The psychology of countering terrorism with technology

142 IEEE ENGINEERING IN MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY MAGAZINE JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2004

The Psychology of Countering Terrorism with TechnologyAn Examination of the Role Psychology Plays inPreparing, Deploying, and Responding to Technologiesin Countering Threats of Terrorism

BY CHRIS E. STOUT

© 1998, 2001 ARTVILLE, LLC.

HO

MEL

AN

D S

ECU

RITY

0739-5175/04/$20.00©2004IEEE0739-5175/04/$20.00©2004IEEE

This article is meant to serve as an examination of the rolepsychology plays in preparing, deploying, and respond-ing to technologies in countering terrorism threats.There is an irony that we now live in a “hybrid” era, one

that is a blending of both technological advancements andpromise within a context of a previously unfathomed menaceof terrorist attack. There is a fine line between knowing howmuch information, and of what type, is optimal for keeping thepublic up to date without causing a panic or instilling informa-tion fatigue. Perhaps psychology can offer some guidance inthat we know that issuing nonspecific alarms is counter-pro-ductive as they tend to make people more paranoid and lessmindfully alert. This article takes a sober approach to whatindividuals can do to be better prepared to deal with the uncer-tainty of these times vis-a-vis the terrorist pall and offers real-istic considerations of how the complex mechanisms ofterrorism may play out, without alarmist hyperbole, andapproaches of situation assessment, appropriate content provi-sion, and concomitant information dissemination. Accuraterisk assessment when combined with appropriate preparationcan go a long way in mitigating unwarranted fears and anxi-eties, as well as provide a more rational and appropriate use ofthe technological tools that are (and will be) available.

Human Behavior, Technology, and PolicySusan E. Brandon, senior scientist, Science Directorate at theAmerican Psychological Association, compiled an impressivedocument titled “Combating Terrorism: Some Responses fromthe Behavioral Sciences” [1] to provide examples of how cur-rent psychological science can be applied to issues related toterrorism. Brandon’s prologue notes that the work is: “intend-ed to illustrate the manner in which policy and planningregarding terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies might beinformed by what is known about the limitations and capabili-ties of human behavior. The solution to the challenges posedby terrorism will not be found only in technological fixes.Rather, our best defenses and offenses depend on psychologi-cal variables: the psychology of decision-making, surveil-lance, and fear; perceptual and motivation variables in securitysystems, human factors considerations in human/machineinteractions, and so on.”

“Anthrax is not contagious, fear is!” This is a very poignantquote. It was made by Rear-Admiral Brian W. Flynn, EdD,

(Fmr.) Asst. Surgeon General US Public Health Service, dur-ing his presentation, “Terrorism and Mental Health,” at theNational Health Policy Forum [2]. It truly speaks to the coreof terrorism, and it offers clues to better dealing with the threatof terrorism. Psychological preparedness can markedly miti-gate the actual as well as emotional impact of an event or thechronic worry associated with threats of such. This is not tosuggest that denial, dulling, passive acceptance, or becomingjaded is a coping strategy; indeed, quite the contrary. It is thisauthor’s belief that having a realistic knowledge of risks andresponses better prepares individuals and communities.

Chemical Risks? Peter Huber [3] notes that there should be little concern overchemical attacks as their “acute effects are felt only when con-centrations are high. Dilution and dispersal are near-perfectremedies. And long term effects are far less grave.” The scenarioof a chemical attack would most likely be an evacuation of abuilding or neighborhood rather than some grid-locked urbancenter. There were no evacuations in 1978 for Love Canal or in1982 for Times Beach. It is the resultant panic that would likelycost most lives and cause injuries. But if people realize the prob-lem is contained, then the high-risk panic should not manifest.

Radiological Risks?It is unlikely that U.S. nuclear power plants are at much risk tobe targets as the security and systems backups have been inplace for a number of years and have been further evaluatedand enhanced as of late. So, a “dirty bomb,” a conventionalexplosive, or an incendiary device used to disperse a smallamount of cesium or the like would be a more realistic threatas accessing such material within U.S. borders could comefrom the multitude of medical and industrial facilities. If sucha device were detonated, it would likely cause the specific areato be quarantined, but the likely greater damage would be psy-chological—via fear that such a thing happened and could per-haps happen again. Likewise, to have a circumstance in whichno one could visit the Washington Memorial because itbecame a hot-zone would certainly cast a pall on the nation’spride and ego. But no one died when Three Mile Islandbecame hot. The happy citizens of Denver, by virtue of theirhigh altitude, are drenched in more radiation every day thanthe rest of us sea-level citizens, and it is not cause for panic or

IEEE ENGINEERING IN MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY MAGAZINE JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2004 143

crisis [3]. Then one may ask, “What are likely to be the great-est risks from radiological incidents?” Brandon [4] notes:

The greatest impact of radiation accidents has beenfrom human reactions to the accident, rather than fromexposure to radioactive substances. These have not beenpanic reactions as much as behaviors that occurredbecause of a lack of information. For example:

Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania (1979): Feed water tosteam generators of a nuclear power reactor stopped,resulting in a loss of cooling of the reactor core. Very littleradioactivity was eventually released to the environment.However, psychological effects have been documented,resulting from inaccurate estimates of very large radiationrelease levels, and the emotional political response andmedia coverage, which projected fetal health outcomes. [5]

Chernobyl, USSR (1986): Within 30 months of an acci-dent in a nuclear reactor, the death toll was 30; about15,000 people were unable to work because of exposure-related illnesses, 12,000 children received large doses tothe thyroid, and 9,000 persons were exposed in utero.Other health-related aftereffects were radiophobia, anincrease in stress-related illnesses due to fear of radiationand dislocation of people; poor diets due to stringent safe-guards against potentially contaminated food, the abortingof as many as 200,000 healthy fetuses because of fears ofradiation exposure, and increases in alcoholism. [5]

With this in mind then, the implications for counter-terror-ism should consider that “the use of radioactive materials insmall explosive devices (‘dirty bombs’) within the U.S. proba-bly would kill relatively few people. The damage would beprimarily from people acting in the absence of good informa-tion and subsequent economic impact. Current media coverageof threats from such attacks are likely to focus on the ill-effects of an attack, while not providing any way for the read-er to learn how to gauge the effects of an attack, nor what todo should such an attack occur. This only increases the likeli-hood of panic behavior which otherwise would not occur andwhich could be avoided altogether” [4].

Biological Risks?Debora MacKenzie, author of the article “Bioarmageddon” [6],offers two differing responses to the same bio-terrorist attack:

It begins with a threat. A terrorist group declares thatunless its demands are met within 48 hours, it will releaseanthrax over San Francisco. Two days later, a privateplane flies across the Bay, spreading an aerosol cloud thatshimmers briefly in the sunlight before disappearing.

Scenario one: Thousands are killed in the panic as 2 million people flee the city. Another 1.6 millioninhale anthrax spores. Antibiotics are rushed in, but thehospitals are overwhelmed and not everyone receivestreatment. Most of the country’s limited stock ofanthrax vaccine has already been given to soldiers.Emergency crews provide little help as there are onlyfour germ-proof suits in the whole city. More than amillion of the Bay Area’s 6.5 million residents die.

Scenario two: In the two days before the attack, citi-zens seal their doors and windows with germ-prooftape. They listen to the radio for instructions, their gasmasks, drugs and disinfectants ready. Few panic. Whensensors around the city confirm that the cloud containsanthrax spores, hospitals receive the appropriate antibi-otics and vaccines. Trained emergency teams withgerm-proof suits and tents set up in the places whereautomated weather analyses show the deadly cloud willdrift. With advance preparation and rapid response only100,000 people die.

The scenarios are both predicated on the assumptions thatthere is a warning provided, and that it is considered valid. It isdoubtful any terrorist would be so polite or that the method ofdisbursal would be so dramatic—or even noticed—whenreleased. Thus, it becomes incumbent for us to increase oursystems of surveillance. Fortunately the Center for DiseaseControl and Prevention (at the time of this writing) is institut-ing such a national system, but it is only monitoring the mani-fest result of an outbreak, not an initial release. For that,diagnostic technologies run by the Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency (DARPA) are able to distinguishthe first symptoms of anthrax, plague, and many other poten-tial agents of bioterrorism from that of, say, flu symptoms.Thus, the differential diagnosis of true positives is importantfor the hypochondriasis that could result from anxiety, panic,and hysteria of a publicly known release of an agent.MacKenzie noted: “Eventually, DARPA would like to devel-op a detector that weighs no more than 2 kilograms, can iden-tify as few as two particles of 20 different biological agents ina sample of air, costs less than $5000 and does not give falsenegatives. Such detectors could be deployed around cities togive early warning of airborne disease” [7].

But there is also the risk of wasting time, money, andresources if we “over engineer” solutions. Consider the June2001 “Dark Winter” bioterrorism simulation exercise in whichclouds of smallpox were “released” in three states, immediately“infecting” 1,000 people, then spooling up to a staggering3,000,000 “dead” by February. Such makes for great alarmistpress; however, smallpox is not very coetaneous in the first placeand actually spreads slowly. So why were such sensationalismand hysterical scenarios considered in Dark Winter? In the DarkWinter model, there was an expectation that for every one personprimarily infected, he/she would infect ten more. In reality, thenumber is more likely to be less than one, and even if it were justover one, the spread would be easily containable [8].

Additional Risk AreasThomas Homer-Dixon [9] warns of various risks resultant fromour own technological developments. We now need to be waryof the clever exploitation of our society’s new and growingcomplexities. Materials engineering, advances in the chemistryof explosives, and the miniaturization of electronics have madebombings more lethal, even if constructed by amateurs, andharder to detect. Many “recipes” for bomb making are stillfreely available via the Internet or public library (e.g., TheAnarchist’s Cookbook, Steal This Book, etc.). Many large build-ing and hotel floor plans also remain accessible on the Internet.

Communications technologies allow for rapid and encryptedcommunications anywhere via satellite phones to the Internet,thus enabling great ease and speed in sharing information on


weapons, attack plans, and tactics, or arranging for surrepti-tious funds transfers across borders through ages-old Hawalasystem of moving money between countries, especially inMiddle Eastern and Asian countries with clan-based networks[9]. If sat-phones are too expensive, there is off-the-shelf tech-nology for “spread-spectrum” radios that randomly switchtheir broadcasting and receiving signals, thus making it almostimpossible to intercept communications transmissions [9].Today’s off-the-shelf laptop has computational power on parwith what the U.S. Department of Defense had in the 1960s.Steganography encryption is easy to use, and there are at least140 tools available for downloading on the Internet [9].Although the Internet was initially designed for military use,and thus backed up, it is not too difficult to hack into a rootserver or router. One can also exploit peer-to-peer software(e.g., the information transfer tool, Gnutella). One could thendistribute millions of “sleeper” viruses programmed to attackspecific machines or the network itself at a predetermined dateand time [9].

There are tens of thousands of transmission lines strungacross the U.S., and they are impossible to protect yet easilyaccessible by a sport utility vehicle. Transmission towerswould be easy to bring down with simply one well-placedexplosive [9]. Coordinate a few of those at the same time andit would not take long for the chaos to spread.

Many large gas pipelines run near or thru urban areas. Theyhave huge explosive potential that could cause both great localdamage and wider disruptions in the energy supply. “Benigntechnologies” have great destructive power [9]. Considerchemical plants, which are packed with toxins and flamma-bles (and maybe explosives, too). Security for them is laxaccording to a 1999 Federal investigation [9].

Trains carry tens of thousands of tons of toxic materialalong transport corridors throughout the United States. A ter-rorist would just need to check the schedule and place a pieceof rail across the path of that train to cause a wreck, releasingthe chemicals and a mass evacuation—all with zero risk to theterrorist. Rail and highway tunnels are also vulnerable as theyoffer “choke points” at which it would be extremely difficultto extinguish a fire, as exemplified by such accidents inSwitzerland and Baltimore in 2001 [9].

Remember Hoof/Foot and Mouth Disease in the UnitedKingdom? All someone would have to do is contaminate just20–30 large livestock farms or ranches, and in a matter ofjust weeks the cattle, sheep, and pig industries would grindto a halt, costing the economy tens of billions of dollars [9].We have a vast grain storage and transportation network inthe U.S., which is easily accessible and unprotected (grainsilos dot the countryside). Someone could just drop somecontaminant into a few of these and watch it diffuse throughthe food system. Polyclorinated biphenyls (PCBs) would be

ideal toxins for this, as they are easy to find in the oil of oldelectrical transformers. They are potent because they havetrace amounts of dioxins, which are both carcinogenic andneurotoxic, and they also disrupt the human endocrine sys-tem; children are particularly vulnerable [9]. Millions couldbe exposed in a short time. In January 1999 in Belgium, 500tons of animal feed were accidentally contaminated by about50 kgs of PCBs from old transformer oil. Ten million peoplein Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and France ate thecontaminated food products. It is expected that this singleincident with animal feed may subsequently cause about8,000 cases of cancer [9].

Large-System ComplexitiesThe U.S. economy gains many of its efficiencies, and thuseconomies, from complex linkages of corporations, factories(especially with just-in-time manufacturing methods), andurban centers that are linked by highways, railways, electricalgrids, and fiber-optic cables; all are increasingly complex andinterconnected. Disproportionately large disruptions andeconomies of scale can quickly occur via disrupting any non-linear or systemic behavior or system such as electrical, tele-phone, or air traffic [9].

As human beings we also function within a nonlinear psy-chological network that also is tightly coupled and complex,and can be very unstable. A terrorist attack, or even just thethreat, can result in a mix of emotions including grief, anger,horror, fear, anxiety, disbelief, and perhaps even hatred.Attacks and threats shake our individual and collective psy-chology by undermining basic feelings of safety and security.The zenith of terrorism is when it is simple and symbolic andamplifies the emotional impact without a moment’s notice; ifsomething is unimaginably cruel, then anything may be possi-ble and only our imaginations limit the potential horror thatcould befall us or our loved ones forever. That is indeed thepowerful psychology of terrorism.

Homer-Dixon [9] notes that if someone can bring downwhat seems to be magnificent and bold statements ofAmerican capitalism like a house of cards as was done withthe World Trade Center towers, then perhaps how we viewourselves as strong and robust may also be a false facade.Terrorists are good at exploiting this. For example, a numberof people did not like to fly even before 9/11, but since then,the terrorists have been able to exploit some people’s naturalfears of flying. Additionally, if one is insecure about the econ-omy or one’s job, such individuals do not go out and buy cost-ly items or go on big vacations. Instead, they hunker downand save their money—just in case. The result? Goods don’tsell and business suffers. People then lose their jobs, thusbecoming even more careful and restrictive about their spend-ing. Then markets constrict as a result, and more businesses

There is an irony that we now live in a “hybrid” era,

one that is a blending of both technological

advancements and promise within a context of a

previously unfathomed menace of terrorist attack.


scale back. Businesses’ scaling back causes more job losses.Job losses cause people to restrict spending, etc. Thus, we eco-nomically do ourselves in. That is powerful psychology.

Public Worries, Fears, and Psychologies The phenomena of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome(SARS) has also fueled worry. “Anxieties surrounding epi-demics are always several things at once,” said Priscilla Wald,a Duke University English professor who studies disease andpopular culture, in an interview by Marie McCullough [10].“They are about the disease and the spread of the disease, but . . . the threat of the disease is always refracted through thecultural anxieties that it taps into.” That’s why West Nile virusand the anthrax attacks were much more worrisome than, say,the flu, even though there are more than 30,000 flu-relateddeaths each year in the U.S. Yet a Gallup poll taken in April2002 shortly after SARS showed up in North America foundthat 37% of American adults are worried about getting it.Americans are a bit less worried about SARS than they wereabout West Nile virus, but more than they were about anthrax,Gallup polls show. The psychology behind epidemics hasalways been a product—and shaper—of cultural fears. “Goback to the Bible or to Homer and you can see that plagueswere seen as a divine judgment,” Wald said. “Bubonic plague,which decimated medieval populations, eventually shook theirfaith in God, which weakened the church’s power. And if thatwasn’t terrifying enough, ‘black death’ disrupted internationaltrade, the labor supply, and feudal control of peasants.”

So then what will the public do in the instance of a large-scale attack, and how can we be best prepared? Brandon [11]found the following:

The National Academies of Science [12] report on“Making the nation safer” noted that although outrightbehavioral panic will be rare, it is likely to occur underspecial conditions such as clogged roads or entrapmentin a building.

Social science research has shown that panic, in the caseof a disaster—which, by definition, is an event that gen-erates casualties in excess of available resources—israre. [13], [14]

During the 1979 accident at the nuclear power plant atThree Mile Island, almost 40% of the population within 15miles of the nuclear plant evacuated the area on their own,effectively and without evidence of panic. [15]

The evacuation of the World Trade towers when they werebombed in 1993 was orderly and calm, despite thousandsof people trapped in dark columns filled with smoke, and

preliminary reports of the evacuations that occurred onSeptember 11 contain similar descriptions. [16]

The evacuation of cars and pedestrians from the CapitolMall area in Washington D.C. on September 11 was order-ly and calm, despite massive traffic jams, temporary clos-ing of the metropolitan trains, and radio reports ofbombings at the Capitol and congressional buildings (per-sonal observation by an evacuee, Susan Brandon).

Perhaps the event in American history that is closest to anincident of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or bio-logical/chemical attack is the Spanish flu epidemic in1918, where more than half a million Americans died.History shows us that people implemented disease controland treatment strategies within their communities.

Social science analyses have shown repeatedly that, in dis-aster, people act in accordance with their customary normsand roles—able-bodied assist the impaired, supervisorsassume responsibility for those whom they supervise, andfriends look out for friends. [16]

Too often, planning for biological/chemical, WMD, andother radiological attack has been myopic, assuming thatemergency rescue and medical systems will be capable ofmanaging such a disaster alone and that the public is incapableof playing a supportive or even vital role. Emergency planninghas generalized the “yellow-tape” approach—separating thepublic from the site of an accident by yellow tape—fromlocalized accidents to large-scale disasters [11].

Thus the implications for countering terrorism shouldinclude “planning for wide-scale WMD, biological/chemicalor other radiological attacks” and should be guided by whatwe know about human behavior in such situations [11]:

1) Keep panic in check. The general public should beviewed as a capable partner, so that civic institutions andneighborhood groups are used to assist with information dis-semination, outbreak monitoring, and medical treatment anddistribution.

2) Plan for treatment of victims in the home. By definition,hospitals, clinics, and even mobile medical care facilities willbe incapable of handling all those who are in need.Emergency plans need to include how to disseminate infor-mation about outbreak, nutrition, sanitation, infection control,and how to care for the seriously ill. Currently, we plan tocreate a stockpile of smallpox vaccination. Also needed is aninformation stockpile (in diverse languages and aimed atdiverse populations) [16].

Attacks and threats shake our individual and

collective psychology by undermining basic

feelings of safety and security.


3) Engage the public in the planning. Many issues can be bestdealt with before an attack occurs. These include decisionsabout quarantine (should children be isolated from parents?)and setting priorities for the use of scarce medical resources.

4) Recognize the value of distributed response systems.Mobile emergency-response teams and incident commandcenters will not be able to take advantage of what has beenshown to be the most effective disaster response, which is thecommunity of people who surround the victims. These are thepeople who have the greatest information on local customs,organizations, infrastructure, and special needs, and who willact most effectively if they can respond to immediate prob-lems and challenges in creative and individualized ways.

Planning IssuesRichard Friedman of the of the National Strategy Forum [17]notes: “The public expectation that the government willrespond effectively in a crisis is high. This confidence is well-warranted; government emergency response teams at all lev-els have shown their effectiveness many times over in thepast. However, trauma creates personal confusion, fear, mis-trust, and hostility. If government action is not rapid andeffective—a strong possibility in the wake of a catastrophicterrorism incident—the public may become unwilling to fol-low government direction. Advance planning involving boththe public and government can help reduce expectation to areasonable level and show individuals what they can do tohelp themselves. Information is critical. People are vulnerableto inconsistent, conflicting messages. The public messageshould avoid false reassurances and provide individuals withoptions and alternatives that are feasible and helpful.”

In consideration of bioterrorism issues from a national per-spective, Debora MacKenzie [7] notes that following the iden-tification of an agent, one approach would be to vaccinatepeople before exposure, but such a course can be problematicdue to limited availability of the vaccine, problematic distribu-tion, and the fact that a vaccine wouldn’t help those alreadyinfected. We also have learned in the U.S. that people do notwish to be vaccinated for smallpox when weighing risk versesbenefit of doing so. Molecular science being what it is todayalso adds the problem of manufacturing a bug that has differ-ing antigens or is a novel artificial pathogen to begin with,which would render the traditional vaccine useless.

The scientific countermeasure that DARPA is consideringinvolves “developing vaccines quickly enough for them to becreated, mass-produced and distributed after an attack. Thefirst step, which many researchers including those in the fast-paced field of genomics are now working on, involves speed-ing up DNA sequencing so that an unknown pathogen’s genescould be detailed in a day. The resulting sequences could then

be the basis for developing an instant DNA vaccine” [7].But good technologies and promising developments can be

rendered useless if the psychology of the populace is ignored.For example, “the principal means available to governmentofficials to prevent the spread of disease are the containmentof infected persons and quarantine. Since the initial reaction ofmost people would be to flee the immediate occurrence area,it would be very difficult for the government to impose andenforce a quarantine. The American public is accustomed to ahigh degree of personal autonomy and civil liberties, and it islikely that many would disregard or resist quarantine orders”[17]. A creative solution then may be using “an alternateapproach to a widespread quarantine: family home treatment.Indeed, it may be more beneficial for individuals as well asthe wider community that a mass exodus from affected areasbe avoided. A household may be a better place for individualsthan a hospital or temporary community shelter. During abioterrorism event this could help break the disease cycle andreduce the burden on incident managers and first responders.With proper advance training and minimal supplies, individu-als could monitor themselves for indications of exposure todisease and treat injuries at home. Also, anxiety decreaseswhen there is a combination of good information coupled withfamiliar and stable surroundings” [17]. The time for trainingand preparation is before an event, such as stockpiling appro-priate foodstuffs, water, medical supplies, informationalresources (in hardcopy), and perhaps portable electrical gener-ators and fuel. Otherwise, such already limited approachesbecome unfeasible.

Homer-Dixon [9] suggests that we need to acknowledge ourlimitations and take steps to reduce our vulnerabilities relatedto economies and technologies; for example, loosening thecouplings in our economic and technological networks, build-ing in various buffers and circuit breakers that interrupt dan-gerous feedbacks, and dispersing high-value assets so they areless concentrated and thus less inviting. Perhaps greater use ofdecentralized, local energy production and alternative energysources to decrease users’ dependence on the energy grid couldalso be implemented. Increased autonomy of local and regionalfood-production networks would be beneficial, so that if one isdamaged, it doesn’t cascade on to other regions as well.Increased inventories of feedstocks (or parts for industry)would result in increases in production costs due to inefficien-cy; however, the extra security in having more stable andresilient production networks could far outweigh this cost.

The capacity for terrorists to be successful depends on theirability to understand the complex systems we depend upon socritically, so our capacity to defend ourselves depends on thatsame understanding. Pauchant and Mitroff [18] offer a strate-gy known as “learning and deep change.” In their model, allevents—even tragic ones—teach us. Complex systems have

Good technologies and promising developments

can be rendered useless if the psychology

of the populace is ignored.


both the creative aspect, which offers speed/efficiency, and thepotentially destructive side, which allows for catastrophic out-comes. They note all complex systems are susceptible to orga-nizational error (such as the Challenger tragedy), human error(such a Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the Exxon Valdez), terrorism(e.g., Tylenol tampering in Chicago, the Oklahoma Citybombing and, of course, 9/11). What we then need to dealwith is responding to complexity by searching for the destruc-tive side. For example, Johnson & Johnson modified bothpackaging and the products themselves after the tamperingevent [18]. Thus, we can increase safety in general by design;the Pentagon was/is a harder target than the World TradeCenter was. This provides lessons for the blueprints of futureskyscrapers, dams, and nuclear plants.

The Brookings Institution [19] produced a white paper titled“Protecting the American Homeland” that offered suggestionsfor protecting key targets:

Buildings and facilities with large numbers of people:Improve air intake system security at major non-federal build-ings (accessibility, filters, and reverse pressure/internal over-pressure). Selectively institute more security precautions atmajor buildings against conventional explosives (e.g., shatter-proof glass).

National symbols: Accelerate GSA plan for federal buildingsecurity.

Critical infrastructure: Protect key nodes of electricity grid.Place chemical sensors at reservoirs; protect and monitorreservoir grounds and pumps. Improve security of e-mail.Centralize, bolster food safety inspections. Improve cyberse-curity. Improve airport security. Improve train security at tun-nels and elsewhere. Place chemical weapons sensors at manypublic sites such as subway stations. Improve fire resiliency ofmajor tunnels and security at major bridges.

The total, annual cost estimates for these measures and addi-tional, general protection is US$8.8 billion.

ConclusionsIt is one thing to build bomb-resistant, reverse-pressure build-ings and to develop higher-tech surveillance and security orclever counter-biologicals, but the most difficult thing to buildmay be an altered world view. Some promote a more ethicaldistribution of wealth as a counter-terrorist, egalitarianapproach, reminding us that in 1789 the French revolutionariessaid: “Let’s risk everything, since we have nothing.” The chal-lenge before us all is how do we build a true culture of civilsecurity? Perhaps psychology can offer some perspective ifnot guidance.

When only ten letters out of millions were found to havetraces of Anthrax, a very containable pathogen, there waswide-spread panic. The U.S. Post Office and the Senate evenshut down. New Zealanders, on the other hand, are prepared toindependently survive for three days in the event of majorweather catastrophes [9]. Maybe there is a good lesson andgood psychology in doing so. If we all were more psychologi-cally and practically prepared, we might have better resilienceand hardiness to what may come our way, be it terrorist based;a natural disaster like a flood, earthquake, or tornado; or a per-sonal trauma such as a house fire or victimization.

When thinking of psychology in the context of terrorism,one cannot help but ponder the etiology of such actions andperhaps presume psychopathology of the perpetrator. Whilethis consideration has not been the focus of this article, it maybe worthwhile to touch upon it in conclusion, and if onlybriefly as there is much in the way of contradictory opinionand little consensus. Nevertheless, a brief review of these dif-ferences may be helpful in appreciating the complexity of theissue of terrorism. (For readers interested in more detail,please review [20].)

For most, it is difficult to understand how someone can com-mit a terrorist act. Then they are quick to consider psy-chopathology as the “cause.” Of course, the complex nature ofterrorism along with the cruelty of it amplifies the manifoldmotivations. There are frustratingly few, if any, simpleanswers. However, Atran [21] offers: “Contemporary suicideterrorists from the Middle East are publicly deemed crazedcowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in povertyand ignorance. (However) recent research indicates they haveno appreciable psychopathology and are as educated and eco-nomically well-off as surrounding populations. A first line ofdefense is to get the communities from which suicide attackersstem to stop the attacks by learning how to minimize the recep-tivity of mostly ordinary people to recruiting organizations.”

Some theorists have focused on the so-called “abuse ofwealth,” which considers wealth to be the world’s number-oneproblem at the moment—stimulating more desires of greed,driven by accumulation of possessions rather than yieldingincreased happiness, contentment, or satisfaction. This is thenjuxtaposed with concern that wealthy nations are not usingsuch riches to deal with global problems of hunger, illness, orpoverty. Indeed, it is difficult for some nonradical and nonreac-tionary citizens of moderate income, social class, and educationliving in developed countries to cope with the embarrassinglygarish displays by others of their wasteful consumerism. Manysee materialism run amok along with the concomitant (if notcomorbid) pretentiousness that accompanies such selfish vul-garity. While it may not be the generalizable case, it is certainlythe appearance that many people are obsessed with hedonistic(but nevertheless rationalized) motivations that border on the

The capacity for terrorists to be successful

depends on their ability to understand the complex

systems we depend upon so critically; our

capacity to defend ourselves depends

on that same understanding.


obscene. The risk in considering such appearances as somehowcausing or justifying a terrorist attack against such countries,political structures, or economic systems smacks of a simple-minded paradigm of blaming the victim. However, there maybe lessons to be learned from this as well.

There are also concerns about unworkable—or at least,unenforceable—international laws such as the KyotoProtocol, Interpol, the Geneva Convention, the Declaration ofHuman Rights, and nonproliferation agreements. It wouldseem that UN peacekeeping is no longer a viable option inmany international flashpoints. Similarly, there is a growingconcern that there is a lack of understanding between cultures,and often in times of conflict, little attempt is being made tofind common ground. This could then lead to major impassesin the future, possibly between the U.S. and China, or betweenChina and India, for example. Without a framework of carefuldiplomacy, problems will turn into major showdowns withpotentially catastrophic consequences.

Peterson, writing in Foreign Affairs [22], wisely suggeststhat public diplomacy is in need of a new paradigm that is partof a comprehensive policy and reforms that include:

1) developing a coherent strategic and coordinating frame-work

2) increasing customized, two-way dialogue in place ofconventional, one-way, push-down communication

3) expansion of private-sector involvement4) improving the effectiveness of public diplomacy

resources5) increasing the assets devoted to public diplomacy.

Peterson concludes that “strong leadership and imaginativethinking, planning, and coordination are critical. Public diplo-macy is a strategic instrument of foreign policy, and US lead-ers must provide the sustained, coordinated, robust, andeffective public diplomacy that America requires. Indeed, thewar on terrorism demands it.”

Flynn [2] notes that the major challenges for psychologyand the behavioral sciences to address hinge on the fact thatthere has been no model/structure for truly dealing with a“national disaster.” Contributing to and compounding thisproblem is the fact that there is a scarcity of good research onrisk and protective factors as well as good interventionresearch. There also remain many “disconnects” between pro-fessional disciplines (such as engineering, psychology, andpolitical science) as well as within professional disciplines(such as human factors, social, and clinical psychologies) withpolicy makers and law enforcement. Finally, we need todesign in seamless mechanisms for tracking psychologicalimpacts and outcomes of programs and technologies and to beable to then incorporate the feedback gained and revise asneed be on an on-going basis in order to develop and improveempirically derived methods of intervention and preparednessin the utilization of technological advances.

AcknowledgmentThis article is based on a chapter by the author in his upcom-ing book, The Psychology of Terrorism: Coping with theContinuing Threat (condensed edition), Praeger, 2004.

Chris E. Stout is a licensed clinical psychologist and clinicalprofessor at the University of Illinois, College of Medicine,

Department of Psychiatry. He served as anongovernmental organization special rep-resentative to the United Nations. He wasappointed by the Secretary of the U.S.Department of Commerce to the Board ofExaminers for the Baldrige NationalQuality Award. He is a Fellow of theAmerican Psychological Association, past-

president of the Illinois Psychological Association, and is aDistinguished Practitioner in the National Academies ofPractice. Dr. Stout has published or presented over 300 papersand 27 books/manuals on various topics in psychology. Hisworks have been translated into six languages. He was notedas being “one of the most frequently cited psychologists in thescientific literature” in a study by Hartwick College. Thebreadth of his work ranges from having served as a judge forDean Kamen’s FIRST Robotics competitions to serving as anAmerican delegate and presenter at the First InternationalConference on Unconventional Computing. He was awarded“Distinguished Alumni of the Year” from Purdue University’sSchool of Engineering in 1991.

Address for Correspondence: Chris E. Stout, 918 N.Woodcrest Lane, Kildeer, IL 60047 USA. E-mail: [email protected].

References[1] S.E. Brandon, Combating Terrorism: Some Responses from the BehavioralSciences, Science Directorate, American Psychological Association, Sept. 6, 2002.Available: www.apa.org/ppo/issues/terrorhome.html[2] B.W. Flynn, Terrorism and Mental Health. Washington, D.C.: National HealthPolicy Forum, Oct. 23, 2001.[3] P. Huber, “Panic and terrorism,” Forbes, vol. 172, no. 6, p. 73, Mar. 31, 2003.[4] S.E. Brandon, Combating Terrorism: Some Responses from the BehavioralSciences, Science Directorate, American Psychological Association, Sept. 6, 2002,p. 45. Available: www.apa.org/ppo/issues/terrorhome.html[5] Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Toxicological Profile forIonizing Radiation. Washington, D.C.: U.S. DHHS, 1999.[6] D. MacKenzie, “Bioarmageddon,” New Scientist, vol. 159, no. 2152, p. 46Sept. 9, 1998.[7] D. MacKenzie, “Bioarmageddon,” New Scientist, vol. 159, no. 2152, p. 42Sept. 9, 1998.[8] S. Begley, “New bioterror models show limited threat from small pox attack,”Wall Str. J., vol. 84, no. 301, p. B1. Nov. 8, 2002.[9] T. Homer-Dixon, “The rise of complex terrorism,” Foreign Policy, vol. 128,pp. 52–62, Jan./Feb. 2002.[10] M. McCullough, “Fear of SARS taps into other worries,” Knight RidderNewswire, Apr. 20, 2003.[11] S.E. Brandon, Combating Terrorism: Some Responses from the BehavioralSciences, Science Directorate, American Psychological Association, Sept. 6, 2002,pp. 31–32. Available: www.apa.org/ppo/issues/terrorhome.html[12] National Academy of Sciences, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Scienceand Technology in Countering Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: National AcademyPress, 2002. [13] R. Dynes and K. Tierney, Disasters, Collective Behavior and SocialOrganization. Newark, DE: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1994.[14] N. Johnson, Response to Disaster: Fact Versus Fiction and its Perpetuation.Lanthan, MD: Univ. Press of America, 1987.[15] L. Clarke, Mission Improbably: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster. Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999.[16] T. Glass and M. Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the people: How to vacci-nate a city against panic,” Confronting Biological Weapons, CID, vol. 34, pp.217–223, 2002.[17] R. Friedman, Prudent Preparation. Washington, D.C.: National StrategyForum, pp. 3–4. Available: www.nationalstrategy.com[18] T.C. Pauchant and I.I. Mitroff, “Learning to cope with complexity,” TheFuturist, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 68–69, 2002.[19] Brookings Institution, Protecting the American Homeland. Washington, DC:The Brookings Institution, 2002, p. 53.[20] C.E. Stout, Ed., The Psychology of Terrorism, vols. I–IV. Westport, CT:Praeger, 2002.[21] S. Atran, “Genesis of suicide terrorism,” Science, 2003.[22] P.G. Peterson, “Public diplomacy and the war on terrorism,” Foreign Affairs,vol. 81, no. 5, p. 94, 2002.