Aneient Philosophy 5Mathesis Publications, Inc.

The Political Intention of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy

P.A. Vander Waerdt

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Aristotle's moral philosophy forms part of his comprehensive political science(1tOAL'tLX1}), but contemporary scholars have generally neglected the relation of his ethicalwritings to the Polities. Richard Bodes' purpose in his important study, Le philosopheet la eite, is to restore Aristotle's moral philosophy to the political framework in whichit was conceived and presented. He refutes the widely if often tacitly held assumptionthat Aristotle's ethical works expound an 'autonomous moral science' (Gauthier andJolif 1959, ii:1, 1-2, 10-12), and he argues that the purpose ofpolitical science is prac-tical rather than theoretical: to provide the actual or potential statesman with the trainingin legislative science (cpPOV1}

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virtue, is found not among the sophists or politicians, but in Aristotle' s teaching onpolitical science. The statesman once properly educated serves as the apxt'tEx'tWV wholays down the end in accordance with which his fellow-citizens are educated. In histhird chapter, apparently responding to Jaeger, Bodes forestalls the objection thatAristotle' s conception of his inquiry into 'ta ~91l as political science is a Platonizingstage of his thought later superseded in a development from a 'morale politique' toa 'morale individuelle' by arguing that the Eudemian Ethics presupposes an identicaldoctrine of political science (1236b39-1237a3), that connexions between EN x 9 andvarious texts such as Politics vii-viii sometimes considered 'early' are to be explainedby their common intention, and that the EN represents the final stage of Aristotle'sthinking on political science. In his last two chapters Bodes reviews the evidencefor the originally oral character of the treatises, arguing that the EN differs from theEE in being intended for an audience larger than Aristotle's school, and then con-siders in detail the character expected of this audience. In abrief conclusion, Bodesmaintains that the statesman must always legislate in conformity with the regime inforce, even if it promotes inferior ends: bis knowledge of 'questions ethiques' is intendedmerely to correet imperfeetions in a regime' s system of law, not to promote ends higherthan the regime' s.

Much in these chapters beyond Bodes' general thesis commands assent. I am notpersuaded, however, that he has explained the intention informing Aristotle' s presen-tation of political science successfully, and in this discussion I should like to considersome difficulties in his interpretation. In the first place, one cannot understand thisintention without settling the complex problems concerning the relation of the twoethical writings to the Politics, but Bodes does not even consider whether the extantPolitics conforms to the program of political science announced in the EN, and hisevasion of the philological issues at stake leads hirn to misunderstand its structureand philosophical motivation. Second, Bodes fails to recognize, much less explain,the perplexing manner of Aristotle'sexposition of political science in the EN and Pol-itics, the first of which is designated 1tOAt'ttX~ 'ttt; but which somehow abstracts fromall of the considerations such as the regime and its laws and customs which in prac-tice, Aristotle holds, govern the individual's education, and the second of which-inits extant form-contains no thematic account or synthesis of how the teaching onmoral education in the ethical writings is to be related to the various forms 'of regimeand their divergent educational programs. So long, however, as the philosophical moti-vation for this procedure and the doctrinal incompleteness of the teaching on virtueand education in the EN remain unexplained, most scholars will continue to treat theethical works as expounding an 'autonomous moral science' even though, as Bodesrightly argues, this assumption is untenable. Third, Bodes' interpretation of how tosquare the account of the moral education of individuals in the ethical writings withthe doctrine that their education must conform to the regime in force is mistaken,and consequently he misunderstands Aristotle' s thinking on education, the role of thestatesman in educating his fellow-citizens, and Aristotle' s intention in educating thestatesman. Fourth, Bodes' attempt to relate the EN and Politics as end to means,the one providing the statesman with knowledge of 'le bien humain (ordre de la fin)'and the other knowledge of 'les regimes constitutionnels (ordre des moyens)' is unsatis-

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factory: the statesman hardly uses his knowledge of legislation simply as the means \to attain ends fixed by his knowledge of 'questions ethiques', for he legislates, in thefirst instance, in accord with the ends promoted by his city's regime, and it is onlythrough the double teleology which underlies the program of political science elabo-rated in iv 1 that one can understand how the statesman in legislating is to make useof the teaching of the ethical writings.

In the space here allowed it is impossible to settle these complex issues. What fol-lows is of necessity only a small selection, but I believe a fair on~, of the criticismsuggested by reflection upon Bodes' arguments. Since much of what I shall say iscritical, let me emphasize that I consider Le philosophe et La cite an important contri-bution, and my criticism is intended as areturn for all I have learned from ponderingit and as astimulus for further investigation.

Bodes' assumption that the EN and Politics in their extant form represent a uni-fied exposition of Aristotle' s teaching on political science requires reconsideration.The Politics as we have it: (a) quotes the EE, not the EN; (b) it diverges significantlyfrom the investigation announced in EN x 9; and (c) it is incomplete: it lacks Aristo-tle' s promised 'discourses on the regimes' in which he will have explained a hostof central issues bearing on 'les rapports entre morale et politique'. One cannot graspthe structure and intention of Aristotle's work without understanding these facts.

(a) Bodes never mentions the important fact that all citations of the ~atXot AOIOtin the Politics (126la30, 1280al8, 1282b20, 1295a36, 1332a8, 1332a22; cf. Meta. 981b25)refer to the EE and the common books (which Bodes considers Eudemian) ratherthan the EN (cf. Jaeger 1923, 297-299; Dirlmeier 1962, 111-115; Kenny 1978, 5-8).This fact alone refutes Bodes' assumption that the EN and Politics were planned asa unit. If the Politics cites the EE because it was written before the EN, which is thebest solution (contra Kenny 1978, 224-229), the priority ofthe Politics to the EN mayprove important. For although the EE is also an inquiry into political science, it isnot explicitly conceived as part of a larger enterprise, and consequently a Politics writtenas its complement may not fulfill the program of political science outlined in the EN.(Bodes is certainly wrong to assert that the EE 'ne se presente pas clairement, nidans son introduction, ni nulle part ailleurs, comme une enquete politique ou destineeau politique' [133], for Aristotle plainly addresses his inquiry to the statesman[1216b35-39, accepting Richards' 't~ 1tOAt'ttX~], and 1216b26-1217aI8 in fact explainsthe method which must be followed to bring about the conjunction between what isgood in itself and what is good for oneself which it is the purpose of political scienceto produce [1236b39-1237a3]; cf. 1216al0-37 with 1153b7-25, 1214a30-b5, 1215bl-5;1216bI8-25 with EN 1112bll-14; 1218a33-35; 1218bll-16 with 1141b21-1142al1; 1234b22-23;and, in the common books, 1130b25-29 with 1276bI6-1277b32; 1137bI7-24; 1152bl-5).At the least, as we shall see shortly, the extant Politics does not fully embody theinvestigation into legislation and the forms of regime which, Aristotle says, is neces-sary to complete his 'philosophy concerning human affairs' (1181b12-24). PerhapsBodes should not be criticized for neglecting the close doctrinal and terminologicalconnexions between the EE and Politics ii, vii-viii (cf. Bendixen 1856, 578-581;Dirlmeier 1962, 112), which deserve serious study, since one could weIl conclude thatthe divergence between the program of the EN and the extant Politics i~ not matched

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by doctrinal divergence (so, e.g., Rowe 1977). But one must consider how weIl theextant Politics fulfills the program of the EN to understand the plan and intention ofAristotle' sexposition of political science.

(b) It is generally agreed that the outline at EN 1181b12-24 does not introduce theextant Politics. It alludes only to books ii (bI5-17), v-vi (bI7-20; cf. 1289b23-26,1301aI9-25, 1316b31-36) and vii-viii (b20-21). Moreover, the further investigation ofhow each ofthe regimes is ordered and what laws and customs it uses (b22) is absentfrom our Politics. This fact is of great importance, for the emphasis on legislationthroughout EN x 9 does not square weIl with the character of our Politics, which inves-tigates the regimes and does not-as is plain from the programmatic remarks at thebeginning of books ii-viii-provide the account of legislation which Aristotle says isnecessary to bring his inquiry to completion. Bodes admits in passing (96) that1181b12-24 does not introduce the extant Politics but does not grasp the significanceof this fact. The discrepancy usually has been explained away in one of two ways.The first is exemplified by Bodes' subsequent attempt (l983b) to argue that Aristotledid not really mean to undertake the investigation he here outlines. The second is todeclare 1181b12-24 spurious, a solution with a long history none of the examples ofwhich, including the recent attribution of this passage to Theophrastus (Lord 1981b,472-474), is at all convincing. Both approaches are misguided. There nlay be roomfor legitimate disagreement over how much revision Aristotle intended for theNicomachean version of the Polities , but its internal evidence proves beyond doubtthat EN 1181b12-24 is genuine and accurately reflects his intention for its revision.

Above all, the promised account of how each of the regimes is ordered and whichlaws and customs it uses is paralleled by several unfulfilled forward references whichshow that Aristotle planned to complete his Polities with an account of legislation,considered in light of the various forms of regime which lay down the end to whichthe laws are directed-precisely the investigation promised in EN x 9. Thus Aristotledismisses at the first stage in his argument a discussion of whether it is expedientfor a general to hold office for life on the ground that this is more the form of inquiryinto laws than into the regime (1286a2-7); at a later stage, when the forms of regimehave been investigated, Aristotle will consider their laws. This interpretation is con-firmed by his programmatic statement in Polities iv 1 that the statesman, in order toaid existing regimes, must know not only the various forms of regime but also whichlaws are suited to which regime; the laws are laid down to suit the regime, and hencethe statesman must first have a general knowledge of the regimes if he is to legislateweIl (1289a5-25). This passage explains why the inquiry into legislation called forin EN x 9 necessarily entails the general inquiry into regimes to which the extant Pol-ities is devoted, as weIl as why that inquiry must precede the one into legislation(1181b12-15); and EN 1181b22 together with the evidence just mentioned as weIl as unful-filled forward references in books iv (1300b5-9) and vi (1316b40-1317al)-hence iv andvi cannot be taken as the promised inquiry into legislation-demonstrate conclusivelythat Aristotle planned to follow his inquiry into the various regimes, which culminatesin the account of the best regime in books vii-viii, with one into the laws appropriatenot only to the best regime but to the others as weIl (cf. also Rhet. 1366aI9-22, whichmay refer to a discussion more extensive than that of our Polities). So 1181b12-24 together

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with the unfulfl1led forward references in the Politics are evidence of Aristotle' s inten-tion to revise the Politics into the work on legislation and the forms of regime calledfor in EN x 9.

(c) The unfulfilled forward references in the Politics (cf. Stocks 1927, 180-183) arecrucial for the interpretation of its argument, for they show that Aristotle planned tofulfill his promise to reconsider not only his account of the moral education of mem-bers of the household (1260b8-20), but also the educational programs appropriate tothe various regimes (cf. 1337aI4-18, 1335b2-5, 1336b24-27, 1338a32-36, 1339bl0-ll,1341b38-40), and the contents of book 1 generally, including (natural?) slavery(1330a25-33; cf. 1264a34-36, 1285aI9-22; [Ps.-Ar.] Oec. 1334a23-b22) and acquisi-tion (1326b30-39; cf. 1280a22-128la8). In these 'discourses on the regimes' (1260b8-20),Aristotle planned to reconsider legislation in light of the different forms of regimeand different natural characters of their citizen bodies, and thereby to fulfill the prom-ise ofEN 1181b22 to explain the laws and customs appropriate to each form of regime.Explanation of the philosophical issues at stake in this reconsideration is complex andmust await another occasion, but these 'discourses on the regimes' obviously providethe key to the relation between the account of moral education in the ethical writingsand the divergent educational programs which promote the divergent ends of the vari-ous forms of regime.

Bodes' neglect of these fundamental issues is unfortunate. His failure to under-stand the structure of political science prevents hirn from considering the doctrinalissues at stake within Aristotle' s own framework, with some serious consequencesfor the philosophical interpretation. In a volume whose main purpose is to show thatthe EN and Politics together are intended to provide the statesman with the knowledgenecessary to legislate weIl, Bodes does not even recognize that the discussion of legis-lation which Aristotle says is necessary to complete his education does not appearin the extant Politics. His failure to see that Aristotle planned in the 'discourses onthe regimes' to reconsider education in light of the divergent ends promoted by thevarious forms of regime results in misunderstanding. How is the account in the ethi-cal writings of the moral education of individuals related to the doctrine that theireducation must conform to the regime in force? Bodes thinks that the statesman usesknowledge of 'questions ethiques' merely to correct deficiencies in the laws and educa-tional programs which promote a regime' s ends, not to improve those ends, but thisview is untenable: first, it is not any 'connaissance des questions ethiques' which ena-bles astatesman to correct a deficient educational program, but rather practical wis-dom (cpp6vl1aL~) concerning the regimes and their laws (1289a5-25); and second, inlegislating the statesman seeks to turn the city to the good life even as he seeks topreserve its form of regime (see pp. 86-88 below). Bodes recognizes that the states-man must establish an educational program which corresponds to his city' s form ofregime and not merely imitate that elaborated for the best regime in books 7 and 8,and his insistence that education can only be understood in light of the form of regimewhich necessarily informs it provides a welcome corrective to the fashionable but mis-guided practice (e.g., in the 'synoptic' account of Burnyeat 1980) of ignoring the factthat education always takes place in regimes which promote particular and varyingends. But to the crucial question of why Aristotle in his ethical works chose to give

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an account of education which abstracts from the dependence of virtue upon the formof regime governing the individual's education Bodes provides no answer and sofails to explain their doctrinal incompleteness.

To understand the reason for Aristotle' s procedure one must consider his introduc-tion of 6Ull6~ (spiritedness) in the political psychology of Politics vii 7 as a fundamen-tal criterion in distinguishing the natural characters of various peoples and theircorresponding capacity for political freedom. Here he specifies the natural qualitiesthe citizens of the best regime must possess to follow its educational program andway of life:

Clearly those who are to be readily guided to virtue by the legisla-tor should be both endowed with thought (OLCtV01}'tLXOU~) and spirited

(6UllOE.LOE.L~) in their nature. (1327b36-38; cf. 1332b8-10, 1334b7-8)In his ethical writings Aristotle does not explain how 6Ull6~ is a necessary precondi-tion for education in virtue, and the complex question of the relation between the moralpsychology of the ethical writings, the political psychology of vii 7 and the theoreticalpsychology of the De Anima must await another occasion. But the natural differencesamong various peoples that Aristotle sketches in vii 7 considerably complicates hisexposition of political science: since different peoples possess different natural charac-ters (they may lack 6Ull6~ or OLcXVOLCt or both) , there are correspondingly different formsof regime and educational programs to promote the different ways of life of whichthey are capable. Hence, in presenting his teaching on political science, Aristotle mustavoid making his account of the individual' s moral education dependent upon the endsand educational progranl of any particular regime, in order to take into account thevariety of regimes in which education takes place. It is this problem, 1 take it, thatmotivates the plan Aristotle adopts for his exposition of political science.

To consider this problem properly one would have to give more thought than Bodesapparently has done to the difficulties Aristotle faced in presenting his teaching onpolitical science. In the first place, political science has three components-that whichstudies the individual, the household, and the city-each of which Aristotle foundnecessary to treat in partial independence from the others. In his extant writings Aristo-tle does not explain how these components of political science are related to each other,although EE 1218b12-16 is suggestive:

So that the good itself would be this-the end of the goods prac-.ticable for man. And this is the good that comes under the supremeof all the practical sciences, which is political science and economicsand practical wisdom; for these states differ from the others in thefact that they are supreme (whether they differ at all from oneanother must be discussed later on).

I take it that the peculiar phrasing of b13-14 is intended to suggest that a single science,political science, is architectonic over the goods practicable for man, but that this sciencedivides into three components, each ofwhich is also supreme in its own sphere ('tOLCt'tCtL[bI5] refers back to U1tO 't~v XUPLCtV [bI3]; cf. 1141b21-1142all); so this passage showspace Bodes 83-84) that Aristotle uses the term 1tOAL'tLX1l both to refer to the unifiedscience as a whole and to that part concemed more stricdy with the city. On 1218b12-16Bodes comments 'cette distinction d'apparence rigoreuse s'estompe considerable-

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ment dans la rt~alite concrete, du fait que tou individu, malgre son autonomie, vit dansune familIe et dans une Cite, et que toute familIe, malgre son autonomie, fait partied'une Cite' (127). Of course this is true: the fact that men have families and live incities makes the distinction between practical wisdom, economies, and political scienceartificial. But.this fact only illustrates the difficulties Aristotle faced in presenting histeaching on political science. He holds that the individual's education depends uponthe form of his regime which in turn, however, depends upon the natural characterof the citizen body; and, as the ethnology of vii 7 clearly shows, the conjunction of

9u1l6~ and 8LcXVOLCX in the citizen body of the best regime, which is the necessary precon-dition for its way of life (dedicated to philosophy [cf. Lord 1982, 196-202; VanderWaerdt 1985b]), does not characterize all peoples or even all Greek peoples. Howthen is Aristotle to present a teaching on the moral education of the individual whichtakes into account variety of regimes in which that education occurs?

However one explains the relation between Aristotle's moral and politicalpsychology-i.e., whatever the precise role of aU1l6~ in education-, any account ofeducation which abstracts from the forms of regime and their corresponding ends,laws and educational programs clearly is incomplete, and thus the account of virtueand education in the EN is incomplete. But this incompleteness was unavoidable inAristotle's presentation of political science. Different peoples have different naturalcharacters, and consequently different forms of regime and educational programs aresuitable to different peoples. But the individual's education is decisively informedby the ends promoted by his city's regime. Hence one might expect Aristotle to treatthe various forms of regime before considering the individual's education. But Aristotlecould hardly have considered the various regimes without first considering the bestregime, from which the others in some sense are deviations. To present his teachingon political science in this order, however, he would have had to consider the bestregime' s way of life before he had considered the best way of life of the individual.But he holds that one's view of the best way of life for the city as a whole derivesfrom a view of the best way of life for the individual (cf. 1323a14-21, 1324a5-13 andvii 1-3 generally). So Aristotle had to treat the individual's eudaimonia before con-sidering the various regimes; he had to treat education in abstraction from the regimesand then reconsider it- in his promised 'discourses on the regimes'- in light of thevarious forms of regime and the natural character of the citizen bodies appropriateto each. His account of moral education in the EN abstracts from the forms of regimeand from the natural role of aU1l6~ in education-from the political face of virtue, asit were-and hence is intentionally incomplete; but the evidence cited above showsthat Aristotle planned in his 'discourses on the regimes' (1260b8-20) to reconsiderthe virtue and education of members of the household in light of the different endspromoted by the various forms of regime. In this reconsideration he will have relatedhis various accounts of virtue and education and thereby revealed the unity of politi-cal science as a whole.

These comments concerning the philosophieal motivation of Aristotle's presenta-tion of political science have the merit of explaining its structure as attested by theevidence collected above and of suggesting how the doctrinal teaching of the EN onvirtue and education is fundamentally incomplete without the reconsideration sup-

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plied by the Politics. Both points are essential if one is to recognize that Aristotle' sconception of the inquiry of the EN as political science shapes not merely his presen-tation but his doctrine as weIl. In failing even to raise the question of how the teachingof the EN is incomplete without the Politics Bodes robs himself of the strongest evi-dence against the notion that Aristotle' s moral philosophy represents an 'autonomousmoral science'.

Bodes relates the EN to the Politics as end to means in Aristotle' s doctrine of prac-tical wisdom, claiming that the former provides the statesman with knowledge of 'lebien humain (ordre de la fin)' and the latter with knowledge of 'les regimes constitu-tionnels (ordre des moyens)' (79-80, 118-121, 221-225). Of course the statesman's viewconcerning the best way of life for his city will depend upon his view of the best wayof life for the individual (cf. vii 1-3). But he certainly does not use his knowledgeof legislation simply as the means to attain the end fixed by his knowledge of the humangood, for he legislates, in the first instance, in conformity to the ends promoted byhis city's regime (the full significance of this point would be clearer if we 'possessedthe 'discourses on the regimes'). In fact, Bodes does not seem to have formulatedcogently the problem at stake: how will the statesman use his knowledge ofthe eudai-monia of the individual in laying down laws to foster eudaimonia in the city? Whatuse will he make of the teaching of the ethical writings?

In a proper investigation one would have to consider the relation between the vir-tues and the various regimes, that is, the particular character each regime promotes(cf. Rhet. 1365b21-1366a16; Pol. 1310a12-18, 1337a14-18; 1309a36-39, 1276b30-33,1284a1), as weIl as the double teleology whereby the statesman in preserving a regimealso seeks to turn it toward the good life (see pp. 86-88 below). But to refute Bodes'end-means model it suffices to raise the question of the relation between the best wayof life for the individual and for the city: if the city is capable only of an analogueof the highest activity of the individual (cpLAoaocp(cx 9E.Wp'Y}'tLxr)), then the best way oflife for the city and individual will diverge, and even in the case of the best regimethe statesman will not simply attempt to establish the best way of life for the individual;in the case of inferior regimes, obviously, the question of how the statesman will employhis knowledge of the ethical writings is even more complex. Bodes wholly assimi-lates Aristotle' s inquiry into character to political science, denying it any autonomyat all; thus in attempting to demonstrate the 'caractere politique de I'entreprise' ofthe EN (80-92) he claims, for example, that 'la eite n'est pas une idee, mais une rea-lite, a laquelle on doit assimiler le bien de tous et de chacun' (89) or 'meme dansce qu' il a de moins politique-et de plus noble-a savoir son intelligence contempla-tive, l'homme reste encore resolument tributaire de la politique' (88). These are typi-cal examples of a tendency which culminates in the radical identification of moralvirtue with citizen virtue (224). Bodes can hold such views only by consistently dis-regarding the tension between the city and man which necessarily arises from the factthat man' s highest end and perfection lies in the non- or trans-political activity oftheoretical contemplation (cf. Strauss 1964, 25-29, 49). He might have avoided theseerrors had he considered how the statesman will be guided in legislating in the bestregime. Does the philosophy to which it is dedicated coincide with that of the individualdescribed in EN x?

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Bodes assumes them to be identical (e.g., 88n47, 137n1, 224), although it is diffi-cult to believe that he has given the matter serious thought. This misunderstandingwould have been avoided had he read Lord's cogent demonstration that the accountof the best way of life for the individual and city in Politics vii 1-3 abstracts fromthe question of the best way of life for the individual, the philosophicallife, and dealswith it only in relation to the question of the best way of life for the city (see Lord1978; Vander Waerdt 1985b). The city is capable only of an analogue of the best wayof life of the individual, for the philosophy to which the best regime devotes itselfis not theoretical contemplation but rather the leisured culture which constitutes theclosest approximation to the philosophical life possible on the level of politics.

If it be true that the best way of life possible for the city and individual diverge,it is difficult to resist the conclusion that each of the components of political science-practical wisdom, economies, and political science-is partially autonomous or sover-eign in its own sphere: the prudent household manager will not necessarily be a goodstatesman, as Aristotle argues in book 1 against the identification of the forms of ruler-ship with one another by Plato (Polit. 258e-26Oe; cf. 292c-293a, 300c-301b) and Xeno-phon (Mem. iii.4.12, iii.6.14), although by acquiring legislative practical wisdom hemay become like Pericles, skilled in managing his own affairs as weIl as those of thehousehold and city (cf. 1140b8-11, 1142a7-10). Bodes has overlooked the partial auton-omy of an investigation into political matters from one into character because he hasfailed to think through what is at stake in the transition of EN x 9. To explain theintention informing Aristotle' s presentation of political science one would have toexplain why Aristotle had to treat the individual, the household and the city indepen-dently of and in partial abstraction from one another, but Bodes seems content toargue that the EN is a political inquiry without ever seriously considering why Aristotlechose to present his teaching on political science in separate treatises and what prin-ciples unify his exposition of the three components of political science. Consequentlyhe never makes tolerably clear the precise sense in which the ethical writings are apolitical inquiry.

In his survey of the ancient evidence, Bodes argues convincingly that the assump-tion underlying Andronicus' constitution of the Corpus, that Aristotle intended toelaborate a complete philosophical system the constituent sciences of which wouldcorrespond to his treatises, is mistaken and that many of the interpretive terms andcategories popularized by the ancient commentators involve serious misunderstand-ing of Aristotle' s doctrine. (Lord 1986 argues [against Bodes 1973 inter alios] thatthe early Peripatetics rather than Andronicus played the decisive role in the consitu-tion ofthe Corpus; but Andronicus' position in any event is revealing ofthe scholarlytradition generally. ) Yet Bodes' account of their interpretation of political sciencegoes no further than to observe that the ancients considered the logically anterior inquiryconcerning character to form a unity with the logically posterior inquiry concerningregimes, and in some cases it would have been more illuminating had Bodes consid-ered what might be learned from the ancients' views rather than simply used themas a foil. Moreover, by failing even to raise the question of when the notion of an'autonomous moral science' did arise in Peripatetic philosophy Bodes obscures thehistorical background of the later tradition. The early Peripatetic author of the Magna

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Moralia, who frequently defends the framework of Aristotelian doctrine the philosophi-eal motivation of whieh no longer is understood (cf. Vander Waerdt 1985a), beginshis work by promising to speak U1ttp ~9LXWV, and insists ~hat ~ 1tEpt 'tcX ~9T} 1tPrti'llrt'tdrtis not apart of politieal seienee (1181a25-1182al; pace Bodes 84n27 this is not a responseto the Stoies), taking far more pains than Aristotle hirnself to impress upon his audieneethat his subjeet is politieal seienee (cf. 1182bl-6, Tl-32; 1183a3-5, 21-24, 33-35;1197b28-29); but his interpretation of the politieal intention of moral philosophy is'unparalleled in the Corpus and obviously is motivated by desire to save Aristotle'sdesignation of his inquiry as politieal seience. Apparently Aristotle' s presentation ofpolitieal seienee in separate treatises led even the earliest Peripateties to isolate thedoetrine of the ethieal writings from politieal seienee as a whole; and subsequent eom-mentators, unable to draw upon a eorreet Peripatetie interpretation of politieal seience,eould only advanee interpretations of their own whieh have no more authority thanmodern ones.

To support his view that Aristotle' s writings on politieal seienee are intended asa praetieal eontribution to the statesman's edueation, Bodes maintains that they areexereises in 'seienee pratique' whieh have action rather than theoretieal knowledgeas their end (16, 47-51, 57-59, 77, 92, 96), even though he realizes that Aristotle neverdesignates the subjeet-matter of politieal seienee as 1tprtX'tLXi} l1tLa't~llT}. Bodes doesnot seem to me even to have elearly formulated the question of the theoretieal statusof politieal seience, for he assurnes rather than establishes bis diehotomy between 'ecritspratiques' and 'theoretiques' (58), and he strangely attempts to settle the questionthrough an extended digression on praetieal wisdom, a procedure whieh begs the ques-tion and ignores the relevant textual evidenee. To make his argument eogent, Bodeswould have to analyze Aristotle's use of the division between theoretieal, praetieal,and produetive seiences in his writings on politieal seience; but EE 1214a9-15 (cf. Woods1982, 199) shows at onee that politieal seienee involves theoretieal philosophy, whiehAristotle' s dialeetieal method-a refinement of the tVOO~rt of the many and the learnedwhieh eonsiders human affairs by aseending from what is known to his audienee towhat is knowable simply (cf. EN 1095a31-b4, 1098a34-b8, 1145bl-7; EE 1214b28-1215al0,121626-39, 1217aI8-21, 1220aI5-22; Anal. Post. 71b33-12a5; Jaffa 1952, Irwin 1981)-enables hirn to ineorporate into his inquiry whenever appropriate. Moreover, themethodologieal refleetions of 1216b3-1217a18 show elearly that knowledge ofthe theo-retieal seiences, although an end Xrt't' rtu'to, may be useful Xrt'tcX aUllET}XOC; (bI5-17),and that one of the tasks of the statesman is to be a good judge of when 9Ewptrt isrelevant, i.e., of when it is useful Xrt'tcX aUllET}XOC; and when not (1216b35-1217a7).So even if Bodes is eorreet in holding that the purpose of politieal seienee is solelypraetieal (but cf. Lord 1982, 30-33), theoretieal philosophy must play an integral rolein the statesman' s edueation.

The best part of Bodes' book is his detailed analysis of EN x 9, in whieh Aristotleexplains why the preeeding ten books must be supplemented by an inquiry into legis-lation and the forms of regime and which therefore, as Bodes reeognizes, is a keyto understanding his intention in edueating the statesman (for the eritique of sophistierhetorie here cf. Lord 1981a). Of partieular importanee is Bodes' eogent demonstra-tion that legislative praetieal wisdom (cpPOvT}aLC; VOllo9E'tLXi}) regulates the edueation of

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individuals and families no less than the city as a whole (cf. 1180al-5, 30-34), forthis suggests that Aristotle' s teaching on political science is intended to enable anindividual to attain virtue for himself and his family even if his regime lacks a propersystem of public education. Unfortunately, however, in regard to the question of howthe statesman williegisiate in inferior regimes, Bodes strangely insists that 'il s'agit,en I'occurrence, de remedier aux carences du legislateur et non d'edicter des reglesde conduite pretendument meilleures que les normes implicitement recommandeespar la legislation' (113n26). According to this view, with which Bodes concludes hisstudy (224), moral virtue is solely a function of citizen virtue and the statesman can-not foster virtue independently of the ends promoted by his particular regime. Thisview cannot possibly be correct. It betrays fundamental misunderstanding of the pur-pose of political science:

(a) The fact that a father by acquiring legislative practical wisdom thereby becomesable to turn his children and friends toward virtue shows that, at least in the absenceof a uniform system of public education, the individual may foster moral virtue indepen-dently of his regime; there is no suggestion in EN x 9 that a father who lives in aninferior regime should educate his children in accordance with its inferior ends, andAristotle's thematic account of the ends of education in Politics vii 12-13 shows Bodes'view to be mistaken.

(b) 'The moral virtues cannot be understood as being for the sake of the city sincethe city must he understood as heing for the sake of the practice of moral virtue' (Strauss1964, Zl). The purpose ofthe city is not merely life, but the good life (cf. 1252b29-30,lZl8bI9-30, 1280a25-1281al0; EN 1160all-30).

(c) Consequently, the statesman's aim is to study how every association may sharein the good life :

It belongs to the good legislator to inquire how a city, a family ofhuman beings and every other kind of association may share in thegood life and in the eudaimonia that is possible for them. (1325a7-10;cf. 1333a33-39; EN 1099b30-32, 1103b2-6, 1113b21-26,1129bI4-1130aI3)

(d) In doing so he will follow the principles of political science as elaborated iniv 1, where Aristotle distinguishes four tasks for the statesman: to investigate, first,the best regime where there are no external impediments; second, which regime isbest for which peoples-for which task the statesman will need to know both the bestregime and the best under given circumstances; third, the regime ex hypothesi, sothat he will be able to consider how a given regime could be brought into existenceand then preserved-e.g., in the case where a regime is inferior to the one practicableunder the circumstances; and fourth, the regime which is suited to most cities. In comingto the aid of a city, whether to establish a new regime or to reform an existing one,the statesman will be guided by the double teleology which underlies the programof political science announced in iv 1: his minimal aim will be the regime's preserva-tion, but his higher aim will be to turn it toward the good life and eudaimonia, somuch as circumstances permit. Perhaps the best illustration of this double teleologyis provided by Aristotle's discussion of the two ways of preserving tyranny in book5: first, the tyrant may seek to humble his subjects, keeping them in mutual distrust

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and incapable of action-thus preserving his power but in no way falling short of wick-edness (1313a24-1314a29); or he may attempt to make his rule kingly, goveming inthe interest of his citizens and protecting only his power-thus his rule will becomemore honorable, it will endure longer, and his character will become nobly disposedtoward virtue or at least only half-base rather than base (1314b30-1315bl0). This sec-ond course of action shows how the tyrant's rule may be tumed toward virtue at thesame time as it is preserved, and the purpose of the statesman's architectonic scienceis not merely to legislate in the interest of the regime in force, as Bodes concludes,but to foster the good life and eudaimonia for others as far as possible through politi-cal virtue.

As the foregoing discussion will suggest, fundamental issues remain to be settledbefore we may arrive at a satisfactory understanding of the plan and intention of Aristo-tle' s teaching on political science. But Bodes' work is the most important and origi-nal contribution to the study of Aristotle's moral philosophy in recent years, andscholars would do well to give it careful consideration. *

Princeton University

* Constraints of space have forced me to shorten this discussion considerably, but a full statement of myown position will appear elsewhere (l985c). I am deeply indebted to David O'Connor for much stimulatingdiscussion. I am grateful as well to Harold Chemiss, A.E. Raubitschek and Friedrich Solmsen for theirgenerous advice and encouragement, and to the National Endowment for the Humanities for its fellowshipsupport.

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