The Two Pragmatisms: From Peirce to Rortyby H. O. Mounce

The Two Pragmatisms: From Peirce to Rorty by H. O. MounceReview by: Ellen Kappy SuckielTransactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter, 1998), pp. 304-312Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320688 .

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304 Book Reviews

The Two Pragmatisms: From Peirce to Rorty H. O. Mounce London and New York: Routledge, 1997 viii + 245 pp.

H. O. Mounce has written a book which raises significant ques- tions and which explores centrally important themes in American pragmatism. It is written with admirable clarity and focus, and it frames and examines the issues in interesting ways. It is also a book about which I have some serious reservations.

Mounce has two main purposes in writing this book. The first is to provide an account of the history of American pragmatism by reviewing what he takes to be its most significant themes -

beginning with Peirce, working through James and Dewey, and concluding with the philosophy of Richard Rorty. His main focus is on issues in metaphysics and epistemology. Mounce's second purpose is to show that a central doctrine of Peircean pragmatism gradually has been transformed (or from his point of view, de- graded) into nothing less than a reversal of Peirce's original position. That doctrine is realism.

Mounce embeds his discussion of realism within the broader context of scientific positivism. He characterizes scientific positivism not as a particular set of determinate propositions, but rather as a "world- view or Weltanschauung, derived from science. It holds, for example, that the world has no overall meaning, all things being the product of chance and blind causation, that all things are determined, that science is the only mode of knowledge and so on" (p. 18). In develop- ing his account of the history of American pragmatism, Mounce shows, first, how James and Dewey, insofar as they rejected mechanism and believed in the purposive nature of mind, agreed with Peirce in his rejection of scientific positivism. But secondly - and this is his com- plaint and the main emphasis of the book - Mounce argues that James and Dewey broke with Peirce, (one might say, from Mounce's point of view, broke faith with him) and also contradicted their own philosophical psychologies, by subscribing to an extreme empiricism,



Book Reviews 305

scientism, and most importantly, anti-realism in their metaphysics. Mounce goes on to argue that the anti-realist philosophy of Ri-

chard Rorty - which he sees as a "lightly disguised form of positivism" (p. 184) - can be seen to have been prompted by the anti-realist elements in Dewey and James. Since Mounce is passionate in his commitment to realism, his attitude toward what he views as the regression of pragmatic philosophy into anti-realism might best be expressed in terms of metaphors of illness: Peirce (the later Peirce, that is) was a healthy realist, but the virus of anti-realism found a foothold in James and Dewey, and seizing the opportunity, grew into a full-fledged philosophical affliction in the work of Rorty.1

Throughout the book, Mounce maintains his commitment to a very straightforward form of classical metaphysical realism. He maintains throughout, without responding to any of the important charges which have been made against such a position, that truth must be understood in terms of the relation of our claims to a reality whose character is entirely independent of our beliefs about it. Mounce asserts that "[t]he mark of an objective truth is that it would be true whether or not people agreed with it" (p. 198); and that "the primitive feeling of objective truth.... is that one is related not to common agreement but to the world" (pp. 198-99).

I do not think anyone would deny the common sense realism which is supported by the primitive feeling on which Mounce relies, but it is not at all clear what metaphysical conclusions can be derived from this. Given that we have criteria of truth which arise from and oper- ate within the context of our experience, is it helpful to postulate an additional layer of metaphysical fact which is meant somehow to guarantee or provide an extra foothold for those judgments? In order for our beliefs to be true, is it necessary that they correspond to an entirely mind-independent reality?

In assuming that truth is either dependent upon actual agreement in belief, or that it is entirely independent of human experience and belief, has Mounce exhausted the metaphysical and epistemo- logical options? I believe that his assumption that these are the only two options keeps him from seeing the most important differences



306 Book Reviews

between the earlier views of James and Dewey on the one hand and the later views of Rorty on the other.

Mounce does a good job of contrasting the anti-realism of Rorty to the realism which Peirce defended in his mature philosophy.2 More- over, his objections to Rorty are on the whole powerful and persua- sive. But it is not necessary to accept Mounce's conception of truth as entirely separable from human belief in order to reject Rorty's position that truth is nothing but a compliment paid to successful discourse; that truth is exhaustively analyzed in terms of the vocabu- lary of practice rather than in terms of the relationship of our beliefs to reality.3

The strength of the philosophies of both James and Dewey lies in the fact that they offer an option which lies between Rorty's relativism on the one hand, and metaphysical realism on the other. James and Dewey worked hard to show that it is pragmatically futile to define truth in terms of a conception of reality which is transexperiential, truth which is independent of all actual or pos- sible experience and belief: for such a conception has no criteria of proper application. As an alternative to such a transexperiential notion, James and Dewey do not go the way of Rorty and define truth merely in terms of human agreement simpliciter. Rather, the central concept in their epistemologies is that of justified agreement. For Dewey, the relevant concept is not just assertibility, but warranted assertibility. And for Dewey, such warrant has objective conditions which the knower is called upon to acknowl- edge. The warrant for our claims derives from the degree to which they meet the requirements imposed by the nature of the prob- lematic situations in which we find ourselves. For James, there is a structure within the context of experience itself which is outside the subject's control, and which sets objective conditions on the subject's beliefs being true.4

Thus, while Mounce offers powerful arguments against the anti- realism of Rorty, he fails to see the ways in which the philosophies of James and Dewey meet at least some of the requirements which metaphysical realists find indispensable. Indeed, it might be argued that



Book Reviews 307

they meet all of those requirements of realism which are reasonable. James and Dewey are, to be sure, internal realists - they define truth, reality and objectivity in terms of parameters within the context of our experience, in contrast to Mounce's metaphysical realism, ac- cording to which truth and reality are regarded as objectively independent of us. I am not claiming that the positions of James and Dewey are without difficulties. But they do provide considerations which put metaphysical realism seriously to the test. Thus, without fully addressing James's and Dewey 's charges against the notion of a transexperiential reality, Mounce cannot make sufficient progress on the issues at hand.

I think that in criticizing James and Dewey from the standpoint of his own commitments to both realism and psycho-physical dualism, Mounce has not taken sufficient account of their deliberate at- tempts to undermine these views. It is not the case that James and Dewey were naive, or somehow ignored or missed the point of these positions, or even that they merely offered alternative views. Their philosophies are designed to show why psycho-physical dualism and the postulation of a transexperiential reality should be rejected, and their views are properly understood only when that fact is fully ac- knowledged and appreciated.

The Two Pragmatisms is clearly the product of an astute and knowl- edgeable philosopher. Mounce deepens his analyses of the pragmatic philosophers by placing them in the context of their important intellectual antecedents and successors, and by subjecting key concepts to considerable analytic scrutiny. As a Wittgenstein scholar, he is able to provide particularly interesting discussions of the relationship of Wittgenstein's ideas to those of the classical pragmatists.5 Mounce's analyses are invariably engaging. Moreover, the fact that he is devel- oping a long argument throughout the course of the book lends a dramatic and enticing quality to the discussion.

At the same time, however, the book displays a certain curious narrowness of approach. Mounce makes claims throughout the book which seem to me to manifest the parochial belief that in order to have viable philosophies, both James and Dewey ought to have been



308 Book Reviews

disciples of Peirce. Peirce is taken as the paradigmatic pragmatist, and one gets the feeling that Mounce believes that James's and Dewey's development of their own philosophies places them in the category of degenerate Peirceans who did not heed the master's lessons (e.g., pp. 2, 37-8, 43, 229). Even in his admiration for James's Principles of Psychology, Mounce chooses to focus on those aspects of the book which he thinks show how James is elaborating ideas introduced by Peirce (p. 73). Perhaps Mounce ought to have taken Wittgenstein more to heart and noted that the classical pragmatists are pragmatists by virtue of sharing a certain family resem- blance, and not by virtue of meeting any particular gold standard.

In Mounce's hands, after Rorty, James gets the worst press. Mounce respects what he considers to be James's psychological works. He considers the Principles to be James's chief masterpiece (p. 73) and The Varieties of Religious Experience to be his "second great work" (p. 103).6 But Mounce is deeply critical of James's more strictly philosophical writings. Rather than being seen as a philosophy in its own right, James's philosophy is regarded more as a serious misun- derstanding of Peirce's ideas (e.g., pp. 48, 125, 174). James's pivotal work, Pragmatism, is judged to be a failure (p. 52). In assessing Essays in Radical Empiricism, Mounce asserts that "in his later work James ventured into areas where he lacked a grip on the philosophical issues" (p. 87). And even Varieties, which Mounce considers to be successful as a psychological work, is judged to be deeply prob- lematic from a philosophical standpoint. Mounce contends, for example, perpetuating one version of an unfortunate common stereo- type, that James's use of utility as a criterion of truth in the context of religion has the effect of turn[ing] religion into a branch of the social services" (p. 119).

The space limitations of this review preclude my dealing with Mounce's criticisms in the way that they deserve, so I shall be very brief in my suggestions:

( 1 ) Regarding Pragmatism, Mounce offers the classic and powerful objections of A. O. Lovejoy and J. B. Pratt, against James's



Book Reviews 309

theories of meaning and truth respectively. But however forceful these objections may first appear, I believe that there are responses to them which ought to be considered. I think that Lovejoy's objection - that James does not distinguish the predictive import of a belief from the consequences of holding it - is ultimately too simple. Regarding Mounce's development of Pratt's objection, I believe that the legitimate role of the principle of verifiability in James's theory of truth is too quickly dismissed. In my judgment, both James's theories of meaning and truth are more complicated than his critics allow, as I have tried to show in my own work on his philosophy.7

(2) Regarding Varieties, it would have been helpful if Mounce had more fully considered the central element in James's analysis of religious experience, which is his attempt to demonstrate the role of verification in establishing the truth of religious belief. Seen in this context, James's view is far more complex, interesting and powerful than Mounce suggests.8

(3) Regarding Essays in Radical Empiricism, I believe that Mounce comes to his negative assessment in part because he incor- rectly interprets James as being a phenomenalist. While James is not a phenomenalist, he does reject dualism. In holding fast to the very dualism that James is so intent to displace, Mounce does not give sufficient attention to the way in which James's arguments are designed to undermine that position.9

On balance, then, I would say that Mounce's analysis of James raises many valuable and thought-provoking points. When all is said and done, however, he does not offer a sufficiently nuanced presen- tation of James's philosophy, primarily due to the undue influence of his own assumptions.

Turning to a few practical matters, it would have been helpful if Mounce had more frequently cited the standard editions,10 or at least the original editions, of the works of classical pragmatists. I think it is



310 Book Reviews

important to use texts which can be shared by anyone with access to a good library. This is especially the case given the great resurgence of interest in classical pragmatism. With the publication of a plethora of new works, scholars can be assisted in their utilization of this ma- terial if they are able to refer to a common set of texts by Peirce, James and Dewey.

On several occasions (e.g., pp. 132, 137) it would have been helpful to have a footnote indicating the source of the views being presented in the text. Also, there are some other errors and omis- sions. On pp. 135 and 136, "Dewey, 1930" is cited, but no such work is listed in the bibliography. Morris R. Cohen's 1940 article in the Philosophical Review, "Some Difficulties in Dewey's Anthropo- centric Naturalism," which is discussed on pp. 152-3, has incorrect page numbers cited both in the text and in the bibliography (they should be pp. 196-228).

Finally, I should like to say that while there is much in this book with which I disagreed, I also believe that Mounce has offered a valuable work with which to think through important issues in American pragmatic philosophy, both in its classical and current forms. As we come to the end of the century and the millennium, it is time for us to begin to develop a broad vision of the history of American philosophy in the twentieth century as a whole. Many prefer to bifurcate the century, and to think of classical pragmatism on the one hand, and the contemporary newly packaged "pragmatism" on the other. But in spite of what are doubtless important differences between "pragmatism" in its earlier vs. later incarnations, it might be most useful to look more sympathetically for continuities between these intellectual move- ments. Moreover, it was not really that long a period between the publication of Dewey's Logic (1938) and Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979). And the perception of a break between the "two pragmatisms" (at least a temporal one) is dimin- ished even more if one accounts for works along the way such as Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951), Kuhn's The Struc- ture of Scientific Revolutions (1962 for the first version, 1970 for



Book Reviews 311

the second, revised edition), and Nelson Goodman's Ways of Worldmakin£f (1978), to name a few.11 There is already much recent work which explores the potentials of the pragmatic point of view, without succumbing to the unabashed historicism and relativism which many have found unacceptable in Rorty's philosophy. As we achieve greater distance and perspective and as the more recently re -invigorated pragmatic point of view is more widely and critically articulated and developed, the notion of two differ- ent pragmatisms in America, with Peirce, James and Dewey on the one hand, and the "new pragmatisms" on the other, may become a progressively less useful concept.

Although I have many significant disagreements with Mounce's book, I commend it for adding a useful and incisive voice to the important discussions with which many of us are so actively occupied.

University of California, Santa Cruz Ellen Kappy Suckiel

NOTES

1. Mounce also objects to Rorty as a historian of philosophy. In

his discussion of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Mounce argues that "[a] close study of the evidence suggests that the history of philosophy advanced by

Rorty is almost entirely mythical" (pp. 217-218). 2 . For superb comparisons of Peirce's and Rorty's views on this topic,

see Susan Haack, '"We Pragmatists...': Peirce and Rorty in Conversation," Partisan

ReviewlXIV^no. 1 (Winter, 1997):91-107. See also Haack's 1996 Patrick Romanell

Lecture, "As for that Phrase 'Studying in a Literary Spirit...'," Proceedings and Ad-

dresses of the American Philosophical Association 70, no. 2 (November, 1996): 57-75.

3. See, for example, Rorty's claim in The Consequences of Prag- matism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 165:

[Pragmatism] is the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones - no wholesale constraints derived from the



312 Book Reviews

nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow inquirers.

4. See, for example, The Meaning of Truth (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1975), p. 47: The only real guarantee we have against licentious thinking is

circumpressure of experience itself, which gets us sick of concrete errors, whether there be a trans-empirical reality or not.

It is the case, however, that sometimes James also appeals to a concept of absolute truth which appears to be transexperiential. See Ellen Kappy Suckiel, The Pragmatic Philosophy of William James (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), pp. 105-115. (Hereafter referred to as PPWJ).

5. Mounce's book on Wittgenstein is Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 1981).

6. I speak in terms of what Mounce considers to be James's psychological works because I do not think he fully appreciates the important philosophical content in these works, particularly in the case of Varieties.

7. See PPWJ, chapters 3 and 6. 8. For further discussion, see Ellen Kappy Suckiel, Heaven's

Champion: William James's Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).

9. For further discussion, see PPWJ, chapter 7. 10. For Peirce, the Harvard University Press editions of The Collected

Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, or the more recent Indiana University Press editions of The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition. For James, the Harvard

University Press editions of The Works of William James. For Dewey, the Southern Illinois University Press editions of John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898, John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924, znàjohn Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953.

11. Mounce also notes some of these continuities on p. 2.



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The Two Pragmatisms: From Peirce to Rortyby H. O. Mounce