3
The “War” on Terrorism: A Cultural Perspective Fawaz A. Gerges 18 R O U N D TA B L E C learly, Osama bin Laden does not subscribe to any international rules in his unholy struggle against the world. The fatwa (religious ruling) issued in February 1998 by the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders—the network of terrorist organizations bin Laden established—holds that “to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individ- ual duty for every Muslim.” 1 It makes no distinction between noncombatants and combatants, viewing civilians as soldiers in a zero sum confrontation. Bin La den claims that targeting American ci vilians is a legitimate defensive act, because “Muslims believe that the Jews and America have overplayed their hand in humiliating, degrading, and punishing Muslims.” Moreover, “these attacks on American targets are legitimate public reactions by the Muslim youth, who are willing to sacrifice their lives to defend their people and Islam.2 The Saudi dissident and his lieutenants further justify their bloody deeds by arguing that the existing international norms are inadequate to address their grievances because, in their view, the United States dominates the system of states and con- trols its institutions, including the United Nations. Regardless of its veracity, this assertion sheds light not only on bin Laden’s twist- ed logic, but also on the need to affirm the moral and political importance of exist- ing international norms and rules. In the quick unfolding of events,some observers and policymakers tend to neglect and downplay the importance of this simple but powerful premise, going so far as to advocate changing the rules of the state system by pursuing an ambitious strategy to “end”states or regimes that support terrorism. They argue that if we do not topple the existing regimes that harbor terrorists, we will encourage people who hate us to continue attempts to kill us in appalling num- bers; states waging proxy wars are by definition bound by no laws, and combating them on the contrary assumption is to risk entering a one-sided suicide pact. 3 1 World Islamic Front Statement, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,”av ailable at www.atour.com/ news/international/20010928b.html. 2 See the recruiting tape of Osama bin Laden, which I translated and edited with some colleagues for Columbia University, available at www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00. 3 See, for example,the thought-provoking essay by Fredric Smoler,“Fighting the Last War—and the Next,” American Heritage(December 2001), pp. 38-42.

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Page 1: The “War” on Terrorism: A Cultural Perspective

The “War” on Terrorism:A Cultural Perspective

Fawaz A. Gerges

18 R O U N D TA B L E

Clearly, Osama bin Laden does not subscribe to any international rules in

his unholy struggle against the world. The fatwa (religious ruling) issued

in February 1998 by the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and

Crusaders—the network of terrorist organizations bin Laden established—holds

that “to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individ-

ual duty for every Muslim.”1 It makes no distinction between noncombatants and

combatants, viewing civilians as soldiers in a zero sum confrontation.

Bin Laden claims that targeting American civilians is a legitimate defensive

act, because “Muslims believe that the Jews and America have overplayed their

hand in hu m i l i a ti n g, degrad i n g, and punishing Mu s l i m s .” Moreover, “t h e s e

attacks on American targets are legitimate public reactions by the Muslim youth,

who are wi lling to sac ri fice their lives to defend their people and Is l a m.”2 Th e

Saudi dissident and his lieutenants further justify their bloody deeds by arguing

that the existing international norms are inadequate to address their grievances

because, in their view, the United States dominates the system of states and con-

trols its institutions, including the United Nations.

Rega rdless of its verac i ty, this asserti on sheds light not on ly on bin Laden’s twi s t-

ed logi c , but also on the need to affirm the moral and po l i tical import a n ce of ex i s t-

ing intern a ti onal norms and ru l e s . In the qu i ck unfolding of even t s ,s ome ob s ervers

and po l i c ym a kers tend to negl ect and down p l ay the import a n ce of this simple but

powerful prem i s e , going so far as to advoc a te ch a n ging the rules of the state sys tem

by pursuing an ambi tious stra tegy to “en d ”s t a tes or regimes that su pport terrori s m .

Th ey argue that if we do not topple the ex i s ting regimes that harbor terrori s t s , we

wi ll en co u ra ge people who hate us to con ti nue attem pts to kill us in app a lling nu m-

bers ; s t a tes waging proxy wars are by defin i ti on bound by no laws , and com b a ti n g

t h em on the con tra ry assu m pti on is to risk en tering a on e - s i ded su i c i de pact .3

1 World Islamic Front Statem en t , “ Ji h ad Against Jews and Cru s aders ,” ava i l a ble at www. a to u r. com /news/international/20010928b.html.2 See the rec ru i ting tape of Osama bin Laden , wh i ch I tra n s l a ted and ed i ted with some co lleagues forColumbia University, available at www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00.3 See, for example,the thought-provoking essay by Fredric Smoler, “Fighting the Last War—and the Next,”

American Heritage(December 2001), pp. 38-42.

Page 2: The “War” on Terrorism: A Cultural Perspective

This line of thinking fails to recognize that one of the major goals of terrorists

like bin Laden is to get rid of the existing norms and rules governing the theory

and practice of international diplomacy. For example, bin Laden has stated that

his goal is to destroy the very foundation of international relations and overhaul

the system of power politics that punishes Muslims and keeps them down. This is

a revolt against secular history and heritage and what he terms Western hegemo-

ny over the lands of Islam: “This humiliation and atheism has ruined and blind-

ed Muslims. The only way to destroy this atheism is by Jihad, fighting, bombings

that bring martyrdom. Only blood will wipe out the shame and dishonor inflict-

ed on Muslims.”4 Originally, bin Laden hoped that in reaction to the killing of

thousands of innocent Americans, the United States would lash out angrily and

i rre s pon s i bly against Mu s l i m s , t hus prec i p i t a ting a clash of c ivi l i z a ti on s . Bi n

Laden lost his gamble: the United States did not play into his hands by pursuing

a strategy that could have pitted the so-called camp of belief against the camp of

disbelief. The Muslim umma(worldwide Muslim community) did not rise up and

join the fray. Surveys show that 40 percent of Arabs and other Muslims sympa-

t h i zed with bin Laden’s cri ticism of the Un i ted States and the pro - We s tern

regimes it su pport s , but they rej ected his terrorist met h od s . It was on ly this

group’s apathy that enabled the activist pro–bin Laden camp to misinform, prop-

agandize, and distort the political sensibilities of other Muslims.5

The Bush administration strategically used international institutions, includ-

ing the Security Council, to define the September terrorist attacks as an “act of

war” and to put together an international coalition to attack and defeat the al-

Qaeda organization and the Taliban regime. The Bush administration approach

has found many supporters in the international system, including many in the

world of Is l a m . Al t h o u gh many Muslims remain skeptical abo ut the U. S . w a r

against terrorism, they appreciate its narrow focus and limited nature so far. The

first phase of the U.S. war against terrorism has achieved its stated purpose: the

toppling of the Taliban regime and de s tru cti on of the al-Qaeda net works in

Afghanistan.

More important, the decisive military defeat in Afghanistan has discredited

bin Laden in the eyes of most Arabs and shattered his well-constructed image of

holy warrior. Bin Laden lost not only the war on the battlefield but also the cam-

paign for the hearts and minds of the “floating middle” of Muslim public opin-

ion. Even those Arab multitudes that initially flirted with bin Ladenism out of

The “Wa r” on Terrori s m : A Cultu ral Pers pective 19

THE NEW WA R :

W H AT RULES

A P P LY ?

4 See the recruiting tape of Osama bin Laden.5 See Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Arab Tide Turns Against Bin Laden,” Los Angeles Times, January 4, 2002.

Page 3: The “War” on Terrorism: A Cultural Perspective

anger with the United States have now discovered that his inflated rhetoric was

composed of thin air. However, bin Laden’s loss of the propaganda war does not

imply that the United States has won. Poll results show that anti-American senti-

ment is a staple of Arab politics. Today, to be politically conscious in the Arab

world is to be highly suspicious of the United States,its foreign policies,its values,

and its insti tuti on s . For many Arabs and other Muslims the Un i ted States has

become a scapegoat for the ills and misfortunes that befell their world in the sec-

ond half of the last century.

The danger lies in the ambiguity of the U.S.strategy regarding the next phase

of the war. Will the Bush administration buy the argument of the hardliners and

expand the war to Ira q , t hus sac ri ficing the legi ti m acy principle at the altar of

political and strategic calculations? Undoubtedly, the United States possesses the

military capability to win wars; yet the real difficulty comes after victory on the

battlefield. The U.S. foreign policy establishment should not become so intoxi-

cated with the victory in Afghanistan that it loses sight of the complex realities of

world politics with its critical restraining mechanisms. The United States will not

be able to win the war on terrorism until it finds the political will to invest in

rebuilding decimated civil societies such as Afghanistan, Pakistan,and even Iraq.

Bin Ladenism taps into the Arab sense of victimization and the deep reservoir

of accumulated grievances against the United States.With the Taliban vanquished

and the al-Qaeda net work in Afghanistan de s troyed , the ch a ll en ge facing the

Un i ted States is to tackle the deepening anti - Am ericanism in the regi on by

reassessing the efficacy and fairness of its foreign policies. The manner in which

the United States conducts the struggle against terrorism will ultimately deter-

mine the nature and character of the Muslim response—either resistance or coop-

eration; it will also determine the potential supply of suicidal foot soldiers to the

unholy war waged against the world,not just the United States, by those who sub-

scribe to bin Ladenism.

20 Fawaz A. Gerges

R O U N D TA B L E