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The Memory and Legacy of KatynBy: Casey Nemecek
International Studies ThesisApril 2010
Table of Contents
Introduction.........................................................................................................................3
Chapter I: The Origins of Katyn..........................................................................................9
Chapter II: The Search for Answers..................................................................................20
Chapter III: The Truth and Identity...................................................................................34
Conclusion.........................................................................................................................40
Map of the Special Camps.................................................................................................42
Bibliography......................................................................................................................43
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Introduction
Few events unite a country more than a communal sense of loss. Bitter political
rivalries come to a halt as the nation mourns the victims of unforeseen atrocities.
Community organizations arrange commemorative events, so that people can grieve the
loss together. As time passes, the memory of the tragic event may become engrained in
the nation’s sense of self through national days of mourning, monuments, or memorial
sites. All these methods can and will lose meaning, however, if the memory is not
maintained.
A memory is not constant. It exists concurrently in the past, present, and future. It
reflects past experiences, present realities, and future expectations. It varies among
individuals, small groups, and nations. Despite all this, memory has a powerful ability to
unite a group if it embeds itself in its self-identification. For this reason, memory has
always played an important, if underlining, role of group formation, whether religious or
political.
This paper seeks to explore the origination and manipulation over time of one
memory in particular, which continues to influence relations between Poland and Russia:
the Katyn Forest Massacre of 1940. It divides time into three distinct periods, analyzing
the role the memory plays in Polish identity in each. It will begin by recounting the
events leading up to the massacre. Who massacred whom? When? Where? Why? The
basic facts are critical to reach an understanding of how the memory has been used by
particular groups over time. Second, it brings the discussion to the search for answers (or
lack thereof) conducted by the Poles and the international community. Here it will also
discuss the initial discovery of the mass graves in Russia by the invading German Nazi
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army in 1943 and the role of the international community in attributing to the sense of
victimization Poland felt at that moment. Finally, it brings the discussion to the recent
present and explores the impact the revelation of the truth had on relations between
Russia and Poland. It will present the history of the memory and its implications
regionally and internationally.
The discussion will incorporate a mixture of scholarly works and journalistic
accounts. Given the evolution of the formation of the memory, dates of sources are
particularly important. It relies heavily on three sources in particular. The first being the
international collaboration of Anna Cienciala, Natalia Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski
to compile and discuss the issue of Katyn through the extensive use of primary sources.
Their publication, Katyn, A Crime without Punishment, was released in 2007 and is a part
of the Annals of Communism. Second, George Sanford’s now out of print monograph,
Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, Truth, Justice and Memory approaches the issue
of Katyn from a less objective and distanced approach than Katyn, A Crime without
Punishment. Instead, Sanford discusses at length the role the demand for truth and justice
has complicated the Katyn affair. Finally, Janusz Zawodny’s Death in the Forest,
originally published in 1962, proved useful and meaningful more than fifty years later.
The mixture of all these different sources allowed for a unique perspective on the story of
Katyn.
Poland has experienced loss after loss over the last four hundred years, leading
many observers of its tumultuous history to consider the state the martyr of Europe, a
victim of the ill will of other states. Most of the blame for its history falls on the Russian
Federation, especially since its predecessor, the Soviet Union, forbade public
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acknowledgement or discussion about significant national tragedies. Instead of
suppressing the events, the enforced silence of yesterday has created a more outspoken
public today. Memories of past events, centuries old, contribute to the tenuous relations
between Poland and Russia today.
A thinly veiled animosity, spurred on by propaganda efforts, contributes to a
mutual history of distrust in Russia and Poland. Both nations have feared the other as a
direct threat to survival from the 1600s to present day. International sympathy has often
fallen on the side of Poland, the nation that had been denied the right of sovereignty for
centuries, but, in the case of relations between Russia and Poland, both states have taken
on the role of aggressor, invader, and terrorizer.
This work seeks to emphasize the varying nature of memory over time: how it
becomes active or passive depending primarily on the contemporary political situations.
The memory of Katyn, like the memory of any other mass tragedy, has played an
important part in the identity formation of the affected people. It presents an account of
the Katyn massacres from the viewpoint of on the use and misuse of memory, instead of
focusing on the justifiability and fairness of the actors involved.
Seventy years have passed since the death of 20,000 Polish officers during a
series of executions that have come to be collectively referred to as the Katyn Forest
Massacre. The massacre occurred during one of the most violent and destructive times in
modern history: World War II. Never before had people been exposed to widespread
violence and hatred so intensely. Firebombing, concentration camps, and atomic
weaponry all contributed to the irreversible transformation of the landscape and
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composition of villages, cities, and states, particularly in Europe. Decades after the dust
of the war settled, questions linger. What does it all mean? Why did this happen? The
survivors began to reconstruct their lives, yet the memories of the horrific experiences of
war remained with them. Few memories have remained as ingrained in a nation’s sense
of self-identity, however, as the Katyn Forest Massacre to the Poles.
The Katyn Forest is located approximately two hundred and fifty miles south-
west of Moscow and thirty miles from the Belarusian border. The name refers to the site
of the Germans’ original discovery of a mass grave in the Katyn forest, but now it has
come to represent the larger, more widespread event of the Soviet NKVD execution of
22,000 Polish officers from five different camps in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.
Captured during the Soviet army’s invasion of Poland in September 1939, almost all the
officers had been executed in an effort to ‘clear out’ the camps by the end of March 1940.
The officers’ families had heard no news about the fate of their loved ones for
three whole years, until the invading Nazi army discovered the gravesite at Katyn in
1943. From that point on, uncertainty surrounded the fate of the Polish officers. Shortly
after a German radio station announced the discovery of the officers, blaming their deaths
on the Soviet Union, the Allied powers and the Soviet Union in particular countered the
Nazi’s claim by declaring it a “Hilterite slanderous fake”1 aimed at undermining Allied
unity. The Polish families were caught in the middle of the international crossfire of
ideology and realpolitik. The families’ need for closure was overlooked for the sake of
international relations until 1992 when Boris Yeltsin, president of the new Russia, made
1 Raymond Daniell, “Polish-Soviet Rift Seen as Nazi Work” New York Times, April 27, 1943 p5.
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the decision to share the Soviet execution order of the Polish officers to the Polish
president, Lech Wałęsa.
Tense relations between the governments of Russia and Poland have persisted
over the last eighteen years. Although general knowledge about the events has increased,
some questions and misunderstandings remained unaddressed. Most importantly, for
example, the exact number of dead is uncertain, though most scholars place the number at
approximately 22,000 men. Additionally, disagreements over the labeling of the
executions continue to produce heated debates. Finally, the reason behind Josef Stalin’s
order to execute is unfulfilling. Whether considered an act of revenge for Russian
soldiers’ deaths in WWI, an attempt to weaken (successfully) the staunchly anti-
communist Polish state, or a consequence of an insecure Party system, which worried
incessantly about counter-revolutionary elements, the sheer number of dead, cover-up,
and the consequent controversy make the Katyn Forest Massacre a truly
incomprehensible crime.
Over the last eighteen years, actors in both Russia and Poland have taken strides
both big and small towards reconciliation of their shared historical past. April 2010 marks
a significant turning point in Russian-Polish relations, as the two countries came together
to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the massacre and cope with a national
tragedy—the death of the Polish President Lech Kaczynski and ninety-five other crew
members and influential actors in Polish society while en route to the Katyn gravesite.
Their death has allowed renewed discussion of the current issues surrounding the Katyn
events and a re-evaluation of the time-hardened stereotypes created by both the Russians
and the Poles of one another.
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This work has come together at a moment in history when the political conflict
surrounding Katyn appears to be at the brink of resolution. The outpouring of sympathy
and grief from Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and
significant segments of the Russian public has introduced a new emotional layer into the
Katyn equation. Instead of remaining a source of political contention, Russian displays of
sympathy have helped alleviate many of the residual tensions between the two countries.
As former president, Aleksander Kwasniewski remarked to one reporter, “The main
contribution of Lech Kaczynski to Russian-Polish relations was in death. The very human
response by Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev to the tragedy—and the symbolism of Katyn—
creates a new chance for Polish Russian relations. The problem is almost solved.”2 Time
has proved, however, that Katyn has become an indelible mark in history. Even if the
tension it has caused between Russia and Poland dissipates, its legacy will continue to be
felt. Therefore, it is imperative for scholars to continue investigating the history of Katyn,
its origins, and present manifestations, which is what this thesis hopes to achieve.
2 “Poland Mourns, but Some Look Ahead to Elections” New York Times April 18, 2010.
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Chapter I: The Origins of Katyn
Today, few holes remain in the story about the last year in the life of the
imprisoned Polish officers; however, as recently as twenty years ago, doubts lingered and
haunted the families of the victims. This section aims to provide a summarized
compilation of current available accounts of the events leading up the mass executions in
order to establish a background, upon which the rest of the chapters will rest. It will
address the reasons for imprisonment, ongoing interrogations, overall conditions of the
camps, the decision to execute, and, finally, the executions themselves.
An Ancient Conflict
The origin of Russian-Polish conflict dates back centuries. Muscovy and Poland-
Lithuania presented themselves as formidable opponents, fighting continuously in order
to maintain control over the territories of today’s Baltic States. At various points in time,
both states acted as invaders. Notably, in 1612, the Poles invaded and seized Moscow.
The day the Muscovites succeeded in driving the Poles out of Moscow, November 4, is
still recognized as a national holiday, the Day of Unity, in Russia. By 1667, the
dominance of Poland-Lithuania began to flag due to an increasingly weakening central
command, poor policy decisions, internal uprisings in Ukraine, and external assaults and
threats from Sweden and Prussia.3 The scales rebalanced in favor of Russia in the 1700s,
as the empire slowly annexed the lands of Poland through a series of partitions in 1772,
1793, and 1795.4 These occurred after decades of increasing political dominance on the
3 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940-Truth, Justice and Memory. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005. Pg 5.4 Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski. Katyn: A Crime without Punishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007, pg 2
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part of Russia, who viewed its intrusions as the natural course of action, but which Poles
naturally met with opposition and noncooperation.
From the Russians standpoint, Poland embodied everything the Soviet Union and
the communist regime stood against—an elite landed class, an aristocratic system, and
the development of a perceived fascist governmental regime headed by Józef Piłsudski
after its independence from the Russian Empire in 1921. The Soviet prison guards
considered the officers Pans, nobles.5 Furthermore, many of the Soviet guards also
carried personal memories or shared stories of the Polish treatment of the Soviet
prisoners-of-war during the Polish-Soviet War, in which an estimated 16,000 to 20,000
prisoners died.6
From the Polish standpoint, Russia represented a direct threat to the independence
of the state. Before the Russian Empire eventually incorporated it, the Poland-Lithuanian
Commonwealth acted as an impressive resister to Russia’s imperialist tendencies. After it
ultimately succumbed to Russian control, the Poles staged a series of revolts with the aim
of regaining independence. They only fully succeeded in 1921 after a peace treaty with
the Soviet Union was signed to solidify Poland’s eastern border.
The Outbreak of WWII
The more recent history of Katyn begins with the foreign ministers Vyacheslav
Molotov of the USSR and Joachim von Ribbentrop of Germany signing the now
infamous Treaty of Non-Aggression on August 23, 1939. In it, the two powers publically
5 In reality, by 1939, only a small percentage of officers came from a noble origin. The vast majority of prisoners came from rural or urban working families, or from the intelligentsia, members of the then impoverished gentry. Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 25.6 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 263
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pledged to “refrain from any violence, any aggressive action, or any attack on each other
either separately or in conjunction with other powers.” Secretly, a supplementary
protocol was added, expressing the understanding reached between the powers as to the
territorial division of Eastern Europe. In regards to Poland, the powers agreed, “the
border between the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR shall approximately
follow the line of the Narew, Wisla, and San Rivers,” thereby essentially dividing Poland
in half.7 Privately, the foreign ministers agreed that their represented states would invade
Poland concurrently, in order to ensure a swift and definitive victory.
On September 1, 1939, five German armies began their invasion of Poland and
gained ground quickly. Abandoned by allies Britain and France (who declared war on
Germany three days after the invasion, but failed to send troops as per the signed treaty),
Poland’s armies could not sustain themselves against the might of the modernized
German armies for long. As Warsaw lost control of growing swaths of country, the USSR
interceded, claiming that the collapse of the Polish government and the surrender of
Warsaw necessitated the USSR to invade to maintain its own security. In a note handed
to the Polish ambassador to the USSR, Wacław Grzybowski, the People’s Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, Viktor Molotov, prefaced this decision with the statement that “left to its
own devices and bereft of leadership, Poland has become a fertile ground for all kinds of
accidents and surprises, which could pose a threat to the USSR.”8 Furthermore, such
lawlessness obliged the USSR to protect its “kindred” Ukrainian and Belorussian
7 Anna M. Cienciala, “Secret Supplementary Protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union,” Katyn, pg 41. 8 Anna M. Cienciala, “Soviet Government Note Handed to the Polish Ambassador in the USSR, Wacław Grzybowski,” Katyn, pg 44.
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minorities living in Poland. The USSR never officially declared war on Poland, since, in
its view, Poland no longer existed as a state with which to negotiate.
In response to the invasion of five hundred thousand Soviet troops on September
17, 1939, the Commander in Chief of the Polish Army, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz,
ordered all units to not engage the Soviet troops (unless the Soviet troops initiated the
attack) and instead to retreat into Hungary or Romania. Not aware of the private
agreement between Germany and the USSR, Śmigły-Rydz concentrated most of the
troops in western Poland to defend against the German army, leaving few forces in
eastern Poland to defend against the Soviet Army. The Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza
(Polish Frontier Protection Corps-KOP), a lightly armed Polish division stationed on the
eastern border stood at around 200,000 troops to the Soviets’ 500,000. Retreating troops
from the west augmented the forces, but the Soviet’s superior numbers prevailed.9
Uncertain of the true motives of the Soviets, some Polish units surrendered, expecting
them to take up the battle against the encroaching German army. Others preferred to
surrender to the Soviets instead of the Germans.10 The order not to engage and the
decision of units to surrender resulted in the large number of Polish prisoners brought to
the Soviet camps after the conflict ended on September 28, 1939. As the prisoners were
being transported, the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union incorporated the claimed
Polish lands into the USSR after signing another treaty with Germany solidifying the new
9 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 21.10 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 20.
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borders between Germany and the USSR.11 Poland became a republic within the Soviet
Union, subject to Soviet laws.
The casualties of the war remain undetermined. In a presentation to the Supreme
Soviet on October 31, foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov stated the ‘liberation’ of
eastern Poland resulted in the death of 737 and wounding of 1862 Soviet men. Polish
historians, in contrast, put the number of lives lost higher, up to 3,000 killed and 8,000-
10,000 wounded. On the Polish side, scholars estimate 3,000-7,000 men were killed and
another 20,000 were wounded. It is further estimated that the Soviet military and
Ukrainian nationalist forces executed 1,000-2,500 without a trial.12 For example, a grave
of eighteen high-ranking KOP officers was found outside Shatsk, Ukraine in 2002.
Although Ukrainian and Belarusian Red Army Military Councils were sanctioned to
ratify death sentences for counter-revolutionary crimes committed by either civilians or
former personnel of the Polish Army, no record of any trial or prosecution has yet
surfaced in regards to these eighteen officers.13
Imprisonment of Officers
Breaking with tradition, the prisoners the Soviet army took did not fall under the
command of the military, but under that of the NKVD, the People’s Commissariat of
Internal Affairs. At the time, the Soviet military was not in a position to accept large
number of incoming prisoners, whereas the NKVD had already established the extensive
11 This action coincided with a mass deportation of Poles, whom the Soviet leadership deemed enemies of the people and counterrevolutionary elements. Particularly vulnerable were the land-owning class, which the Russian Revolutions and Civil War had already weakened considerably.Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 24. 12 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 23.13 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 21.
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Gulag system.14 Confusion surrounded the status of the prisoners, partly because neither
the Soviet Union nor Poland officially declared a state of war.
The NKVD arranged three special camps in western Russia for the imprisoned
Polish officers at Kozelsk, Ostashkov, and Starobelsk, outside of the city of Smolensk.
The prisoners traveled packed in cattle cars with little access to food and water. Upon
arrival to the camps, they were further separated by rank. The highest-ranking officers
were placed in the Starobelsk camp; police officers, intelligence agents, prison guards,
and members of the KOP in Ostashkov; and the rest of the officers were sent to
Kozelsk.15
These special camps were not designed to be death camps in the same sense as
those designed by Nazi Germany. Their sanitary and health conditions were poor, a
reality made worse by the lack of good food and water. At first, the major issue in the
camps was overcrowding. Shortly following the Soviet invasion of Poland, the camps
held anywhere from 6,000-12,000 prisoners each, but by the time of execution, the
population leveled at around 4,000 men each in November 1939 because of NKVD
efforts to stabilize population levels. Non-officers and prisoners captured outside Soviet-
controlled eastern Poland were released or sent to other prisons or work camps. A
combination of the de-population and the own efforts of the prisoners resulted in better
standards of living as time passed. Food rations remained unsatisfactory, due to its
increased scarcity following the outbreak of the Finnish-Soviet War and the theft on the
part of some guards of food supplies before they reached the camp kitchens. Considering
the poor food quality, illnesses plagued the prisoners. Influenza, digestion problems, and
14Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, 26.15 Ibid 27.
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skin diseases were the most widespread. Although debate continues over the number who
died before the start of the massacre, Polish reports claim that only seventy prisoners
died.16 The concentration of the officers and the survivable living conditions lend
credence to the belief that the Soviet officials did not intend these camps to be the reason
for the prisoners’ death. Instead, the Soviets used the camps to interrogate and
indoctrinate the prisoners, in order to determine who would be willing to fight under the
Soviet flag.
In an October 3, 1939 directive to the local NKVD leadership of the camps, Beria
outlined the tasks regarding the officials’ roles toward the prisoners. He declared their
immediate objective to be two-fold. First, they had to uncover counterrevolutionary
elements, arrest the incriminated, or recruit those who proved willing to advance the
Soviet cause. Second, the officials were to maintain the security and seclusion of the
camps so to prevent “the possible utilization of POWs of individuals among the camp
service personnel for criminal purposes (transmission of messages and letters, bribery for
the purpose of escape)….”17 Moreover, the local officials were to remain subordinate to
central command in Moscow.
By December 1, 1939,18 the local NKVD agents reported on the camp conditions,
prisoner moods, and the propaganda efforts in action in the Kozelsk camp in particular.
On the political and moral condition of the prisoners of war, they report that patriotic and
feeling religious devotion remained strong despite efforts of deterrence. In the camp,
16 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 56.17 Anna M. Cienciala, “Beria’s Directive on Operational-Cheka Work among POWs in NKVD Camps,” Katyn, pg 67. At the time of this document, correspondences between prisoners and family were forbidden. 18 This date is not confirmed, but document could not be sent before this date.
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Soviet newspapers circulated in order to provide prisoners with information and
knowledge (albeit carefully selected information and knowledge) about the world outside
the camps. The workers of the Political Section of the camp claimed to have arranged
talks and readings with the aim of explaining the political situation. Film screenings
occurred regularly, and according to the report, an orchestra and choral group performing
songs of the Soviet Union were formed. Radio pervaded the camp as well, blasting Soviet
slogans to all the prisoners.19 According to George Sanford, specialist in Polish and East
European studies, the imprisoned officers only “laughed off Soviet attempts to
indoctrinate them or reduce them to the Soviet level of obedience.”20 Their national,
patriotic, and religious values and behaviour as well as their individualism and
autonomous self-organisation were a continuous affront to NKVD ideas of camp
discipline, resulting in an increased divide between Polish officers and camp guards.
Until October 20, 1939, the prisoners were forbidden to correspond with family or
friends, despite international conventions stating the contrary. This decision to allow
correspondence after October benefited both the prisoners, who desired to communicate
their fate to their loved ones, and the NKVD, who used the letters as a means to gain
access to the thoughts of the prisoners. Even with the knowledge that their letters were
being censured; the prisoners in the Starobelsk camp alone sent out 50,000 and received
back 110,000 letters up until the month of their execution.21 When communications from
the camps suddenly ceased, families pressured representative of the Polish government-
in-exile to determine their loved ones fate. Despite the use of official and unofficial
19 Anna M. Cienciala, “NKVD UPV Report to Vasily Chernyshov on Condition in Kozelsk Camp,” Katyn, pg 84.20 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 85.21 Ibid 58.
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means, the Soviet command provided no relevant information. The story of the Polish
officers has been pieced together more thoroughly after 1990.
Execution
On March 5, 1940, six months after the capture of the prisoners, Beria issued a
top-secret memorandum to Joseph Stalin regarding their future. It suggested the
examination of all the officers’ case files without informing the men of the charges
against them or the decision made about them. To the counterrevolutionary elements in
the camps, the NKVD leadership assigned to the task of ‘cleaning out the camps’,
Vsevolod Merkulov, Bogdan Kobulov, and Leonid Bashtakov, were to “apply to them
the supreme punishment, [execution by] shooting.”22 Thus, the process of exterminating
22,000 Polish prisoners was set into motion.
The execution methods differed depending on location (the Katyn Forest being
only one of five gravesites), but all maintained utmost secrecy. Little is known about the
exact methods of executions, since few eyewitnesses came forward, and none remained
consistently reliable. Although efforts to exhume and rebury the bodies continue, the
number of lost officers and bodies does not yet correspond.
Although the document ordering the execution of all the Polish captives in the
five special camps states that the officers proved a threat to the Soviet state, as they
continued their ‘counter-revolutionary’ activities despite NKVD efforts to indoctrinate
and convince them otherwise. In a series of interviews, camp administrators determined
that “only about 70 PoWs declared themselves willing to remain in the USSR rather than
22 Anna M. Cienciala, “Beria Memorandum to Joseph Stalin Proposing the Execution of the Polish Officers, Gendarmes, Police, Military Settlers, and Others in the Three Special POW Camps, Along with Those Held in the Prisons of the Western Regions of Ukraine and Belorussia,” Katyn, pg 118.
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to be repatriated to the West, through a neutral power, or even to German-occupied
Poland.”23 The remaining 21,000 captives maintained their fierce loyalty and devotion to
the Polish state and their religion.
After the decision to ‘clear out’ the camps was made, a total of one-hundred-and-
sixty men avoided execution.24 They were the last to leave the camps, watching their
comrades leave in groups before them, supposedly on their way back to Poland. In the
beginning of April, camp guards began informing the officers of their release and ability
return home shortly. In the Ostashkov camps, the guards staged a grand farewell
ceremony for the inmates. One survivor described the event, “In order to give a more
festive air to the departure, the camp authorities organized a band to play as the convoys
left. This produced an excellent effect on the prisoners.”25 Although the true motivation
behind such a grand send-off remains unknown, it did allow the surviving officers believe
that their comrades had been released and not executed when Radio Berlin announced the
discovery of mass graves outside Smolensk. After the camps were ‘cleared out,’ the
matter was naturally silenced. No official, no matter his position, seemed to know
definitively why more than 20,000 men had suddenly stopped communicating with their
loved ones. The families were left without answers until three years later, when the first
graves were discovered.
23 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 85. 24 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 114. 25 Ibid 123.
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Chapter II: The Search for Answers
A breakthrough for the Poles’ search for answers about the fate of their missing
officers came after the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, thereby breaking off all
previous ties between the two states. The Soviet Union joined sides with the Allied
forces, which consequently led to the re-establishment of relations with the Polish
government-in-exile situated in London. This section will discuss the efforts of various
Polish diplomats to discover the whereabouts of the officers, the German discovery of the
mass graves at Katyn, and the international response to the German and Soviet accounts
of the Katyn graves.
1940-1943
On July 30, 1941, General Władysław Sikorski, representing the Polish
government-in-exile, and Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain Ivan Maisky signed a
diplomatic agreement, stating that “the Soviet-German Treaties of 1939 relative to
territorial changes in Poland have lost their validity….”and granting “amnesty to all
Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the
U.S.S.R., either as prisoners-of-war or on other adequate grounds.” 26 The aim here was to
allow the Polish government to regroup their army to join the fight against the Nazis as a
strong, united front. The new army would serve under the military direction of the Soviet
Union; however, Poland and the USSR had different views about the role the developing
army would play.27 Sikorski believed that “the Poles would be allowed to freely organize
a 150 000-strong army which would become a significant political force favouring a
26 J.K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962. Pg 6.27 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 125.
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balanced Polish-Soviet relationship within the Great Power alliance,” which Great Britain
and the United States would reward with territorial security against the desires of the
Soviet Union following the war.28 Lavrentiy Beria, on the other hand, considered the
Polish commanders’ loyalty fell with Great Britain and not the Soviet Union, and treated
them accordingly.29 As the Polish units grew, the absence of the 22,000 men became
startlingly clear, since General Anders “needed officers badly, but officers rarely
appeared. Of fourteen Polish generals captured by the Soviet Army, only two appeared,
in a state of exhaustion’ the remaining twelve were missing.”30 Furthermore, the missing
officers represented approximately forty-five percent of the Polish Land Army Officers’
Corps.31 Soon, Anders learned that the path to the missing men ended at the camps in
western Russia and that the families had not heard any news since mid-April 1940.
Possessed with this knowledge, Anders another other high-ranking officers and
diplomats used all means necessary and available to discover the whereabouts of the men,
but at step, Soviet officials met them with denial or dismissal. As Janusz Zawodny,
author of the 1962 authoritative account of the Katyn massacre, states, “Nobody knew
[about the officers], including the Soviet authorities, who refused even to guess. Polish
inquiries were met either with silence or evasive answers.”32 The Polish officers and
diplomats submitted more than fifty formal inquiries to the Soviet Government and
exhausted their informal networks searching for answers as well, resulting only in the
increasing irritation of the Soviet government towards the persistent Poles. Zawodny
describes the following scene in his account:
28 Ibid 126.29 Ibid 126.30 J.K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest, pg 6.31 Ibid 9.32 Ibid 7.
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General Sikorski decided to talk to Stalin personally and flew from London to Moscow. The two leaders met at the Kremlin on December 3, 1941. To the persistent question, “Where are the men?” Stalin replied, “They escaped.” General Anders, who was also present, asked, “Where could they escape to?” “To Manchuria,” Stalin replied. Though Sikorski had flown thousands of miles over enemy-controlled territory to reach Moscow this was all the information he obtained.33
As the Soviet armies proved their military necessity, the denials of knowledge about the
missing men became even more adamant and dismissive.
Soviet denial caught the attention of the Allied powers as well. In one case in
1942, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Admiral William H. Standley,
inquired after the fate of the missing men and questioned the Soviet’s commitment to the
July agreement of a full amnesty and release of Soviet detained Polish prisoners-of-war.
Vice-premier Andrej Vyshinsky responded eventually responded with a curt statement of
“there are too many people interesting themselves in Polish politics.”34 The growing
importance of the Soviet Union to the Allies’ war efforts meant little more was done to
put pressure on the Soviet government to reveal the whereabouts of the men. The Polish
government’s requests regarding the post-war territorial division of Poland and the fate of
the missing officers was increasingly becoming a nuisance to the Allied forces.
German Discovery of Mass Graves at Katyn
By the time Radio Berlin announced the discovery of mass graves in the Katyn
Forest in April 1943, the Soviet Union had already solidified its dominance over the
Poles. The announcement provided the opportunity for Stalin to break off diplomatic
relations with the Polish government-in-exile, thereby further jeopardizing the
33 J.K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest, pg 10.34 Ibid 10.
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government’s relationship with Great Britain and the United States.35 Both Germany and
the Soviet Union succeeded in their efforts to weaken the Polish government’s political
influence. More than ever before, discovering the truth about the missing officers became
linked to the identity formation of the Polish state. Forty-five percent of its military
command and manpower appeared to be eliminated, leaving the already weak state in a
difficult situation. They needed to know what happened to the men, but pursing an active
investigation meant agitating relations with the Great Powers. The need to win the war
superseded the needs of grieving families.
When the news of the German announcement regarding the mass graves spread,
the Polish government was faced with a “shocked and outraged Polish public in German
Poland, in the West, and, most importantly, in the Polish Army formed in the USSR.”36 In
response, Polish defense minister, General Marian Kukiel, issued a communiqué
outlining the previous fruitless efforts to determine the whereabouts of the missing
officers, and the understanding that almost all the missing men were linked to three
camps in western Russia, concluding that “Poles were accustomed to the lies of German
propaganda and understood its goal, but in view of the detailed information about the
graves near Smolensk, it was necessary for an investigation to be conducted by a
competent international body like the [International Red Cross].”37 Although the
communiqué presented unemotional and unbiased reasoning, the Great Powers decried
the Poles request to the International Red Cross placed almost simultaneously with that of
Germany. When Poland refused to rescind its request to the IRC, Stalin severed
35 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 127.36 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 217.37 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 218.
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diplomatic ties with Poland on April 25, 1943, forcing Sir Winston Churchill and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to choose between the two.
Newspapers in the United States covered the diplomatic rift extensively, focusing
on the poor and unfortunate decision making of the Polish government and the effect the
tense relations would have on the war effort. They presented the Polish government as
having fallen for the lies of Nazi Germany’s propagandists, “slid to the path of accord
with Hitler’s government,” and adopted “a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union.” 38
These accounts naturally mirrored the attitudes of the Allied governments as they
negotiated relations with Poland. They emphasized the rift as a test of the Allied unity
and the need “to stick together at all costs until the war is won.”39 Debates over the
German news could not divide the Allied powers since they knew “that they must hang
together, or they will hang separately.”40 They asserted that the “Nazis have capitalized
long-existing fears of Russia on the part of both Poles and Finns,”41 and that not enough
solid facts existed to verify the German claims. The followed the staunch Soviet line that
the dead were “Polish prisoners-of-war who in 1941 were engaged in construction work
west of Smolensk and who…fell into the hands of the German-Fascist hangmen….”42
This stance against the desire of the Polish government for clarification and investigation
would continue until the Russian revelation of the truth behind the massacre in 1990.
When the Soviet Union did not grant the International Red Cross permission to
perform an investigation on the graves, the German government invited an International
38 Raymond Daniell, “Polish-Soviet Rift Seen as Nazi Work” New York Times, April 27, 1943 p5.39 “A Test of Our Unity,” New York Times, April 30, 1943, pg 20.40 “Russia’s Break with Poland,” New York Times, April 27, 1943, pg 22.41 Callenders, Harold. “Washington Voices ‘Regret’ at Break” New York Times, April 27, 1943, pg 5.42 J.K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest, pg 15.
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Commission to study the findings independently in a compelling effort to prove Soviet
guilt to a wary Allied audience, thereby weakening the Great Powers unity. Scholars and
specialists in forensic medicine arrived in the Katyn Forest from twelve different
countries (including neutral Switzerland) in Europe from April 28-30, 1943. The
Germans granted them complete control over the investigation efforts, from the bodies
chosen to autopsy to conducting interviews with local Soviet citizens. A team from the
Polish Red Cross from the German-occupied territory conducted a concurrent
investigation. Unbeknownst to the Germans, several members of the Polish Underground
Movement accompanied the team to gather data and see for themselves the veracity of
the Germans’ claims.43 Moreover, some German prisoners-of-war from the Allied nations
arrived at the gravesites. The goal of introducing these investigative and observational
groups into Katyn was to determine when exactly the execution took place. More credible
evidence supporting a 1940 execution date undermined Soviet counter-accusations of
German culpability and a late-1941 execution date. In general, the reports resulting from
the aforementioned investigations and observations expressed their hesitation to trust the
Nazi propaganda machine, but acknowledged that based on the available evidence, the
1940 execution date was the only logical conclusion possible.
The Burdenko Commission
The Soviet Army succeeded in liberating the Smolensk region on September 25,
1945. Nikolai Burdenko, chief surgeon for the Army and at times personal physician for
Stalin and Beria, arrived at Katyn four months later in order to lead the Special State
Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Circumstances of the Shooting of
43 Ibid 18.
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Polish Officer Prisoners by the German-Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest. The
commission’s members were all Soviet citizens; no foreign medical representatives were
invited the assist the investigation, as had been the case with the German investigation.
The report focused on discrediting the findings of the previous investigative
bodies. It declared that its investigators had discovered documents on the officers dating
from as recently as June 20, 1941,44 corroborating the Soviet story that the invading
German Army captured the Polish prisoners while they were occupied with building
roads outside Smolensk.45 They claimed that the bodies they exhumed and examined did
not show advanced levels of decomposition, in accordance with a later execution date.46
Finally, it concluded that the German investigators “dug up an extremely insignificant
number of corpses,” and the similarity between “the method of execution of the Polish
POWs and the method of execution of peaceful Soviet citizens and Soviet POWs that was
widely practiced by the German-Fascist authorities on the temporarily occupied territory
of the USSR.”47 Altogether, it enforced the Soviet declarations that the German claims
were only creations of German propagandists, determined to undermine Allied unity in
their efforts to win the war.
The conclusions of the Burdenko Commission, as the report came to be known,
would be the authoritative account on the Katyn Forest Massacre in the Soviet Union
until 1990. The governments of United States and Great Britain accepted the findings as
well, suppressing contradictory evidence in the hopes of maintaining good relations with
the government of the Soviet Union.
44 Anna M. Cienciala, “The Burdenko Commission Report (Excerpts),” Katyn, pg 320.45 J.K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest, pg 50.46 Anna M. Cienciala, “The Burdenko Commission Report (Excerpts),” Katyn, pg 321.47 Anna M. Cienciala, “The Burdenko Commission Report (Exports),” Katyn, pg 322.
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The Memory of Katyn Inside the Soviet Union
After the war, debate about Katyn reached a point of stagnation. Poland became
incorporated into the Soviet Union and eventually adopted a communist government,
which was essentially subservient to that of Moscow. The findings of the Burdenko
Commission became the only truth, and then Katyn gradually ceased to exist in the public
sphere. The name was erased from maps and other publications. Strict guidelines existed
outlining the manner in which Katyn should be discussed if it became unavoidable to
mention. Importantly, despite the denunciation of other Stalinist crimes in Nikita
Khrushchev’s 1956 speech, Katyn was not listed. In 1973, the summary of the Burdenko
Commission in the Soviet Encyclopedia was omitted.48 Even though doubts still existed in
the minds of many of the affected families, few vessels to communicate their grief and
understand what happened were available
Despite the prohibition, many Poles still talked about the matter and endeavored
to discover more about the executions. Consequently, rumors ran rampant. Various
forged documents also surfaced claiming to establish Soviet guilt for the crime. For
example, one story describes a young Pole befriending Jakub Dzugashvili, the son of
Stalin, in a German prisoner of war camp. The anonymous Pole claimed that the son
confessed that the executions were “a government necessity.”49 Stories similar to this one
represent a public need to come to terms with the tragedy in the midst of an oppressive
air of uncertainty.
Andrzej Wajda’s film, Katyń depicts the confliction affecting the families of the
Polish officers. Wajda himself is the son of one of the missing officers, but the film is a 48 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 195.49 Ibid 149. The story was told by Jerzy Lewczewski to the US Congressional Committee investigating Katyn in the 1950s.
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work of fiction. In an interview found on the 2009 DVD release, Wajda describes his
motivation behind the creation of this momentous film. By mirroring the story of the
officers in the camps with that of the families they left behind, Wajda attempts to show
the effects of the crime and the consequent lie. In the interview, he describes how the war
changed people.
This thing you can’t wrap your head around. You know, just after that last war, we became completely different people. Who could have thought one can gas and incinerate millions of people? Who could have suspected 20,000 officers, intellectuals, who are useful in any war, even if only to be exchanged for some other prisoners of war, that they’d be murdered. You just couldn’t believe it. We are different people now.50
His film depicts the restlessness of the post-war generation, who had to live under the
very government that prevented the discovery of the truth behind the death of their loved
ones. One scene in the film shows a young man, a former partisan fighter, wishing to
enroll in the newly re-opened university. In his record, he reports that his father died in
the war in 1940 at Katyn, implying Soviet responsibility. The director of the university
reviewing his record explains that he cannot write that and recommends that he changes
the date to 1941. The young man responses angrily, “I must lie about my father?” to
which the director responds, “Be reasonable.”51 The young man refuses to sacrifice his
honor for the sake of conforming and leaves.
In 1980, as the social salience of nationalist and anti-Soviet organizations
expanded, one group in particular manipulated the memory of Katyn in order to further
its own political intentions. The Young Poland movement decried the Polish leader’s
continuous complacency in covering-up the truth about Katyn, describing them as an
50 Katyń. DVD. Directed by Andrzej Wajda. Port Washington, NY: E1 Entertainment U.S. LP, 2009.
51 Katyń. DVD, 2009.
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insult to the Polish nation. On April 8, 1980, forty years after the execution, the
movement’s leaders issued a statement declaring that Katyn remained “an important
symbol of all the Poles murdered and persecuted” during the Soviet invasion and
occupation of Poland. They asserted, “Real reconciliation with Russia could be achieved
only if Poland regained her sovereignty” and if the Russians could “accept the truth about
their historical relations which involved numerous ‘Polish wrongs at Russian hands.”52
Within these social circles, the victims of Katyn came to represent the Polish nation, The
Soviet apparatus silenced the proud and honorable men, as it silenced the suppressed
Polish nation.
Considering these conditions, the most progressive discussions about Katyn took
place outside its borders in communities of Polish emigrants, in Great Britain and the
United States particularly.
The Memory of Katyn Outside the Soviet Union
The issue of Katyn did not only affect the lives of citizens within the Soviet
Union. Émigré families also wanted to see some form of closure in regards to Katyn and
looked to their governments for help, but, as Anna Cienciala aptly observed in an
interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC), “there was always
something the British and U.S. governments wanted from Moscow that was more
important than justice for the Poles.”53 During the Cold War, the governments were
careful not to cause a stir in diplomatic relations for an ends that would not immediately
benefit them. This status quo did not prevent concerned citizens from attempting to create
their own sense of closure through commemoration of the events.
52 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 214. 53 “The Katyn Massacre: A crime without punishment” CBC News, April 7, 2010.
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The first major monument dedicated to the memory of those fallen in the Katyn
Forest was established in a cemetery outside of London in 1976. Interest in discovering
the truth behind Katyn had peaked in 1971 thanks to a reprint of Janusz Zawodny's Death
in the Forest, an account that, in many ways, broke the silence surrounding Katyn. In it,
he guides the reader through an account of Katyn removed from the propaganda back-
and-forth that had occurred during the Second World War. He provided a clear account,
using all the current information available to him, and showed how the evidence pointed
to Soviet guilt for the deaths and the international community’s responsibility for the
continuing cover-up. Newspapers, like the Times of London and the Daily Telegraph
carried reviews of the work, bringing its message to an even wider audience.
The increased interest led to the establishment of the Katyn Memorial Fund in
1972, which was devoted to the construction of a memorial to the victims of Katyn.
Designers of the monument intended for the inscription to read “Sumieni świata woła o
świadectwo prawdzie” (“The conscience of the world cries out for a testimony of the
truth”) and to mention 1940 as the year of execution.54 Inclusion of the year, however,
dismayed the current British government. At this time, the British Conservatives party
was using Katyn to undermine the respectability of the Labour party, who was in power
during the war and who was viewed to have had too friendly of relations with the Soviet
Union.55 Furthermore, the Soviet ambassador to London had been advised to “express the
Soviet expectation that the British Foreign Office would prevent the spread of
‘slanderous materials.’”56 The political repercussions (internally and externally) of
including the year proved too great to risk. Initial plans for construction of the monument 54 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 243.55 Ibid 242.56 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 242.
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in a cemetery of St. Luke’s Church in Chelsea were denied and the Fund supporters
looked for a new location in order to maintain the integrity of their project.
The Times of London carried a continuous debate in its Letters to the Editor section.
Many authors between 1972 and 1976 expressed their sympathy towards the Poles’
efforts. Mrs. Joyce Mendoza conveyed her wish to support the Katyn Memorial Fund’s
endeavors in the following letter to the editor in 1974:
It is sad to read the Poles regard themselves guests of our country after all these long years and not part of us. Perhaps they will permit us to share, with humility, their homage to the great and brave men of that dreadful massacre; thus, by demonstrating sympathy and sincerity we may help to banish their tragic sense of nostalgia and alienation.57
Julian St-John Brooks' letter appeared in the September 18, 1976 edition. In it, he decried
the British Foreign Office’s stance towards Katyn:
Sir, Is there anyone not excluding the anonymous Foreign Office spokesman […] who is not convinced that the Russians were responsible? There is no controversy here except in the minds of those who do not wish to see the truth. Any British Government which assists in concealing this truth dishonours not only itself but all of us as well.58
Messages like these reminded readers that the death of the Polish officers was not a
matter contained in the realm of international relations and politics, but affected
individuals and families as well. If the government was not willing to admit the truth
about Katyn, it should not prevent others from seeking their own form of closure.
Ultimately, the persistence of the supporters was rewarded and the monument was
unveiled on September 17, 1976 in the Gunnersbury Cemetery in West London. The
57 Joyce Mendoza, “The Katyn Memorial.” The Times, October 12, 1974, Letter to the Editor, pg 13.58 Julian St. John Brooks, “Official Attitudes to Katyn Memorial.” The Times, September 18, 1976, Letter to the Editor, pg. 13.
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black-granite obelisk of a monument stood 20 feet tall, engraved with the image of a
white eagle entangled with barbed wire, which symbolized the “continuing enslavement
of Poland.”59 The War Office forbade British officers to attend the opening ceremony in
full uniform in an effort to distance themselves from Soviet scrutiny of the event.60 The
Foreign Office reported a month later that it did not object to commemoration of the
Katyn victims, but rather to the motivation behind the events that extended beyond
honoring the dead. It claimed, “The memorial also bore the Polish national emblem in a
manner derogatory to the present Polish Government, with whom the Government had
good relations.”61 Governmental hesitation in Great Britain and the United States would
continue until the Russia Federation revealed the truth after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1990.
59 Diana Geddes, “Site Found in Cemetery for Katyn Memorial.” The Times, December 19, 1975, pg. 2.60 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 244.61 Staff Reporter. “Why Government Ignored the Katyn Ceremony.” The Times, October 12, 1976, pg 3.
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Chapter III: The Truth and Identity
Discussion about Katyn remained suppressed until Mikhail Gorbachev ushered in
a new era of glasnost and perestroika. These two policies marked the beginning of a
political and social turnaround, but they did not provide immediate shifts in politicians’
attitudes toward the Katyn issue. This section will discuss the prolonged process of the
Russian revelation of the truth about Katyn and the ways in which it has affected
relations with Poland.
Glasnost and the Demand for Truth
Even though the Soviet government strictly censured discussion about Katyn, it
failed to erase the topic completely from the minds of the Polish citizens. It bubbled
forcefully to the surface of public debate during the period of glasnost and liberalization
of the media throughout the Soviet Union in the late-1980s. The Soviet government
granted permission for a Joint Commission of Soviet-Polish Party Historians to
investigate the ‘blank spots’ in their mutual history in 1987.62 Although there was much
support for the Polish historians, the Soviet historians did not contribute much and the
Soviet archives remained closed. In the spring of 1989, Valentin Falin, head of the
International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, recognized
that “the Katyn affair was disturbing social peace in Poland,” in response to Polish
General Roman Paszkowski’s intention to gather an urn of soil from Katyn to rebury in
Warsaw and concerns about the ongoing Round Table talks.63 Favorable relations with
Poland were vital for a Soviet success to the talks. For that reason, several Soviet officials
62 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 246.63 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 197.
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decided that the best way to mend relations and regain a sense of trust with Poland would
be to admit the truth about Katyn.
Fifty years after the execution of 21, 857 Polish officers, the Soviet Union issued
a public declaration and apology, condemning the event as “one of the heaviest Stalinist
crimes.”64 The following day, April 14, 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev presented Polish
president Wojciech Jaruzelski with folders of documents pertaining to Katyn—NKVD
dispatches related to the prisoners, transportation lists, and a list of names more complete
than previous records.65 While the gesture was momentous, the effort was less than
sincere. Many pertinent documents were withheld, particularly the signed order for
execution in March 1940.
The Polish people wanted more and put pressure on its leaders to take action in
regards to Katyn. Bolesław Kulski, secretary of state in the Polish Foreign Ministry,
announced before the Sejm on September 30, 1989, several months before Gorbachev’s
release of some of the Katyn documents, “Once the full truth was revealed, the Polish
government could seek compensation for victims’ families and follow the trail of those
responsible for the crime.”66 Indeed, the government persisted in this aim, guaranteeing
Katyn would remain a sore spot in Polish-Russian relations until the issues of
compensation and full disclosure were resolved.
Aleksandr Yakovlev, an official and adviser to Gorbachev, encountered the key
document, ordering the execution, in December 1991 while searching through the
archives. Gorbachev, shortly thereafter, passed the document onto Boris Yeltsin, the
64 Ibid 199.65 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 252-253.66 Ibid 249.
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leader of the newly forming Russian Federation. He handed a folder of documents to
Yeltsin with a caveat, “I’m afraid they can lead to international complications. However,
it is up to you to decide.”67 Yeltsin ultimately decided to pass the documents along to the
new Polish president, Lech Wałęsa, on October 14, 1992, thereby bringing a tumultuous
chapter in the history of Katyn to a close. Although this gesture brought a sense closure
to the families of the victims, the move could be interpreted as a grander political move
than social one. By proving Soviet guilt, Yeltsin and Polish politicians aimed to discredit
the weakening Communist party in both countries. In fact, when charges of criminality
and genocide appeared before the Constitutional Court in 1992, Professor Felix Rudinskii
defended the Communist Party, declaring that there was no way to certify the signed
documents had not been falsified, but was a slanderous attack against the Party.68 As
always, the issue of Katyn was bound up in politics and political power.
With the perpetrators of the Katyn crime determined once and for all, focus
shifted to the issue of uncovering the remaining gravesites of the officers from the four
other camps, tracking down and interrogating surviving witnesses and participants of the
crime, and compensation for the families of the victims. Polish historians still sought to
fill in the remaining blank spots in the story. They were aware that not all the pertinent
documents were available to them, especially those concerning not the crime itself, but
the consequent cover-up. The search for answers continued, but after 1993, the political
and social fervor towards this end had reached a plateau.
Katyn did not fade from the public’s mind, despite the difficulties of accessing
new documents or testimonies related to the topic. The memory, instead, took on an
67 Anna M. Cienciala, Katyn, pg 254.68 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 204.
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increasingly important political tool. On the fifty-fifth and sixtieth anniversaries,
politicians in the Sejm seized the opportunity to thank “all those who had kept its
memory alive during the years of ‘silence and lies.’”69 They acknowledged the role of the
Polish émigré community and key American, British, Russian diplomats in aiding the
Poles search for answers and keeping the memory of the crime alive, but deplored the
fact that “legal responsibility had not fully established.”70 Furthermore, on the sixtieth
anniversary in particular, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski “apologized, on behalf of
the successor PRL [People’s Republic of Poland] camp, for all those who for whatever
reason of fear, personal benefit or totalitarian propaganda had kept quiet or falsified the
truth about Katyn.”71 Declarations such as these engrained Katyn into the re-developing
Polish national identity and would complicate relations with Russia as long as Katyn
remained a perceived emotionally charged and personal issue among Polish politicians.
April 2010
As the issue of Katyn became an engrained aspect of Polish national identity,
relations between Poland and Russian became increasingly tense. After the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, Polish politicians used memories such as Katyn as a political tool to
distance the nation from Russia and re-orientate it towards the European Union and the
United States. This attitude led many political analysts and scholars to question the
flexibility of Russian-Polish relations for years to come.
The momentous and tragic events of April 2010 signified a potential turnaround
in Russian-Polish relations for the first time since the revelation of the truth in 1990.
Much speculation took place during the months leading up the seventieth anniversary of 69 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 218.70 Ibid 218.71 Ibid 218.
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the executions. In an effort to improve relations and ease tension during negotiations
between Gazprom and Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNiG) for the drafting of a new
accord,72 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin invited his Polish counterpart, Donald Tusk to
join him in commemorating the seventieth anniversary of Katyn at the Katyn Memorial
Park on April 7, 2010. A testimony to the role of Katyn in Polish nationalism, Russian
diplomats and politicians both viewed Tusk as more liberal and open to relations with
Russia than President Lech Kaczynski.
On April 7, 2010, Vladimir Putin became the highest-ranking Russian official to
commemorate the events of Katyn at the Katyn memorial site outside of Smolensk.
Corresponding with Tusk’s visit, Andrzej Wajda’s internationally acclaimed film, Katyń,
was broadcast on Russian television for the first time. Prior to the showing, the Russian
government had denied Katyń approval for widespread release and sales. A round table
discussion between various historians, scholars, and Andrzej Wajda took place
immediately following the film’s premiere. Although the film debuted on a secondary
channel, it too marked a notable gesture to illustrate that the Russian people were not
ignoring the Katyn issue.
News reporters across the globe remarked on the shift in direction these gestures
seemed to suggest and their implications. In many regards, Putin and Tusk’s joint
commemoration was hailed a success. Both politicians focused on avoiding vilification of
current personages based on past experiences. Putin for one “sought to end the chilliness
by showing that Russian regret the killings, just as they feel sorry for their countrymen
who fell victim to Stalin’s totalitarian rule” and expressed how “Russia and Poland must
72 Anatoly Medetsky, “Katyn Commemorations Mark ‘Turnaround,’” The Moscow Times, Apr 8, 2010.
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move beyond their grievances, while still remembering the victims.”73 The ceremony
concentrated more on the similarities between Russia and Poland than their differences.
Although statements of disappointed floated around when Putin did not issue a
full apology to the Polish people, the overall mood was one of optimism. For the most
part, newspaper reports viewed Putin’s statements as genuine, deserving respect. Nobody
foresaw the event that would make one of the biggest impacts on the history of Katyn. On
April 10, 2010, President Kaczynski and ninety-seven other members of the military,
business, political, and social elite, and crewmembers perished miles away from the
burial site of their compatriots. The shock of the news reverberated internationally. The
President and his associates were travelling to the Katyn Memorial Park to conduct their
own commemoration ceremony. The imagery of the Katyn Forest claiming another
segment of the Polish political elite was unavoidable. The two events will be tied together
indefinitely.
Despite the gravity of the tragedy, the plane crash seems to have achieved the
creation of new ties of unity between Russia and Poland that would not have existed
otherwise. One Polish reporter for the Gazeta Wyborzca declared, “it’s a paradox but the
tragedy in Smolensk is a chance to connect our nations like never before.”74 The
reframing of the memory of Katyn to exclude the fusion of politics and emotion will
provide Poland and Russia with the opportunities to reach new levels of cooperation in
the years to come.
From tragedy arises opportunities for change based on new perspectives. The
unfortunate plane crash will certainly affect politics in Poland for a while still, but it also
73 Anatoly Medestsky, “Katyn Commemorations.”74 Adam Easton, “Russia-Poland thaw grows from tragedy,” BBC News, Apr 12, 2010.
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carries a lesson in regards to the use and manipulation of memory. Even when a shared
aspect of two conflicting groups’ history appears to be too unforgivable to forget, when
the tensions caused by the conflict ease in order to come together to grieve a shared
tragedy, the superficiality of the dispute becomes more apparent. The issue of Katyn has
by no means been resolved because of the plane crash. It can serve as a reminder that
focusing on passing judgment on current actors for the crimes of past actors leads to no
resolution or absolution. Instead, shared expressions of sorrow and compassion result in
more steps forward towards a mutual understanding and closure than anything else can.
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Conclusion
As the discussion of the story of Katyn shows, collective memory of collective
events is not objective or constant. It evolves over time, adapting to the needs of various
actors, political or otherwise. The search for the truth is only half the battle facing those
who wish to understand memory. As is apparent, multiple truths emerge from a singular
event, leaving the interpreter to create a dialogue among and between the various
narratives to understand fully the story of the memory.
The legacy of Katyn has endured over the years, despite efforts to suppress the
matter indefinitely. It attracts attention because of its shock value. The length of the
period cover-up appeals to conspiracy buffs, paranoid about government conspiracies. It
suggests the confirmation the assumptions of many of the Cold War generation of the
pure maliciousness and inhumanity of the Soviet Union.
Looking deeper, however, these manipulations of the Katyn memory lose
salience. For one, declarations of Katyn’s exceptionality begin to crumble when all parts
of the story are pieced to together. As Sanford explains, “All one can say, is that while
the 1940 massacre was in some respects untypical of Soviet practice it was by no means
outside its more extreme parameters. The contrary view, expressed by an NKVD defector
[…] is that it was ‘a typical operation…considered entirely routine and unremarkable in
Soviet Russia.’”75 By juxtaposing the memory of Katyn in Poland with that of its memory
in Russia, a more expansive and timeless story unfolds. In many regards, Katyn is tied
into Russian national identity as it is in Polish identity.
75 George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, pg 85.
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Debate over the legacy of the Katyn Forest Massacre can branch off in different
directions, from discussion about the falsification of data and reports, to the response of
the international community over the decades. It can focus on the criminal aspect of the
events, of its classification as a war crime, crime against humanity, or even an act of
genocide, and the failure of justice to be served. This thesis, instead, has intended to
concentrate on the role memory has played in shaping relations between Russia and
Poland up to the present day. It explored the various ways political and social actors may
manipulate a memory to achieve a goal more mundane than seeking justice for a crime
against humanity may. Execution of justice is appropriate in many cases, but perhaps
more focus should be placed on efforts of mutual commemoration efforts through the
creation of meaning monuments, memorials, or museums, and understanding of an
event’s entire history. “Although monuments are powerful because they appear to be
permanent markers of memory and history, they require both physical and symbolic
maintenance or…‘commemorative vigilance’.”76 This vigilance is the responsibility of
both politicians and diplomats and the public they are meant to represent. As can be
learned from the case of Katyn, understanding of the truth of an event can only be
achieved when all the story narratives are explored in tandem. In this way, perhaps
victims of crimes on a mass scale can attain a sense of closure like never before.
76 Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, “Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers Vol. 92, No. 3 (Sept., 2002): pg 1.
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Map of the Special Camps
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Figure 1. April 1940- Map of camp locations and corresponding gravesites.
Source: http://paolomorawski.splinder.com/archive/2007-09
Bibliography
Journal Articles
1. Cohen, Stanley. “State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability,
and the Policing of the Past.” in Law and Social Injury vol. 20 no. 1 pg. 7-50.
Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Bar Foundation, 1995.
2. Esbenshade, Richard S. “Remembering to Forget: Memory, History, National
Identity in Post-War East-Central Europe.” in Representations no. 49 pg. 73-96.
California: University of California Press, 1995.
3. Forest, Benjamin and Johnson, Juliet. “Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-
Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow.” Annals of the
Association of American Geographers Vol. 92, No. 3 (Sept., 2002): 524-547.
4. Osiel, Mark J. “Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre.” in
University of Pennsylvania Law Review vol. 144 no. 2. Pennsylvania: The
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, December 1995.
5. Pienkos, Donald E. “Polish American Congress: An Appraisal,” Polish American
Studies Vol. 36 No 2 (Autumn, 1979): 5-43.
Monographs
1. Cienciala, Anna M., Lebedeva, Natalia S., and Materski, Wojciech. Katyn: A
Crime without Punishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.
2. Heisler, Martin O., Ed. The Politics of History in Comparative Perspective.
Philadelphia, PA: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2008.
3. Hosking, Geoffrey A. The Road to Post-Communism: Independent Political
Movements in the Former Soviet Union. New York: Pinter Publishers, 1992.
4. Orla-Bukowska, Annamaria. “New Threads on an Old Loom: National Memory
and Social Identity in Postwar and Post-Communist Poland” in The Politics of
Memory in Postwar Europe, edited by Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and
Claudio Fogu, 177-210. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
5. Sanford, George. Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940-Truth, Justice and
Memory. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
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6. Wertsch, James V. Voices of Collective Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
7. Zawodny, J. K. Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre
Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962.
Newspaper Articles
1. Associated Press, “The Polish Government’s Statement” New York Times, April
29, 1943, pg 6.
2. Associated Press, “Text of Pravda Editorial Denouncing Polish Sikorski Regime”
New York Times, April 29, 1943, pg 7.
3. Bilefsky, Dan and Kulish, Nicholas. “Poland Mourns, but Some Look Ahead to
Elections” New York Times, April 18, 2010.
4. Callenders, Harold. “Washington Voices ‘Regret’ at Break” New York Times,
April 27, 1943, pg 5.
5. CBC News, “The Katyn Massacre: A crime without punishment” CBC News,
April 7, 2010.
6. Daniell, Raymond. “Russo-Polish Quarrel Involves Other Allies” New York
Times, May 2, 1943 pg E3.
7. Daniell, Raymond. “Soviet-Polish Rift is Healing; Ties Suspended, Not Broken”
New York Times, April 28, 1943 pg 1.
8. Dempsey, Judy. “Tragedy as Harbinger of Change” New York Times, April 14,
2010.
9. Easton, Adam. “Russia-Poland thaw grows from tragedy” BBC News, April 12,
2010.
10. Fitzgibbon, Louis. “Conspiracy of silence still cloaks the Katyn Massacre.” The
Times, October 19, 1974, pg.12.
11. Geddes, Diana. “Site Found in Cemetery for Katyn Memorial.” The Times,
December 19, 1975, pg. 2.
12. Levy, Clifford J. “Russia and Poland: A Blood Feud Rooted Deep in the Past”
New York Times, April 16, 2010.
13. McCormick, Anne O’Hare. “Abroad: Poland as a Factor in the German-Russian
Struggle” New York Times, May 1, 1943, pg 14.
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14. Medetsky, Michael. “Katyn Commemorations Mark Turnaround” The Moscow
Times, April 8, 2010.
15. Mendoza, Joyce. “The Katyn Memorial.” The Times, October 12, 1974, Letter to
the Editor, pg. 13.
16. Parkers, Ralph. “Poles Denounced: Russia Charges Exiled Cabinet Aids Nazis in
‘Massacre’ Case” New York Times, April 27, 1943, pg 1.
17. “Pravda Sees Poles as Duped by Nazis” New York Times, April 20, 1943, pg 12.
18. “Remembering Katyn, 70 years later” BBC News, April 7, 2010.
19. Ronay, Gabriel. “Katyn spectre still haunts poles.” The Times, March 28, 1980,
pg. 10.
20. “Russia’s Break with Poland,” New York Times, April 27, 1943, pg 22.
21. Robbins, Liz. “Layers of History and Grief in Katyn” New York Times, April 10,
2010.
22. “Services for Polish crash victims” BBC News, April 17, 2010.
23. Schwirtz, Michael. “Putin Marks Soviet Massacre of Polish Officers” New York
Times, April 7, 2010.
24. Staff Reporter. “Why Government Ignored the Katyn Ceremony.” The Times,
October 12, 1976, pg 3.
25. St. John Brooks, Julian. “Official Attitudes to Katyn Memorial.” The Times,
September 18, 1976, Letter to the Editor, pg. 13.
Other
1. Katyń. DVD. Directed by Andrzej Wajda. Port Washington, NY: E1
Entertainment U.S. LP, 2009.
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