Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness in Plotinus

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Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness in Plotinus

Author(s): Andrew SmithSource: Phronesis, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1978), pp. 292-301Published by: BRILL

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Unconsciousness nd Quasiconsciousnessin Plotinus

ANDREW SMITH

According o Plotinus,when a manenters hephysicalworlda secondmanor self attaches tself to the primaryman,the higherself.We tendto directall ourattention o thissecondself andlose sightof the higherselfwhich,nevertheless, ontinuesto operate as nouswithoutceasing. It is the philo-

sopher'sduty to rediscover hishigherself whichlies within and to returnto it throughcontemplation.

Plotinushas twogeneralapproaches o the problemof ourrelationshipto our higherself. Sometimeshe sees the aim of contemplation o be theturningof thelowermantowards hehigherself. In thiscase the lowerselfis awareof thehigherself, is turnedtowards t and awayfrom thematerialworld. This spiritual direction is described in terms of awarenessorconsciousnessand the seat of consciousnessseems to be identifiedwithwhat we might term our normalempiricalconsciousness.Most of these

ideas may be found in Enneadv. 3. But in the same treatisetheir in-adequacy is also expressed.If we wish to rediscoverand trulyknow ourhigherself it is notsufficientmerely o directthe attentionof ourempiricalself towards t since in this waywe standoutsidethe object of knowledgeand know it only by image. True knowledgecomes only when we areidentical with the objectof knowledge.Trueself-knowledge omes, then,only when we becomeidentifiedwithour higherself, whenwe transcendourempirical elf andlive at the level of the higherself.

If the higher self never ceases thinking,why, Plotinusfrequentlyasks,arewe not awareof it?Usuallyhe answers hatalthoughwe mayallpossessa higherself we do not all turntowards t. Inanimportantpassage ch. 4) ofEnnead 4., the treatiseon Well-Being,he again poses this questionbutsurprisinglydeclares that it is not a necessaryconditionof our spiritualwell-beingthat webe awareof our higherself. Evenin v. 3.,wherePlotinusrejectsas inadequatethe simpleturningof the empirical elf towards hehigherself and advocatesahigherstageofcontemplation,he does notgo sofaras to saythat theempirical elf need not be awareof thiscontemplation.Now in otherpassageswhatwe areasked to turntowards s ourhigherselfconsidered as a permanentlyactive nous. Our spiritual improvement

dependson ourbecomingawareof itspresence. n i. 4, however,Plotinus sconcerned with the stage of contemplationwhich, as stated in v. 3,

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transcends the mere directing of our empiricalawarenesstowards our

higher self, i.e. where we arealready ntegratedwith our everactive nous.Then Plotinus s tellingus that ourempirical elf need not be awareof ournew spirituallife at the level of our higher self. It is importanthere todistinguish hehigherself(ourever activenous)andthe empirical elf froma vague 'we',a sort of floatingego,which determines he particularevel ofbeing which we may choose to dominatein our lives. In reading . 4. weshould also remember that Plotinus is talkingabout the good man, theu'rrov&xtos, he sort of manwho will alreadyhavereintegrated is floatingego with his higher self. This makes it easier to understandi. 4.9,24XXVOtVoL 8'aV

avuTrq?'VipyEUX

ovx VToV'rr`vaivra, &XXaX p'pos av'UoO. t isonly part of us which does not notice the activity of the higher self.Therefore, some other part of us does notice. In that case some form ofawareness s, after all, involvedin ourrelationship o ourhigherself.Thisawareness s precisely hat self-knowledgeor internalconsciousnesswhichwe have of our higherself when we have gone over to the level of our higherself or nous.

If this interpretations correct, ruewell-beingconsistshere,as in the restof the Enneads, n the identity of subject(floatingego)and object(higherself) within nous. In other words the term evtp-yeLain the sentence just

quoted represents, n strict terms, the ever active nous as goal. Spiritualprogressoccurs (i.e. spiritualwell-being occurs) only when 'we' becomeconscious of it. But, by 'we', is to be understooda floating ego which hassevered its connections with the empiricalself and attacheditself to thehigherself. It is now 'we' at the higher evel, the subjectwhichthinksandknows itself. We are dealing here with two different ypesof consciousness.At the level of the higher self there is an internalor horizontal onscious-ness, parallel with self-knowledgeat the level of nous. Thereis also theactivityof awarenesswhich links the empirical elf with the higherself and

which may be described as vertical. In the verticalsense we may, on theempirical evel, be awareor not awareof our higherself. In thehorizontalsense 'we' refers to the knowing subject which is fully consciousof andidenticalwith the known object at the level of nous. In i. 4. Plotinusrejectsthe necessity for vertical awareness n returning o our higherself, whilstnot excluding horizontal awareness. Although he deals with horizontalawareness on a number of occasions (especially in v. 3.), in i. 4., he isparticularly oncernedwith its relationto verticalawareness.

Of course much of this, especially the union of self in nousdiscussed n

ontological and epistemological terms,1 is well-worn ground. What Ishouldlike to probe nto furtherare some of the statementsPlotinusmakes

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about 'consciousness' in relation to the experience of nous. Now this en-

quiry will obviously require us to compare his statements about

consciousness at other levels too. Indeed Plotinus often uses the one toillustrate the other and here we encounter a difficult problem of exegesis.

What is the status of such comparisons and how far are the similarities to be

taken? I feel that this question applies to many of the examples Plotinus

uses to account for reality beyond normal experience. We might compare

Lucretius'use of 'examples'. When he describes2 specks of dust in a shaft of

light these specks of dust fulfil two purposes. Firstly they are a pictorial

representation ofjolting atoms. The atoms behave like specks of dust. Then

they are examined in their own right as molecular structureswhich actually

do exhibit atomic action in themselves. In i. 4. 10. Plotinus gives as anillustration of unconscious activity the case of a man who is reading with

concentration and so is not aware that he is reading. In fact self-awareness

would detract from his understanding of what he reads. Are we to treat this

(i) as a sort of analogy, (ii) as an actual example of the very thing he means,

or (iii) as an example of what he means but at a different level of reality?3If

the latter, what would be the relationship and points of similarity or

difference between levels?

In i. 4. 9, then, conscious activity takes place at the level of the higher self,

whilst it is not always the case that awareness of this activity reaches our

empirical consciousness. This situation need not preclude conscious

activity of some other kind (e.g. of the physical world) taking place at the

empirical level. There is nothing in Plotinus' theory to prevent there being

two areas of consciousness which may operate independently of each

other. Plotinus clearly feels (ch. 11 beginning) that he may have given the

impression that his "good man" is 'dead' to the world. But it is clear from

what follows that Plotinus does not mean this. The man in the bull of

Phalaris may retain his well-being and still be aware of and feel pain. The

two areas of consciousness co-exist.4 E. W. Warren5 understands the

"reading" example as implying that in contemplation we are dead to the

world - "This psychic unity removes us from the spatial world, if not the

temporal." This may possibly be said of a man who is reading with con-

centration but the same need not apply to the man who is contemplating.

What exactly is the function of Plotinus' illustration? Can Warren's inter-

pretation be extracted from the other illustrations which Plotinus gives in

the previous chapter?Here Plotinus says that we do not have to be aware of

our health or wisdom in order to be healthy or wise. Presumably the

healthy man may go about his ordinary business. In chapter ten Plotinus

expands his explanation and then introduces two fresh examples to illus-

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Dr. Blumenthal7uggests hat the 'disturbance'maybe due to the 'arri-

val of sensations'from below, which, in iv. 3. 30, are said to preventawarenessof intellection. f thisis whatPlotinus s consideringhere thenit

would (or,perhapsmore cautiously, t could) be a normalevent (i.e. not a

resultof magicor sickness)and supports he generalinterpretation am

givingof the passage.As we have noted, the horizontalconsciousact is barelymentionedin

i. 4. It isdescribedmorefullyin v. 8. 11where, f I am not mistaken,we alsofind referenceto the verticalact of awareness.It may be over-rigidto

separate he twoso widely.Therewouldappearto be a different eatfrom

which each operatesand yet whilst it is relativelysimple to locate theempiricalconsciousness,t is farmoredifficultto describethe 'carrier' f

consciousnessat the levelof nous.

In v. 8. 11 Plotinusdescribesthe union of self with nous and does so

partly by an analogy with consciousnessat a lower level. We are not

actuallyawareof our union.Thereis a OlOPvveatsxvi avvaiaNats 23).There s an analogywith illness,which mpingesuponuswith considerable

violenceso thatwe notice t,whereashealthdoes notimpingeuponuswith

the same violenceand we notice it less. And yet, Plotinus adds,we have

moreacvEuvsof healthbecausewearemoreatone with it.Health so xetov.We do not in fact perceivewhat is ours (we are &votiaftoL) ut we are

xviroisuvvVeT0o.he ideaof quasi-consciousnessn thispassagedoes double

duty. Itexplainsat oncewhy theempirical elfis notawareof theactivityof

nousand maintains hat consiousness of a specialkind)does occurat the

level of nous. That is just the position maintainedin i. 4 as we have

interpreted it.

Schwyzer8understands he 'god' which is the subjectof union in this

passageto be the One andthusdisposesof a passagewhichwoulddisturb

the neatnessof his claimthat realself-consciousnessi.e. not otov)occursonly at nous level whilst above and below this we have only 'a kind of

consciousness'and not the real thing. I would broadly agree with his

analysisthatthe areaof self-consciousness ar excellenceis in nous. (The

questionof self-consciousness tthe levelof theOneis highlyvexatious).9would,however,disagreewith hisinterpretation f v. 8. 11 as a description

of union with the One. TheOeos f v. 8. 11 sclearly heintelligibleworldof

the previouschapter.10What we havehere is a furtheremphasisingof the

unity of nous (as in ii. 9. 1,51 f xvL ovi8eqr I1TLVOLiXExetBLTXoiv) o dif-

ferentiate t from the less unifiedlevels of being which lie below and to

assist in explainingwhy we are apparentlyunawareof its operation.A

differentemphasis s givenwhen he iscomparingnouswiththe One(e.g.v.

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3. 10-11,v. 1.4,29f., v. 6. 5 wheretheresidualdualityof nous s expressed).

Finally it shouldbe saidthatthequasi-consciousnessf v. 8. 11,farfrombeing a tendency towards he unconscious,mightmorecorrectlybe desc-ribed as superconsciousness.Super' n the sense that it is better(a greaterunity of subject and object is attained) than normal (i.e. empirical)consciousnessand also in that, becauseof its veryexcellence, t is beyondtheexperienceof normalconsciousnessandthe empirical we'is notawareof it. By the qualificationotovhe is enabled to explainboth ourempiricalnon-awareness ndour intellectualawareness-in-total-unity.

v. 8. 11 is interesting n anotherrespect. Once again Plotinus is found

illustratingone level of activityby another. In this case he compares theformof quasi-conscious ctivitywhichtakesplaceat the higher evel withwhathappensonly atthe level of empirical onsciousness.We fail to noticethe things which aregood and naturalsuch as healthwhilstwe do noticeirregular hings ikesickness.As alreadymade clear,this'notnoticing' s infact a form of consciousness.It bringsgreater knowledge accordingtoPlotinus. (If knowledge is related to the degree of unity betweensubjectand object then the normal,what is one with us, will be moreknowablethantheabnormal.)What s strikinghereis thatquasi-consciousnessnthe

unionwith nous is being comparedwith a state of quasi-consciousness tthe empirical evel where the agent is relatingto what is 'below'him, theexternalworld." Thisstate of quasi-consciousness t thelower evel is alsoacharacteristic f theWorldSoul (and pFOus)n theirrelation o the world.

In iii. 8. 4,16 f qpTLsis said to have a otov avvaiaX Us of what goes on

below it 'iou) iv VxurjOewpiavxouo . . . v j avr7s gTraUEL xvi oiovUVVOCLoUCOEL,f CUVEUELWUrf XviLUVV4LUO?1UELTo ET Ov'Tv ELEV 'WS OLOV

t' avr. This is close in wording to the otov JVVwts ava0VeqmOsof

v. 8. 11,23.Andjust as v. 8. 11vergedon the paradoxical avaL'GrNoL1)inits expositionof a difficult concept, so also we should not be surprised ofind elsewherean apparentdenial of what stands n iii. 8. 4. In iv. 4. 13,11fPlotinus denies that p6aIs has cparracia or ovveuLs at all.2 Does Plotinus

ever assertspecificallyof the World Soul that it has this form of quasi-consciousness? n iii. 4.4 Plotinuswould seem to deny this. Herehe askswhether the World Soul has JVva'jLV W`xJrrEpjits rCvEVT'riq'f[tCv.Note

theparallelismwiththe individual oul.)The answer s ij6piows oTx' pv3tv

iXOvTrwv pilr1oS. Schwyzer13 rightly interprets this passage as follows:

'Das wird nicht rundweg verneint, aber die avvaiafnsflLswird immerhin zu

einer 'pi1r9aLs,einer Ruhe in sich selbst, reduziert.' On this interpretation

we could ascribe here a o'OVovva;Oi*oLs o World Soul. The idea ofquietness is seen in ii. 8. 4,16 vxjn) nd v. 8. 11 v;?LI 8e iLpea auvovaa.

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The phrase6piowsxar& tV$LV is also explicable n termsof the theoryof

v. 8. 11 where we have a otovavvacauNLsof normal and good stateslikehealth. (cf. also otxeLovn v. 8. 11,29).These states would be xar& nVaIV.

The consciousnessof WorldSoul (andqpuls) is a quasi-consciousnessinceits object, ts creation, s in total conformitywith itself.'4Of interest n thisregard s the statement (in iv. 8, 19) that those things which disturb theindividual soul are sapp&uv'Lv.Also in iv. 3. 18,17xaTr&OLV is used todescribethe effortlessreasoningof the soul before embodimentand par-ticularlyof the star souls. This is connectedwith their not having to plantheiractions - ovpoXeovtEVowvibidline 18).The starsouls are againthe

subject of iv. 4. 8 where Plotinusdiscussesmemory.He uses, in his argu-ment, the observation hat we do not notice the fact that we partdifferentportionsof air when making a journey(unless we pay special attention othis item for some reason) nor do we notice the details of routine action.Sensationmay take placeandthismay penetrate otheqavTraMa.Yeteventhis does not ensure consciousnessof the thing sensed xai 6 rvITos TOV

TOWoUTOVv OWUL CuVXLUerqCLV19).The sort of sensationwhich may entertheTpavraCiautwhichdoes not entertoo deeply intothesoulissaid to bemoved &lTpoa.LpErws10). We note the connection of will with conscious

perception'5 I use the term consciousperceptionhere sincethe sensationwhich reaches the qpav'raiashould perhaps be called a perceptiontodistinguish t from the 'sensation'which goes no further hanthe externalorgan of sensation.) What Plotinusseems to be envisaginghere is a half-way process n which a sensationmay actuallyreachthe level of qpavraciabut without a full act of the will'6and, therefore,without consciousness.This is a state which might be similarto the otovGVVaXLONaLS of the WorldSoul and qpius. There is a further imilarityn the exampleof the routine,regularaction which recalls the xal& qpvoLvf iii. 8. 4. Moreinstructives

30-33 wherePlotinussays that no attention s paid to the detailof an actionknown to be invariable.The point is thatwe are not entirelyunawareof theaction but only partiallyunaware of its details. I feel that here is an

attempt odescribequasi-consciousnesss awareness f awholeactionbutnotof the part.'7

Althoughthereare some similaritiesbetweenthequasi-consciousnesstnous leveland thatof the WorldSoulin its relation otheworld here s alsoa profound difference. In the formercase the tendencyis to unity andidentity, n the latter he conceptservesrather oseparatesoulfromwhat s

below it. In this respect v.4. 4,10 f is exceptionalsincePlotinusheresaysthat 'unconscious'activitycan be a bad thingas it leadsto unitywith the

thingswe areunconsciousof and this mightlead us unawares o identify

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ourselveswith whatis below us. Presumably his wouldnot happento the

philosopherand neednot,then,be incompatiblewithhis otherstatements.It may be interesting o note the chronologyof the treatiseswithwhich

we have been dealing.v. 1.[10]and iv. 8.[6],which both treat empiricalawarenessas essentialto the ascentand union with nous,are early.Theidea of quasi-consciousnessn theWorldSoul is suggested n a vaguewayin iii.4.[1514.Then follows the periodwhen Porphyrywas in the school.iv. 4.[281 eems to be a watershed. t is full of originalideas.The idea ofunconsciousactivity nvolvinga greaterunityof subjectandobject s foundagain(v. 8. 11,32-3)butneveragainwithrespect o anobjectwhich s'rapa

qikanv.The ideas in chapter8 also seem to be a startingpoint for laterspeculations.Someresultsof thisrenewedexplorationof psychologymaybe seen in iii. 8.[301.4 nd v. 8.[31].1 . The full evaluationof the theoryoftheunconsciousmaybe seen in i. 4.[461, nd there s a passage n i. 1.[53]. 9which may possibly be using the same idea to explain the relationshipbetween&&voixndwhat iesbelowit. It is interesting o seehowaconceptwhich originated n the teasing out of special problemsconcernedwithmemorycould be usefullyappliedboth to explainour union with nousandtheawareness ntranscendence f theWorldSoul(and theindividualsoul)overbody.

In i. 4. 10 Plotinus had put nous and BLavoLobove the centre ofconsciousness.18n chapter13 he correspondinglydescribes he activitiesof the three majorstrataof the humanbeing, i.e. nous,&LavoLa,nd thelowest part concernedwith externalactivities.For nous there is rb . . .

p.&yrov Nu1a whichis somethingwhichwe can alwayshaveevenwhenwe are in the bullof Phalaris.Thereareothertheoreticalactivitieswhich insuchcircumstanceswould be disturbed.These areclearlythe activitiesofBLavoLmtqrvqaas . . oxe.4i&pvos).Plotinus also includes in this account

theactivitieswhichareexpressed n theexternal ife suchas, one supposes,beingbrave. Thegreatest tudy'andexternalactioncancoexist,eachwithits own form of consciousness.It is in this way, we may feel sure, thatPlotinuswaspresentat the sametime to himself andto his friends.19

There may also be a moredirectapplicationto the individual soul ofPlotinus'speculationabout quasi-consciousness n the World Soul. Wehave stressed the quasi-consciousnatureof our higher activityas beingcompatiblewithan empiricalself whichis fullyconsciousof the externalworld.Butquasi-consciousnesssequallyapplicable o theempirical elf inits relationto the externalworld. If we are only partiallyaware of the

externalworldwe may be free to turnour attentionupwards.The directapplication o the individualsoul of a quasi-consciousnessike that of the

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WorldSoul may be implied by Plotinus' nstructionhatwe should mitate

the way in which it rules the worldwithout being distracted.20 hese twoapplicationsarenot,I think, ncompatible,but differ nemphasis, helatterbeingmorein accordwith thedescriptionof ascentas thedirectingof ourempiricalconsciousness owardsnous.

UniversityCollegeDublin

1 See for example vi. 7.15 end - qpav'ro6LiEvosv ov`TwsEw'rws&XXos.v6p4,-aXXov.

8EI & 0v'r6v iXEvoyevo6evov 'njvOiav [fxvTovJTOLn00aOcttand A. C. Lloyd "Nosce te

ipsum and conscientia",Archivfur

Geschichteder Philosophie46 (1964) 188-200.2 De rerumnatura, i, 112 ff.3 cf. v. 9. 6. where a phenomenon of soul is applied to the level of nous with the

qualificationo rwsor'v ai rroXi i&aXXovvoi,s wrtv6piov &n'ra 7).4 cf. my Porphyry'sPlace in the NeoplatonicTradition, The Hague, 1974)25.5 "Consciousness n Plotinus"Phronesis x (1964), 83-97.See 85.6 The analogieswhich Plotinusgivesarenot entirelysatisfactory. t is crear hat he wishes

to say, not merely that theempiricalself is not aware thatthinking s takingplace, butalso

that it is unaware of the content of the thinking. Throughout my discussion I have

understood nternalconsciousness n this double sense.cf. i. 4. 10,14ff ... T& 'rs 8&avoxas

xCviTOD VOV E?XoViOPaTer, iVOp&TaL rotfxrotvi otov axsl'r&; yLVwaxeT RETr&s npo'rpas

yvxEoWS, b'L 6 voiv xat 'I &ivoLa &vepyeL.

7 Plotinus'Psychology.His Doctrinesof the EmbodiedSoul, (The Hague, 1971)89.8 "'Bewusst'und 'Unbewusst'bei Plotin",Entretiens url'antiquitMlassique,V. (Gen6ve,

1960) 376.9 ibid, 375 and discussionon 387.10 This view is held by Br6hier Enntades vol. v., 132-3),Armstrong Plotinus,London

1953, 170),O'Daly (Plotinus'Philosophyof the Self; Shannon 1972,78).11 Although the agent or empirical self operates at the level of Wtvomawithin"the

physical world, yet Plotinus would regard the actual physical world and the lower

facultiesof the human individualas standingbelow&L&VOLan the hierarchyof being.12 The real emphasis hereis on the automatic qualityof nature'sactivity(By&p xXELTCr

?qpEisMoiaot &'npoaLpE&rs 8) and wavraxia as meant here involves conscious knowledge

-EL8EVaL&I'rraOEv15). In iii. 8. 1,22q)vas is termed&q'iv.aov but Plotinus is here

reportinga Stoic term equivalentto Aristotle'sgrowthprinciplecf. S VF111016,III 386.

See furtherIII. 6. 4,18-23where the paradoxappears n one sentenceandis explained by

two kinds of cpavTacxiahe secondof whichota 'I XEyoRivqiuGeLVV1T6tPXEL&VEpyELCX0O

& %ovLtIxarxt, 'W'spaOLV, qparvr&cars.e might be justified in calling this a otov

qpaavroa. See Deck, Nature, Contemplationand the One, (Toronto, 1967) 76 n. 6 -

"Plotinus is not adopting the notion that nature is, in an unqualified sense, without

imagination. Indeed his meaning seems to be that nature's heoriacan be regardedas a

watered-down imagination,just as it is a watered-downnoesis." For the lattercf. iii.

8.8,15 qpvrmIvO6quS.13 EntretiensV,372.14 The notion of normalityor concordancealso appears n i. 1.9,19 f.wherehe is anxious

to maintain the impassivity of the soul whilst having to admit the involvement of WEVoLG

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in sense perception.BL&voLahich properlyconcerns itself with voq'aocv vVEpyELxiews

(OF,petv) mbodied forms oLov uvawaOe. A. H. Armstrongtranslates"by a kind ofsympathy", which is justified by the following sentence which refers to the frequent

6PL&O S Xa;OLV(Via of the externaland the internal.This is close to xar&quvLV in thepassageswe have mentioned. More preciselyPlotinusmay mean thatperceptionof theexternal is achievedthrough ts affinity (avv-)with the formswithin&tavoV and to stressthe interiorityof this 'perception'otov s added.15 cf. iv. 4.13,8 whereqaVAscreates&'rpomprws. cf. n. 12.16 It should be noted, however, that Plotinus'concept of 'will' is not clearlyformulated.17 We could argue that there is a difference, too, between our'non-awareness'of health(v. 8. 11) and our non-awarenessof desires (cf. unconscious desiresin iv. 8. 8.) We are in

a sense aware of our health. At a deeper metaphysical evel this is because health is good

and xMT&qfVaLv (and as particulargood it is subsumed under the universalgood).18 There remains a problem about the exact location of the centre of empiricalconsciousness. Plotinus clearly distinguishes nous and its attendant soul (= &&voLa)

which both come before the 'mirror' n i. 4. 10,3 f. i]4vxi sepi avi'Tov'ipb QtoOa"as vibXws&vTrLX'q1E. See also 14 f. In iv. 8.8, however, the central faculty of xavrauCas more

closely allied to the 8taVo1iL 8UVaILLSn the phrase Tv ac'T4Xnh Tn ?V80V UV&VVOL' xi

8&av"Yrmxt . . fi &>wqm.lumenthal (Plotinus' Psychology, 47) says that the aiafTLxLX

ivacusss sometimes the same as 0uvviOaLs (as in iii. 4.4,10 f). Possibly the involvementof will in the productionof a conscious image (i.e.auvtaioNrLsee iv. 4. 8) may introduce8L&voMaince L6tvoLa/XoyuWP6sin the embodied state at least,cf. iv. 3. 18) areconnectedwith conscious planning. Clearly Plotinus was flexible on the precise involvement of the

higher faculty n theprocess of q(xv'rnana.ne reasonwhich may have promptedPlotinusto place more emphasis on the role of pav'raoian consciousness is the comparativesimplicityof the idea that the faculty of pavrxraias (accordingto iv. 3. 30 and probablyi. 4. 10) the meanswherebywe are conscious of our own thinking including&61vo4).Not

surprisingly in such a view bL&vomaould be regarded as being above the centre ofconsciousness. However it may be better to refrain from locating the centre ofconsciousness at either level and to regard it rather as a product of both 8&avota nd

vparracxia workingtogether. Although v. 3 may place the 'we', the empirical ego, at thelevel of discursive reasoning, still it is not surprising hat vparraoiawhether connectedexplicitlywith8L&voLar not) is sometimes seen as the centralpivot of the individual andthatthe human being 'splits' n the middle of this faculty (cf. Blumenthal bid.99 n. 27 -

though it is for other reasons that Plotinus explicitly posits a double qvaracia/memoryfaculty.).l9 Porphyry, Vita Plotini ch. 8,19 ouavvv rv xai iav'rr&,uaam ods&XXoms.20 ii. 9. 18,30; ii. 4. 3,24 ff.; cf. also iv. 3. 18,12.

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Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness in Plotinus