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The OpenUniversity

Faculty of Mathematicsand Computing

The Nature of The ArtificialThe Nature of The Artificial

Augmenting Negrottian Artificiality Augmenting Negrottian Artificiality with Heideggerian-Whiteheadian with Heideggerian-Whiteheadian

NaturalityNaturality

Syed Mustafa Ali, Ph.D

IV International Conference: The Culture of The Artificial. Urbino, Italy, 25-27 May 2001.

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The Meaning(s) of NatureThe Meaning(s) of Nature

nature1

– “the collective term for all that exists apart from the artificial” NATURE AS “OTHER” TO THE ARTIFICIAL

nature2

– “all that exists in the evolving universe of space and time” NATURE AS EXISTENTIAL TOTALITY

nature3

– that which is expressed “all other things being equal, when it develops according to its kind without outside interference.”

NATURE AS ESSENCEFerré, F. (1988) Philosophy of Technology.Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.

EXISTENTIAL CONTINUUM

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Mimetic NatureMimetic Nature33 of The of The ArtificialArtificial

NATURE TECHNOLOGY

THE ARTIFICIAL

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The Theory of The Artificial The Theory of The Artificial (I)(I)

Negrotti, M. (1999) The Theory of The Artificial. Exeter, Intellect.

Negrotti, M. (1999) From The Artificial to the Art: A Short Introductionto a Theory and Its Applications. Leonardo 32 (3), 183-189.

DefinitionDefinition: : The ArtificialThe Artificial

– An object or machine that reproduces An object or machine that reproduces by means of different materials and by means of different materials and procedures the essential performance procedures the essential performance of a natural object taken as an of a natural object taken as an exemplar based on a more or less exemplar based on a more or less shared representation at a particular shared representation at a particular observation level.observation level.

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The Theory of The Artificial The Theory of The Artificial (II)(II)

observation level

representation

exemplar

conventional technology

essential performance

artificial

nature3nature1

nature2?

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Evaluation of The TheoryEvaluation of The Theory

MeritsMerits

– Self-evident simplicity of conceptual foundationsSelf-evident simplicity of conceptual foundations– Possible overall correctnessPossible overall correctness

DrawbacksDrawbacks

– Problematic metaphysical assumptions about Problematic metaphysical assumptions about the the naturenature33 (as essence) of (as essence) of naturenature11 (as “other” (as “other” to the artificial)to the artificial)

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The Philosophy of The The Philosophy of The ArtificialArtificial

NB: Performative, Behavioural,Observational, Phenomenological

Dreyfus vs. Christiansenon Heidegger and

Representationalism

RealismRealism– A human-independent reality existsA human-independent reality exists

RepresentationalismRepresentationalism– Human interactions with phenomena are Human interactions with phenomena are

mediated by mental representationsmediated by mental representations

EssentialismEssentialism– The essence (or The essence (or what-nesswhat-ness) of a ) of a

phenomenon is definable in terms of a finite phenomenon is definable in terms of a finite set of necessary and sufficient features that set of necessary and sufficient features that it must possessit must possess

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Negrottian Realism (I)Negrottian Realism (I)

AccessibleAccessible and and InaccessibleInaccessible Reality Reality

– ““The objects that we perceive from the observation levels The objects that we perceive from the observation levels that we assume in each unit of time and space are not that we assume in each unit of time and space are not ‘pieces’ or partial spheres of reality: rather, they are the ‘pieces’ or partial spheres of reality: rather, they are the verifiable reality that we can grasp from those selected verifiable reality that we can grasp from those selected levels.” (p.13)levels.” (p.13)

FiniteFinite Access to Reality Access to Reality

– ““There is no reason to think that, having to deal with a finite, There is no reason to think that, having to deal with a finite, limited and filtering sensory power, reality should disappear limited and filtering sensory power, reality should disappear from our horizon.” (p.13)from our horizon.” (p.13)

OBJECTIVE RELATIVISM (OR)

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Negrottian Realism (II)Negrottian Realism (II) Accessible Reality Accessible Reality asas Infinite Infinite

– ““The observational levels of concrete reality - both of the The observational levels of concrete reality - both of the natural and of the artificial reality - and their interplays natural and of the artificial reality - and their interplays have to be considered as infinite.” (pp.36-37)have to be considered as infinite.” (pp.36-37)

Inaccessible Reality as Inaccessible Reality as InfiniteInfinite

– ““Reality includes, that is to say, it has in itself, all the Reality includes, that is to say, it has in itself, all the features observable by all the species, along with infinite features observable by all the species, along with infinite others which cannot be observed by any species and others which cannot be observed by any species and which are sometimes revealed through investigations which are sometimes revealed through investigations using scientific instruments.” (p.14)using scientific instruments.” (p.14)

HIERARCHICAL INFINITISM

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OROR: : TRTR or or ERER ? ?

Reality In-Itself is independent of anyactual encounter with it (Heidegger)

EMPIRICAL REALISM (ER)

Reality In-Itself is independent of anypossible knowledge of it (Kant)

TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM (TR)

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Negrottian Realism (III)Negrottian Realism (III)

Reality Reality In-ItselfIn-Itself as as InaccessibleInaccessible

– “… “… it does not matter what the world is in itself, since it does not matter what the world is in itself, since the only ways we have at our disposal to describe the the only ways we have at our disposal to describe the world are our representations of it.” (p.15)world are our representations of it.” (p.15)

TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM (TR)

Appearance

Inaccessible Reality Reality

Accessible Reality

OR TR

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The Problem of The Problem of ConsciousnessConsciousness

“Where appearance is concerned we cannotmake the appearance-reality distinctionbecause the appearance is the reality.” (p.122)

Searle, J.R. (1992) The Rediscovery of The Mind.Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

Consciousness provides at leastone example of reality accessible

as it is In-Itself.

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From From TRTR to to ERER

Heideggerian Empirical RealismHeideggerian Empirical Realism– HermeneuticHermeneutic (access-oriented) (access-oriented)– PluralisticPluralistic (multiply-moded) (multiply-moded)

Dreyfus, H.L (1991) Being-In-The-World. Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.

RobustRobust (supports scientific-naturalism) (supports scientific-naturalism)– Evolutionary account of consciousnessEvolutionary account of consciousness

– Materialistic conception of Materialistic conception of naturenature11

naturenature11 as “absurd”, “meaningless” as “absurd”, “meaningless” naturenature11 as In-Itself yet as In-Itself yet notnot For-Itself For-Itself naturenature11 as non-experiential or “vacuous” as non-experiential or “vacuous” Pylkkö’s Critique

of Dreyfus

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ERER and The “Hard” and The “Hard” ProblemProblem

The “Hard” Problem ofConsciousness

Explaining how ontological subjectivity(or first-person experience) can arise in(or from) an ontologically-objective (or

non-experiential) substrate.Chalmers, D.J. (1996) The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory. OUP

Heideggerian ER cannot solve it.

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Post-Heideggerian Post-Heideggerian ERER

What we What we knowknow

– Some form of ER is correctSome form of ER is correct ProofProof: In-Itself reality of consciousness: In-Itself reality of consciousness

– Heideggerian ER is incorrectHeideggerian ER is incorrect ProofProof: Failure to solve The “Hard” Problem: Failure to solve The “Hard” Problem CauseCause: Non-experiential ontology of : Non-experiential ontology of naturenature11

What we must What we must dodo

Reconsider the nature3 of nature1

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Rethinking NatureRethinking Nature11: A : A SketchSketch

WHITEHEADIANPANEXPERIENTIALISM

A process-atomism in which the fundamentalunits of nature1 are dipolar physical-mental

events (actual occasions), relationally-constitutedvia a process of actualisation (concrescence)involving mental selection of physical feelings(prehensions) of actualised events (objects) by

actualising events (subject-superjects).

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Concrescence: Subject Concrescence: Subject PhasePhase

SUBJECT1

SUBJECT2

PHYSICAL PREHENSIONS

TIME

OTHER-CAUSATION

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Concrescence: Superject Concrescence: Superject PhasePhase

SUPERJECT1

SUPERJECT2

MENTAL SELECTIONS

TIME

SELF-CAUSATION

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Types of Prehension Types of Prehension (Feeling)(Feeling)

PhysicalPhysical

– objects of prehension are objects of prehension are concreteconcrete actualitiesactualities (prior (prior actual occasionsactual occasions))

purepure– actualities prehended in terms of their actualities prehended in terms of their physicalphysical pole pole

hybridhybrid– actualities prehended in terms of their actualities prehended in terms of their mentalmental pole pole

ConceptualConceptual

– objects of prehension are objects of prehension are abstractabstract potentialitiespotentialities ((eternal objectseternal objects))

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Collections (or complexes) of actual Collections (or complexes) of actual occasions form occasions form societiessocieties or or nexusnexus

Societies can be distinguished into two Societies can be distinguished into two kinds on the basis of kinds on the basis of internal structureinternal structure

AggregatesAggregates– non-experiential, non-creativenon-experiential, non-creative

Compound IndividualsCompound Individuals– experiential, creative (experiential, creative (regnant monadregnant monad))

Aggregates and Aggregates and IndividualsIndividuals

ARTIFICIALS

NATURALS

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Post-Mimetic Artificiality ?Post-Mimetic Artificiality ?

Conventional panexperientialism does Conventional panexperientialism does notnot provide any criteria other than the provide any criteria other than the mimeticmimetic (behavioural) by which to (behavioural) by which to distinguish aggregates from individualsdistinguish aggregates from individuals

Problem Case 1Problem Case 1– Pseudo-non-experience Pseudo-non-experience ((Guillain-Barré Guillain-Barré

syndromesyndrome)) (Searle 1992)(Searle 1992)

Problem Case 2Problem Case 2– Pseudo-experience Pseudo-experience ((Chinese RoomChinese Room, , ZombiesZombies))

(Searle 1980) (Chalmers 1996)(Searle 1980) (Chalmers 1996)

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The Poietic Difference (Ali The Poietic Difference (Ali 1999)1999)

The being or existence) of an actual entity is itsbecoming or process (Whitehead)

Being and becoming are the same in the sense that theybelong together in essential, unitary relation (Heidegger)

A difference in becomingentails a difference in being

NATURALS ARTIFACTUALS

?

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SUBSTANCE

SUBSTANCE

SUBSTANCE

M, E, Fo, Fi

Physis (Autopoiesis)[Self-Production]

PRODUCTANT

PRODUCT

SUBSTRATUM

Fi

M

E, Fo

Techne (Allopoiesis)[Other-Production]

Phenomenology of Phenomenology of ArtificingArtificing

Aristotelian Framework

Artificing as “rupture” of (and “irruption” into)the causation of the natural (Ladrière)

NATURALS ARTIFACTUALS

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Panexperientialist Panexperientialist ConceptionConception

Contraction of the field of incoming prehensions to a concrescing occasion occurs in two ways: (Ferre 1996a)

– forcing discordant elements on subjectivity– negating elements of potential richness (pure physical feeling)

En-forcing – or En-Framing (Heidegger 1977) – is an intrinsically temporal process involving effective purpose sustained over time by constant renewal and refreshment (Ferre 1996b)

En-Framing involves canalization and intensification of originality through hybrid prehension (Sherburne 1966)

Artificing as Canalization (En-Framing)

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Process Model of ArtificingProcess Model of Artificing

P M

P M

Fi

E Fo

P M

P M

PRODUCTANT

PRODUCT

SUBSTRATUMPRODUCTANTM

TIM

E

Whiteheadian Framework

P M

P M

Fi

Fo

P M

PROCESS

PROCESS

PROCESS

M, E

P M

PROCESS

Artificing as “rupture” of (and “irruption” into)the causation of the natural (Ladrière)

NATURALS ARTIFACTUALS

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Negrotti on Replication (I)Negrotti on Replication (I)

According to Negrotti,According to Negrotti,

– ““We can define A as a replication (in empirical terms We can define A as a replication (in empirical terms and not logical) of B if A is the result of a and not logical) of B if A is the result of a reproduction of B at all its observation levels by using reproduction of B at all its observation levels by using the same materials and, more importantly, by the same materials and, more importantly, by drawing upon all its performances, without making drawing upon all its performances, without making any selection of essential performances.” (p.75)any selection of essential performances.” (p.75)

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Negrotti on Replication (II)Negrotti on Replication (II)

Technological SystemsTechnological Systems

– ClosedClosed– Completely FormalCompletely Formal– Finitely-describable at Finitely-describable at

single observation levelsingle observation level

– Therefore, Therefore, replicablereplicable

Natural SystemsNatural Systems

– OpenOpen– Partially Non-FormalPartially Non-Formal– Infinitely-describable Infinitely-describable

at infinite levelsat infinite levels

– So, So, non-replicablenon-replicable

Assumption of Assumption of Hierarchical InfinitismHierarchical Infinitism

However, However, isis the number of levels infinite? the number of levels infinite?

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Whitehead on ReplicationWhitehead on Replication

Although Although naturenature11 is hierarchically is hierarchically infinite, all naturals (except God) are infinite, all naturals (except God) are finitefinite

Non-replicability of naturals follows from Non-replicability of naturals follows from their their opennessopenness which follows from ... which follows from ...

… … self-creativityself-creativity (final causation) (final causation)

Self-creativity more pronounced in Self-creativity more pronounced in higher compound individualshigher compound individuals

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Necessity and Sufficiency Necessity and Sufficiency (I)(I)

Replication is only possible in 3 cases:

– “When we know all the steps and all the components needed to reproduce something, for example, in the case of mass production;

– When we are able to act as combiners of natural elements which, when they are combined, are necessary and sufficient for producing a complete system, as, for example, in the case of artificial insemination;

– When the reality to be reproduced is composed or is describable from only one possible level of observation: this is clearly possible only for a reality man has himself created in purely formal or informational terms, as, for example, in the case of replicating a computer program.” (p.78)

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Necessity and Sufficiency Necessity and Sufficiency (II)(II)

On a panexperientialist conception of On a panexperientialist conception of naturenature11, need to distinguish between, need to distinguish between

– preparatorypreparatory (or subjective) necessity (or subjective) necessity efficient causation (physical and conceptual efficient causation (physical and conceptual

feelings) from prior actual occasionsfeelings) from prior actual occasions– cancan be established by the artificer be established by the artificer

– consummatoryconsummatory (or superjective) necessity (or superjective) necessity final causation (self-creation) of actual final causation (self-creation) of actual

occasionoccasion– cannotcannot be established by the artificer be established by the artificer

SU

FFIC

IEN

CY

Even in phenomena such as artificial insemination, artifactualcombination must work in conjunction with natural combination