US Marine Corps - Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) MCWP 2-15.2

MCWP 2-15.2

Signals Intelligence

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 143 000063 00

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

22 February 1999

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-15.2, Signals Intelligence,serves as a basic reference for understanding concepts, operations, and proce-dures for the conduct of signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations in support ofthe Marine air-ground task force. This publication complements and expands onMarine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, Intelligence, and MCWP 2-1, Intelli-gence Operations, which provide doctrine and higher order tactics, techniques,and procedures for intelligence operations.

The primary target audience of this publication is intelligence personnel respon-sible for planning and executing SIGINT operations. Personnel who providesupport to SIGINT or who use the results from these operations should also readthis publication.

MCWP 2-15.2 describes aspects of SIGINT operations, including doctrinal fun-damentals, equipment, command and control, communications and informationsystems support, planning, execution, security, and training. Detailed informa-tion on SIGINT operations and tactics, techniques, and procedures is classifiedand beyond the scope of this publication.

MCWP 2-15.2 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-23, (C) Signals Intelli-gence/Electronic Warfare Operations (U), dated 21 September 1990.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

J. E. RHODES Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

DISTRIBUTION: 143 000063 00

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used,both men and women are included.

To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions andchanges that will improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to CommandingGeneral, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42),3300 Russell Road, Suite 318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917(DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail to smb@doctrine div@mccdc. Recommendationsshould include the following information:

• Location of changePublication number and titleCurrent page numberParagraph number (if applicable)Line numberFigure or table number (if applicable)

• Nature of changeAdd, deleteProposed new text, preferably double-spaced and typewritten

• Justification and/or source of change

Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from MarineCorps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBu5600, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtainedfrom the Doctrine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following universal reference locator: http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil.

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Signals Intelligence

Table of Contents

PageChapter 1. Fundamentals

1001 What is Signals Intelligence? 1-1002 Concept of Employment 1-11003 SIGINT and Electronic Warfare 1-21004 Threats 1-31005 All-Source Intelligence and Operations Command Support1006 Capabilities 1-41007 Limitations 1-51008 Organization 1-51009 Command and Control 1-61010 Operations 1-61011 Commanders’ Responsibilities 1-

Chapter 2. SIGINT Responsibilities in the SupportingEstablishment

2001 Marine Corps SIGINT Organization 2-2002 SIGINT Organizations in Other Military Services 22003 National SIGINT Organizations 2-3

Chapter 3. SIGINT Responsibilities in the MAGTF

3001 Commanders, Marine Corps Forces 33002 MAGTF Staff Sections 3-13003 MAGTF Intelligence Section Elements 3-3004 Marine Divisions and Aircraft Wings 3-53005 Radio Battalions 3-53006 VMAQs 3-5

Chapter 4. Radio Battalion

4001 Tasks 4-14002 Organization 4-14003 Task Organization for MAGTF Operations SIGINT

Support Unit 4-34004 Command and Control 4-54005 Notional Concepts of Employment and Task Organizations

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Chapter 5. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons

5001 Mission and Tasks 5-15002 Organization and Concept of Employment 55003 EA-6B Prowler 5-25004 Tactical EA-6B Mission Planning System 5-5005 TERPES 5-4

Chapter 6. Communications and Information Systems

6001 Basic MAGTF SIGINT CIS Requirements 6-6002 Notional MAGTF SIGINT Operational Architectures 6-6003 Planning Consideration 6-76004 SIGINT Communications 6-7

Chapter 7. Plannin g and Operations

Section I SIGINT Functional Plannin g 7-1

7101 SIGINT Concept of Operations 7-7102 Enemy Characteristics 7-7103 Topography 7-27104 Planning Responsibilities 7-37105 Coordination of SIGINT Operations 7-

Section II SIGINT Operational Plannin g 7-5

7201 Planning and Direction 7-57202 Collection 7-67203 Processing and Exploitation 7-7204 Production 7-87205 Dissemination 7-87206 Utilization 7-10

Section III SIGINT Plans and Orders 7-11

Section IV Execution 7-12

Chapter 8. Security of Sensitive Compartmented Information

8001 Special Security Officer 8-28002 Personnel Security Program 8-8003 Physical Security 8-38004 Information Systems Security 8-

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Chapter 9. Training

9001 Military Occupational Specialty Training 9-9002 Functional Training 9-29003 Exercises 9-29004 Operational Training Objectives 9-

Appendices

A Radio Battalion SIGINT Support Unit Checklist A-1B Marine Corps SIGINT Equipment B-1C SIGINT and SCI Security Management Operations

Flowchart C-1D SIGINT Appendix Format D-1E TSCIF Checklist E-1F Glossary F-1G References and Related Publications G

List of Figures

1-1 The Intelligence Cycle 1-74-1 Radio Battalion Organization 4-24-2 SIGINT Support Unit Elements 4-34-3 Notional SSU Fly-In Echelon Configuration 4-5-1 EA-6B Prowler 5-25-2 VMAQ Organization 5-25-3 VMAQ and TERPES Operations 5-6-1 Notional MEF SIGINT Operational Architecture 6-6-2 Notional MEF Lead Echelon SIGINT Operational Architecture 6-46-3 MEU(SOC) CE Afloat SIGINT Operational Architecture 6-6-4 MEU(SOC) CE Ashore SIGINT Operational Architecture 66-5 MEF CE CIC Communications

and Information Systems Architecture 6-6-6 RadBn SSU Operations Control and Analysis Center

Communications and Information Systems 6-6-7 VMAQ Operations Center and TERPES

Communications and Information Systems 6-7-1 MAGTF and Supporting SIGINT Operations 7-1B-1 AN/ULQ-19(V2) B-1B-2 AN/MLQ-36 B-2B-3 AN/MLQ-36A B-3B-4 AN/PRD-12 B-4B-5 AN/MSC-63A B-5B-6 AN/MSC-63A (interior view) B-5B-7 Technical Control and Analysis Center

Concept of Employment B-6B-8 Team Portable Collection System Upgrade B

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B-9 Team Portable Collection System COMINT Collection Subsystem B-8

B-10 Team Portable Collection System Analysis SubsystemB-11 Trojan Spirit II B-10B-12 RREP SS-1 B-11B-13 RREP SS-2 B-11B-14 Rifle-Mounted HIDRAH B-12B-15 EA-6B Prowler B-14B-16 AN/TSQ-90D/E(V), TERPES Portable Unit B-1

List of Tables

2-1 Marine Support Battalion Companies 2-4-1 Notional MEU(SOC) SSU T/O 4-74-2 Notional Fly-In Echelon T/O 4-77-1 Emitter Technical Data 7-2

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Chapter 1

Fundamentals

All military forces use the electromagnetic spec-trum to command and control operating forcesacquire targets, guide weapons, and direct sup-porting arms. These military forces also use theelectromagnetic spectrum to collect, process, andreport intelligence and to support other adminis-trative and logistics operations. Most facets omilitary operations involve the use of some de-vice or system that radiates or receives electro-magnetic energy via air waves, metallic cable, orfiber optics. Radios, radars, sensors, smart muni-tions, telephone systems, and computer networksuse electromagnetic radiation. Both complex andunsophisticated military organizations depend onthese systems and their inherent use of the elec-tromagnetic spectrum. Signals intelligence opera-t ions are the principal way to exploi t anadversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

1001. What Is Signals Intelligence?

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is “a category ointelligence comprising either individually or incombination all communications intelligence,electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumenta-tion signals intelligence, however transmitted”(Joint Pub 1-02). Simply, SIGINT is intelligencegained by exploiting an adversary’s use of theelectromagnetic spectrum with the aim of gainingundetected firsthand intelligence on the adver-sary’s intentions, dispositions, capabilities, andlimitations.

a. Communications Intelligence

Communications intelligence (COMINT) is thetechnical and intelligence information derived

from foreign communications by anyone oththan the intended recipient.

b. Electronics IntelligenceElectronics intelligence (ELINT) is the technicaand intelligence information derived from foreignoncommunication electromagnetic radiation emanating from anywhere other than nuclear detontions or radioactive sources.

c. Foreign Instrumentation Signals IntelligenceForeign instrumentation signals intelligence (FIINT) is the technical and intelligence informatioderived from the intercept of foreign instrumentation signals by anyone other than the intended cipients. (FISINT is primarily strategic in naturand will not be addressed further in this manua

1002. Concept of Employment

SIGINT can be employed in tactical situationwhen the enemy uses electromagnetic spectcommunications and/or systems. Optimal employment is against enemy forces that depend tactical communications and noncommunicatiofor command and control of their operations. SIGINT operations are more difficult against enemforces that have established more permanent em-placements using land lines or other cabled comunications systems.

SIGINT is one of several intelligence disciplinesThe other key intelligence disciplines are imageintelligence (IMINT), human resources intelligence (HUMINT), and measurement and signture intelligence (MASINT).

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1003. SIGINT and Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare (EW) is “any military actioninvolving the use of electromagnetic and directedenergy to control the electromagnetic spectrum orto attack the enemy” (Joint Pub 1-02). EW deniesthe enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrufor command and control and protects it forfriendly command and control. There are three di-visions of EW.

a. Electronic Warfare SupportElectronic warfare support (ES) includes actionstasked by or under the direct control of an opera-tional commander to search for, intercept, identi-fy, and locate sources of intentional andunintentional radiated enemy electromagnetic sig-nals for the purpose of immediate threat recogni-tion. ES provides information required forimmediate tactical decisions and operations suchas the identification of imminent hostile actions,threat avoidance, targeting, or electronic attack.

Both SIGINT and ES involve searching for, inter-cepting, identifying, and locating electronic emit-ters. The primary differences between the two arethe information’s intended use, the degree of ana-lytical effort expended, the detail of informationprovided, and the timeliness required.

SIGINT is used to gain information concerningthe enemy, usually in response to a priority intelli-gence requirement (PIR), an intelligence require-ment (IR), or other means. As described inchapter 6, SIGINT support is usually provided tothe Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) as awhole, but may also be provided directly to subor-dinate elements.

SIGINT information is normally provided to theMAGTF all-source fusion center (AFC) for inclu-sion into all-source intelligence products and forfurther dissemination throughout the MAGTF andto external organizations. See Marine CorpsWarfighting Publication [MCWP] 2-1, Intelli-gence Operations. SIGINT-derived informationof immediate tactical importance that does not re-

quire further processing, correlation, or analysmay be passed directly to subordinate commaners or to the operations section or supporting arelement of supported commands, in accordanwith United States Signals Intelligence Directiv(USSID) 316, Non-Codeword Reporting Pro-gram, and USSID 240, ELINT Processing, Analy-sis, Reporting, and Forwarding Procedures.

b. Electronic Attack

Electronic attack (EA) is action taken to preveor reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electmagnetic spectrum.

The objectives of SIGINT may conflict with thosof EA. For example, EA may be conducted to interfere with the adversary’s use of an emitterthe same time as SIGINT operations are designto exploit the adversary’s use of the same emittFurthermore, EA operations against one targmay disrupt or otherwise interfere with friendlSIGINT collection against the same or differetargets.

SIGINT operations, EA operations, and thMAGTF’s overall use of the electromagnetispectrum for command and control (C2) opertions must be carefully coordinated within thMAGTF and with pertinent external organizations. Depending on operational requiremenSIGINT and EA operations coordination and dconfliction may occur within the radio battalionoperations control and analysis center (OCACwithin the electronic warfare coordination cente(EWCC), or within the MAGTF command element (CE) current operations center (COC).

c. Electronic Protection

Electronic protection (EP) involves the actiontaken to ensure effective, friendly use of the eletromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s useEW. Within the MAGTF, SIGINT elements mabe tasked to employ similar techniques againsfriendly force electronic emitters in order to identify and help eliminate signals security vulnerabities that could be exploited by an enemy’SIGINT operations.

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1004. Threats

a. Enemy Capabilities

The more a combat unit relies on the electromag-netic spectrum, the more vulnerable it is to the en-emy’s signals intelligence and electronic warfareactions. The enemy can—

� Detect a unit’s devices which radiate elec-tromagnetic energy to reveal its identity andlocation.

� Monitor a unit’s communications to revealits intentions, combat capabilities, logisticsand personnel status, and other critical oper-ational and tactical information.

� Inject false information into communica-tions and information systems (CIS) to con-fuse and mislead a unit.

� Interrupt a unit’s use of the electromagneticspectrum, thereby degrading its ability to re-ceive and process intelligence, plan opera-tions, and execute C2 functions.

b. Countermeasures

To counter threats listed and to enhance effective-ness, Marines must be able to—

� Protect, to the maximum extent possible, thefree use of the electromagnetic spectrumand ensure the reliable performance of ouCIS.

� Exploit the enemy’s use of the electromag-netic spectrum for intelligence and targetingand intrude into the enemy’s CIS and net-works.

� Attack the enemy’s CIS to adversely affecttheir decisionmaking process and opera-tions.

1005. All-Source Intelligence and Operations Command Support

Generally, SIGINT is more useful to the commander and the decisionmaking process whehas been correlated and fused with informationfrom other intelligence sources and disseminatin easily usable, tailored, all-source intelligencproducts. Tactical SIGINT operations within thMAGTF, along with other services, theater, annational SIGINT support, make SIGINT a valuable source of information within the overall intelligence effort. SIGINT supports the followingsix functions of intelligence.

a. Commander’s Estimate SIGINT helps formulate and modify the commander’s estimate of the situation by providinginformation needed to analyze the enemy’s operations, identify the current parameters of oerating emitters, give insight into enemy intetions, and assess the enemy’s intelligence, Eand other military capabilities.

b. Development of the SituationSIGINT’s ability to track enemy emitters and associated units and to obtain indicators of inten-tions can confirm or refute potential enemcourses of action. SIGINT also helps commandto better understand the enemy and the btlespace, thereby reducing uncertainty by acquir-ing information regarding enemy structuredispositions, locations, movements, and opetional activities and patterns.

c. Indications and Warning SIGINT is often the principal provider of indications and warning (I&W) because adversaries oten reveal their intentions, locat ions, anmovements in their communications and othelectronic emissions.

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d. Force ProtectionSIGINT supports force protection by revealingcritical intelligence about enemy intelligence,sabotage, subversion, and terrorism and by as-sessing the vulnerability of friendly C2 and CIoperations.

e. TargetingSIGINT supports targeting by providing key op-erational and locational intelligence on enemy C2operations and facilities, weapons systems, forcecompositions, and dispositions. Information pro-vided through SIGINT can identify high valueand high payoff targets and help develop optionsfor attacking these targets. SIGINT also supportsall-source intelligence gain and loss assessmentsof potential enemy targets.

f. Combat AssessmentSIGINT can aid in all-source intelligence supportof battle damage assessments by exploiting ene-my reports of sustained battle damages and by de-tecting changes in enemy operations subsequento friendly attacks.

1006. Capabilities

a. Remote IntelligenceSIGINT operations provide extended-range intel-ligence without the need for physical presencewithin or near the surveillance area. The standoffrange for SIGINT operations is directly depend-ent on the characteristics of the terrain in whichSIGINT collection is being conducted and thetype, operating characteristics, and methods ofemployment of the enemy’s electromagnetic sys-tems. Some enemy electromagnetic systems mayrequire that SIGINT operations be close to thetransmission origin, path, or medium. Conversely,other electromagnetic systems may be exploitablefrom positions farther away from the transmissionorigin, path, or medium.

(1) Ground SIGINT Elements. Locatingground SIGINT operational elements with friend-ly combat forces provides the friendly commander

with the capability to collect a wide range of inteligence information. Locating SIGINT elementwith the ground combat element (GCE) forceprovides the MAGTF commander with intelligence support for decisionmaking as well as I&and force protection intelligence reporting to thlocal unit.

(2) Air-Platform SIGINT Elements. AirbornSIGINT elements can provide direct support both air and ground operations and significantenhance collection operations by exploiting enmy targets masked or otherwise unattainableground-based elements. These SIGINT elemealso support friendly air operations by identifyinlocating, and determining the status of enemy sveillance, targeting, and weapons systems andproviding intelligence support to friendly EA operations targeting these enemy systems.

(3) Ship-Based SIGINT Elements. SIGINTelements may operate from ship-based SIGIoperations facilities in support of amphibious operations. Marine and Navy elements operatifrom ship-based SIGINT facilities may supportamphibious operations as a part of the assaforce, airborne SIGINT operations, or ship-baseSIGINT operations. Within an amphibious tasforce (ATF), the principal SIGINT facilities arefound with ship’s signals exploitation space(SSESs) located within the intelligence centersmany ships.

b. Target Detection and Identification

SIGINT can detect enemy activity in designateareas and provide a general indication of its tyand volume. Analysis of SIGINT information caprovide the identity and location of specific enemy units, indications of enemy plans and futuoperations, and the type, function, and location specific enemy units and systems.

c. Near-Real-Time Reporting

SIGINT operations can immediately report enemactions or events critical to the operations friendly units. Time-sensitive SIGINT reportingto combat units may be via standard MAGT


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intelligence communications channels or anyavailable direct communications means.

d. Continuous Operations

SIGINT operations are conducted on a 24-houbasis. The size and composition of SIGINT forcesalong with the supported commander(s)’s conceptof operations will influence the scope, servicesand capabilities of SIGINT operations.

e. Stealth

SIGINT operations are a passive intelligencetechnique and can usually be conducted withouthe enemy’s knowledge or detection. EW opera-tions include both active and passive techniquesand, depending on implementation, may or maynot be recognized by the enemy.

f. Flexibility

Marine SIGINT operations may be employed in avariety of means to support the MAGTF conceptof operations and supporting intelligence opera-tions. SIGINT elements may be deployed with ad-vance forces or forward ground units; they maybe aboard air platforms or ship-based. Additional-ly, Marine SIGINT elements routinely operatewith joint and other service elements. These ele-ments are effective at leveraging their capabilitiesin support of MAGTF requirements.

1007. Limitations

a. Enemy System

The primary value of SIGINT operations isagainst enemy systems using electromagneticspectrum system transmissions. SIGINT opera-tions are ineffective against systems that do nouse radio frequency (RF) transmissions (e.g., fiberoptics, land-line telephone systems, or other ca-bled systems). If the enemy conducts operationsunder enemy emission control (EMCON) condi-tions (e.g., radio silence), SIGINT operations willnot be effective.

b. Terrain Masking

Heavily wooded and urban areas reduce the sceptibility of enemy transmissions to SIGINT colection. In these areas, generally, SIGINelements must be closer to the enemy’s transmsion origin or medium. Mountainous or very hillyterrain also inhibits SIGINT operations (particu-larly ground-based operations) by effectiveblocking enemy signals from detection.

c. Complex Signals

Enemy signals that are complex or encrypted duce the intelligence information available fromthe transmission. Complex signals (i.e., frequenhoppers) require special equipment for interceand signals analysis. Encrypted signals requdeciphering to reveal intelligence informationDeciphering simple encryption methods may bpossible, but an enemy’s use of complex encrytion methods is currently beyond the scope of tactical SIGINT elements.

d. SIGINT versus Electronic Attack

SIGINT operations may be affected when enemsignals are being jammed. Prior to initiating Ejamming operations, consideration must be givto the intelligence value of the enemy’s signal athe effects of its loss.

1008. Organization

Within the Marine Corps, the units responsible fthe conduct of tactical SIGINT are the two radbattalions and the four Marine tactical electronwarfare squadrons.

a. Radio Battalion

The radio battalion (RadBn) provides tacticSIGINT, electronic warfare, communications security monitoring and analysis, and special communications operations in support of the MAGTA variety of employment concepts may be usdepending upon the situation. Refer to chaptefor a detailed description of RadBns.

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b. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare SquadronThe Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron(VMAQ) conducts tactical electronic reconnais-sance and ELINT operations in support of theMAGTF.

The VMAQ provides—

� ELINT collection operations to maintain theelectronic order of battle, including identifi-cation of selected emitters and location ononfriendly emitters.

� Threat warnings for friendly aircraft, ships,and ground units.

� Intelligence support to prevent, delay, or in-terrupt detection and tracking by enemy ear-ly warning, acquisition, and fire or missilecontrol radars of aviation combat elemen(ACE) operations and Marine EA-6B tactical jamming aircraft in support of strike air-craft.

Refer to chapter 5 for a detailed description of theVMAQ.

1009. Command and Control

a. Radio BattalionThe RadBn (or RadBn detachment) is generally asubordinate command of, or attached to, theMAGTF CE. The MAGTF commander has oper-ational control (OPCON) of the RadBn (or RadBndetachment).

(1) Staff Cognizance. The MAGTF command-er exercises C2 over the RadBn or its detachmentsvia the MAGTF intelligence officer. Such a rela-tionship allows for the centralized direction andeffective integration of SIGINT operations withinthe MAGTF’s broader all-source intelligence con-cept of operations. RadBn’s EW operations faunder the staff cognizance of the MAGTF opera-tions officer, requiring close coordination and in-tegration among the intelligence staff officer (G-2/S-2), operations staff officer (G-3/S-3), and

communications and information systems offic(G-6/S-6) to achieve optimum employment oRadBn.

(2) Support Relationships The RadBn mosttypically operates in general support of theMAGTF. However, RadBn or its elements mabe employed in direct support of any of thMAGTF’s major support elements, i.e., GCE anACE. In such cases, the scope of the supportedcommander’s control over assigned RadBn ements usually is specified to ensure effective suport of operations while allowing the MAGTFcommander to maintain effective control obroader intelligence and SIGINT operations.

b. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare SquadronVMAQ or its detachments are subordinate to tACE and under the OPCON of the ACE commander.

(1) Staff Cognizance. The ACE commanderwill usually exercise C2 over VMAQ via the ACEoperations officer or tactical air command cent(TACC). The ACE intelligence officer will exer-cise staff cognizance over VMAQ ELINT activities beyond that required to support EA missions.

(2) Support Relationships. VMAQ elementsprincipally operate in direct support of ACE opeations or other designated commanders (e.g.,joint force air component commander). HoweveELINT acquired during VMAQ operations is capable of being used in general support of MAGTelements and supporting intelligence operations

1010. Operations

RadBn and VMAQ conduct both COMINT anELINT operations to varying degrees. RadBnconduct predominantly COMINT operations; thealso ensure rapid dissemination of fused ELINand COMINT from organic or external sources the G-2/S-2 and subordinate commanders. TVMAQ’s main focus is ELINT and ES.


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To complete intell igence tasks, RadBn anVMAQ incorporate the six intelligence cyclephases into their SIGINT methodology (see figure1-1). Products of the SIGINT cycle are dissemi-nated to commanders and others through theMAGTF intelligence officer. RadBn and VMAQalso provide SIGINT products to other Serviceand agencies as directed.

a. Planning and DirectionSIGINT direction is a continuous process that en-compasses the tactical and technical employmentof SIGINT assets. It begins on receipt of a warn-ing order, initiating directive, or establishment ofa planning objective and continues until termina-tion of the mission. SIGINT unit commandersclosely coordinate their operations with theMAGTF intelligence officer and pertinent exter-nal intelligence and SIGINT elements.

Planning and direction involves—

� Determining PIR and IR and SIGINT re-quirements to support them.

� Preparing supporting SIGINT collection,production, and dissemination plans.

� Issuing orders and requests to SIGINT units. � Checking continuously on the productivity

and effectiveness of SIGINT collectors, pro-

ducers, disseminators, and other SIGINT eements and agencies.

b. CollectionDuring collection, organic, attached, and suppoing SIGINT elements detect, collect, and recoCOMINT and ELINT data. The collected COMINT and ELINT data is then delivered to the apropriate SIGINT processing or productioelement. The OCAC is the processing and pduction element for RadBn, while the TacticaElectronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaation System (TERPES) is VMAQ’s processingand production element. In some instances, suas immediate threat information, PIRs and sup-porting reporting criteria may direct the SIGINcollector to disseminate SIGINT reports directto the local commander (e.g., an infantry manever element) for immediate support to operation

c. Processing and ExploitationSIGINT processing consists of converting anformatting raw signals data to a form that is uable in follow-on SIGINT and all-source intelligence analysis. The processing and exploitatphase is usually not a discrete function, but rathone that is accomplished during collection. Onthe collected information has been processeanalysis must determine its significance. Other telligence information may also be fused togethwith the processed SIGINT to give a comprehesive picture and to show how the information cabe used by the commander to gain an advantag

d. ProductionThe production stage involves converting thSIGINT analysis into appropriately tailored SIGINT reports and all-source intelligence productthat can be easily understood by the commanand other users. Specifically formatted standard-ized messages, graphics, and other intelligenceproducts are required to familiarize these uswith layout and content and to ensure rapid usaand automated processing of finished reporWithin the MAGTF, the RadBn OCAC and thVMAQ TERPES produce SIGINT reports anproducts, and the MAGTF AFC incorporate

Figure 1-1. The Intelligence Cycle.

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SIGINT products and information into all-sourceintelligence products.

e. DisseminationDissemination is the process through which SIG-INT products are delivered to MAGTF users: theMAGTF commander, subordinate commandersand their staffs, and others as appropriate (e.g.joint force commander, joint components, andvarious theater and national organizations and in-telligence agencies). SIGINT products are dis-seminated via dedicated SIGINT or generalpurpose CIS channels according to available CISresources, the classification of the product, andthe intelligence dissemination plan. These prod-ucts include time-sensitive voice reports, text re-ports, data base updates, and web-based resources(e.g., via the MAGTF sensitive compartmentedinformation local area network).

f. UtilizationSIGINT must be exploited to have value. Com-manders, G-2/S-2s, G-3/S-3s, and other principalstaff officers must continuously evaluate SIGINTproducts for timeliness, usefulness, and overaquality and provide feedback to the intelligenceofficer and SIGINT elements.

1011. Commanders’ Responsibilities

MAGTF commanders are responsible for theplanning and direction, collection, processingproduction, dissemination, utilization, and securi-ty of all SIGINT information by units under theircommand. The Director, National Security Agen-cy (DIRNSA), delegates SIGINT operationaltasking authority (SOTA) to MAGTF command-ers by name for the duration of an operation oother specified period of time. SOTA allows thedesignated commander to task and direct the op-erations of organic or attached SIGINT units. Ad-ditional information regarding SOTA may befound in USSID 4, Concept of SIGINT Support toMilitary Commanders.

Commanders are also responsible for planninintegrating, and using SIGINT support, if avaiable, from other United States or allied nationand military SIGINT organizations. The commander’s primary responsibilities fall into the fol-lowing areas.

a. Tasking and Directing

The commander possessing SOTA is responsifor the effective tasking and operation of assignSIGINT assets. Generally, once a commander dtermines the intelligence requirements, the GS-2, with the advice and assistance of the integence operations officer and SIGINT office(SIO), decides which requirements can be safied via organic SIGINT operations. SIGINT unicommanders or officers in charge (OICs) will alscoordinate operations with other key staff officewithin the intelligence section (i.e., the collectionmanager, the AFC OIC, the surveillance and connaissance center OIC, and the disseminatmanager). The G-2/S-2 passes these IRs as tings to the commanding officer (CO) or OIC othe organic or attached SIGINT unit (e.g.,RadBn unit). These requirements will be in theform of either PIRs or IRs. PIRs and IRs are futher managed within the intelligence efforthrough the use of intelligence collection requirements (ICRs), intelligence production requirements (IPRs), and intelligence disseminatiorequirements (IDRs) in order to achieve effectivmutually supporting all-source intelligence opera-tions (see MCWP 2-1, chapter 3, for detailed formation on IR management). The SIGINT uncommander is then responsible for commandingand controlling resources to accomplish the signed mission. This process is discussed furtin chapter 7.

b. Reporting

The ultimate goal of tactical SIGINT operations the timely and usable production of SIGINT information which answers the MAGTF commander’s PIRs and other MAGTF IRs. SIGINT reporare discussed in detail in chapter 7.


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c. Protecting

The MAGTF commander is responsible for safe-guarding SIGINT personnel, facilities, and infor-mation used or produced by units within thecommand. Loss of SIGINT units and capabilitiesby destruction or capture and unintended disclo-sures of SIGINT operations may result in severelosses of MAGTF capabilities. The effectivenessof SIGINT depends on the ability to maintain se-curity and conceal SIGINT techniques and suc-cess from the adversary. Accordingly, thecommander must provide adequate protection toprevent the capture of SIGINT facilities and per-sonnel. In addition, special intelligence couriermust be adequately protected, and positive mea-sures must be taken to conceal courier runs androutes. To meet this responsibility, the MAGTcommander must satisfy the following four basisecurity requirements.

(1) A special security officer (SSO) must be ap-pointed in all units authorized to receive and useSCI. The SSO is under the staff cognizance of theunit intelligence officer and is responsible for theoperation of the SCIF and the security, control,and use of SCI within the SCIF. Marine expedi-tionary force (MEF) CEs, Marine divisions,Marine aircraft wings, force service supportgroups, and other designated organizations haveSSOs. Other SSOs may also be appointed as

needed during tactical operations or whenever aTSCIF is established.

(2) Sensitive compartmented information (SCgenerally must be handled, processed, or stoonly in a SCI facility (SCIF). This may be either mobile tactical SCIF (TSCIF) or a permanent fcility. SCI security requirements are discussedgreater detail in chapter 8.

(3) Persons who handle or use SIGINT informtion must have proper security clearances andindoctrinated for access to SCI and any additionrequired accesses. Access to SCI will be goverby need-to-know requirements. Unit commandeare responsible for determining who requires Saccess. At a minimum, all unit staff principals ankey functional planners should have SCI acces

(4) SCI-secure CIS means for handling and tranmitting special intelligence and SIGINT-relatedinformation must be available. These include SCvoice circuits, SCI record communications, SClocal area networks (LANs), and Joint WorldwidIntelligence Communications System (JWICS).

d. TrainingThe MAGTF commander is responsible for esuring that staff and operating forces are trainto effectively use SIGINT and to protect themselves against enemy SIGINT efforts.

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Chapter 2

SIGINT Responsibilities in the Supporting Establishment

RadBns and VMAQs are the principal SIGINTunits within the operating forces. These units areaddressed further in chapters 4 and 5. To effec-tively execute their missions, MAGTFs, RadBns,and VMAQs draw on a wide range of external or-ganizations to provide personnel and equipmenresources, training opportunities, and unique SIG-INT support. To understand how MAGTF SIG-INT operations can be supported externally, it isnecessary to understand the missions and func-tions of external SIGINT organizations and howthey provide operational support to the MAGTF.

2001. Marine Corps SIGINT Organization

a. Headquarters Marine Corps

Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) is responsi-ble for the internal organization, training, equip-ping, and readiness of the Marine Corps; for theoperation of its material support system; and forthe total performance of the Marine Corps. TheAssistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control,Communications, Computers, and IntelligenceDepartment (C4I), has the following SIGINT re-sponsibilities:

� Formulates Marine Corps SIGINT plans andpolicies and participates in the formulationof joint and combined plans, policies, andrelated command relationships.

� Determines present and future SIGINT ac-tive and reserve personnel requirements,both quantitative and qualitative.

� Provides final authority on validation andapproval of all personnel augmentation fromnon-Fleet Marine Force (FMF) resources tosupport MAGTF operations.

� Reviews the internal organization, trainingrequirements, and readiness of all SIGINelements of the Marine Corps. The internorganization of Marine Corps SIGINT elements is constantly reviewed, with particular emphasis on occupational field (OccFldmilitary occupational specialty (MOS) skillrequirements, to ensure requisite skills atraining are available to meet MAGTF opeational needs.

b. Marine Support BattalionThe Marine support battalion (MarSptBn) is special supporting activity that provides foMarine Corps participation in national and Department of the Navy (DON) cryptologic activities. (SIGINT operations within the Navy argenerally referred to as cryptologic operationsThis term may generally be used synonymouswith the term SIGINT.) Marines in MarSptBn areassigned to national and theater organizations tsupport both deployed and in-garrison MAGTFwith routine and time-sensitive, mission-criticaSIGINT support. Additionally, these Marineslearn national-level SIGINT collection, production, and dissemination systems and benefit froSIGINT skills training available only at thessites.

(1) Commanding Officer. The principal func-tions and tasks assigned to the CO, MarSptBn, clude the following:

� Coordinate the withdrawal of MarSptBnMarines to augment MAGTFs in responsto global-sourcing requests.

� Support Marine Corps SIGINT requirements through interface at the National Scurity Operations Center (NSOC) anregional secur i ty opera tions center

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(RSOCs). (Refer to paragraph 2003 for a de-tailed discussion of these organizations.)

� Manage and administer the reserve SIGINTprogram to provide augmentation to activeduty SIGINT forces.

� Provide for entry-level skills qualificationand skills progression training of MarineSIGINT personnel.

(2) Battalion Headquarters. The battalionheadquarters, collocated with Commander, NavalSecurity Group (CNSG), Fort Meade, Maryland,provides command, administrative, and MarineCorps-unique logistics support for the battalionand Marine Corps personnel in various Naval Se-curity Group (NSG). It is under the military com-man d and management co nt ro l o f th eCommandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and un-der the staff cognizance of the Assistant Chief ofStaff, C4I, HQMC.

(3) Letter Companies. MarSptBn’s letter com-panies support the naval mission of the Naval Se-curity Group Activity (NSGA) to which they areassigned as well as provide for the unique servicesupport of assigned Marines (see table 2-1). The

letter companies are under the military commaand administrative control of the CO, MarSptBwhile under the OPCON and technical directioof the CO of the NSGA site each supports.

(4) Company K. Company K, MarSptBn, pro-vides administration for Marine students and staassigned to the Naval Technological TraininCenter (NTTC), Pensacola, Florida, and providliaison and instructors in conjunction with SIGINT training.

2002. SIGINT Organizations in Other Military Services

Services man, train, and equip organic SIGINforces to support their operational commanderand to prepare to participate in joint, theater, ntional, and combined operations. Each Servihas a service cryptologic element (SCE) heaquarters that provides SIGINT managemenguidance, and oversight. The National SecurAgency (NSA) maintains SIGINT operationacontrol of each SCE.

Table 2-1. Marine Support Battalion Companies.

Company Site/Host Location

Headquarters Company NSG Ft. Meade, Maryland

Company A NSGA Denver Buckley Air National Guard Base, Aurora, Colorad

Company B NSG Ft. Meade, Maryland

Company D NSGA Ft. Gordon Ft. Gordon, Georgia

Company E NSGA Misawa Misawa Air Force Base (AFB), Japan

Company F1 NSGA Rota Rota, Spain

Company G NSGA Menwith Hill Royal Air Force Menwith Hill, England

Company H NSGA San Antonio Kelly AFB, San Antonio, Texas

Company I NSGA Kunia Kunia, Hawaii

Company K NTTC Corry Station Pensacola, Florida

Company L NSGA Guantanamo Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 1Company F is scheduled for deactivation 30 June 1999.


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a. Naval Security Group NSG is the DON’s SCE. It directly supports de-ployed MAGTFs by providing access to—

� SSES use with MAGTF SIGINT personnelwhile embarked.

� Direct support to MAGTF operations withNSG elements operating aboard Navy shipsor aircraft.

� Direct service support to MAGTF opera-tions from ashore NSG facilities in the the-ater of operations.

� Hardware, software, specialized equipment,and training to the RadBns.

� SIGINT technical support kits from region-ally focused cryptologic shore support activ-ities.

b. United States Army Intelligence and Security Command United States Army Intelligence and SecurityCommand (INSCOM) is the Army’s SCE. It pro-vides support to deployed MAGTFs when—

� Marines are part of a joint force that in-cludes Army SIGINT units.

� Marines are serving as part of a larger forcethat includes adjacent Army units.

� Army theater fixed-site activity or mobileSIGINT asset can provide support.

c. Air Intelligence Agency Air Force Intelligence Agency (AIA) is the AiForce’s SCE. Its elements support deployedMAGTFs by collecting and producing air intelli-gence or by providing SIGINT support for air andair defense operations.

2003. National SIGINT Organizations

a. National Security AgencyIn order to provide timely, effective SIGINT sup-port to military commanders, NSA establishedseveral tailored support mechanisms.

(1) National Security Operations Center.The NSOC supports JTF and MAGTF operationby providing SIGINT reporting derived from na-tional assets. The NSOC functions as the curroperations and crisis management center of NSA to ensure that time-sensitive SIGINT neeof commanders are satisfied. The NSOC worclosely with the National Military CommandCenter (NMCC) and other Department of Defen(DOD) I&W watch centers.

(2) Regional Security Operations Centers.NSA established three RSOCs to enhance SINT support to combatant commanders at all ecelons. RSOCs are regionally focused and receinputs from multiple sources. The RSOCs are lcated at Fort Gordon, Georgia; San AntoniTexas; and Kunia, Hawaii.

The following organizations are established each RSOC:

� NSG established a cryptologic shore suppactivity (CSSA) staffed with Marine andNavy personnel at each RSOC. CSSAs pvide direct support to naval tactical operations through interface with the RSOC. Thinterface allows greater tailoring of RSOCoperations supporting the intelligence rquirements of MAGTF operations. Principacommunications connectivity to CSSAs iprovided by Navy communications systemwithin SSES.

� INSCOM established a technical controand analysis element (TCAE) at each of tRSOC locations. CSSA Marine personninterface with TCAE personnel to providground-oriented intelligence information insupport of the MAGTF. Communicationconnectivity with the TCAEs is providedgenerally via the Trojan Spirit II communi-cations system organic to the RadBns communications battalions.

b. National Reconnaissance OfficeThe National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) prvides critical support to United States SIGINoperations. NRO’s mission is to enable UniteStates global information superiority during pea

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and war. NRO is responsible for unique and inno-vative technology, large-scale systems engineer-ing, development and acquisition, and operationof space reconnaissance systems and related intel-ligence activities to support global informationsuperiority. NRO’s capabilities include support-ing I&W, monitoring arms control agreementsand supporting military operations. The NRO ac-

complishes its mission through ongoing researand development, acquisition, and operation spaceborne and airborne intelligence data colltion systems. NRO assets and capabilities mayrequested to support MAGTF operations undprocedures described in the Joint Tactical Exploi-tation of National Systems (J-TENS) Manual.

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Chapter 3

SIGINT Responsibilities in the MAGTF

The MAGTF commander is ultimately responsi-ble for the conduct of MAGTF SIGINT opera-tions. The MAGTF commander’s staff, majorsubordinate commands (MSCs), specialized units,and theater or national level organizations assistthe commander in execution of SIGINT responsi-bilities. This chapter focuses on the roles and re-sponsibilities of Marine operating forces’ staffs,MSCs, and specialized units.

3001. Commanders, Marine Corps Forces

Commanders, Marine Corps forces (COMMAR-FORs), are responsible for using their organicSIGINT assets effectively and for ensuring re-sponsive national and theater support to subordi-nate commands. COMMARFORs—

� Review and validate SIGINT support re-quests from subordinate commands and en-sure they receive the tailored support theyrequire.

� Review and comment on cryptologic sup-port plans (CSPs) prepared by NSA and the-ater combatant commanders for MAGTFoperation plans (OPLANs).

� Coordinate SIGINT issues and requirementswith the theater and national agencies insupport of Marine Corps forces (MAR-FOR).

� Coordinate with theater and national SIG-INT and all-source intelligence agencies andorganizations to support MARFORs.

� Review, exercise, and if necessary, develop,interoperable CIS architectures to supportthe SIGINT effort.

� Coordinate between MARFOR and theirsubordinate commands to improve SIGINTinteroperability, standardization, prepared-ness, and performance.

3002. MAGTF Staff Sections

a. G-2/S-2All MAGTF intelligence and counterintelligenceactivities, to include SIGINT, are under the stacognizance of the unit G-2/S-2. Within thbounds of the commander’s SOTA, the G-2/S-2responsible for planning, directing, managinand supervising the tasking and operationsSIGINT units organic to and supporting thMAGTF. The G-2/S-2—

� Develops and satisfies outstanding PIRs aIRs by planning, directing, integrating, ansupervising organic SIGINT operations another MAGTF all-source intelligence operations.

� Prepares MAGTF SIGINT plans and order

� Coordinates SIGINT collection (to includeSIGINT amplifications and SIGINT timesensitive requirements), production, and dsemination requirements that are beyond tcapability of the MAGTF and submits themto higher headquarters for JTF, theater,national SIGINT support.

� Ensures routine and time-sensitive SIGINinformation is rapidly processed, analyzeand incorporated in all-source intelligencproducts, and rapidly disseminates this iformation to MAGTF and external units.

� Evaluates JTF, theater, and national SIGINsupport to the MAGTF and adjusts stated rquirements if necessary.

� Identifies, validates, and assists with resoltion of SIGINT personnel and equipment re-sources deficiencies (e.g., insufficienlinguists and special signal analysts expetise).

� Incorporates SIGINT in training exercises timprove MAGTF individual, collective, andunit readiness.

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b. G-1/S-1The manpower or personnel staff officer (G-1/S-1) is responsible for all SIGINT personnel re-quirements. Often it is necessary to augment or-ganic SIGINT units with specially-trainedpersonnel from outside the command. The G-1S-1 either internally sources or forwards person-nel augmentation requests developed by the G-2/S-2 to higher headquarters for action.

c. G-3/S-3The G-3/S-3 is responsible for planning, coordi-nating, and supervising the tactical employmenof units. The G-3/S-3 coordinates the movementand operations of SIGINT units with the G-2/S-2 for integration in current and future operationsplanning. Because SIGINT units also provide cer-tain EW capabilities, the G-3/S-3, normally viathe electronic warfare officer (EWO), coordinatesSIGINT units’ tactical positioning to provide tac-tical EW and command and control warfare(C2W) support. Normally, as the principal stafSIGINT user, the G-3/S-3 has the primary respon-sibility for planning maneuver operations and firesupport, which requires close coordinationthroughout the planning process to ensure effec-tive SIGINT support.

d. G-4/S-4The logistics staff officer (G-4/S-4) is responsiblefor the combat service support (CSS) of MAGTFSIGINT units. To ensure the required support iavailable, the G-4/S-4 develops CSS arrange-ments to meet the needs of the deployed SIGINTunits (particularly SIGINT units’ unique equip-ment logistics requirements).

e. G-6/S-6The G-6/S-6 is responsible for providing and pro-tecting internal and external MAGTF CIS con-nectivity and operations. The G-6/S-6—

� Coordinates or provides communicationpaths, network accesses, and frequencies forSIGINT organizations attached to and/orsupporting the command.

� Provides representation for CIS matterswithin the EWCC, when it is established.

� Assists the unit security manager and G-3S-3 in promoting personnel awareness enemy SIGINT threat capabilities, signasecurity training, and unit signals securitypreparedness.

3003. MAGTF Intelligence Section Elements

The MAGTF intelligence section, resident in thMAGTF CE, is the focal point for MAGTF SIG-INT planning and direction and is supported bthe combat intelligence center (CIC). Dependinon the size of the MAGTF, operational requirments or other factors, the CIC may consist onumber of subordinate elements.

a. Combat Intelligence CenterThe CIC is established within the MAGTF CEPerforming the primary functions of the MAGTFintelligence section, the CIC includes the following subelements.

(1) All-Source Fusion Center The AFC is theprimary MAGTF analysis and productionelement. It processes and produces all-sourcetelligence products in response to MAGTF rquirements.

(2) Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cen-ter. The surveillance and reconnaissance cen(SARC) is the primary element for the supervsion of MAGTF collection operations. It directscoordinates, and monitors intelligence collectionoperations conducted by organic, attached, anddirect support collection assets.

(3) Operations Control and Analysis Cen-ter. The OCAC is the main node for the command and control of RadBn SIGINT operationand the overall coordination of MAGTF SIGINToperations. It processes, analyzes, produces, adisseminates SIGINT-derived information and drects the ground-based EW activities of thRadBn.


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b. Intelligence Section and SIGINT Unit Commanders and Officers in Charge

(1) Intelligence Operations Officer. The in-telligence operations officer is responsible to theG-2/S-2 for the overall planning and execution ofMAGTF all-source intelligence operations. Theintelligence operations officer—

� Plans and implements a concept of intelli-gence operations based upon the missionthreat, commander’s intent, and concept ofoperations.

� Develops, consolidates, validates, and prior-itizes recommended PIRs and IRs to supportMAGTF planning and operations.

� Plans, develops, and directs MAGTF intelli-gence collections, production, and dissemi-nation plans, to include the effectiveemployment and integration of MAGTFmultidiscipline intelligence and reconnais-sance operations.

� Coordinates and integrates MAGTF intelli-gence operations with other components,JTF, theater, and national intelligence oper-ations.

� Evaluates and improves MAGTF intelli-gence operations.

(2) SIGINT Officer. The SIO is responsible tothe MAGTF G-2/S-2 for the planning, direction,and execution of MAGTF SIGINT operations.The SIO—

� Coordinates with other intelligence sectionstaff officers, the RadBn CO or OIC, and theACE G-2/S-2 (for VMAQ TERPES opera-tions) to prepare SIGINT plans and orderfor the MAGTF.

� Coordinates with the collection manage-ment officer and RadBn and VMAQ TERP-ES planners to coordinate, plan, supervise,and assist SIGINT collection requirementand taskings for MAGTF operations.

� Coordinates with the SARC OIC, RadBnCO or OIC, VMAQ TERPES OIC, and G-3/

S-3 to coordinate the movement, operatioand reporting of SIGINT units.

� Coordinates with MAGTF AFC OIC,RadBn CO or OIC, and VMAQ TERPESOIC to coordinate MAGTF AFC analyst exchanges with RadBn TERPES COMINand ELINT analysts and to coordinate thintegration of SIGINT with all-source intel-ligence production.

� Coordinates with the dissemination officeto plan for the timely reporting of SIGINT-derived intelligence to MAGTF and externaelements and the rapid handling of perisable SIGINT information.

� Coordinates with the G-6/S-6, Marine division (MARDIV) OICs, Marine aircraft wing(MAW) special security communicationsteams (SSCTs), and SIGINT unit OICs tplan and coordinate special intelligenccommunications paths and operations.

� Assists the intelligence operations officewith preparing and presenting special inteligence briefings and reports as required.

(3) Special Security Officer. The SSO is re-sponsible to the commander for ensuring the comand’s adherence to SCI regulations and policsecurity clearance procedures, and SCI matehandling. Generally, the SSO is the unit’s senintelligence officer. The SSO—

� Establishes and/or maintains a SCIF TSCIFs to support SIGINT and other compartmented operations.

� Ensures that the command and all subordnate organizations have sufficient SCI blets to meet all potential operationarequirements, to include the administratioand management of unit SCI billets and SCsecurity investigations.

� Provides oversight, training, and supportinprocedures for the conduct of SCI sanitization and dissemination within the MAGTFThis inc ludes the dete rminat ion oapplicable authority for sanitization and authorized recipients of the sanitized materia

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(4) Collections Management Officer. Thecollections management officer (CMO) is respon-sible for formulating detailed ICRs and taskingand coordinating internal and external collectionoperations to satisfy the requirements. The CMOreceives PIRs and IRs from the intelligence oper-ations officer and develops an integrated collec-tion plan using organic and supporting resources.

In coordination with the SIO and SIGINT unitCOs or OICs, the CMO—

� Determines and coordinates ICRs that maybe tasked to organic or supporting SIGINTelements.

� Identifies ICRs and prepares requests for in-telligence that are beyond organic capabili-ties and that must be submitted to higherheadquarters and external agencies for satis-faction.

(5) MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center Of-ficer in Charge. The MAGTF AFC OIC isprimarily responsibile for managing and super-vising the MAGTF’s all-source intelligence pro-duction and processing effort. The MAGTF AFCOIC—

� Determines and coordinates MAGTF IPRs,to include SIGINT element products as wellas all-source intelligence products.

� Maintains all-source automated intelligencedata bases, files, workbooks, country stud-ies, planning imagery, mapping and topo-graphic resources, and other references.

� Administers, operates, and maintains intelli-gence processing and production systemsboth general service (GENSER) and SCI,e.g., joint deployable intelligence supportsystem (JDISS) and intelligence analysissystem (IAS).

� Analyzes and fuses all-source intelligenceinto tailored products in response to statedor anticipated PIRs and IRs, to include sani-tized SCI products.

� Develops and maintains current and futureintelligence situational, threat and environ-mental assessments, and target intelligence

based upon all-source analysis, interpretion, and integration.

(6) Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cen-ter Officer in Charge. The SARC OIC is re-sponsible for coordinating and supervising texecution of the integrated organic, attached adirect support intelligence collection, and reconnaissance operations. The SARC OIC—

� Maintains the status of the following ongoing intelligence collection operations, to include deployed RadBn collection andirection finding teams:� Mission of all teams.� Locations and times of all restricted fire

areas and reconnaissance areas of opetions.

� Time and method of radio reconnaissanteam (RRT) insertion and extraction.

� Primary and alternate communicationsplans.

� Time of last contact.� Time of next contact.

� Coordinates and monitors the insertion anextraction of SIGINT and other intelligencelements.

� Coordinates RadBn and VMAQ TERPEelements’ collection and reporting activitieunder the overall intelligence operationplan. Ensures SIGINT elements understathe collection plan and are able to carry otheir responsibilities under the plan.

� Ensures other MAGTF C2 nodes (e.g., thcurrent operations center, the fire suppocoordination center) are apprised of ongoiintelligence and reconnaissance operations.

� Receives routine and time-sensitive intellgence reports from deployed SIGINT colection teams; cross-cues or exchangintelligence reports with other intelligencecollectors, as appropriate; and rapidly dis-seminates intelligence to MAGTF C2 nodeand others in accordance with intelligencreporting criteria and dissemination plans.

(7) Dissemination Officer. The disseminationofficer is responsible for the effective conduct o


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intelligence dissemination within the MAGTF.The dissemination officer—

� Determines and coordinates MAGTF IDRs,to include all-source IDRs as well as intelli-gence discipline-unique requirements.

� Recommends dissemination priorities.� Advises on and selects dissemination means.� Develops intelligence dissemination plans

and coordinates with the G-6/S-6 supportingCIS architectures for both voice and datanetworked communications. Coordinatesand integrates these plans and architectureswith theater, joint force, and MAGTF CISand intelligence plans and architectures.

� Monitors the flow and ensures timely deliv-ery of intelligence throughout the MAGTF.

(8) SIGINT Unit Commanding Officer orOfficer in Charge. The SIGINT unit CO orOIC is responsible for the effective conduct oSIGINT operations in support of the command-er’s intent and the operational and intelligenceconcept of operations. The SIGINT unit COor OIC—

� Plans and employs SIGINT resources in re-sponse to the commander’s intent, threat sit-uation, MAGTF G-2/S-2’s guidance adirection, and intelligence operations plan.

� Effects technical direction and control ofMAGTF organic SIGINT collection, pro-cessing and exploitation, production, anddissemination operations. Also helps coor-dinate MAGTF SIGINT operations withJTF, theater, national, and other ServiceSIGINT agencies.

� Coordinates movement and operations ofSIGINT units with MAGTF staff elementand subordinate units’ commanders. En-sures that all element movements are coor-d ina ted wi th the COC, f i re supportcoordination center (FSCC), and SARC.

� Advises the G-2/S-2, SIO, intelligence opeations officer, MAGTF AFC OIC, CMO,and dissemination officer on SIGINT employment and its integration with JTF, theater, and national SIGINT operations.

3004. Marine Divisions and Aircraft Wings

SIGINT activities of the MARDIVs and MAWscome under the staff cognizance of the respectG-2s. This includes the integration of SIGINT operations and products in support of unit operationsand the operations of their organic SSCT. SSCprovide special intelligence (SI) communicationsupport to their commanders and designated sordinate elements.

3005. Radio Battalions

The 1st and 2d RadBns are the Marine Corpprincipal organic, tactical, SIGINT direct suppoelements. The primary mission of the RadBn aits detachments is to provide tactical SIGINT suport to MAGTFs. RadBns are discussed furtherchapter 4.

3006. VMAQs

VMAQs of Marine aircraft group (MAG)-14 per-form airborne electronic reconnaissance anthrough the use of TERPES, produce ELINT rports and electronic order of battle (EOB) intellgence. Due to the unique capabilities of TERPEthe ACE will often be tasked with producing anmaintaining the EOB to be used by all MAGTelements. VMAQs are discussed in chapter 5.

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CHAPTER 4

Radio Battalion

The mission of radio battalions is to provide com-munications security (COMSEC) monitoring, tac-tical SIGINT, EW, and SI communication supportto the MAGTF.

4001. Tasks

The radio battalion—

� Conducts interception, radio direction find-ing (DF), recording, and analysis of commu-nications and noncommunications signalsand SIGINT processing, analysis, produc-tion, and reporting.

� Conducts EW against enemy or other hostilecommunications.

� Assists in the protection of MAGTF com-munications from enemy exploitation byconducting COMSEC monitoring, analysis,and reporting on friendly force communica-tions.

� Provides SI communications support andcryptographic guard (personnel and terminalequipment) in support of MAGTF commandelements and RadBn operations. (Normally,communications connectivity for SI com-munications is provided by the communica-tions unit supporting the MAGTF CE.)

� Provides task-organized detachments toMAGTFs with designated SIGINT, EW, SIcommunications, and other required capa-bilities.

� Exercises technical control and directionover MAGTF RadBn SIGINT and EW op-erations.

� Provides RRT with specialized insertion andextraction capabilities (e.g., combat rubberraiding craft, fast rope, rappel, helocast, stat-ic line parachute) to provide specified SIG-INT and EA support during advance force,preassault, or deep postassault operations.

� Coordinates technical SIGINT requiremenand exchanges SIGINT technical information and material with national, theaterjoint, and other SIGINT units.

� Provides intermediate, third- and fourthechelon maintenance of RadBn SIGINT anEW equipment.

4002. Organization

The 1st RadBn, Marine Corps Base (MCBKaneohe Bay, Hawaii, is subordinate to Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (COMMARFORPAC), and supports both I and IIMEFs. The 2d RadBn, Camp Lejeune, NortCarolina, is subordinate to II MEF. Both battaions are organized and equipped along functiolines to provide administrative control of subordnate elements, to facilitate training, and to permrapid structuring and operational deployment task-organized units or detachments.

The 1st RadBn is organized into a headquartand service (H&S) company and three line companies (A, B, and C). The 2d RadBn is comprisof an H&S company and two line companies (and B). See figure 4-1 on page 4-2. RadBns’ licompanies are not tactical organizations, but istead they serve as training and administratunits providing the basic unit structure arounwhich task-organized SIGINT support units odetachments are trained, equipped, and formEven if the entire RadBn were to deploy, it woutask-organize for the mission assigned.

a. Headquarters and Service CompanyThe H&S company provides personnel and facities with which the RadBn commander commands and controls battalion operations. It alprovides service support for other battalio

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elements. Those tasks are accomplished by H&Sstaff sections (i.e., S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, and S-6) andthe following specialized platoons.

(1) Operations Control and Analysis Pla-toon. The operations control and analysis (OCA)platoon provides the Marines and equipment toperform RadBn operational planning and direc-tion and SIGINT production, analysis, and report-ing operations. Additionally, it is the nucleus forthe RadBn OCAC during tactical operations.

(2) Communications Platoon. The communi-cations platoon provides Marines and equipmentto conduct special security communications oper-ations in support of RadBn and, when deployed,MAGTF CE operations. Additionally, the platoonis equipped to support RadBn’s internal commu-nications requirements.

(3) Radio Reconnaissance Platoon. The ra-dio reconnaissance platoon (RRP) providtrained RRTs for operations during advance forcpreassault, or other operations where the emplment of conventional RadBn teams may be inappropriate or unfeasible.

(4) Electronic Maintenance Platoon. Theelectronic maintenance platoon provides upfourth-echelon maintenance support on RadBunique equipment and second-echelon supportMarine Corps common communications and eletronics equipment.

(5) Mobile Electronic Warfare SupportSystem Platoon. Using a light armored vehicle(LAV) variant platform, the mobile electronicwarfare support system (MEWSS) platoon provides Marines and equipment capable of SIGIN

Figure 4-1. Radio Battalion Organization.


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collection, DF, reporting, and communicationjamming operations.

b. Operational Companies Each RadBn operational company has a table oforganization (T/O) of 5 officers and 100 enlistedMarines organized into a company headquarters,EA platoon, voice collection and DF platoon, andnonvoice or ELINT collection platoon. Duringtactical operations, the company will be task-organized or reinforced with battalion assets con-sistent with the threat, mission, commander’sintent, and intelligence concept of operations.

4003. Task Organization for MAGTF Operations SIGINT Support Unit

An entire RadBn will support a MEF operationTo support smaller MAGTFs, the RadBn’s tacti-cal organization is the task-organized SIGINTsupport unit (SSU). The SSU may be as large asan operational company (minus or reinforced) oras small as a four-Marine team. The RadBn orga-nization enables the rapid structuring and opera-tional deployment of task-organized SSUs.

a. SIGINT Support Unit StructureA fully structured SSU containing all the capabili-ties found in the RadBn is comprised of six basicelements (see figure 4-2). The nature of the threat,specific mission tasking, and intelligence and op-

erational requirements determine the compositiand equipment of each element.

(1) Command Element. The RadBn CO wdesignate an OIC and/or a staff noncommissionofficer in charge (SNCOIC) for each SSU. Thcommand element is comprised of the personand facilities to command and control the SSFor smaller SSUs, the command element mayintegrated within the operations control and anysis element with an OIC or an operations officenoncommissioned officer in charge or an opertions chief, and sufficient resources for commanand control of the SSU operations. When the mjority of the battalion deploys, the command elment consists of the battalion commandeexecutive officer, sergeant major, and sufficiepersonnel for command and administrative suport.

(2) Operations Control and Analysis Ele-ment. The SSU’s command and control, analsis, production, and dissemination functions aexecuted within the OCAC. The OCAC performthe SIGINT processing, analysis, exploitatioproduction, and reporting of signals intelligencproducts and information. Additionally, it is theprinciple element that coordinates with other intelligence nodes to plan, direct, and integraSIGINT operations with other intelligence and reconnaissance operations. Marines assigned to element include the operations watch officers operations watch chiefs, COMINT and ELINanalysts, translators or transcribers, and SIGIreport writers.

Figure 4-2. SIGINT Support Unit Elements.

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(3) Collection and Direction Finding Ele-ment. The collection and DF element is com-prised of SIGINT support teams (SSTs) and othercollection elements consisting of Marines andequipment for conducting SSU SIGINT collec-tion and DF operations. Personnel assigned to thiselement include SIGINT linguists (or voice inter-cept operators), manual-Morse, non-Morse, andELINT collection and DF operators, and supervi-sory personnel. Additionally, this element maycontain MEWSS- or RRT-capable SSTs if themission or situation warrants.

(4) Electronic Attack Element. The EA ele-ment is comprised of the Marines and equipmentto conduct EA operations. Personnel assigned tothis element include EA supervisors or controllersand EA operators.

(5) Special Intelligence CommunicationsElement. The SI communications element in-stalls and operates the SI or special security com-munications terminals for the SSU and theMAGTF CE. In addition, the SI communicationselement will install and operate SCI-level LANsystems to support SSU operations. The systemsinstalled will depend on the mission, intelligenceand CIS operations concepts, connectivity re-quirements, and terminal equipment availability.Personnel assigned to this element include com-munications supervisory personnel, informationsystems security and system administrators, andcommunications operators.

(6) Service Support Element. The servicesupport element provides limited supply, engi-neers, electronic maintenance, and medical sup-port to the SSU. The SSU depends on theMAGTF combat service support element (CSSE)for most of its combat service support. Marineassigned to the service support element may in-clude medical, electronic maintenance, motortransport, engineer, supply, and administrativepersonnel.

b. SIGINT Support Unit Task-Organizational ConsiderationsSSUs are task-organized from resources availablethroughout the RadBn and are tailored to the re-

quirements of the supported commander. TSSU’s specific size and composition will also binfluenced by threat and environmental factoknown or expected to be encountered in the tended area of operations. The following factomust be considered when task-organizing an S

(1) Enemy Signals Environment. The primefactor in determining the size, composition, ancapabilities of an SSU is the known or anticipatenemy signals environment. Enemy factors consider are—

� Target power output and frequency range.� Digital or analog signals.� Modulation techniques.� Target signal operating instructions (i.e., s

phisticated or complex).� Target emitters (i.e., number, type, and de

sity).

(2) Physical Environment. Terrain, climate,vegetation, and the operations area size influenthe size and composition of the SSU.

(3) Operational Environment. Among factorsthat must be considered are—

� The military and political situation.� The adversary’s—

� Size.� Composition.� Disposition.� C2 and CIS operations.� Doctrine, tactics, techniques, and proce

dures.� The friendly force’s—

� Composition.� Commander’s intent.� Operational and intelligence concepts.� Task organization.� Mobility.

c. SIGINT Support Unit Operations Watch StructureThe SSU must be capable of sustained, 24-hoperations. SSU elements, excepting the serv


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support element, are normally employed in two orthree watch sections. In large SSUs, each watchsection may have an officer and/or a staff non-commissioned officer (SNCO) assigned as an op-erations watch officer (OWO) or operations watchchief (OWC). In smaller SSUs, this function maybe performed by a noncommissioned officer(NCO).

4004. Command and Control

a. Command Relationships

(1) Operational Control. The MAGTF com-mander with SOTA has OPCON of RadBn, whichis exercised by the MAGTF G-2/S-2 and executedby the RadBn OIC.

(2) Administrative Control. Administrativecontrol (ADCON) of RadBn SSUs is exercised bythe unit to which the SSU is attached (in most cas-es the MAGTF CE).

(3) SIGINT Technical Control. SIGINT tech-nical control (TECHCON) of United States SIG-INT system assets, to include RadBn SSUs, isalways retained by DIRNSA who delegates SO-TA to MAGTF commanders. This means thatwithin the MAGTF, the MAGTF commanderwith SOTA generally retains, coordinates, and ex-ercises SIGINT TECHCON regardless of anyother C2 relationships established for the opera-tion (e.g., RadBn elements attached to or placedin direct support of MAGTF subordinate ele-ments).

b. Support RelationshipsThe MAGTF commander may establish variousupport relationships between the SSU andMAGTF subordinate elements when one organi-zation should aid, protect, complement, or sustainanother unit. The nature of the support relation-ship will be specified by a directive (e.g., annex Bof the operations order) which should detail—

� Forces and other resources allocated to thesubordinate element of the SSU.

� Time, place, level, and duration of the SSsupport effort.

� Priority of the SSU supporting effort.� Command relationships and degree of au

thority granted to the supported command

The two most common support relationships fSSUs are general and direct support.

(1) General Support General support (GS) isaction given to the MAGTF as a whole rather thto a particular subordinate element. Given the nture of SIGINT operations, GS is the most common support re la t ionsh ip used fo r SSoperations.

(2) Direct Support. Direct support (DS) is amission requiring a force to support another spcific force and authorizing it to answer directlythe supported force’s requests for assistanWhen required by the mission and situation, ements of a SSU may be placed in DS of MAGTsubordinate elements (e.g., elements of the Sin DS of the GCE).

4005. Notional Concepts of Employment and Task Organizations

The mission, enemy or other potentially hostileelements, and operational environment will aways influence the composition and employmeof SIGINT assets, as will logistics concerns suas footprint or airlift availability. To serve as aplanning departure point, RadBns have developnotional SSU packages and concepts of emplment which will be refined as mission and advesary details become known. (Appendix A, RadBattalion SIGINT Support Unit Checklist, is provided as an SSU operations planning guide.) Tlevels of RadBn support can range from electroic collocation with the supported unit to an entirRadBn (minus or reinforced) deploying with MEF as indicated by the following examples. It important to note that no specific RadBn SSmay ever match exactly the following notionadescriptions due to task organization, personne

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equipment availability, and mission and threatconsiderations.

a. Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) SIGINT Support UnitThe SSU concept of employment is dependent onthe Marine expeditionary unit’s (MEU) mission,threat, and planned concept of operations. TheSSU is attached to the CE and almost always isemployed in general support of the MEU (specialoperations capable [SOC]).

Generally, MEU(SOC) SSUs consist of 1 officeras the OIC, possibly another officer as the assis-tant OIC, and 20 or more enlisted Marines (to nor-mally include at least one RRT). Table 4-1provides a notional MEU(SOC) SSU T/O.

b. Fly-In EchelonThe fly-in echelon (FIE) is integrated and tasorganized to provide immediate SIGINT, EWand SI communications in support of lead elments of a MAGTF or to reinforce MEU(SOCSSU capabilities. The FIE serves as the fountion for the buildup of SIGINT assets as required.Figure 4-3 illustrates a notional FIE configuration. The FIE generally consists of 2 officers an18 to 30 enlisted Marines. Table 4-2 providestypical FIE T/O. The FIE is under the operationacontrol of the MAGTF commander who exerciseSOTA. Initial operations will be in general sup-port of MAGTF requirements. As the situatiomatures and the mission and associated taskscome clearer, the task organization and commarelationships of the FIE or SSU elements may modified to provide direct support to designatemajor subordinate elements (MSEs).

Figure 4-3. Notional SSU Fly-In Echelon Configuration.


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c. Marine Expeditionary Force SupportFor detailed SIGINT support information regarding a specific MEF operation, refer to the CSand annex B of the OPLAN for that operatioThe following is a discussion of RadBn support ofa notional MEF operation.

Table 4-1. Notional MEU(SOC) SSU T/O.

Billet Rank MOS

H&S Support Elemen

OIC Capt 0202/0206

Assistant OIC Lt 0206

SNCOIC GySgt 2621/2629

Electronic maintenancetechnicia

Cpl 2841

SI CIS chief Sgt 2651

LAV mechanic LCpl-Sgt

2147

OCA Element

Processing and reporting chief

SSgt 2621/2629

ELINT analyst Sgt 2631

Signals analyst Sgt 2621/2629

Collection/DF Team #1 (MEWSS capable)

Team leader SSgt 2621/2629

Linguist or voice intercept operator

Sgt 267X


Cpl 267X

Manual morse or DF operator

LCpl 2621

EA operator LCpl 2621

Collection/DF Team #2 (Helo capable)

Team leader Sgt 2621/2629


Cpl 267X


LCpl 267X

Collection or DF operator LCpl 2621

Collection/DF Team #3 (RRT capable


Assistant team leader Sgt 267X


Cpl 267X


LCpl 267X

Collection or DF operator Cpl 2621

Collection or DF operator LCpl 2621

Table 4-2. Notional Fly-In Echelon T/O.

Billet Rank MOS

H&S Support Elemen

OIC Capt 0202/0206

SNCOIC MSgt 2691

Electronic maintenancetechnicia

Sgt 2841

SI Communications Element

Communications chief SSgt 2651

Trojan Spirit operator1 Sgt 2651

Trojan Spirit operator LCpl 2651

Communications operator Cpl 2651

Communications operator LCpl 2651

OCA Elemen

Operations officer Lt 0206

Senior analyst GySgt 267X/2629

Analyst SSgt 2621/2629

Analyst Sgt 2621/2629

Signals chief SSgt 2621/2629

Signals analyst Sgt 2621

Signals analyst Cpl 2621

ELINT analyst Sgt 2631

ELINT analyst LCpl 2631

Collection/DF Element



Sgt 267X


Cpl 267X

Collection or DF operator Cpl 2621

12nd RadBn does not have Trojan Spirit

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(1) Concept of Operations A MEF-level op-eration is supported by the RadBn (minus or rein-forced. It could be minus because prior committedRadBn assets, such as MEU SSUs, were unavail-able. It could be reinforced because some level ofpersonnel or equipment augmentation from theother RadBn, MarSptBn, and/or Marine Corpsunits might be required.

(2) Concept of Employment. The RadBntask-organizes and employs its companies andteams to best support the MEF by—

� Deploying collection or DF teams for im-proved target signals access and operationalsupport to forward MAGTF units.

� Collocating RadBn’s C2 node with theMAGTF G-2/S-2’s CIC and operating with-in the integrated intelligence concept of op-erations in GS of the MAGTF.

� Focusing on tasked PIRs and IRs and pro-viding required support to all six intelli-gence functions.

� Disseminating time-sensitive SIGINT prod-ucts to subordinate MAGTF units when re-quired by the tactical situation.

� Providing OCAC liaison teams (OLTs) tothe lead elements of the MEF, its MSEs andadjacent units as required; and providingSIGINT support elements (SSEs) and SSTswith mobile MAGTF units.

� Providing security and CIS for all internalRadBn requirements and for specifiedMAGTF CE support.

� Integrating operations with other MAGTFintelligence units to support cueing of otherintelligence and reconnaissance collectionelements, all-source intelligence production,and other mutual support.

(3) Company Command Element. One of thekeys to effective MEF support is the placemenand use of the company command elements(CCEs). The CCEs are normally collocated withthe GCE or MAGTF-subordinate task force head-quarters depending on the mission and threat.

The CCE—

� Provides I&W support to the supportedcommanders.

� Coordinates location, operations, and suport of SSTs with supported units and othforward-deployed intelligence and reconnaissance units.

� Serves as the C2, communications, anSIGINT-tasking channel between thOCAC and forward-deployed SST as required.

� Provides company liaison teams (CLTs) adjacent and subordinate units as required

� Provides or arranges for SST administrtion, logistic, and physical security support

� Provides SIGINT tasking and direction oSSTs when the OCAC is unable to providtasking and direction.

d. Radio Reconnaissance TeamsRRTs are six-Marine teams trained in special sert or extract means and basic amphibious recnaissance capabilities. This additional traininmakes the RRT capable of advance force, presault, deep postassault, and maritime special ppose force (MSPF) SIGINT missions as assigneRRTs support the six intelligence functions. Additionally, they may be tasked to conduct SIGINTsignals search and data base development in oto enhance understanding of threat operations or to the arrival of other SSU forces. In an avance force role, RRTs may be employed to—

� Provide SIGINT-derived I&W intelligencesupport to advance forces.

� Provide SIGINT collection and reporting inareas not accessible to conventional SSTs.

� Provide SIGINT collection and reporting insupport of assault and landing forces.

� Provide collection of unique signals. Uniqus ignals are signals expected to havintelligence value that cannot be collectedby other reasonable means (e.g., low-poered UHF communications).

� Conduct threat signals search and data badevelopment.


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e. Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System SIGINT Support TeamThe principal advantage of a MEWSS SST is itshigh mobility, light armored protection, allowingit to maintain operations and provide direct sup-port of similarly equipped ground combat elementunits. The employment of MEWSS vehicles re-quires close coordination with both the G-2/S-2and G-3/S-3 as the MEWSS provides the onlyground-based ELINT collection and the majorground-based communications EA capabilities or-ganic to the MAGTF. The COMINT capabilitiesof the MEWSS are similar to that of any SST.

f. Aviation SIGINT Support TeamThe aviation SSTs capabilities are similar to thoseof other SSTs. Its principal advantage is the abili-ty to operate aboard Marine aviation platforms(e.g., helicopters). Aviation SSTs can provideSIGINT support to air and airborne units duringmissions such as deep raids and tactical recoveryof aircraft and personnel operations or when theMAGTF commander needs immediate I&W ac-cessible only by airborne SIGINT collection ele-ments. The use of airborne SIGINT operationprovides supporting SSTs with the ability to col-lect and exploit threat signals from extended rang-es. The basic aviation SST is task-organizedconsistent with the mission and supported force’srequirements. Generally, an aviation SST consistsof RadBn Marines with a COMINT receiver, in-telligence broadcast receiver, communicationsjammer, and UHF satellite communications radio.

g. Operations Control and Analysis Center Liaison TeamAn OLT supports the intelligence effort ofMAGTF subordinate elements (e.g., ACE orCSSE headquarters or rear area operations cen-ter). OLTs collocate with the G-2/S-2 of the sup-ported unit operating from within its TSCIF. TheOLT is task-organized out of available SSU assetsin tactical support of the organization to which itis assigned. This assignment could be for a specif-ic operation, phase, or for the duration of a con-flict. Primarily, OLTs provide additional SIGINT

C2 support and CIS connectivity for tactical SIGINT planning, production, and reporting with thMAGTF G-2/S-2 and RadBn OCAC. OLTs expedite, simplify, and coordinate the sharing of SIGINT I&W, technical data, taskings, and productNormally, the OLT monitors RadBn collectionteams and theater SIGINT reporting communictions to provide the supported unit access to taccal and operational-level SIGINT and I&Wintelligence. In most cases, an OLT will consisof at least one officer and three enlisted Marinwith supporting CIS equipment.

h. Company Liaison TeamA CLT is task-organized with available assets best satisfy the requirements of the organizatior unit to which it is assigned (e.g., an infantbattalion). This assignment is normally for a spcific duration or operational phase. In most casea CLT will consist of one SNCO and one to threadditional enlisted Marines. Like the OLT, thCLT expedites SIGINT I&W to local decisionmakers and assists with SST employment, task-ing, and support.

i. Augmentation and CompositionDue to the low density of many SIGINT skills anequipment and the high tempo of operations, tRadBns may lack sufficient personnel with threquisite skills or SIGINT equipment with thenecessary capabilities for a particular operatioRadBns are reinforced with personnel and SIINT equipment by augmenting and compositing

For a small number of personnel requirements, dividual augmentation often works best. Witconcurrence from the supported organization, tRadBn will forward a request for SIGINT personnel augmentation to CMC (C4I or CIS) via thCOMMARFOR (G-1/G-2). Once the request received at CMC, it will be validated and forwarded to CNSG and MarSptBn. MarSptBn wattempt to satisfy the request with active andreserve Marines from the battalion. Any portioof the request that MarSptBn can not satisfy wbe returned to CMC (C4I/CIS) for sourcing fromother Marine Corps units or other sources.

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For significant numbers of personnel and equip-ment in support of a large operation or major re-gional contingency, elements may be compositedfrom one RadBn with the other RadBn. Coordina-tion between the RadBns should be continuous in

the development of contingency plans (CONPLANs), OPLANs, and CSPs to ensure mutuunderstanding and validation of requirements ainformation (e.g., time-phased force deploymedata).

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Chapter 5

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons

Marine aviation performs six functions: offensiveair support (OAS), antiair warfare (AAW), assaultsupport, aerial reconnaissance, EW, and C2 of air-craft and missiles. VMAQs provide the MAGTFand other designated forces with EW support. TheVMAQ also has an inherent capability to performvisual and electronic air reconnaissance. Electron-ic reconnaissance is the detection, identification,evaluation, and location of foreign electromagnet-ic radiation to provide EOB information. Thischapter will focus on the VMAQ electronic re-connaissance and ELINT capabilities.

5001. Mission and Tasks

VMAQs provide EW (principally EA) andELINT support to the MAGTF and other desig-nated forces. When deployed, the VMAQ is underthe operational and administrative control of theACE commander. To support the MAGTF, theVMAQ conducts tactical jamming to prevent, de-lay, or interrupt detection and tracking by enemyearly warning, acquisition, fire or missile control,counterbattery, and battlefield surveillance radars.Tactical jamming also denies and/or degrades en-emy communications capabilities.

In addition, the VMAQ conducts electronic re-connaissance and ELINT operations to maintainEOB, to include both selected emitter parametersand location of nonfriendly emitters. VMAQs al-so provide threat warnings for friendly aircraft,ships, and ground units.

Key VMAQ tasks include—

� Providing aerial EA and ES support to ACEand other designated operations.

� Processing, analyzing, and producing rou-tine and time-sensitive ELINT reports fo

updating and maintaining enemy EOB. This accomplished through the intelligence aelectronic warfare division, TERPES, anthe tactical EA-6B mission planning system(TEAMS) sections to support premissioplanning and postmission processing of colected data and production of pertinent inteligence reports. Working in concert with thintelligence section, TERPES and TEAMSsections provide required ELINT and EOBintell igence products to the ACE anMAGTF.

� Providing liaison personnel to ACE andMAGTF CE staffs to assist in VMAQ employment planning. Inherent in this task the requirement to provide an air EW liaisoofficer to the MAGTF EWCC.

� Conducting EA operations for EP trainingof MAGTF units.

� Intercepting, recording, and jamming threcommunications and noncommunicationemitters.

5002. Organization and Concept of Employment

There are four VMAQs (designated VMAQ-1through VMAQ-4) assigned to MAG-14, 2dMAW, Cherry Point, North Carolina. Each squaron has five EA-6B Prowler aircraft and is orgnized into administrative, intelligence anelectronic warfare, operations, logistics, safeand standardization, and maintenance divisioSee figures 5-1 and 5-2 on page 5-2.

EA-6B aircraft conduct EA, ELINT, and electronic reconnaissance operations in supportACE and other MAGTF missions. The TERPEsection functions as a key element of thMAGTF’s intelligence operations. TERPES is a

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air-transportable, land-mobile intelligence proces-sing and production system organic to VMAQand is used to develop, maintain, and distributetactical EOB and ELINT reports. TERPES func-tions as an automated tactical data system capableof producing current and future intelligencethrough information storage and retrieval, data re-cording, data base management, and data compar-ison. TERPES has a stand-alone capability but isutilized by VMAQs to optimize signals analysiand reporting to support MAGTF operations. Fig-ure 5-3 provides an overview of VMAQ andTERPES operations.

5003. EA-6B Prowler

The EA-6B Prowler is a subsonic, all-weathecarrier-capable aircraft. The crew is composedone pilot and three electronic countermeasuofficers. The Prowler’s primary missions includcollecting and processing designated threat Sfor jamming and subsequent processing, analyand intelligence reporting; and employing thAGM-88 high-speed anti radiation missile(HARM) against designated targets. The ANALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System effectivel

Figure 5-2. VMAQ Organization.

Figure 5-1. EA-6B Prowler


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incorporates receivers and external pods for sig-nals reception and transmission of jamming sig-nals (principally those associated with threat airdefense radars and associated C2).

In addition to the AN/ALQ-99, the EA-6B alsoemploys the USQ-113 Communications Suitewhich provides the ability to collect, record, and

disrupt threat communications in either of the folowing two modes of operation:

� EA which scans the electromagnetic envronment to intercept and jam targeted snals of interest (SOIs).

� ES which scans the electromagnetic enviroment to intercept and digitally record SOIs

Figure 5-3. VMAQ and TERPES Operations.

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5004. Tactical EA-6B Mission Planning System

TEAMS is designed to assist EA-6B aircrew withplanning allocation and optimization of receivers,jammers, HARM, and other integrated weaponsystems into a comprehensive C2W package. Ba-sic intell igence data is provided by variousMAGTF theater and other intelligence and analy-sis centers. Parametric data for friendly and ad-versary platforms, weapons systems, and emittersis provided by the electronic warfare data basesystem (EWDS) on a quarterly basis and near-re-al-time updates may be provided through tacticalreceive equipment (TRE) integrated by the TER-PES section into the TEAMS workstation. Worldmaps, terrain data, and digitized navigation chartsare provided by the National Imagery and Map-ping Agency (NIMA) on a quarterly basis.

TEAMS allows the operator to—

� Maintain area of operations emitter listings.� Edit emitter parameters.� Develop mission-specific geographic data

and EOB.� Perform postflight mission analysis to—

� Identify electronic emitters using variouselectronic parameter data bases andELINT analytical techniques.

� Locate emitters by coordinates with a cer-tain circular error of probability for eachsite.

� Correlate new information with existingdata.

� Accomplish mission planning in support ofcoordinated strikes and EA-6B optimiza-tion.

5005. TERPES

TERPES (AN/TSQ-90) is an air- and land-trans-portable, single-shelter ELINT processing andcorrelation system. The TERPES team is com-

posed of Marines, equipment, software, and suporting procedures integrated to—

� Identify and locate enemy radar emittersfrom data collected by EA-6B aircraft othose received from other intell igencsources.

� Process and disseminate EW data rapidlyMAGTF intelligence centers.

� Provide mission planning and briefing support to VMAQ EA and ES operations.

The standard TERPES configuration consistsone 8- by 8- by 20-foot shelter and two skidmounted environmental control units (ECUs). Psitioned on and around the shelters are a TRantenna, an HF antenna, and two mast-mounUHF antennas. These modules can be tailoredspecific mission requirements. Electrical powsupport for TERPES must be obtained from tMarine wing support squadron.

The TERPES is operated by one MOS 2602 SIINT/EW warrant officer and six MOS 2631 TER-PES operators/analysts. Maintenance support iprovided by one MOS 9966 TSQ-90 maintenanofficer and four MOS 2821 TSQ-90 technicians

a. Operational CapabilitiesThe TERPES will—

� Translate rapidly the machine-readable, aborne-collected digital data into man- anmachine-readable reports (i.e., paper, manetic tape, secure voice, plots, and ovelays).

� Receive and process EA-6B mission tapes� Accept, correlate, and identify electronic

emitters data from semiautomatic or autmatic collection systems using various eletronic parameter data bases and ELINanalytical techniques.

� Locate emitters by coordinates with a certain circular error of probability for eachsite.


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� Provide EA-6B EWOs with tactical intelli-gence briefings to support EA and ES mis-sions. (The off ic ial t i t le for EWO iselectronic countermeasures officer [EC-MO]. EWO is used to accurately reflect thescope of MOS 7588 activities and EW ter-minology changes.)

� Provide tactical jamming analysis.� Ensure tactical intelligence data base main-

tenance for the VMAQ and the EOB for theMAGTF.

b. Mapping PackageThe TERPES mapping and overlay package isbased on NIMA products which have been inte-grated into a software program called the De-lorme mapping system. This system allowsTERPES operators to display mapping data that isloaded to the TERPES system at scales rangingfrom worldwide scale down to the 1:5,000 scale.A wide range of tools such as zoom, projectionmagnification, perspective, linear, and spatialanalysis allow operators to manipulate mappingdata to enhance understanding of the overlaidthreat information.

c. Intelligence AnalysisThe TERPES Intelligence Analysis Application(IAA) enables the operator to analyze ELINT datacombined with additional modernized integrateddata base (MIDB) intelligence data to—

� Respond to requests for intelligence (RFIs).� Prepare intelligence data base updates.� Analyze threat and tactical situations.� Estimate changes in the threat’s tactical situ-

ation.

d. Data FusionMIDB is the primary intelligence data base forIAA operator queries. In addition to EA-6B air-craft mission tapes, other inputs required to maxi-mize the support provided to tactical intelligenceoperations include the following:

� Naval intelligence data base (NID) containcharacteristics and performance data fweapons, sensors, and platforms.

� EWDS is similar to the NID and providesEA-6B tailored data.

� ELINT parameters list (EPL) is NSA’s ob-served radar parametric data.

� Electronic warfare integrated reprogramming (EWIR) is produced by the UnitedStates Air Force Foreign Technology Divsion. EWIR combines assessed technical dar parameters from the United States AForce EW Science and Technology dabase with the observed parameters of tNSA data base.

� Joint spectrum center (JSC) is used to derfriendly EOB and radar parametric data.

e. TERPES Fusion ProcessorThe TERPES fusion processor (TFP) procesintelligence data from tactical ELINT (TA-CELINT) reports, tactical reports (TACREPsand IMINT reports. The TFP provides filtering,characteristic and performance identification, oder of battle (OOB) identification, technical anaysis, multisource correlation, and candidateupdates. The TFP presents the information in vious forms for analysis. One TFP integrated infomat ion so urce i s the TRE and Re la teApplications (TRAP) broadcast. This broadcastaccessed using the TRE and provides near-retime (NRT), national-level reports to the TERPES. The TRAP broadcast also assists the TFPmaintaining an ELINT parameter data base track airborne, shipboard, and land-based targas a tool to develop EOBs and as an instrumenperform comparative studies on radar paramete

f. TERPES ELINT Preprocessor The TERPES ELINT preprocessor (TEPP) proesses all EA-6B SOI collected from recorder reproducer set tape or disk files. Specifically, tapplication allows for the NRT analysis of techncal ELINT data. Position reports and specific unidentification and location information are used

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update the TERPES data base and to prepare TA-CELINT reports. TERPES also provides tacticaljamming system (TJS) analysis for the EA-6B air-crew and maintenance personnel.

TJS analysis consists of recovering recorded datafor verifying jammer calibration, on- and off-jam-mer times, and frequency and azimuth coverage.TERPES will use mission data in the generationof EW mission summary reports.

g. Intelligence Reporting

The primary intelligence output from TERPESoperations is mission reports. Mission reports areavailable in many forms and are provided prima-rily to MAGTF intelligence elements in responseto established intelligence requirements. The mostcommonly used reporting form is the TACELINT(refer to USSID 340, Tactical ELINT Reporting,for format and content).

Other report forms include the following:

� TACREP provides information on immedi-ate threat activity.

� ELINT summary report provides a summaof ELINT activity over established periods(normally 24 hours). Refer to USSID 200Technical SIGINT Reporting, for format andcontent.

� ELINT technical report provides for analysexchange of information of parametric datRefer to USSID 341, Technical ELINT Re-porting, for format and content.

� Over the horizon (OTH) “GOLD” reportprovides information derived from contacreports of ELINT parametrics.

� Order of battle report (OBREP) provides oder of battle information such as basic encclopedia (BE) number, equipment, anlocation.

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Chapter 6

Communications and Information Systems

The area of SIGINT operations currently under-going substantial change is SIGINT CIS techno-logical advances and architectures development.SIGINT architectures are changing from the useof separate, secure, 24-hour manned communica-tions centers with dedicated, bulk-encrypted linksto the use of multilevel information system secu-rity initiative (MISSI) capabilities over unsecuredcommercial or DOD networks via the DefensMessage System (DMS). Adding the proliferationof SIGINT collection, processing, and productionsystems and centers along with other intelligenceand operations systems and centers that must dis-seminate and share SIGINT and communicatedigitally creates a very dynamic situation.

The SIGINT effort depends heavily on a secure,reliable, and fast CIS architecture to receive SIG-INT and all-source intelligence products and topass collected data and SIGINT products andtechnical reports to the MAGTF and other users.Communications and information systems are al-so required for the C2 of SIGINT units and theirintegration with multidiscipline intelligence oper-ations. Every mission and situation is unique, re-qu i r in g so me mod i f i ca t ions to the CISarchitecture supporting MAGTF SIGINT opera-tions. Detailed planning and close coordinationamong the SIGINT units’ CO or OICs, theMAGTF G-2/S-2 and G-6/S-6, and pertinent op-erational and intelligence organizations is criticalto establishing reliable and effective SIGINT ar-chitecture.

See appendix B, Marine Corps SIGINT Equip-ment, of this publication for additional informa-tion on select communications and information

systems resources pertinent to MAGTF SIGINoperations. Also, see MCWP 6-22, Communica-tions and Information Systems, for a detailed re-view of MAGTF CIS and supporting tacticstechniques, and procedures.

6001. Basic MAGTF SIGINT CIS Requirements

a. Capability to Command and Control Subordinate UnitsMAGTF SIGINT units must be capable of postive C2 of subordinate units and integration of ioperations with broader MAGTF and external intelligence and operations C2. Traditionallysingle-channel radio (SCR) and record messatraffic have been used to support C2 of SIGINunits. In semistatic situations, secure electronicmail or the telephone may be the method choice, while in highly fluid or mobile scenarioscellular telephones, satellite communication(SATCOM), VHF, or HF radio may be used.

b. Ability to Receive and Transmit Collected Data and Information from Collection and DF ElementsThe SIGINT architecture must provide connectiity among organic and supporting SIGINT collect ion or DF teams , SIG INT ana lys i s anproduction centers, and supported MAGTF opera-tions and intelligence centers. Requirements iclude the capability to receive and transmcollection files and reports digitally via fiberwire, or radio (voice and data) in formats that a

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readily usable by the SIGINT and all-source intel-ligence analysts.

c. Ability to Provide Intelligence to the Supported CommanderThe required SIGINT architecture must supportthe commander’s intent, concepts of operationand intelligence, command relationships, andstanding PIRs and IRs. The SIGINT CIS architec-ture must be capable of integrating SSU SCI-secure channels and C2 operations with theprimary GENSER channels used by supportedcommanders throughout the MAGTF.

d. Ability to Share SIGINT Products and Technical ReportsThe SIGINT architecture must provide the meansto share products and reports with MAGTF all-source intelligence centers and with SIGINT andall-source JTF, other components, theater, andnational intelligence centers. The traditionalmeans for providing this capability are the SCIsecure defense special security communicationsystem (DSSCS) for record communications andoperator’s communications (OPSCOM) circuitfor SIGINT analyst-to-analyst exchanges andcoordination. These means are rapidly beingreplaced by—

� JWICS which provides interoperability ofintelligence systems, access to intelligencedata bases, and direct analyst-to-analyst ex-change.

� National Security Agency Network (NSA-NET) which provides access to national-level SIGINT reports and data bases andelectronic mail connectivity for SIGINTanalyst-to-analyst exchanges and intelli-gence requests.

e. Ability to Receive and Disseminate SIGINT Indications and WarningsA significant strength of SIGINT is its ability tprovide time-sensitive I&W of the adversary’s ac-

tions and intentions. This I&W intelligence is disseminated by a variety of means to include voicrecord messages, tactical reports, electronic mand intelligence broadcasts. Having the capabito receive the information, recognizing the I&Wintelligence as such, and possessing a methoddisseminate this I&W intelligence to the affecteunits and decisionmakers are key to satisfying trequirement.

f. Ability to Receive SIGINT BroadcastsFor several years MAGTFs have possessed inligence broadcast receivers capable of accessselect SIGINT broadcasts. The broadcast receers currently being fielded and under develoment will allow MAGTFs to receive multiplechannels of JTF, fleet, theater, and nationintelligence broadcast data. This data includes source intelligence and SIGINT on enemy opertions as well as friendly positional and otheinformation. Effective planning, design, and integration of SCI and GENSER CIS and proper iformation management filtering, correlating, antailoring prior to dissemination or display providtimely SIGINT reporting to supported commanders while preventing information overload.

6002. Notional MAGTF SIGINT Operational Architectures

a. MEFFigure 6-1 depicts a notional SIGINT operationarchitecture for a fully deployed MEF. It shows full complement of organic and supporting JTother service components, theater, and natioSIGINT capabilities.

Key architectural concepts include the following

� SIGINT operations planning and manage-ment are centralized within the MAGTFG-2/S-2.


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� RadBn OCAC is collocated with the G-2/
S-2 CIC and operates in general support ofthe MAGTF, with collection or DF teamscollocated with forward-deployed MAGTFunits.

� VMAQ TERPES is collocated with ACEheadquarters and principally supports ACoperations.

� MAGTF CIC, RadBn OCAC, and TERPESmaintain connectivity with appropriate

Figure 6-1. Notional MEF SIGINT Operational Architecture.

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external intelligence and SIGINT organiza-tions.

b. MEF Lead EchelonFigure 6-2 shows a notional operational architec-ture in support of the MEF lead echelon during itsinitial deployment and employment phases. SIG-INT operations focus on the MEF as it deploys in-to the area of operations and builds its combatpower.

Key architectural concepts include the following:

� SIGINT operations planning and manage-ment remain centralized within the MAGTFG-2/S-2, which is not yet within the area ooperations.

� RadBn fly-in echelon is collocated with leaelements of the MAGTF G-2, with organiteams operating in GS of deployed elments. RadBn OCAC is collocated with thG-2/S-2 CIC.

� VMAQ TERPES is collocated with ACEheadquarters and principally supports ACoperations.

Figure 6-2. Notional MEF Lead Echelon SIGINT Operational Architecture.


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� MAGTF CIC, RadBn OCAC, and TERPESmaintain connectivity with appropriate ex-ternal intelligence and SIGINT organiza-tions.

c. MEU(SOC) CE Afloat Figure 6-3 shows a notional operational architec-ture in support of a MEU(SOC) afloat. Duringsuch operations, MEU and ATF SIGINT capabili-ties and organizations generally collocate withinthe same afloat facilities (e.g., SSESs) integrateand share some systems operations. A criticalcomponent of this architecture is satisfactorvoice and data ship-to-shore SCI communicationsbetween the MEU(SOC) command element andashore SIGINT elements.

Key architectural concepts include the following

� SIGINT operations planning and manage-ment are centralized in the MEU(SOC) S-2

� RadBn SSU OCAC operates out of thSSES collocated with the S-2 CIC withithe amphibious task force intelligence ceter (ATFIC). RadBn operates in generasupport of the MAGTF. Depending on themission, RadBn collection and DF elemenmay operate in either general support of tMAGTF or direct support of elements operating ashore.

� MAGTF CIC and RadBn OCAC maintainconnectivity with appropriate external intelligence and SIGINT organizations.

Figure 6-3. MEU(SOC) CE Afloat SIGINT Operational Architecture.

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Figure 6-4. MEU(SOC) CE Ashore SIGINT Operational Architecture.

d. MEU(SOC) CE AshoreFigure 6-4 depicts a notional operational architec-ture in support of a shore-based MEU(SOC) CE.The MEU(SOC) requires ship-to-shore SCI com-munications connectivity to continue exploitingexternal SIGINT capabilities and resources whileminimizing the CIS and logistic footprints ashore.

Key architectural concepts include the following:

� SIGINT operations planning and C2 remaincentralized within the MEU(SOC) S-2.

� The MAGTF RadBn SSU OCAC is collo-cated ashore with the S-2 CIC. Other SSelements provide continued support fromthe amphibious task force intelligence ceter SSES.

� RadBn SSU normally will operate in GS othe MAGTF.

� MAGTF CIC and RadBn OCAC principalconnectivity with appropriate external intelligence and SIGINT organizations is via thamphibious task force intelligence centeSSES.


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6003. Planning Consideration

The following are key CIS requirements and plan-ning considerations in support of MAGTF SIG-INT operations.

� Add the MAGTF CE, RadBn SSU, VMAQTERPES, and other MAGTF elements toappropriate addressee indicator groups(AIGs) to receive pertinent JTF, theater, andnational intelligence and SIGINT products.

� Obtain and activate SCI plain language ad-dresses for MAGTF CE, RadBn SSU, andother MAGTF elements as appropriate.

� Determine and coordinate radio nets, sup-porting frequencies, and procedures for—� MAGTF external SIGINT operations.� MAGTF internal SIGINT operations.� Intelligence broadcasts.� Retransmission sites.� Routine and time-sensitive operations.

� Obtain authority and establish proceduresfor the sanitization of SIGINT products, re-ports, and other information.

� Determine and coordinate wire communica-tions, to include telephones.

� Determine and coordinate SCI and GEN-SER LANs and WANs and unique intelli-gence networks information systems re-quirements (e.g., hardware, software,internet protocol addresses).

� Determine and coordinate SCI-courier re-quirements and operations.

� Integrate RadBn SSU and VMAQ CIS oper-ations with those of other MAGTF and per-t i nen t JTF and o the r co mpon entsintelligence and reconnaissance units (e.g.,mutual support, cueing).

� Integrate RadBn SSU, SSE, and SST, andVMAQ TERPES communications with col-located GCE, ACE, CSSE, and otherMAGTF elements to—

� Provide time-sensitive I&W and non-codeword (NCW) SIGINT reporting.

� Coordinate with maneuver forces.� Support targeting.� Support force protection.

� Coordinate SIGINT CIS and disseminatiooperations and procedures with allied ancoalition forces.

� Coordinate SCI and SIGINT CIS activationand restoration priorities and procedures.

� Determine unique COMSEC material system (CMS) requirements for SIGINT anSCI communications.

� Determine communications requiremenbetween TSCIFs and mobile SCIFs and suporting security forces.

6004. SIGINT Communications

The SIGINT CIS architecture for any given opeation is dynamic. Specif ic theater, JTF, oMAGTF reference documents include—

� CSPs developed for various OPLANs.� Combatant commanders intelligence, CIS

and SIGINT tactics, techniques, and procdures (TTPs).

� Annexes B (intelligence), C (operationsand K (communications) of an OPORD.

� Appendix 2 (SIGINT) to annex B of anOPORD.

The MAGTF mission, threat signals environmenfriendly concepts of operations and intelligencand supporting task organization and commandrelationships influence which communicationnets are established.

The following information addresses importaaspects of systems and technical architecturessupport of MAGTF SIGINT operations.

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a. MAGTF Command Element SIGINT Communications NetsFigure 6-5 shows aspects of a notional CIS archi-tecture for the MEF CIC. The following key SIG-INT communications nets terminate within theMAGTF CE CIC or RadBn SSU.

(1) MAGTF DSSCS or Special IntelligenceCommunications Net External (HF). TheDSSCS provides the MAGTF commander with asecure data communications channel for the ex-change of SCI information and the receipt ofrecord communications. The path is provided bythe supported commander, and the terminalequipment and personnel are provided by theRadBn SSU. Key net participants include—

� The MAGTF CE via the RadBn SSU’s spe-cial security communications element.

� Commander, joint task force (CJTF).� Commander, amphibious task force (CATF).� Other theater and national organizations.

(2) MAGTF Critical Communications Net(UHF-SATCOM/VHF). The critical communica-tions (CRITICOMM) net provides the MAGTFcommander communications with adjacentservice cryptologic and other SIGINT and JTF el-ements and theater cryptologic support groupsThe path is provided by the supported command-er, and the terminal equipment and personnel areprovided by the RadBn SSCT. Key net partici-pants include—

� MAGTF CE via the RadBn or SSU specialsecurity communications element.

� JTF.� Adjacent headquarters.� Theater and national intelligence or SIGINT

agencies.

(3) Theater Cryptologic Support Net (HF/UHF-SATCOM). Theater cryptologic support netprovides for rapid exchange of cryptologic infor-mation with the SIGINT elements of other organi-zations. The path is provided by the supportedcommander, and the terminal equipment is pro-vided by the RadBn/SSU. Key participants in-clude—

� RadBn OCAC.

� Adjacent service cryptologic elements.

� JTF or ATF SIGINT agencies.

� Theater and national SIGINT agencies.

(4) Tactical Receive Equipment and Relat-ed Applications Program Data Dissemina-tion System. The TRE and related applicationprogram data dissemination system (TDDSbroadcast provides I&W and global surveillancinformation in time for sensor cueing. Data is fowarded from sensor to communications gatewaor relays for dissemination to worldwide militaryusers via geosynchronous UHF satellite linkTDDS data sources include national and tacticsensor systems. Participants include the MAGTFCE CIC or SSU OCAC and other JTF, theateand national intelligence centers and agencies.

(5) Tactical Information Broadcast Ser-vice. The tactical information broadcast servic(TIBS) provides near-real-time intelligence froman open network of interactive participants usinmultiple sensors and sources. The TIBS broadcuses UHF SATCOM assets for network operatiand for the relay of out-of-theater specific infomation into the tactical users’ areas of operatioTIBS participants include a wide variety onational and Service airborne, surface, and ssurface intelligence platforms. The broadcast wterminate in the MAGTF CE CIC or SSU OCAC

(6) Tactical Intelligence Net. Tactical intelli-gence (TACINTEL) net is an automated, highspeed data link for transmission and receptionSCI (data and voice) among SIGINT collectioand production units during amphibious opertions. Key participants include naval expeditionary force (NEF) and ATF SIGINT centers (withinthe SSES) and the RadBn and SSU OCAC.

(7) MAGTF-Internal Special IntelligenceCommunications Net (VHF/UHF/SHF). Spe-cial intelligence communications (SPINTCOMMnet provides the MAGTF commander with secuSCI communications with subordinate division owing commanders through their organic SSCT.


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The path is provided by the supported command-er, and the terminal equipment and personnel areprovided by the RadBn SSU or SSCT.

(8) TROJAN SPIRIT II Net. The Trojan SpiritII net (C and Ku band SATCOM) receives and

disseminates intelligence information over a spcial-purpose satellite system. Key participants iclude the MAGTF CE CIC, RadBn SSU OCACamphibious task force intelligence center SSEand various external intelligence agencies and ganizations.

Figure 6-5. MEF CE CIC Communications and Information Systems Architecture.

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b. Radio Battalion SIGINT Support Unit Internal Communications NetsFigure 6-6 shows key aspects of the CIS architec-ture for the internal operations of the RadBn SSU.The following key communications nets termi-nate within the RadBn SSU OCAC.

(1) Command and Control Net (HF/VHF).The RadBn SSU C2 net provides the battalioncommander or detachment OIC with C2 of subor-dinate elements. The path, equipment, and per-sonnel are provided by the RadBn. Key netparticipants include the RadBn SSU OCAC anddeployed collection and DF, EA, and RRT teams.

(2) Collection and Reporting Net (UHF-SATCOM/HF/VHF). The collection and report-ing net provides C2 and SIGINT reporting net for

RadBn SSU collection operations. Key particpants include the OCAC and deployed collectioand DF teams.

(3) Electronic Attack Control Net (VHF).The EA control net provides direction and controf RadBn EA teams and assets. The path, equment, and personnel are provided by the RadSSU. Key participants include the OCAC and dployed MEWSS and EA teams.

(4) Direction Finding Flash Net (VHF). TheDF flash net provides the DF control station wita means of broadcasting DF flashes to DF teamThe path, equipment, and personnel are providby the RadBn. Key participants include thOCAC’s DF control and deployed collection anDF teams.

Figure 6-6. RadBn SSU Operations Control and Analysis Center Communications and Information Systems.

Signals Intelligence ______________________________________________________________________________________ 6-11

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(5) Direction Finding Report Net (VHF). TheDF report net provides reporting from DF outsta-tions to the OCAC DF control. Path, equipment,and personnel are provided by the RadBn SSU.

(6) Direction Finding Data Net (VHF). TheDF data net exchanges DF information betweenthe deployed collection and DF team and theOCAC DF control. The path, equipment, and per-sonnel are provided by the RadBn.

(7) Mission Equipment Control Data LinkNet (UHF). The mission equipment control datlink (MECDL) net provides the means to control,coordinate, and monitor the mission equipment ofMEWSS teams. This net is used for internalMEWSS operations and for interface and coordi-nation with the Army intelligence and EW com-mon sensor systems.

(8) Tasking and Reporting Net (VHF) Thetasking and reporting net provides a means for RadBn to task deployed collection teams and toreport SIGINT information.

(9) Radio Reconnaissance Command Net(UHF-Tactical Satellite/HF) The radio recon-naissance command net provides the meanscommand and control deployed RRTs and threporting of SIGINT collection and DF reports tthe RadBn SSU OCAC.

c. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron Communications NetsFigure 6-7 shows key aspects of the CIS architeture for VMAQ TERPES operations. The following key SIGINT communications nets terminatewithin VMAQ operations or TERPES elements.

Figure 6-7. VMAQ Operations Center and TERPES Communications and Information Systems.

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(1) Aviation Combat Element CommandNet (HF). The ACE command net provides ameans for the ACE commander to exercise com-mand and coordinate subordinate units’ adminis-trative and logistic functions. Compositionincludes ACE headquarters, MAG detachmentsMarine air control group or detachment, and inde-pendent squadrons or battalions.

(2) Aviation Combat Element IntelligenceNet (VHF/HF/UHF). The ACE intelligence neprovides a means for rapid collection and dissem-ination of intelligence between the ACE head-quarters and subordinate units. Compositionincludes the ACE headquarters, the TACC,MAGs or squadrons headquarters, the tactical airoperations center (TAOC), direct air support cen-ter (DASC), TERPES, and others as appropriate.

(3) Tactical Digital Information Link A (HF/UHF). Tactical digital information l ink A(TADIL-A), also called Link-11, is used to ex-change tactical data in real time among ships, air-craft, and shore sites. TADIL-A messages providenavigational data, surface and subsurface tracks,and operational orders. TADIL-A is an encryptedhalf-duplex system. It can be used on either Hsingle- or dual-sideband or UHF frequencies.

There are two data rates:

� Fast, at 2250 bits per second (bps) which isthe most used data rate.

� Slow, at 1364 bps.

TADIL-A is available within the United StateNavy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army. TheMAGTF’s C2 nodes that can use TADIL-A arethe TAOC and the TACC. The exchange of digi-tal information by TADIL-A is accomplished bynet-configured participating units (PUs) under thecontrol of a net control station (NCS). A net canbe composed of as few as two PUs (e.g., TERP-ES, via the TACC, and the TAOC).

(4) Tactical Digital Information Link B(Multichannel Radio). TADIL-B, multichannelradio (MUX), (also known as Link-11B) is a full-duplex, point-to-point, encrypted system that smultaneously exchanges tactical data betwetwo units capable of TADIL-B at a rate of 6001200, and 2400 bps. TADIL-B messages providnavigational data, surface and subsurface tracand operational orders. It may use VHF, UHSHF, and ground mobile force-SATCOM MUXsystems. Additionally, TADIL-B can also be exchanged over wire. TADIL-B is used by the Unied States Air Force, Army, and Marine CorpMAGTF C2 nodes with TADIL-B capability arethe TACC, TAOC, and Marine air traffic controdetachment (MATCD). Participants on a TADILB network, such as TERPES, are called reportiunits (RUs). Some RUs are capable of simultneously linking with several other RUs. Thosunits that can redistribute the information received from one RU to another RU are called fowarding reporting units (e.g., TACC and TAOC)

(5) Tactical Digital Information Link C(UHF). TADIL-C, also called Link-4A, is usedby the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) and the United States Armed ForceTADIL-C is an unencrypted, computer-tocomputer digital information link that operates ithe UHF frequency range at 5000 bps. ThTADIL-C link is between a controlling unit and acontrolled tactical aircraft. TADIL-C is a valuablmeans for providing radar track correlated sybology both up to the aircraft and, in the case two-way transmissions, back down to the controling agency. The MAGTF TAOC uses thTADIL-C for one-way and two-way links to control F-14, F/A-18, EA-6B, and S-3 aircraft.

(6) Voice Product Net (UHF). The voice prod-uct net (VPN) provides a communications meansfor forwarding nondigital intelligence informationto other intelligence and operations elements. KMAGTF participants include the TACC, TAOCEA-6B, and TERPES, as well as other MAGTexternal platforms (e.g., Rivet Joint, CompaCall, EP-3).

Chapter 7

Planning and Operations

The purpose of SIGINT operations is to developintelligence on the enemy’s capabilities, intent,

and operations by exploiting the enemy’s use ofcommunication, radars, and electronic systems.

Section I. SIGINT Functional Planning

Detailed planning must precede actual SIGINToperations to take advantage of the wealth of in-formation available on the adversary’s signalsemanations and operations.

7101. SIGINT Concept of Operations

SIGINT operations must support the command-er’s intent, concept of operations, and the support-ing concept of intelligence operations.

Questions that must be answered to develop theSIGINT concept of operations include the follow-ing:

l What is the MAGTF area of operations(AO) and area of interest (AI)?

l What is the MAGTF concept of operations,task organization, and main and supportingefforts? Does the friendly concept of opera-tions allow for fixed-site SIGINT collectionand DF operations, mobile collection andDF operations, or both?

l What are the standing PIRs and IRs? Whichhave been tasked to SIGINT units? Whatspecific information is the commander mostinterested in (e.g., enemy air operations, en-emy ground operations, friendly force pro-tection, target battle damage assessment[BDA], or enemy future intentions)?

l What is the MAGTF force protection con-cept of operations?

l What is the MAGTF concept of fire sup-port? How will MAGTF target developmentand target intelligence be conducted?

l What are the SIGINT and intelligence con-cepts of operations of other JTF compo-nents, the JTF, and theater resources? Whatare the task organization and command orsupport relationships for all other MAGTFintelligence and reconnaissance units?

l How can shipboard SIGINT assets and otherJTF, theater, and national SIGINT assets bein tegra ted and employed to suppor tMAGTF operations?

7102. Enemy Characteristics

Intelligence operations focus on the enemy. Priorto commencing SIGINT operations, MAGTF in-telligence personnel must learn as much as theycan about the following enemy C2 CIS practices.

a. Size and Composition of Enemy Forces

l What threat forces are within the MAGTFAO and AI?

l What are the enemy’s centers of gravity andcritical vulnerabilities?

l Is this a large enemy force organized alongconventional military lines or a small, loose-ly knit guerrilla or unconventional militaryforce?

7-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

b. Enemy Command and Control and Supporting Communications and Information Systems

l What and where are the enemy’s critical C2nodes and what are their vulnerabilities?

l What types and categories of communica-tions nets and networks are used by the ene-my?

l What echelons of command do the commu-nications nets and networks serve?

l What are the associated communicationsand noncommunications electronic emit-ters?

l What are the tactics, techniques, and proce-dures used for enemy CIS operations? Howdo they relate to various threat functionalactivities?

l How is information transferred among theenemy’s units and command echelons?

l Does the enemy employ communicationsemitters at all levels of command or does itrely on communications means less exploit-able by SIGINT (e.g., fiber, wire, and mes-senger)?

c. Emitter Technical DataEffective SIGINT operations require extensivetechnical information on the enemy’s CIS re-sources and operations. See table 7-1 for keythreat emitter technical data requirements.

7103. Topography

Terrain, physical obstructions, and vegetation inthe area of operations have a major effect on theemployment of SIGINT resources and their abili-ty to exploit enemy signals. Proper placement ofSIGINT collection and DF assets is essential foreffective reception of adversary emanations. Sev-eral factors affect reception quality.

a. Target FrequenciesMany of the frequency ranges and power levels inuse by the world’s military and paramilitary forc-es require line-of-sight (LOS) or near-LOS pathsfrom transmitter to receiver. Generally, the higher

the frequency used, the greater the LOS influenceand the more critical the accurate placement ofSIGINT collection and DF equipment. Lower

Table 7-1. Emitter Technical Data.

Aspect Technical and Operational Characteristics

Communications Operationsand Emitters

Frequency range and use

HF, VHF, UHF, etc.

Call sign use Rota, random, etc.

Transmitter power

Hearability, SIGINT collection, and DF location requirements

Emission type Single, multichannel, spread spectrum, frequency hopping, burst, etc.

Signal type Analog or digital

Modulation AM, FM, PCM, etc.

Cryptologic system

Public, private key, none

System type Voice, data, teletype, facsimile, video, combinations of some or all

Language use Dialect, written, or voice

Miscellaneous Communication procedures, emissions control practices, use of deception, security sys-tems, etc.

Noncommunications Operations and Emitters

Location Fixed, mobile

Platform Air, ship, vehicle, fixed-installation

Associated C2 node or weapon system

Command post, type of weapon system

Frequency range Band of operation

Modulation characteristics

Pulse duration, pulse repetition frequency, etc.

Transmitter power

Effective radiated power, effec-tive range

Purpose of function

Jamming, surveillance, target-ing, C2, fire control, etc.


frequencies (particularly those below 30 MHz)generally do not require LOS paths. Consequent-ly, the placement of SIGINT collection and DFsites to exploit these frequencies may be locatedat greater distances from the target transmitters.

b. Power OutputThe power output of a transmitter is an importantfactor in receiving the signal. To intercept somelow-powered signals, SIGINT collection and DFassets must be located closer to the adversary’stransmitter, often requiring SIGINT collectionand DF teams to either collocate with or closelyfollow forward MAGTF combat units.

c. AntennasIf the targeted adversary’s system uses highly di-rectional antennas, as do many multichannel sys-tems, the SIGINT collection and DF site must beplaced within the adversary’s antenna radiatingpattern.

7104. Planning Responsibilities

Primary staff responsibility for SIGINT opera-tions planning lies with the G-2/S-2. The G-2/S-2responsibilities are—

l Preparing integrated, multidiscipline intelli-gence and reconnaissance operations, to in-clude supporting SIGINT plans, orders,annexes, and appendices.

l Coordinating with the G-3/S-3 to ensure—n Planned SIGINT effort will support the

concept of operations and scheme of ma-neuver.

n SIGINT and EW operations are effective-ly prioritized and integrated.

n Adequate site placement and security forSIGINT collection elements is provided.

l Coordinating with the G-6/S-6 officer forCIS support to the SIGINT elements, in-cluding circuits and networks access, fre-quency assignment, equipment, and callsigns.

l Acting as liaison with SIGINT agencies andunits external to the MAGTF.

l Coordinating with the G-4/S-4 to ensure ad-equate logistics support of SIGINT elements(e.g., transportation and maintenance ofSIGINT units’ unique equipment).

7105. Coordination of SIGINT Operations

a. Internal CoordinationInternal MAGTF SIGINT requirements must becoordinated with maneuver, fires, electronic war-fare, force protection, and CIS requirements. Thiscoordination may occur within the EWCC underG-3/S-3 staff cognizance, within the CIC, or with-in the OCAC, depending upon the task organiza-tion and C2 and support relationships in effect.Additionally, collection and DF team movementsand locations must be coordinated with theMAGTF’s tactical movements to ensure continu-ous support without interference.

These efforts are accomplished through planningand close coordination among the followingMAGTF staff officers:

l MAGTF G-2/S-2, the intelligence opera-tions officer, and the intelligence battalioncommander.

l SIO, MAGTF AFC OIC, collections officer,SARC OIC, and the dissemination manager.

l MAGTF G-3/S-3 future and current opera-tions officers, C2W officer, and EWO.

l MAGTF G-6/S-6.l GCE, ACE, and CSSE staff officers.l RadBn SSU and VMAQ TERPES COs and

OICs.

b. External Coordination

(1) Higher Headquarters and External Or-ganizations. The MAGTF G-2/S-2 and all SIG-INT p l anne r s mus t coo rd ina t e S IGINToperations, activities, and requirements withDIRNSA. Accordingly, a continuous exchange of

7-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

data and information is required. This requiresJWICS access and special security communica-tions circuits for the exchange of SIGINT techni-cal data and intelligence information.

(2) Adjacent and Area SIGINT Activities.MAGTF SIGINT activities must be coordinatedwith other SIGINT activities within the jointoperations area and theater to reduce duplicationand to ensure maximum use of available assetsand mutual support. For example, an NSG-fixed

site outside the MAGTF tactical operations areacould be conducting SIGINT collection and DFagainst targets within the MAGTF area of respon-sibility. With proper planning and coordination,external SIGINT assets of the combatant com-mander, JTF, and other components can provideSIGINT support to the MAGTF (e.g., product re-porting, exchanges of technical information), al-lowing organic MAGTF SIGINT resources tofocus on critical targets.


Section II. SIGINT Operational Planning

This section provides a general description of theSIGINT planning cycle and activities to enable anunderstanding and appreciation for the SIGINTeffort as a whole. No attempt is made to providetechnical details for SIGINT processing. TheSIGINT cycle is in concert with the following sixphases of the intelligence cycle (see MCWP 2-1for additional information on the intelligence cy-cle and intelligence planning).

7201. Planning and Direction

The planning and direction phase of the intelli-gence cycle consists of those activities whichidentify and prioritize pertinent IRs and providethe means for satisfying them. Intelligence plan-ning and direction is a continuous function and acommand responsibility. The commander directsthe intelligence effort; the intelligence officermanages this effort based upon the commander’sintent, designation of PIRs, and specific guidanceprovided during the planning process. The intelli-gence planning and direction functions are—

l Requirements development.

l Requirements management.

l Collections management.

l Production management.

l Dissemination management.

l Intelligence support structure.

l Supervision of the intelligence effort.

SIGINT planning is performed in concert withoverall intelligence planning. It consists of thoseactivities that identify pertinent IRs which havebeen tasked to SIGINT units and then providesthe means for satisfying those IRs. SIGINT plan-ning and direction is a continuous function thatrequires close interaction between the G-2/S-2and SIGINT unit planners.

SIGINT planning and direction objectives in-clude—

l Identifying intelligence requirements taskedto SIGINT elements.

l Preparing a SIGINT operations plan, to in-clude integral SIGINT collection, produc-tion, and dissemination plans.

l Planning and establishing the SIGINT sup-port system (e.g., CIS, logistics).

l Issuing orders and tasking to SIGINT units.

l Supervising and coordinating the SIGINToperations.

The selection of a particular source of informationor intelligence discipline to fulfill a given intelli-gence requirement is an important decision. SIG-INT is a valuable source of information, and aneffective, dynamic SIGINT operations plan mustbe developed to maximize the effectiveness of theSIGINT effort. With the multitude of threat sig-nals being transmitted, the collection plan must becarefully constructed to collect and exploit enemysignals that are most likely to provide the neces-sary intelligence data. Additionally, the SIGINTproduction and dissemination plans must effec-tively support unique SIGINT and all-source in-t e l l i gence ope ra t ions r equ i r emen t s andoperations.

a. Mission Planning

Based on the commander’s PIRs and IRs, the G-2/S-2 determines those ICRs which are applicableto and have the potential to be satisfied by the or-ganic SIGINT collection effort. The G-2/S-2 in-corporates these ICRs into the overall intelligencecollection plan and issues mission tasking andguidance to the RadBn OIC, ACE G-2/S-2, andother attached or supporting SIGINT units. Addi-tionally, SIGINT taskings from the joint forcecommander (JFC) and supplemental taskingsfrom DIRNSA will need to be assessed by the G-2/S-2 and incorporated if possible into MAGTFSIGINT operations (refer to USSID 4 for addi-tional information regarding DIRNSA supple-mental tasking).

7-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

b. Mission ManagementSIGINT mission management is the unit com-mander’s supervision of collection, processing,production, and dissemination efforts. Propermission management requires centralized controlof SIGINT assets at the MAGTF command ele-ment level. The OCAC (for RadBn SSUs) and theTERPES section (for VMAQ) provide this cen-tralized control for the their respective SIGINTefforts. Collection and DF elements are usuallypositioned throughout the MAGTF’s operationsarea based on the MAGTF’s focus of effort,scheme of maneuver, hearability of enemy sig-nals, and security of SIGINT units. Air SIGINToperations in support of both ACE and MAGTFrequirements will be planned and incorporated inthe supporting air tasking order (ATO). SIGINTunit commanders and planners must ensure thatcoverage is complete, that assets are gainfully em-ployed or redirected, and that SIGINT reporting(and supporting CIS support) is effective. Collec-tion tasks must be analyzed to determine if theycan be met or if new collection or analysis effortsare required. The collection, direction finding,and analysis and production efforts must besupervised, integrated with all-source intelligenceoperations, and evaluated to ensure mission effec-tiveness.

7202. Collection

During collection, organic, attached, and support-ing SIGINT elements collect and deliver informa-tion to the appropriate processing or productionelement (e.g., OCAC or TERPES). In someinstances (e.g., immediate threat) the informationwill be delivered directly to the local commanderfor immediate action.

a. COMINT CollectionCOMINT collection is performed using equip-ment that intercepts adversary communicationssignals. Simple signals (e.g., unencrypted single-channel voice) can be received by ordinary re-ceivers. More complicated signals or those thatare encrypted require more sophisticated equip-ment to fully exploit the signals for their intelli-

gence value (i.e., external SIGINT processing andproduction centers such as the RSOCs or NSA).

Initially, a concentrated intercept search, signalsanalysis, and target development program is car-ried out to catalog the electromagnetic environ-ment and identify the desired threat SOIs. Inmany cases, prior knowledge of some technicalcharacteristics, such as in RSOC or CSSA databases, will enhance and streamline the MAGTF’sCOMINT search effort. When SOIs are acquiredthat are readily exploitable, SIGINT collectionoperators prepare a gist of the transmission. Re-cording of the entire intercepted signal using taperecorders may also occur.

Multichannel transmissions are first divided bySIGINT operators into their component parts orseparate channels and then processed channel bychannel. The acquired data (e.g., logs, gists, datafiles, page-prints, tapes) are rapidly assessedagainst standing PIRs for items of immediate tac-tical intelligence value and reported in accordancewith reporting and dissemination criteria to—

l Designated commanders.

l OCAC or TERPES production elements fordetailed analysis and reporting.

l MAGTF AFC for all-source analysis andproduction.

b. Direction FindingRadio DF uses electronic equipment to obtain thelocations of adversary emitters by determining thedirection of arrival or the time difference of arriv-al of the radio waves. In ideal conditions, direc-tion finders are arrayed in a network along apredetermined baseline consisting of at least threecollection and DF stations, one of which acts asnet control. The DF sites must be placed carefullyso that all stations can hear the target SOI and mu-tually support the mission.

Close coordination between collection and DFsites and the OCAC is required for a responsiveDF effort. RadBn SSU DF results are then report-ed, either manually or via automated means, to


the OCAC for follow-on intelligence exploitationand reporting.

c. ELINT Collection and Direction FindingAlthough few in numbers, the RadBn MEWSSproduct improvement program (PIP) (AN/MLQ-36A) provides for the automated search, acquisi-tion, identification, and a single DF line ofbearing of radars and other noncommunicationsemitters. Mission management, reporting, anddissemination are handled similarly to COMINTDF operations.

Additionally, in support of its strike escort mis-sion, VMAQ elements collect ELINT informationthat can be used by MAGTF intel l igenceproducers such as the MAGTF AFC and OCAC.Technical capabilities within the EA-6B’s ELINTcollection system allow for DF operations to occurfrom a single aircraft. Acquired signals are record-ed and then provided to the TERPES section forpostmission analysis, production, and reporting.

7203. Processing and Exploitation

The following processing and exploitation func-tions are used to convert collected raw informa-tion into a form suitable for SIGINT production.

a. Traffic AnalysisTraffic analysis is the study of all characteristicsof communications except encrypted texts. Callsigns, frequencies, times of transmission, crypto-graphic indicators, precedence, and messagelengths are examples of these characteristics.These characteristics are called externals and arecompiled and sorted primarily for the purpose ofreconstructing the adversary’s communicationstructure and organization. This informationyields valuable electronic order of battle data andother information. With on-line communicationencryption systems becoming widely used by po-tential adversaries, traffic analysis becomes an in-creasingly difficult function.

b. CryptanalysisCryptanalysis is the study of encrypted signals,data, and texts to determine their plain languageequivalents. The capability to read the adversary’sencrypted communications is obviously valuable.The RadBns’ limited cryptanalysis capability de-pends on the sophistication of the target’s encryp-tion system and the availability of specializedequipment and software resources from NSA.

c. Linguistic AnalysisLinguistic analysis is the transcription and trans-lation of foreign language intercepts into English.This analysis starts at the collection site upon in-terception. Messages of considerable length re-quire more time and are usually transcribed andtranslated in the OCAC. Marines are trained in awide variety of languages for this task, but aug-mentation by external sources (e.g., native and/orcontract linguists) may be required in order to sat-isfy all requirements.

d. Signal AnalysisSignal analysis consists of working with all typesof signals (e.g., COMINT, ELINT, pro forma) toidentify, isolate, reduce to pure form, and exploitacquired SOIs. The signal analyst must be welltrained and possess the proper electronic and soft-ware support tools to be effective.

e. ELINT AnalysisThe location of early warning, surveillance, andfire control radars can provide a general trace ofthe adversary’s forward battle positions and loca-tions of key C2 and fire control nodes and weap-ons systems. Medium-range and counterweaponsradar identification provides order of battle infor-mation since these systems are organic to specificadversary units.

Identification and location of air defense radarsprovide information on the disposition of the ad-versary’s air defense systems and their threat tostrike, close air support, and assault support air-craft. Following the reporting of any I&W infor-mation to tactical decisionmakers, technical dataand detailed ELINT information is forwarded to

7-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

the OCAC or to the TERPES section for furtheranalysis, production, and reporting.

7204. Production

Production is the conversion of raw informationinto SIGINT product reports through the evalua-tion, integration, and interpretation of the infor-mation derived during the processing andexploitation effort. The results of the analysis arecorrelated by SIGINT analysts and reporters toform the basis for SIGINT reports. These reportsare provided directly to tactical commanderswhen appropriate, to the G-2/S-2 for the furtheranalysis and production of all-source intelligence,and to the staff sections for future operationsplanning.

SIGINT production planning and management areclosely coordinated with all-source intelligenceproduction planning and management to—

l Determine the scope, content, and formatfor each product.

l Develop a plan and schedule for the devel-opment of products.

l Assign priorities among the various SIGINTproduct requirements.

l Allocate SIGINT processing, exploitation,and production resources.

l Integrate production efforts with all-sourcecollection and dissemination activities.

The production goal is the effective and efficientuse of limited resources while focusing on estab-lished SIGINT priorities.

a. Evaluation

SIGINT analysts evaluate the raw SIGINT infor-mation to determine its pertinence to intelligencerequirements. Further evaluation is made to judgethe reliability and accuracy of the information andto isolate significant elements.

b. IntegrationThe information derived from traffic analysis,cryptanalysis, linguistic analysis, signal analysis,ELINT analysis, and radio DF must be fully inte-grated into a fused SIGINT product to develop acomplete SIGINT picture. Concurrently, integra-tion of SIGINT processing and production withongoing MAGTF G-2/S-2 all-source intelligenceprocessing and production is essential to achievea complete, effective, and current intelligence es-timate while using the strengths and results fromthe other intelligence disciplines to improve SIG-INT operations.

c. InterpretationThe information derived from SIGINT collectionis interpreted to form logical conclusions and esti-mates of enemy capabilities, intentions, and fu-ture actions. This step completes the translation ofthe raw SIGINT information into usable intelli-gence.

7205. Dissemination

Dissemination is the provision of SIGINT infor-mation in a timely manner and in a usable form tocommanders, other decisionmakers, or all-sourceintelligence analysts. Because of security require-ments, dissemination of COMINT information ismade primarily to SIGINT and all-source intelli-gence production elements such as the MAGTFAFC. Proper SIGINT C2 and supporting CIS ar-chitectures that provide accurate situationalawareness, along with effective IRs and tacticalrequirements management, enable proper dissem-ination.

SIGINT dissemination planning and manage-ment involves establishing dissemination priori-ties, stipulating dissemination and reportingcriteria, selecting dissemination means, and moni-toring the flow of SIGINT reporting. The ultimatedissemination goal is to deliver SIGINT productsto the appropriate user in the proper form and atthe right time, while concurrently preventing thedissemination of irrelevant products and avoidinginformation overload.


Reporting consists of providing the SIGINT prod-ucts in standardized, easily usable formats neededto satisfy tasked requirements in a timely manner.The nature of the SIGINT effort requires timelyreporting to effectively exploit its intelligencevalue. SIGINT reports generally fall into two cat-egories, product reports and technical reports.Standardized formats are used in the preparationand transmission of these reports for speed andcompatibility. As most of these formats are classi-fied, readers should refer to USSID 300, SIGINTReporting, for specific information and examples.

a. Product Reports

Product reports are prepared by all SIGINT pro-ducers for commanders, planners, and all-sourceintelligence analysts. A product report containstimely, accurate, thorough, relevant, and usefulSIGINT information about the adversary in re-sponse to the supported commander’s PIRs andIRs. Reports may be sent periodically or may besent whenever highly perishable data is acquiredin accordance with specified intelligence report-ing criteria. Generally, SIGINT product reportswill fall into one of three categories:

(1) SIGINT Report. In SIGINT reports, thesource of information is clearly SIGINT by thecontent and classification markings. Such reportsgenerally contain the SIGINT assessment alongwith pertinent SIGINT technical information.These reports are handled within SCI-controlledfacilities and communications channels. Within aMEF, the CE, GCE, and ACE may be included indistribution for SIGINT products. Within aMEU(SOC) or special-purpose Marine air-groundtask force (SPMAGTF), the CE is generally thesole recipient of these reports. When pertinent, ei-ther these reports will be fused within all-sourceintelligence products for further disseminationwithin the MAGTF or dissemination will occurvia SCI courier or briefings.

(2) Non-Codeword Report. NCW reportingprocedures may be used only when authorized byDIRNSA. The principal value of NCW reportingis to allow time-sensitive dissemination of criticalSIGINT information to a broader audience during

high tempo operations. In NCW reports, thesource of information is clearly SIGINT. Howev-er, unlike standard SIGINT product reports, theNCW report is passed directly to commanderswithout SIGINT markings or SI security controlsto allow immediate tactical use (e.g., I&W, sup-port to targeting, support to force protection). Forexample, NCW reports may be passed directlyfrom the SSU collector to other MAGTF units(e.g., an infantry battalion) via GENSER commu-nications (usually voice message). Typically, theformat for these is the standard size, activity, lo-cation, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) re-port. Specific procedures regarding NCWreporting during operations should be containedwithin the SIGINT appendix to annex B of the op-erations order.

(3) Sanitized Report. Sanitized SIGINT re-ports contain SIGINT information that is reportedvia GENSER communications means in a mannerthat does not reveal SIGINT as the source of theinformation. The level of sanitization authority al-lowed the MAGTF commander is established byDOD Directive TS-5105.21-M-2, Sensitive Com-partmented Information (SCI) Security Manual,Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Policy.Within the MAGTF, actual sanitization of SIG-INT reports is generally performed by designatedintelligence personnel under the guidance and su-pervision of the MAGTF SSO or AFC OIC. Thereports are disseminated via all-source productsor other GENSER intelligence reports.

b. Technical Reports

Technical reports consist of the SIGINT technicalelements required by SIGINT collectors, analysts,and technical support and production agencies ex-ternal to the MAGTF (e.g., call signs, frequencies,operating schedules). SIGINT technical reportingrequires SCI-secure connectivity with pertinentorganizations (e.g., NSA, theater RSOC, support-ing CSSA) via JWICS, NSANET, or some alter-nate SCI communications means. Within theMAGTF, all SIGINT technical reporting is con-ducted by either RadBn or VMAQ’s TERPESsection.

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7206. Utilization

SIGINT, as all intelligence, has no inherent value.Its value is realized only through its effectivesupport of the commander’s intelligence require-ments or other operational requirements.Commanders, G-2/S-2s, and G-3/S-3s must con-tinuously evaluate SIGINT operations, products,and reports for timeliness, usefulness, and overallquality and responsiveness to stated IRs. They

must provide feedback to the MAGTF G-2/S-2and SIGINT unit leaders to improve future SIG-INT operations. Ultimately, SIGINT utilizationprovides guidance for future intelligence andSIGINT operations and management.

See appendix C, SIGINT and SCI Security Man-agement Operations Flowchart, that summarizesthe principal SIGINT planning considerations, ac-tivities, and products discussed in this chapter.


Section III. SIGINT Plans and Orders

Guidance for the conduct of SIGINT operationscomes from many sources. The DIRNSA-developed USSID series are the principal SIGINToperations directives that contain policy, direc-tion, guidance, instruction, and procedures on per-forming SIGINT functions in compliance withnational directives and security requirements. Ad-ditionally, since MAGTFs will normally be partof a JTF or NEF, reference to joint and naval or-ders, guidance, and SIGINT TTPs is necessary toidentify unique operating concepts and methodol-ogies and support procedures and formats.

The MAGTF G-2/S-2 prepares SIGINT plans andorders. The intelligence operations officer coordi-nates the overall effort with the assistance of theSIO, other intelligence section staff officers, andthe CO or OICs of organic and supporting SIG-INT units. SIGINT plans and orders focus on in-ternal MAGTF SIGINT requirements, operations,and TTP.

The SIGINT appendix will appear as appendix 2(signals intelligence) to annex B (intelligence) inall MAGTF operations plans and orders. (See ap-pendix D, SIGINT Appendix Format, of this man-ual for a recommended format for the SIGINTappendix.) It should include the following:

l Friendly forces to be utilized include—

n Personnel augmentation requirements.

n SIGINT units of adjacent or other theaterforces and the support expected.

n Joint force maritime component com-mander (JFMCC) and ATF DS SIGINTelements and CSSA available to supportthe landing force during amphibious oper-ations.

n RSOC, joint force land component com-mander (JFLCC), joint force air compo-nent commander (JFACC), and othercomponent commanders or task forces ca-pable of providing SIGINT support dur-ing JTF operations.

l Planned arrangement, employment, and useof external SIGINT support, to include anyspecial collection, production, dissemina-tion and CIS arrangements.

l Establishment of coordinating instructionsfor SIGINT operations planning and con-trol, to include technical support expectedfrom higher headquarters.

l MAGTF SIGINT element taskings.

l Communication and information SIGINTsupport.

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Section IV. Execution

MAGTF SIGINT operations generally are cen-trally managed by the MAGTF G-2/S-2 and de-centrally executed to—

l Integrate RadBn SSU and ACE VMAQTERPES SIGINT effectively with otherMAGTF and external intelligence and re-connaissance operations.

l Provide the most effective MAGTF intelli-gence requirements support.

The integration of RadBn SSU and VMAQ TER-PES SIGINT collection, production, and dissemi-nation plans and activities with those of otherMAGTF and supporting intelligence organiza-tions uses these limited resources and their mutualsupport more effectively (e.g., cueing). TheMAGTF mission, commander’s intent, threat op-erations and signals usage, concept of operations,and environmental considerations all influencethe ultimate task organization, command relation-ship, concepts of employment, and tasks of SIG-INT units. For example, they determine a decisionto task-organize elements of the SSU in directsupport of the GCE or rear area operations com-manders. Such information is specified within

annexes B, C, and K of the operations order or ina subsequent fragmentary order.

Figure 7-1 notionally depicts the following sevenkey aspects of these interrelated SIGINT opera-tions.

l Task organization and command or supportrelationships of MAGTF SIGINT units withother MAGTF elements. RadBn SSUOCAC is collocated with the MAGTF G-2/S-2 and operates in general support of theMAGTF. VMAQ and TERPES are organicand OPCON to the ACE.

l External SIGINT units that typically supporta MAGTF.

l Principal SIGINT systems employed withinand in support of the MAGTF.

l Relationship of other MAGTF intelligenceand reconnaissance units with SIGINTunits.

l Principal communications pathways, means,and level of classification.

l Key intelligence information systems thatinteroperate with SIGINT systems.

l Principal SIGINT reports disseminated viathe communications pathways shown.


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Figure 7-1. MAGTF and Supporting SIGINT Operations.

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Chapter 8

Security of Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCI is classified information concerning or de-rived from intelligence sources, methods, or ana-lytical processes that is required to be handledwithin formal access control systems establishedby the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).Only intelligence and information that clearlywarrant extraordinary security measures will berestricted to SCI control.

When dealing with issues involving SCI security,refer to the following publications for policy andinstructions:

� Director, Central Intelligence Directive(DCID) 1/14, Personnel Security Standardsand Procedures Governing Eligibility foAccess to Sensitive Compartmented Infor-mation.

� DCID 1/16, Security Manual for UniformProtection of Intelligence Processed in AISsand Networks.

� DCID 1/21, Physical Security Standards forSensitive Compartmented Information Fa-cilities.

� Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DI-AM) 50-4, Department of Defense Intelli-gence Information Systems (DODIIS)Information Security (INFOSEC) Program.

� Department of Defense Directive (DODD)5105.21-M-1, Sensitive Compartmented In-formation (SCI) Security Manual, Adminis-trative Security.

� Department of the Navy Supplement (NAV-SUP) to DODD 5105.21-M-1, SCI Adminis-trative Security Manual.

These documents provide policy and guidanceon—

� SCI personnel and information securityclearance procedures.

� SCIF and TSCIF requirements.� Classification levels.

� Compartmentation.� Decompartmentation.

� Sanitization.� Release to foreign governments.

� Emergency use.� Security policy and procedures for the pro

tection of information controlled in SCIcompartments.

Safeguarding SCI is critical. Security of SCI isimportant as it protects not only a piece of intelgence but also its source. For these reasons, semination and access to SCI information amaterials are restricted. However, to be wortwhile, SCI must be accessible to commanders use in decisionmaking. SCI must be classifieonly to the degree necessary in the interests of curity. SCI security must be applied within thcontext of the mission, with security needs costantly assessed and balanced against operatimission needs.

SCI security is the responsibility of the commaner, who exercises this responsibility through thunit G-2/S-2. The SSO serves as the primary stofficer for day-to-day SCI security administratioand management. The commander must ensSCI is accessed only by those persons with an propriate clearance, access approval, identifiedneed-to-know, and appropriate SCI indoctrintion. This is accomplished by carefully managinthose units and persons with SCI access andequipment and facilities used to process, dissemnate, and store SCI. (Appendix C, SIGINT anSCI Security Management Operations Flowchasummarizes the principal SCI security planningconsiderations, activities, and products discussin this chapter.)

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8001. Special Security Officer

The SSO serves as the command’s focal point forthe receipt, control, and accountability of SCI ma-terials and the supervision of the SCI securityfunctions of subordinate SCIFs. The SSO will bea military commissioned officer, warrant officer,or civilian (GS-9 or above). The SSO—

� Supervises the operation of the special secu-rity office and administers the SCI securityprogram. This includes oversight of otherlocal SCIFs under the SSO’s cognizance.

� Maintains required SCI directives, regula-tions, manuals, and guidelines to adequatelydischarge SSO duties and responsibilities.

� Ensures all SCI is properly accounted for,controlled, marked, transmitted, transported,packaged, and safeguarded. Ensures all SCIis destroyed in authorized destruction facili-ties and in accordance with current regula-tions.

� Ensures SCI is disseminated only to personsauthorized access with an established need-to-know.

� Provides guidance and assistance for proc-essing SCI access and eligibility requests.

� Serves as the official channel for passingSCI access certifications.

� Conducts or otherwise manages SCI person-nel, information, physical, and technicalsecurity (i.e., TEMPEST, technical surveillance countermeasures [TSCM]) actions andprocedures according to current regulations.

� Conducts SCI security briefings, indoctrina-tions, and debriefings; administers andmaintains signed nondisclosure agree-ments; and performs other related personnelsecurity actions.

� Investigates SCI security infractions, makesrecommendations, prepares required re-ports, and initiates and supervises any nec-essary corrective actions.

� Conducts a continuing training and aware-ness program to ensure that all SCI-indoctri-

nated individuals are apprised of nerequirements and guidelines.

� Ensures that appropriate accreditation docmentation is available for each SCIFTSCIF, and SCI system under the SSOcognizance.

8002. Personnel Security Program

The protection of SCI is directly related to the efectiveness of the personnel security prograDCID 1/14 establishes the personnel securstandards for the United States intelligence comunity. A mutually supporting series of programelements (e.g., need-to-know, investigation, bining contractual obligations on those granted acess, security education and awareness, aindividual responsibility) provides reasonable asurances against compromise of SCI by those thorized access to it.

a. Access Approval AuthorityIn accordance with DCID 1/14, the Director Naval Intelligence is authorized to grant, deny, revoke SCI access to Marines and Sailors. Tresponsibility is carried out through the Depament of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility(DONCAF).

b. Requirements for SCI AccessDONCAF may grant an individual SCI acceswhen the following requirements have been me

(1) Need-to-Know is Determined. Evenwhen approved for a specific access, the holdeexpected to acquire or disseminate only that Sessential to effectively carry out an assignmentNo person will have a need-to-know solely by vitue of rank, title, or position.

(2) Eligibility is Determined. DCID 1/14 pro-vides eligibility standards for investigation anevaluation for an individual’s access to SCI.


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single-scope background investigation (SSBI)conducted within the last 5 years serves as the ba-sis for determining access approval.

(3) SCI Billet is Identified. DCI does not re-quire the Navy to maintain an SCI billet structure.However, SSO Navy and CNSG have decided toretain the current SCI billet numbering system foraccountability within the DON. SCI billets are ad-ministered by the local command SSO and report-ed ann ua l l y to SSO Navy or CNSG asappropriate.

(4) Security Indoctrination is CompletedSCI indoctrination is the instruction an individualreceives prior to receiving access to an SCI sys-tems, programs, and materials. The instructionconvey the unique nature, sensitivity, and specialsecurity safeguards and practices for SCI han-dling, particularly the necessity to protect sensi-tive sources and methods.

(5) Nondisclosure Agreement is Signed.As a condition of access to SCI, individuals au-thorized SCI access must sign a DCI-authorizednondisclosure agreement (NDA). The NDA es-tablishes explicit obligations on both the Govern-ment and the individual for the protection of SCI.An NDA is binding for life and cannot be revokedor waived. Failure to sign an NDA is cause for de-nial of SCI access.

8003. Physical Security

All SCI must be processed, used, and stored with-in an accredited SCIF. Accreditation is grantedwhen the proposed facility meets the physical se-curity standards stipulated in DCID 1/21. TheSSO, DIA, is the accrediting authority for allDOD SCIFs, while NSA is the accreditation au-thority for all service cryptologic element SCIFs.Organizations are responsible for ensuring thatSCIFs are established only when operationally re-

quired and when existing SCIFs are not adequto support the unit’s mission.

a. Sensitive Compartmented Information FacilityA SCIF is an accredited area, room, group rooms, buildings, or installation where SCI mabe stored, used, discussed, and/or electronicallyprocessed. Access to SCIFs will be controlledpreclude entry by unauthorized personnel. NoSCI-indoctrinated personnel entering a SCIF mbe continuously escorted by an indoctrinated indi-vidual who is familiar with the security procedures of that SCIF. The physical securi tprotection for a SCIF is intended to prevent well as detect visual, acoustical, technical, aphysical access by unauthorized persons.

b. Emergency Action PlansEach accredited SCIF will establish an emergenaction plan. This plan will be approved by the apropriate G-2/S-2 or SSO. The essential conceof the plan must be safety of personnel over other factors. The plan will address—

� Physical protection of personnel working ithe SCIF.

� Adequacy of fire fighting equipment andlife-support equipment (e.g., oxygen anmasks).

� Entrance of emergency personnel (e.g. plice, medical technicians, and firemen) inta SCIF.

� Evacuation plans for persons. � Emergency destruction and transfer proc

dures of classified material and equipmein the event of—� Fire.� Loss of essential utilities.� Sabotage.� Riots.� Civil disorders.� Hostile or terrorist attack or capture.� Natural disasters.

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c. Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

Recognizing the need for SCIFs to support tacti-cal operations, the DCI requires the followingminimum physical security standards for aTSCIF. If the situation and time permit, theseminimum standards will be improved on by usingthe security considerations and requirements forpermanent secure facilities. (Appendix E, TSCIFChecklist, is provided as a guide when activatingor deactivating a TSCIF.)

� Locate the TSCIF within the supportedheadquarter’s defensive perimeter, prefera-bly within its main command echelon.

� Use permanent-type facilities, if available.

� Maintain 24-hour operation under field orcombat conditions.

� Establish a physical barrier around theTSCIF. Where practical, the physical barriershould be tr iple-strand concert ina ogeneral-purpose barbed-tape obstacle. TheTSCIF approval authority determineswhether proposed security measures provideadequate protection based on local threatconditions.

� Guard the TSCIF perimeter by stationingwalking or fixed guards to observe the con-trolled area. Guards will be armed withweapons and ammunition in accordancewith Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5500.6F,Arming of Security and Law Enforcemen(LE) Personnel and the Use of Force.

� Restrict access to the controlled area with asingle gate or entrance that is guarded con-tinuously.

� Maintain an access list. Only those peoplewhose names appear on the list will be al-lowed access to the TSCIF.

� Staff the TSCIF with sufficient personnel asdetermined by the on-site SSO or G-2/S-2based on the local threat conditions.

� Keep emergency destruction and evacuationplans current.

� Store SCI material in lockable containerswhen not in use.

� Establish and maintain communications wilocal security or emergency reaction forceif possible.

� Conduct an inspection of the vacated TSCarea. The SSO or G-2/S-2 ensures SCI mterials are not inadvertently left behinwhen the TSCIF displaces.

� Coordinate planning with the unit’s head-quarters commandant, who is responsibfor providing TSCIF guard personnel, communication with command post guard forces, emergency personnel reaction forceand internal reaction forces.

d. Mobile Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information FacilityMobile TSCIF requirements are as follows:

� Maintain a 24-hour operation and staff theTSCIF with sufficient personnel as detemined by the on-site SSO or G-2/S-2 bason the local threat conditions.

� Incorporate external physical security meaures into the perimeter defense plans for timmediate area in which the mobile TSCIis located. (A physical barrier is not requireas a prerequisite to establish a mobiTSCIF.)

� Use Marines performing the day-to-day operations of the TSCIF to control externaphysical security.

� Establish and maintain communicationwith backup guard forces, if possible.

� Incorporate incendiary methods in emergen-cy destruction plans to ensure total destrution of SCI material during emergencsituations.

� Adhere to the following restrictions whenusing a rigid-sided shelter or portable van.

� Mount the shelter to a vehicle so that thshelter can move on short notice.

� Affix a General Services Administration(GSA)-approved security container per-manently within the shelter. Protect thlock combination to the level of securityof the material stored therein.


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� Control the entrance to the mobile TSCIFwith SCI-indoctrinated Marines on dutywithin the shelter.

� Limit entrance to the mobile TSCIF toSCI-indoctrinated personnel.

� Store classified material within the lockedGSA container and secure the shelter’exterior entrance during redeployment.

� Adhere to the following restrictions whenusing a mobile TSCIF for a soft-sided vehi-cle or man-portable system.� Protect SCI material in an opaque con-

tainer (i.e., leather pouch, metal storagebox, or other suitable container that pre-vents unauthorized viewing).

� Keep this container in the physical pos-session of an SCI-indoctrinated person.

� Limit the quantity of SCI material permittedwithin the mobile TSCIF to that which is ab-solutely essential to sustain the mission.Employ stringent security arrangements toensure that the quantity of SCI material isnot allowed to accumulate more than is ab-solutely necessary.

e. Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility AccreditationThe accreditation process consists of three steps,each requiring a message to be sent to the cogni-zant approval authority (see NAVSUP to DODD5105.21-M-1). Approval authorities vary with re-spect to information and formats required. Whenrequesting TSCIF authorization and accreditation,use the current reference from the cognizant au-thority. The following reports and messages areprepared by the unit SSO or G-2/S-2.

(1) Concept of Operations. A message thatoutlines the who, what, when, where, and why for

the TSCIF and identifies supporting security, aministrative, and point of contact information.

(2) TSCIF Activation Report. A report sent tothe approval authority upon commencement TSCIF operations.

(3) TSCIF Deactivation Report. A report sentto the approval authority when the TSCIF haceased operations and has been certified to beof SCI material.

8004. Information Systems Security

All SCIF intelligence and information systemused for processing, storing, and conveying inteligence and/or SIGINT information must be acredited prior to operating. The DON approvinauthority for SCIF intelligence systems is the Ofice of Naval Intelligence (ONI-54) in accordancwith DIAM 50-4. The cognizant DON approvingauthority for SCIF resident cryptologic systems CNSG (N1).

The SSO is responsible to the G-2/S-2 for overmanagement and administration of the unit’s Ssecurity program and for SCIF security. Thunit’s information system security manage(ISSM) and the information system security offier (ISSO) complement the SSO and are accouable for the SCIF-resident information systemThe ISSM or ISSO will help ensure new anchanged information systems meet all security quirements. These individuals coordinate the aproval of new or changed systems with thappropriate DON approving authority. Normallythe ISSM and ISSO are the principal interfacbetween the approving authority and the loccommand.

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Chapter 9

Training

The policies, standards, and procedures for theconduct of SIGINT training as well as the assign-ment of responsibilities to ensure adequate and re-sponsive training are spelled out in DODD5210.70, DOD Cryptologic Training. Additional-ly, MCO 1510.50A, Individual Training Stan-dards (ITS) System for the Signals IntelligenceGround Electronic Warfare Occupational Field(OccFld), provides a detailed description (by rankand MOS) of tasks SIGINT Marines must be ca-pable of performing.

9001. Military Occupational Speciality Training

Training for the SIGINT Marine focuses on build-ing, maintaining, and enhancing the technicalskills required to be MOS proficient.

a. Entry-Level Training

The foundation for all SIGINT Marine training isthe entry-level training. Due to its highly techni-cal nature, this OccFld possesses some of thelongest MOS entry-level training pipelines. Thefollowing paragraphs briefly describe these pipe-lines.

(1) 0206 Basic SIGINT. Following The BasicSchool, all SIGINT-designated lieutenants aresent to the Cryptologic Division Officers Course(CDOC), Corry Field, Pensacola, Florida. Fol-lowing CDOC, all 0206 lieutenants are ordered toone of the two RadBns to develop and enhancetheir SIGINT skills.

(2) 7588 Electronic Warfare Officer. The ini-tial, formal EW training for air EW lieutenants isthe Joint Electronic Warfare School, PensacolaFlorida. The course focuses on basic radar theory,friendly and threat integrated air defense system

(IADS), naval forces organization and capabities, and the application of EW.

Following the Joint Electronic Warfare School,7588 lieutenants receive specialized training wthe Fleet Replacement Squadron (VAQ-129Whidbey Island, Washington. This 9-montcourse provides instruction and training on tEA-6B aircraft operations and systems and othreat IADS aircraft and shipping. Additionallyall 7588 electronic warfare officers obtain NavAir Training and Operating Procedures Standarization (NATOPS) program qualification in theEA-6B.

(3) 2621 Manual Morse Intercept Operator.Manual Morse training begins with Morse codetraining at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona. Upon gradution, the new manual Morse intercept operator rports to Corry Field, Pensacola, Florida, for tCommunication Signals Collection and Procesing (450) Course.

(4) 2631 ELINT Intercept Operator or Ana-lyst. Basic ELINT training is provided by theCryptologic Technician Course, Corry FieldPensacola, Florida. Marines assigned to tVMAQ TERPES section also attend the TERPEOperator Course, Navy and Marine Corps Intelgence Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia.

(5) 2651 Special Intelligence Communica-tor. Training in SI communications, data communications, networks, and system security provided in the Cryptologic Technician “O”Course, Corry Field, Pensacola, Florida.

(6) 267X Cryptologic Linguist. The crypto-logic linguist has the longest initial training tracof any ground MOS. Training begins with basilanguage training at the Defense Language Instute (DLI), Monterey, California, for a period o47 to 63 weeks, depending on the language a

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student’s ability. Following graduation from DLI,the basic linguist will report to Goodfellow AFB,Texas, for cryptologic linguist specialist training.

(7) 2629 SIGINT Analyst. Upon completion oftheir initial tour, many 2621’s, and some 2631’s,and 267X’s will attend the Fleet Analysis and Re-porting Course, Goodfellow AFB, Texas, for ad-dit ional training to qualify for MOS 2629,SIGINT analyst.

b. SIGINT Skill Progression TrainingSIGINT Marines have a wealth of resident andnonresident training opportunities to refine, main-tain, or enhance their skills. These programs areannounced by HQMC and include—

� NSA Director’s Fellowship Program forfield grade officers.

� Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Programfor company grade officers.

� Middle Enlisted Cryptologic Career Ad-vancement Program for SNCOs.

� Military Intern SIGINT Analyst Programfor SNCOs and NCOs.

� Military ELINT Signals Analyst Programfor SNCOs and NCOs.

� Marine Corps Cryptologic Computer Ad-ministration Program for enlisted Marines.

� Various military linguist programs.

9002. Functional Training

Functional SIGINT training focuses on ensuringMarines in all elements of the MAGTF are awareof SIGINT contributions and the correspondingSIGINT or EW threat from our adversaries.

a. SIGINT MarinesFunctional training educates SIGINT Marines onall-source intelligence operations within theMAGTF, naval forces, and JTFs. SIGINTMarines participate in exercises to learn opera-tional intelligence requirements; the interactionbetween commanders and staffs and MAGTFunits and intelligence sections; and the capabili-

ties, limitations, and operational support methoologies within MAGTF and other units. Duringexercises, SIGINT Marines interact with the G-3S-3 and G-6/S-6 to refine coordination requirments and improve intelligence flow during actual operations.

b. SIGINT Training of Non-SIGINT MarinesNon-SIGINT Marines are trained in the capabities and limitations of Marine, Navy, JTF, theateand national SIGINT systems that supportMAGTF operations. Equal time should be spetraining these Marines on the capabilities and liitations of the adversary’s SIGINT or EW systems and on individual and force protectiotactics and techniques. To improve mutual undestanding and eliminate misconceptions, thunique security restrictions required when dealiwith SIGINT information should also be explained to and practiced by non-SIGINT Marines.

9003. Exercises

SIGINT operations in exercises are closely cotrolled. The same security precautions and cotrols are required for both the real world anexercises. USSID 56, Exercise SIGINT, providesguidance on obtaining and using SIGINT durinexercises.

Exercise SIGINT provides commanders, stafand units with experience in SIGINT operationinformation, rules, communications, and personel. Exercise SIGINT operations may be condued with or without an opposition force. Carshould be taken during exercises to present a ristic picture of what SIGINT systems can providto avoid creating false expectations.

If an opposition force does not participate, execise SIGINT may be scripted or preplanned (e.staff exercise [STAFFEX] or a command poexercise [CPX]). Use of scripted SIGINT in aexercise must be requested and approved byappropriate agency well in advance of the execise. This will allow time to script the exercis


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SIGINT necessary to realistically support the sce-nario. Exercise planners and exercise SIGINTscripters must coordinate to ensure the SIGINinformation flow is realistic. All security require-ments must be maintained throughout the exercise(e.g., TSCIF activation and SCI-handling proce-dures).

Exercise SIGINT operations may be conductedagainst an opposition force (e.g., during aMAGTF field exercise). This provides more real-istic training for the SIGINT element and SIGINTusers. Depending on the level of the exercise, theuse of simulators and national systems may be re-quested to add realism and enhance trainingThese assets must be requested well in advance ofthe exercise and approved by the appropriateagency described in the J-TENS manual.

9004. Operational Training Objectives

The major objective for SIGINT operations train-ing is exercising SIGINT operations in a realistictactical environment with all elements of theMAGTF.

a. SIGINT OrganizationsRadBns and VMAQs should—

� Train unit leaders, planners, and supervisorypersonnel to—� Plan and direct, process and exploit, pro-

duce, disseminate, and use uniqueSIGINT and integrated all-source intelli-gence.

� Plan and integrate SIGINT operationswith multifunctional staff operations.

� Conduct SIGINT operations.� Train SIGINT operators in SIGINT—

� Operations.� Systems.� Equipment. � TTP.� Supporting operations (i.e., CIS, logistics,

and intelligence).

b. G-2/S-2 and Intelligence Personnel Intelligence personnel must be able to—

� Understand the capabilities and limitationof SIGINT collection operations and thplanning, integration, coordination, and excution of SIGINT collection with multidis-cipline intelligence and reconnaissanccollection operations.

� Understand the capabilities and limitationof SIGINT production operations and thplanning, integration, coordination, and excution of SIGINT production with all-source intelligence production operations.

� Understand the capabilities and limitationof SIGINT dissemination operations (e.gplanning, integration, coordination, and excution of routine and time-sensitive SIGINTdissemination) and the requirements, estalishment, and integration of unique SIGINTand multiuse CIS architectures.

c. G-3/S-3 and Maneuver and Fires PersonnelOperations, maneuver, and fires personnel shobe able to—

� Plan, coordinate, and conduct effectivMAGTF SIGINT, EW, and CIS operations.

� Plan, coordinate, and conduct insertion anextraction methods.

� Site and coordinate SIGINT collection anDF teams with supporting SIGINT elementG-2/S-2, and subordinate commanders.

� Coordinate SIGINT operations withMAGTF and subordinate units’ future andcurrent operations centers and fire suppcoordination centers.

� Disseminate and use SIGINT and other Sinformation.

d. G-4/S-4 and Combat Service Support PersonnelLogistics and CSS personnel should understaSIGINT units’ unique CSS requirements (particularly electronic maintenance and unique consuables such as batteries).

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e. G-6/S-6 and Communications and Information Systems PersonnelCIS personnel must be able to plan, coordinateand integrate SIGINT CIS requirements withinMAGTF and supporting CIS plans and opera-tions.

f. Headquarters CommandantHeadquarters commandant personnel mustable to understand, plan, and provide for the SIINT units’ security requirements (particularlythose associated with TSCIFs and mobile SIGINSCIFs).

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Appendix A

Radio Battalion SIGINT Support Unit Checklist

The following checklist is provided as a guide toassist the radio battalion (RadBn) SIGINT sup-port unit (SSU) officer in charge (OIC) conducoperations. Depending on the mission, locationand duration of an operation, some items may notbe applicable.

Planning Stage

� Coordinate with the RadBn S-3 to—

� Determine exact mission and tasking ofthe detachment and the authority and com-mand relationship.

� Review all messages related to deploy-ment and composition of the detachment.

� Ensure S-3 tasks companies or sections toprovide required personnel to fill detach-ment table of organization (T/O) line num-bers.

� Request assignment of RadBn SIGINT ad-dress and producer designator digraph, ifnecessary.

� Verify formats and instructions for re-quired reports.

� Determine if area clearances and clearancecertifications are necessary and requestspecial security officer (SSO) take appro-priate action.

� Review pertinent orders and instructionsof the supported unit.

� Identify and arrange for special trainingand operational requirements.

� Coordinate with the following supported com-mand—

� G-2/S-2 intelligence operations officer todetermine initial intelligence collection,

production, and dissemination require-ments and current intelligence estimate.

� G-2/S-2 intelligence operations officer todetermine time constraints for submissioof input to appendix 2 to annex B of theoperations order.

� G-2/S-2 all-source fusion center OIC todetermine plans and integration of intelligence and SIGINT production activities.

� G-2/S-2 dissemination officer for a list ofSIGINT products recipients, appropriatereport formats, and routine and timesensitive communications and informa-tion systems (CIS) plans.

� G-2/S-2 intelligence operations officer anG-4/S-4 for supply and logistics requirements to be provided by supported command (e.g., electronic maintenance aconsumables such as batteries; mealready to eat; maps; and fuel).

� G-3/S-3 electronic warfare officer for electronic attack (EA) requirements and capabilities and input to appendix 3 to annex of the operations order.

� G-2/S-2 operations officer and G-6/S-6 taddress requirements for communicatiosupport (e.g., secure and unclassified locarea network [LAN] access, equipment).

� G-3/S-3 to establish liaison teams withsupported unit’s subordinate elements necessary.

� Command security manager, G-2/S-2, anG-3/S-3 for force protection and communications security monitoring requiremenand plans.

� Develop and publish a training schedule in cordination with the RadBn S-3 and supporteunit’s intelligence officer.

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� Request courier cards from RadBn SSO forappropriate detachment personnel.

� Coordinate collection and analytical and pro-duction requirements with the operations con-trol and analysis (OCA) element to—

� Ensure the detachment analytical and pro-duction team knows the technical aspectsof the operations area.

� Ensure the analytical and production teamhas a current technical support package;request an update if required (i.e., hard-copy, electronic copy).

� Ensure SIGINT position designators forequipment are current; prepare and issuerequired SIGINT resource status report(RSR).

� Ensure the National Security Agency(NSA) or the pertinent regional securityoperations center or cryptologic shore sup-port activity provides a current technicalbriefing on targets in the area of opera-tions.

� Coordinate transportation requirements withRadBn S-3, S-4, and supported unit.

� Coordinate embarkation requirements withRadBn S-4 and supported unit to—

� Review current embarkation orders.

� Complete embarkation forms (e.g., Tacti-cal Cargo Manifest Declaration, 1387-2,1348-1).

� Review current inbound and outbound ag-ricultural restrictions on vehicles.

� Assemble complete embarkation kit withguidelines for use upon departure.

� Request table of equipment (T/E) items fordetachment.

� Coordinate communications and informationrequirements with RadBn S-6 and supportedunit intelligence officer and CIS officer to—

� Determine circuit request requirement.

� Determine telecommunications service rquest (TSR) requirement.

� Determine frequency and call sign requirments and request communicationelectronics operating instructions.

� Request special intelligence (SI) routingindicator and plain language address asignments.

� Determine communications security materials system (CMS) requirements and rquest that the CMS custodian havematerial available for issue.

� Designate an SSO CMS custodian.

� Determine TEMPEST inspections and automated information systems accredittion requirements.

� Determine cryptographic hardware andkeying material requirements and procdures with all communication elements.

� Ensure all personnel are qualified with T/Oweapons and arrange for battlesight zero(BZO) firing as necessary.

Predeployment Stage

� Audit health records to—

� Determine inoculations required and ar-range for required shots with the corpsman.

� Determine if detachment members omembers of their families are undergoinextensive outpatient care, with an indefinite prognosis.

� Confirm and record blood types.

� Ensure all personnel requiring eyeglasshave two pair. Also ensure they have opcal inserts for gas masks.

� Ensure detachment members meet clasor II dental readiness.

� Arrange for block pickup of health anddental records.

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� Coordinate legal affairs to—

� Inform personnel of advisability of willsand procedures for obtaining them.

� Inform personnel of powers of attorneyand procedures for obtaining them.

� Arrange for storage of privately owned vehi-cles and personal effects.

� Arrange for mail handling.

� Coordinate pay matters to—

� Conduct personal financial record audit.

� Prepare savings and other allotments.

� Coordinate administrative matters to—

� Verify accuracy of record of emergencydata.

� Ensure identification cards are current andhave proper Geneva Convention categoryinformation.

� Ensure personnel have current identifica-tion (ID) tags.

� Audit and update officer qualification rec-ords and enlisted service record books.

� Complete change of reporting senior fit-ness reports, fitness report roughs, andproficiency and conduct marks.

� Coordinate clothing inspection and require-ments to—

� Ensure personnel have appropriate service-able uniforms for all destinations.

� Ensure personnel have appropriate civilianattire in accordance with local militarycustoms of country(ies) to be visited.

� Ensure temporary issue requirements drawincludes the proper sizes and is coordinat-ed through the RadBn S-4 and supportedunit.

� Ensure baggage is appropriate and of sturconstruction.

� Ensure personnel know customs requiremeof locations to be visited.

� Prepare government transportation request.

� Prepare military transportation authorization

� Conduct the following:

� Family services deployment briefing forall SSU and family members.

� Red Cross brief.

� Navy and Marine Corps Relief brief (to include preauthorized emergency loan appcations).

� Religious services brief.

� Family services brief.

� Key spouses brief.

� Assemble assigned T/E equipment requirefor deployment to—

� Perform operational check of equipment.

� Complete limited technical inspection(LTI) on all equipment.

� Perform acceptance inspections on alltemp-loan equipment.

� Check the date of last calibration, if applicable.

� Arrange for draw or transfer of CMS materia

� Receive CMS custodial briefing from CMScustodian.

� Receive security requirements and emergendestruction briefing from SSO.

� Conduct training in accordance with established detachment training schedule.

� Coordinate with the RadBn SSO and classfied materials control officer to—

� Designate a detachment classified matersecondary control point and custodian.

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� Ensure required single-scope backgroundinvestigation periodic reviews are initiat-ed on those detachment personnel identi-fied as needing updates.

� Request sensitive compartmented informa-tion (SCI) clearance certification on all de-tachment personnel be forwarded tocognizant units and other organizations asnecessary.

� Coordinate with the RadBn adjutant or S-1to—

� Draw record books.

� Pick up orders.

� Establish report criteria.

� Arrange for administrative and legalbriefs.

� Arrange for detachment Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice and code of conduct brief-ings.

� Coordinate with RadBn SSO to—

� Confirm security requirements.

� Pick up courier cards for specified person-nel.

� Receive area intelligence briefs to includecustoms, politics, religion, and standardsof personal conduct.

� Receive counterintelligence area threatbriefs.

� Ensure all required personnel receive ap-propriate special access indoctrination(s).

� Transfer necessary technical material fromSSO and OCA classified material controlcenter accounts.

� Coordinate with RadBn S-3 to—

� Establish SIGINT operations report crite-ria.

� Determine topographic and map requirements and request allowance from OCA the supported unit.

� Request preparation of appropriate cryptlogic technical kits from NSA or the sup-porting cryptologic shore support activity.

� Coordinate with RadBn S-4 supply to estalish fiscal account job order numbers and sigthe consolidated memorandum receipt.

� Coordinate with RadBn S-4 electronic maintenance to—

� Establish equipment maintenance procedures.

� Establish electronic maintenance suppoand prepare pre-expend bin support bloc

� Ensure that all equipment receives a preployment LTI.

� Ensure skeleton record jackets are prepared for all equipment.

� Coordinate with RadBn S-4 motor transpoand engineer to—

� Establish equipment maintenance procedures.

� Establish motor transport and enginesupport.

� Ensure skeleton record jackets are prepared for all vehicles.

� Coordinate with RadBn S-4 ordnance officeto—

� Determine weapon requirements andother ordnance needs.

� Obtain proper storage boxes for the tranport of weapons.

� Draw weapons.

� Conduct necessary inspections.

� Conduct daily sight counts.

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� Determine ammunition and pyrotechnictraining requirements during deployment.

� Coordinate with RadBn S-4 embarkation of-ficer to—

� Receive embarkation package.

� Determine dunnage requirements.

� Draw equipment and sign for gear assigned todetachment.

� Receive medical brief from battalion medicalpersonnel.

� Contact special services officer for recreationitems.

� Publish the final—

� Detachment T/O and T/E.

� Roster of personnel.

� Dependent point-of-contact roster.

� Equipment and uniforms required.

� Detachment training schedule.

� Detachment operations order.

� Palletize or combat load supplies and equip-ment.

� Coordinate embarkation of personnel andequipment with S-4 of supported unit.

� Stage for embarkation.

Deployment

� Coordinate with G-2/3 and S-2/3 for initial lo-cation of combat operations center, combat in-telligence center, and collection directionfinding (DF) and EA teams.

� Continue coordination of collection and DFteam and radio reconnaissance team locationswith G-2/S-2 collections officer and G-3/S-3.Include updates for inserts, extract times, andmethods.

� Coordinate with G-2/S-2 intelligence operations officer for inputs and presentation for intelligence estimate, concept of operations, aintelligence operations plans briefings.

� Submit the following required reports andmessages:

� Activation report and deactivation repoto RadBn S-3 and supported unit G-2/S-2

� Circuit activation report to RadBn S-6 ansupported unit G-6/S-6.

� Administrative reports to RadBn S-1.

� CMS destruction reports to SSO or CMS

� Circuit deactivation report to RadBn S-6and supported unit G-6/S-6.

� Transportation request to RadBn and suported unit G-4/S-4.

� Required analysis and technical reportsOCA and supported unit G-2/S-2. (RSR tNSA upon activation and deactivation.)

� Tactical SCI facility activation and deac-tivation reports to Commander, Naval Security Group, supported unit SSO, andothers as appropriate.

� Prepare and distribute required reports to thsupported commander.

� Send deactivation message.

Postdeployment

� Turn in weapons and classified material immediately upon return.

� Participate in supported unit operations de-briefings as required. Debrief with RadBcommanding officer and S-3 on the firstworking day after return.

� Coordinate with RadBn adjutant, S-1, S-3and S-4 to—

� Return record books to S-1.

� Return medical and dental records.

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� Terminate temporary additional duty(TAD) orders.

� Prepare and submit performance evalua-tion reports and proficiency and conductmarks as required for the TAD period.

� Notify mail clerk to stop forwarding mail.

� Return technical material to the OCA pla-toon.

� Return CMS material to CMS custodian with-in 48 hours of return.

� Return courier cards to SSO.

� Prepare equipment for postdeployment LTI.

� Ensure proper maintenance is conducted onequipment prior to returning to respectivecompanies or sections.

� Turn in equipment on equipment repair ordeand note any equipment damage or problem

� Settle fiscal account.

� Submit an after action report within 20 days return (or as directed) to the supported uniG-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and RadBn S-3.

� Disband detachment.

� Prepare award recommendations on deservpersonnel.

� Recommend necessary changes to unit SOand coordinate with the RadBn and supportunit staff.

Appendix B

Marine Corps SIGINT Equipment

Radio battalions (RadBns) and Marine tacticalelectronic warfare squadrons (VMAQs) useunique specialized equipment for the search, de-tection, identification, processing and exploitationof enemy signals of interest (SOIs), and the subse-

quent production and dissemination of SIGINTproducts. The following sections describe the pri-mary SIGINT equipment in the inventory of theRadBns and VMAQs.

Section I. Radio Battalion SIGINT Equipment

AN/ULQ-19(V)2 Electronic Attack Set

The AN/ULQ-19(V)2 electronic attack (EA) set(figure B-1) provides the capability to conductspot or sweep jamming of single-channel, en-crypted or unencrypted, voice or data signals op-erating in the standard military frequency range of20-79.975 MHz from selected mobile platforms(e.g., high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehi-cles [HMMWVs], mobile electronic warfare sup-port system [MEWSS], helicopters). In addition,it can provide up to four channels of high-powerVHF voice and/or data communications when notbeing used as a jamming system. When employedas a tactical, general-purpose, low-VHF jammingsystem, it has a 250-watt radio frequency linearamplifier that produces a nominal 200 watts of ef-fective radiated power (ERP) using a standardomnidirectional whip antenna. To provide re-quired jamming, the system must be employedand operated from a location with an unobstructedsignal line of sight to the target enemy’s commu-nications transceiver. Figure B-1. AN/ULQ-19(V)2.

B-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

AN/MLQ-36 Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System

The AN/MLQ-36 MEWSS provides a multifunc-tional capability that gives SIGINT electronicwarfare (EW) operators limited armor protection(figure B-2). This equipment is ideally suited toprovide SIGINT EW support for highly mobilemechanized and military operations in urban ter-rain where maneuver and/or armor protection iscritical. MEWSS comprises a signals interceptsystem, a radio direction finding (DF) system, anEA system, a secure communications system, andan intercom system installed in a logistics variantof the light armored vehicle (LAV)-25. Electronicwarfare support (ES) activities are accomplishedthrough the use of two WJ-8618B(S1) acquisitionreceivers and the WJ-32850 MANTIS DF system.EA activities are conducted with the AN/ULQ-l9(V) electronic attack set.

Figure B-2. AN/MLQ-36.

Signals Intelligence _______________________________________________________________________________________ B-3

AN/MLQ-36A Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System Product Improvement Program

The mobile electronic warfare support systemproduct improvement program (MEWSS-PIP) isan advanced SIGINT/EW system integrated intoan LAV (figure B-3). The MEWSS-PIP provides atotal replacement of the EW mission equipmentnow fielded in the AN/MLQ-36 MEWSS. It pro-vides the ground commander with a mobile SIG-INT/EW system capable of operating in a varietyof tactical situations. The primary mission of theMEWSS-PIP is to provide intercept, collection,automated DF, and EA against threat moderncommunications and noncommunications emittersacross a broad frequency range. It is a multiser-vice, open-systems architecture developed by theMarine Corps and the Army that incorporates ele-ments of the Army’s intelligence and electronicwarfare common sensor (IEWCS) system. Thissystem enhances interoperability through cooper-ative engagement, data sharing, and precision lo-cation. Initial operational capability is scheduledfor fourth quarter, fiscal year 1999.

Figure B-3. AN/MLQ-36A.

B-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

AN/PRD-12 Direction Finder Set

The AN/PRD-12 is a tactical, man-transportablesystem that provides search, intercept, and DF oncommunications signals in the HF/VHF/UHFbands (figure B-4). Up to four PRD-12 stationscan be networked, providing DF data to a missioncontrol station via radio link with single-channelground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS)equipment. Each station has the ability to functionas the net control station. When stations are net-worked, they provide target emitter position datato mission control via voice link. A complete sta-tion can be relocated rapidly, optimizing its use inforward areas with combat units.

Figure B-4. AN/PRD-12.


AN/MSC-63A Communications Central

The AN/MSC-63A is a shelterized communica-tions switch that provides a secure semiautomateddata communications switch and terminals for theprocessing of general service (GENSER) or de-fense special security communications system(DSSCS) sensitive compartmented information(SCI) record message traffic. See figure B-5.There is one AN/MSC-63A with each Marine di-vision and Marine aircraft wing special securitycommunications team, and three AN/MSC-63A’swith each RadBn. The system consists of threefunctional subsystems: shelter and auxiliary sup-port subsystem, the communications subsystem,and the data processing subsystem. See figure B-6.The AN/MSC-63A is fully compatible with theArmy’s AN/TYC-39. Figure B-5. AN/MSC-63A.

Figure B-6. AN/MSC-63A (interior view).

B-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

AN/TSQ-130(V)2/(V)5 Technical Control andAnalysis Center

The AN/TSQ-130(V)2/(V)5 technical control andanalysis center (TCAC) is an all-weather, tactical,transportable, SIGINT-processing, analysis andreporting system installed in a large, self-contained, modified S-280G shelter. TCAC is the

primary system used by the RadBn SIGINTsupport uni t . I t is capable of performingsemiautomated-SIGINT collection management,data base maintenance, analysis, technical andtactical reporting, and SIGINT technical controlof forward deployed RadBn elements or teams.The (V)2 is the baseline system, while the (V)5has upgraded communications capabilities. Seefigure B-7 for a notional TCAC concept of em-ployment.

Figure B-7. Technical Control and Analysis Center Concept of Employment.


AN/MYQ-8 TCAC-PIP

The AN/MYQ-8 TCAC-PIP will replace theTCAC. It will consist of three remoteable analysisworkstations (RAWSs), one communications in-terface module (CIM), and one supervisor controlmodule (SCM). Each workstation will consist ofmodularly designed component equipment fullyintegrated to perform their intended functions.

Remoteable Analysis WorkstationRAWS provides the capability to perform neces-sary analysis and reporting functions at a centrallocation or a more forward deployed site, remotedfrom the TCAC shelter. During shelter opera-tions, a RAWS will be electrically interconnectedto the other terminals in the shelter. During remote

operations, a RAWS will be connected to the shel-ter via local area network (LAN) or radio link. Itcould operate in a stand-alone mode.

Communications Interface ModuleCIM provides man-machine interface to commu-nication subroutines that support the interface be-tween the TCAC PIP and other RadBn systems(e.g., team portable collection system, mobileelectronic warfare support system) or external in-telligence agencies.

Supervisor Control ModuleSCM provides a man-machine interface to fileserver and supervisor subroutines to support sys-tem control and overall supervision of the TCACPIP workstations.

AN/USC-55 Commander’s Tactical Terminal

The AN/USC-55 commander’s tactical terminal(CTT) is a multiservice-developed, special appli-cation, UHF satellite communications receiverthat can be dedicated to receive critical, time-sensitive intelligence by commanders and intelli-

gence centers at all echelons, in near-real-time, atGENSER or SCI levels. The receiver providesone full-duplex and two receive-only channels.Planned concept of employment for CTT is simi-lar to that of the tactical receive equipment (TRE)fielded widely within the MAGTF to allow accessto intelligence broadcasts and intelligence collec-tors and producers. Full operational capability forCTT is expected during fiscal year 1999.

B-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

Team Portable Collection System Upgrade

The team portable collection system (TPCS) up-grade (figure B-8) is a semiautomated, man-trans-portable communications intelligence (COMINT)system. It provides intercept, collection, radio di-rection finding, analysis, reporting, and collectionmanagement support. The system provides signif-icant SIGINT capabilities in a modular configura-tion that can be deployed by component as astand-alone COMINT system or as part of the in-tegrated RadBn SIGINT and MAGTF intelligenceefforts. TPCS uses state-of-the-art equipment thatconsolidates information and expedites the deliv-ery of critical COMINT to MAGTF and externalcommanders and agencies. The upgrade will ex-tend the frequency range of the system and pro-vide capabilities against modern signals.

Figure B-9. Team Portable Collection System COMINT Collection Subsystem.

Figure B-8. Team Portable CollectionSystem Upgrade.


TPCS upgrade is comprised of three subsystems:a COMINT collection subsystem (CCS), includ-ing the AN/PRD-12 direction finding set (to bereplace by TOPMAKER) and collection receivers(see figure B-9 on the facing page); an analysissubsystem (AS) (figure B-10); and a communica-tions subsystem (CS). Modern single-channel

radio nets are used to link TPCS upgrade outsta-tions with the RadBn TCAC to allow automatedprocessing and dissemination of collected infor-mation and ultimate dissemination to the MAGTFG-2/S-2 and other organizations. Full operationalcapability for TPCS upgrade is expected by thesecond quarter of fiscal year 2001.

Figure B-10. Team Portable Collection System Analysis Subsystem.

B-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

Trojan Spirit II

Trojan Spirit II (TS II) is a mobile SHF satellitecommunications (SATCOM) system that usescommercial or military satellites to receive, trans-mit, and process secure, voice, data, videoteleconferencing (VTC), and facsimile communi-cations. See figure B-11. TS II provides 14 chan-nels of digital voice or data (SCI or GENSER) witha maximum aggregate data rate of 1.544 mega-bytes per second (Mbps). LAN communicationsare supported by SCI and GENSER ethernets.

Routers provide access to the secret internet pro-tocol router network, the Joint WorldwideIntelligence Communications System, NationalSecurity Agency platform, and the defense SAT-COM system. These capabilities provide the nec-essary dedicated communications for coordinatingMAGTF SIGINT and other intelligence opera-tions. The system consists of three HMMWVswith mounted standard integrated command postlightweight multipurpose shelters, tunnel-mountedpower generation units, a towed 2.4 meter (C, Ku-band), and a 6.1 meter (C, Ku, X-band) antenna.

Figure B-11. Trojan Spirit II.

Signals Intelligence ______________________________________________________________________________________ B-11

Radio Reconnaissance Equipment Program

The radio reconnaissance equipment program(RREP) SIGINT suite (SS)-1 is a semiautomated,integrated radio intercept and DF system com-posed of a ruggedized computer and six function-al modules that plug together. See figure B-12.RREP SS-1 modules may operate independentlyor semi-independently through the use of the rug-gedized, handheld computer system. It isdesigned to enable preplanned product improve-ments and future technology upgrades. The se-l ec t ed equ ipmen t w i l l enab l e t he r ad ioreconnaissance teams (RRTs) to target the majori-ty of low-level, single-channel, unencrypted tacti-cal signals of interest used by military, police,insurgents, and other potential hostile forcesthroughout the world. RREP SS-1 will be em-ployed by RRTs during advance force, preassaultand deep postassault conventional, and specialoperations, under any environmental, climatic, orweather conditions. The system is designed tolighten the individual RRT Marine’s combat loadas well as to enhance the RRT’s operational sig-nal search and technical data base developmentcollection operations.

The RREP SS-2 will provide a highly deployable,man-transportable, signals intercept and DF sys-tem employed by RRTs in support of the entirespectrum of MAGTF operations. See figure B-13.RREP SS-2 employs advanced receiver capabili-ties, cellular phone and other digital communica-tions collection and DF technology, globalpositioning system map navigation software, amore modular design, and electronic attack capa-bilities. As with RREP SS-1, the SS-2 operates atthe modular level and at the integrated systemlevel. The system can be controlled manually orvia subcompact personal computer.

Figure B-12. RREP SS-1.

Figure B-13. RREP SS-2.

B-12 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

The handheld integrated directional receiver andhoming (HIDRAH) system is a man-transport-able, tactical, cordless, radio intercept and signalline-of-bearing (LOB) DF system consisting ofseveral commercial off-the-shelf items of equip-ment fully integrated in a single, ruggedized andweather-resistant housing. HIDRAH provides

RRTs with a threat I&W capability during radioreconnaissance foot-mobile patrols and signalhoming support for tactical recovery of aircraftand personnel operations. The HIDRAH systemhas a unique design that may be employed inde-pendently in a handheld manner or by mounting itto an M16 rifle (figure B-14).

Figure B-14. Rifle-Mounted HIDRAH.

Signals Intelligence ______________________________________________________________________________________ B-13

Section II. Radio Battalion SIGINT Equipment Technical Characteristics

Designator Description Frequency Coverage Modulation

AN/MLQ-36 MEWSS; COMINT collect/process/analysis; EA

20-80 MHz (collection and DF expandable to 500 MHz)

AM, FM, ICW, SSB, FSK

AN/MLQ-36A MEWSS-PIP; COMINT/ELINT col-lect/process/geolocation; EA

0.5 MHz - 40 GHz conventional, low probability of intercept

AN/PRD-12 direction finder set, manpackable

.5 - 500 MHz AM, FM, ICW, SSB, FSK

AN/ULQ-19(V)2 electronic attack set; EA 20 - 79.975 MHz FM

AR-2002 commercial VHF/UHF frequency scanner; COMINT

25 - 550 MHz, 800 - 1300 MHz AM, FM

AR-2500 commercial HF/VHF/ UHF fre-quency scanner; COMINT

1 - 1500 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB


5 - 1500 MHz AM, FM


0.1 - 2036 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB

EB-100 receiver, miniport VHF/UHF; DF 20 - 1000 MHz intercept and DF AM or FM

HEXJAMS hand-emplaced, expendable jam-mers

barrage jam 20 - 80 MHz NA

HIDRAH COMINT collection, DF .1 - 1900 MHz intercept25 - 1000 MHz DF

AM, FM, USB, LSB, CW

IC-R71A general coverage HF receiver; COMINT

0.1 - 30 MHz AM, FM, CW

IC-R7000 general coverage VHF/UHF receiver; COMINT

25 - 1300 MHz AM, FM, SSB

IC-R9000 general coverage HF/VHF/UHF receiver; COMINT

0.1 - 1999.80 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB

ICF-PR080 commercial HF/VHF handheld fre-quency scanner; COMINT

.15 - 108 MHz & 115.15 - 223 MHz AM, FM, SSB

MPR-88 receiver, miniport VHF/UHF, rugge-dized; COMINT

20 - 1000 MHz intercept AM or FM

R-2174(P)/URR radio receiver, general purpose, HF; COMINT

0.5 - 29.999 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB

RREP SS-1 COMINT collection, DF 1 - 2000 MHz intercept25 - 1000 MHz DF


RREP SS-2 COMINT collection, DF .1 - 1900 MHz intercept25 - 1000 MHz DF


WJ-8616 radio receiver, general purpose, HF; COMINT

0.5 - 29.999 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB

WJ-8618 radio receiver, general purpose, VHF/UHF; COMINT

20 - 500 MHz AM, FM, CW, pulse

WJ-8654 radio receiver, general purpose,COMINT

.5 MHz - 1.0 GHz AM, FM, CW, pulse

B-14 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

Section III. VMAQ SIGINT and EW Equipment

AN/TSQ-90D/E(V) TERPES

The AN/TSQ-90D/E(V) tactical electronic recon-naissance processing and evaluation system(TERPES) receives, processes, evaluates, and dis-plays electronic reconnaissance and EA missioninformation received from the EA-6B aircraft andother theater and national electronic intelligence(ELINT) assets (figure B-16). TERPES also as-sists the MAGTF aviation combat element’s

(ACE) air strike mission planning and intelligencerequirements. It is a multisource, integrated, tacti-cal ELINT data processing, correlation, and fu-sion system installed in a S-280-size transportableshelter. TERPES supports the ELINT and EA/ESmission and VMAQ and MAGTF ACE com-mander’s intelligence requirements. TERPESmay be transported by aircraft, shock-mountedair-ride commercial or tactical ground vehicle, orattachable mobilizer for short distances.

EA-6B Prowler

The EA-6B Prowler (figure B-15) is a subsonicadvanced warfare carrier capable aircraft, pow-ered by twin turbojet engines. The crew is com-posed o f one p i lo t and th ree e l ec t ron iccountermeasure officers. The AN/ALQ-99 tacti-cal jamming system effectively incorporates re-ceivers and external pods for power andtransmission of jamming signals. The Prowler re-ceives and processes designated signals of interest(SOIs) for jamming selected SOIs for subsequentprocessing and analysis and employs the AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM). Figure B-15. EA-6B Prowler.

Figure B-16. AN/TSQ-90D/E(V), TERPES Portable Unit.

Appendix C

SIGINT and SCI SecurityManagement Operations

Flowchart

The flowchart on the following pages summarizes the principal SIGINT andSCI security planning considerations, activities, and products discussed in thispublication.

C-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

Signals Intelligence _______________________________________________________________________________________ C-3

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Appendix D

SIGINT Appendix Format

This appendix should explain how SIGINT elements supporting or underoperational control of the MAGTF will be used to support this plan. It shouldso provide guidance to subordinate commanders for the conduct of SIGINTerations and the support of SIGINT elements and personnel identified to futhe SIGINT requirements in this plan.

___________________________________________________________

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no.___ of ___ copiesIssuing UnitPLACE OF ISSUEDate/time groupMessage reference numbe

APPENDIX 2 (Signals Intelligence) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to OperatioOrder _________ ( )

Ref: (a) Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) for intelligence counterintelligence

(b) Combatant commander, joint task force, or other higher authoritoperation orders (OPORDs) and tactics, techniques, and proceddirectives

(c) (List other documents that provide guidance required for SIGIand supporting operations planning functions.)

1. ( ) SITUATION

a. ( ) Enemy Situation. (Reference Appendix 8 [Intelligence Estimatto Annex B. Describe the threat and potential threat, the basic situation anSIGINT operations perspective. Identify the enemy’s command and contactical and electronic orders of battle; and estimates of the enemy’s centgravity, critical vulnerabilities, intentions, capabilities, and possible courseaction pertinent to SIGINT operations. When possible, identify finished integence products supporting these findings. Reference Annex B and current inligence estimates for threat capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, order obattle, and assessed courses of action.)

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b. ( ) Friendly Situation. (Reference Annex C [Operations] and othpertinent sources.)

c. ( ) SIGINT Support Available. (Reference Annex A [Task Organization], Annex B, and other pertinent sources. Identify organic, attachedsupporting SIGINT elements available to support MAGTF intelligence options. Specify elements attached to or in direct support of any subordinate

2. ( ) MISSION

(State concisely the SIGINT mission as it relates to the command’s planneeration.)

3. ( ) EXECUTION

a. ( ) Concept of Operations. (Summarize pertinent command relationships, task organization, main and supporting efforts, and the scope of MAand supporting SIGINT and relevant all-source intelligence operations.)

b. ( ) Tasks for SIGINT and Subordinate Units and Task Force Comanders and Officers in Charge (OICs).

(1) ( ) Radio battalion (RadBn) SIGINT support unit (SSU) commanding officer or OIC

(2) ( ) Aviation combat element commander (special attentionVMAQ tasks)

(3) ( ) Ground combat element (GCE) commander

(4) ( ) Rear area operations center (RAOC) commander

(5) ( ) (Others as appropriate)

(This section may include direction, requirements, authority, and othguidance regarding SIGINT elements placed in direct support of MAGTF sordinate element. Also it may include tactical sensitive compartmented [SCcilities, special security offices, physical security, and personnel supportingSIGINT and SCI operations, etc.)

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c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. (Restatement of MAGTF priority in-telligence requirements; detailed procedures for intelligence requirements agement; SIGINT support requests; direct liaison among subordincommanders, MAGTF SIGINT units, staff officers, and pertinent external onizations and agencies; routine and time-sensitive reporting and formats; e

4. ( ) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. ( ) Logistics. (Reference Annex D [Logistics]. Identify unique combservice support requirements, procedures, and guidance to support MASIGINT units and operations. Specify procedures for specialized technicagistics support necessary from external organizations [e.g., from Director,tional Security Agency, or via service cryptologic element channels].)

b. ( ) Personnel. (Reference Annex E [Personnel]. Identify SIGINTunique personnel requirements and concerns, including global sourcing suand contracted linguist requirements.)

c. ( ) Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls aLimiting Factors. (Provide a consolidated listing and impact assessment of sonnel and equipment shortfalls and other limiting factors that significantlyfect unit SIGINT operations and support. Identify resource problems specify key tasks that might not be accomplished adequately.)

5. ( ) COMMAND AND CONTROL

(Reference the MAGTF’s and SIGINT units’ SOPs and Appendix 10 [Integence Operations Plan]. Provide guidance as appropriate on the followingcluding internal unit and external organizations’ command and control [C2]

a. ( ) Command Relationships. (Reference Annex J [Command Rela-tionships]. Provide any instructions necessary regarding command relationarrangements that will influence MAGTF SIGINT operations, with specialtention to C2 relationship concerning SIGINT elements attached to or in dsupport of MAGTF subordinate units.)

b. ( ) Information Management. (Reference Annex U [InformationManagement], Annex C [Operations], and Appendix 10 to Annex B. Provany instructions necessary regarding information management [e.g., time-stive and routine SIGINT reporting criteria, SIGINT data bases, administraand access, reports] that will influence MAGTF SIGINT operations.)

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c. ( ) Communications and Information Systems (CIS). (ReferenceAppendix 10 to Annex B and Annex K [Communications and Information Stems]. Provide any instructions necessary regarding CIS that will influenceMAGTF SIGINT operations.)

d. ( ) SIGINT C2 Nodes and Facilities. (Reference the MAGTF's andSIGINT units’ SOPs and Appendix 10 to Annex B. Provide any guidance instructions necessary regarding the establishment and operations of SIC2 nodes and facilities [e.g., the operations control and analysis center, amious task force ship’s signals exploitation spaces] and their integration wither MAGTF C2 nodes [e.g., the MAGTF all-source fusion center, tsurveillance and reconnaissance center, the reconnaissance operations the amphibious task force intelligence center, electronic warfare coordincenter].)

/s/ ___________________ ____________________

OFFICIAL

/s/ ________________________________________

TABS:

A - Communications Intelligence Operations Requirements B - Electronic Intelligence Operations RequirementsC - (Others as appropriate: routine and time-sensitive reporting forma

SIGINT CIS plan, etc.)

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Copy no.___ of ___ copiesIssuing UnitPLACE OF ISSUEDate/time groupMessage reference numbe

TAB A (Communications Intelligence Operations Requirements) to APPEN2 (Signals Intelligence) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order_________ ( )

1. ( ) GENERAL

(The purpose of this tab is to identify operations requirements for communtions intelligence [COMINT] support to the planned MAGTF operation.)

NOTE: SCI controls may require this tab to be published separately frombasic OPORD, Annex B and/or Appendix 2.

a. ( ) (Orient COMINT collection, processing and exploitation, pro-duction, and dissemination efforts to answer the questions listed in paragraand 3 below.)

b. ( ) (These requirements should address both organic and externrect support SIGINT resources tasked to support the MAGTF.)

c. ( ) (Reference other pertinent portions of Annex B and current inligence estimates.)

2. ( ) COMINT OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS AND MANAGE-MENT

a. ( ) Classification. (Designate the overall classification of the information included. Assign the lowest classification possible consistent with elished security guidelines.)

b. ( ) Statement of Requirement. (Describe in detail COMINT infor-mation need, priority, specification of timeliness, location accuracy, and peicity using the following format:

(1) ( ) Requirement. A detailed narrative statement of the requirment.

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(2) ( ) Priority. The priority of each requirement specification, us-ing the following criteria for assigning priority:

(a) ( ) Priority 1. Intelligence vital to successful plan implementation (forms the basis for the most crucial operational decisions).

(b) ( ) Priority 2. Intelligence of critical importance to planimplementation, required for making operational decisions and planning futoperations.

(c) ( ) Priority 3. Intelligence of major importance to plan implementation, including intelligence required for the security of significant nbers of United States (and allied) forces.

(d) ( ) Priority 4. Intelligence of considerable importance toplan implementation (makes important contribution to operational decisionming and planning).

(e) ( ) Priority 5. Intelligence of moderate importance to plaimplementation (makes moderate contribution to operational decisionmaand planning).

(f) ( ) Priority 6. Intelligence of some importance to plan implementation (contributes in a measurable way to operational decisionmaand planning).

(g) ( ) Priority 7. Intelligence of interest to plan implementation.

(3) ( ) Time. (Identify the maximum delay acceptable for receiof information by the intended user [e.g., within 10 minutes after recognitio

(4) ( ) Location Accuracy. (Identify the minimum locational accu-racy for which the information is needed [e.g., 95-percent confidence, withkilometer of center mass, within 25 kilometers of emitter location].)

(5) ( ) Periodicity. (Identify the maximum amount of time thatshould pass before the target is covered again [i.e., once every 24 hours oevery 8 hours].)

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c. ( ) User Echelon(s). (Identify the primary echelon needing the information [e.g., GCE, RAOC]. List multiple users only if all data elements osubparagraph 2c above are the same for all listed echelons; otherwise, resrequirement.)

d. ( ) Geographic Area. (Specify the geographic area for which the rquirement specification applies, defined precisely [i.e., Country X, 0 to 50from western border; or Country Y, 50 to 75 km from southeastern border].)

e. ( ) Justification. (For each requirement specification, indicate thoperational function(s) or purpose(s) [i.e., artillery targeting or air reconnsance planning].)

3. ( ) UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPORD. (List, in the mannerdescribed above, the COMINT operational requirements that become releupon implementation of the plan. Use subsequent paragraphs to reflect adal support requirements for planned phases of combat operations.)

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Appendix E

TSCIF Checklist

The following checklist is provided as a guidewhen activating and deactivating a tactical sensi-tive compartmented information facility (TSCIF).The security measures identified should be im-proved upon as the situation permits. Refer to Di-rector of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/21, Physical Security Standards for SensitiveCompartmented Information Facilities, and De-partment of Defense Directive (DODD) 5105.21-M-1, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)Security Manual, Administrative Security, for de-tailed TSCIF operations policy and procedures.

TSCIF Activation

� Obtain site location from advance party per-sonnel.

� Submit request to establish TSCIF to cogni-zant special security officer (SSO).

� Assign vehicle and/or shelter locations tosite personnel.

� Move vehicles into site position. Ensure SCIcontainers remain locked and guarded untsite is accredited.

� Configure site for operation needs and easeof future movement.

� Erect shelters, antennas, and camouflage.

� Establish internal communications (SSO toaccess control point and emergency reactionforce).

� Review and implement guard procedures.

� Emplace barrier material and restrictionsigns.

� Establish a 24-hour, single-gate access point(shelter with lights). Provide guards with ac-cess roster of authorized personnel.

� Determine location of destruction site (burbarrel, etc.).

� Conduct briefings (i.e., operations securityemergency destruction, emergency evacution, shift schedule, reaction force, perimetedefense, badge system).

� Doublecheck physical security of site.

� Accredit site; declare site secure.

� Inventory SCI documents and materials they are unpacked.

� Inform G-2/S-2 of commencement of TSCIoperations.

� Begin SCI operations and communications

� Send TSCIF activation message.

TSCIF Deactivation

� Receive the order to terminate operations.

� Coordinate deactivation time with the G-2/S-2.

� Zeroize communications security (COM-SEC) equipment; ensure message queuesemptied.

� Establish guards for SCI materials; inventoand pack SCI into locked containers.

� Debrief all one-time access personnel.

� Ensure all magnetic media is degaussedminimum of three times each and all teletype, printers, and/or typewriter ribbons ardestroyed or secured with SCI material.

� Sweep all SCI work areas for SCI and otheclassified materials, including telephone di-rectories, newspapers, magazines, notepatrash bags, etc. Check desk drawers, undneath desks and boxes, equipment contain-ers, bulletin boards, acetate overlays, etc.

E-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

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� Ensure all SCI is either packed in propercontainers for redeployment or destroyed us-ing established procedures.

� Account for all TSCIF badges and accessrosters.

� Make a final inspection of the TSCIF and de-clare it officially deactivated.

� Send TSCIF deactivation message.

� Ensure all personnel are briefed on movement time and location and SCI is propercontrolled.

� Upon termination of operations, return togarrison SCIF, reinventory and account fall SCI material, reset all combination locksclear all hand receipts, and clean equipmen

� Update standing operating procedure and fiwith lessons learned during the operation.

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Appendix F

Glossary

Section I

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAW.............................................. antiair warfareACE .............................. aviation combat elementADCON ............................. administrative controlADP ............................. automatic data processingAFB................................................Air Force baseAFC.................................. all-source fusion centerAI ...................................................area of interestAIA ......................Air Force Intelligence AgencyAIG .............................. addressee indicator groupAM..................................... amplitude modulationAMP........................................................amplifierAO.............................................area of operationsAS ...........................................analysis subsystemATARS ........................advanced tactical airborne

reconnaissance systemATF.................................... amphibious task forceATFIC................................ amphibious task force

intelligence centerATO ............................................ air tasking orderAWACS .............................. airborne warning and

control system

BDA............................. battle damage assessmentBE ........................................... basic encyclopediaBn Hq................................. battalion headquartersbps..................................................bits per secondBZO ..............................................battlesight zero

C2........................................command and controlC2W...................... command and control warfareC4I .............. command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligenceCapt ............................................................ captainCATF ............ commander, amphibious task forceCCE.......................... company command elementCCIR ................commander’s critical information

requirementsCCS..................... COMINT collection subsystemCDOC ...........cryptologic division officers course

Cdr ......................................................commandCE ............................................ command elemCGS..................................common ground statCHATS ..................counterintelligence/HUMINT

analysis tool setCI ............................................counterintelligenCIC.............................. combat intelligence cenCIM................. communications interface moduCINC......................................commander in chCIS ......communications and information systemCJTF..........................commander, joint task forCLF ..............................commander, landing forCLT.................................... company liaison teaCMC................Commandant of the Marine CorCMO ................... collections management officCMS.......................... COMSEC materials systeCNSG............Commander, Naval Security GroCO......................................... commanding officCOC ...............................current operations cenCOMINT................. communications intelligenccomm .......................................... communicatioCOMMARFOR ..........commander, Marine Corp

forcesCOMMARFORLANT......................Commander

Marine Corps Forces,Atlantic

COMMARFORPAC.........................CommandeMarine Corps Forces,

PacificCOMSEC...................... communications securCONPLAN................................. contingency plaCpl............................................................ corpoCPX.................................. command post exercCRITICOMM ................. critical communicationsCS.............................. communications subsystCSG.............................. cryptologic support groCSP ................................ cryptologic support plCSS .................................. combat service suppCSSA ...............cryptologic shore support activi

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CSSD ............ combat service support detachmentCSSE ..................combat service support elementCTT....................... commander’s tactical terminalCW..............................................continuous wave

DASC.............................. direct air support centerDCI ..................... Director of Central IntelligenceDCID....................................... Director of Central

Intelligence DirectiveDCS................................ Defense Courier ServiceDF ..............................................direction findingDIA ........................ Defense Intelligence AgencyDIAM......... Defense Intelligence Agency manualDIRNSA..................... Director, National Security

AgencyDLI ............................Defense Language InstituteDMS..............................Defense Message SystemDOD ................................ Department of DefenseDODD............... Department of Defense directiveDON ...............................Department of the NavyDONCAF ...........Department of the Navy Central

Adjudication FacilityDS ................................................... direct supportDSSCS ............................defense special security

communications system

EA ............................................... electronic attackEA-6B .......................all weather electronic attack...................................................aircraft (Prowler)ECAC...................Electromagnetic Compatibility

Analysis CenterECMO............ electronic countermeasures officerECU ............................environmental control unite.g....................................................... for exampleEHF ............................. extremely high frequencyELINT ..............................electronics intelligenceEM ...............................................electromagneticEMCON ......................................emission controlEOB .............................. electronic order of battleEP .........................................electronic protectionEPL ....................................ELINT parameters listERP ................................effective radiated powerES ................................electronic warfare supportEW ...........................................electronic warfareEWCC ................ electronic warfare coordination

centerEWDS .......................electronic warfare data base

systemEWIR .......................electronic warfare integrated

reprogramming

EWMSNSUM......... EW mission summary repoEWO .............................electronic warfare office

FDM .................. frequency division multiplexingFIE .................................................. fly-in echeloFIIU....................force imagery interpretation unFISINT ................ foreign instrumentation signa

intelligenceFM ..................................... frequency modulatioFMF .......................................Fleet Marine ForFMFM ....................... Fleet Marine Force manuFSCC................... fire support coordination cenFSK ........................................frequency shift kFSSG..........................force service support gro

G-1 ............... manpower or personnel staff officG-2 .................................. intelligence staff officeG-3 .................................... operations staff officG-4 ....................................... logistics staff officeG-6 ................... communications and informatio

systems officerGCE ................................ground combat elemGENSER .......................................general servGHz.........................................................gigaheGS ....................general support; general schedGSA .................. General Services AdministratioGySgt ......................................... gunnery serge

H&S ............................... headquarters and servHARM .............. high-speed antiradiation missiHF ................................................ high frequenHIDRAH..............handheld integrated direction

receiver and homingHMMWV..................high mobility, multipurpose

wheeled vehicleHQMC .................... Headquarters, Marine CorHUMINT ............... human resources intelligenc

I&W ............................... indications and warninIAA ..................Intelligence Analysis ApplicationIADS ....................... integrated air defense systIAS ........................... intelligence analysis systeICR................. intelligence collection requiremeICW.......................... interrupted continuous waID ..................................................... identificatioIDR.......... intelligence dissemination requiremei.e..................................................................thaIEWCS ........................ intelligence and electron

warfare common sensoIMINT .................................. imagery intelligenc

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INSCOM................... U.S. Army Intelligence andSecurity Command

intel ..................................................... intelligenceIPR ............... intelligence production requirementIR ....................................intelligence requirementISSM .......... information system security managerISSO.............. information system security officerITS ...........................individual training standardsITT ............................ interrogator-translator team

JC2WC..................... Joint Command and ControlWarfare Center

JCS........................................ Joint Chiefs of StaffJDISS ....................... joint deployable intelligence

support systemJFACC ...... joint force air component commanderJFC .................. .................joint force commanderJFLCC........................ joint force land component

commanderJFMCC................joint force maritime component

commanderJIC ...................................joint intelligence centerJISE.................. joint intelligence support elementJMCIS ............................ joint maritime command

information systemJSC.......................................joint spectrum centerJSIPS................ Joint Service Imagery Processing

SystemJ-TENS........................ Joint Tactical Exploitation

of National SystemsJTF .................................................joint task forceJWICS.....................Joint Worldwide Intelligence

Communications System

LAN ......................................... local area networkLAV ................................... light armored vehicleLCpl ................................................lance corporalLE................................................law enforcementLOB .............................................. line of bearingLOS ................................................... line of sightLSB .............................................. lower sidebandLt ............................................................lieutenantLTI ............................ limited technical inspection

MAG ................................... Marine aircraft groupMAGTF ................. Marine air-ground task forceMARDIV ..................................... Marine divisionMARFOR .............................Marine Corps forcesMarSptBn ......................Marine support battalion

MASINT ....................measurement and signatuintelligence

MATCD..... Marine air traffic control detachmenMAW ...................................Marine aircraft winMbps .................................. megabytes per secMCB........................................ Marine Corps baMCO ..................................... Marine Corps OrdMCW .......................modulated continuous waMCWP ......Marine Corps warfighting publicationMECDL .......mission equipment control data linMEF ..........................Marine expeditionary forcMEU ............................Marine expeditionary unMEU(SOC) ..................Marine expeditionary un

(special operations capableMEWSS ..........mobile electronic warfare suppo

systemMEWSS PIP .................mobile electronic warfa

support system producimprovement program

MHz ......................................................megaheMIDB.................modernized integrated data baMISSI.................... multilevel information system

security initiativeMOS .................... military occupational specialMSC.........................major subordinate commaMSE ............................major subordinate elemeMSgt..............................................master sergeMSPF ...................maritime special purpose forMUX ....................................... multichannel rad

NATO ........... North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNATOPS......... Naval Air Training and Operatin

Procedures StandardizatioNAVSUP .................................. Navy supplemeNCA.................... National Command AuthoritieNCO..............................noncommissioned officNCOIC ......... noncommissioned officer in chargNCS...........................................net control statiNCW .............................................. non-codewoNDA...............................nondisclosure agreemeNEF...............................naval expeditionary forNID ............................naval intelligence data baNIMA.................. National Imagery and Mappin

AgencyNIPRNET........ nonsecure internet protocol rout

networkNIST................ national intelligence support teaNMCC.......... National Military Command Cente

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NRO...................National Reconnaissance OfficeNRT ...............................................near-real-timeNSA ............................National Security AgencyNSANET....... National Security Agency NetworkNSG ................................... Naval Security GroupNSGA................... Naval Security Group ActivityNSOC.......... National Security Operations CenterNTF.............................................. naval task forceNTTC.........Naval Technological Training Center

OAS ..................................... offensive air supportOBREP................................. order of battle reportOCA.....................operations control and analysisOCAC ...... operations control and analysis centerOccFld ......................................occupational fieldOIC.............................................. officer in chargeOLT........................................OCAC liaison teamONI ...........................Office of Naval IntelligenceOOB................................................order of battleOPCON .................................. operational controlOPLAN ...........................................operation planOPNAV ..............................Office of the Chief of

Naval OperationsOPORD.........................................operation orderOTH ............................................ over the horizonOWO...............................operations watch officer

PCM.................................. pulse code modulationPIP ....................... product improvement programPIR .....................priority intelligence requirementPU .............................................. participating unit

RadBn ............................................ radio battalionRAOC ......................... rear area operations centerRAWS................ remoteable analysis workstationrecon.............................................. reconnaissanceRF................................................. radio frequencyRFI ....................................request for intelligenceRREP ................. radio reconnaissance equipment

programRRP......................... radio reconnaissance platoonRRT ............................ radio reconnaissance teamRSOC............. regional security operations centerRSR..................................... resource status reportRU....................................................reporting unit

S-1................ manpower or personnel staff officerS-2................................... intelligence staff officerS-3..................................... operations staff officerS-4........................................ logistics staff officer

S-6............................................... communicatioand information systems staff office

SALUTE ................... size, activity, location, unitime, and equipment

SARC ................ surveillance and reconnaissacenter

SATCOM ......................satellite communicationSCAMP...............sensor control and managem

platoonSCE ........................... service cryptologic elemeSCI ............sensitive compartmented informatiSCIF ...............................sensitive compartmen

information facilitySCM.............................supervisor control moduSCR.......................................single-channel raSgt ............................................................ sergeSHF .....................................super high frequenSI.............................................special intelligenSIDS................. secondary imagery disseminat

systemSIGINT ..................................signals intelligencSINCGARS ................ single-channel ground a

airborne radio systemSIO .............................. signals intelligence officSIPRNET ............... secret internet protocol rout

networkSNCO....................staff noncommissioned officSNCOIC .......................... staff noncommission

officer in chargeSOC .............................special operations capaSOI .............................................. signal of intereSOP .........................standing operating procedSOTA........ SIGINT operational tasking authoritSPINTCOMM ........................special intelligenc

communicationsSPMAGTF ...................... special-purpose Marin

air-ground task forceSS.....................................................SIGINT suSSB ..............................................single sidebaSSBI ......... single-scope background investigatiSSCC ................ special security communicatio

centerSSCT ........special security communications teaSSE.................................SIGINT support elemeSSES ................. ship’s signals exploitation spaSSgt.................................................. staff sergeSSO .................................. special security officSSOC .............. special security operations cenSST......................................SIGINT support teaSSU ...................................... SIGINT support un


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STAFFEX ........................................ staff exerciseSTU III ................... secure telephone unit-type III

TACC......... tactical air command center (USMC)tactical air control center (USN)

TACELINT................................... tactical ELINTTACINTEL............................ tactical intelligenceTACREP ........................................ tactical reportTACSAT.......................................tactical satelliteTAD ............................. temporary additional dutyTADIL ............... tactical digital information linksTAMPS ........................ Tactical Aircraft Mission

Planning SystemTAOC ...................... tactical air operations centerTCAC ......... technical control and analysis centerTCAE....... technical control and analysis elementTCIM .................tactical control interface moduleTCO .............................tactical combat operationsTDDS ........tactical receive equipment and related

applications program data dissemination systemTDN .................................... tactical data networkT/E ...........................................table of equipmentTEAMS ........................... tactical EA-6B mission

planning systemTECHCON..................................technical controlTEG..............................tactical exploitation groupTENCAP .............tactical exploitation of national

capabilities programTEPP ..................... TERPES ELINT preprocessorTERPES ........Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance

Processing and Evaluation SystemTFP...............................TERPES fusion processorTIBS...........tactical information broadcast systemTJS ..................................tactical jamming system

T/O ...................................... table of organizatitopo .................................................... topograpTPCS ..................team portable collection systeTPFDD............................... time-phased force a

deployment dataTPU....................................TERPES portable uTRAP ....................TRE and Related ApplicationTRE .............................tactical receive equipmeTRIB .......... tactical remote intelligence broadcaTRIXS ....... Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligen

Exchange SystemTRSS.......................tactical remote sensor systTS II .............................................. Trojan Spirit TSCIF................ tactical sensitive compartment

information facilityTSCM ..... technical surveillance countermeasuTSR ...............telecommunications service requTTP ................ tactics, techniques, and procedu

UAV................................unmanned aerial vehicUHF ..................................... ultra high frequenUSAF ...............................United States Air ForUSB .............................................. upper sidebaUSMC ....................... United States Marine CorUSSID ............ United States Signals Intelligen

DirectiveUSSS .................... United States SIGINT Syste

VHF ..................................... very high frequenVMAQ ............Marine tactical electronic warfar

squadronVPN ...........................................voice product nVTC .................................. video teleconferencin

WAN........................................ wide area netwo

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Section II

Definitions

A

all-source intelligence Intelligence productsand/or organizations and activities that incorpo-rate all sources of information, including, mostfrequently, human resources intelligence, imageryintelligence, measurement and signature intelli-gence, signals intelligence, and open source data,in the production of finished intelligence. (JoinPub 1-02)

amphibious objective area—A geographical ar-ea, delineated in the initiating directive, for pur-poses of command and control (C2) within whichis located the objective(s) to be secured by theamphibious task force (ATF). This area must beof sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of theATF’s mission and must provide sufficient areafor conducting necessary sea, air, and land opera-tions. Also called AOA . (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of interest—That area of concern to thecommander, including the area of influence, areasadjacent thereto, and extending into enemy terri-tory to the objectives of current or planned opera-tions. This area also includes areas occupied byenemy forces who could jeopardize the accom-plishment of the mission. Also called AOI . (JointPub 1-02)

area of operations—An operational area definedby the joint force commander for land and navalforces. Areas of operation do not typically encom-pass the entire operational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enough for com-ponent commanders to accomplish their missionsand protect their forces. Also called AO. (JointPub 1-02)

B

basic intelligence—Fundamental intelligenceconcerning the general situation, resources, capa-bilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries orareas which may be used as reference material in

the planning of operations at any level and evaluating subsequent information relating to thsame subject. (Joint Pub 1-02)

battle damage assessment—The timely and ac-curate estimate of damage resulting from tapplication of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined objective. Batdamage assessment can be applied to the empment of all types of weapon systems (air, grounnaval, and special forces weapon systemthroughout the range of military operations. Batdamage assessment is primarily an intelligenresponsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessmis composed of physical damage assessmefunctional damage assessment, and target sysassessment. Also called BDA. (Joint Pub 1-02) InMarine Corps usage, the timely and accurate emate of the damage resulting from the applicatiof military force. BDA estimates physical damagto a particular target, functional damage to thtarget, and the capability of the entire target sytem to continue its operations. (MCRP 5-12C)

battlespace—All aspects of air, surface, subsuface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrwhich encompass the area of influence and aof interest. (MCRP 5-12C)

battlespace dominance—The degree of controlover the dimensions of the battlespace which hances friendly freedom of action and denies emy f reedom o f ac t ion . I t permi ts fo rcesustainment and application of power projectioto accomplish the full range of potential opertional and tactical missions. It includes all actionconducted against enemy capabilities to influenfuture operations. (MCRP 5-12C)

C

centralized control—In military operations, amode of battlespace management in which oneechelon of command exercises total authority a


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direction of all aspects of one or more warfightingfunctions. It is a method of control where detailedorders are issued and total unity of action is theoverriding consideration. (MCRP 5-12C)

collection—In Marine Corps usage, the gatheringof intelligence data and information to satisfy theidentified requirements. (MCRP 5-12C)

collection management—The process of con-verting intelligence requirements into collectionrequirements, establishing priorities, tasking ocoordinating with appropriate collection sourcesor agencies, monitoring results and retasking, asrequired. (Joint Pub 1-02) Its purpose is to con-duct an effective effort to collect all necessary da-ta while ensuring the efficient use of limited andvaluable collection assets. (MCRP 2-1)

combat data—Data derived from reporting byoperational units. (MCRP 5-12C)

combatant command—A unified or specifiedcommand with a broad continuing mission undera single commander established and so designatedby the President through the Secretary of Defenseand with the advice and assistance of Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commandtypically have geographic or functional responsi-bilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control—The exercise of authori-ty and direction by a properly designated com-mander over assigned and attached forces in theaccomplishment of the mission. Command andcontrol functions are performed through an ar-rangement of personnel, equipment, communica-tions, facilities, and procedures employed by acommander in planning, directing, coordinating,and controlling forces and operations in the ac-complishment of the mission. Also called C2.(Joint Pub 1-02) The means by which a com-mander recognizes what needs to be done andsees to it that appropriate actions are taken.(MCRP 5-12C)

command and control warfare—The integrateduse of operations security, military deception,psychological operations, electronic warfare, andphysical destruction, mutually supported by intel-

ligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and contcapabilities, while protecting friendly commandand control capabilities against such actions. Alcalled C2W. (Joint Pub 2-0)

commander’s critical information require-ments—Information regarding the enemy anfriendly activities and the environment identifieby the commander as critical to maintaining situtional awareness, planning future activities, anfacilitating timely decisionmaking. Also calledCCIR . Note: CCIRs are normally divided intothree primary subcategories: priority intelligencrequirements, friendly force information require-ments, and essential elements of friendly informtion. (MCRP 5-12C)

commander’s intent—A commander’s clear,concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind oor more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is oof two parts of every mission statement whicguides the exercise of initiative in the absence instructions. (MCRP 5-12C)

communications intelligence—Technical and in-telligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipienAlso called COMINT . (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications security—The protection re-sulting from all measures designed to deny unathorized persons information of value whicmight be derived from the possession and studytelecommunications, or to mislead unauthorizpersons in their interpretation of the results such possession and study. Also called COM-SEC. (Joint Pub 1-02 extract)

coordination—The action necessary to ensuadequately integrated relationships between serate organizations located in the same area. Codination may include such matters as fire suppoemergency defense measures, area intelligenand other situations in which coordination is cosidered necessary. (MCRP 5-12C)

critical information— Specific facts aboutfriendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan a

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act effectively so as to guarantee failure orunacceptable consequences for friendly missionaccomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

critical intelligence—Intelligence which is cru-cial and requires the immediate attention of thecommander. It is required to enable the com-mander to make decisions that will provide atimely and appropriate response to actions by thepotential/ actual enemy. It includes but is not lim-ited to the following: a. strong indications of theimminent outbreak of hostilities of any type(warning of attack); b. aggression of any natureagainst a friendly country; c. indications or use ofnuclear-biological-chemical weapons (target);and d. significant events within potential enemycountries that may lead to modification of nuclearstrike plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

critical vulnerability— An aspect of a center ofgravity that if exploited will do the most signifi-cant damage to an adversary’s ability to resist. Avulnerability cannot be critical unless it under-mines a key strength. Also called CV. (MCRP5-12C)

D

decentralized control—In military operations, amode of battlespace management in which a com-mand echelon may delegate some or all authorityand direction for warfighting functions to subor-dinates. It requires careful and clear articulationof mission, intent, and main effort to unify effortsof subordinate leaders. (MCRP 5-12C)

descriptive intelligence Class of intelligencewhich describes existing and previously existingconditions with the intent to promote situationalawareness. Descriptive intelligence has two com-ponents: basic intelligen , which is generalbackground knowledge about established and rel-atively constant conditions; and current intelli-gence, which is concerned with describing theexisting situation. (MCRP 5-12C)

detachment—1. A part of a unit separated fromits main organization for duty elsewhere. 2. Atemporary military or naval unit formed from oth-er units or parts of units. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direction finding— A procedure for obtainingbearings of radio frequency emitters by using ahighly directional antenna and a display unit onan intercept receive or ancillary equipment. (JoPub 1-02)

dissemination—Conveyance of intelligence tousers in a suitable form. (Joint Pub 1-02)

E

electronic attack—That division of electronicwarfare involving the use of electromagnetic, drected energy, or antiradiation weapons to attapersonnel, facilities, or equipment with the intenof degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemcombat capability. Also called EA . (Joint Pub1-02)

electronic protection—That division of electron-ic warfare involving actions taken to protect pesonnel, facilities, and equipment from any effecof friendly or enemy employment of electroniwarfare that degrade, neutralize, or destrfriendly combat capability. Also called EP.(Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic reconnaissance—The detection, iden-tification, evaluation, and location of foreign eletromagnetic radiations emanating from other thnuclear detonations or radioactive sources. (JoPub 1-02)

electronic warfare—Any military action involv-ing the use of electromagnetic and directed engy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three ma-jor subdivisions within electronic warfare arelectronic attack, electronic protection, andelectronic warfare support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic warfare support—That division ofelectronic warfare involving actions tasked by, ounder direct control of, an operational commandto search for, intercept, identify, and locate soures of intentional and unintentional radiated eletromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediathreat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare suport provides information required for immediatdecisions involving electronic warfare operation


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and other tactical actions such as threat avoid-ance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES.Electronic warfare support data can be used toproduce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both com-munications intelligence (COMINT), and elec-tronic intelligence (ELINT). (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic intelligence—Technical and geoloca-tion intelligence derived from foreign noncommu-nications electromagnetic radiations emanatingfrom other than nuclear detonations or radioactivesources. Also called ELINT . (Joint Pub 1-02)

essential elements of friendly information—Key questions likely to be asked by adversary of-ficials and intelligence systems about specificfriendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, sothey can obtain answers critical to their opera-tional effectiveness. Also called EEFI . (Joint Pub1-02) Specific facts about friendly intentions, ca-pabilities, and activities needed by adversaries toplan and execute effective operations against ourforces. (MCRP 5-12C)

estimative intelligence Class of intelligencewhich attempts to anticipate future possibilitieand probabilities based on an analysis of descrip-tive intelligence in the context of planned friendlyand assessed enemy operations. (MCRP 5-12C)

F

friendly force information requirements— In-formation the commander needs about friendlyforces in order to develop plans and make effec-tive decisions. Depending upon the circumstanc-es, information on unit location, compositionreadiness, personnel status, and logistics statucould become a friendly force information re-quirement. Also called FFIR . (MCRP 5-12C)

fusion—In intelligence usage, the process of ex-amining all sources of intelligence and informa-tion to derive a complete assessment of activity.(Joint Pub 1-02)

G

global sourcing—A process of force provision oraugmentation whereby resources may be drawnfrom any location/command worldwide. (MCRP5-12C)

I

indications and warning—Those intelligencactivities intended to detect and report time-sentive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the UniteStates or allied military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forwarning of enemy actions or intentions; thimminence of hostilities; insurgency; nucleanon-nuclear attack on the United States, its ovseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactionsUnited States reconnaissance activities; terrorisattacks; and other similar events. Also calleI&W . (Joint Pub 2-01)

intelligence—The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evalution, and interpretation of evaluated informatioconcerning foreign countries or areas. Informtion and knowledge about an adversary obtainthrough observation, investigation, analysis, understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02) Also in MarinCorps usage, intelligence is knowledge about theenemy or the surrounding environment neededsupport decisionmaking. This knowledge is thresult of the collection, processing, exploitationevaluation, integration, analysis, and interpretion of available information about the battlespaand threat. (MCRP 5-12C)

intelligence cycle—The process by which infor-mation is converted into intelligence and maavailable to users. (Joint Pub 2-01)

intelligence data—Data derived from assets primarily dedicated to intelligence collection such imagery systems, electronic intercept equipmehuman intelligence sources, etc. (MCRP 5-12C

intelligence discipline—A well-defined area ointelligence collection, processing, exploitationand reporting using a specific category of techcal or human resources. There are five major dc ip l ines: human in te l l i gen ce , imag erintelligence, measurement and signature integence, signals intelligence (communications intligence, electronic intelligence, and foreiginstrumentation signals intelligence), and opesource intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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intelligence operations—The variety of intelli-gence tasks that are carried out by various intelli-gence organizations and activities. (Joint Pub1-02 extract)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—Ananalytical methodology employed to reduce un-certainties concerning the enemy, environment,and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligencepreparation of the battlespace builds an extensivedata base for each potential area in which a unitmay be required to operate. The data base is thenanalyzed in detail to determine the impact of theenemy, environment, and terrain on operationand presents it in graphic form. Intelligence prep-aration of the battlespace is a continuing process.Also called IPB . (Joint Pub 1-02) In MarineCorps usage, the systematic, continuous processof analyzing the threat and environment in a spe-cific geographic area. (MCRP 5-12C)

intelligence requirement—1. Any subject, gen-eral or specific, upon which there is a need for thecollection of information or the production of in-telligence. (Joint Pub 1-022. In Marine Corpsusage, questions about the enemy and the envi-ronment, the answers to which a commander re-quires to make sound decisions. Also called IR .(MCRP 5-12C)

J

joint deployable intelligence support system—A transportable workstation and communicationssuite that electronically extends a joint intelli-gence center to a joint task force or other tacticaluser. Also called JDISS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force—A general term applied to a forcecomposed of significant elements, assigned or at-tached, of two or more Military Departments, op-erating under a single joint force commander.(Joint Pub 1-02)

joint intelligence center—The intelligence cen-ter of the joint force headquarters. The joint intel-ligence center is responsible for providing andproducing the intelligence required to support thejoint force commander and staff, components,task forces and elements, and the national

intelligence community. Also called JIC . (JointPub 1-02)

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communica-tions System—The sensitive compartmenteinformation portion of the Defense InformatioSystem Network. It incorporates advanced nworking technologies that permit point-to-poinor multipoint information exchange involvingvoice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconfeencing. Also called JWICS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

M

main effort—The designated subordinate unwhose mission at a given point in time is mocritical to overall mission success. It is usualweighted with the preponderance of combat pow-er and is directed against a center of gravithrough a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C)

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophythat seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion throa variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected ations which create a turbulent and rapidly deterirating situation with which the enemy cannocope. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine Corps Planning Process—A six-stepmethodology which helps organize the thougprocesses of the commander and staff throughthe planning and execution of military operationIt focuses on the threat and is based on the MaCorps philosophy of maneuver warfare. It capitaizes on the principle of unity of command ansupports the establishment and maintenance otempo. The six steps consist of mission analyscourse of action development, course of actianalysis, comparison/decision, orders develop-ment, and transition. Also called MCPP. Note:Tenets of the MCPP include top down planning,single battle concept, and integrated plannin(MCRP 5-12C)

N

named area of interest—A point or area along aparticular avenue of approach through which ene-my activity is expected to occur. Activity or lackof activity within a named area of interest wi

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help to confirm or deny a particular enemy courseof action. Also called NAI . (MCRP 5-12C)

national intelligence support team—A national-ly sourced team composed of intelligence andcommunications experts from either Defense In-telligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency,National Security Agency, or any combination ofthese agencies. Also called NIST . (Joint Pub2-01)

O

operational architecture—A description (oftengraphical) of the operational elements, assignedtasks, and information flows required to supportthe warfighter. It defines the type of information,the frequency of exchange, and what tasks aresupported by these information exchanges. Alsocalled OA. (MCRP 5-12C)

operational control—Transferable command au-thority that may be exercised by commanders aany echelon at or below the level of combatancommand. Operational control is inherent in com-batant command (command authority). Opera-tional control may be delegated and is theauthority to perform those functions of commandover subordinate forces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and giving authoritativedirection necessary to accomplish the mission.Operational control includes authoritative direc-tion over all aspects of military operations andjoint training necessary to accomplish missionassigned to the command. Operational controlshould be exercised through the commanders osubordinate organizations. Normally this authori-ty is exercised through subordinate joint forcecommanders and Service and/or functional com-ponent commanders. Operational control normal-ly provides full authority to organize commandsand forces and to employ those forces as the com-mander in operational control considers necessaryto accomplish assigned missions. Operationalcontrol does not, in and of itself, include authori-tative direction for logistics or matters of adminis-tration, discipline, internal organization, or untraining. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations control and analysis center—Mainnode for the command and control of radio battion signals intelligence operations and the overcoordination of MAGTF signals intelligence operations. Processes, analyzes, produces, andsemina tes s igna ls i n te l l i gen ce -d er iveinformation and directs the ground-based eletronic warfare activities of the radio battalion. Also called OCAC. (MCRP 5-12C)

order of battle—The identification, strength,command structure, and disposition of the persnel, units, and equipment of any military forcAlso called OOB. (Joint Pub 1-02)

P

priority intelligence requirements—1. Thoseintelligence requirements for which a commandhas an anticipated and stated priority in his taskplanning and decisionmaking. Also called PIR.(Joint Pub 1-02) 2. In Marine Corps usage, an intelligence requirement associated with a decisithat will critically affect the overall success of thcommand’s mission. (MCRP 5-12C)

production management—Encompasses determining the scope, content, and format of each tell igence product, developing a plan anschedule for the development of each product, signing priorities among the various productiorequirements, allocating processing, exploitatioand production resources, and integrating prodution efforts with intelligence collection and dis-semination. (MCRP 5-12C)

R

reach back—The ability to exploit resources, capabilities, expertise, etc., not physically located the theater or a joint operations area, when estlished. (MCRP 5-12C)

S

sensitive compartmented information All in-formation and materials bearing special commnity controls indicating restricted handling withinpresent and future community intelligence colletion programs and their end products for whi

F-12 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

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community systems of compartmentation havebeen or will be formally established. (These con-trols are over and above the provisions of DOD52001R, Information Security Program Regula-tion.) Also called SCI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sensitive compartmented information facili-ty—An accredited area, room, group of rooms, orinstallation where sensitive compartmented infor-mation may be stored, used, discussed, and/orelectronically processed. SCIF procedural andphysical measures prevent the free access of per-sons unless they have been formally indoctrinatedfor the particular SCI authorized for use or stor-age within the SCIF. Also called SCIF. See alsosensitive compartmented information. (JointPub 1-02)

sensor data—Data derived from sensors whoseprimary mission is surveillance or target acquisi-tion, such as air surveillance radars, counterbat-tery radars, and remote ground sensors. (MCR5-12C)

Service component command—A commandconsisting of the Service component commanderand all those Service forces such as individualsunits, detachments, organizations, and installa-tions under the command, including the supportforces that have been assigned to a combatantcommand, or further assigned to a subordinateunified command or joint task force. (Joint Pub1-02)

signals intelligence—A category of intelligencecomprising either individually or in combinationall communications intelligence, electronic intel-ligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intel-l igence, however transmitted. Also calledSIGINT . (Joint Pub 1-02)

SIGINT operational tasking authority— A mil-itary commanders’s authority, delegated byDIRNSA/CHCSS, to operationally direct andlevy SIGINT requirements on designated SIGINTresources. This includes authority to deploy andredeploy all or part of the SIGINT resources forwhich SOTA has been delegated. Also calledSOTA. (USSID 1, SIGINT Operating Policy)

situational awareness—Knowledge and under-standing of the current situation which promotestimely, relevant and accurate assessmentfriendly, enemy, and other operations within thbattlespace in order to facilitate decisionmakinAn informational perspective and skill that fostean ability to determine quickly the context andrelevance of events that are unfolding. (MCR5-12C)

split base—Two or more portions of the samforce conducting or supporting operations froseparate physical locations. (MCRP 5-12C)

surveillance and reconnaissance center—Pri-mary element responsible for the supervisionMAGTF intelligence collection operations. Directs, coordinates, and monitors intelligence clection operations conducted by organic, attachand direct support collection assets. Also calleSARC. (MCRP 5-12C)

sustained operations ashore—The employmentof Marine Corps forces on land for an extendduration. It can occur with or without sustainmentfrom the sea. Also called SOA. (MCRP 5-12C)

systems architecture—Defines the physical con-nection, location, and identification of key nodecircuits, networks, warfighting platforms, etcand specific system and component performanparameters. The systems architecture is constred to satisfy operational architecture requiremeper standards defined in the technical architectuThe systems architecture shows how multiple stems within a subject area link and interoperaand may describe the internal construction operations of particular systems within the archi-tecture. Also called SA. (MCRP 5-12C)

T

tactical intelligence—Intelligence that is re-quired for planning and conducting tactical opertions. (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine Corps usagtactical intelligence is concerned primarily withthe location, capabilities, and possible intentionof enemy units on the battlefield and with the tatical aspects of terrain and weather within the btlespace. (MCRP 5-12C)

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technical architecture—The technical architec-ture identifies the services, interfaces, standards,and their relationships. It provides the technicaguidelines for implementation of systems uponwhich engineering specifications are based, com-mon building blocks are built, and product lineare developed. Also called TA . (MCRP 5-12C)

technical control—The performance of special-ized or professional service, or the exercise oprofessional guidance or direction through the es-tablishment of policies and procedures.

tempo—The relative speed and rhythm of mili-tary operations over time. (MCRP 5-12C)

W

warfighting functions—The six mutually sup-porting military activities integrated in the con-duct of all military operations are:

1. command and control—The means by whicha commander recognizes what needs to be doand sees to it that appropriate actions are taken2. maneuver—The movement of forces for thepurpose of gaining an advantage over the enem3. fires—Those means used to delay, disrupt, dgrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, orcilities as well as affect the enemy’s will to fight.4. intelligence—Knowledge about the enemy orthe surrounding environment needed to suppodecisionmaking.5. logistics—All activities required to move andsustain military forces.6. force protection—Actions or efforts used tosafeguard own centers of gravity while protectinconcealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critcal vulnerabilities.Also called WF. (MCRP 5-12C)

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Appendix G

References and Related Publications

Department of Defense Directives (DODDs)

S-3115.7 Signals Intelligence 5105.21-M-1 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)

Security Manual, Administrative SecurityTS-5105.21-M-2 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, Communications Intelligence (COMINT)

PolicyTS- 5105.21-M-3 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, TK Policy5200.1 DOD Information Security Program5210.70 DOD Cryptologic Training

Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs)

1/14 Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information

1/16 Security Manual for Uniform Protection of Intelligence Processed in AISs and Networks

1/21 Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities

United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSIDs)

1 SIGINT Operating Policy4 Concept of SIGINT Support to Military Commanders56 Exercise SIGINT200 Technical SIGINT Reporting240 ELINT Processing, Analysis, Reporting, and

Forwarding Procedures300 SIGINT Reporting316 Non-Codeword Reporting Program340 Tactical ELINT Reporting341 Technical ELINT Reporting510 Information for SIGINT Users

Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM)

50-4 Department of Defense Intelligence InformationSystems (DODIIS) Information Security (INFOSEC) Program

G-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-15.2

Department of the Navy Supplement (NAVSUP) to DODD

5105.21-M-1 SCI Administrative Security Manual

Joint Publications (Joint Pubs)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations2-01 Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations2-02 National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare3-54 Joint Doctrine for Operations Security5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations6-0 Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting 2 Intelligence 3 Expeditionary Operations4 Logistics5 Planning6 Command and Control

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

2-1 Intelligence Operations6-22 Communications and Information Systems

Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP)

5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

5-12D Organization of Marine Corps Forces

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)

1510.50A Individual Training Standard (ITS) System for the Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic WarfareOccupational Field (OccFld) 26

5500.6F Arming of Security and Law Enforcement (LE) Personnel and the Use of Force

Signals Intelligence _______________________________________________________________________________________ G-3

Army Field Manuals (FMs)

34-2 Collection Management and Synchronization Planning34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Related Publication

Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (J-TENS) Manual

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Documents

US Marine Corps - Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) MCWP 2-15.2