Transportation Energy Conservation Policy: Implications for Social Science Research

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES VOLUME 37, NUMBER 2, 1981

Transportation Energy Conservation Policy: Implications for Social Science Research

Anne Marie Zerega

U.S. Department of Energy

This paper examines the role that social science research plays in Federal transportation energy conservation policy; assesses the current forms and degrees of consideration of social issues in transportation energy conservation policy; and identifies additional contributions that the social sciences could make toward achieving energy conservation goals. The analysis begins with transportation energy consumption figures. It then discusses conventional techniques used to develop transportation energy conservation policy, provides an assessment of the implications of these conventional techniques, and finally, examines certain case studies to identify roles that the social sciences could play in transportation energy conservation policy. The conclusions reached include: that energy conservation policy does not consider psychological factors underlying mechanical economic realities except as evidenced by market responses to rising energy prices and other economic measures; that transportation and energy philosophy, analytical tools, and interpretive techniques do not allow for consideration of social and behavioral issues; that energy problems are causing a shift in the nature of the U.S. transportation system; and, that there is a serious need for government to identify, analyze and understand the psychological and sociological forces affected when national transportation /energy conservation policy is charted.

Fifty-five percent of the petroleum consumed in the United States is used for transportation. Seventy-seven percent is used by cars and trucks. Thus, highway vehicles consume (77% of 55%) 43% of all the petroleum used in the United States. Buses, including intercity coaches, school buses, and transit vehicles, consume a scant one percent of total transportation energy. Three

Correspondence regarding this article may be addressed to Anne Marie Zerega, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Transportation Programs, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., CS-133.1, Washington, D.C. 20585.

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percent is used by railroad trains; eight percent by airplanes; the rest by ships and pipelines.

As of 1970 (the latest census data available), of all passenger trips made in the U.S., 85% are made by automobile, six percent by vans, personal trucks and motorcycles, five percent by school buses, and only four percent by public transportation-bus, taxicab, subway, train and airplane combined (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1973). The 1980 census figures will be available in 1981 and the figures will probably shift to reflect the great number of vans and small trucks that have been sold over the past five years. There may also be a slight increase in trips made by public transportation, but even a very high 50% increase here would still mean that only six percent of all trips are made by transit, train and airplane combined.

Of all trips made by automobiles, 32% are made for commuting back and forth to work, and these trips for commuting are the least efficient. Three out of every four cars going to and from work carry only the driver; the fourth car has two or more people in it. This results in an average auto occupancy of 1.4 persons per car for commuting to work. All other trips, shopping, vacation, etc., average two or more people in the car (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1973).

Since passenger cars burn 5 1 % of all trasportation fuels and carry 85% of all trips, they offer the greatest potential for energy conservation; aviation, which consumes eight percent, is a distant second; passenger trains, buses, and subways combined amount to only one percent of all transportation fuels consumed. This proportion holds true from other perspectives. The average automobile consumes anywhere from two to ten times more energy to carry one passenger one mile than buses or subways use to carry the same passenger one mile. This is true for all trips except those taken by airplane. Aircraft consume up to twice as much fuel per passenger mile as automobiles.

Thus, ignoring freight, affecting the efficiency and use of the private automobile has greater energy conservation potential by far than changes in any other passenger mode of travel. Aviation consumes a small but significant amount of transportation energy. Transit and rail travel are inconsequential energy consumers.

E NERG Y PO LIC Y: PROCEDURES A ND PHILOSOPHY The preceeding paragraph, the conclusion from a rudimen-

tary presentation of transportation energy figures, is the corner-

TRANSPORTATION ENERGY CONSERVATION POLICY 33

stone of transportation energy conservation philosphy and policy. The Federal approach to identify an energy conservation policy has consistently been to go to the energy consumption figures, find the areas of large consumption and poor efficiency, and then evaluate the traditional Federal policy alternatives against costs, energy savings and political concerns. The traditional Federal alternatives are taxation, regulation and funding programs. Thus, the first major transportation energy proposals after the 1973 Arab oil embargo were for a gasoline tax, mandatory automobile fuel economy standards, and a state conservation grants program. Of these, the gasoline tax was not accepted by Congress and the other two measures passed in 1975.

The automobile fuel economy standards require the combined ayerage fuel economy of all cars produced (not of each auto) to be 27.5 miles per gallon by 1985, and the responsibility is on auto manufacturers to meet this standard. The state conservation grant program authorized $50 million a year for all 50 states to fund all types of conservation programs-buildings, industry and administrative programs, as well as transportation. The choice of which types of conservation programs to implement is left to the state, and, to date, only about five percent of the relatively small amount of money for conservation programs has been spent on transportation measures of any kind.

There have been five major energy bills since the first one in 1975, but only two proposed any real transportation programs: a research and development program, passed in 1976, authorized hundreds of millions of dollars to develop electric vehicles and turbine engines; and President Carter proposed a gasoline tax that was defeated in 1978. In sum, the transportation energy conservation policies pursued by Federal energy officials have been: to increase the price of energy; to pass money and responsibility to the states with few priorities and no criteria; and, to mandate a technological solution.

This course is fully consistent with the Department of Energy (DOE) policy document released in January 1980. That document states that its overall objective is to encourage the adoption by the economy of cost-effective conservation measures as rapidly as possible. DOE’S principal means to attain this objective is to use market mechanisms, with supplementary federal actions only if the market response is impeded by such things as limited access to capital, lack of conservation investment incentives, or sluggish reaction times. In other words, energy conservation policy is one dimensional, driven wholly by economics. Currently, it operates

34 A N N E MARIE ZEREGA

on the assumption that the next twenty years will be marked by more expensive and less secure supplies of imported oil, and that the principal role of government will be to foster adjustment to these difficult realities. The following are the primary categories of activity being pursued by DOE in the interest of offsetting market imperfections and protecting national security: short-run contingency plans; oil import reductions through conservation and increased domestic supplies; research and development and related activities that reduce lead times for conservation and for developing alternative energy sources; and, increased and diversi- fied foreign supplies (US. Department of Energy, 1980). Of these activities, the first three involve actions related to transportation energy conservation, and all three have major social implications. However, there is no vehicle in the policy for identification, analysis and resolution of the social issues implied in these government activities. Nor is there any account taken of any psychological factors underlying mechanical economic realities. The policy considers only market responses to rising energy prices and other economic measures.

TRANSPORTATION POLICY: PHILOSOPHY A N D PROCEDURES Energy conservation policy for transportation has had even

less DOE involvement than other areas because the U S . Depart- ment of Transportation (DOT) has primary responsibility for most national transportation policy (except for certain regulatory functions). The main objective of most federal, state, and local transportation offices is to ensure the mobility of the population. The first highway bill was passed in 1916, to assist the building of rural roads. Federal assistance was expanded in 1944 to provide money to build urban links in these roads and again in the fifties to create the interstate highway program to build more and better roads in rural and urban areas. All of these road building programs were in direct response to an ever increasing population of automobiles. The need for new roads was identified by traffic counts measuring how many cars travel which direction how often. Historically, when areas of chronic traffic congestion are identified, a new or expanded facility is built.

Thus, national transportation policy has sixty-five years of commitment to build more and more roads (and supporting facilities) so that all citizens can travel (by auto and usually alone) wherever and whenever they want to go. These highway projects are politically popular: they are tangible; they pump huge sums


of money into the economy; and they stimulate jobs. They are designed to meet the needs of the driving public, and have provided a constantly expanding system of roads with no increase in the four cents per gallon Federal gasoline tax since 1954. This four cents tax goes into a Federal highway trust fund, which was originally designed to finance the interstate highway system between cities. As population shifted to urban areas, the regulations were changed to include financing of urban freeways to meet the increasing rush hour traffic demands generated by commuters from the suburbs going to employment centers (Zerega, Note 1). This growth of suburbs, and correlated growth of commuter traffic form the crux of current transportation problems.

Since World War 11, there has been an increasing concentra- tion of population in urban areas, and, concommitantly, an increasing number of people living in suburbs who commute to work by auto. Many factors contributed to the growth of the suburbs, including Federal financing and low interest mortgages, cheaper land in the suburbs, and post war population increases. After the war, suburban living represented an improvement over cramped urban residences; gasoline and automobiles were readily available and relatively inexpensive; parking was free, and the roads were good and constantly improving. More cars created congestion. The congestion was measured by traffic counts, a need was identified, and new, wider roads were built. The new roads made travel more convenient; developers built more housing along the corridor so more people moved farther away; more people traveling farther bought more cars, generated more congestion and then generated the need for more roads; and the cycle continued. This spiral has been characterized as America’s “love affair with the automobile,” and has resulted in urban sprawl, and dependence on the automobile for eighty-five percent of all travel. It also seems to have resulted in the public’s general assumption that congested roads will be enlarged, expanded and extended. This assumption has a corollary: that the natural resources from which cars, fuels, and roads are made are unlimited.

Urban Mass Transit The decline of our urban mass transit systems paralleled

the rise of the automobile. At their peak in 1945, transit systems carried 23 billion passengers a year; by 1972, this figure had dwindled to 6 billion. As a result of the loss of revenues, many transit systems across the country either became publicly owned


and operated, or went out of business. In 1964, the Congress, acting in response to this decline, established an agency, now part of DOT, to give grants to public and private transit systems to build facilities, buy equipment, and subsidize operating expenses. Today, this transit program gives $2 billion a year in direct financial assistance to serve less than four percent of the travel within the U.S. This compares to about $6 billion for the other highway programs that serve over 96% of U.S. highway travel. This disproportionate funding has been justified on the basis that mass transit serves social goals: maintaining urban mobility at low energy cost; and providing mobility for the transportation disadvantaged, the poor, elderly and handi- capped-segments of society that have limited access to automobiles.

Some social issues related to transportation policy are addressed in a committed way through the regulations governing approval of highway programs. Every highway project that has Federal financing must comply with a complex series of variable procedures including: an environmental impact statement; analysis of the impact of the project on the area or neighborhood; certification that minority interests are adequately represented in the labor and materials contracted for; energy efficient pro- curement practices; compliance with relevant portions of labor and commerce legislation. In practice these regulations are so complex that they often do not seem to serve the goals that they are designed to meet. The requirements are so burdensome that they are regarded by many as obstacles to be overcome. In many cases, especially in small urban areas not used to dealing with the Federal bureaucracy, local governments will use Federal transportation money for minor projects in order to minimize or eliminate problems of compliance with Federal procedures (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1977).

Thus, national transportation energy conservation policy hinges almost solely on economics. There is very little meaningful consideration of social concerns in transportaion policy, beyond susidizing mass transit, and the general goal of ensuring the mobility of the people. The established mechanisms for in- corporating specific social goals have evolved into a maze of regulations, requiring skilled reporting abilities rather than effective action toward those goals. Finally, the existing U.S. transportation system, in theory and in practice, is based on assumptions of unlimited and inexpensive energy, automobiles and roads.


Analytical Tools for Transportation Policy

The analytical techniques by which the effects of transportation and energy policies are measured rely on complex computer simulation models that yield rather rigid information based on measurements of past trends and reactions. The analysis of proposed federal gasoline taxes, for example, relies on an econometric demand model that predicts that a $1 .OO increase in gasoline price over the price of $1.25 per gallon will reduce demand by 16% and result in a savings of 1.1 million barrels per day. Supporting analysis projects the impacts on the auto industry, on the balance of payments, and on the general public as defned by political opposition to increases in gasoline taxes. Transportation demand models are usually econometric demand models, and yield projections about changes in travel in reaction to alternative policies or groups of policies. These are, basically, “elasticity” models. For example, a model developed for DOE, to measure the impacts of policies designed to promote carpooling, predicts that gasoline rationing, allowing 13 gallons of fuel per week for each registered vehicle, would result in a 17% decrease in fuel consumption. Furthermore, the model predicts where the savings will come from: non-work trips.

The model predicts that work trips, which constitute 33% of all travel, would be reduced by 9%; non-work trips would be reduced by 22%; the number of persons driving alone would be reduced 9%; carpooling would increase 8%; and transit would increase 13%. Thus, the major reduction in automobile travel would be in non-work travel (shopping, recreation, etc.) (Cam- bridge Systematics, 1976). One implication of these projections is that rationing would result in a great strain on the transit systems, because most transit systems operate at capacity during the rush hours; a thirteen percent increase would cause serious problems from overloading. Increasing the capacity of transit is a complex issue that will be discussed later. Another implication is that the majority of drivers who commute to work by car would save their gasoline ration to continue to drive to work alone, and would reduce other kinds of trips. Yet, the single occupant auto traveling to work is the least efficient mode of travel, with the greatest potential for energy savings.

Similar results are obtained when the model is used to predict effects of quadrupling the price of gasoline (over 1975 prices) from 50-55 cents per gallon to $2.00 per gallon: a 4% reduction


in the number of persons driving to work alone; a 5% increase in carpoolers to work; and an 8% increase in transit. The model predicts, overall, a 4% decrease in work travel and an 18% decrease in non-work travel. The pattern of behavioral response is the same, and the implications are the same, as for the rationing effects study noted above.

The point to be made here, a key point of this paper, is that using the traditional analytical tools and interpretive techniques, and operating under the currently dominant philosophy of mobility and market forces, the only Federal involvement called for by the model predictions is for an increase in the capacity of the urban mass transit system to meet the increase in demand. The social and psychological factors relating to why drivers persist in energy-inefficient and economically-inefficient behavior patterns-driving alone to work-are not included in the analysis models and are not addressed in Federal policy. There has been some valuable behavioral research recently (to be discussed later) to explore why such poor results were obtained in many ridesharing programs. Even the exception highlights the general point that concern with other than economic factors in transportation- energy-conservation policy is, at best, an afterthought.

The data used in transportation demand models are from surveys of past travel-related behavior. These are used to predict future travel behavior. They measure only overt behavior, often only the travel act, and ignore the social and psychological variables underlying such behavior. Their data bases represent travelers’ behavior measured during periods of small, slow, incremental changes in the transportation system, with unlimited energy supplies. It is not clear that they can predict behavior and guide transportation policy during energy supply shortages or rapid price increases, and the 1980s will be marked by such rapid changes in the price and availability of fuels. Technical and economic approaches are necessary, but not sufficient. Today’s energy and environmental problems call for major changes in our traditional attitudes towards transportation, and the traditional transportation policies and analytical tasks are not designed to identify, predict or influence such changes.

Political Factors in Transportation Energy PoliGy The Federal government should serve the will of the people,

under the direction of elected officials who are supposed to remain responsive to goals and needs by periodically undergoing the election process. Currently, the public seems to be sending very


conflicting signals to government, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for officials to interpret and respond to these signals. The public wants energy efficient cars; no congestion; more mass transit; an unlimited supply of fuel and highways. They want neighborhoods maintained; unrestricted access to urban centers; and an end to environmental problems. Furthermore, they want all this at no extra cost in taxes, and with less government or at least less bureaucracy.

In contrast to these demands are the realities: energy efficient American cars are being designed and will be built, but the costs of retooling the entire auto manufacturing industry will result in steep increases in the near term in the cost of smaller, albeit more efficient cars, and major economic disturbances stemming from the auto industry. Also, these cars will still burn petroleum fuels. Mass transit is a heavily subsidized service that can be expanded, but at a cost of billions of tax dollars. Unrestricted access to urban centers means disrupting neighborhoods by building roads through them; these roads create an incentive for commuters to drive to work alone, and ultimately result in congestion and less transit patronage. Finally, fuel supplies are finite and are unstable in the near future, and energy costs are going to continue to increase precipitously.

These realities-the lack of clear signals to elected officials, and the rigidity of conventional philosophies and analytical techniques of federal transportation and energy policy- together pose serious doubts about future energy conservation policy in the transportation area. The next section tries to show how social science research can play a vital role in analyzing and moderating that policy.

EXAMPLES O F POSSIBLE ROLES F O R SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH I N

TRA NSPOR T A T I O N ENERG Y C o NSER V A T I O N POLK Y

As mentioned earlier, one of DOE’S four generic activities is contingency planning. Here, identification, analysis and resolution of non-economic issues could benefit energy policy actions in general. Conservation contingency plans often are highly controversial when presented for public review and comment. For example, DOE published nine contingency plans for comment in February 1980. The proposed measures were the result of several years of study, and the transportation measures relied on the conventional analytical techniques discussed earlier. The most extreme public reaction was to the measure that proposed


to curtail recreational boating. A description of the proposed plan was broadly publicized by the boating industry, and reaction was immediate, organized, and vitriolic. Over sixty thousand letters opposing it were received by DOE. Nineteen U S . Congressmen were among the hundreds of opponents who testified against the proposal at public hearings. Physical threats were made against the hearings office staff by many outraged boaters. The opponents to the plan cite criticisms that the measure would have little if any energy impact (by DOE’S own estimate the measure would save less than one percent of transportation energy); and that boating had been singled out for restrictions not imposed on other recreational activities, that is, that there was not equality of sacrifice.

From DOE’S perspective, there are few measures which save more than one percent. Transportation measures with significant impacts, such as a one or two dollar per gallon gasoline tax, have severe negative political impacts and public reactions, relative to the savings. DOE’S problems are compounded by consideration of equity. Recreational contingency plans banning recreational flying and off road vehicles, as well as boating, were considered more to meet equity concerns than energy concerns. They would serve to spread the burden and dislocation of fuel shortage across middle and upper economic strata that own recreational vehicles, planes and boats. The published rationale given for the boating restriction states that “the measure has an important symbolic purpose which would logically extend these restrictions to all types of recreational vehicles” (Federal Register, 1980). The regulations state that consideration was in fact given to restricting four-wheel drive vehicles, “dune buggies,” snowmobiles and general aviation aircraft, but detailed analysis using the conventional techniques concluded that including these other recreational vehicles would greatly increase the difficulty and cost of implementing and enforcing the restrictions and would yield insignificant increments of energy savings. Therefore, all other recreational users of petroleum fuels were not included (Federal Register, 1980).

Contingency plans and rationing plans are political pariahs that engender immediate and fierce opposition. However, the opposition is only understood and anticipated in a political context, with no identification, analysis, or understanding of the psychological forces underlying the public’s reaction. In fact, there appears to be a classic dichotomy between public reactions to transportation conservation contingency proposals and the public’s actual behavior during a shortage. In the instance described here,


the right to recreational boating was threatened, vehemently opposed and the measure has been eliminated. Yet, the gasoline and transportation demand models discussed earlier predict, and empirical studies have shown, that non-work, recreational travel is the first area in which people do cut back during gasoline shortages (University of Chicago, 1974). The salient point is that the government is not seeking to define or understand adverse public reactions beyond tracking them in public opinion polls and public comment on proposed regulations. The prospect of gasoline shortages is real. The public has turned, and will continue to turn, to the government to d o something to alleviate the situation during a shortage. Yet, DOE has experienced opposition to most of its contingency plans. The result is an increasing reluctance by DOE officials to propose any plan. Thus, the government will not be prepared to act even during major shortages when gasoline prices are projected to reach $5 to $6 a gallon.

T.hus, analyses on which conservation contingency plans are based, and most other energy policy analyses, need to include studies to identify, interpret, and respond to the psychological and sociological impacts of proposed policies. The meaningful energy conservation policy options that are available to the federal government is the near term involve constraints on mobility, reductions in energy supply, and high energy prices. These constraints, reductions and high prices are inevitable in the face of energy supply realities, whether the government imposes them or not. The U.S. public has never been confronted with such constraints in peacetime. The public does not seem to grasp, or does not accept, the inevitability of this condition. Proposed government policies have exacerbated negative public reaction to these very unsettling problems. There is a serious need to identify, analyze and understand the psychological and sociological forces that are affected when overall national energy policy is charted, and to consider how much and what kind of government involvement is necessary and desirable in imposing such policy.

The social sciences have an equally important contribution to make in studying specific transportation policy options. AS discussed earlier, from a mechanical energy consumption standpoint, and ignoring freight, automobiles and airplanes are the only viable targets for conservation in the transportation area. This approach may be shortsighted. It is based on conventional transportation systems. The future is highly uncertain in this area. But some things are certain (e.g., a finite supply of fossil fuels), and others are highly probable (e.g., periodic and/or


prolonged gasoline shortages; continuing environmental problems; extremely high initial costs of developing synthetic fuel technology and improving vehicle efficiency; increasing congestion in urban areas). These make it clear that we are faced with forced conservation in the immediate future. Institutionalizing conservation requires a major change in the existing U.S. transportation system, which up to now has been automobile and highway oriented. This shift not only must involve developing alternatives to the automobile, but also concommitant shifts in attitudes, land use, transportation system management, and urban form. The following discussion identifies some of the specific contributions that social science research has made and could make in specific transportationlenergy conservation areas.

Social Theory of Transportation Klausner (Note 2) noted that the last attempt to establish

a broad theory of transportation and society was done by C. H. Cooley in 1894. Transportation policy and analysis has been dominated by specialists from non-social science fields. Analysis of the social aspects of a specific transportation energy policy cannot be complete unless there is an understanding of the interrelationships of all aspects of transportation. Today’s system is dominated by the automobile which is the only source of mobility for most suburban and rural residents. The conventional alternative to the auto are mass transit and ridesharing; but these modes are primarily associated with commuting to work and are not considered viable for the 66% of travel done for other purposes. A new “social theory of transportation” would incorporate attitu- dinal and behavioral changes that have occurred during this century, and provide an understanding of the impacts of technological advances on the roles and interrelationships operating within the system. A greater understanding of the social and psychological dimensions of the transportation system could help modify transportation energy policy. For example, many people willingly take mass transit to work, but few use it for any other type of trip. If the trade off between mass transit and the auto were understood in a social context, research could identify other types of trips or conditions under which people might substitute mass transit for their cars. Similar research could examine why people choose air travel over intercity bus or rail. If this were understood, policies and service could be better shaped to stimulate shifts from air to energy efficient rail or bus.

Another example of the potential usefulness of a modern


“social theory of transportation” is in relation to automotive technology. The standard automobile has a capacity for four or five passengers, yet average occupancies rarely exceed two passengers. The national maximum speed limit is 55 MPH, yet all cars are engineered to exceed that limit by 20 to 50 MPH. The technology for two passenger, limited range, low speed, electric “commuter cars” exists, but is not being pursued because it is predicted that the market response would not be receptive, and because of safety and other issues. Yet, shifts to systems of such vehicles for short trips would alleviate many of today’s energy and environmental problems. DOE is sponsoring a program to stimulate the marketing of electric vehicles, but these are vehicles that are being developed with the same excess capacities as traditional vehicles. The point, here, is that technology is being directed to engineer changes that merely refine conventional all purpose vehicles, with little attempt to identify or develop the potential for use of a range of alternate types of vehicles. We are more likely to identify the conditions under which society could adapt to changes in specific vehicles and their use if the role of the automobile were considered within a “social theory of transportation.”

Attitudes, Behavior and Market Research The one area in which social psychological factors are consid-

ered by energy policy makers is the area of consumer attitudes. A large data base from DOE and other national surveys has been tracked and interpreted by Millstein (Note 3).

There is a great need to communicate clearly the nature of our country’s energy situation, including its international context; to describe what consumers can do about their own energy situation; and to relate the progress that has been made so far. DOE is launching a multi-million dollar paid advertising program that has not begun at this writing. Some seminal market research has already been sponsored by DOE, but much more is needed to commercialize conservation successfully.

R idesha ring Another area where a significant body of social and behavioral

research exists is ridesharing (Dueker & Levin, 1976; Horowitz & Sheth, 1977; Margolin & Misch, 1978; Ross, Krantz & Zerega, Note 4; Tischer & Dobson, Note 5). Next to technological improvements, ridesharing offers the greatest energy conservation potential of all transportation energy conservation options. Eighty


five percent of all trips are made by car; and average auto occupancies are only 1.4 for commuters, and 2 for other trips. Results of government efforts to increase ridesharing have, characteristically, been disappointing. As an extreme example, DOE sponsored a $350,000 vanpool demonstration program in 1975-76 that did not result in a single vanpool.

The U.S. Department of. Transportation’s involvement in ridesharing originated when traditional analytical models predicted that congestion could be reduced by increasing average auto occupancy and thus eliminating vehicles from the roads. DOT sponsored behavioral research in this area, and that research found ridesharing to be an intricate and little understood behavior involving complex social processes. Margolin and Misch (1978) identified sociodemographic and perceptual differences among carpoolers and solo drivers, and they then classified five general categories of commuters: dedicated carpoolers with an active interest in advancing the mode; marginal carpoolers; uninformed or passive potential carpoolers; marginal antipoolers who would become involved only if incentives highly appropriate to them were provided or particular disincentives that bother them were removed; and, dedicated opponents or confirmed solo drivers who for reasons of independence or status refuse to consider carpooling. They examined six factors often considered critical for carpooling: cost, timing, parking, convenience, carpool lanes and social dynamics. Contrary to common belief, cost is generally not the major factor in carpooling decisions. Social dynamics emerged as the primary consideration in decisions to share rides; and timing, parking, and convenience are very important factors in carpooling.

Margolin and Misch’s results (1978) indicate that a far greater number of commuters can be induced to carpool if the forces that influence ridesharing are understood and if a disaggregated approach is taken so that strategies are tailored to meet the uncertainties of different population segments. This work and its recommendations are of immense value. It demonstrates the vital contribution that social science research can make to transportation energy conservation policy. More work remains to be done though. For example, often vanpooling programs are more successful than carpooling programs. Research is needed to examine whether this is due to different psychological or sociological aspects of vanpools or carpools, or if it is due to the different organizational and administrative techniques charac- teristic of vanpool programs.


Public Transit

The role of mass transit is a complex issue. It is very heavily subsidized, even though it serves less than four percent of all trips. Transit capacity can be increased, but only with tremendous economic subsidies. The questions that must be addressed are: Does the public wish to spend its tax money in this way? If capacity were increased, how would it be used? Would people substitute mass transit for the private car?

The single largest operational problem with mass transit is that (except for subways) it is a highly labor intensive industry- eighty percent labor versus twenty percent capital investment. Today, mass transit’s major function is to serve commuters going to work in urban centers during the peak rush hours. By the time a bus driver makes one run and returns to the beginning of the route to pick up another load of city bound commuters it is 8:45 or 9 am, rush hour is over, and the driver has been at work 2-1/2 hours. Quitting time will be 3:30 pm, before the next rush hour. In effect the driver’s productive work was only one hour. Transit unions have labor contracts forbidding split shifts for their drivers and severely limiting the transit operator’s ability to hire part-time drivers. A large number of drivers make unproductive runs most of the day. It is cheaper for transit companies to let drivers sit idle most of the time than to fuel their buses to run with 3 or 4 paying passengers in them. Transit systems can fill every bus they can get on the street during peak rush hours, and they literally lose money with every new one they add. It is not uncommon to hear transit operators say that they do not want any gift buses, they cannot afford them.

Very few urban areas have the population densities to support subway systems and most of these have had subways or are in the process of digging them. Subway systems are very expensive and very capital intensive. Washington D.C. Metro, for example, will cost around $8 billion before it is completed. This cost-of a new full-sized subway system in only one city-is equal to four times the annual federal transit assistance for the entire country.

Engineering, technology and production capacity are available to expand transit capacity. What is lacking is the decision to proceed to do it. That decision should hinge on the question of whether society wants it done, as well as other questions. The conventional answer, based on historical spiraling increases in automobile usage and the decline of public transit, is not to develop transit but to serve the needs of the private auto. However, transit ridership


has steadily increased from its lowest point in 1972, before the Arab oil embargo. Whether attitudes have changed, and whether society is prepared to use transit and to pay the costs of expanding mass public transportation, are major unresolved questions.

Tomazinis (1 977) defined urban transportation systems as social services delivery systems, and presented a comprehensive framework for a social evaluation of urban transportation systems. Such concepts need to be incorporated into energy conservation policy in the transportation areas. We need to decide whether we can continue to support a transportation system based almost solely on autos; and if not, to make the massive investment required to expand mass transit capacity or some other alternative.

Preferential Treatment for High Occupancy Vehicles One final example of a transportation measure that shows

how non-economic factors affect such programs is the Santa Monica Diamond Lanes trial. The Santa Monica, California Freeway project was the first (and so far the only) attempt to use “diamond lanes,” special lanes for carpools and buses. These lanes were created by taking busy freeway lanes away from regular traffic and reserving them for vehicles with 3 or more passengers. Preferential lanes have been very successful in increasing ridership and ridesharing, because they are not congested and therefore reduce commuting time significantly. In all other cases, though, preferential lanes have been extra added lanes, built adjacent to or in the median of freeways, or contra-flow lanes taken from lanes going in the other direction.

The Diamond Lanes were in effect from March 15 to August 8, 1976 over a twelve mile, eight lane segment of the Santa Monica Freeway. The project achieved many of its energy and air quality goals, as well as an expansion of the capacity of the freeway, by increasing the total number of people carried on it daily. The evaluation of the project (Billheimer, Bullemer & Fratessa, 1977) shows that by the end of the 21 weeks of the Diamond Lanes’ existence, bus ridership was up 225% and there was a nine percent increase in the overall number of passengers per vehicle, due to a 65% increase in three passenger carpools. This was not accomplished without cost, however; the average accident rate was 5.1 accidents per million vehicles miles (MVM) as compared to the average of 1.4 accidents/MVM for the same period in 1975. This 5.1 accidents/MVM average is not repre- sentative, however; in the first five days of the project 59 accidents were reported during rush hours along the 12 mile stretch of


freeway, compared to its prior average of eight accidents per week. This unprecedented accident rate declined, but remained at least double the average before the experiment.

The other major cost was in travel time. The average rush hour travel time over this 12 mile portion of the freeway was 18 minutes in the morning and 16 minutes in the evening before the diamond lanes. During the first weeks the preferential lanes were in operation the other lanes travel times increased to 21 and 20 minutes respectively. The morning travel time was reduced to 19 minutes by the 14th week of the project but the evening travel time remained at 20 minutes. In the preferential lanes, however, trip times were reduced to 15 and 16 minutes respectively.

There are many more traffic engineering dimensions of the project that could be discussed, but the significance of the diamond lanes for this paper is the fact that the primary reason the experiment was ended was public outrage.

The evaluation found it impossible to know whether the public outrage was generated by the negative media image or whether the media image simply reflected public outrage. It seems unlikely that negative media reports alone could have generated such a hostile response if the media were not reinforced by a negative impact on the lives of the public. The negative impact was, in fact, reinforced daily for over 100,000 freeway users who perceived their work trip lengthened by a project designed to benefit a perceptively smaller proportion of the traveling public.

There are many non-economic issues involved here, foremost of which is deliniating the role that the media played in fueling public outrage. Los Angeles’ three major daily newspapers published 2 15 predominantly negative articles and solidly opposing editorials during the 21 weeks of the project. The evaluation reports that newspaper coverage grew steadily more hostile as the demonstration progressed, yet, as shown earlier, accident rates declined and travel times improved as the demonstration progressed. Radio and television coverage was similar to that of the newspapers. The evaluation reports that the most hostile and least balanced of all media coverage was provided by radio disc jockeys whose exacerbating comments (“you’ll get home tonight if it takes all year”) were broadcast to motorists while they were in the car commuting.

Public reaction and media opposition were further exacerbated by public opposition from several elected and appointed officials. The evaluation reports that “responsible and objective

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analysis of the project had to clamor for a hearing against simplistic arguments, emotional appeals and self-serving electioneering.”

The diamond lane project also shows that questionnaire results and behavior often differ. Sixty-three percent of all carpoolers using the diamond lanes stated that their primary incentive was to save money. Twenty-five percent of those carpools were formed during the diamond lane demonstration. Only 30 percent of these new carpoolers identified the lanes as the primary incentive behind their decision to carpool. Yet, after the project ended, the number of carpools dropped to within 5 percent of 1976 levels, suggesting that the diamond lanes were more of a carpool incentive than the survey responses indicated.

The diamond lane project was the subject of intense local and national scrutiny. An evaluation was distributed to federal, state and local officials across the country. That report concludes that the project succeeded in attracting riders to carpools and mass transit, and in increasing freeway capacity with minimum construction and enforcement costs. It also concludes: that there was a significant increase in freeway accidents; that energy and air quality improvements were insignificant; and that non- carpoolers lost more time than carpoolers gained. However, the public outrage permeated every aspect of the project. The overall conclusion of the evaluation is that the heated public outcry has delayed the implementation of other preferential treatment projects, and “given planners and public officials in other areas ample cause for reflection before attempting to implement similar projects.” Yet none of the non-hardware factors involved have been clarified or analyzed.

In the next ten years we will probably have increasingly difficult problems to face in the U.S. transportation systems. It would help a lot, in charting policy on these problems, if we had a better understanding of the psychological and sociological factors involved in them. The adverse and apparently unanticipat- ed reactions to the diamond lanes, to the recreational boating contingency plans, and to other such effects, both demonstrate the need for social science research and provide a wealth of pertinent data with which to begin.

Still another example is the possible social impact of a $2 or $3 per gallon gasoline tax with rebate to substitute for gasoline rationing in the event of a major shortage. Both proposals are under consideration at DOE. Their analysis shows the gasoline tax to be a better policy, economically. However, consumer groups have expressed strong opposition to the concept of such a tax, and prior experience with contingency plans indicates that such


opposition can be vitriolic. Yet no analysis is being done of likely public reactions to such use of gasoline taxes instead of rationing.

Examples can surely be found in other transportation areas: intercity travel, alternate work patterns, the 55 MPH speed limit, parking policies, etc. While specifics may change, a lack of consideration of social dimensions is common to almost all transportation energy conservation policies. The realities of the national energy situation indicate that we need a significant shift in the U.S. transportation system, from its 60 year history of constant expansion with an auto and highway emphasis. The new emphasis needs to be on increasing the productivity of the system we already have by more efficient management. This shift involves critical non-economic and non-hardware issues, that are for the most part not understood and not being addressed, and that are pivotal to the success of energy conservation. This paper has only sought to define the problem and identify some of the issues. The next step is to include those issues in policy analysis and, at a minimum, to incorporate psychological and sociological impact studies into the development of transportation energy conservation policies.

REFERENCE NOTES 1. Zerega, A. M. Analysis of enerpy and the urban transportation planning process,

February 1980. Anne Marie Zerega, Office of Transportation Programs, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 20585.

2. Klausner, S. F., Masnick, G. S., & Santo, Y. Thinking sociologically about transportation and society. Report prepared for the National Research Council, Washington, D.C., February 1977. Samuel Z. Klausner, Director, Center for Research on the Acts of Man, 3718 Locust Walk/CR, Philadel- phia, Pennsylvania 19104.

3. Millstein, J. S. The conserver society: Consumers’ attitudes and behaviors regarding energy conservation, June 1979. Jeffrey S. Millstein, Office of Commercialization, Conservation and Solar Energy, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 20585.

4. Ross, R. B., Krantz, R., & Zerega, A. M. Application of conjoint measurement techniques in evaluating carpooling policies. Paper presented at the 1976 American Psychological Association Convention. Richard Ross, Market Facts, Inc., 1750 K Street, N.W. Suite 1240, Washington, D.C. 20006.

5. Tischer, M. L. & Dobson, R. A n empirical analysis of behavioral intentions to shzyt ways of traveling to work. Paper presented at the 1977 Transportation Research Board Meeting. Mary Lynn Tischer, Office of Highway Planning, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590.

REFERENCE LIST Billheimer, J. W., Bullemer, R. J., & Fratessa, C. The Santa Monica Freeway

Diamond Lanes (Vol. I). Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1977, 1-92.


Cambridge Systematics, Inc. Carpooling incentives: analysis of transportation and energy impacts. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1976.

Dueker, K. J., & Levin, I. P. Carpooling: Attitudes and participation. Technical Report No. 81, Center for Urban Transportation Studies, Institute of Urban and Regional Research, University of Iowa, July 1976.

Federal Register. Standby federal emergency energy conservation plan p o l . 45). No. 27, 10 CFR Pact 477 (CASORM-79-507). Washington, D.C.; US. Government Printing Office, 848, February 7, 1980.

Horowitz, A. D., & Sheth, J. N. Ridesharing to work: A psychosocial analysis. Research Publication GMR-22 16 (revised). Warren, MI: General Motors Corporation, Research Laboratories, January 11, 1977.

Margolin, J. B., & Misch, M. R. Incentives and disincentives fo r ridesharing, a behavioral study. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1978.

Tomazinis, A. R. Urban transportation systems viewed as social services delivery systems. Transportation planning and technology (Vol. 4). Great Britain: 1977, 47-56.

United States Department of Energy. Draft policy programming and fiscal guidance, F Y 1982-1986. Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, January 30, 1980.

United States Department of Transportation. Nationwide personal transportation study, mode of transportation and personal characteristics of tripmakers, Report No. 9. Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1973.

United States Department of Transportation. Urban system study, report of the Secretary of Transportation to the U.S. Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1977.

University of Chicago, National Opinion Research Center. The impact of the 1973-74 oil embargo on the American household. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, December 1974.

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Transportation Energy Conservation Policy: Implications for Social Science Research