UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—UNITED STATES MOSCOW SUMMIT

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—UNITED STATES MOSCOW SUMMITSource: International Legal Materials, Vol. 27, No. 5 (SEPTEMBER 1988), pp. 1176-1203Published by: American Society of International LawStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693258 .

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1176

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS-UNITED STATES MOSCOW SUMMIT*

[May 29-June 2, 1988] +Cite as 27 I.L.M. 1176 (1988)+

I.L.M. Background/Content Summary on

Joint Statement, Exchange of TNF Treaty Documents7 and Agreement on Notifications of_Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

The President of the United States, Ronald W. Reagan, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, met in Moscow May 29-June 2, 1988. At the Moscow Summit, the exchange of documents marking the entry into force of the INF Treaty took place on June 1. A number of bilateral agreements were also concluded, among which was the Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed on May 31, 1988. These documents follow the Joint Statement made by the two leaders on June 1, 1988.

The Joint Statements made in Geneva in November 1985 and at the Washington Summit in December 1987, and the unilateral statements, made at the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, appear respectively at 25 I.L.M. 102 (1986), 26 I.L.M. 255 (1988), and 26 I.L.M. 209 (1987). The INF Treaty, done at Washington, December 8, 1987, appears at 27 I.L.M. 84 (1988). The Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, done and entered into force on September 15, 1987, appears at 27 I.L.M. 76 (1988).

The U.S. Senate Resolution on its advise and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty, together with documents relating to that Resolution, appear in this issue at I.L.M. page 1406.

JOINT STATEMENT - I.L.M. Page 1181 June 1, 1988

[Introduction: List of attendees at the US-Soviet Summit in Moscow from 29 May to 2 June 1988. Agenda included arms control, human rights and humanitarian affairs, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations]

I. ARMS CONTROL - I.L.M. Page 1181

INF [Regarding the signing of the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification by both countries]

*[The text the Joint Statement is reproduced from the Department of State Bulletin, Volume 88, Number 2137 (August 1988), pp. 25-31. The other documents were provided to International Legal Materials by the U.S. Department of State.]



1177

Nuclear and Space Talks [Noting that a joint draft treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms has been elaborated. Negotiations continue on a separate ABM treaty. Both have agreed to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for communicating certain information. Counting rules for new types of ballistic missiles and for heavy bomber armaments have been agreed on. Joint drafts have been prepared for an inspection protocol, a conversion or elimination protocol, and an MOU on data. START verification measures have been elaborated and are set forth. Both have begun exchanging data on strategic forces. Discussions have begun on limiting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs]

Ballistic Missile and Launch Notifications [An agreement was signed to reduce the risk of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war (see below)]

Nuclear Testing [Both reaffirmed a commitment to negotiate limitations on and eventual cessation of nuclear weapons testing]

Nuclear Nonproliferation [Noting the 20th anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (7 I.L.M. 809 (1968)]

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers [Noting activation of the new communications link (27 I.L.M. 76 (1988)]

Chemical Weapons [Condemning the spread and use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol]

Conventional Arms Control [Emphasizing the need for stability and security in Europe]

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] [Expressing commitment to the CSCE process]

Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation [Agreeing to discussions at the expert level]

Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly [Noting the upcoming session on Disarmament]

II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS - I.L.M. Page 1183

[Both discussed the establishment of a forum for discussions between persons from both countries]

III. REGIONAL ISSUES - I.L.M. Page 1183

[Discussions included the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, and the Afghanistan settlement]

IV. BILATERAL AFFAIRS - I.L.M. Page 1184

Bilateral Agreements and Cooperative Activities

Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges



78

Other Cooperative Activities

Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

Initiative for Expanded Civil Space Cooperation

Arctic Contacts and Cooperation

Trade and Economic Affairs

Consulates Exchanges/Diplomatic and Consular Missions [Agreement to open Consulates General in Kiev and New York as soon as practicable]

V. FUTURE MEETINGS - I.L.M. Page 1185

[Meetings will continue at the expert level and as necessary between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze]

NOTE FROM THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSING THAT CERTAIN DOCUMENTS HAVE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS INF TREATY - I.L.M. Page 1186 May 28, 1988

[Referring to the 12 May 1988 Exchange of Notes, to the 12 May Agreed Minute and to the 21 May 1988 Exchange of Notes making corrections to INF Treaty: Proposing that these documents have same force and effect as Treaty]

[Signature]

NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING APPLICATION OF INF TREATY - I.L.M. Page 1187 May 12, 1988

[All intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, present and future, are subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Definition and common understanding of "weapon-delivery vehicle". The Treaty does not apply to non-weapon-delivery vehicles]

[Signature]

[Geneva, May 12, 1988]



1179

AGREED MINUTE ON ISSUES RELATED TO INF TREATY - I.L.M. Page 1189 May 12, 1988

[Preamble: Referring to the US-Soviet 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles]

1. [Regarding the Inspection Protocol: The parties will be inspecting the entire inspection site]

2. [Regarding stages of US GLBMs: Soviet inspectors will observe their elimination. The list of second stages will be updated. The number and location of such second stages will be provided at the inspection site]

3. [Regarding site diagrams of inspections areas and technical corrections made to them]

4. [No shipments, from USSR facilities of items equal to or greater than the size of an SS-20 missile (less its front section)]

5. [Regarding equipment of inspection teams]

6. [Items at an elimination facility may be weighed and measured randomly]

7. [Regarding the contents of cannisters at elimination sites]

8. [The designated length of the SS-23 missile stage is changed to 4.56 meters]

9. [Exchange of photographs no later than 15 May 1988]

10. [Notice of transit points by place-name and center coordinates in minutes]

11. [Elimination site of the BGM-109G cruise missile is designated as Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona]

[Signatures]

EXCHANGE OF NOTES CORRECTING SITE DIAGRAMS AND CERTAIN TECHNICAL ERRORS IN INF TREATY - I.L.M. Page 1194 May 21, 1988

Note from the US Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 21 May 1988

[Proposing attached corrections to the 1987 US-Soviet Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter range Missiles]

[Signature]

Attachment to Note [List of corrections]



1180

Response Note from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US Embassy in Moscow, dated 21 May 1988

[Expressing agreement, noting the US corrections, and attaching its own corrections]

[Seal of Ministry]

CORRECTIONS TO DATA [List of corrections]

NOTE FROM SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGREEING THAT CERTAIN DOCUMENTS HAVE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS INF TREATY - I.L.M. Page 1199 May 29, 1988

[Agrees that documents mentioned in US note of May 28, 1988, have same force and effect as INF Treaty]

[Signature]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON NOTIFICATIONS OF LAUNCHES OF ICBMS AND SUMBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES - I.L.M. Page 1200

[Preamble: To reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, especially by accident]

ART. I [24-hour notification of ICBM and SLBM launches shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the US and the Soviet Union]

ART. II [No new notice required for launch delays of up to 4 days]

ART. Ill [The notice shall indicate the place of the launch and the geographic coordinates of the planned impact area]

ART. IV [Consultations; amendments; entry into force]

ART. V [This Agreement shall not affect other agreements of the parties]

ART. VI [Entry into force on the date of signature; duration is unlimited; termination shall be by 12 months notice]

[Done at Moscow on 31 May 1988]

[Authentic texts: English and Russian]

[Signatures]



1181

JOINT STATEMENT, MOSCOW, JUNE 1, 19882

In accordance with the understanding reached during the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, and confirmed at the Washington summit in December 1987, Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of Amer ica, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), met in Moscow May 29-June 2, 1988.

Attending on the U.S. side were Secretary of State George P. Shultz: Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carnicci, III; presidential Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; assistant to the President for national security Colin L. Powell; Ambassador at Large and special adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control matters Paul H. Nitze; special adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control matters, Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Ambassador of the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme So viet, Andrei A. Gromyko; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Commit tee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Alternate Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Commit tee, Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R., Dimitri T. Yazov; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Assistant of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Alexander A.

Bessmertnykh; and Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin.

The President and the General Sec retary view the Moscow summit as an

important step in the process of putting U.S.-Soviet relations on a more produc tive and sustainable basis. Their compre hensive and detailed discussions covered the full agenda of issues to which the two leaders agreed during their initial meet ing in Geneva in November 1985?an agenda encompassing arms control, human rights and humanitarian matters, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilat eral relations. Serious differences remain on important issues; the frank dialogue

which has developed between the two countries remains critical to surmounting these differences.

The talks took place in a constructive atmosphere which provided ample oppor tunity for candid exchange. As a result, the sides achieved a better understanding of each other's positions. The two leaders welcomed the progress achieved in vari ous areas of U.S.-Soviet relations since their last meeting in Washington, not withstanding the difficulty and complex ity of the issues. They noted with satis faction numerous concrete agreements which have been achieved, and expressed their determination to redouble efforts in the months ahead in areas where work remains to be done. They praised the creative and intensive efforts made by representatives of both sides in recent months to resolve outstanding differ ences.

Assessing the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, the President and the General Secretary underscored the historic importance of their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow in laying the foundation for a realistic ap proach to the problems of strengthening stability and reducing the risk of conflict. They reaffirmed their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and

must never be fought, their determina tion to prevent any war between the United State? and Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional, and their dis avowal of any intention to achieve mili

tary superiority. The two leaders are convinced that

the expanding political dialogue they have established represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern. They do not minimize the real differences of history, tradition, and ideology which will con tinue to characterize the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But they believe that the dialogue will endure, because it is based on realism and focused on the achieve

ment of concrete results. It can serve as a constructive basis for addressing not

only the problems of the present but of tomorrow and the next century. It is a

process which the President and the General Secretary believe serves the best interests of the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and can contribute to a more stable, more peace ful, and safer world.

I. Arms Control The President and the General Secre tary, having expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined ob jectives and next steps on a wide range of issues in this area. These will guide the efforts of the two governments in the

months ahead as they work with each other and with other states toward equi table, verifiable agreements that strengthen international stability and security.

INF The President and the General Secretary signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub lics on the Elimination of Their Interme diate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of this historic agreement, which for the first time will eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms, and which sets new standards for arms con trol. The leaders are determined to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and understandings of the treaty, viewing joint and successful work in this respect as an important precedent for future arms control efforts.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The two leaders noted that a j.oint draft text of a treaty on reduction and limita tion of strategic offensive arms has been elaborated. Through this process, the sides have been able to record in the joint draft text extensive and significant areas of agreement and also to detail positions on remaining areas of disagreement.

While important additional work is re quired before this treaty is ready for signature, many key provisions are re corded in the joint draft text and are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the treaty.

Taking into account a treaty on stra tegic offensive arms, the sides have con tinued negotiations to achieve a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washing ton summit joint statement dated Decem ber 10, 1987. Progress was noted in preparing the joint draft text of an associated protocol. In connection with their obligations under the protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of relevant information. The leaders directed their negotiators to pre pare the joint draft text of a separate agreement and to continue work on its associated protocol.

The joint draft treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms reflects the earlier understanding on es tablishing ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads as well as agreement on subceilings of 4.900 on the aggregate of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic



1182

missile] warheads and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles.

The draft treaty also records the sides' agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50% below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded.

During the negotiations the two sides have also achieved understanding that in future work on the treaty they will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the joint state ment of December 10, 1987, and the number of warheads which will be attrib uted to each new type of ballistic missile will be subject to negotiation.

In addition, the sides agreed on a

counting rule for heavy bomber arma

ments according to which heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs [short-range attack missiles] will count as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit ?nd one warhead against the 6,000 limit.

The delegations have also prepared joint draft texts of an inspection protocol, a conversion or elimination protocol, and a memorandum of understanding on data, which are integral parts of the treaty. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and elaborating them as necessary to

meet the more demanding requirements of START. The START verification measures will, at a minimum, include:

A. Data exchanges, to include dec

larations and appropriate notifications on the number and locations of weapons systems limited by START, including locations and facilities for production, final assembly, storage, testing, repair,

training, deployment, conversion, and

elimination of such systems. Such decla

rations will be exchanged between the sides before the treaty is signed and updated periodically.

B. Baseline inspections to verify the accuracy of these declarations.

C. Onsite observation of elimination

of strategic systems necessary to meet

the agreed limits. D. Continuous onsite monitoring of

the perimeter and portals of critical pro duction facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited.

E. Short-notice onsite inspection of:

(i) Declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(ii) Locations where systems covered by this treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(iii) Locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

F. Short-notice inspection, in ac

cordance with agreed upon procedures, of locations where either side considers cov

ert deployment, production, storage, or

repair of strategic offensive arms could be

occurring. G. Prohibition of the use of conceal

ment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on

telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetrie information broadcast during missile flight.

H. Procedures that enable verifica tion of the number of warheads on de ployed ballistic missiles of each specific type, including onsite inspection.

I. Enhanced observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by national tech nical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine

ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

The two sides have also begun to

exchange data on their strategic forces. During the course of this meeting in

Moscow% the exchanges on START re sulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of ALCMs and the attempts to

develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs. The details of this addi tional common ground have been re

corded in documents exchanged between the sides. The delegations in Geneva will record these gains in the joint draft text of the START treaty.

The sides also discussed the question of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed

SLCMs [submarine-launched cruise mis siles]. Ronald Reagan and M.S. Gor

bachev expressed their joint confidence

that the extensive wTork done provides the basis for concluding the treaty on re

duction and limitation of strategic offen sive arms which will promote strategic stability and strengthen security not only of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., but of all mankind.

Guided by this fundamental agree ment, the U.S. President and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU agreed to continue their efforts in this area energetically and pur posefully. The delegations of the two countries have been instructed to return to Geneva on July 12, 1988. It has been agreed as a matter of principle that, once the remaining problems are solved and the treaty and its associated documents are agreed, they will be signed without delay.

Ballistic Missile Launch Notifications

The agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles,

signed during the Moscow summit, is a practical new step, reflecting the desire of the sides to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or

accident.

Nuclear Testing The leaders reaffirmed the commitment of the two sides to conduct in a single forum full-scale, stage-by-stage negotia tions on the issues relating to nuclear testing. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiat ing further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. In implementing the first objective of these negotiations, agree ment upon effective verification measures for the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, the sides agreed to design and conduct a joint verification experiment at each other's test sites.

The leaders, therefore, noted with satisfaction the signing of the Joint Veri fication Experiment Agreement, the con siderable preparation underway for the

experiment, and the positive cooperation being exhibited in particular by the sub stantial numbers of personnel now en

gaged in work at each other's test sites.

They also noted the substantial progress on a new protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear

Explosions Treaty and urged continuing constructive negotiations on effective

verification measures for the Threshold lest Ban Treaty.

Expressing their conviction that the progress achieved so far forms a solid basis for continuing progress on issues relating to nuclear testing, the leaders instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously the preparation of a proto col to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and to complete the preparation of a protocol to the Threshold lest Ban Treaty as soon as possible after the joint verification experiment has been con

ducted and analyzed. They confirmed their understanding that verification measures for the TTBT will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear



1183

test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

They also declared their mutual in tention to seek ratification of both the 1974 and 1976 treaties when the corre sponding protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty are completed and to continue negotiations as agreed in the

Washington joint summit statement.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

The two leaders noted that this year marks the 20th anniversary of the Nu clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the most important international arms control agreements with over 130 adher

ents. They reaffirmed their conviction that universal adherence to the NPT is important to international peace and se

curity. They expressed the hope that each state not a party to the treaty will join it, or make an equally binding com

mitment under international law to forego acquisition of nuclear weapons and pre vent nuclear weapons proliferation. This will enhance the possibility of progress toward reducing nuclear armaments and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

The two leaders also confirmed their support of the International Atomic En ergy Agency, and agreed that they would continue efforts to further strengthen it. They reaffirmed the value of their regular consultations on nonproliferation and agreed that they should continue.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The leaders expressed satisfaction over the activation of the new communications link between the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Moscow and Washington, es tablished in accordance with the U.S. Soviet agreement of September 15, 1987. It was agreed that the centers can play an important role in the context of a

future treaty on reducing U.S. and Soviet

strategic nuclear arms.

Chemical Weapons The leaders reviewed the status of on going multilateral negotiations and bilat eral U.S.-Soviet consultations toward a

comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons (CWs), encompassing all chemical w?ap ons-capable states. They also expressed concern over the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

The leaders reaffirmed the impor tance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique chal lenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention. WTiile noting the progress already achieved in the talks and the difficult problems with

regard to effective monitoring of the global prohibition of chemical weapons and the non-use of dual-capable chemi

cals for chemical weapons purposes, the

leaders underlined the need for concrete

solutions to the problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security for all convention participants. They gave instructions to their respective delegations to this effect.

Both sides agreed on the vital impor tance of greater openness by all states as a way to build confidence and strengthen the foundation for an effective conven

tion. The leaders also emphasized the necessity of close coordination on a

multilateral basis in order to ensure the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable states in the convention.

Both sides strongly condemned the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol. They stressed the im portance of both technical and political solutions to this problem and confirmed their support for international investiga tions of suspected violations. Noting the initial efforts being made to control the export of chemicals used in manufactur

ing chemical weapons, the leaders called on all nations with the capability of producing such chemicals to institute stringent export controls to inhibit the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Conventional Arms Control

The leaders emphasized the importance of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. They welcomed progress to date on development of a mandate for new negotiations on armed

forces and conventional armaments. They

expressed their hope for an early and balanced conclusion to the Vienna CSCE followup meeting. The President and the General Secretary also noted that full implementation of the provisions of the

document of the Stockholm Conference on

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe can significantly increase openness and

mutual confidence.

They also discussed the situation in the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

They expressed their commitment to further development of the CSCE proc ess. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. will continue to work with the other 33 participants to bring the Vienna CSCE followup meeting to a successful conclusion through sig nificant results in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid concluding document.

Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation

The leaders agreed to bilateral discus sions at the level of experts on the problem of proliferation of ballistic mis sile technology.

Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly

The President and the General Secretary noted the importance of the ongoing Third Special Session on Disarmament.

II. Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns

The President and the General Secretary engaged in a detailed discussion of human rights and humanitarian concerns. The leaders reviewed the increasingly broad and detailed U.S.-Soviet dialogue in this area and agreed that it should be con ducted at all levels in order to achieve sustained, concrete progress. They noted that this dialogue should seek to maximize assurance of the rights, freedoms, and human dignity of individuals; promotion of people-to-people communications and

contacts; active sharing of spiritual, cul tural, historical, and other values; and greater mutual understanding and re

spect between the two countries. Toward

this end, they discussed the possible establishment of a forum which, meeting regularly, would bring together partici pants from across the range of their two societies. They noted steps already taken to establish the exchange of information and contacts between legislative bodies of both countries, as well as discussions between legal experts, physicians and representatives of other professions di

rectly involved in matters pertaining to human rights, and between representa tives of nongovernmental organizations.

III. Regional Issues

The President and the General Secretary thoroughly discussed a wide range of regional questions, including the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, and other issues. They expressed satisfaction with the April 1988 conclusion in Geneva of accords on an Afghanistan settlement.

Although the discussions revealed serious differences both in the assessment of the causes of regional tensions and in the means to overcome them, the leaders agreed that these differences need not be an obstacle to constructive interaction between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.



1184

They reaffirmed their intention to continue U.S.-Soviet discussions at all

levels aimed at helping parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions which advance their independence, freedom, and security. They emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other interna tional institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

IV. Bilateral Affairs

The President and the General Secretary reviewed progress in further expanding bilateral contacts, exchanges, and coop eration since their meeting in Washing ton, D.C., in December 1987. They noted the increasingly important role that mu tually beneficial interchange between the two countries can play in improving mutual understanding and providing stability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. They stated their intention to intensify such ties.

They noted with particular satisfac tion that concrete agreements had been reached in most of the areas identified at their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, and

Washington.

Bilateral Agreements and Cooperative Activities

The President and the General Secretary welcomed the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements which open new

opportunities for fruitful cooperation in the following fields: cooperation in transportation science and technology:

maritime search and rescue; operational coordination between U.S. and Soviet

radionavigation systems in the Northern

Pacific and Bering Sea; and mutual fish eries relations.

The two leaders welcomed the recent signing of a new Memorandum on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety under the bilat eral agreement on Peaceful Uses of

Atomic Energy. There was an exchange of notes to extend that agreement.

They expressed satisfaction with the recent signing of a newr protocol under the bilateral housing agreement for coop eration in construction research relating to extreme geological and unusual cli

matic conditions.

They reviewed the status of nego tiations between the two countries concerning maritime shipping, the U.S. U.S.S.R. maritime boundary, basic

scientific research, and emergency pollu tion cleanup in the Bering and Chukchi Seas. They instructed their negotiators to accelerate efforts to achieve mutually acceptable agreements in these areas at

the earliest opportunity. The two leaders welcomed the start

of bilateral discussions on combatting

narcotics trafficking. They noted with satisfaction ongoing consultations be

tween the two sides concerning law of the sea, air and sea transportation safety, and areas of mutual interest in the field of law.

Cultural and People-to-People

Exchanges

Noting the expansion of exchanges in the areas of education, science, culture, and

sports under the general exchanges agreement, the two leaders welcomed the

signing of a new implementing program for 1989-91 under the agreement and expressed their intention to continue expansion of such exchanges. During the time in which this program is in force, the two sides, taking into consideration their mutual interest as well as financial and technical conditions, will conduct ne

gotiations on the opening of culture/ information centers in the U.S. and the

U.S.S.R. with the aim of signing an

appropriate agreement on behalf of the governments of both countries.

They expressed satisfaction that, over the course of their dialogue, people

to-people contacts and exchanges be tween nongovernmental organizations have significantly increased and become one of the most dynamic elements in the bilateral relationship. They reaffirmed their commitment to further growth of such exchanges, which contribute to mu

tual understanding, and welcomed plans for increased exchanges of young people in the future. In this context, they ex pressed their readiness to consider in practical terms the idea of further devel oping exchanges of high school students. They cited recent joint U.S.-Soviet ini tiatives on culture, theater, and the cinema as examples of new opportunities to engage those involved in the creative arts.

Noting the rapidly growing sports ties between the two countries, includ

ing their national Olympic committees, the two leaders expressed their support for the international Olympic move

ment, which promotes international

cooperation and understanding through athletic competition.

Other Cooperative Activities

The President and the General Secretary noted the successful expansion of scien tific cooperation within the framewrork of bilateral agreements in environmental

protection, medical science and public health, artificial heart research and de velopment, agriculture, and studies of the wTorld ocean, and expressed their in

tention to continue to expand activities under these agreements in areas of mu

tual benefit to the two sides. The President and the General Sec

retary noted with pleasure the com

mencement of work on a conceptual de

sign of an international thermonuclear

experimental reactor (ITER), under the auspices of the International Atomic En ergy Agency, between scientists and experts from the United States, Soviet Union, European Atomic Energy Com

munity, and Japan. The two leaders noted

the significance of this next step toward the development of fusion power as a

cheap, environmentally sound, and es

sentially inexhaustible energy source for

the benefit of all mankind. The President and the General Sec

retary welcomed agreement by represen tatives of the United States, Soviet

Union, Canada, and France to institu tionalize in the near future the CO SPAS/ SAR SAT. [a] space-based, life-saving global search and rescue system.

Both leaders reaffirmed their sup port for the WHO/UNICEF [World Health Organization^1 Children's Fund] goal of reducing the scale of pre ventable childhood death through the most effective methods of saving chil dren. They urged other countries and the international community to intensify ef forts to achieve this goal.

Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

The two leaders expressed their satisfac tion with activities since the Washington summit in expanding cooperation with respect to global climate and environ mental change, including in areas of mutual concern relating to environmental

protection, such as protection and conser

vation of stratospheric ozone and a possi ble global wTarming trend. They empha sized their desire to make more active use of the unique opportunities afforded by the space programs of the two countries to conduct global monitoring of the environment and the ecology of the earth's land, oceans, and atmosphere. They underscored the need to continue to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this impoitant area in the future.

Initiative for Expanded Civil Space Cooperation

Recognizing the long-standing commit ment of both countries to space science and exploration, and noting the progress made under the 1987 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Co

operative Agreement in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, the two leaders agreed to a new initiative to expand civil space cooperation by exchanging flight oppor tunities for scientific instruments to fly on each others spacecraft, and by ex

changing results of independent national studies of future unmanned solar system exploration missions as a means of as



1185

sessing prospects for further U.S.-Soviet cooperation on such missions. They also agreed to expand exchanges of space science data and of scientists, to enhance the scientific benefit that can be derived from the two countries' space research missions. They noted scientific missions to the Moon and Mars as areas of possible bilateral and international cooperation.

Arctic Contacts and Cooperation

Taking into account the unique environ mental, demographic, and other charac teristics of the Arctic, the two leaders reaffirmed their support for expanded bilateral and regional contacts and cooperation in this area. They noted plans and opportunities for increased scientific and environmental cooperation under a number of bilateral agreements as well as within an International Arctic Science Committee of states with interests in the region. They expressed their support for increased people-to-people contacts be tween the native peoples of Alaska and the Soviet north.

The President and the General Sec retary noted the positive role played by the multilateral Antarctic Treaty and emphasized the importance of U.S. Soviet scientific and environmental cooperation in that region.

Trade and Economic Affairs

The two sides reconfirmed their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations and noted recent activity in this area. They reiterated their belief that com mercially viable joint ventures comply ing with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial rela tions. They welcomed the results of the

meeting of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission in April and noted with satisfaction that working groups had been created under the com mission to further the establishment of better conditions under which mutually advantageous trade can develop. Taking note of the 1974 joint statement and protocol amending the Long-Term Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet So cialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation is sued at the conclusion of the Joint Com mercial Commission, they agreed that

the commission should continue to meet to build upon the forward momentum which has been generated.

The two leaders cited expanding relations between Aeroflot and PanAm

Airlines under the government-to

government Civil Air Transportation Agreement as a positive example of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Consulates Exchanges/Diplomatic and Consular Missions

The President and the General Secretary reaffirmed their agreement to open Con sulates General in Kiev and New York as soon as practicable.

The two leaders discussed questions relating to ensuring adequate and secure conditions for U.S. and Soviet diplomatic and consular establishments and their personnel in each other's territory. They agreed on the need to approach problems relating to such matters constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

V. Future Meetings

The President and the General Secre tary, recognizing the importance of their personal involvement in the devel opment of relations in the months ahead, instructed Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevard nadze to meet as necessary and to re

port to them on ways to ensure contin

ued practical progress across the f?ll range of issues. Expert-level contacts

will also continue on an intensified basis.



1186

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Moscow, May 28, 1988

No. MFA/148/88

The Government of the United States of America has the

honor to refer:

1) to the notes exchanged in Geneva on May 12, 1988,

between the United States and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics concerning the application of the

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their

Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (the INF

Treaty);

2) to the agreed minute concluded in Geneva on May 12,

1988 concerning certain issues related to the Treaty; and

3) to the agreements concluded by exchanges of notes,

signed on May 21, 1988, in Vienna and Moscow, respectively,

correcting the site diagrams and certain technical errors

in the Treaty.

The Government of the United States proposes, in

connection with the exchange of the instruments of

ratification of the INF Treaty, that the two Governments

signify their agreement that these documents are of the

same force and effect as the provisions of the Treaty, and

that this note together with the reply of the Union of



1187

Soviet Socialist Republics, shall constitute an agreement

between the two Governments to that effect.

Charge d'Affaires a.i.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Geneva. Switzerland

NOTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

In light of the discussions between the Secretary of

State of the United States of America and the Foreign Minister

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Geneva and Moscow

on April 14 and April 21-22, 1988, and the Foreign Minister's

letter to the Secretary of State, dated April 15, 1988, the

Government of the United States of America wished to record in

an agreement concluded by exchange of notes the common

understanding reached between the two Governments as to the

application of the Treaty Between the United States of America

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination

of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles

(hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty"), signed at Washington



1188

on December 8, 1987, to intermediate-range and shorter-range

missiles flight-tested or deployed to carry weapons based on

either current or future technologies and as to the related

question of the definition of the term "weapon-delivery

vehicle" as used in the Treaty.

It is the position of the Government of the United States

of America that the Parties share a common understanding that

all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as

defined by the Treaty, both at present and in the future, are

subject to the provisions of the Treaty.

In this connection, it is also the position of the

Government of the United States of America that the Parties

share a common understanding that the term "weapon-delivery

vehicle" in the Treaty means any ground-launched ballistic or

cruise missile in the 500 kilometer to 5500 kilometer range

that has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as

a weapon ? that is, any warhead, mechanism or device, which,

when directed against any target, is designed to damage or

destroy it. Therefore, the Treaty requires elimination and

bans production and flight-testing of all such missiles tested

or deployed to carry or be used as weapons based on either

current or future technologies, with the exception of missiles

mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty. It is

also the position of the Government of the United States of

America that the Parties share a common understanding that the

Treaty does not cover non-weapon-delivery vehicles.



1189

It is the understanding of the Government of the United

States of America that the above reflects the common view of

the two Governments on these matters. If so, the Government of

the United States of America proposes that this note and the

Soviet reply note confirming that the Government of the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics shares the understanding of the

Government of the United States of America, as set forth above,

shall constitute an agreement between the Government of the

United States of America and the Government of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics.

Representatives of the United States of America and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics discussed the following

Geneva, May 12, 1988

Geneva

May 12, 1988



1190

issues related to the Treaty Between the United States of

America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the

Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range

Missiles, signed in Washington on 8 December, 1987, during the

meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister

Shevardnadze in Geneva on 11-12 May 1988. As a result of these

discussions, the Parties agreed on the points that follow.

1. In accordance with paragraph 7 of Section VII of the

Inspection Protocol, during baseline, close-out and

short-notice inspections, the Parties will be inspecting the

entire inspection site, including the interior of structures,

containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, capable

of containing: for the United States - the second stage of the

Pershing II, and the BGM-109G cruise missile; for the USSR -

the first stage of the SS-12 missile, the stage of the SS-23

missile, the SSC-X-4 cruise missile and the SS-4 launch stand.

2. Regarding the second stages of United States GLBMs, the

aggregate numbers of these stages are listed in the Memorandum

of Understanding and will be updated in accordance with Article

IX of the Treaty no later than 30 days after entry into force

of the Treaty and at six-month intervals thereafter. Except in

the case of close-out inspections and inspections of formerly

declared facilities, the United States in-country escort is

obliged to provide the Soviet inspection team leader with the

number of such second stages at the inspection site as well as

a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of



1191

those stages. Finally, as set forth in the Elimination

Protocol, Soviet inspectors will observe the elimination of all

the stages of United States GLBMs.

3. The entire area of an inspection site, including all

buildings, within the outer boundaries depicted on the site

diagrams are subject to inspection. In addition, anything

depicted outside these outer boundaries on the site diagrams is

subject to inspection. Any technical corrections to the site

diagrams appended to the Memorandum of Understanding will be

made via the corrigendum exchange of notes prior to entry into

force of the Treaty. Such corrections will not involve the

exclusion of buildings, structures or roads within or depicted

outside the outer boundaries depicted on the site diagrams

currently appended to the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. The Soviet side assured the United States side that, during

the period of continuous monitoring of facilities under the

Treaty, no shipment shall exit a continuous monitoring facility

on the territory of the USSR whose dimensions are equal to or

greater than the dimensions of the SS-20 missile without its

front section but less than the dimensions of an SS-20 launch

canister, as those dimensions are listed in the Memorandum of

Understanding. For the purposes of this assurance, the length

of the SS-20 missile without its front section will be

considered to be 14.00 meters. In the context of this

assurance, the United States side will not be inspecting any



1192

shipment whose dimensions are less than those of an SS-20

launch canister, as listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

5. Inspection teams may bring to the inspection site the

equipment provided for in the Inspection Protocol. Use of such

equipment will be implemented in accordance with the procedures

set forth in that Protocol. For example, if the inspecting

Party believes that an ambiguity has not been removed, upon

request the inspected Party shall take a photograph of the

object or building about which a question remains.

6. During baseline inspections, the Parties will have the

opportunity, on a one-time basis, to verify the technical

characteristics listed in Section VI of the Memorandum of

Understanding, including the weights and dimensions of SS-20

stages, at an elimination facility. Inspectors will select at

random one of each type of item to weigh and measure from a

sample presented by the inspected Party at a site designated by

the inspected Party. To ensure that the items selected are

indeed representative, the sample presented by the inspected

Party must contain an adequate number of each item (i.e., at

least 8-12, except in the case of the United States Pershing IA

launcher, only one of which exists).

7. Immediately prior to the initiation of elimination

procedures, an inspector shall confirm and record the type and

number of items of missile systems which are to be eliminated.

If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include



1193

a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters. This

visual inspection can include looking into the launch canister

once it is opened at both ends. It can also include use of the

equipment and procedures that will be used eight times per year

at Votkinsk and Magna to measure missile stages inside launch

canisters (i.e., an optical or mechanical measuring device).

If it should turn out, in particular situations, that the

inspector is unable to confirm the missile type using the above

techniques, the inspected Party is obligated to remove the

inspector's doubts so that the inspector is satisfied as to the

contents of the launch canister.

8. The length of the SS-23 missile stage will be changed, in a

corrigendum to the Memorandum of Understanding, to 4.56

meters. The length of the SS-12 first stage will continue to

be listed as 4.38 meters, which includes an interstage

structure.

9. The sides will exchange additional photographs no later

than May 15, 1988. For the United States side, these

photographs will be of the Pershing IA missile and Pershing II

missile with their front sections attached and including a

scale. For the Soviet side, these photographs will be of the

SS-23, SS-12, and SS-4 with their front sections attached, and

of the front section of the SS-20.

10. In providing notifications of transit points in accordance

with paragraph 5(f)(iv) of Article IX of the Treaty, the



1194

Parties will specify such intermediate locations by providing

the place-name and its center coordinates in minutes.

11. The United States side has informed the Soviet side that

Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona will serve as the

elimination facility for the United States BGM-109G cruise

mj ssile In order to address Soviet concerns on a related

matter, the United States will formally inform the Soviet side

before entry into force of the Treaty, of an elimination

facility for each of its Treaty-limited items.

These points reflect the understandings of the two Parties

regarding their obligations under the Treaty.

Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman

United States Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear

Forces

ervov

EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Moscow

May 21, 1988

No. MFA/130/88

The Embassy of the United States of America

presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign



1195

Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

and has the honor to refer to the Treaty between the

United States of America and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their

Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles, with

Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols (the

Treaty), signed at Washington December 8, 1987.

The Embassy proposes that the corrections set

forth in the attachment to this note be made in the

text of the Treaty. The Embassy further proposes

that this note and the Ministry's note in reply

accepting the corrections shall constitute a

correction of the text of the Treaty.

The following corrections should be made in the text of the

1. In the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base for the Treaty, Section II, paragraph 1, concerning intermediate-range missiles and launchers, for the United States: the number of non-deployed missiles should read "266,11 the aggregate

John M. Joyce Minister-Counselor

Attachment : As Stated

Attachment to Note No. A/130/88

Treaty:



1196

number of deployed and non-deployed missiles should read "695,11 and the aggregate number of second stages should read "238.??

2. In the MOU, Section III, paragraph 1(A)(II), for missile operating base Wueschheim ? the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 007 25 40 E., and the number of launchers should read "21.11

3. In the MOU, Section III, paragraph 2(A)(1), for launcher production facilities: Martin Marietta? the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 39 19 N. For missile storage facilities: Pueblo Depot activity

?

the number of missiles should read "120"; Redstone Arsenal ? the number of training missile stages should read "0"; Weilerbach ? the number of missiles should read M9.M For launcher storage facilities: Redstone Arsenal ? the number of training missile stages should read "4." For launcher repair facilities: Redstone Arsenal ? the number of training missile stages should read "20"; Ft. Sill ?

the number of launchers should read "1"; Pueblo Depot activity

? the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 38 17 N. For training facilities: Ft. Sill ? the number of training missile stages should read "76."

4. In the MOU, Section IV, paragraph 2(A)(1), for missile production facilities: Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant ?

the number of missiles should read "8" and the number of training missile stages should read "1." For launcher production facilities: Martin Marietta ? the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 39 19 N. For missile storage facilities: Pueblo Depot activity

?

the number of missiles should read "162" and the number of training missile stages should read "63." For missiles, launchers, and support equipment in transit the number of missiles should read "0" and the number of training missile stages should read "6."

5. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 1(A)(IV) for the BGM 109G, the maximum diameter of the missile should read "0.52."

6. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 1(B)(1), for the BGM 109G launcher the maximum length should read "10.80" and the maximum height should read "3.5."

7. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 1(D)(1) for the BGM 109G launch canister the maximum length should read "6.97" and the maximum diameter should read "0.54."

8. In the protocol regarding inspections, Section XI, paragraph 1, the reference to "paragraph 10 of Section VI of this protocol" should read "paragraph 11 of Section VI of this protocol."



1197

No. 01/YPOVR

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Embassy's Note of May 21, 1988, and Annex thereto containing notification of corrections to data submitted by the American side in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987. The Soviet side takes note of the aforementioned notification.

The Ministry also has che honor to advise the Embassy that the data submitted by the Soviet side in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the united States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles will be provided with corrections contained in the Annex to this note.

The Ministry further has the honor to advise that the Soviet side agrees to the proposal of the American side, contained in the Embassy's Note, to enter corrections to the text of paragraph I of section XI of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles for the end of the third sentence of that paragraph to read: "... pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol."

The Soviet side shares with the American side the understanding that the aforementioned Note of the Embassy and the Reply Note of the Ministry shall constitute a correction of :he text of the Treaty.

The Ministry avails itself of this occasion to renew to the Embassy the assurance of its highest consideration.

Seal of the Ministry Moscow, May 21, 1988

CORRECTIONS TO DATA

Submitted by the Soviet side in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist



1198

Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

1. In paragraph 2(a)(ii) [2(b)(ii) in English-language

text] of Section IV of the Memorandum of Understanding, the

geographic coordinates for the V.l. Lenin Petropavlovsk Heavy

Machine Building Plant, Petropavlovsk, should be 54?54'20"

and 69?09,58" E.

2. In paragraph 2(a)(i) [2(b) (i) in English-language text]

of Section III and in paragraph 2(a)(i) [2(b)(i) in

English-language text] of Section IV of the Memorandum of

Understanding, the geographic coordinates for the Barrikady

Plant, Volgograd, should be 48?46'50" and 44?35'44" E.

3. In paragraph 2(a)(i) [2(b)(i) in English-language text]

of Section III of the Memorandum of Understanding, the

Elimination Facility at Aral'sk with the coordinates 46?50'

c^nd 61?18? E should be changed to the Elimination Facility at

Kapustin Yar with the coordinates 48?46' and 45?59' E.

Moreover, in the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to

the INF Treaty, paragraph 7 of Section I regarding points of

entry for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should read

"Moscow or Ulan Ude."



1199

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. "6207 JS/AO Russian

No. 2/UPOVR

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

confirms receipt of U.S. Government Note no. MFA/148/88 of May 28,

1988, which reads as follows:

[The Russian text of Note no. MFA/148/88 of May 28, 1988, agrees in all substantive respects with the original English text.]

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

agrees that the documents mentioned in U.S. Government Note no.

MFA/148/88 of May 28, 1988, are of the same force and effect as the

provisions of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of

Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and that this

note and the reply thereto shall constitute an agreement between

the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the

United States of America to that effect.

Moscow

May 29, 1988

[s] V. Karpov

/Seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR/



1200

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ON NOTIFICATIONS OF LAUNCHES OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC

MISSILES

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate

the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result

of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never

be fought.

Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the

risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of

strengthening international peace and security,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement on

Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between

the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics of September 30, 1971, the Agreement between the

Government of the United States of America and the Government

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of

Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972, and the

Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk

Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987,

Have agreed as follows:



1201

ARTICLE I

Each Party shall provide the other Party notification,

through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the United States

of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, no less

than twenty-four hours in advance, of the planned date, launch

area, and area of impact for any launch of a strategic

ballistic missile: an intercontinental ballistic missile

(hereinafter ICBM*) or a submarine-launched ballistic missile

{hereinafter "SLBM").

ARTICLE II

A notification of a planned launch of an ICBM or an SLBM

shall be valid for four days counting from the launch date

indicated in such a notification. In case of postponement of

the launch date within the indicated four days, or cancellation

of the launch, no notification thereof shall be required.

ARTICLE III

1. For launches of ICBMs or SLBMs from land, the

notification shall indicate the area from which the launch is

planned to take place.

2? For launches of SLBMs from submarines, the

notification shall indicate the general area from which the

missile will be launched. Such notification shall indicate

either the quadrant within the ocean (that is, the ninety



02

degree sector encompassing approximately one-fourth of the area

of the ocean) or the body of water (for example, sea or bay)

from which the launch is planned to take place.

3. For all launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, the notification

shall indicate the geographic coordinates of the planned impact

area or areas of the reentry vehicles. Such an area shall be

specified either by indicating the geographic coordinates of

the boundary points of the area, or by indicating the

geographic coordinates of the center of a circle with a radius

specified in kilometers or nautical miles. The size of the

impact area shall be determined by the notifying Party at its

discretion.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually

agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the

provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible

amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of

the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into

force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

ARTICLE V

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either

Party under other agreements.



1203

ARTICLE VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its

signature.

The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12

months written notice to the other Party.

DONE at Moscow on May 31, 1988, in two copies, each in

the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally

authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET OF AMERICA: SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

