The social basis of higher cognitive functioning · 2015-07-17 · GoalGoal--directed motor control, imitation learning & in directed motor control, imitation learning & inter--ter

The social basis of The social basis of

higher cognitive functioninghigher cognitive functioning

Mark Ashton SmithMark Ashton SmithDepartment of PsychologyDepartment of Psychology

Bilkent UniversityBilkent UniversityBilkent UniversityBilkent University

‘Executive functioning’‘Executive functioning’

�� Controlled & flexibleControlled & flexible (not automatic) (not automatic)

�� Voluntary / goal directed guidance of behaviourVoluntary / goal directed guidance of behaviour

�� Rational Rational –– flexible meansflexible means--ends appropriate action ends appropriate action

�� Context sensitiveContext sensitive

�� Effective problem solving in novel situationsEffective problem solving in novel situations

Selective attention Selective attention –– ‘on line’ control system‘on line’ control system�� Selective attention Selective attention –– ‘on line’ control system‘on line’ control system

�� Inhibition of inappropriate responsesInhibition of inappropriate responses

�� Representational / symbolic / mental model basedRepresentational / symbolic / mental model based

�� ‘Offline’ thinking / reasoning / planning / decision‘Offline’ thinking / reasoning / planning / decision--makingmaking

�� Rule acquisition and applicationRule acquisition and application

�� Causal understanding and insight learningCausal understanding and insight learning

�� Symbolic language use Symbolic language use

Theories of what distinguishes human Theories of what distinguishes human

from nonfrom non--human cognition in evolutionhuman cognition in evolution

�� Shared intentionality (ToM ability):Shared intentionality (ToM ability): Tomasello’s labTomasello’s lab�� ‘Intersubjective sharing’ = “collaborative interactions in which ‘Intersubjective sharing’ = “collaborative interactions in which

participants share psychological states with one another/ what participants share psychological states with one another/ what makes human cognition different is/the ability of humans to makes human cognition different is/the ability of humans to learn through other persons and their artefacts, and to learn through other persons and their artefacts, and to learn through other persons and their artefacts, and to learn through other persons and their artefacts, and to collaborate with others in their collective activities.” (Tomasello & collaborate with others in their collective activities.” (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007)Carpenter, 2007)

�� Reinterpretation hypothesisReinterpretation hypothesis: Povinelli’s lab: Povinelli’s lab�� “without discarding the ancestral mechanisms it built on, this “without discarding the ancestral mechanisms it built on, this

novel causal explanation system then generated its own novel causal explanation system then generated its own /behaviors (e.g. progressive cultural transmission/explicit /behaviors (e.g. progressive cultural transmission/explicit pedagogy), which hinge on the ability to represent the social and pedagogy), which hinge on the ability to represent the social and physical world governed by abstract causal forces” (Povinelli & physical world governed by abstract causal forces” (Povinelli & Bering, 2002)Bering, 2002)

Byrne and Whiten ‘social brain hypothesis’

In primates, mean social group size increases with relative neocortex volume (indexed as the ratio of neocortex volume to the volume of the rest of the brain).

Social complexity keySocial complexity key

�� Relative size of the neocortex (disproportionately Relative size of the neocortex (disproportionately

expanded in primates) correlates with:expanded in primates) correlates with:

�� social group size social group size

�� grooming clique sizegrooming clique size

�� frequency of coalitions frequency of coalitions

�� male mating strategiesmale mating strategies

�� prevalence of social play prevalence of social play

�� frequency of tactical deceptionfrequency of tactical deception

�� technical innovationtechnical innovation

�� frequency of social learningfrequency of social learning

Dunbar & Shultz (2007) Evolution of the Social Brain. Science, 317, 1344-1347

Silk et al. (2007) Social components of fitness in primate groups. Science, 317, 1347-1351

The argument of the paperThe argument of the paper�� The phylogenetic foundation for higher cognition is rational, goal The phylogenetic foundation for higher cognition is rational, goal

directed motor planning and control.directed motor planning and control.

�� Motor based higher cognition depends on goalMotor based higher cognition depends on goal--based based action action understandingunderstanding. Understanding ‘own. Understanding ‘own--goals’ cogoals’ co--evolves with evolves with understanding ‘others goals’. Thus higher cognition has a understanding ‘others goals’. Thus higher cognition has a social social basis basis in evolution.in evolution.

Goal based action and action understanding is ‘objectified’ via Goal based action and action understanding is ‘objectified’ via �� Goal based action and action understanding is ‘objectified’ via Goal based action and action understanding is ‘objectified’ via imitation learning of skills/techniques and communicative gesturing. imitation learning of skills/techniques and communicative gesturing. Actions and gestures thereby acquire interActions and gestures thereby acquire inter--subjective (public) subjective (public) meaning meaning –– much like words of a language or artefacts have much like words of a language or artefacts have intersubjective meaning.intersubjective meaning.

�� The ‘objectification’ is the basis of The ‘objectification’ is the basis of shared intentionalityshared intentionalitypp (not shared (not shared intentionalityintentionalitytt), which embraces both Tomasello’s and Povinelli’s ), which embraces both Tomasello’s and Povinelli’s theories theories -- shared cognition/intentionalityshared cognition/intentionalitytt, and comprehending , and comprehending properties of an properties of an agentagent--independent realityindependent reality. .

�� Shared intentionalitityShared intentionalititypp is the mark of the highest levels of cognition.is the mark of the highest levels of cognition.

“After they understand others as intentional “After they understand others as intentional

agents like themselves, a whole new world of agents like themselves, a whole new world of

interinter--subjectively shared reality begins to open subjectively shared reality begins to open

up. It is a world populated by material and up. It is a world populated by material and

symbolic artefacts and social practices that symbolic artefacts and social practices that symbolic artefacts and social practices that symbolic artefacts and social practices that

members of their culture, both past and present, members of their culture, both past and present,

have created for the use of others” (Tomasello)have created for the use of others” (Tomasello)

�� GoalGoal--directed motor control, imitation learning & interdirected motor control, imitation learning & inter--agent goalagent goal--directed action understanding codirected action understanding co--evolved as evolved as part of the same ‘executive system’.part of the same ‘executive system’.�� More sophisticated causal understanding & ToM built on this More sophisticated causal understanding & ToM built on this

foundation.foundation.

Specific hypothesesSpecific hypotheses

�� Mirror neuron circuitry with a shared ‘selfMirror neuron circuitry with a shared ‘self--other’ other’ representational space representational space –– along with working memory along with working memory circuitry in precircuitry in pre--frontal cortex frontal cortex -- is the critical neural is the critical neural substrate for implementing this system.substrate for implementing this system.

�� The challenges and opportunities of a complex social life The challenges and opportunities of a complex social life provides the selective pressure for the evolution of this provides the selective pressure for the evolution of this system.system.

Ancestral & modernhumans

complexity ofgoal directed motor control

mind-reading(understanding

self & others’ goaldirected actions)

monkeys

great apes

imitation learningability

Greater sharedintentionalityp



self & others’ goal directed actions)


�� that planned motor action is executive likethat planned motor action is executive like

�� that where you find executive motor planning you also find that where you find executive motor planning you also find imitation learning and the ‘social transmission’ of motor imitation learning and the ‘social transmission’ of motor techniquestechniques

What I should showWhat I should show

�� that where you find motor planning and imitation learning you that where you find motor planning and imitation learning you find action/intention understandingfind action/intention understanding

�� that this set of relations becomes increasingly more complex that this set of relations becomes increasingly more complex over evolutionary timeover evolutionary time

�� that the neural circuitry underlying it codes ‘social’ interthat the neural circuitry underlying it codes ‘social’ inter--agent agent information: that it reveals the social basis of higher cognitioninformation: that it reveals the social basis of higher cognition





�� that this set of relations becomes increasingly more complex that this set of relations becomes increasingly more complex over evolutionary time.over evolutionary time.


Breuer et al. (2005) First Observation of Tool Use in Wild Gorillas. PLoS Biol 3(11): e380

Complex tool problem for Japanese macaques

Hihara et al. (2003). Rapid learning of sequential tool use by macaque monkeys. Physiology & Behavior 78, 427-434

Success < 50 trials, compared to 2 weeks for basic raking task

�� “monkeys were required to sequentially “monkeys were required to sequentially

What type of cognition mediates What type of cognition mediates

this flexible motor planning and this flexible motor planning and

problem solving?problem solving?

�� “monkeys were required to sequentially “monkeys were required to sequentially

organize tool using actions by manipulating organize tool using actions by manipulating

the proper tool at each stage of the task to the proper tool at each stage of the task to

achieve the onachieve the on--going set of subgoals.” going set of subgoals.” (Hihara (Hihara

et al)et al)

Overall goal:

Get food

Goal-directed action hierarchy

Subgoal 1 Subgoal 2

Use short tool 1 to rake long

tool 2

Use long tool 2 to rake food

Extend tool 1

Hook tool 2

pull in tool

Extend tool 2

Hook food

pull in food

Apes/humans may have voluntary control at this level, but not monkeys

Hierarchical control for Hierarchical control for

voluntary actionvoluntary action

�� Byrne & Russon (1998) hypothesis: Byrne & Russon (1998) hypothesis: �� “individuals of some species of animal have access to “individuals of some species of animal have access to

the hierarchical structure of their own behaviour, and the hierarchical structure of their own behaviour, and control over its organization control over its organization -- just as humans show in just as humans show in planning or problemplanning or problem--solving. /behaviour is controlled solving. /behaviour is controlled planning or problemplanning or problem--solving. /behaviour is controlled solving. /behaviour is controlled by an elaborate but modifiable structure of goals and by an elaborate but modifiable structure of goals and subsub--goals.”goals.”

�� In cog science hierarchical structuring argued to be In cog science hierarchical structuring argued to be essential for many acquired skills (Chomsky, Newell essential for many acquired skills (Chomsky, Newell & Simon)& Simon)�� Language Language

�� Problem solvingProblem solving

�� Everyday planning Everyday planning

IntelligenceIntelligence

�� IntelligentIntelligent

�� Behavioural structures are modifiable by the Behavioural structures are modifiable by the

individual in rational, flexible waysindividual in rational, flexible ways

�� More complex, ‘deep’ and flexible goal hierarchy More complex, ‘deep’ and flexible goal hierarchy

behaviour behaviour ◄►◄► more intelligentmore intelligentbehaviour behaviour ◄►◄► more intelligentmore intelligent

�� Not intelligentNot intelligent

�� Behaviour as a single unit of action connected to a Behaviour as a single unit of action connected to a

goalgoal--representation representation

�� A long sequence of linear associative connectionsA long sequence of linear associative connections

�� A rigid hierarchical structure A rigid hierarchical structure

Byrne & Russon (1998). BBS, 21: 667-684 21: 667-684

‘Executive functioning’ like‘Executive functioning’ like

�� ►►Controlled & flexibleControlled & flexible (not automatic) (not automatic)

�� Voluntary / goal directed guidance of behaviourVoluntary / goal directed guidance of behaviour

�� Rational Rational –– flexible meansflexible means--ends appropriate action ends appropriate action

�� Context sensitiveContext sensitive

�� Effective problem solving in novel situationsEffective problem solving in novel situations

�� Selective attention Selective attention –– ‘on line’ control system‘on line’ control system�� Selective attention Selective attention –– ‘on line’ control system‘on line’ control system

�� Inhibition of inappropriate responsesInhibition of inappropriate responses

�� ►► Representational / symbolic / mental model basedRepresentational / symbolic / mental model based

�� ‘Offline’ thinking / reasoning / planning / decision‘Offline’ thinking / reasoning / planning / decision--makingmaking

�� Rule acquisition and applicationRule acquisition and application

�� Causal understanding and insight learningCausal understanding and insight learning







Imitation learning

�� Learning novelLearning novel goalgoal--directed actions or multidirected actions or multi--

component action techniques, from seeing the component action techniques, from seeing the component action techniques, from seeing the component action techniques, from seeing the

actions done by others.actions done by others.

�� Unlike mimicry requires the ability to understand Unlike mimicry requires the ability to understand

the intention / goal of an observed action and to the intention / goal of an observed action and to

copy it to attain the goal.copy it to attain the goal.

Chimpanzee imitation experimentChimpanzee imitation experiment

�� 2 experimental conditions, 1 control condition.2 experimental conditions, 1 control condition.

�� Unobserved by group mates, 2 highUnobserved by group mates, 2 high--ranking females ranking females from 2 two groups of 16 captive (but nonfrom 2 two groups of 16 captive (but non--aculturated) aculturated) chimpanzees trained to adopt one of two different tool chimpanzees trained to adopt one of two different tool use techniques use techniques -- ‘poke’ and ‘lift’ ‘poke’ and ‘lift’ -- for obtaining food from for obtaining food from chimpanzees trained to adopt one of two different tool chimpanzees trained to adopt one of two different tool use techniques use techniques -- ‘poke’ and ‘lift’ ‘poke’ and ‘lift’ -- for obtaining food from for obtaining food from a food chute, then rea food chute, then re--introduced each female to her introduced each female to her group.group.

�� Control group (6 chimps) had no ‘expert’ but had access Control group (6 chimps) had no ‘expert’ but had access to the tool and food chute.to the tool and food chute.�� Baseline for individual discoveryBaseline for individual discovery

Whiten et al. (2005) Conformity to cultural norms of tool use in chimpanzees. Nature, 437, 737-740

‘Poke’ and ‘lift’ food chute techniques

Note – these actions are not part of the ape’s existing repertoire of action patterns

Median latency = 29 sec


2 months later


Abyssianian Colobus monkey

�� 2 experimental conditions (2 groups of 2 experimental conditions (2 groups of

Abyssinian Colobus monkeys)Abyssinian Colobus monkeys)

�� Monkeys shown video footage of familiar Monkeys shown video footage of familiar

monkeys either pushing (C1) or pulling (C2) a monkeys either pushing (C1) or pulling (C2) a monkeys either pushing (C1) or pulling (C2) a monkeys either pushing (C1) or pulling (C2) a

plastic flap by the corner to obtain plastic flap by the corner to obtain

a food reward, while they were given a food reward, while they were given

simultaneous access to the same apparatus. simultaneous access to the same apparatus.

Price & Caldwell (2006) Artificially generated cultural variation between twogroups of captive monkeys. Behavioural Processes, 74, 13-20

Goal hierarchy for illicit fire-making (from Byrne & Russon, 1998).

�� Imitation learningImitation learning = learning voluntary goal directed = learning voluntary goal directed behaviour that is both sequentially and behaviour that is both sequentially and hierarchically organized organized

�� Critically involves Critically involves working memoryworking memory to keep track of goal to keep track of goal structure for a taskstructure for a task

Byrne & Russon theory of Byrne & Russon theory of

imitation learningimitation learning

structure for a taskstructure for a task

�� Imitation learning can occur at Imitation learning can occur at different levelsdifferent levels of the of the action hierarchy from more abstract to more concrete action hierarchy from more abstract to more concrete �� ‘program level’ movements (monkeys / apes)‘program level’ movements (monkeys / apes)

�� ‘action level’ ‘action level’ -- highly specific motor actions (humans)highly specific motor actions (humans)

�� Sophistication of imitation learning Sophistication of imitation learning ◄►◄► action action hierarchy hierarchy depth & complexity and working memory capacitydepth & complexity and working memory capacity

Byrne & Russon (1998) Learning by Imitation. A Hierarchical Approach. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 667-684

�� The motor techniques learned in imitation The motor techniques learned in imitation learning (called cultural variants) function like learning (called cultural variants) function like group specific gestures in apes or tools, or group specific gestures in apes or tools, or language systemslanguage systems�� Learning how to crack a nut through imitation is a Learning how to crack a nut through imitation is a

MAS ‘objectification’ hypothesisMAS ‘objectification’ hypothesis

�� Learning how to crack a nut through imitation is a Learning how to crack a nut through imitation is a precursor form of learning a set of verbal instructionsprecursor form of learning a set of verbal instructions

�� Motor techniques are exchanged ‘publicly’ in the Motor techniques are exchanged ‘publicly’ in the social group social group –– like words or artefacts like words or artefacts

�� They form the basis of They form the basis of shared intentionalityshared intentionalitypp

�� they ground cognition in an ‘objective’ realm, a type of they ground cognition in an ‘objective’ realm, a type of ‘shared cognition’‘shared cognition’







�� TaskTask�� In each condition demonstrator operates one of 3 In each condition demonstrator operates one of 3

types of apparatus to cause a buzz or an illumination, types of apparatus to cause a buzz or an illumination, using an unusual body part: head, foot or bottom.using an unusual body part: head, foot or bottom.

�� ConditionsConditions�� Hands free (suggesting free choice)Hands free (suggesting free choice)

Hands occupied (suggesting forced choice)Hands occupied (suggesting forced choice)

Rational imitation experimentRational imitation experiment

�� Hands occupied (suggesting forced choice)Hands occupied (suggesting forced choice)

�� SubjectsSubjects�� Eight enculturated chimpanzees (3.2Eight enculturated chimpanzees (3.2--8.1 years)8.1 years)

�� Replication of previous studies on 12 and 14 Replication of previous studies on 12 and 14 month old infants (e.g. Gergely et al. 2002). month old infants (e.g. Gergely et al. 2002).

Buttelmann et al. 2007. Enculturated chimpanzees imitate rationally.

Developmental Science, 10, 4: 31-38

�� Within subjects design: each subject participated Within subjects design: each subject participated

in both conditions (‘hands free’ and ‘hands in both conditions (‘hands free’ and ‘hands

occupied’) for each of the 3 types of apparatus.occupied’) for each of the 3 types of apparatus.

�� 3 action demonstrations per trial > no delay > 3 action demonstrations per trial > no delay > �� 3 action demonstrations per trial > no delay > 3 action demonstrations per trial > no delay >

response period (approx. 60 secs).response period (approx. 60 secs).

�� Video recording and ‘blind’ coding for first 20 secs for Video recording and ‘blind’ coding for first 20 secs for

(a) whether imitation of demonstrator occurred, (b) (a) whether imitation of demonstrator occurred, (b)

which body part first acted on the apparatus.which body part first acted on the apparatus.

Results� As with human infants in

the Gergely et al (2002) study, chimpanzees imitated the demonstrator’s action more (twice as often) in the Hands Free than in the Hands Occupied conditions.

� As in the Gergely et alinfant study, in almost all trials (96.9%) chimpanzees’ first action on the apparatus involved a body part other than the one used by the demonstrator – usually the hand. These first actions were usually (75.3%) successful in producing the light or sound.

� These experiments suggest chimpanzees understand that actors choose plans of action that fit the opportunities and constraints of the current situation - they understand others’ intentional actions are performed rationally.

� They understand means-ends adequacy for understood goals as a guide to whether to imitate or not.

� A basic form of causal understanding (think Povinelli).

Understanding of intentional actionUnderstanding of intentional action

in human infantsin human infants

�� Before 12 monthsBefore 12 months

� infants understand that others act in goal-directed ways, and that others persist in their goals if they are blocked. (Behne et al. 2005)

By 12By 12--14 months14 months�� By 12By 12--14 months14 months

� Infants understand (something of) others’ intentional action as rational choices of action plans to achieve goals, and they use this understanding when deciding what to imitate from them - like adult apes.

Discriminating intentionalfrom accidental actions in others to

Wood et al. (2007)The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates. Science, 317, 1402-1405.

actions in others to guide food searching behaviour

Note: could be responsepriming

Discriminating rational from irrational gestures in others to guide food searching behaviour (Note: this looks like understanding gesturing)

Rhesus Macaque monkey

Experiment 1Experiment 1

� 6 rhesus macaques

� D.V. = looking time (attention duration) at action, and at face

Rochat et al. 2008. The evolution of social cognition. Goal familiarity shapes monkeys’ actionunderstanding. Current Biology, 18, 227-232

ResultsResults

Experiments 2 & 3Experiments 2 & 3

ResultsResults

�� Chimpanzees presented withChimpanzees presented withhuman with food in hands.human with food in hands.

�� Two conditionsTwo conditions�� UnwillingUnwilling

�� tease the ape with food tease the ape with food

�� just stood there looking at foodjust stood there looking at food

�� UnableUnable

‘unwilling’ vs ‘unable’ experiment‘unwilling’ vs ‘unable’ experiment

�� UnableUnable

�� accident with foodaccident with food

�� trying to get the food from a tubetrying to get the food from a tube

�� couldn’t see the foodcouldn’t see the food

�� ResultsResults�� More banging and leaving theMore banging and leaving the

cage (frustration) in unwilling conditions.cage (frustration) in unwilling conditions.

�� Strongest effect when there was ‘intention in action’Strongest effect when there was ‘intention in action’

Call et al. 2004. ‘Unwilling’ vs ‘unable: chimpanzees’ understanding of human

intentions. Developmental Science, 7, 488-498.

Subordinate chimp

selects food based

on whether it is hidden

from the dominant chimp

-anticipating competition

Tomasello et al. (2003) Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.7 No.4

Dominant chimp either

sees or doesn’t see the

food hidden.

Subordinates act accord

to what the dominant

chimp knows.

Chimpanzee and bonobo gesturesChimpanzee and bonobo gestures31 distinct manual gestures

18 facial-vocal gestures

�� Only found in apes & humans. Only found in apes & humans.

�� Social group specific.Social group specific.

�� Flexible, depending on context.Flexible, depending on context.

� Under greater cortical control than facial/vocal signals

communicative gesturescommunicative gestures

�� Right hand bias in both apes and humans.Right hand bias in both apes and humans.

�� Ape equivalent of human Broca’s area is involved Ape equivalent of human Broca’s area is involved in production and perception of gestures but not in production and perception of gestures but not vocalizations:vocalizations:�� Part of the premotor mirror neuron systemPart of the premotor mirror neuron system

�� Enlarged in apes left hemisphereEnlarged in apes left hemisphere





�� that this set of relations becomes increasingly more complex that this set of relations becomes increasingly more complex over evolutionary time.over evolutionary time.


The MirrorThe MirrorNeuronNeuronNeuronNeuronCircuit!Circuit!

a) Observing an object

directed (transitive)

hand action

b) Performing a similar

Mirror neurons code for both:

b) Performing a similar

action (or logically

related action)

performed by

another monkey

or human being

Di Pellegrino et al. (1992); Gallese et al. (1996); Rizzolatti et al. (1996)

�� Evidence suggests mirror neuron circuits are necessary Evidence suggests mirror neuron circuits are necessary for action planning, action understanding and imitation for action planning, action understanding and imitation learning (through simulation). learning (through simulation). �� Review: Rizzolatti & Craighero. The Mirror Neuron System. Review: Rizzolatti & Craighero. The Mirror Neuron System. Annu.

Rev. Neurosci. 2004. 27:169–92

�� Evidence suggests that the mirror neuron system has a Evidence suggests that the mirror neuron system has a shared ‘selfshared ‘self--other’ mapping code.other’ mapping code.

Understanding other’s actions depends on simulating them in Understanding other’s actions depends on simulating them in �� Understanding other’s actions depends on simulating them in Understanding other’s actions depends on simulating them in one’s own motor system one’s own motor system

�� Argue that: being able to plan selfArgue that: being able to plan self--generated actions depends on generated actions depends on understanding of other’s actions! understanding of other’s actions!

� Mirror neurons may bridge observed action and what you plan to do.

Mirror neuron systems and imitation learningMirror neuron systems and imitation learningof guitar chord playingof guitar chord playing

During observation of chords During pause before execution

Buccino et al. 2004. Neural Circuits Underlying Imitation Learning of Hand Actions:An Event-Related fMRI Study. Neuron, 42, 323-334

�� Neurophysiological, brain imaging and behavioural Neurophysiological, brain imaging and behavioural evidence indicates:evidence indicates:

�� “that self and other actions are similarly coded in the “that self and other actions are similarly coded in the brain. As such, they form the foundation of a system in brain. As such, they form the foundation of a system in which we can not only understand the actions of others which we can not only understand the actions of others on the basis of the production of our own actions, but on the basis of the production of our own actions, but also can then use others’ actions as the basis for our also can then use others’ actions as the basis for our own future actions” own future actions” own future actions” own future actions”

�� “plans for action and the perception of the actions of “plans for action and the perception of the actions of others are intimately connected”others are intimately connected”

�� “this shared representational basis for self and other “this shared representational basis for self and other actions may serve as a powerful engine in development”actions may serve as a powerful engine in development”

Decety & Sommerville (2007) Motor Cognition & Mental Simulation. In Smith & Kosslyn eds. Cognitive Psychology: Mind and Brain.

� Unlike e.g. supplementary motor cortex, mirror

neuron circuits with pre-frontal working memory

circuitry mediates both imitation learning and

executive functioning.

� Because mirror neurons are inherently ‘social’

(coding inter-agent goal-directed actions)

executive control has a social basis.

Ancestral & modernhumans


summarysummary


self & others’ goaldirected actions)

monkeys

great apes


Greater sharedintentionalityp


Basis of highercognition

Selective pressure: complex goal-directed social life


self & others’ goal directed actions)


Biological basis: mirror neuron and pre-frontal systems

Documents

The social basis of higher cognitive functioning · 2015-07-17 · GoalGoal--directed motor control, imitation learning & in directed motor control, imitation learning & inter--ter