés Velas-quez from Causa Radical, representing the union movement, comes in fourth with 21.95 percent. Abstention: 39.84 percent.



1994



March 24, 1994—Chávez’s ReleasePresident Caldera, who had used some of the arguments of the 1992 coup leaders during his campaign, had also promised to pardon them if he was elected. After two years in jail, Hugo Chávez is freed by Caldera’s government, which dismisses his case. Because the release comes before the court verdict, it is not necessary to give him a pardon, which would have legally disqualified him from ever holding public office.

December 13, 1994—Chávez’s First Visit to CubaHugo Chávez travels to Cuba as the leader of the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200. During the next couple of years, Chávez travels through Venezuela, first with his abstention message as a political weapon, and eventually, as a candidate for 1998 presidential elections.

1998

November 8, 1998—Legislative and Local ElectionsThe traditional parties collapse in their primaries after failing to come up with solid candi-dates. They end up presenting an ex-mayor and former beauty queen (Irene Sáez for COPEI) and an elderly caudillo (Alfaro Ucero for Acción Democrática) for president. Never-theless, in an effort to avoid a landslide victory that could give Chávez control over all institutions, the establishment manages to separate the parliamentary and local elections from the presidential ones, moving them to an earlier date. Still, the pro-Chávez Movimiento Quinta República (Fifth Republic Movement) and its coalition obtain eight of 23 State Governments and almost one third of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Abstention: 46.5 percent.

December 6, 1998—Presidential ElectionsHugo Chávez Frías, the unsuccessful commander of 1992’s coups d’états, is elected president for the first time. Among his supporters, Chávez counts several families of Venezuela’s historic upper class and owners of the biggest industrial conglomerates of the country. They allowed him to run his campaign nationwide, making use of many of the most prominent TV channels and newspapers. Hence Chávez managed to attract a great part of the shrinking middle class and a vast majority of the lower classes, which felt betrayed by the old bipartisan system.

The anyone-but-Chávez side of the spectrum had managed to unite two weeks before the elections to rally around former governor Henrique Salas Romer, who, riding on top of his white horse Frijolito, still only obtained 39.97 percent against Chávez’s 56.2 percent. Abstention: 36.55 percent.



1999

January 16, 1999—Second Visit to Cuba, Now as President-ElectJust weeks before assuming the presidency, Chávez visits Havana to meet Fidel Castro and the Colombian president, Andrés Pastrana. He is informed about the so-called Peace Process being negotiated between Colombia and leftist guerrilla groups, most prominently the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

February 1999—The Colombian GuerrillasAfter his inauguration, Chávez overhauls Venezuela’s traditionally antagonistic policy with regard to Colombian guerrilla groups, announcing “neutrality” toward the Colombian conflict—a euphemism that opened the door for the increased presence and operation of these groups in Venezuelan territory, with tacit approval and recognition of the guerrillas as belligerent groups.

April 25, 1999—Referendum: New Constitution’s DraftingPresident Chávez obtains authorization from an opposition-controlled Supreme Court to call for a Consultative Referendum (which was not included in the 1961 constitution) in order to ask people if they would agree to the writing of an entirely new constitution. The “yes” option, supported by Chávez, receives 87.75 percent of the vote. Abstention: 62.35 percent.

July 25, 1999—Constituent National Assembly’s ElectionsNational elections are held to select the Constituent National Assembly. Members are appointed to write the new constitution. Pro-Chávez forces obtain 95.49 percent of the seats, while opposition parties only manage to gain the remaining 4.51 percent of the assembly. Abstention: 53.8 percent.

October 1999—Opening to ChinaPresident Chávez visits China for the first time and establishes the basis for the Sino-Venezuelan strategic partnership.

December 15, 1999—Referendum: New Constitution’s Approval Following torrential rains and disastrous mudslides, anywhere from 10,000 to 50,000 people die as improvised urban settlements in Vargas State are flooded. The government does not suspend the realization of the referendum to approve the new constitution, which changes the name of the country to the “Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” permits presi-dential reelection for the first time, and extends the president’s mandate from five to six years. The new constitution is approved by 71.78 percent of the vote. Abstention: 55.62 percent.



2000

December 30, 2000—Presidential, Legislative and Local ElectionsThe 1999 constitution calls for the election of new authorities at all levels. This time, all public servants—president, Congress, state governors, mayors and town councils—are to be elected at the same time in order to guarantee Chávez’s landslide victory, in what is locally known as the “Aircraft Carrier Effect.” The opposition partially rallies around another 1992 coup plotter and both former and future Chávez ally, Army Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Arias Cárdenas. Chávez is reelected for a new term, with 59.76 percent of the vote against 37.52 percent for the main opposition candidate. The Chávez coalition also obtains 15 of 23 government states and 52.12 percent of Congress, which now consists of the House of Representatives alone. Abstention: 43.37 percent.




Click on arrows or page numbers to return to the conversation or the chronology.

2001

April 2001—Chinese Government Steps InChinese President Jiang Zemin pays a visit to Caracas, bringing along the Chinese Vice Premier, the minister in charge of the State Development Planning Commission, the Minis-ter of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, his Vice-Foreign Minister, the Deputy Director of the General Office of the Communist Party of China, the Central Committee and Director of the Central Guard Bureau and the Deputy Director of the Policy Research Office of the Communist Party Central Committee.

May 2001—Second Visit to ChinaChávez visits China again and gets a $20 billion loan from Beijing, partly repayable in oil. This is the beginning of a major shift in geostrategic economic policy and loss of oil sover-eignty.

Annual violent death count: 7,960—a rate of 32 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants.



2002


April 11-14, 2002—Coup d’état Against ChávezA three-day long general strike organized by the “Civil Society” is channeled into a massive march calling for Chávez's resignation. The march is redirected—without govern-ment authorization—to the presidential palace, where Chávez followers gather to “protect the Bolivarian Revolution.” The truth about what happens is unknown, but 19 people from both groups die from gunshots on the 11th. The immediate crisis provokes the High Command of the military to ask for Chávez's resignation and the immediate appointment of Pedro Carmona Estanga as the new president. On April 12, Carmona’s brief government dissolves Congress, the Supreme Court and the National Electoral Council; overturns the 1999 constitution and discharges the attorney general and the High Command of the military, among other officials. On April 14, after supporters of Chávez appear all over the country in street protests, Carmona is forced out of power, and the arrested Chávez is brought back to the presidential palace.

The mass media imposed a coverage blackout against the street protesters and the looters. Media executives explained that they didn’t want to promote rioting and violence, but Chávez’s government officials argued that they did it to obscure the truth about the protest and to hide police repression.

December 2002 to January 2003—National StrikeMore radicalized than ever, the organizers of April’s coup—with the exception of Carmona, who is replaced by Carlos Fernández—rebrand their movement as the Coordinadora Democrática. After Chávez fires the whole board of directors of the state-owned oil indus-try (Petróleos de Venezuela, or PDVSA) on live television, the opposition convokes a nation-wide general strike that lasts for two months, depriving the vast majority of the population of their salary, food, fuel to cook, gas and beer. Chávez, who challenges the “impotent opposition” at the beginning of the strike, radicalizes his purge of potential traitors from all state institutions, especially PDVSA—where approximately 20,000 workers, including directors, managers and technicians are laid off. In one remarkable case, the whole IT, financial and operations division is shut down. The strike ends as common sense and acknowledgment of people’s basic needs set in. Chávez grows stronger in the aftermath.



2003

July 2003—“Las Misiones”Chávez’s government designs and implements a series of social programs called “Las Misiones,” which take on the immediate needs—they are interim, not structural plans—of the vast majority of the population in areas such as health, food and education. These programs are said to be—and Chávez agrees—the main impetus for his popularity increase between January 2003 and August 2004 (from 35 percent to 60 percent).





2004

August 15, 2004—Referendum: Presidential RecallAfter a two-year effort, opposition forces manage to rally around the idea of organizing a recall against the president. They are forced to collect—three times—the full names, ID numbers and signatures of more than three million people, the 20 percent of the elec-torate required by the Constitution for a recall. Chávez obtains 59.1 percent of the vote to remain as president. Abstention: 30.08 percent. Almost immediately, the Coordinadora Democrática crumbles and some of its leaders hurry to cry “fraud,” without any hard evidence.

October 31, 2004—Local ElectionsThe same opposition leadership that denounced the recall results as fraudulent now calls for polls in order to preserve the small redoubt of power they have left in some regions. The forces that rally against Chávez are all but united. There are voices of dissent that successfully call for abstention in order to delegitimize the recently reinforced govern-ment. Chávez’s coalition obtains 20 of 22 states with 58.04 percent of the vote. The opposition retains two states with 39.6 percent. Abstention: 54.3 percent.

December 2004—Celebrating Christmas in ChinaChávez makes his third visit to Beijing, this time with his family and seven cabinet minis-ters. The motive is to consolidate the 57 bilateral treaties he has been pushing since 1999 and to send a Christmas message to the Venezuelan people from Beijing to propagandize the new strong alliance between both governments.

2005




April 2005—Bolivarian MilitiasChávez decrees the creation of the Bolivarian militias. These organized units spread around the whole country normally meet twice a month for training and indoctrination purposes and are comprised of unpaid civilians, equipped by the army but receiving direct orders from Chávez to bypass the traditional military structure of command. The main function of these armed trained groups is to defend the “Bolivarian Revolution” from all national or foreign enemies and assist the population. That is, they are created to control and confront the rest of the population in case of civilian protests or uprisings against Chávez’s revolution or for asymmetrical warfare in case of foreign intervention.

December 4, 2005—Legislative ElectionsDemoralizing results in the regional elections cause more division and chaos among the opposition. Some political parties and most of the NGOs that belong to and control the opposition propose not to present candidates for Congress and call for abstention, a decision provoked by two main events. The first is the Supreme Court’s legitimization of “Las Morochas” (the Twins), a loophole that allows parties to obtain 70 percent of the seats with only 40 percent of the vote. The second is the introduction of fingerprint-reading machines that technicians from the opposition prove capable of violating the secrecy of vote. The pro-Chávez coalition wins 94.28 percent of the votes and 100 percent of the seats. Abstention: 74.74 percent.

2006




August 2006—Fourth Visit to ChinaChávez signs a major oil pact with Beijing among a host of other trade, energy and infrastructure projects. This emboldens him to negotiate with other international oil corpo-rations doing business in the country.

2006—Restructuring National Oil Company (PDVSA)At the beginning of Chávez’s first term, PDVSA was ranked the world’s second largest oil company, after Exxon-Mobil. From 2001 on, the government started raising taxes on all private operators. After the institutional crisis and loss of production caused by the 2002 national strike, the government became obsessed with reverting the international out-sourcing process that started in the mid-1990s with the Apertura Petrolera .

In 2006, Chávez obliges all private oil companies to become minoritarian partners with the state regardless of their previous status (majoritarian partners or simple service contrac-tors). By the end of this process, only Exxon-Mobil and ConocoPhillips leave the country, winning international litigation against Venezuela for $975 million. Their share is taken by China Petrochemical and China National Petroleum.

Chávez’s propaganda war against the Apertura Petrolera accuses previous governments of privatizing PDVSA while disguising his incapacity to operate the oil business. Previ-ously, PDVSA was the only company authorized to sell Venezuelan oil and to account for its reserves. After Chávez’s restructuring, international corporations actually own the Venezuelan oil they exploit and can count the reserves as their own, contradicting Chávez’s nationalistic propaganda. In 2006, PDVSA’s oil production capacity is still 13 percent lower than it was in 2002.

December 3, 2006—Presidential ElectionsThe new umbrella organization for the opposition movement, Unidad Nacional, supports a single candidate, selected following several opinion polls. Manuel Rosales, a former gov-ernor from the oil-rich Zulia state, obtains only 36.9 percent of the vote, and Chávez becomes the first president in Venezuela’s democratic history to be reelected, after obtaining 62.84 percent. Abstention: 25.3 percent.

2007




May 28, 2007—RCTV Goes Off AirChávez’s government decides not to renew RCTV’s authorization to transmit its signal. Under Venezuela’s legislation, once the permit expires, the government has the power to choose whether or not to renew it. RCTV was the first private network of the country and was the only widely carried TV channel that fiercely opposed Chávez since before his election, until the day it went off air.

November 2007—China and Japan Loans to Be Paid in OilAfter Chávez’s reelection for six more years, the China Development Bank starts to lend the first $4 billion of a total $42.5 billion sum (as of 2012), which is balanced by revenue from oil reserves. Japan lends $3.5 billion on similar terms. (Sources: WikiLeaks, Caracas-U.S. Embassy cables, and Bloomberg News,“China Bankrolling Chávez’s

Re-Election Bid,” September 2012)

December 2, 2007—Referendum: Constitutional ReformThis reform provides for the president’s reelection as many times as the voters want it; the 1961 Constitution didn’t allow any reelection, while the one from 1999 only allowed a second term. The reform also calls for centralization of power for the president and his party, via the Communal Councils, depriving states and municipal councils of much of their authority and finances. For the first time since 1998, the opposition forces-consolidated as Unidad Nacional and strongly supported by a large and noisy student movement—manage to win at the polls with 50.65 percent and 51.01 percent against 49.34 percent and 48.99 percent of the pro-Chávez movement (the reform was divided into two pieces). Abstention: 44.1 percent.

2008



January 23, 2008—New Opposition MovementThe opposition forces make their unity official by signing a “National Union Agreement,” which is considered the starting point of the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, the entity that will henceforth serve as meeting point and political platform for forces that oppose Chávez.

September 12, 2008—General Alleged to Support Drug TraffickingThe U.S. State Department releases an order to freeze all assets and bank accounts belonging to Venezuelan General Henry Rangel Silva that fall under American jurisdiction, following alleged evidence of his support of the FARC and its drug-trafficking activities.

November 23, 2008—Local ElectionsThe opposition gains momentum, but doesn’t agree on candidates for state governors. The loss in the referendum provokes a strong reaction from Chávez, who tries to force his party and its allies to merge into the new United Socialist Venezuelan Party (PSUV). This maneuver allocates, centralizes and controls resources and efforts to increase his power inside the movement, but also causes tension with three old allies—the Partido Comuni-sta, Patria Para Todos (“Homeland for Everyone”) and Podemos (“We Can”)—who refuse to disappear but manage to maintain themselves in the coalition. As a result, the pro-Chávez PSUV wins 18 of 23 states (down from 21), with 58.04 percent of the votes. The opposition increases its control from two to five states and wins in five of six of the most populated and urbanized regions of the country, obtaining 39.6 percent. Abstention: 34.55 percent.


2009




February 15, 2009—Referendum: Unconstitutional Constitutional AmendmentArticle 345 of the 1999 Constitution states that once rejected, no constitutional amendment can be presented for a second popular vote during the same electoral period (i.e., before 2012).

President Chávez calls for a referendum to approve a constitutional amendment that includes some of the measures that were rejected in the 2007 reform, including the autho-rization of several continuous reelections, not only for the president, but for all the heads of the executive wing (including mayors and governors). Furthermore, he again includes in this referendum all the legislation related to the communal governmental structures that supplant federal governance.

Pro-Chávez forces obtain 54.86 percent against 45.13 percent. Abstention: 30.08 percent.

April 2009—China AgainChávez’s sixth visit to China. Chinese President Hu Jintao suggests the boost of various pragmatic cooperation agreements to overcome the effects of the international financial crisis. Chávez touts the 2008 launch of Venezuela’s first telecommunications satellite, which was built by Chinese engineers. Chávez notes that the world order is undergoing a profound change, and China plays a significant role in addressing the crisis.

2010




April 21, 2010—Lukoil, Gazprom and Rosneft invest in VenezuelaPDVSA signs an agreement with representatives of the biggest Russian oil companies to create a joint venture to exploit one of the newest areas of the oil-rich Orinoco belt. The resultant company, PetroMiranda, will be 60 percent controlled by the Venezuelan state and 40 percent owned by the Russian conglomerate.

May 2010—Colombian GuerrillasA Colombian intelligence report claims that some 1,500 FARC combatants are present in 28 camps on the Venezuelan side of the border. (Source: El Espectador, July 15, 2010)

September 26, 2010—Legislative ElectionsThe opposition is better organized and wants to avoid another five years of Chávez's total control over Congress. The pro-Chávez Congress and the government-controlled CNE make changes to the electoral rules, including the gerrymandering of districts.

The new law changed the proportion of seats assigned by nominal vote (majoritarian) and listed vote (proportional) from 60-40 percent to 70-30 percent. In doing so, and instituting the “Twins mechanism,” the biggest minority could guarantee becoming the absolute majority in the smaller, mostly rural states where Chávez was stronger. Without their targeted redistricting, the opposition would have obtained 53 percent of the House of Representatives and the government only 47 percent.

As a result of these manipulations, the government forces gain control of 58.33 percent of the House with only 48.13 percent of the vote, while the opposition—with 50.13 percent of people’s will—only obtain 41.67 percent of available seats. Abstention: 33.15 percent.

November 12, 2010—General Linked to Drug Trafficking PromotedHugo Chávez promotes Division General Henry Rangel Silva to general in chief, the highest possible rank in Venezuela's Armed Forces, four days after the general told Venezuelan newspaper Ultimas Noticias: “Venezuela's Armed Forces are married with the socialist political project. This hypothesis (of an opposition government) would be like selling the country, and the military and the people aren't going to accept it.”

2011




June 8, 2011—Cancer Steps InHugo Chávez is hospitalized in Cuba, where he is diagnosed with an undisclosed form of cancer and treated with surgery to remove a tumor, followed by radiotherapy and chemo-therapy. For the next three months, he shuttles between Venezuela and Cuba in order to be treated.

September 22, 2011—Cancer Steps Out?Chávez comes back from Cuba after finishing his fourth session of chemotherapy. Shortly after, he declares himself completely free from carcinogenic cells and ready to perform his duties as president.

2012



2012 - China Boosts Chávez ReelectionSince Chávez’s reelection in 2006, the China Development Bank has lent $42.5 billion (as of September 2012) collateralized by revenue from oil reserves, according to data compiled from Venezuelan government announcements. This sum amounts to approxi-mately 23 percent of all overseas loans by the state-run Chinese bank.

January 17, 2012—General Linked to Drug Trafficking Promoted—AgainPresident Chávez names General in Chief Henry Rangel Silva his secretary of defense.

February 12, 2012—The ContenderHenrique Capriles Radonski, a former speaker of Congress, mayor of a wealthy Caracas town council and recently reelecteds governor of Miranda State, is chosen to be the oppo-sition candidate for the presidential elections in October. He is elected among four other candidates, with 63.91 percent of the three million votes.

February 21, 2012—Cancer Steps In AgainBroadcasting live from his home state of Barinas, five months after declaring himself completely free from carcinogenic cells, Chávez reports on his condition: "During the test in Havana, they have detected an injury in the same spot they found the tumor almost one year ago. It is a small injury with a two centimeters diameter that is clearly visible. This forces us to extract that injury and this means I will undergo surgery once again. It's supposed to be a much more simple procedure. I'm in good shape right now to face this new battle. I'm sorry to give the Venezuelan people this news because I know, although some will be happy, most of them will suffer after hearing this news. I ask for your forgive-ness because the last thing I want is to make my people suffer."

April 6, 2012—General Linked to Drug Trafficking Guarantees ElectionsIn an interview with Univision, Defense Secretary and General in Chief Henry Rangel Silva states, “We will recognize whomever wins next October 7th elections; we won't recognize who says that he won, but the actual winner of the electoral process.”

July 9, 2012—Cancer Steps Out AgainAt a press conference with international media, Chávez says, “Luckily, thanks to God, here I am. And I am feeling in better physical condition everyday. I firmly believe that what you just called my ‘physical limitations’ won't play any role in this campaign.” Asked if he had beaten the disease, he responds, “Free, I'm totally free.”

Annual violent death count: 21,709–a rate of 73 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. One persondies a violent death every 30 minutes in a country of under 29 million inhabitants.

2012



September 2012—Civil War? Presidential Fear-mongeringOn September 4, in a radio appearance, Chávez accused the opposition of radical fascism and of planning to overturn his socialist agenda. He added that Capriles “seeks to drag us back to a Venezuela we wouldn’t put up with, and which would lead to a grim scenario of profound destabilization, and which might even bring us to a civil war.”

On September 11, broadcasting live from a political rally, Chávez declares, “Look, even for the wealthy my victory would be positive. Think about it, because for rich families, the ones who think rationally, the ones who have their wealth, their families, their nice houses, their nice cars, their beach condos and many more properties. Those who like to travel overseas for holidays. To all of them, what would be the most convenient outcome? A civil war? No one would benefit from that. [A civil war] will only be convenient for the fascist extreme right represented by El Majunche (Capriles). But even the richest families who enjoy calmness are interested in a Chávez victory and I invite them to vote for Chávez on October 7. Chávez is a warranty of peace, stability and economic growth.”

September 29, 2012—Not Only ThreatsDuring the electoral campaign, duly authorized opposition caravans and rallies encoun-tered armed street blockages and aggressions in much of the country. Mobilized Chavistas rings, which operate in conjunction with regional authorities and police, organized these systematic blockages planned by the PSUV.

The opposition chooses not to confront but to dialogue or to find alternative solutions. Close to the end of the campaign in a fateful blockage of one opposition caravan in Barinas, Chávez’s birth state, two opposition campaign organizers are shot dead. The three suspects, employees of the regional government who were seen using government vehicles, are rapidly detained. Four days later, two of them are freed and are awaiting trial, while the suspected shooter is still in jail.

October 7, 2012—Third Presidential PeriodChávez is reelected for his third mandate, up to 2019. If fit to govern, he will complete the longest presidential period in Venezuelan modern history: 20 years. Chávez receives 55 percent of the vote against 44 percent for Henrique Capriles Radonski The opposition is still resisting the so-called revolution, which is about to turn 14 years old. An oil-price-dependent economy with a demagogic and corrupt government apparatus remains in place. Structural education and poverty-reduction policies are nowhere to be found, but the historically high oil income has permitted the redistribution of wealth to perform better. Abstention was only 19.44 percent.


2012


December 8, 2012—Cancer Takes Him Out, But the Apparatchiks Stay“(…) As the Constitution says…If any unexpected circumstance develops, so says the Constitution, by which I will be unable—listen carefully—to continue in charge of the Presi-dency of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, either to complete in the few days that are left... How many? One month? Today is... Yes, one month, thirty-two days. Especially to assume the new period for which I was elected by you, for the vast majority of you. If something happens, I repeat, If I’m somehow unable to continue; Nicolás Maduro, in such a circumstance, must conclude the period, as mandated by the Constitution. It is also my firm opinion, as clear as a full moon—irrevocable, absolute, total—that in such a scenario, which will demand a call for presidential elections, as mandated by the Constitution, you elect Nicolás Maduro as president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. I ask you from the bottom of my heart.”

These were the instructions left by Chávez in his last address to the nation, broadcast live before he traveled to Cuba for another cancer surgery.

Chávez’s instructions have not been followed as of the publication of this work. With Maduro remaining vice president beyond his mandate, the constitution has been violated once more, this time not by Chávez himself but by the Chavista apparatus, with the sup-port of his strategic allies and the indifference of the international community.

December 16, 2012—Gubernatorial ElectionsHenrique Capriles Radonski is reelected for a second four-year term as governor of Miranda, the second-most populous state in the country, which includes more than half of Caracas. Capriles has run for public office six times and lost only once, in the last presi-dential election against Chávez.

In the governors elections, Chavismo receives 56.22% of the vote against 44.78% for the opposition. Abstention was 46.06%.

The government recovered four states from opposition incumbents and now controls 20 out of 23 regional governments. Nevertheless, two of the remaining opposition governors are among the most prominent leaders in Venezuela's opposition forces: Capriles and Henri Falcón of Lara state.

The opposition is still resisting the so-called revolution, which is about to turn 14 years old. Venezuelan oil-price-dependent economy, with a demagogic and corrupt government apparatus, is sustaining a political struggle of global magnitude if we are to consider China, Russia, Cuba and Iran links with Caracas. Structural education and poverty-reduction policies are nowhere to be found, but the historically high oil income has permit-ted the unsustainable redistribution of wealth to perform better.




The only two years where we can observe a considerable decrease of violent deaths are the two years directly following the implementation of Chávez’s social programs. Then, after 2005, the escalation of violence continues its ascendance. Seventy percent of polled Venezuelans consider violence the biggest problem in the country. It is a problem that goes beyond class barriers. Chávez’s government stopped producing death statistics in 2009.

The world death by violence rate is about 8.8 per 100,000 people. The Venezuelan estimate for 2012 shows 73 violent deaths by each 100,000 inhabitants. That is, in Venezuela we have an average of 59.4 violent deaths per day, or more than one every half an hour. These estimates correspond to, and even surpass, similar statistics for countries at war. In Venezuela, the battlefield is everywhere; virtually everybody lives under an undeclared death threat.

Sources: The Venezuelan Observatory of Violence (Observatorio Venezolano de violencia, or OVV); the Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigative Body (Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas, or CICPC) and the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, or INE)

*Calculated based on number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants with population data from the INE.

* * *


Violence Analysis

Year 1988

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

2009 2010 2011

*Death Rate

*Total Violent Deaths

9 13 13 12 16 20 22 20 22 18 19 25 33 32 38 44 37

37 45 48

52

65

61

67

1709

2419

2474

2502

3266

4292

4733

4481

4961

4225

4550

5968

8022

7960

9617

11342

9719

9964

12257

13156

14589

18436

17600

19336

2012

73

21692

7 8 13 15

Venezuela’s Electoral Autocracy—Glossary

Apertura PetroleraIn the mid-1990s, faced with low oil prices and little capital, PDVSA had reopened its oil fields for exploration and extraction. The government established two possible business models to rule the relationship between PDVSA and its foreign partners (Chevron-Texaco, Exxon-Mobil, BP, ConocoPhillips, Shell, Total, Repsol, Eni, Statoil, Petrobras, China National Petroleum and Korean National Oil): service contracts, which functioned as out-sourcing companies and did not require any government investment, and strategic part-nerships, which implied joint ventures where PDVSA retained operative but not equity control. These joint ventures were forged according to 1976 Venezuelan oil law.

Asymmetrical warfareArmed groups, active in urban centers and the countryside, instrumentalize political discourse sympathetic to the Bolivarian Revolution. The Colombian guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN), the Bolivarian Liberation Forces (FBL) and the urban colectivos have all benefited from the ambiguous, if not complicit attitude of the Chávez regime. In particular, the colectivos are pro-Chávez armed militias (or paramilitary groups), some of which pre-cede the Chávez government and control dense urban neighborhoods located less than a kilometer away from the presidential Palacio de Miraflores. The police have confronted them at times, but they continue to operate and proclaim their alliance with the Bolivarian Revolution. They have also acted, on numerous occasions, to intimidate the mass media and other corporate organizations.



Glossary


39Venezuela’s Electoral Autocracy, 1999-2019?

3 6 29 31

Chávez's resignationBroadcasting live after Chávez’s detention on April 12, 2002, General in Chief and Defense Minister Lucas Rincón Romero said, “We asked the President of the Republic to resign from his position, which he accepted.”

Civil SocietyThe collapse of the traditional bipartisan system and the deterioration of its public image made it impossible to consolidate an organized opposition of political parties. Nonethe-less, a heterogeneous movement opposing Chávez was catalyzed by the national corpo-rate mass media (TV, radio and newspapers), NGOs, opinion makers and the self-defined “Civil Society” leaders, including both the president of the major national union, Carlos Ortega, and the president of the national commerce federation, Pedro Carmona Estanga. These groups were at least in part supported by foreign governments, through organiza-tions such as the National Endowment for Democracy. This heterogeneous leadership guided the opposition during the period in which Chávez was more focused on transform-ing the State’s structure than satisfying the population’s needs. As a consequence, Chávez lost popularity rapidly and his opponents saw the opportunity to oust him from the presidency.

The opposition adopted the name “Civil Society” in order to differentiate itself from the “People” (el pueblo), a distinction appropriated by forces that supported President Chávez. In the gap between these two concepts, one could find a clear socioeconomic prejudice, where the educated part of society is “civil” and regards the more vulgar group of regular “people” with profound disdain. This situation only served the government’s aims to widen the breach that still divides the country into two pieces.

Communal CouncilsIn April 2006, the government unilaterally passes the Law of Communal Councils (Cosejos Comunales). These structures, nonexistent in the previous constitution, are ostensibly created to empower local citizens to form neighborhood-based, elected councils that would initiate and oversee local policies and projects directed toward community develop-ment, running in parallel to federal structures. In fact, the councils comprise groups orga-nized by the PSUV; they are neither directly nor freely elected by the population. This law and many others were rejected in the referendum of December 2007.

13 24 42

Glossary



Fingerprint-reading machinesOn November 25, 2005, during an auditing process of the electoral system in which tech-nicians from all parties participated, the opposition proved to authorities of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, or CNE) and pro-Chávez parties that the newly purchased fingerprint-reading machines were capable of recording the order in which votes were cast. From this sequence, people monitoring the machines couldmine the selection of each voter. This discovery led to protest, and the CNE agreed to unplug the machines form the rest of the equipment, making it impossible to violate the secrecy of the vote, but still refused to eliminate them from the process in order to avoid voting fraud. The machines were provided by Cogent Systems, a U.S. company that derives 60 percent of its total income from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Food, fuel to cookMost Venezuelans eat the national dish “arepa” (a corn-based bread) at least once a day, because of its low price and “stomach-filling” properties. Polar Enterprises, a company owned by one of Venezuela’s richest families, produces the major corn-flour brand (as well as a leading brand for beer), which accounted for three-quarters of the market and com-pletely disappeared from shelves during the strike. To cook, Venezuelans also depend on gas cylinders produced by PDVSA (and sometimes distributed by Polar), the state-owned company that halted production during the days of the national strike.

Impotent oppositionThe Venezuelan version of the Spanish word for “strike” is paro, which could be translated as “standing up” or “rising.” This word and some of its variants are used in Venezuela to describe an erect penis. In a rally of Chávez sympathizers in Caracas, the President challenged the opposition to try to "erect the country,” and then noted, “The opposition doesn't get a boner even with Viagra.”

Interim, not structural plansThe opposition initially failed to recognize the importance of these policies and rejected their implementation, alienating a vast majority of the population who saw no wrong in receiving immediate help from the government. Still, these programs’ main functions are to proselytize government ideology and control the population—hence their inefficiency as drivers of sustainable progress.

13 27

Glossary


41Venezuela’s Electoral Autocracy, 1999-2019?

IT, financial and operations divisionIn 1997, former PDVSA president Luis Giusti outsourced all IT, financial and commercial oil operations (without bid) to INTESA, a joint venture between PDVSA and the American defense company SAIC. During his first presidential campaign, Chávez accused Giusti of wanting to privatize PDVSA. Giusti resigned from PDVSA one day before Chávez took power in 1999. Shortly afterward, he became an advisor to the State Department and an external director for Royal Dutch Shell.

Worried about the links between SAIC and the US intelligence apparatus, Chávez’s government had opened investigations into PDVSA’s outsourcing of vital information. Since January 2002, he was effectively trying to finish the contract with INTESA. The sav-ings PDVSA was supposed to obtain from the outsourcing were nowhere to be found and Chávez was planning to regain control of the “brains of the oil industry.” The delay in achieving an agreement to end the contract continued until the end of 2002, when the two-month-long national strike began. The support that the majority of PDVSA and INTESA personnel gave to the strike led the army to take control of INTESA and PDVSA offices and turn off their computers to start operating the industry manually.

Opposition increases its control from two to five statesAs a consequence of these results, President Chávez forced all the governors from his movement who lost their campaigns to transfer regional control of institutions and infrastructure—highways, hospitals, ports, airports, etc.—to the central government before leaving office. With this move, he drastically cut the budget of states outside his control. He also personally appointed several executive figures for each of those regions, as planned in the constitutional reform rejected by citizens two years prior.

Subsidized gas priceSince the 1970s, Venezuelans have been taught that oil belongs to the people. One of the causes of this phenomenon is the surreally high state subsidy on gas prices that allows Venezuelans to say they have the cheapest gas in the world ($0.06 per gallon).

Glossary



Three million peopleChávez authorized the publication of the list, which was used by public institutions to fire or refrain from hiring the 3.4 million citizens who exercised their constitutional right to ask for a presidential recall. Chávez himself acknowledged the use of the list and its value for “the process” when, in 2005, he asked institutions to stop using it.

Twins mechanism—Las MorochasThe “Twins mechanism” is designed to avoid proper representation of minorities in a mixed electoral systems like Venezuela’s, which combines “nominal” and “listed” votes. The nominal votes are those cast for a specific candidate whose full name is printed on the ballot. The listed votes are those cast for a political party that has previously elabo-rated a list of people who, in an order the party has chosen, would be appointed for Congress depending on the number of votes the whole list receives. In a mixed system, the nominal seats are selected by a majoritarian recount where the biggest minority wins, while the listed seats are selected by a proportional recount in which all forces should obtain as many seats as they do votes. To avoid overrepresentation of the largest minority, the seats received by nominal vote are then subtracted from the ones they were given by the listed vote. The “Twins mechanism”, designed by Chávez’s allies in 2005, created a new party with the sole purpose of including the nominal candidates under its flag and avoiding the subtraction process that would have corrected the overrepresentation of that party.

Unidad NacionalLa Unidad acknowledged and accepted previous electoral results. This coalition was led by a mix of new and old political parties, including more experienced politicians, instead of radical “Civil Society" leaders and well known “opinion makers” who supported fraud-related conspiracy theories. This new credibility made it easy for political parties to attract followers for the next series of electoral events, starting with the referendum for constitutional reform requested by Chávez.

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Since the mid-1990s, Alessandro Balteo Yazbeck has developed a hybrid practice that incorporates the activities of a researcher, archivist, historian and curator. Working across various mediums, his productions formally resemble or incorporate the works of others, stressing notions of authorship and cultural authority. His entangled narratives follow strict methodological rules that are inspired by the unusual relationships he establishes between different realms and disciplines. In his works he aims to reveal the political strategies and motives at work in the world by analyzing the dynamics of power and propaganda in modern history and aesthetics. Born in 1972, Balteo Yazbeck received his MFA in his native city, Caracas, Venezuela, where he extensively exhibited his work before living in New York, from 2000 to 2010. He is now based in Berlin. Recent solo exhibitions include “Chronoscope” at Galerie Martin Janda, Vienna, Austria; “Corrupted Files” at Galeria Luisa Strina, Sao Paulo, Brazil; “Cultural Diplomacy: An Art We Neglect” at Henrique Faria Fine Art, New York; and “A Little Bit of Heaven” at Car-penter Center for the Visual Arts, Harvard University, Cambridge. He has been included in numerous group exhibitions, such as “When Attitudes Became Form Become Atti-tudes,” CCA Wattis Institute, San Francisco; “Liberalis,” Lütze-Museum and Galerie der Stadt Sindelfingen; the 12th International Istanbul Biennial, Istanbul; “Then & Now: Abstraction in Latin American Art, 1950 to Present,” Deutsche Bank, New York; and “Panorama,” Museu de Arte Moderna de Sao Paulo. Balteo Yazbeck’s work has been the subject of analysis in academic periodicals includ-ing The Harvard Crimson, Oxford Art Journal, American Art and ARTMargins, and has been reviewed in Frieze, Art in America, Flash Art, Modern Painters, Bidoun and Art Nexus. His work is in the collections of the Harvard Art Museum, Cambridge; Phoenix Art Museum; El Museo del Barrio, New York; Museu de Arte Moderno de São Paulo; Colec-ción Patricia Phelps de Cisneros, New York; Coleção Teixeira de Freitas, Lisbon; Cisne-ros Fontanals Art Foundation, Miami; and Colección Banco Mercantil, Caracas.

Cristian Balteo Yazbeck holds a Master’s Degree in International Studies from Univer-sitat de Barcelona and Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and recently finished his MBA at Esade Business School (Cataluña, Spain). His academic research focused on Venezu-elan petroleum financial policies and he has written on the subject, as well as Chavista electoral strategies, for the German magazine Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. He also holds a magna cum laude Bachelor’s Degree in International Studies from Universidad Central de Venezuela.

Boris Muñoz is a Venezuelan journalist and author of several books, including La ley de la calle, testimonios de jóvenes protagonistas de la violencia en Caracas (Fundarte 1995), Más allá de la ciudad letrada, Crónicas y espacios urbanos (University of Pitts-burgh Press, 2003) and Despachos del imperio (Random House 2007). Muñoz was editor-in-chief of Exceso magazine and Nueva Sociedad. He contributes regularly to Latin American magazines such as Gatopardo and El Puercoespin, and he recently wrote articles on the 2012 Venezuelan election campaign for Newsweek, and on the country's post-election situation for the New Yorker.

Muñoz is a fellow at the Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University. He holds a PhD in Hispanic American Literature from Rutgers University. In 2000, he received the Fellowship of the Humanities Institute at Dartmouth College and the First Accésit of the Premio Internacional de Periodismo Fernando Lázaro Carreter in Madrid.

Author Bios

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Venezuela's Electoral Autocracy, 1999-2019?