Towards Understanding South Africa’s Differing Attitudes to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Open Governance Partnership

South African Instit

ute of Inte

rnat

iona

l Affa

irs

African perspectives. Global insights.

Governance of Africa's Resources Programme

O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 4 6

Towards Understanding South Africa’s Differing Attitudes to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Open Governance Partnership

M a y 2 0 1 3

W R N a d è g e C o m p a o r é

A b o u t S A I I A

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record

as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,

non-government think tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into

public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs

with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research

excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers

present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in

Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good

governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;

and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the

environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about

SAIIA’s work.

A b o u t t h e G o v e r n A n c e o f A f r I c A ’ S r e S o u r c e S P r o G r A m m e

The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme (GARP) of the South African Institute

of International Affairs (SAIIA) is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The

programme contributes to policy governing the exploitation and extraction of Africa’s

natural resources by assessing existing governance regimes and suggesting alternatives

to targeted stakeholders. GARP examines the governance of a number of resource-rich

African countries within the context of cross-cutting themes such as environmental change

and sustainability. Addressing these elements is critical for Africa to avoid deepening the

challenges of governance and reducing its vulnerability to related crises, including climate

change, energy security and environmental degradation. The programme focuses on the

mining, forestry, fisheries and petroleum sectors in select African countries.

Programme head: Oladiran Bello, [email protected]

© SAIIA May 2013

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the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.

Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.

A b S t r A c t

The paper undertakes a critical assessment of the various motivations behind South Africa’s

active participation in the Open Government Partnership (OGP), as a contrast to the

country’s notable absence from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Indeed,

although the South African government is one of the eight pioneering states to have

officially launched the OGP on 20 September 2011, it is not a signatory to the EITI, which

celebrates its 10-year anniversary in 2013. How has the South African government justified

its absence from the EITI so far, and what do these justifications mean for its participation in

the OGP? The paper focuses specifically on developments regarding access to information

in South Africa – namely the Promotion of Access to Information Act – and their implications

for the country’s attitudes towards global transparency initiatives. The paper also considers

the ways in which the South African government’s discourses, practices and contrasting

approaches vis-à-vis these two multilateral transparency frameworks hold relevance for

access to information in the country’s extractive resource sector. It suggests that the South

African government may be more responsive to EITI-membership appeals if it perceives

that its aspirations as an emerging power, both regionally and globally, are better

acknowledged.

A b o u t t h e A u t h o r

WR Nadège Compaoré is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Studies at

Queen’s University, Canada. Her research interests include international relations, global

political economy, global governance, resource governance, business ethics, and African

politics. Her doctoral project investigates the political economy of transparency in the oil

sectors of Gabon, Ghana and South Africa. A student from Burkina Faso, Nadège holds a

BA in international political economy from Trent University, Canada, and an MA in political

studies from Queen’s University, Canada.

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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 6

G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E

A b b r e v I A t I o n S A n d A c r o n y m S

ATI AccesstoInformation

BRICS Brazil,Russia,India,ChinaandSouthAfrica

CSO civilsocietyorganisation

DMR DepartmentofMineralResources

EITI ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative

MPRDA MineralandPetroleumResourcesDevelopmentAct

MSG multi-stakeholdergroup

NGO non-governmentalorganisation

OBI OpenBudgetIndex

OGP OpenGovernmentPartnership

PAIA PromotionofAccesstoInformationAct

PoSIB ProtectionofStateInformationBill

PWYP PublishWhatYouPay

R2K Right2KnowCampaign

SADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity

SAHA SouthAfricanHistoryArchives

SAHRC SouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission

SSA sub-SaharanAfrica

TI TransparencyInternational

S O U t h A f R I C A ’ S d I f f E R I N G A t t I t U d E S t O t h E E I t I A N d t h E O G P

5


I n t r o d u c t I o n 1

Recentfiguresfromgloballyestablishedindicesrevealdivergingperceptionsabout

thestateoftransparencyandcorruptioninSouthAfrica.Forinstance,SouthAfrica

ispositionedsecondintheOpenBudgetIndex(OBI)Survey2012,whichwasreleased

inJanuary2013bytheOpenBudgetPartnership.2SouthAfricawasonlysurpassedby

NewZealand,withascoreof93outof100,whichsuggeststhatSouthAfricadiscloses

extensiveinformationonitsbudget,andthereforehasaverytransparentbudget.South

Africa’sOBIscoreisespeciallyimportanttonote,giventhatthe2012OBIaveragescore

was52outof100forthe100participatingcountries,andgiventhatSouthAfricafared

betterthancountriesgenerallyreputedtobehighlytransparent,suchasSweden(fourth

withascoreof84outof100)andNorway(fifthwithascoreof83outof100).3In

contrast,SouthAfricarankedpoorlyontheTransparencyInternational(TI)Corruption

PerceptionsIndex2012;atjust69thoutof176countriesandterritoriesworldwide,with

alowscoreof43outof100.4OnemaypointtothefactthattheOBIisspecifictobudget

transparency,whereastheTI’sindex,inadditiontobeingmorecomprehensiveinnature,

focusesnotontransparencyitself,butalsooncorruption.Thesedifferentfocusesmay

appeartocomplicatethecomparisonbetweenbothindices.However,byemphasising

corruption(asenabledbyalackoftransparency)ratherthanfocusingontransparency

itself,theTI’sindexallowsananalyticalbridgebetweenbothindices.Thisanalytical

bridgeinturnreflectstheexpectedroleoftransparencyregimesinmanagingresources

suchasmining,oilandgas,andprovidesahelpfulcontextforthepaper.

In this regard, the paper asks whether South Africa is justified to invoke the

transparencyframeworks(bothlocalandglobal)thatthecountryhasadoptedandwhich

aregeneralinnature,asanalternativetojoiningtheExtractiveIndustriesTransparency

Initiative(EITI).Specifically,theanalysisreferstonationaldiscoursesthatdirectlyand

indirectlypresentthePromotionofAccesstoInformationAct(PAIA)No2of2000atthe

locallevel,andtheOpenGovernmentPartnership(OGP)atthegloballevel,aseffective

andsufficientalternativestotheEITI.Thepaperseekstoinvestigatetheimplications

of South Africa’s absence from the EITI for transparency measures in the country’s

extractivesector.Itisdividedintothreesections.Thefirstdiscussesthesignificanceof

theEITIasaglobalinitiative,andcontextualisesitsimplicationsforresource-richAfrican

countries,andforSouthAfricainparticular.Thesecondsectionexploresthenatureof

localandglobaltransparencyframeworksadoptedbySouthAfrica,tounderstandtheir

relevancefortheSouthAfricanextractivesector.Indoingso,thepaperseekstoidentify

whetherSouthAfricacurrentlyholdssubstantialalternativestotheEITI.Thefinalsection

discussespossibilities forSouthAfrica’s adherence to theEITI,bypresentingpolicy

recommendationsbasedontheprecedingsections.

t h e e I t I : A ‘ G L o b A L ’ f r A m e W o r K f o r t r A n S P A r e n c y ?

TheEITI isamulti-stakeholder initiative involvinga tripartite relationshipbetween

states,civilsocietyandmultinationalcorporations.Itisaimedatincreasingtransparency

andaccountabilityinthemining,oilandgassectors.Althoughannouncedbyformer

Britishprimeminister,TonyBlair,attheWorldSummitonSustainableDevelopmentin

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Johannesburgin2002,itwasnotuntiltheEITI’sfirstplenaryconferencein2003that

theinitiativewasofficiallylaunched,withtheestablishmentofthe12EITIPrinciples.5

OfficiallyendorsedbytheWorldBankandmanyresource-richcountriesintheglobal

North,suchasAustralia,Canada,andtheUS,theEITIemergedfromaglobalcivilsociety

initiative–namelyaPublishWhatYouPay(PWYP)campaignledbyGlobalWitness,

aninternationalnon-governmentalorganisation(NGO).Yetdespiteitsglobalrootsand

reach,theinitiativenowmostlyincludesresource-richcountriesfromtheglobalSouth,

particularlyfromAfrica.

Indeed,theEITIhasseenthestrikingabsenceofresource-producingcountriesfrom

theglobalNorthasimplementingcountries,suchasAustralia,Canada,theUKandtheUS.

WiththeexceptionofNorway,whichbecameacompliantcountryin2011,otherresource-

richgovernmentsintheglobalNorthhavelongshownareluctanceinimplementingthe

initiative,thoughthisisbeginningtochangeinafewcases.OnesuchcaseistheObama

administration,whichofficiallyconfirmedinSeptember2011thattheUSwillsignon

totheEITI;astatementthatwasrevealinglymadeat the launchof theOGPinNew

York,inthepresenceofotherOGP-foundingmemberssuchasSouthAfrica.6Almost

twoyearsafter thisannouncement, theUS isnowmuchcloser tobecominganEITI

candidatecountry.Thegovernmentisclosertomeetingoneofthemaincandidacycriteria,

namely‘theformationofamulti-stakeholdergroup(MSG)comprisedofrepresentatives

from government, industry, and civil society to oversee the implementation of EITI

anddevelopa fully-costedworkplan’,having inaugurated the firstUSEITIAdvisory

CommitteemeetinginFebruary2013,whichwillserveasthefirstUSEITIMSGmeeting.7

TheAustraliangovernmenthasalsoshownastrongercommitmenttowardstheinitiative

followingtheUSmove–thoughithasproceededmorecautiously,announcinginOctober

2011thatitwouldimplementanEITIpilot.8InFebruary2013AustraliapublishedaPilot

Progress ReporttotheEITIBoard,whichshowsthatthedatacollectionphaseofthepilotis

underway,andwillincludefiguresforthefinancialyear2011–12.9DespiteitsEITIpilot,

AustraliahasstillnotcommittedtoimplementingtheEITI.10

AnotherinterestingcaseistheUK,which,likemanyrichcountries(excludingthe

USandAustralia),hasexpressedapossibleinterestinjoiningtheEITIinitiativebuthas

yettomakeanyformalcommitments.PrimeMinisterDavidCameronrecentlycalled

onG-8leaderstonotsimplypledgefinancialsupporttotheEITI,buttoinsteadseekan

implementationoftheinitiative.11Thisstancereflectsanearlierrecommendationfroma

UKparliamentarycommitteethattheUKimplementEITIbackinAugust2012.12Thus

criticsrightlywonderwhether,orwhen,theBritishgovernmentwillmovefromrhetoric

topracticeregardingitspositionontheEITI.Canada,ontheotherhand,hasconsistently

declinedinvitationstojointheEITI,bothinrhetoricandinpractice,pointinginsteadto

itslargefinancialcontributiontotheinitiativeasasignificantcontribution,andusingits

domestictransparencymechanismsasjustifiablealternativestotheEITI.13

ThisrelativereluctancefromtheglobalNorthtoembracetheEITIpartiallyexplains

why, as of March 2013, in the year that marks its ten-year milestone, the initiative

comprisedonly37implementingcountries:20compliantcountriesand17candidate

countries.Notably,21outof37oftheseimplementingcountriesareAfrican.14Thatthe

EITImembershipislargelyAfricanreflectsthatitisperhapsthecontinentmostconcerned

withtheparadoxofbeingsimultaneouslyabundantinnaturalresources,yetpoor.Some

analystshaveexplainedthisparadoxtobearesultofresourcerevenuesbeinglostto


7


corruption,particularlywhenitcomestohighlylucrativeresourcessuchasoil.15Itisthis

argumentthatunderpinscivil-societymovements,suchasthePWYPcampaign,whichcall

ongovernmentsandcompaniestodiscloseinformationonpaymentsandrevenuesfrom

themining,oilandgassectorsasameanstofightcorruptionandbuildamoreaccountable

extractivesector.16ThePWYPcampaignandtheresultingEITIareidealinstrumentsfor

addressingtheaforementionedparadoxintheAfricanresourcesector.However,giventhat

issuesoftransparencyandcorruptionarerampantworldwide,thusexplainingtheglobal

targetoftheEITI;andgiventhattheperpetuationofcorruptpracticesinAfrica’sresource

sectorinvolvesnotonlytheparticipationofAfricangovernmentsbutalsothatofother

actorssuchasmultinationalcorporations,mostofwhichcomefromtheglobalNorth

andthereforemustabidebylawsfromtheirhomegovernments,itispertinenttoaskwhy

growingpressuretoimplementtheEITIcontinuestobeunevenlytargetedatregionsin

theglobalSouth,suchassub-SaharanAfrica(SSA).Insodoing,onecanbegintobetter

understandwhySouthAfricamayormaynotbeamenabletojoiningtheinitiative,and

thepolicyimplicationsforboththeEITIaswellasforSouthAfrica.

TherecentemergenceoftheOGPrepresentsacompellingcontrasttotheEITI,asit

isamultilateraltransparencyinitiativewithaglobalplatform.TheOGPwaslaunched

on20September2011byeightfoundingcountries,namelyBrazil,Indonesia,Mexico,

Norway,thePhilippines,SouthAfrica,theUKandtheUS.17UnliketheEITI,theOGP

incorporatestheparticipationandleadershipofimportantglobalNorthplayers,suchas

theUSandtheUK.Interestingly,AfricanpresenceintheOGPisminimal.Dominated

byEuropeancountries,ithasonlyfiveAfricancountries(SouthAfrica,Ghana,Liberia,

Tanzania,Kenya)amongits58members.18ItisthereforesignificantthattheSouthAfrican

government,whichisabsentfromtheEITI,isnotonlyanactivememberoftheOGP,but

alsooneoftheeightfoundingmembers.Givensimilarconcernsheldbybothinitiatives,

SouthAfrica’schoicetobeapartoftheOGPandnottheEITIappearspuzzling.Providing

astrikingresonancetotheEITI’sfocusontransparencyandaccountability,theOGP’s

objectiveisto‘secureconcretecommitmentsfromgovernmentstopromotetransparency,

empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen

governance’.19ThusthecoredifferencebetweentheEITIandtheOGPcentresaroundthe

factthat,unliketheEITI,theOGPisgeneralinnatureandnotspecifictotheextractive

sector.Assuch,theOGPdoesnotmakedirectprovisionsforcorporatecommitmentto

transparency.Inthislight,adheringtotheprinciplesoftheEITIcouldcomplementSouth

Africa’scommitmenttotheOGP,asdoingsowouldhelpaddressthegapsintheOGPas

farasaddressingtransparencyissuesintheextractivesectorisconcerned.Moreover,given

thattheEITIandtheOGParedominatedrespectivelybyAfricanandEuropeancountries,

perhapsanefficientwayforSouthAfricatobepartofatrulyglobalconversationwould

betoseekadherencetotheEITI,untilclaimsofbothinitiativestobe‘global’arerealised

throughawider,moreglobalmembership.

S o u t h A f r I c A ’ S A L t e r n A t I v e t r A n S P A r e n c y m e A S u r e S A n d t h e I r r e L e v A n c e f o r t h e e X t r A c t I v e S e c t o r

DominantofficialdiscourseshaveattributedSouthAfrica’sabsence fromtheEITI to

existingtransparencyframeworksinthecountry.20Arecentinterviewwithagovernment

8



official from theDepartmentofMineralResources (DMR) confirms this view.With

respecttotheEITI’saimofensuringthattherevenuescollectedfrommineralextraction

areaccountedfor,thefollowingstatementfromtheDMRrepresentativemaintainsthat

SouthAfricaalreadyhasmeasuresinplacetothiseffect: ‘[W]edon’treallyseeavery

compellingargumentorneedtobesignatoryoftheEITI[…]Wethinkwearetransparent

enoughintermsofhowweaccountforthemineralresourcesrevenuesthatcometo

us’.21Moreover,andatthecoreofthisemphasisonexistinglocalframeworks,isastrong

denunciationofwhatappearstobeadoublestandardonthepartofcountriesintheglobal

North.For instance, theDMRrepresentativenotesthatsomeNortherngovernments

continuetopushtheEITIagendaontoSouthAfrica,whileremainingreluctanttojoin

theinitiativethemselves.22AnotheroftencitedexampleisthatoftheUKgovernment’s

continuedabsencefromtheEITI,whichcommentatorsfromcivilsocietyorganisations

(CSOs)suchasPWYPcharacteriseasadoublestandardsattitude,giventhatformerUK

primeminister,TonyBlair,wascentralinannouncingthelaunchoftheinitiativein2002;

andmostimportantly,giventhattheUKcontinuestosupporttheimplementationofthe

EITIincountriesintheglobalSouth.23Themainimplicationofthesedenunciationsis

thatifresource-richcountriesintheglobalNorthareabletodirectlyorindirectlyjustify

theirabsencefromtheEITIbasedontheirowndomestictransparencyframeworks,South

Africacanalsodoso,giventhatthecountryhastransparencyframeworksinplace,such

asPAIA.However,theSouthAfricangovernment’sreluctancetojointheEITIsuggestsa

similardesiretoabstainfromtheOGP,sincethesamejustificationsofalternativelocal

transparencyframeworksapply.ThisisespeciallysosincetheOGP,muchlikePAIA,is

generalinnature,andmustthereforerepresentaredundantframeworkaccordingtothe

aforementionedrationale.Inthiscase,theEITIwouldappeartobeacomplementary

frameworktoPAIA,giventhatitisfocusedspecificallyontheextractivesector,afocus

thatdoesnotexistwithinSouthAfrica’sdomestictransparencymechanismssuchasPAIA.

Assuch,theabovejustificationsforSouthAfrica’sabsencefromtheEITIcanbelargely

understoodaspoliticalandideologicalrhetoricthatarenotsubstantiated.Itbecomes

thereforeimportanttomovebeyondmerediscourse,andtoexaminetowhatextentthe

establishmentofalocaltransparencyframeworksuchasPAIAcanaccountforthefactthat

thegovernmentisnotpartoftheEITI.

ThepassingofPAIAin2000theoreticallysuggeststhatSouthAfricahasastronglegal

frameworkthatfacilitatesAccesstoInformation(ATI)inthecountry.PAIAreflectsthe

entrenchmentofATIinSouthAfrica’sConstitution(No108of1996),withsection32

(1)(a)oftheBillofRightsprovidingfor‘accesstoanyinformationheldbythestate’.24

However,section32doesnotprovideforaccesstoinformationdirectlyheldbyentities

suchascorporations,unlesssuchinformationcanbeaccessedthroughthestate.Inthis

case,theobjectiveofreconcilingtheextractivesector’srevenuesandpaymentsasbuilt

withintheEITIframeworkcannotbemetwithinthePAIAframework,sinceonecannot

seekinformationheldbyextractivemultinationalsindependentlyfromthestate.This

meansthatstateinformationonrevenuesmadefromminingandoilcompaniescannot

beverifiedagainstcompanyinformationonpaymentsissuedtothegovernmentthrough

PAIA;unlessoneseeksotheravenuesprovidedbycompaniesthemselvesonthiskindof

information.

Furthermore,despitetheeffectiveexistenceofPAIA, its implementationis facing

manyhurdles thatneed tobeaddressedbefore it canserveasa strongplatform for


9


addressingtransparencyissues,withinoroutsidetheextractivesector.Discussionswith

localCSOs,suchastheOpenDemocracyAdviceCentreandtheSouthAfricanHistory

Archives(SAHA),aswellaswiththeSouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission(SAHRC),

suggest thatwhenitcomesto the implementationofPAIA, theaveragecitizen faces

anumberofobstaclesintermsoflocating,accessing,andmakingsenseofrequested

information ina timelymanner.25Experiences and studies from theseorganisations

reportthatmanyrequestsforATIgounansweredorrefused,wherethepossibilityfor

appealisoftendifficult.Moretroubling,inthewakeoftheProtectionofStateInformation

Bill(PoSIB),alsoknownastheSecrecyBill,whichcriminalisesunlawful dissemination

ofsomestateinformation,manyanalystsandactivistsfearthatprogressonaccessto

informationmaybejeopardised.26Inthecontextoftheextractivesectorparticularly,given

thatalotofcorporateinformationregardingresourceextractioncanbetiedtosecret

stateinformation,thepassingofthebillmayindeedcontributetokeepingimportant

informationsafelyguarded,ultimatelyimpedingthepublic’sabilitytoholdthestateand

extractivecorporationsaccountable.

Finally,giventhegeneralfocusofPAIA,itisimportanttoexaminetheextenttowhich

theMineralandPetroleumResourcesDevelopmentAct(MPRDA),alegislationpassedin

2002andtargetedatthemanagementofmineralandpetroleumresourcesinSouthAfrica,

maybeatoolforenhancingtransparencyintheextractivesector.TheMPRDAseeksto

‘makeprovisionsfortheequitableaccesstoandsustainabledevelopmentofthenation’s

mineralsandpetroleumresources;andtoprovideformattersconnectedtherewith’.27

Withthisobjectiveinmind,althoughtheactspeakstomattersofgoodgovernance,it

doesnotdirectlyprovidetoolsthatthepubliccanusetoaccessinformationrelatedto

theextractivesector.Sofar,accordingtoonecommentator,theimplementationofthe

MPRDAhasbeenmoresuccessfulinillustratingthepowerofthestatetoaccessextractive

companies’information,andtousesuchinformationaccordingly,suchastherevokingof

corporatelicences.28Althoughagreattoolforgovernmenttoregulatecorporatebehaviour

withregardstoresourceexploitationinthecountry,theMPRDAdoesnotdoenoughto

increasetransparencyintheextractivesector.ThisisbecausetheMPRDAfocuseson

regulatingcorporations,withnoequalchecksontheroleofthestate;andtheroleofcivil

societyisrelativelyabsent,withCSOs,workersandlocalcommunitiesnotbeingprovided

withthemeanstoaccessrelevantinformationonextractivecompaniesoroncorporate–

stateactivities in theextractivesector. Inotherwords, in termsofbeingapotential

alternativetotheEITI–especiallyoneofamandatorynature–inpracticetheMPRDA

doesnotrepresentaviablealternativethroughwhichthepubliccanholdgovernmentand

companiesaccountablewhenitcomestoresourceexploitationandrevenueflows.

ThissuggeststhatthereisnoalternativetotheEITIatthenationallevelinSouth

Africa.AlthoughPAIAmaybeusedtoaccessgovernment-heldinformation(keeping

inmind theaforementioneddifficultiesdiscussed),onecannotuse it to requestkey

information from the corporate sector. Yet corporate information from mining and

petroleumcompaniesarevitalinprovidingcivilsocietywiththemeanstoholdboth

statesandextractivecompaniesaccountable.Insum,whetherlegalorvoluntary,thereis

nosingleco-ordinatedmechanisminthemining,oilandgassectorsthatpromotesthe

proactive and timelydisclosureofinformationonstate–companypaymentsorrevenuesto

thepublic,whichistheaimoftheEITI.

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P o L I c y I m P L I c A t I o n S : L e S S o n S f r o m , A n d f o r , t h e e I t I

Giventhediscussionsofar,andinlightofcurrentdiscourseemanatingfromgovernment

circlesinSouthAfrica,therearenosolidjustificationsforthecountry’sabsencefromthe

EITI.However,werecommentatorstofocusonquestioningtheeffectivenessoftheEITI

asatransparencymechanisminitself,thedebatesregardingSouthAfrica’sabsencefrom

theinitiativewouldbemoreproductive.Inatellingadmission,anofficialfromtheDMR

revealedthatbeyondtheoverallperceptionofskepticismconcerningtheEITI,thereis

currentlynohomogenisedpositionfromtheSouthAfricangovernmentonthematter.As

heputit,therehasnotbeenaconcerteddepartment-wide,norinterdepartmental,meeting

toaskwhattheEITImeansforSouthAfrica:‘Wehaven’tevensatdowntoaskwhatdoes

thisthingmeantous,howcanweberelevanttoit,howcanitberelevanttous?’The

DMRofficialalsopointedtotheexistingconfusionwithinthegovernmentonwhether

leadershipovermattersrelatedtotheinitiativebelongstotheDMR,theNationalTreasury

(DepartmentofFinance),ortheDepartmentofInternationalRelationsandCooperation

(DIRCO).29Fromthisrevelation,itissafetoassumethatthereiscurrentlynoserious

dialoguebetweendifferentdepartmentsofthegovernmentregardingtheEITI;inother

words,itisnotapolicypriority.Moregenerally,thisscenarioreflectsthelackofanofficial

governmentpositiononissuesrelatedtotransparencyinSouthAfrica’sextractivesector.

Thisultimatelysuggeststhattransparencyissuesintheextractivesectorarenotprioritised

atpolicylevelinSouthAfrica.

Theimmediatepolicyrecommendationistheneedformoreseriousandsystematic

discussionsoftransparencyissuesintheSouthAfricanextractivesectoratthegovernment,

corporateandcivilsocietylevels.Thiswillbeanecessaryfirststepininvolvingallrelevant

actorstothedebate,inordertomeaningfullyengagewiththeissueoftransparencyin

SouthAfrica’sextractive sector.Second,policydebates shouldengagewithpractical

aspectsofhowtransparencymeasuresintheextractivesectorwilltranslateintoenhanced

accountability.Finally,discussionswithkeySouthAfricangovernmentofficialshighlight

thatthegovernmentseekstoassertitspositionnotonlyasaregionalpowerbutalsoas

anemergingpowerglobally.Assuch,growingcallsforSouthAfrica’simplementationof

theinitiativewillnotbeseriouslyconsideredunlesstheglobalNorthfirstshowsabetter

recordofimplementingtheEITI,aspreliminarymovestowardsUSEITIcandidacynow

indicate.MovesliketheUSonewillgiveabetter incentiveforthe ‘emergingmiddle

power’30 toreconsider its reluctance to join the initiative.This ideologicalargument

stressestheneedtotakenoteoftherelevanceofpowerrelationswhenpromotingthe

initiative,ratherthanseekingtopresentitinadepoliticisedstance.AsofApril2013,

theonlySouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC)countriesintheEITIwere

Mozambique,Tanzania,Zambia(compliantcountries)andtheDemocraticRepublicofthe

Congo(whichhasbeensuspendedtemporarilyasof24April2013).31Thecontinuedpush

forSouthAfricatojointheinitiativeisthereforeespeciallystrategic,asitisalsousedasa

politicalmeanstoexertpressureoncountriesintheSADCregion–includingimportant

resourceproducerslikeBotswana–tojoin.Perhapsdisclosingthisobjectivefromthe

onsetwouldprovidebetteravenuesforSouthAfricatogenuinelyassessitsdecisionto

adheretotheinitiativebasednotonlyonitsownlocalconditionsbutalsooninterstate

dynamics,bothattheregionalandgloballevels.


11


These recommendations will only be possible with the active prioritisation of

transparencyissueswithintheextractivesector.Tellingly,duringthefieldworkcarriedout

inSouthAfricaforthisstudyfromJanuarytoMarch2013,discussionswithanumberof

peoplefromCSOsandthemediarevealedthatmanywithinthesegroupsknewlittleornot

enoughabouttheEITI.Thissituationinturncreatesanatmosphereinwhichmeaningful

debatesonthetopicof transparencyintheextractivesectorremainat theperiphery

of policy discourse, thus ensuring that the arguments for or against South Africa’s

participationintheEITIarenotadequatelyaddressed.Inthiscontext,itisimportant

torecallthattheEITIitselfwasestablishedasaresultofpressurefromCSOssuchas

GlobalWitness,highlightingthecentralroleofCSOsinthisrespect.Withtheimpressive

advocacyworkontransparencythat isbeingdonebyCSOs inSouthAfrica through

theRight2KnowCampaign(R2K),32aspecificfocusontransparencyintheextractive

sectoriswellwithinreach,butonlyifarealneedisperceivedandclearlyarticulatedby

thecampaign.

c o n c L u S I o n

Thepapersubmitsonemainrecommendationtotheagendaofstakeholderswhoview

transparencyinthemining,oilandgassectorsaskeytoacountry’sdevelopment.The

debateonwhetheragivencountryshouldjointheEITIshouldnotrevolveonideological

anddiplomaticarguments,butrathershouldfocusonpracticalwaysinwhichtousethe

initiativeasafirststeptowardssecuringtransparencyandaccountabilityintheextractive

sector.Afterall,thesectorisarguablyoneofthemostsusceptibletocorruption.Whether

thisfirststepwillactuallyleadtoareformoftheinitiativeortoaradicalalternativeis

unknown,butfocusontheextractiveindustriesmustnotbeabandonedaltogetherin

favourofageneraldebateontransparency.InthecaseofSouthAfrica,althoughlessons

canbelearnedfromvarioussectorsthroughageneralstandardfortransparencysuchas

PAIA,thisframeworkisnotenough.Sectorssuchastheoil,gasandminingindustries

holdparticularitiesasfaraslicensingrightsandcontractagreementsareconcerned,which

requirespecialisedattentionthroughtheestablishmentofadditionalframeworks,whether

locallyorglobally.CurrentlytheglobalroutecouldbeakeyplatformforSouthAfrica,

whichcouldbeusedasameanstoreinforceandlegitimiseitsstatusasaregionalpower

withinAfrica;andperhapsasameansofassumingaleadershiprolewithintheBRICS

(Brazil,Russia,India,ChinaandSouthAfrica)platformasfarastransparencyinthe

extractivesectorisconcerned.TodatenoneoftheBRICScountriesisasignatorytothe

EITI.ThisanalysissuggeststhatthepotentialmembershipofSouthAfricaintheEITIwill

probablybenefittheinitiative,inthesensethatthecountrymaysharelessonslearned

withtheinitiativeregardingATIlegislation,particularlywithregardstotheprospectsand

challengesoflegalframeworksforenhancingtransparency.

12



12

e n d n o t e S

1 ThepaperisinformedbyfieldresearchconductedinSouthAfrica,andfundedbytheStudents

forDevelopmentProgram,aCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgencyproject.Theauthor

wouldparticularlyliketothankSAIIAresearchersfromtheGovernanceofAfrica’sResources

Programme, aswell asotherprogramsat the institute, foroffering insightful comments

followingherpresentationsinJohannesburgandCapeTowninFebruaryandMarch2013.

2 IBP (International Budget Partnership), ‘Open budget index 2012 rankings’, http://

internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI-2012-Rankings-English.png, accessed

28March2013.

3 Ibid.

4 TI(TransparencyInternational),‘Corruptionperceptionsindex2012’,http://www.transparency.

org/cpi2012/results,accessed28March2013.

5 EITI(ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative),‘TheEITIprinciplesandcriteria’,http://

eiti.org/eiti/principles,accessed10March2013.

6 EITI,‘PresidentObama:TheUSwillimplementtheEITI’,20September2011,http://eiti.org/

news-events/president-obama-us-will-implement-eiti.

7 US,DOI(DepartmentoftheInterior),‘USExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative’,http://

www.doi.gov/eiti/index.cfm.

8 EITI,‘AustraliatopilottheEITI’,27October2011,http://eiti.org/news-events/australia-pilot-eiti.

9 EITI,‘ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative:Australia’sPilotProgressReport,February

2013’,http://eiti.org/files/Australia%20Pilot%20Progress%20Report%20February%202013_0.

pdf.

10 EITI,‘OtherCountries’,http://eiti.org/countries/other.

11 UK,Government,‘PrimeMinister’slettertoG8leaders’,2January2013,https://www.gov.uk/

government/news/prime-ministers-letter-to-g8-leaders.

12 EITI,‘UKparliamentarycommittee:UKshouldimplementEITI’,23August2012,http://eiti.

org/news-events/uk-parliamentary-committee-uk-should-implement-eiti.

13 Dion-OrtegaA,‘EITIandthepushforglobaltransparency:IsCanadaignoringitsleadership

roleintheextractiveindustries?’CanadianInstituteofMining,MetallurgyandPetroleum,

August2012,https://magazine.cim.org/en/August-2012/Upfront/EITI-and-the-push-for-global-

transparency.aspx?page=3.

14 EITI,‘EITICountries’,http://eiti.org/countries,accessed29March2013.

15 MagrinG&GvanVliet,‘TheuseofoilrevenuesinAfrica’,inLesourneJ&WCRamsay

(eds),Governance of Oil in Africa: Unfinished Business.Paris:InstitutFrançaisdesRelations

Internationales,2009,pp.103–164.

16 PWYP(PublishWhatYouPay),‘Aboutus’,http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/about.

17 OGP(OpenGovernmentPartnership),‘About’,http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about.

18 For a complete list of current members, including countries that have delivered their

commitmentstotheOGPmandateandthosestilldevelopingtheircommitments,seethe

‘Countrycommitments’pageathttp://www.opengovpartnership.org/country-commitments.

19 OGP,‘About’,op. cit.

20 BenkensteinA,‘SouthAfrica:Miningrevenue,transparencyandtheEITI’,DiplomaticPouch.

Johannesburg:SAIIA,2011,http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/south-africa-mining-

revenue-transparency-and-the-eiti.

21 Personalinterview,DMRrepresentative,CapeTown,4February2013.


13


22 Ibid.

23 O’HareS,‘UKrefusestosignuptooil,miningandgastransparencyinitiative’,Telegraph,21

September2011,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/expat-money/8779905/

UK-refuses-to-sign-up-to-oil-mining-and-gas-transparency-initiative.html.

24 SouthAfrica,Governmentinformation,‘Chapter2–BillofRights’,http://www.info.gov.za/

documents/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm,accessed28March2013.

25 Personalinterviews,CapeTown(ODAC)andJohannesburg(SAHAandSAHRC),Februaryto

March2013.

26 Freedominfo.org,‘SouthAfricanAssemblyOksProtectionofInformationBill’,26April2013,

http://www.freedominfo.org/2013/04/south-african-assembly-oks-protection-of-information-

bill/,accessed28April2013.

27 South Africa, Government Gazette, ‘No. 28 of 2002: Mineral and Petroleum Resources

DevelopmentAct,2002’,448,23922,CapeTown,10October2002,p.5.

28 Personalinterview,CapeTown,4February2013.

29 Ibid.

30 SchoemanM,‘SouthAfricaasanemergingmiddlepower’,African Security Review,9,3,2000,

pp.47–58.Theterm‘emergingmiddlepower’exemplifiesSouthAfrica’saspirationtobean

importantplayerattheglobalstage.ItalsoreferstoSouthAfricaasarisingpowerfromthe

globalSouth,especiallywithintheBRICScomplex,andasanemergingpowerglobally.

31 EITI,‘EITIcountries’,http://eiti.org/countries.

32 R2Kisacivil-societyplatforminSouthAfrica,whichwaslaunchedinAugust2010,and

regroupsorganisationsandpeople responding to thePoSIB.TheR2K’smissionhasnow

broadenedtoincludemattersrelatedtofreeexpressionandaccesstoinformation.Formore

onthiscoalition,seeR2K,‘Whatwedo’,http://www.r2k.org.za/about/what-we-do.

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donors. Our work is currently being funded by, among others, the Bradlow Foundation, the

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Documents

Towards Understanding South Africa’s Differing Attitudes to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Open Governance Partnership