Thoughts about the political trials

admits that the evidence available does not warrant any definite conclusions. Stalin’s published messages to Gottwald concerning Slansky’s fate are highly ambiguous and open to conflicting interpretations. Was Stalin aware of the trap prepared for Slansky by the state security? Did Slansky fall prey to the purges of Zhdanov’s friends and followers which Beria and Malenkov set in motion after Zhdanov’s death in 194876

The impression seems to be gaining ground that in his declining years Stalin had come fully under the influence of Beria, his “evil genius,” and that he lost control over the machinery he had created.0 This would tend to support the view that Beria had engineered Slansky’s downfall, perhaps without Stalin’s approval or beyond his intention. The answer to these and many other questions will have to be. deferred until access is obtained to sources that are at present unavailable for examination.-Henry B. Brompton

GEdward Tabonky, Communi.sm in Czechoskmakia, 1948-1960 (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1961). p. 106: “While it is di5cult to prove that Slansky was Zbdanov’s pro- t&5, the two had been in frequent contact in Commform affairs. Since Slansky wns also the KSJ’s [CPCSI main representative at the Corninform, be was closer to the Soviet Comin- form boss [Zhdanovl than any other high-ranking Czecboslovak Communist. One may also note that tbe sudden rehabilitation of Klement Gothvald coincided with Zbdanov’s eclipse in tbe Summer of 1948.”

6See Svetlana Alliluyeva, op. cit., pp. 136-38, and tbe recently published “Excerpts from a Draft Letter Written at Some Time During tbe First Months of 1945,” by George F. Kennan, Slavic Reoiew, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 1968 Also, Boris Nicolaevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite (New

p. 481-84 supporting this view. ‘Ark:

p. 257. Fred&k A. Praeger, 1965).

‘THOUGHTS ABOUT THE POLITICAL TRIALS’

Selections from parts one and two of a study by Karel Kaplan of the Czecho-

Slovak show trials of the 1950s; they were printed in Nova Mysl, Nos. 6 and 7, June 5 and July 10, 1968. The transla-

tion is by Henry B. Brompton. . . . .

I am aware that it is not possible to present a completely unbiased picture of the political trials; however, L shall attempt to present as comprehensive a report as possible. I shall endeavor to place

the trials inside a large framework in order to make them easier to understand. For that reason I have decided to approach them by commenting on documents (taken primarily from the archives of the CC of the CPCS). I shall try to abstain from forcing my views on the reader . . .

. . . The first [part] is an attempt to uncover the roots, the origins of the conditions that led to the main political trials; the second will consist of a de- scription of the preparations and the conduct of the trials . . .

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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

Part One . . . .

At its second meeting in June 1948, the Cominform adopted the notorious resolution attacking the Yugoslav Com- munist Party. The conflict between the leadership of the CPSU and the CPY thus took on international dimensions; it turned into a conflict between the Cominform and the CPY. The Comin- form (a) adopted the Stalinist theory of the intensification of the class struggle, (b) declared the attitude toward the Soviet Union to be the only and decisive yardstick of true socialism, and (c) rejected the concept of specific roads to socialism as a symptom of bourgeois nationalism, declaring war on it as one of the main threats to the communist movement. These new concepts of the Cominform resolution profoundly and fatefully influenced the whole socialist camp. . . .

The theoretical principles and political demands proclaimed by the Cominform resolution, binding on all member parties, were in complete contlict with the road to socialism which Czechoslovakia had followed hitherto, as well as with requirements imposed by existing conditions. All the progressive groups in the country, including the communists, had up to that time agreed on the necessity of following an independent, specifically Czechoslovak road to socialism. This, however, was rejected by the Cominform. The sudden change had the effect of undermining the whole social structure on which the socialist transformation of society was based. The spirit and the meaning of the Cominform resolution ran counter to the requirements of Czechoslovak politics, and its implemen- tation made the task of socialist transformation much more difficult.

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However, the Czechoslovak Commu- nist Party accepted all the points of the Cominform resolution. . . . The theory of the sharpening political struggle, sup- ported by sectarian politics, began to take firm root in political thinking as well as practice. . . .

In this context, the speech of Rudolf Slansky, at the conference of regional secretaries held in September 1948, is interesting for two reasons. First, the speech gave notice of changes in the political line and related them to the Cominform resolution and to the Stalin- Gottwald discussions [then in progress in Sochi]; second, it suggested that Czechoslovak policy had been approved by Stalin up to February 1948, but had come under attack after that date:

All of us failed to realize. immediately after February, that the Leninist-Stalinist concept of the transition from capitalism to socialism demands not moderation of the class struggle but its increasing intensitication, a fact of which we were reminded by the Cominform resolution concemina the Yunoslav question. After FGbruary, many comrades thought that we had already transcended the stage of class struggle, that we were so strong that the reactionaries would cease to offer resistance; they talked about the cowardice of the reactionaries which had become apparent after Febru- ary and were confident that they would timidly continue to retreat. They felt our opponents would accommodate themselves to the situation. that we could look forward to a period of peaceful development toward socialism.

It is true that before February we too had talked about a quiet development toward socialism, about the Czechoslovak road to socialism, which, unlike the Russian road, was to be distinguished by peacefulness and accommodation.

After Comrade Gottwald’s return from the Soviet Union, our Central Committee and the Presidium of our party will have to face up to a

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number of tactical problems, and will proceed to develop a new party line in a manner corresponding to the conditions created by the intensification of the class struggle. . . .

It is clear now that we committed many mistakes in our policy, and particularly that we underrated the

‘power of the reactionaries; we failed to be watchful enough, and we ought to have started sooner to intensify our struggle against the reactionaries.

We must now take strict measures aeainst them. We must cease merelv to threaten. We have just been reminded that many party officials use strong words but that their deeds fail to correspond to their words.

This lenienf liberal attitude, this belief that by taking strong measures we might worsen the situation, that we might provoke our enemies, was very much in evidence among party members and is still frequently ap parent; we must fight this attitude vigorously and prove that it is a mistaken, serious and dangerous ab- erration. . . .

And on March 13, 1949, at [another] conference of regional secretaries, Slan- sky stated:

From reports of the ministry of internal affairs it has become evident that there are many party members among those who were arrested. Recently a particularly dangerous group of enemies was taken into custody. Many of them were party members. We shall have to check and find out who recommended these people for party membership and then go after those individuals and demand to know how they could have recommended members who turned out to be suies and traitors. The most dangerous enemies are those who hide in our midst. A person who is not a party member can never be quite as dangerous. . . .

Soon, far-reaching changes began to aEect the structure of the police and security systems. The practice of exer- cising jurisdictional control over them through district and regional party or

state organs was abandoned, and they were answerable directly to special agencies.

. . . This reorganization of the security system was an important innovation. From here on, the security services (especially state security) ceased to be sub- ject to the jurisdiction of state, or other elected bodies, and were made solely responsible to a so-called “Central Se- curity Quintet.” This was headed by R. Slansky. Other members were (during their terms of 05ce) J. Vesely, K. Svab, L. Kopriva, and A. Cepicka. The new “quintet” reported directly to Klement Gottwald and A. Zapotocky. The Party Presidium ceased to discuss important security questions and was merely informed about actions of the security agencies. Decisions of the central “quintet” concerning the arrest of important persons were approved by Klement Gott- wald and the Political Secretariat.

The Cominform resolution concerning the CPY had declared war on bourgeois nationalism. It had stated that bourgeois nationalism had failed to accept the leading role of the Soviet Union and the CP SU in the communist movement. Warn- ings pointing to the danger of nationalism in Czechoslovakia had already ap peared at the time of the exchange of letters between the CPSU and the CPY, and after the Cominform resolution these voices had become even more strident.

On June 9, 1948, when the Presidium of the CPCS discussed some personnel changes in the government, KJement Gott- wald rejected a demand of Slovak comrades for increased representation and declared: “In Slovakia you do have the local administration in your hands, and what you pursue are parochial and sectarian policies.”

And on June 28, 1948, during a CPCS Presidium meeting to discuss the results of Cominform activities, V. Kopecky

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openly took issue with the problem by stating: “Jn Yugoslavia bourgeois nationalism is spreading. This is very dangerous. Similar tendencies have also appeared in Slovakia. We must suppress them resolutely.” . . .

. . . .

So far we have dealt with two kinds of external influences: the consequences of the cold war and the ideological impact of the Cominform. For a certain period these remained key influences, but they were not the only ones. There existed pressures of another kind. One type could be called “indirect external pressures,” and the other, “direct pressures.” . . .

Let us start with the “indirect pressures.” In the fall of 1949 a number of political trials had begun in the people’s democracies. During September, the trial of L. Rajk had taken place in Hungary and three defendants had been sentenced to death; in December, T. Kostov had been executed after a trial in Bulgaria. Rajk’s trial, in particular, received extensive publicity and the Cominform organs paid it the greatest attention. . . .

. . . The Czechoslovak state security services had always maintained close contact with the Hungarian ministry of internal affairs. Early in 1949 it became clear that evidence against Rajk was being collected and that the preparatory work was supervised by M. Rakosi himself with the assistance of Soviet security specialists. In April, Rajk’s arrest was announced. Hungarian and Czechoslo- vak security organs reached an agreement for the exchange of material evidence used during Rajk’s hearings.

On May 9, 1949, M. Rakosi requested Klement Gottwald to arrest N. Field, whose name had been mentioned during the Rajk hearings. He also demanded the arrest of G. Pavlik. Both men were

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taken into custody. Physical force was used to extort from Pavlik an admission that he was a spy, as well as a fictitious list of persons to whom he had allegedly passed information. Thus, a list of about 60 persons, mostly communist leaders with “Western” contacts, had been put together and these people came under suspicion and distrust.

On September 5, 1949, M. Rakosi requested the arrest of an additional number of people in Czechoslovakia whom the Hungarians distrusted. In a letter written in the same month, he denounced these people as agents of American imperialism. Among them appeared the following names: L. Frejka, Vladimir Clementis, V. Navy, E. Loebl, L. Holdos, M. Faltan, J. Pull, S. Rais, J. Goldman, 0. Sling, E. Fris, F. Zupka, E. Gold- stuecker, V. Nosek, A. London and K. Moskovic. M. Rakosi expressed suspicion about the Czechoslovak ministers of foreign affairs and internal affairs, and also about those who had participated in organizing national resistance from Western countries, and about some Slovak functionaries. In the same letter he disclosed that the intelligence contacts of certain Czechoslovak functionaries would be made public during the Rajk trial and recommended that the Czecho- Slovak government prepare itself for those sensational revelations. This com- munication cannot be regarded as anything other than direct pressure on the Czechoslovak authorities. President Gott- wald tried to resist these pressures but was persuaded to appoint a commission consisting of Svab, Kopriva and Zavod- sky which was to investigate the 60 persons who had come under suspicion. (G. Pavlik used this investigation as the occasion to retract his statement, claiming that it had been obtained under duress.) J. Vesely, Kohoutek, Klenhova and other [security agents] interrogated a number of party officials during the

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months of September and October 1949 in the offices of the Secretariat of the CPCS CC. All those under investigation, including the minister of the interior, V. Nosek, suddenly found themselves under the shadow of suspicion.

On September 7, 1949, K. Svab met M. Rakosi in Budapest and the latter again made no secret of his views on the situation.

Klement Gottwald and the [other] Czechoslovak leaders underestimated the serious implications of Rakosi’s inten- tions. The latter persisted in his claim that there were spies in high places in Czechoslovakia, especially among those functionaries who had spent the war years in London. He suggested that investigation be initiated along the lines indicated by him, and that members of the Spanish International Brigades be included among the suspects. He further advised Svab to err in the direction of possibly hitting wrong targets rather than to miss anyone who was guilty. [Ra- kosi’s] Soviet advisers, too, began to direct their investigations toward suspects among “Londoners and Interbrigadists.”

J. Vesely, a security agent, conferred with the Polish communist leaders R. Zambrowski and B. Bierut and with Polish security organs. They informed him that on the strength of information obtained from the Rajk trial, they had arrested 50 persons, many of whom had contacts in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Polish officials clearly indicated that. in their opinion, the home base of their enemies was in Czechoslovakia.

Both J. Vesely and K. Svab informed Klement Gottwald of these discussions. Gottwald, however, refused to give in, declaring that matters were different in Czechoslovakia [from what they were in Poland and Hungary] because the party had been legal and thus relatively free of infiltration by agents provoca~urs.

But the forces of destiny moved on ir- resistably. . . .

The first important political trials in the new socialist bloc countries had been concluded, but a threatening shadow was cast on the communist movement. The trials ended with four death sentences and several long-term prison sentences. The Hungarian and Soviet security organs and other engineers of the trials saw in them the first move toward the exposure of a great international conspiracy of imperialist and Yugoslav enemies of socialism, a conspiracy which, according to those who engineered the trials, could be expected to have roots and tentacles in all the people’s democracies. . . .

As a result of Rajk’s trial, Hungarian and Polish officials and security services proposed that Czechoslovakia request Soviet security advisers. M. Rakosi and the Soviet adviser in Hungary, Belkin, pressed this view on K. Svab, and Polish functionaries made similar recommendations.

Thus it came about that the first Soviet advisers, Makarov and Lichacev, came to Czechoslovakia in October 1949 at Klement Gottwald’s request. (These Soviet security agents later met their deserved punishment in the U.S.S.R.) Upon their arrival they expressed great surprise that no enemies had as yet been discovered in the party. During the same month, a special department was organized within the security services with the task of seeking out enemies within the party. Shortly afterward, a similar organization was established in Slovakia and in other regions.

Toward the end of 1949, the lirst round of political trials in the people’s democracies was concluded. The whole concept of the [Rajk] trial, however, indicated that this would not be the end

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of the matter. Where would the next blow fall?

Between 11 and 13 November 1949, the Polish party relieved Gomulka, Kliszko and Spychalski of their functions, expelled them from the Central Committee, and co-opted Marshal Rokos- sovsky. The noose tightened around Czechoslovakia. . . .

The post-February political situation arose from conditions created by the cold war, an era of severe international con- flicts, and strong social and political internal tensions. It arose out of these tensions and at the same time it created new sources of tension. As a consequence of this situation, the security services, the army, and the institutions of coercion in general, penetrated deeply into the power structure. These organs were well placed to reinforce tension, to strengthen the sources from which tension arose, and thus to justify their own r&on d’e^tre.

Part Two

The Intensification of the Cold War

Relations between the two world camps-the socialist and the capitalist Aid not improve in the years 1950- 1952; on the contrary, open armed conflict erupted in Korea in the middle of 1950. The governments in both camps expected a third world war to break out within five years at the latest. Both sides prepared for this, militarily and economically as well as ideologically. The isolation of the one group from the other increased, and previously active economic and cultural relations ceased to all intents and purposes.

Normal diplomatic contacts were dras- tically reduced. Espionage and military expenditures, on the contrary, increased, and security provisions and expenditures connected with them multiplied.. . .

The Cominform conference held in

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November 1949 gave a new impetus to this process. The Corninform demanded in no uncertain terms that the socialist camp withdraw completely from the capitalist camp; that it break all existing contacts and ties, claiming that this was necessary in order to strengthen the socialist alliance. It charged that the imperialists were out to drive a wedge between the people’s democracies and the Soviet Union by means of Western agencies which existed in all socialist countries and in their ruling parties, and were bent on undermining the unity of the socialist camp. Under these circum- stances, so went the argument, the uni- fication of the socialist camp required the unreserved subordination of politics, economics and ideological activity in each socialist country to the needs of the camp as a whole.

The consequences of the new Comin- form line were particularly severe for Czechoslovakia, because Czechoslovak political, economic and cultural relations, as well as private contacts, with Western Europe had been extensive and the most vigorous and highly developed in the people’s democracies. This followed from the historical development of the republic and from its geographical position in Europe: it also arose from the important fact that Czechoslovakia’s struggle for liberation had taken place in Western Europe; and tinally, from the fact that Czechoslovak communists had contributed a fairly large number of men to the International Brigades in Spain. Even years later, these men maintained fairly close contact with progressive groups in Western Europe. . . .

As the conflict with American imperialism became the focal point of Soviet foreign policy, there occurred a gradual change in the attitude of the socialist states. and especially of the U.S.S.R.,

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toward the Middle East. The situation in the Middle East was changing rapidly. The U.S. gradually gained influence in Israel, and some of the Arab states obtained a greater degree of independence from British and French influences. The socialist countries, on the other hand, shifted their support from Israel to the Arab world. One may safely assume that this development had its effect on internal politics within the socialist bloc, where anti-Jewish feeling greatly increased. . . .

. . . ,

During the cold war, the army and the security services grew in importance. Their intluence shaped the political atmosphere of the period. Those two branches of government rapidly took control of leading positions in political life. Army and security functionaries pro- moted this development with all their power. . . .

The cold war gave the military an opportunity to exercise a dominant role in society. Not only did the military (and not in Czechoslovakia alone) ex- pect war and year after year forecast its outbreak, but also vast economic power was concentrated in their hands (they were in control of enormous military expenditures). The military made demands on resources which no one had the courage to refuse; they mili- tarized previously civilian aspects of life; they even penetrated the theatre, music, and culture in general. Military disci- pline began to invade all of society; relationships between the higher and lower levels of the political system, as well as social relationships generally, gradually assumed a command-and-obey character, a relationship that became particularly evident in the Communist Party.

The First Big Political Trials

. . . .

The Cominform had declared bourgeois nationalism to be the main enemy. The whole concept was left rather undefined, though three groups of ad- versaries were singled out for special attention. The first group was made up of people who had shown a question- able attitude toward the Soviet Union. The second included those party members who in the past had maintained contacts with Yugoslavia. And the third category of suspects was made up of people who had lived or worked in Western Europe.

The November conference of the Cominform called upon the communist parties in the people’s democracies to increase their watchfulness against their enemies and especially against enemies within their own ranks. It urged that the past records of party functionaries be investigated. The search for the enemy was thus shifted to the ranks of the communist movement. . . .

. . . After the November conference of the Cominform, the search for a Czechoslovak Rajk began in earnest. The state security agency began to focus on the need for decisive action against “Tito’s agency,” which surely had its branches in Czechoslovakia too.

First, Milan Reiman, who had already been interrogated by a commission of the CPCS CC, was arrested in the second half of November. On November 24, 1949, security agents arrested Evzen Loebl, deputy minister of foreign trade, and two days later V. Novy, editor in chief of Rude Pravo, because both had allegedly been in contact with Noel Field. Later, however, the security apparatus completely changed the indictment against both men. . . .

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. . . The minister of the interior, V. Nosek, also came under suspicion and with him many of his co-workers who had served with him during his wartime activities in London. In Slovakia the so-called “group of the Yugoslav con- sul” was brought to trial.

The circle of those “under observation and suspicion” corresponded roughly to the aforementioned list of suspects in Rakosi’s letter, but it constantly grew in length. All this took place strictly along the lines of the ideological concept of the Cominform, that is, within the framework of hostility toward Yugo- slavia and the Rajk trial. The range of potential suspects, however, was considerable, since it included, among others, Londoners and Interbrigadists. . . .

. . . All this was based on the premise that a Czechoslovak Rajk had to be found. The functionaries of the security agencies, as well as the Soviet advisers, had settled on the proposition that this role was to be assigned to Vlado Cle- mentis. For this reason the search for bourgeois nationalists was intensified and the interrogations of all imprisoned officials began to center on Clementis and other nationalists.

On March 7, 1950, K. Svab submitted to the leadership of the CPCS a report on the result of the investigations of a group of bourgeois nationalists within the leadership of the CPSL [Slovak Communist Party].

On March 13, 1950, the Presidium discussed the “case of Comrade Clemen- tis.” It was decided to recall Clementis from the ministry of foreign affairs and to give him an opportunity to work in a different field and thereby to show by his work his good will and honesty toward the party.

On March 14, the Presidium met again, with a delegation of the Central

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Committee attending. . . . Kopriva attempted to explain the decision of the Presidium, pointing out that V. Cle- mentis had opposed the German-Russian Pact of 1939 and the occupation of Po- land by the Soviet Union; Kopriva said it should also be heId against Clementis that he was a member of DAV [Musses, a group of radical intellectuals in pre- Munich Czechoslovakia and also the name of their publication] and that he lacked sincerity in his relations with the party. The ensuing discussion was rather interesting; it was claimed that Clementis, though he had held important positions in the party even before the war, was not a true party member, that he had stood against the policy of the party, and that he never really under- stood the party. He was further criti- cized for having shirked “black work” in the party and for having been active only among intellectuals. G. Husak, one of the participants at the meeting, was unable to conceal his surprise at the accusations leveled against Vlado Cle- mentis and pointed out that those errors were probably the result of his naive relationships with people, that Clementis tended to be overtrusting. Lace Novo- mesky declared that he was a close friend of Clementis and that all this was very painful to him. J. Duris also spoke in a similar way. Finally, Vilem Siroky stated that while in Britain, Vlado Cle- mentis had moved too close to the bourgeoisie, and found evidence for this charge in the fact that Clementis had accepted membership in the State Council (this statement did not correspond with the facts-author).

Rudolf Slansky provided the real moti- vation for the removal of Vlado Clemen- tis when he stated in the concluding speech : “The Central Committee has passed a resolution demanding greater revolutionary vigilance and for that rea-

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son we are today checking all party members, including the leading ones. When we assembled all the evidence dealing with Clementis’s past, his activity, his wavering, his gross mistakes, his dealings during the war as well as since 1945, we came to the conclusion that these acts were not accidental, that the party cannot ignore them and must draw administrative conclusions from them.”

Vlado Clementis was removed from office. No one spoke in his favor. He remained alone. There followed an exchange of letters among [Clementis], Gottwald, and the Presidium, in which Clementis tried to explain himself. The Presidium and Klement Gottwald, however, rejected his explanations and repeatedly demanded from him a severe self-critical approach. Finally, on May 23, 1950, the Presidium adopted the following resolution: (1) the Presidium rejects the letters of Comrade Clementis and considers them not self-critical but apologetic; (2) it instructs a commission, composed of Comrades Kopecky, Bares and Koehler, to prepare within a week a short but sharp answer and submit it for final approval to Comrade Gottwald.

On April 3, 1950, the campaign against the “bourgeois nationalists” took another decisive step forward. On that day for the first time the Slovak Party Presidium accused Gustav Husak and Lace Novo- mesky of spreading bourgeois nationalism. They both defended themselves and tried to prove that the only offenses they might have committed were of a minor nature, and, moreover, that those offenses had been committed by the whole leadership and not merely by themselves alone.

The wave of criticism increased. In May 1950, at the Ninth Slovak Party Congress, it was the dominant tone in Vilem Siroky’s report. Gustav Husak and Lace Novomesky became the tar-

gets of vicious attacks. Shortly after that (June 12, 1950) the CPCS CC Pre- sidium recalled Husak from the chair- manship of the Board of Commissioners and transferred him to the Slovak Cen- tral Committee’s agricultural department. Novomesky departed for the SIovak Academy of Sciences, K. Smidke became a factory director and Vlado Clementis an employee of the state bank.

The case of Vlado Clementis and the charges brought against him played an important role in the development of the political trials. He was the first party functionary of the highest rank to be removed from power. The direct causes of his downfall were the new directives of the Cominform and the CPCS CC’s demand for the evaluation of past activities of party members, reports of the security services, and, last but not least, statements coerced from functionaries already in prison. The factor in Clemen- tis’s past which provided the main target for his accusers was his critical attitude toward the Soviet Union in 1939; there was also his newly discovered “nationalism.” These two factors had convinced the security services that Clementis would make a suitable Rajk, because these elements would enable the security people to construct a trial similar to that of the former Hungarian foreign minister.

However, the attempt to manufacture a Czechoslovak Rajk ran into unexpected difficulties. It is not easy to determine the reasons at the present time. Perhaps factors stemming from a reluctance to take strong action against a Slovak political figure served as a restraint; perhaps none of the personalities involved appeared to be suflicieotly important to become the central figure in a big political trial; perhaps a trial on the grand scale was to be prepared, a trial that could not remain restricted to Slo- vakia alone. Perhaps in view of the

105


international situation and its pressures, it was felt that the most extensive trial possible, providing the greatest degree of international ramifications, should be mounted; a trial to be. aimed in a direction other than soIely against Yugoslavia. At present, documentary evidence fails to confirm or disprove any of these or other possible hypotheses with absolute certainty. The fact remains that early in 1950, links with Yugoslavia began to recede into the background of the investigation, whiIe Interbrigadists and Londoners OC-

cupied the limelight. It became evident that the search for a Czechoslovak Rajk had moved away from the circle of so- called bourgeois nationalists.

Meanwhile, new developments were steering the course of events in new directions. The so-called “Brno case” was in the process of preparation.

From the beginning of 1950, the Cen- tral Committee as well as the Party Con- trol Commission began to receive ever- increasing complaints concerning the activities of Otto Sling, the Ieading secretary of the Bmo regional party committee. Obviously, some of the complaints were substantial but most were connected with incidents that did not reach beyond particular districts. These complaints referred mostly to violations of internal party democracy and in some cases to minor statutory violations. . . . At some point in their investigations, the security services and their Soviet advisers reached the conclusion that Sling was an important link in a great conspiracy within the party. . . .

. . . Sling, however, refused to admit anything. He resisted mounting physical and psychological pressures. . . . He was repeatedly interrogated, tortured, put in a strait jacket, and denied food for long periods. All this was designed to force from him an admission that he had led a conspiracy within the party. Only after

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prolonged torture did Sling provide the names of a number of regional secretaries (all Londoners) and of M. Sver- mova as his alleged fellow conspirators. . . .

In October 1950, the CPCS CC Pre- sidium appointed a commission to investigate the Sling-Sverma case. The members of the commission were Vaclav Kopecky, Bruno Koehler and G. Bares.

Shortly after Sling’s arrest, the original commission investigating the Brno case was reconstituted as an extraordinary commission headed by Bruno Koehler. It was ordered to ascertain and list all the people who had gained admittance to the party or to the state and economic apparatuses with the help or intercession of SIing; it was to collect fuIl cadre files on these people and, in particular, to search for evidence of suspicious activities in their cadre records. In order to carry out these tasks, subcommissions were formed to investigate the party, state and economic machinery, Spaniards [i-e., Interbrigadists), London &nigr&, illegal groups in the Brno region, and Trotskyists. T’he extraordinary commission prepared more than 6,000 cadre records and aIerted regional committees, government departments and other institutions to persons who had met Sling in London or in the Interbrigades, and who had been found to have maintained contacts with him.

It became evident that a major trial was in the stages of preparation. A good deal of activity seemed to be directed against leading members of the security services themselves. J. Taussigova began to insist that many former Interbriga- dists held leading positions in the security services and, in her opinion, obstructed the detection of enemies within the party. When her name began to appear in some of Sling’s depositions, she demanded

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that K. Svab, her brother, be removed from the case.

On November 27, 1950, J. Taussigova reported to Rudolf Slansky that there were many Interbrigadists among the members of the security services, a cir- cumstance which led her to doubt that they could be relied on to conduct a thorough investigation of the Sling case. She therefore recommended an investigation of all leading functionaries in the security services. This investigation, in fact, was set in motion toward the end of 1950. . . .

In mid-January 1951, Kolodeje Castle was remodeled to accommodate a grow- ing number of prisoners. The cellars were rebuilt into prison cells. Most of them had no windows; all were without floors and thus quite unsuitable and offensive to human dignity.

On January 27, L. Kopriva summoned the chiefs of the security services to a conference. As they left the meeting, they were arrested and hustled away, one by one, by members of the people’s militia. . . .

On January 28, J. Miler, the deputy commander of the state security set-vices. was arrested. On the same day the security services arranged an “escape” for Vlado Clementis and arrested him in the process.

On January 29, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, A. London, was arrested.

On January 30, E. Polak, the regional secretary of the CPC [sic], who was

returning from a conference in Prague, was brought to Kolodeje.

On February 2, J. Pavel, the deputy minister of national security, and J. Holdos were arrested.

February 4 saw the arrest of Daniel Okali.

On Februarv 6. Gustav Husak and Lace Novomesky .were imprisoned.

On February 7, the number of those arrested was increased by Lomsky and Fuchs, both regional secretaries, the former in Plmn, the latter in Ostrava.

On February 8, Reicin, the deputy minister of national defense, was arrested.

On February 16, the deputy minister of national security, K. Svab, was arrested.

On February 21, M. Svermova swelled the ranks of those detained.

Other well-known names appeared in the list of those arrested at the beginning of 1951. In January, Generals Z. Novak and R. Bulander were imprisoned, as were J. Smrkovsky, V. Hajdu and T. Balaz. Altogether, more than 50 promi- nent state and party functionaries were arrested and imprisoned at Kolodeje. . . .

The Search for the Leader of the Conspiracy

Though more than 50 former functionaries had been imprisoned pending trial, and though interrogations were carried out under extreme physical and psychological pressure, the whole case seemed to run into great difIiculties. The investigation moved in circles. Nothing new was discovered. . . .

Though they had forced the admission from Sling that he was the leader of the conspiracy, the interrogators themselves had to discount a good many of his statements. . . . Svermova, too, re- tracted what she had been forced to confess and the security people began to doubt whether her arrest had been a good idea in the first place. The forced admissions of others provided no tangible evidence of a logically consistent conspiracy. Some of those arrested spoke of an organized conspiracy in 1949. Others, again, refused to admit anything

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and heroically resisted ah pressures (e.g., Pave1 and Husak) .

All through March, April, and well into May 1951, the investigation made little progress. It continued to move in circles. The end of the tunnel remained out of sight. The investigators, the heads of the security services, and some of the party leaders grew increasingly im- patient. Even interrogators who had en- tered the security services with Svab, but who had demonstrated their reliability and later advanced to important positions, came under suspicion of being in some way responsible for the bogging down of the whole case. This suspicion found expression in a letter handed to Slansky by some particularly xeaIous security agents. The letter, a copy of which went to Gottwahi, contained an idea that was to have fateful consequences: that the head of the conspiracy must be a man of greater power and position than sling. . . .

The new concept, that the head of the conspiracy would have to be a person high in the councils of the party, gradually pervaded the thinking of the security agents, of their advisers, and of party functionaries, the more so since little new information turned up and hard evidence remained conspicuously absent. This was the situation when the names of Rudolf Slansky and Geminder suddenly began to appear in the statements of some prisoners.

The question arises: why did it become necessary to search so exhaustively for the head of the conspiracy when more than 50 high party and state officials were already in prison? According to the pattern set by the Budapest and Sofia trials, and because of their high positions, any one of these men could easily have served as head of the conspiracy. There was Clementis, the minister of foreign affairs, who had opposed the Soviet-Ger-

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man treaty of 1939 and had participated in the antifascist movement in Western Europe, where he had made many friends during the war years. There were a number of other potential candidates. For one reason or another they alI seemed unsatisfactory. . . .

. . . From all the evidence now available, one must conclude that the main reason is to be found in the field of international relations. The most important factor undoubtedly was the change in the attitude of the socialist camp toward the countries of the Middle East. There lies the key to the reason behind the search for the “head of the conspiracy.” This situation widened the scope of investigations and at the same time changed the whole political purpose and the ideological motive of the trials.

In brief, this change could be expressed thus: from bourgeois nationalism to Zionism. . . .

It is necessary to recall these facts in order to place the attack on Zionism in the proper perspective. However, in order to understand it fully, we must not omit mentioning anti-Semitism, with which it was closely connected. The people who participated in the fabrication of the “conspiracy” were affected by antiSem- itism in different degrees. This was true of members of the security services, of Soviet advisers, as well as of political functionaries. . . . The security services organized a special department to deal with Zionism. They developed a strong tendency to combine the fight against Zionism with anti-Semitism. Anti-Zion- ism either led to anti-Semitism or was used to rationalize long-held and strong anti-Semitic convictions.

. . . We interrupted our observations at the moment when the name of Rudolf Slansky began to appear in some interrogations. This fact, unimportant in itself, appears, however, in quite a different light

when seen in the context of another development. Simultaneously, as a matter of fact, there began to appear statements about Jewish nationalism, statements that its champions had deliberately placed supporters in positions of great economic influence and other positions of power, and, finally, that although Slansky’s attention had been drawn to this matter, he had done nothing to stop it.

In the middle of 1951, Slansky’s name appeared in the statements of a profes- sional agent named Vondracek and of certain former security officers who had been arrested. These interrogations had been conducted by Dr. Smola, who had been appointed to the group of interrogators by the Party Control Commission. Two other prisoners, who had been interrogated by Kohoutek (one of the few police agents under the bourgeois republic to have been retained in service), also made statements implicating Slansky.

All statements were forced out of the prisoners, and it is not difhcult to discern that they were the result of a coordinated effort by the security services, though this cannot be demonstrated with absolute certainty at this time. There are, however, certain facts that support this view:

(1) The tirst and most important depo- sition was produced by the security agent Vondracek, a man notorious for his will- ingness to implicate anyone and everyone. The interrogating officers appeared not to have been aware of this fact. (2) None of the interrogators submitted these depositions to their superiors, nor did they transmit them to their minister; in fact, not even to the Soviet advisers (they distrusted all of them). They took them, with the assistance of other agents, directly to the Soviet Embassy. (3) Once Minister Kopriva discovered this, he took appropriate steps. One of those who had transmitted the reports was arrested. The investigators, however, continued with their inquiries.

.

Soon the whole a&air was to take a most unusual and unexpected turn. Re- ports about the depositions implicating Slansky reached Moscow and Stalin himself. At first he apparently considered them to be possible attempts at provocation. He wrote in this vein to Gott- wald on July 20, 1951:

We have received incriminating documents concerning Comrades Slansky and Geminder. We consider the evidence insuflicient and conclude that there is no cause for prosecution.

It seems obvious to us that the attitudes exhibited in this investigation lack responsibility, and we have therefore decided to recall Bojarsky to Moscow.

Gottwald’s reply of the same date was as follows:

I am in complete agreement with you that it is not possible to bring charges against the comrades mentioned by you (Slansky and Gemind- er) on the basis of the evidence sup plied by the investigations. All the more so since these statements were ma& by convicted criminals. This was the immediate impression I formed upon learning of this matter. Among leading comrades, these depositions are known only to Ko- priva, Comrade Gottwald, and in part to Cepicka, who was informed by Gottwald.

Stalin invited Gottwald to Moscow in order to discuss matters in detail. Gott- wald, however, declined, pleading ilhtess (during this whole period, Gottwald participated only very sporadically in meet- ings of the Political Secretariat). He sent Cepicka instead. A conference of the Politburo of the CPSU CC, with Stalin present, took place on July 23, 1951.

In the course of the discussions, Cepicka reported on the progress of the investigation and pointed out that the names of Slansky and Geminder had appeared in the interrogations. Stalin re- acted by saying that this could well be an

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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNlSM

attempt at provocation by the enemy. He provided some examples from the Soviet Union, where faithful members of the party had been smeared by people under arrest. “If the activities of investigating officers are not to deteriorate and give comfort to our enemies, it will be necessary to exercise continuous and strict control over them and not to per- mit confusion and distrust to spread at the highest levels of government.” This also was to apply to the activities of the Soviet advisers.

Cepicka delivered a letter to Gottwald from Stalin which summarized the out- come of the conference, as well as Stalin’s own attitude. In it he restated his opinion: “We continue to take the view that statements of convicts without supporting evidence cannot provide sufficient reasons for accusations leveled at functionaries who are known in the party for their great contributions. You are, therefore, well advised to take great care and to refuse to rely on statements made by criminals, particularly where such important party members as Comrades Slansky and Geminder are involved.” At the same time, however, he recommended the recall of Slansky from the position of General Secretary of the party because of errors he had committed in making unsuitable appointments and because many of his appointees had proved to be subversive elements. “For this reason I think that he should be moved into another position,” Stalin wrote.

Gottwald replied to Stalin . . . that he had acquainted Zapotocky with the con- tents of [Stalin’s] letter and that both “agreed with your suggestion concerning Comrade Slansky. . . . We intend to appoint him to another position in the government.” Gottwald had shelved an earlier draft of his letter to Stalin; he took some ideas from it and omitted the rest. The original draft sheds considerable light on Gottwald’s state of mind. . . .

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I must admit that I myself never considered this eventuality (the recall of Slansky). My thought was that a complete reorganization of the work of party operations, from top to bottom, would prevent the repetition of mistakes on such a scae. My concept is based, first, on my trust in the political and per- sonal honesty, the honor and the nood will of Comrade Slanskv: and secondly, on the fact that evei now I fail to see how I could replace Comrade Slansky in his key position. Finally, I feel that I too am not entirely without blame and responsibility for mistakes committed.

. . . Gottwald instructed Kopriva, the minister of security, to stop the investigation of Slansky and Geminder. The minister transmitted the instructions to the investigating agencies. The latter, however, refused to follow his orders and continued to collect evidence against Slansky. They went so far as to install listening devices in prison cells. When this became known, a meeting of the minister of security and leading security officers involved in the case was called, at which the decision was reached that, in the future, no leading questions concerning Slansky would be permissible but that no one would be prevented from volunteering information about him. Also, it was suggested that the minister take part in the interrogations of some of those who apparently were ready to talk about Slansky. This, in fact, was done.

Thus, interrogations involving Slansky continued and the depositions multiplied. A further conference of security officers took place, this time without the presence of the minister. The participants at this meeting agreed with the view expressed by the Soviet advisers that there existed the threat of a Zionist conspiracy and that the leadership of the party should be informed of it. Consequently, a report was drafted by two of the inter-

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rogators (Doubek and Kostal) and was transmitted to Kopriva. He in turn discussed this letter with Gottwald and later gave permission to go on with the investigations. Everything seems to point to the fact that the security agents involved in the investigation held opinions that dif- fered widely from those of the leading political figures (Gottwald and Kopriva). The former assumed, as a matter of course, that the head of the conspiracy was not Sling but Slansky, while the politicians seemed, at that time, to think that the accusations against Slansky would prove to be groundless.

Meanwhile, free rein was given to the investigation. Although no additional evidence had turned up, Minister KO- priva continued to receive reports from investigators who tried to impress him with their ideas regarding the head of the conspiracy. The minister himself appears to have inclined to the possibility that Geminder might be the head of the conspiracy. This, however, did not correspond to the ideas held by the security services. . . . On September 6, 1951, the Party Central Committee met in conference. Gottwald submitted a proposal that Slansky be transferred from the post of General Secretary of the party to that of Vice-Premier of the government. The Central Committee also accepted Slansky’s self-critical statements.

Gottwald’s report contained a sharp criticism of the Secretariat of the CPCS cc. . . . He also used the occasion to point to the danger arising from two competing centers of power-the party and the government.

Slansky made a self-critical statement admitting all his errors, particularly his failure to prevent the activities of such people as Sling and Svermova. He admitted mistakes in his use of the party apparatus, which had obtained control and powers of appointment over the state

apparatus as well as over elected party officials.

The Central Committee proceeded to abolish the office of General Secretary, and his duties and functions were transferred to the party Chairman. It also elected a new Political Secretariat of the CC: Gottwald, Zapotocky, Siroky, Slan- sky, Dolansky, Bacilek and Cepicka. Novotny, Frank, Bares, David, Hendrych and Bastovansky were elected secretaries of the CPCS CC. The Central Commit- tee agreed to accept the self-criticism of Slansky, who “with Bolshevik frankness admitted his mistakes and pointed to the danger they posed for the party.”

The attacks on Slansky and his de- motion only served to co&m the notions of the security agents who had decided that Slansky was the head of the conspiracy. All the more so since the September plenum and also Gottwald’s report seemed to give substance to the idea of a conspiracy at the top level of the Communist Party.

. . . The security people worked hard to translate their scheme into reality. De- spite all their efforts, however, new evidence failed to materialize. . . . Though the quantity of statements implicating Slansky increased, there had heen no essential change in the situation since Stalin and Gottwald expressed their fear of a potential provocation in the Slansky case. This fact remained the main ob- stacle in the path of the security services in attempting to “find” the head of the conspiracy. Because of this, they concentrated all their resources on working out some solution to the problem.

On November 9, 1951, an agent of the Czechoslovak intelligence who, by the way, had worked formerly for foreign intelligence organizations, obtained some letters allegedly given to Kankovska, a Czechoslovak citizen, by agents of a Western government. He immediately

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passed them on to the security services. T’he documents included the now famous letter addressed to the “Great Sweeper.” It was quite obviously the code name of a man of very high standing who was preparing to leave the Czechoslovak Re- public. The letter contained offers by a foreign agency to assist in his escape, and also, among other details, information about a secret code to be transmitted in broadcasts of Radio Free Europe signaling the start of this action. Radio Free Europe did in fact broadcast the signals.

In the midst of the furor over the letter addressed to the “Great Sweeper,” a highly interesting meeting took place, a meeting concerning which only scant facts are known at present. However, what we know for certain is that Mikoyan came to Czechoslovakia. He allegedly handed Gottwald a request from Stalin to arrange the arrest of Slansky on the grounds of an incipient attempt to escape abroad. Gottwald hedged, claiming that he had no evidence that would authorize him to take such strong action against Slansky. Mikoyan then took his leave in order to meet with Stalin in MOSCOW and inform him of Gottwald’s views. . . . Upon his return, Mikoyan informed Gottwald that Stalin had no additional cause for advocating the arrest apart from the fear that Slansky might be planning his escape. Finally, Gottwald pointed out that Stalin quite probably had very good reasons for his advice but that he, Gottwald, knew of nothing that would make such a serious step necessary. . . .

The facts and time sequence of Miko- yan’s visits and the discovery of the letter to the “Great Sweeper” are still far from clear. At the present stage of our know- ledge it can be stated, however, that the combination of both those factors provided the motive for Slansky’s arrest.

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Which of those factors was the more important will have to be judged in the light of the facts when they are fully kIlOWlL

On November 23, Zapotocky, Kopriva and Alexei Bezcasnov (the Soviet adviser replacing Bojarsky) were invited to a meeting by Gottwald. They decided on Slansky’s arrest. On the very same day they made the necessary arrange- ments. During the night of November 23-24, Slansky was arrested while on his way home from a social gathering, at- tended by Soviet economists, at Zapo- tacky’s house.

On November 24, the case against Slansky was discussed, first by members of the Political Secretariat, and later by the Party Presidium. Besides Gottwald, Zapotocky, Cepicka, Siroky, Bacilek, Ko- priva and Dolansky participated in the Secretariat meeting. In his opening re- marks, Gottwald stated that in the light of a report given to him by Comrades Kopriva and Zapotocky he had found it necessary to relieve Slansky of his position in the government and have him taken into custody. Kopriva then ad&d that, in Slansky’s case, it was not a matter of merely having committed mistakes but of intentional, hostile acts. “He was the head of the whole group, and consequently also the head of the conspiracy.” Ko- priva proceeded to outline the conspiratorial preparations of the group. Accord- ing to his report, Slansky’s arrest was set off by information concerning his plan to escape. All members of the Political Secretariat agreed with the measures that had been taken. . . .

Concluding the meeting, Gottwald stated that Slansky’s activities now appeared in a different light; he then attempted to justify his own change of mind concerning the conspiracy: “The initial statements of the arrested party members contained

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admissions of their antiparty and antistate activities and also attempts to explain the internal party conspiracy in terms of an effort to remove Slansky and to appoint Svermova in his place. This was the version everybody seemed to have agreed on. Now, however, most of the suspects reject this version, claiming that it was untrue and that they produced it on purpose in order to cover up their tracks. The latter appears to be more logical.”

The meeting of the Presidium followed a similar course. Here, too, there was complete agreement. The same situation could be observed at the December plenum of the CPCS CC. On that occasion too Gottwald tried to justify Slansky’s arrest, and the other members of the Central Committee followed his lead and sought to heap accusations [on Slansky]. Thus it came to pass that the very highest party institutions approved the actions taken against the former General Secre- tary and, without granting Slansky a hearing, proceeded to condemn him as a foreign agent, enemy, and traitor. All this without one foolproof shred of evidence being offered. . . ,

At last the head of the conspiracy had been found. It was to be Slansky, the erstwhile General Secretary of the Com- munist Party, a leading party and state functionary, and for nearly a quarter of a century a close collaborator of Gott- wald, Zapotocky, Siroky, Bacilek and Dolansky. All of them decided on his arrest and, tinally also about his life. Lending their support to the plots manufactured by the security services, they had made him into a traitor, an enemy, and an agent of imperialism, all this just a few weeks after having award- ed him the highest decorations in cele- bration of his fiftieth birthday.

Slansky’s arrest shook the whole of SO-

ciety. An atmosphere of deep mistrust

and mutual recriminations developed, and any trust or confidence that party members could cling to centered now solely on the person of Gottwald, since the leading cadres could not be sure whose turn would come next, and which one of the remaining three party and state leaders would next be accused of treason.

In spite of the fact that the head of the conspiracy had now been discovered, the number of arrests continued to grow. It appeared that Slansky’s arrest served only as the signal for increased police activities, which had not abated even during the period between the first cycle of arrests (following that of Sling) and the second cycle (after the arrest of Slansky). In this period considerable changes occurred at the level of regional secretaries.

Many were dismissed from their posts, including Fuchs in Ostrava, Vais in Prague, Reznicek in Olomouc, and Ho- mola in Karlovy Vary. Many of them were later arrested. At the end of July

1951, the Political Secretariat approved the arrests of Hoffman, Gajdos, Fischl and Holy.

Geminder, the head of the international department of the CPCS CC, was arrested together with Slansky, and a day later Taussigova, the leading member of the Party Control Commission, was arrested. In December, Goldstuecker appeared among those arrested, while January 1952 saw the arrests of Hajek, Frejka and Margolius, followed by that of Simone in June. Further arrests were made among economists and the general managers of Czechoslovak industry. These included Goldman, Rudinger, Fa- binger, Barta, Jicinsky, Outrata, and later, Smrkovsky, Kolar, Lewitzer, followed by the so-called Trotskysts Hruby, Holatko and Rausar. Toward the end of 1952, Generals S. Drgac and V. Dmec were

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added to the number of political prisoners.

Simultaneously, all those associated with Slansky were dismissed from their 05ces. In January 1952, Bastovansky, Moskovic and Fris were stripped of all party functions. At the same time G. Bares and J. Frank (who was later arrested) were recalled from their posts of secretaries of the CPCS CC; Erban was deprived of his membership in the Presidium of the CPCS CC, and later Hendrych was recalled from his post of secretary of the CPCS CC.

In January, a change also took place in the ministry of national security. Ko- priva left on the recommendation of Stalin and his place was taken by Bacilek. . . .

The interrogations were speeded up and sharpened but failed to produce the desired results. Slansky steadfastly refused to make the required admissions in spite of daily interrogations lasting many hours. He wrote letters to the Presidium in which he continued to protest his complete innocence. . . .

Slansky continued his appeals for quite some time. He admitted mistakes, but sharply rejected charges of treason, organized conspiracy and usurpation of power. However, his psychological and physical ordeals exceeded the limits of endurance. Slansky frequently lost con- sciousness and his jailers began to fear that he might seriously disfigure himself. When Slansky realized that his interrogators were not interested in establishing facts but simply wished to coerce him into a confession, his despair and the hopeless- ness of his situation drove him to attempt suicide. In this he failed. Even after this unsuccessful attempt, he continued to resist his tormentors, though with faltering strength, until they gradually broke him down and he began to confess whatever was demanded. . . .

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The interrogators had their difllculties also with Svermova. Her statements bore the marks of honest self-criticism, but there was little in them that could be considered useful for a court trial. At the end of 19.51, the investigation ran into a dead end. The Soviet advisers were of the opinion that Svermova should never have been arrested. But they could not discharge her. It had become one of the firm principles of the security services that no one could be released without trial, since release would be damaging to the image of the services and raise doubts about their activities. So everyone had to confess.

The ability to withstand interrogation varied considerably. Some admitted everything the interrogators demanded. There were cases where the prisoners wrote out their own depositions. Others again (e.g., Pavel, Smrkovsky, etc.) rejected all charges. In the end, none of this really mattered much. Where statements failed to come up to expectation, the interrogators would simply alter them, or they would continue with the interrogations until the required confession was produced.

In some cases, Minister Bacilek himself visited the arrested persons in prison and urged them to confess. He argued that to do so would be a service to the party. He came to see Slansky and appealed to him not to make things difficult since there was no way out but to admit his guilt. Slansky replied that he had never been an enemy, and if he signed the confession it would only be in order not to cause damage to the party. Similar arguments were used by other interrogators, and thus the monstrous device of rendering a “service to the party” became an important factor of psychological per- suasion. Combined with systematically applied torture, it was very effective in bringing many prisoners to the point

where they were ready to “confess” anything demanded by the interrogators.

The preparations leading to the trial of the antistate and antiparty center began in earnest during the second half of 1952. The immediate problem was the selection of defendants. The general composition of the “conspiratorial center” had been provided by the security services and the Soviet advisers participated in giving it final shape. The selection of appropriate conspirators fof- lowed a definite pattern: (1) it would have to include appropriate representa- tives from every sphere of political activity; (2) it would have to be based care- fully on prisoners who could be counted on not to cause difficulties with “confes- sions” or to embarrass the interrogators before the court.

Thus it came about that, in addition to Slansky, the “center” was composed of Svab for the security services, Reicin representing the army, Clementis and Hajdu the foreign office, Sling the party apparatus, Frejka the leaders of the econ- omy, Margolius and London the “for- eigners” and Interbrigadists, Loebl foreign trade; Simone was tried as a well- known journalist, and Fischl as a “sup- porter” of Zionism in the ministry of finance.

Husak, Svermova, Taussigova, Pave1 and Smrkovsky were not included because they “would not behave in court.” The other prisoners were unsuitable because, in the opinion of the organizers of the trial, they did not hold sufficiently important positions.

As soon as all the actors had been selected and their roles assigned, preparations for the trial of the “center” went forward. The security agents and prisoners diligently worked out questions and answers which were to provide the basic script for the court trial. The f%al draft had to be memorized by the de-

fendaztts under the direction of the security agents, who checked their progress and kept an eye on “their homework.” . . .

On November 20, 1952, the trial of the heads of the antistate conspiratorial center opened in the courtroom at Pan- krac, before the senate of the state cmlrt. . . .

The indictment charged the defendants with the most heinous crimes: high treason and collaboration with international imperialism. They were branded hostile agents, Zionists, nationalists, enemies of socialism, etc. . . .

On November 27th, the tribunal announced the verdict, thus bringing the greatest politica triaI in CzechosIovakia’s history to a conclusion. The individual sentences had been determined before- hand by the Political Secretariat.

None of those sentenced appealed. Petitions for clemency were rejected. The death sentences were carried out on December 3, 1952. Nearly all of the prisoners (with the exception of SIansky) wrote letters to their relatives and also to Gottwald. AI1 of them again claimed that they had never been traitors or enemy agents. In their last letters written before their execution, when they would have had no reason to deny the truth, they all stated that they had con- fessed only in order to serve the party and socialism. . . .

Thus ended the trial of the heads of the antistate center. One chapter had been closed, but the prison still held more than 60 people arrested in connection with the “conspiracy.” What should be done with them? Bacilek, in due course, submitted a proposal on how to liquidate the remnant of the conspiratorial center. . . .

The whole machinery started moving again. Seven more trials followed: the so-called Svermova group, the economists

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(Goldman), the so-called Committee of Trotskyists (Vlk), the Slovak bourgeois nationalists (Husak), members of the security services (Zavodsky), the army (Drgac) and, lastly, the staff of the ministry of foreign affairs (Goldstuecker, Richard Slansky). In addition to these big trials, a number of individual trials were held (those of J. Srnrkovsky, E. Gutrata, V. Navy, and others). . . .

These trials took place after the death of Gottwald, when the Political Secre- tariat consisted of A. Zapotocky, V. Si- roky, I. Dolansky, A. Cepicka, K. Baci- lek, A. Novotny, and V. Kopecky.

It was not until 1954 that the wave of political trials came to an end, trials that made a lasting impact on the whole fabric of Czechoslovak society and continue to cast their shadow over it to this day.

‘Trtn POLITICAL TRIALS AND THE PRESENT DAY’

Excerpts from a postinvasion article by Karel Kaplati, printed in the February 13, 1969 issue of Doba, a new weekly publication of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

. . . .

Not only was the political system tm- able to prevent the start of the political trials, but it actually took an active part in launching them. This active part consisted mainly in the fact that the regime created the mechanism to produce the political trials-political bodies, the state security services, and [the ministry of] justice participated in the fabrication of the political trials, each of these groups by a different method. This mechanism was able to create ever-new conditions for its existence and for preserving a special, authoritative position within the political system. It influenced the system,

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stimulated its negative aspects, and was one of the factors hindering the removal of those aspects. , . . The political trials helped in a remarkable way to create the political atmosphere of their time, an atmosphere marked by fear of expressing one’s views and by suspicion. Such an atmosphere naturally stifled every form of democratic expression and created conditions which increased the political impotence of the citizen. . . . The security services “manipulated” the political leadership as well as the administration of justice and took part in manipulating the citizens.

As a result, the citizens believed that the trials were just; and not only that: they actually turned from passive resig- nation at the horrors of these trials to an active support of them. The “political activity” organized and directed against the unjustly accused was turned into a mass psychosis in which frequent and loud demands for capital punishment were to be heard. This activity was in- humane and was in conflict with the meaning and purposes of socialism. It grew out of lies and misused thousands of honest and trusting citizens. This was one of the causes of the future social crisis, because the discovery of truth turned confidence into mistrust of both individuals and policies.

. . . .

The political trials left little freedom of movement for political thought. Politi- cal developments could be perceived only through special “spectacles.” Every- thing was seen from the angle of the enemy’s activities and his agencies, while the views of the social classes, the demands of the nations and nationalities, and often even the recommendations of the trade unions, if they were not in harmony with the ideas of the political leadership or the Stalirdst pattern, were

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Thoughts about the political trials