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Understanding the 2011 Ugandanelections: the contribution of publicopinion surveysNicolas de Torrenté aa Manager, Deepening Democracy Component, DemocraticGovernance Facility , Kampala , UgandaPublished online: 16 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: Nicolas de Torrenté (2013) Understanding the 2011 Ugandan elections: thecontribution of public opinion surveys, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7:3, 530-548, DOI:10.1080/17531055.2013.810839

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Understanding the 2011 Ugandan elections: the contribution of publicopinion surveys

Nicolas de Torrente*

Manager, Deepening Democracy Component, Democratic Governance Facility, Kampala,Uganda

In the run up to Uganda’s 2011 election, five public opinion surveys carried outby three different research firms found that President Yoweri Museveni would winbetween 64% and 70% of the vote, which closely matched the eventual electoraloutcome. By revealing opinions and attitudes of would-be voters, opinion surveysshed light on some key aspects of the electoral process and its result in Uganda.First, they highlight the wide gap between the National Resistance Movement(NRM) and the opposition in terms of recognition, affection and capacity forgrassroots mobilization. Second, they reveal a disconnect between the opposi-tion’s denunciatory campaign message and would-be voters’ more positiveappreciation of their political and socio-economic situation. Finally, surveyshighlight the importance of material benefits to voters, as well as their seriousconcerns about possible electoral violence, which both played in the NRM’s favoras patronage and control of the security agenda have been cornerstones of its rule.While polls help understand how voter support was induced, they also raisequestions about its durability, as pre-electoral optimism soured reflecting adeterioration in the post-electoral economic situation.

Keywords: Uganda; elections; opinion polls; voter behavior

Introduction

In the run up to Uganda’s 2011 general election, five public opinion surveys based on

nationally representative samples were carried out by three different research firms.1

All found that President Yoweri Museveni would win between 64% and 70% of the

vote.2 At the time, the opposition and a number of journalists dismissed these

surveys as part of the National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) rigging machinery, or

as having been undertaken in such an atmosphere of fear generated by the regime’s

security forces that people were unable to express their genuine opinions.3

In February 2011, Museveni was re-elected President of Uganda with over 68% of

the popular vote. Not only did he win a fourth term, but also he significantly

increased his margin of victory over his perennial challenger, the Forum for

Democratic Change’s (FDC) Dr Kiiza Besigye, thus reversing a trend of declining

support since the 1996 elections (76% in 1996, 69% in 2001, 59% in 2006). For the

first time, Museveni won in all geographical regions, posting large gains particularly

in the North (Acholi, Lango, West Nile) and East (Teso, Bukedi).4 His party, the

NRM, increased its overwhelming majority in parliament.

*Email: nicolas.de.torrente@gmail.com

Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2013

Vol. 7, No. 3, 530�548, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2013.810839

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Incumbents, particularly those presiding over ‘‘semiauthoritarian regimes,’’ only

exceptionally lose elections in Africa, so Museveni’s win was not surprising.5 It is

rather the decisiveness of his victory, against a backdrop seemingly favorable to the

opposition, which merits attention. In the pre-electoral period, observers highlighted

the deterioration of public services like health and education and the increase of

corruption in an ageing regime. Poverty levels, though falling, remained high and

unemployment worsened as the economy, despite posting consistent growth figures,

failed to absorb a rapidly expanding youthful population. An important support

base in the populous central Buganda region seemed to have been alienated by NRM

policies on land and traditional leaders. Moreover, opposition parties had more time

to organize and campaign than in 2006, when multi-partyism was reintroduced

months before the election and Besigye spent much of the campaign in prison

fighting treason and rape charges.6 Many thus predicted a repeat of that close and

tense race, with a second round mentioned as a distinct possibility.7

How then can Museveni and the NRM’s massive, increased win be explained?

Post-election analyses have principally highlighted the unprecedented amount of

money injected into race by the dominant ruling party, against the background of

restored stability in Northern Uganda and a campaign largely devoid of violence in

the rest of the country.8 These perceptive explanations rely on qualitative observa-

tions and inferences, but are rarely supported by more than interviews with key

informants or focus group discussions. The millions of Ugandan women and men

across the country whose views and motivations determined the electoral outcome

are largely left out of the picture.This paper argues that opinion surveys constitute an important and credible

source of data concerning ordinary voters’ attitudes towards the electoral process

and opinions about electoral choices. Given the paucity of available data, and the

often urban and elite bias of political commentary, they can make a valuable

contribution in explaining Uganda’s 2011 electoral outcome, serving to buttress,

nuance or disprove the views of analysts and observers.

Opinion polls have only recently become a tool of social and political inquiry in

Africa, mainly thanks to the pioneering Afrobarometer.9 A small but increasing

number of analysts have turned to surveys to understand attitudes and perceptions

that contribute to forming electoral decisions.10 In Uganda, 2011 pre-electoral survey

results not only closely match the outcome of the election, but also they are

remarkably consistent, both internally and across surveys. Their credibility is

bolstered by the fact that responses to a significant number of questions, including

politically sensitive ones, are unfavorable to the NRM government, suggesting that

respondents were able to speak their mind.

This is not to say that the context in which the surveys were conducted did not

affect respondents’ opinions and attitudes, quite on the contrary. Uganda’s electoral

process was characterized by uncertainty and fears of instability, as well commercia-

lization and an uneven playing field.11 Indeed, surveys can bring these situational

factors and their importance in determining voter attitudes and decisions to light.

This is all the more significant in Uganda’s case, as the proximity between pre-

electoral survey findings and declared electoral results indicate that manipulation on

polling day was limited, suggesting that analytical focus should be placed on the

nature of the electoral process and the determinants of electoral choice which led

Ugandans to cast ballots the way they did.12

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The contribution of opinion surveys

This paper highlights the following contributions made by surveys to our under-

standing of the Ugandan general election, with the main focus on the presidential

contest.13

Opinion polls first provide information highlighting the wide gap between the

ruling NRM and its opposition challengers, in terms of recognition, affection and

organizational structure. In particular, surveys give data about the large numbers

who participated in the NRM’s primaries and were elected to party positions,

indicating the reach of the NRM’s unparalleled grassroots mobilization that was

activated prior to the elections.While this point of departure suggests that the opposition had a wide river to

cross, the second part sheds light on the message opposition leaders chose to

convince Ugandans to trust them to get to the other side. Surveys here reveal a

disconnect between the opposition’s denunciatory campaign about the parlous state

of fundamental freedoms and public services in Uganda, on the one hand, and

would-be voters’ more positive appreciation of their governance and socio-economic

situation, on the other.

Finally, the third part of the paper turns to survey findings about voters’

appreciation of the NRM’s strategy and electoral message, highlighting the

importance of material benefits as well as their serious concerns about possible

electoral and post-electoral insecurity. Provision of patronage, both through

clientelism and populist policies, as well as control of the security agenda, have

been cornerstones of the NRM’s governance methods, and they both featured

prominently in its efforts to induce voter support in the 2011 elections.

In closing, opinion surveys provide some pointers about the 2011�2016 electoral

cycle, raising the question as to whether the NRM’s landslide could be an electoral

rather than a political victory, as Perrot et al. conclude.14 Indeed, a striking

characteristic of surveys is the pre-electoral optimism expressed by Ugandans: a

large majority viewed the country as going in ‘‘the right direction’’ and thought that

their personal situation, despite indications of widespread poverty, would improve.

Would these expected improvements materialize? What would happen if they did

not? In 2012, a year later, polls revealed a souring of the public mood related to the

economic downturn and high inflation that followed the large financial outlays

during the elections.

The gap between opposition and NRM, and the importance of grassroots mobilization

After 20 years of the ‘‘no-party’’ Movement system, multi-partyism was reintroduced

in 2005. While officially a pluralistic, competitive system, the disparity between the

dominant state-linked NRM and opposition parties remains huge, whether measured

by membership, elected representatives or funding. Opinion surveys give an

indication of the extent of the gap in terms of name recognition, trust and affection.

While 88% of Ugandans stated that they ‘‘feel close’’ to a political party, the NRM

was their favorite, with 62% declaring they ‘‘felt close to it’’ and 65% saying that they

‘‘liked’’ or ‘‘strongly liked’’ it. The FDC, the best ranked opposition party, only

garnered 13% and 26%, respectively. This discrepancy is also reflected in trust levels,

with 64% saying they trusted the NRM ‘‘somewhat’’ or ‘‘a lot,’’ while the

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corresponding figure for opposition parties was 37%. Voters were also generally not

convinced that the opposition offered a credible alternative vision.15

The pattern is even amplified at the level of presidential candidates. Among the

opposition, only Besigye had significant name recognition, with 79% able to namehim as a presidential contender, while only 23% could name Mao and 21% Otunnu.16

Panel discussions conducted in nine constituencies by Conroy-Krutz showed that,

similarly to survey data about parties, significantly more people rated Museveni’s

honesty and abilities positively than negatively, while the opposite was true for

opposition candidates (with the exception of Mao).17

Given the personalization and concentration of power in the highest office,

Ugandan presidential elections have often been characterized as ‘‘a referendum on

Museveni,’’ and 2011 was no exception. Polls reveal that Museveni enjoyed highapproval ratings (79% ‘‘approve’’ or ‘‘strongly approve’’ the way he performed his job

during the previous year) and that ‘‘the President’’ was viewed as the most trusted

institution in the country (46% say that they trust the president ‘‘a lot’’ and an

additional 23% ‘‘somewhat’’).

Surveys also shed light on a key attribute of how the NRM has sustained its hold

on power: its capacity for grassroots mobilization, through the local council system

and now also party structures. Grassroots organization has been an important

feature of the ‘‘Movement system,’’ when local councils were fused with the NRM asa political organization.18 This merging of state and party structures was loosened by

the advent of multi-partyism, particularly at the district level, as opposition

councilors were elected. However, the state system has continued to operate its

network of administrative and security operatives reaching down into the villages.

The fusion between state and party has moreover subsisted at the village level, as

LC1s (village councils) were last elected in 2001 under the Movement system. LC1

chairpersons have significant influence in local communities, and this is what the

government’s decision to provide each with an unprecedented 150,000 UGX and abicycle in December 2010 tapped into.19

It is noteworthy that the NRM decided to employ the same model of cascading

councils for its party structure. In mid-2010, it embarked on a massive membership

drive, securing a reported 9 million members, an effort that was followed by universal

suffrage elections for NRM ‘‘office bearers’’ and then primaries for ‘‘flag bearers’’

from the village level up.20 Commentators dwelled on the chaotic nature of these

polls, highlighting logistical problems as well as widespread allegations of fraud

which led to the replacement of the NRM’s electoral commission in an attempt toresolve disputes.21

While important, these issues overshadowed the more significant effects of these

primaries: the mobilization of NRM sympathizers and recruitment of party officials.

A remarkable 34% of Ugandans stated that they had participated in a party primary

which, given the ‘‘electoral college’’ nature of opposition primaries, essentially refers

to involvement in NRM processes. These elections also resulted in over 1.8 million

Ugandans being given official party positions, as NRM committees comprising 30

people each were set up in some 60,000 villages.22 Surveys confirm this mobilization:34% of respondents said that they were an ‘‘active member in political party’’ and 4%

an ‘‘official leader’’!

Access to the state’s local council system as well as its own network down to the

villages provided the NRM with an unrivalled grassroots presence, as opposition

groups only recently re-established offices in districts after having been ‘‘frozen’’ for

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20 years under the Movement. These networks represented a unique vehicle for

NRM voter mobilization, dissemination of campaign messages, as well dispensation

of patronage.

The opposition’s misreading of public sentiment about governance and public services

Opposition parties typically struggle to win over voters in entrenched regimes

controlling state institutions in Africa, and Uganda is no exception. Prior to the 2011

election, opposition parties faced the arduous task of developing their organizations

following two decades of the NRM’s state-supported dominance of the political

space under the Movement. Attracting funds and mobilizing members, particularly

in rural areas, proved particularly daunting challenges. They also had to combat

negative perceptions fuelled by the NRM’s demonization of the opposition as a

divisive force adverse to development, even after the return to multi-partyism. This

message was buttressed by the president’s dominance in the mass media, particularly

in state-owned media, which was confirmed during the campaigns. Findings from

media monitors, corroborated by European Union observers, indicate that the

president and ruling party enjoyed a disproportionally large share of coverage both

on radio and in print.23

Faced with this uphill challenge, opposition parties decided to take the NRM

head on rather than to attempt a reformist course.24 Emboldened by their showings

in 2001 and 2006, Uganda’s main opposition parties and candidates, particularly

Besigye, painted the picture of a country wallowing in entrenched poverty and

dramatically falling behind in the provision of services such as health and education,

the building of infrastructure and the management of the economy to provide

employment and improve livelihoods.25 This failure was centrally attributed the

NRM’s repressive and corrupt governance methods, as a nepotistic and unaccoun-

table leadership centered in the presidency was accused of disregarding the interests

of the general population for its personal benefit.26 While party manifestos did

outline alternative policies on a range of issues, the main thrust of the opposition’s

message was that any hope for improvement depended on the ouster of Museveni

and the NRM.27 In the same vein, state institutions, such as the army, police and the

Electoral Commission, were also faulted for being at the service of the ruling party’s

interests.28 Accordingly, opposition parties pushed for electoral reforms and at times

threatened a boycott if fundamental changes were not made.29

How did this radical message resonate with prospective voters? Survey results

suggest the existence of a major disconnect. Not only did most Ugandans have a

generally favorable view of their enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and displayed

general confidence in the electoral process, but also they assessed quite positively

government efforts to improve the acknowledged poor state of public services. They

also expressed considerable optimism about their country’s and their own economic

future, despite the precariousness of their living conditions.

To begin with, survey results show that Ugandans expressed considerable interest

in elections: 91% indicated that they were ‘‘very’’ or ‘‘fairly’’ interested in presidential

elections. Ugandans viewed elections as the preferred option for choosing leaders

(87%) and, to a lesser degree, as an effective way to ensure that leaders represent their

views (57%) or are removed from office if they do not do what voters want (64%).

Accordingly, 85% of respondents stated that they intended to vote.

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This interest in elections is a reflection both of Ugandans’ support for multi-

partyism and their high degree of involvement in politics and public affairs.30 A total

of 68% ‘‘strongly agreed’’ or ‘‘agreed’’ that ‘‘many political parties are needed to

make sure that Ugandans have real choices.’’ Election-related activity was

commensurately high: 61% said they had discussed elections with others and

attended campaign rallies, and 43% said they had worked to get candidates elected.

These numbers run counter to prevailing views about the apathy of Ugandans

relative to politics and elections.

Ugandans also generally expressed trust in the process: 58% said electoral laws

were ‘‘adequate’’ and 62% expected the 2011 elections to be better than 2006.

Confidence in the Electoral Commission was however not as high: while 61% and

57% stated that the Electoral Commission was ‘‘prepared’’ and ‘‘neutral’’ respec-

tively, trust in the institution was only 51%.31 While these figures reveal concern

about the Electoral Commission, they do not reflect the opposition’s accusation that

the Electoral Commission was fundamentally partial and unable to organize a

credible election.

Would be-voters’ assessment of the freedom and fairness of the electoral process

was also relatively sanguine: 61% expected the elections to be either ‘‘completely free

and fair’’ or ‘‘free and fair with minor problems.’’ A total of 89% stated that they are

‘‘completely’’ or ‘‘somewhat’’ free to vote for the candidate of their choice, and 73%

asserted that the ability of parties to organize rallies has been ‘‘completely free’’ or

‘‘free with minor problems.’’

Areas viewed as most problematic were access to the media (only 40% opined

that it ‘‘completely free’’ or ‘‘free with minor problems’’) and to money and resources

(52% assess that it is ‘‘completely free’’ or ‘‘free with minor problems’’). A significant

section of the electorate thus recognized the uneven playing field favoring the ruling

NRM party.

While the opposition decried the erosion of human rights and freedoms of

expression and assembly in Uganda, would-be voters largely had a different view.

Respondents rated their freedoms of speech, association and to vote the candidate of

their choice very highly (between 85% and 90% saying they are ‘‘somewhat or

completely free’’). A total of 79% also thought that confidentiality of their vote

would be respected.

There has been much discussion over the 65% of respondents opining that people

‘‘often or always’’ have to be careful of what they say about politics, with opposition

commentators saying that this figure invalidates survey results. However, this high

number, which has been relatively constant across opinion polls over time, does not

appear to have deterred critical responses towards government performance and

positions.

In the governance area, the opposition also tried to capitalize on the deteriorating

relations between the NRM government and some of its key supporters, particularly

in Buganda. Criticizing excessive centralization, the opposition espoused a federalist

agenda, which also played into monarchist sentiments rife in Buganda. Following his

heavy-handed suppression of pro-Kabaka demonstrations in 2009, the president’s

determination to pass a law to curb the political role of traditional leaders barely a

month prior to the election was thus viewed by many as political suicide handing

Buganda to his opponents.32 Surveys, however, discredited this claim, delivering a

split verdict in the Central region (25% were in favor of ‘‘all’’ or ‘‘parts’’ of the bill

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while 29% were not in favor of ‘‘any’’ parts of the bill, the rest having either not heard

of it, being undecided or not knowing).

When asked to rate priority issues for candidates to address in the election,

respondents placed public services, such as health and education, at the forefront oftheir concerns. The fight against corruption and the need to ensure order in the

country followed. Interestingly, both NRM and opposition supporters had a similar

ranking, albeit with the latter placing more emphasis on corruption.

These issues featured prominently in both NRM and opposition manifestos,

however with differences in emphasis. President Museveni has stressed that

infrastructure (energy, roads) and improvement of livelihood incomes through the

modernization of productive sectors, including agriculture, deserve priority atten-

tion.33 On the campaign trail, he however also discussed health and education whileblaming corrupt local officials and civil servants for implementation deficits.34 While

the president ran as a reformer, the opposition denounced corruption as central to

the NRM and thus fundamentally responsible for the decay in public services and

the failure to generate employment.

While indicating convergence about issues of concern to voters, opinion polls also

reveal a mismatch between the opposition’s message and respondents’ views. While

would-be voters severely criticized government’s performance on job creation and the

fight against corruption, they were more positive about the government’s record indelivering public services. There is a difference here between doomsday portrayals by

the opposition about government failures leading to a deterioration of services and

the 51% and 63% of Ugandans who gave the government good marks about its

handling of ‘‘improving basic health services’’ and ‘‘addressing educational needs,’’

respectively. These ratings were only down a few percentage points compared with

the 2008 Afrobarometer poll.35

While a majority stated that the quality of key services in their area was ‘‘very

poor’’ or ‘‘fairly poor’’ (58% for roads and 51% for health facilities), in the samebreath they also assessed the situation as the ‘‘same’’ (34% for roads, 37% for health)

or ‘‘getting better/much better’’ (41% for roads, 40% for health) rather than getting

worse. On education, people were even more sanguine, giving high marks (65%

‘‘fairly good’’ or ‘‘very good’’) to the quality of ‘‘Universal Primary Education,’’

(UPE) a landmark NRM policy, while opposition politicians and experts have argued

that UPE has increased student numbers at the expense of educational outcomes.36

These findings may account for the success of Museveni’s approach of portraying

the government as trying to improve matters, for which it is credited, but beingfrustrated by local bureaucrats and petty corruption. It also indicates that the

opposition’s catastrophist theme on the collapse of public services was somewhat in

discordance with people’s perceptions. Whether services are indeed relatively good is

not the point here: what matters is that people did not perceive government’s failures

as being responsible for a worsening state of public services as denounced by the

opposition. Surveys thus suggest that the opposition misread the electorate’s mood

by emphasizing deficits in governance as being at the root of Uganda’s allegedly

deteriorating service delivery.In fact, before the elections, Ugandans were optimistic about the future: 65% said

that the country was going ‘‘in the right direction’’ and the majority thought the

economic situation would improve over the next 12 months (51%). And even though

respondents assessed their own situation to be precarious � 41% described their

living conditions as ‘‘very’’ or ‘‘fairly bad’’ and only just less than half (47% and 42%,

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respectively) said that they have ‘‘never’’ gone without either enough food to eat or

fuel to cook their food in the past year � 57% believed that their economic conditions

would be better in 12 months’ time. Mobilizing around a message of fundamental

change in these circumstances presented a significant challenge for the opposition,particularly when the NRM’s resilience is factored into the equation.

The NRM’s enduring strength: the role of patronage and security for voters

Beyond the opposition’s weakness, both induced and self-inflicted, there is a need to

look further into the president and NRM’s lasting appeal. In many ways, survey

findings reflect less what occurred during the campaign than the situation after 25

years under the NRM. This view is borne out by the fact that 86% of would-be voterssaid in January that they had not changed their plans about their presidential choice

since the start of the campaigns.

Opinion surveys shed light on the role played by features that analysts have often

associated with the NRM’s rule, i.e. its provision of direct and indirect material

benefits to a poor population in a patronage system and its dominance over the

security agenda amid high fears of instability.37

Patronage

Vote-buying and patronage more broadly are features often associated with elections

in Africa.38 It has been widely reported that the 2011 elections were the most highly

commercialized in Uganda’s history, with unprecedented sums spent in presidential,

MP and local council races. The FDC reported it had spent over US$2 million (5.7

billion UGX), a significant increase over 2006.39 No reliable figures of NRM spending

are available, but a knowledgeable analyst have estimated that the party spent

approximately US$350 million on presidential and MPs’ races.40 There is considerablediscussion about the sources of these funds, particularly as the president was entitled

to all ‘‘facilities normally attached to his office’’ during elections, with widespread

allegations that additional government funds were diverted to his campaign.41 In

addition to party support, MP candidates are reported to have routinely spent tens of

thousands of US dollars of personal money in their campaigns.

In part, this outlay of funds reflects the rising costs of campaigning, including the

printing of posters, hiring of agents, organization of rallies and so on. The NRM in

particular embarked on an expensive modern multi-media campaign, including massrallies with subsidized attendance, free concerts, the printing of millions of T-shirts,

radio, television and billboard advertising as well as SMS messaging and robocalls.42

Other parties with less means also bought advertising, particularly on radio and

billboards.

However, the use of money went beyond campaigning expenses. A total of 56% of

Ugandans stated their belief that political parties or candidates ‘‘often or always’’

buy votes during elections. Indeed, a substantial number of voters (15% in December,

17% in February) revealed that they had been personally offered a bribe either incash or in kind. A total of 64% stated that the offer came from the NRM, while 19%

said it was from the FDC and 5% from the Democratic Party (DP) and Uganda

People’s Congress (UPC), respectively. Just under 50% of respondents stated that

people in their area would receive, on average, less than 1000 UGX (or under

US$0.50) to sell their votes.

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While vote-buying appears to be extensive, opinion polls suggest that would-be

voters struggled with issues of acceptability and efficacy. A vast majority displayed an

aversion to bribery: only 9% and 11% stated that is ‘‘not wrong at all’’ for voters to

accept bribes or candidates to offer bribes, respectively. However, this strong stancedid not lead to the rejection of vote-buying: only 19% said they would refuse the

money, while 52% said that it is ‘‘wrong but acceptable’’ for voters to accept vote-

inducing payments.

The rationalization people offered is that taking bribes largely did not affect their

vote: over three-quarters of respondents stated that they would accept the money and

vote the candidate of their choice, while only 4�5% admitted that they would vote for

the candidate offering the bribe. Indeed, Conroy-Krutz and Logan report that voting

intentions were not affected by vote-buying offers, as those having been offeredbribes were no more or less likely to say they would vote for the candidate/party

making the offer than those who had not. They conclude that ‘‘there is nothing to

suggest that its efforts to buy votes gave the NRM any significant advantage over its

competitors at least in the presidential race.’’43

While these data question the ‘‘converting’’ effect of vote-buying, where a voter

admits to switching camp as a result of a gift, there is no doubt candidates perceived

the spending of money on voters, either directly (bribes, transport/sodas at events,

contribution to development projects, contributions at marriages, etc.) or indirectly(posters, agents, etc.) to be a successful campaign strategy. And while voters were

conflicted about vote-buying, they displayed no such qualms about candidates’

promises of material benefits as rewards for their electoral support. The ‘‘ability to

deliver jobs or development’’ was cited as the most important factor for the choice of

an MP (46%), above ‘‘personality and leadership skills’’ (39%) or party affiliation.

This view of the MP as a ‘‘patron’’ providing for his/her constituents is all the more

pronounced in light of inadequate public services. Successful examples include MPs

who have ensured that the medical bills of women requiring hospital referrals duringchildbirth are covered or have earned the nickname of ‘‘Hon. Ntunguka (Develop-

ment)’’ due to the many projects being supported.44

This perception of the successful political leader as a patron providing benefits to

his/her community is not confined to MPs or local councilors. Beyond the powers

inherent in the presidency, in recent years Museveni has expanded the use of personal

interventions and contributions. The increase in State House’s budget, including the

‘‘donations’’ line item, reflects this trend. In January 2011, parliament passed a

supplementary budget which included an additional 95 billion UGX for State House,including an additional 18.6 billion UGX for donations.45 Promises of a presidential

intervention to bring a development benefit to a community (like a new bridge or

school), the handing out of presidential contributions, whether in cash or in kind

(like a donation to a women’s group or the provision of iron sheets for priests’

houses) or the dispensing of presidential gifts to individuals (such as vehicles to

bishops) have all escalated, attracting discussion about the legality and legitimacy of

presidential ‘‘brown envelopes.’’46

The provision of material benefits and rewards from public sources is at the heartof political dynamics in Uganda. Joughin and Kjaer have noted that as elections have

become the key means of securing domestic and international legitimacy, mobilizing

voters has becoming increasingly important for Museveni, particularly as politics

have become more competitive and support for the regime has declined over time.47

The classical manner to accomplish this is clientelism, where elites representing a

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wide variety of religious, ethnic and other groups are co-opted into positions of

power. Indeed, Tumushabe, analyzing the ballooning costs of public administration,

remarks that it is driven by the expansion of ‘‘political bureaucracy’’ as ministries

and other posts are created to reward a range of different interests.48

But co-opting elites is not enough. As Joughin and Kjaer note, ‘‘welfarist’’

policies promising direct benefits to voters are increasingly important. The NRM has

thus endeavored to implement programs that have ‘‘tangible benefits to citizens

country-wide’’ and also provide ‘‘material resources in exchange for political

loyalty.’’49 Indeed, in the 2011 election, President Museveni routinely co-opted

government programs, in particular the National Agricultural Advisory Services

(NAADS), promising to extend its benefits and correct malpractices if supported by

voters.50 He also urged voters to send him MPs that he can ‘‘work with’’ and made

clear that government benefits would flow in case of favorable outcomes.51

The opposition has argued that President Museveni and the NRM only react

when there is cause for it, and that voting for the opposition is the best way to

mobilize attention for the needs of a particular area/community. What is significant

is that this argument is symmetrical to the NRM’s pitch and thus corroborates the

key role that the provision of benefits from the state, either directly or indirectly,

plays in winning over voters.

A good example of how positively voters view patronage is ‘‘districtization,’’

which refers to the mushrooming of districts (from 30 in 1990 to 112 in 2011). While

officially justified to ‘‘bring services closer to the people,’’ there is near-unanimity

among experts that the proliferation of districts is a wasteful and inefficient policy.52

It is however a popular one: in May 2010, the TNS/Research International poll

found that 69% of Ugandans thought that the government was ‘‘right to create new

districts in the country.’’ It serves the political purpose of recognizing and rewarding

the particular area being elevated to district status, with public employment a key

resultant benefit.

Not only did Museveni usher in 32 new districts since 2006, but also he promised

to create over a dozen new ones in the 2011 campaign, often stating that he was

doing so in response to demands from the electorate.53 Teso, the region which most

distinctly moved to the FDC in 2006, was singled out for special treatment as

Museveni promised to create a Ministry for Teso if it reverted to the NRM.

The strategy was indeed a vote-getter, as new districts swung their vote towards

the president. Conroy-Krutz and Logan break down Museveni’s vote share among

old/unchanged districts (55), ‘‘mother’’ districts (from which new districts have been

carved out, 25) and new districts (32) created since 2006. They show that Museveni’s

vote share increased by ‘‘an additional 5 percentage points in new and mother

districts relative to districts that saw no change,’’ concluding that ‘‘since just over

one-third (37%) of all registered voters live in new or mother districts, this translated

at the national level into a roughly two-point increase in Museveni’s national voter

share due to districtization, out of the total increase of 9.1%’’ over his 2006 score.54

There are other indications that linking material benefits to electoral support is

an effective strategy. Voters on a national level were equally split on the question of

whether ‘‘districts that do not vote for the winning party will be penalized by

receiving fewer government programs and resources’’ (46% say ‘‘not at all’’ or ‘‘not

very likely’’ to 44% who say ‘‘somewhat’’ or ‘‘very likely,’’ with 10% ‘‘do not know’’).

However, areas where the opposition has been strong were less doubtful about the

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negative impact of supporting the losing side: 51% in the North and 56% in the East

think that this is ‘‘somewhat’’ or ‘‘very’’ likely to be the case.

It does not mean that voters were naıve or at ease with the practice of patronage.

They took promises with a grain of salt (51% said that ‘‘political parties andcandidates make promises simply to get elected’’) and harbored few illusions about

the political establishment: 31% and 33% believed that ‘‘most’’ or ‘‘all’’ MPs and

cabinet ministers are corrupt, respectively, with only 6% saying that ‘‘none’’ are.

Echoing the moral stance against vote-buying, they also largely felt (63%) that the

president ‘‘should not use government resources in his campaigns because it gives

him an unfair advantage.’’

To conclude, the rampant and escalating monetization of elections suggests that,

despite its reported lack of efficacy in ‘‘converting’’ voters, Conroy-Krutz andLogan’s conclusion that money was just ‘‘a bit player’’ in the elections may well miss

some of its important effects.55

In many ways, the resources used served to confirm and sustain the patronage-

based system that has become a hallmark of the NRM’s rule. It served as a tangible

reminder of where benefits flowed from, and a predictor of more to come. As

Kramon and others have argued, vote-buying, and by extension patronage, is more

than an economic transaction: it provides an effective way of signaling the credibility

of politicians and creating voter expectations of future benefits.56 In Uganda,injecting money through the network of party (and state) officials that reach down to

the grassroots level also served to sustain this system of active party representatives.

An indication that this massive infusion of cash played such a validating role is

electoral participation.57 Contrary to the expectation that turnout would be lower in

areas where the NRM has traditionally dominated (as it is typically more difficult to

mobilize when victory appears assured), Museveni grew his share of the vote as

participation levels increased, while a majority of voters stayed away from the polls

in opposition strongholds such as Kampala.58 This is consistent with what Gans-Morse et al. call ‘‘turnout buying,’’ whereby ‘‘clientelist parties’’ use a range of

strategies to activate their passive constituencies rather than induce vote switching.59

In Kenya, Kramon also found empirical corroboration from survey data that vote-

buying had a significant effect on increasing turnout.60

Security

The other feature highlighted by opinion polls that has played an important role inthe NRM’s rule is security. One of the surveys’ most striking findings is would-be

voters’ fear of violence associated with political contest. A majority of Ugandans

(57%) said that political competition ‘‘always’’ or ‘‘often’’ leads to violent conflict,

and a sizeable minority (38%) stated that politicians ‘‘always’’ or ‘‘often’’ use violence

during elections. This translates into significant numbers fearing personal victimiza-

tion (28% stated they have ‘‘a lot’’ of fear of becoming a victim of violence)61 and

smaller numbers reporting intimidation during the campaigns (8% reported personal

intimidation and 11% reported intimidation in their neighborhood/village).This fear of violence during the campaigns spilled over to anxiety about post-

electoral violence. In November, 59% of Ugandans were afraid that post-election

violence would break out, with 73% opining that losers would reject electoral

results.62 While a sizeable majority also expected that security agencies would be able

to contain ‘‘large scale outbreaks,’’ over one-third of Ugandans (35%) went into the

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polls expecting that ‘‘widespread conflict’’ would break out after results were

announced, a remarkably and disturbingly high figure.

These expressed fears of violence play into a dominant narrative in Ugandan

politics. Museveni and the NRM have repeatedly made it clear that they areresponsible for bringing the country out of chaos and that no disruption would be

allowed. Ugandans have largely recognized the return of stability in most parts of the

country as a significant NRM achievement. Indeed ‘‘at least we can sleep’’ is an often

repeated rebuttal by NRM politicians and ordinary people alike to critiques about

economic performance, social services or other issues, and the NRM has regularly

campaigned on this theme.

In 2011, surveys predicted that the NRM would make inroads in Northern

Uganda, hitherto dominated by the opposition, in part because of the ‘‘peacedividend’’ associated with the end of open warfare. Indeed, the NRM made massive

gains in Northern Uganda, reversing its losing record dating back to 1996 for Acholi

and Lango sub-regions. Across Northern Uganda, Museveni won a majority (55.6%)

for the first time, increasing his vote share by 24.2%. Besigye, who had swept the

region except for Karamoja with 58.7% in 2006, suffered a precipitous decline to

25.1%, as part of the dwindling opposition vote went to Norbert Mao and Olara

Ottunu. While resentment in the North persists about all sides in the conflict,

including the government, the drastic improvement in security, paving the way forsocio-economic rehabilitation, moved the region into the NRM’s camp. The NRM’s

gains in the North were a significant factor in Museveni’s victory and increase in

share of the overall vote.63

There is however also another side to the NRM ‘‘pro-security’’ credentials. The

NRM has not abandoned its roots as a guerilla movement using force to promote its

political agenda, and Uganda’s security services, particularly the army and

intelligence, remain aligned with the NRM.64 Moreover, in previous elections,

particularly 2006, much of the violence and intimidation was actually dispensed bysecurity forces or informal armed groups linked to the NRM.65 Security forces

largely view the opposition with suspicion and the way police have continued to

prevent demonstrations critical of the state (for instance, protests against the

Electoral Commission) are indicative of this partiality. Surveys show that it is

opposition supporters who were most concerned about being victims of political

intimidation or violence (45% compared with 32% for NRM supporters).

In the 2011 campaigns, force largely took a back seat to a range of methods,

particularly the use of material resources, to win over voters. However, Museveni hasmade it clear that, having liberated Uganda, he would not hand over power to

someone unable to continue the NRM’s struggle. As elections approached, he stated

that he would respect the outcome, but there is an ingrained view among Ugandans

that Museveni will only leave power at a time of his choosing, a position guaranteed

by his command over the security agencies.66 The security forces’ deployment during

the elections served both as a deterrent against violence and a reminder about their

strength and interest in the process.67

On the other side, the opposition remained ambiguous about the use of violenceas a political weapon. In the run up to the elections, Besigye argued that violence

could only be expected if the elections were flawed, drawing parallels to Museveni

‘‘going to the bush’’ in protest at the rigged 1980 polls. The opposition also

announced it would form volunteer groups to ‘‘protect its votes’’ against rigging,

raising the specter of opposition militias to counter NRM-aligned security agencies.

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Finally, the opposition declared that it would not petition the courts if it lost the

election fraudulently but rather take its case to the ‘‘court of public opinion,’’ raising

the prospect of street protests that have often turned violent.68 While the few

documented violent incidents that took place during campaigns were mainlyattributable to the NRM, the assertive and visible posture of security forces,

particularly on and after election day, was largely directed against the danger of

protests and possible rioting coming from the opposition.

The potential for upheaval, largely linked to expectations that the opposition

would reject results as security forces warned that they would crack down, appeared

to loom large in the minds of would-be voters. Ugandans’ anxiety about instability,

combined with the NRM’s double-edged message highlighting its credentials in

restoring stability while equating security with its continued stay in power, appears tohave been a powerful vote-getter for Museveni and his party.

While worries about violence were widespread, casting a shadow over the

election, fears of personal intimidation did not appear to deter voters. Survey results

show that those most concerned about being victims of political intimidation were

not just opposition supporters, they were also significantly more likely to express

their intention of actually voting for the opposition.69 This is a testament to the high

degree of freedoms that Ugandans felt they enjoyed and is consistent with the survey

finding that 91% of Ugandans stated they were free to choose who to vote forwithout being pressured.

Conclusion: listening to the voters � the value and limitation of opinion surveys

By revealing information directly emanating from would-be voters, opinion polls

shed light on some key aspects of the electoral process and its outcome, in a context

where parties, analysts and the media have limited means to gauge voters’ views,

opinions and attitudes. Indeed, pre-electoral surveys were dismissed by oppositionpoliticians and commentators for not fitting in with their prediction of a tight race,

leading one analyst to call the 2011 election ‘‘a possible referendum on the future of

opinion polling in Uganda.’’70 Since polls closely matched electoral outcomes,

politicians may now be reconsidering their skeptical stance and taking a second look

at opinion surveys.71

Surveys however have limitations of their own. They contain a margin of error,

which is often ignored in the heat of the debate about their findings. They also can

only reflect stated opinion at the time the survey is conducted, which may bedifferent from actual behavior. Issues that may be affected by ‘‘socially desirable’’

responses are particularly prone to discrepancies in this regard. The most visible

instance here concerns electoral participation: while 85% stated that they were

registered voters intending to vote, actual turnout was just below 60%. Denial that

vote-buying would affect electoral choice could also be affected by an inclination to

give ‘‘socially desirable’’ answers. People’s stated intentions to take action in the

future must thus be viewed with factors that could affect their realization in mind.

Even with these constraints, data from surveys about the 2011 elections are helpfulin highlighting opinions and attitudes that influenced voters’ choices. The opposition

put forward a message of fundamental change based on a doomsday depiction of the

country’s deterioration under the NRM, which surveys show was at variance with

people’s more positive appreciation of the prevailing governance, public service

delivery and economic situation at the time. Surveys also underline the gap between the

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NRM and the opposition in terms of recognition, trust, affection and organizational

presence, while providing insights into sources of the NRM’s electoral strength.

In particular, surveys reveal respondents’ concerns over the possibility of violence

resulting from a disputed election, as well as their appreciation of patronage benefits

that have been at the center of the president’s governance methods and campaign

promises, such as the creation of new districts. While the environment in which surveys

are conducted matters, if people are largely able to speak their mind, as in Uganda,

then surveys will reveal these situational factors rather than be corrupted by them.

While pre-electoral surveys show that the opposition may well have misjudged

voter perceptions, it also illustrates the opposition’s difficulties to overcome factors

molding voters’ mindsets. The power of the incumbent President to shape the

discourse and incentive structure facing voters is great, particularly as the ruling

party retains deep ties with state structures reaching to the grassroots, has a historical

connection to security forces, commands far greater resources and enjoys superior

coverage in the media. Museveni’s double-edged emphasis on security, both feeding

off and stoking voters’ fears, illustrates this phenomenon which is highlighted by

survey results. An analysis of opinion polls should thus contribute to the discussion

about the extent to which elections can produce governments deriving their

legitimacy from contests where change is a realistic possibility, especially when there

are such large disparities between the contending sides.

Finally, while survey results help show how electoral winners induced popular

consent, the durability of this support was to be challenged in the immediate post-

electoral period. Discontent triggered by escalating fuel and food prices translated

into ‘‘walk to work’’ protests forcibly put down by security forces.72 Indeed, the

Afrobarometer Round 5 poll conducted in January�February 2012, barely a year

after the election found a striking reversal in people’s moods: close to three quarters

now felt that the country was going ‘‘in the wrong direction,’’ blaming the rising cost

of living primarily attributed to government mismanagement of the economy and

spending during the elections.73 The poll revealed pessimism about the future (55%

stating that general economic conditions and 50% that their own living conditions

would be ‘‘much worse’’ or ‘‘worse’’ in 12 months’ time). While Ugandans have not

migrated to the opposition (‘‘closeness’’ to the FDC only rose nine points to 22%),

support for a constitutional limit on the number of presidential terms reached an all-

time high (85%), an indication among many of Uganda’s more fragile and uncertain

political situation going towards the 2016 elections.

Acknowledgements

The author holds a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics. Hewas the Programme Manager of the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP), a multi-donor(Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK) basket fund supportingdemocratic processes and practices in Uganda. The DDP financed three opinion surveys in therun-up to the 2011 elections: one in partnership with the Monitor Publications carried out byTNS/Research International in May 2010 and two carried out by Wilsken Agencies forAfrobarometer in November�December 2010 and January 2011, respectively. The opinionsexpressed in this paper are the author’s alone: they cannot be attributed to the DDP or any ofits sponsoring governments. The author wishes to thank Simon Osborn, Kristof Titeca andFlorence Brisset-Foucault, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for helpful comments onearlier versions of this paper.

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Notes

1. Three polls released findings publicly, while two others (Synovate for the Inter-partyCooperation and University of California � Davis) only provided results to their clients.The publicly available polls include: Afrobarometer 4.5 (December 2010) and 4.5.2.(January 2011) (http://www.afrobarometer.ug); and TNS/Research International for theMonitor Publications (January 2011); also Daily Monitor, ‘‘Museveni Leads, UgandansFear.’’

2. Daily Monitor, ‘‘Museveni Leads, Ugandans Fear.’’3. Aside from claims that the polling company had been infiltrated, detractors pointed to the

60% who thought that it was the government that had sent the interviewers as evidence ofmanipulation. This figure is not unusual in countries surveyed by Afrobarometer, aspeople expect the government to be the leading political and social force. It was, however,used as an indictment of the polls: opposition politicians called them ‘‘biased’’ and ‘‘NRMpropaganda’’; Kiiza Besigye cited in Baraire, ‘‘Besigye Ends Western Tour.’’ Veteranjournalist T. Kalyegira wrote that the ‘‘view among the public’’ was that ‘‘this publicationof opinion polls is a way of getting the public to believe a sense of a Museveni victory asinevitable’’ as well as ‘‘speculation that it is cover for what is widely believed to bepreparations for massive rigging’’; Kalyegira, ‘‘How 2011 Opinion Polls Took On OwnLife.’’

4. ‘‘This has never happened [before],’’ Museveni wrote. ‘‘The people of West Nile and NorthCentral Uganda are now politically together with the rest of the country’’; Museveni,‘‘Factors Behind NRM’s Victory.’’

5. Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda, p. 13; Cheesman, ‘‘African Elections,’’ p. 140.6. He was cleared of trumped-up rape charges in 2006, and then of treason in October 2010,

just before the campaigns started.7. Izama and Wilkerson, ‘‘Uganda: Museveni’s Triumph and Weakness,’’ pp. 64�78.8. Ibid., p. 66.9. See http://www.afrobarometer.org/.

10. For a discussion of the accuracy and political impact of pre-electoral surveys in Kenya, seeWolf, ‘‘‘Poll Poison’?’’; also: Bratton et al., ‘‘Voting Intentions in Africa.’’ Branch andCheesman, ‘‘Briefing: Using Opinion Polls’’, use poll data to show the gap betweenconventional political assessments and citizen opinions.

11. Cf. European Union Election Observation Mission in Uganda, General Elections 18February 2011; African Union, ‘‘Preliminary Statement of the African Union ObserverMission’’; Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group.

12. DEMGroup’s parallel vote tabulation, based on 1000 random polling stations, foundMuseveni garnering 67.8% of the vote with Besigye on 25.3%, a difference of less than 1percentage point from Electoral Commission results; DEMGroup, Despite Challenges.This finding also supports the view that there was no tampering in the transmission andtallying of results beyond the polling station level.

13. All opinion survey results are from the Afrobarometer pre-electoral surveys: Round 4.5,published in December 2010; and Round 4.5.2, published in February 2011. Unlessotherwise indicated, the results cited in the text are from the latest poll: Round 4.5.2.

14. Perrot et al., ‘‘Revisiting the 2011 Multiparty Elections.’’15. A total of 53% felt that ‘‘the opposition has not shown that it has the plans to solve the

country’s problems,’’ in contrast to 41% who felt that ‘‘the opposition has presented aconvincing alternative plan and vision for Uganda.’’

16. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,’’ p. 14.17. Ibid., p. 15.18. Carbone, No-Party Democracy?19. Kiwanuka, ‘‘Govt to Give Bikes to LC1 Chiefs.’’20. The number of NRM members is an estimate, as there is no authoritative total following

the registration drive of 2010; interview with Professor Elijah Mushemeza, DeputyChairperson, NRM Electoral Commission, March 16, 2012.

21. A total of 600 aspirants filed petitions contesting the results; Candia, ‘‘Museveni DisbandsNRM Electoral Body.’’

22. Interview with Professor E. Mushemeza, Deputy Chairperson, NRM Electoral Commis-sion, March 15, 2012.

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23. According to Memonet, Uganda Media Coverage, pp. 52, 53, 78, 79, 74.0% and 37.9% ofnews content on Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) radio and 10 private radiostations, respectively, were accorded to Museveni. In the print media, 60% of daily and42% of weekly coverage, respectively, was allocated to Museveni, followed by Besigye at21% in dailies and 16% in weeklies, respectively. The NRM dominated the daily print newsat 58% of total space, with FDC at 23% and DP at 7%, respectively.

24. Wetaka, ‘‘Besigye Appeals to Electorate.’’25. Otunnu’s UPC put the key priority of its 2011 campaign manifesto thus: ‘‘During 25 years

of Museveni/NRM rule, the vast majority of Ugandans have descended into unbelievablyhumiliating poverty. For them everything has been wiped out. This is programmedpoverty; Museveni has stated that poor people are easy to rule. The UPC cannot acceptthat vast majority of Ugandans to be condemned to such a deep and perpetual cycle ofpoverty’’; http://www.upcparty.org/campaigns.php/.

26. For an overview of Besigye’s message, see, for instance, Twinoburyo, ‘‘Besigye in SouthAfrica Denounces Museveni’s Patrimonial State.’’

27. You Tube, ‘‘Kiiza Besigye to Challenge Museveni.’’ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v�_Iw4gdeqOkE/.

28. For instance, NTV, ‘‘Besigye Outline 2011 Campaign Strategy.’’ NTV September 2, 2010.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v�82tIcgHCTGU/.

29. Lule and Among, ‘‘Olara Otunnu, Besigye Clash Over Boycott.’’30. A review of key Afrobarometer indicators from 2000 to 2008 (Rounds 1�4) shows that

support for democracy and appreciation of fundamental freedoms remains high, with anincrease in support for multi-party political competition and a decrease in satisfactionwith democracy and in the evaluation of election quality as most significant changes;Afrobarometer. ‘‘Popular Attitudes Toward Democracy.’’

31. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,’’ p. 5.32. The Observer, ‘‘Editorial: Revise or Discard Cultural Leaders Bill.’’33. Hickey, Beyond the Poverty Agenda.34. Mwenda, ‘‘Why Museveni Won and Besigye Lost.’’35. In 2008, 55% and 67% rated the government’s performance in improving health and

education services as ‘‘fairly’’ or ‘‘very’’ well; Afrobarometer Round 4 (http://www.afrobarometer.org).

36. Habati, ‘‘Early Ghosts in Schools.’’.37. Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda; Rubongoya, Regime Hegemony.38. Lijphart, ‘‘It’s Our Time to ‘Chop’.’’39. Personal communication with an Senior FDC leader, May 12, 2011.40. Andrew Mwenda quoted in Wilkerson, ‘‘Heads I Win, Tails You Lose.’’ The NRM has,

however, rubbished this figure as being unsubstantiated and far too high.41. DEMGroup, Money in Politics Report, pp. 7, 24. An indicator of a possible injection of

election-related funds is that currency in circulation increased rapidly from September2010 onwards, peaking in December 2010/January 2011 with an annual percentage changeof over 30%; Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC), EPRC Speaks on EconomicTurbulence.

42. In reaching out to the youth, Museveni also recorded a ‘‘rap’’ song that receivedconsiderable airtime on radio and in clubs. Furthermore, robocalls allowed the president’svoice to reach into the phones of millions of Ugandans and ask them personally for theirvote. Based on anecdotal information, this novel campaigning method made a strongimpression, particularly among less-educated voters in rural areas.

43. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,’’ p. 21.44. Personal communications with the Hon. Ronald Reagan Okumu (FDC), Aswa County,

Gulu; and the Hon. Henry Banyenzaki, (NRM) Rubanda West, Kabale. http://www.enteruganda.com/D/9/579/700743/.

45. Mugerwa, ‘‘State House Bills Hit Record Shs190b.’’ The initially approved budget forState House in FY2010/11 was 63.67 billion shillings; Republic of Uganda, MinisterialPolicy Statement, p. 99.

46. Habati, ‘‘Bribery or Service?’’47. Joughin and Kjaer, ‘‘Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform,’’ p. 63.48. Tumushabe, ‘‘Trends in Public Administration Expenditure.’’

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49. Joughin and Kjaer, ‘‘Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform,’’ p. 61.50. Mwesigye, ‘‘Museveni Uses NAADS, Roads, to Woo Baganda.’’51. National Resistance Movement (NRM), ‘‘Museveni Promises Teso Ministry.’’52. Bjornestad, Political Economy of Decentralization.53. For instance. see Kivabulaya, ‘‘Museveni Grants Kikumiro and Kagadi District Status.’’54. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,’’ p. 13.55. Ibid., p. 25.56. Kramon, Vote-Buying and Political Behavior, p. 23.57. Gans-Morse et al., Varieties of Clientelism.58. At polling stations with a turnout between 60% and 69% (i.e. above the national average),

Museveni got 70.9% of the vote; between 70% and 79%, he received 74.5% of the vote; andbetween 80% and 89%, he got 81.9% of the vote; National Democratic Institute,‘‘Preliminary Analysis’’; also Green, ‘‘Uganda Post-Election Report.’’

59. Gans-Morse et al., Varieties of Clientelism.60. Kramon, Vote-Buying and Political Behavior.61. More positively, the percentage saying they do not fear ‘‘at all’’ of being a victim of

violence increased from 33% to 45% from November to January as a reflection ofgenerally violence-free campaigns.

62. The numbers decreased to 50% and 63%, respectively, in January.63. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election, pp. 21�2.64. During the campaigns, the UPDF did state that it would transfer its allegiances to another

president if that were the outcome of the vote; Uganda Radio Network, ‘‘UPDF Re-assuresOpposition of Non-Interference.’’ However, there were contradictory statements fromarmy leaders and the UPDF has continued its allegiance to Museveni as its founder andhistoric leader of the NRA, from which it emerged.

65. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Preparing for the Polls.66. Uganda Radio Network, ‘‘Museveni Ready to Hand Over Power.’’ In 2008, Museveni

famously remarked: ‘‘I hunted and killed my animal, now they want me to go, whereshould I go?’’; quoted in Katureebe, ‘‘Why Museveni Freed Rwaksisi.’’ Museveni has beenquoted as saying that he cannot be removed ‘‘by a mere piece of paper (a ballot),’’although the original citation cannot be readily found; Wilkerson, ‘‘Heads I Win, TailsYou Lose.’’

67. HURINET, Uganda Decides.68. Malone, ‘‘Uganda Election War of Words.’’69. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,’’ pp. 23�4.70. Sserunjogi Mukiibi, Eriasa. ‘‘Afrobarometer Poll: A Possible Referendum on the Future of

Opinion Polling in Uganda’’, The Independent February 15, 2011. http://www.indepen-dent.co.ug/cover-story/3916-afrobarometer-poll.

71. Email communication with Norbert Mao, June 28, 2012; also Mwenda, ‘‘Need forAlternative Vision.’’

72. In April�May 2011, ‘‘walk to work’’ protests led by the opposition to criticize the highcost of living and undermine the government resulted in hundreds of arrests, including keyopposition leaders, and nine deaths as a result of the crackdown by police and army. Theywere followed by traders’ and teachers’ strikes as inflation hit over 30% in October, itshighest level since January 1993.

73. Afrobarometer, Country Headed in the Wrong Direction.

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