The multi-value basis of procedural justice

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47 (2011) 541–553

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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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The multi-value basis of procedural justice

Larry Heuer ⁎, Steven J. StroessnerBarnard College, Columbia University, USA

⁎ Corresponding author.E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Heuer).

0022-1031/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. Aldoi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.01.007

a b s t r a c t
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:Received 15 December 2009Revised 3 January 2011Available online 19 January 2011

Keywords:Procedural justiceGroup valueSocial identityDeservingness

Three experiments demonstrate that multiple values can account for the relation between respectfultreatment and judgments of procedural fairness. The Group Value Theory of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler,1988) asserts that respectful treatment is viewed as fair because it communicates positive information aboutone's standing within one's group. We propose that other values introduced in other contexts, including adesire for positive intergroup standing, and self-interest, will also mediate the relation between respect andprocedural fairness. Three experiments are reported in which individuals have encounters with ingroup oroutgroup members who treat them respectfully or disrespectfully. Results from these experiments supportthis multiple valuemodel by showing that: (1) Each of the value judgments of intragroup standing, intergroupstanding, and self-interest has positive direct effects on procedural fairness; and (2) The effect of respect onprocedural fairness is mediated by each of these value judgments. Additionally, evidence is summarized thatis generally supportive of a third, ancillary hypothesis: (3) The meaning of respect varies across contexts thathighlight different values. These findings suggest that theorizing about procedural fairness will benefit byrecognizing the multiply-determined and contextually-dependent nature of procedural fairness.

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Indian people are dying of sympathy. What we want is respect.Russell Means, First Director of the American Indian Movement
(AIM)
We need international support so that our people live a life of normality,of dignity, of liberty and freedom. I hope that our cry for freedommay beheard.Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman, Palestinian National Authority

The basic tenet of black consciousness is that the black man mustreject all value systems that seek to make him a foreigner in thecountry of his birth and reduce his basic human dignity.
Steven Biko, anti-apartheid activist, South African Students'Organization (SASO).
Each of the speakers quoted above is advancing a claim to respectand dignity. Strikingly, given the desperate circumstances of thegroups whose interests are being represented, the speakers are notappealing for better wages, or better health care, or more comfortableliving conditions; rather, they are appealing for better treatment.Furthermore, these are expressions of concern with dignity andrespect rather than control or influence. Individually and collectivelythen, these statements are powerful testimonials to the importance ofconcerns that have been central to theorizing about procedural justice

since the Group Value Theory of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler,1988; Tyler, 1989) first asserted the importance of symbolic concernsstemming from relational values. At the same time, however, theseappeals for dignified and respectful treatment seem not to reflect aconcern about any individual's standing in his valued social group, asocial motive that is central to the Group Value Theory. Rather, theyappear to reflect a concern with a social value that has received littleattention from justice scholars: that one's group is treated withrespect and dignity. Below, we propose that respectful treatment,while clearly linked to justice judgments for precisely the reasonsproposed by the Group Value Theory, is also linked to justicejudgments because it is viewed as an indication of the extent towhich values other than within-group standing are being expressed.In particular, we focus on the role of respect in intergroup encounters,and its role in communicating a source's view of the perceivedstanding of a target's valued group.

Why procedures influence fairness judgments

The Group Value Theory of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988;Tyler, 1989) was proposed to account for a finding which was noteasily explained by instrumental accounts of procedural justice(Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978): that participation in decision-making processes increased judgments of fairness even whendisputants believed that their participation did not influence theiroutcomes (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). This finding suggested thatindividuals are motivated not just by a desire for fair and beneficialoutcomes, but also by a need to identify and affiliate with groups.

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542 L. Heuer, S.J. Stroessner / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47 (2011) 541–553

Because individuals are concernedwith their long-term relations withsocial groups (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Sedekides & Brewer, 2001;Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tyler & Blader, 2000), the group value andrelational theories (Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler &Smith, 1999) assert that non-instrumental, or relational, variablessuch as trust, neutrality, and standing assume important symbolicmeaning—participation in group procedures signifies one's standingin one's valued social groups. An extensive literature now supportsthe group value and relational models' claim that individuals baseprocedural fairness judgments on cues regarding belongingness (DeCremer & Blader, 2006; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005b; Tyler & Lind, 1992).Furthermore, this connection between relational variables and feltbelongingness has been obtained both when belongingness ischaracterized as within-group status or rank (De Cremer & Tyler,2005a; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, 1989, 1994; Tyler, Boeckmann,Smith, & Huo, 1997; van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2005) andwhen characterized as inclusion or acceptance by ingroup members(De Cremer, 2002; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Lind, 2001). Thesestudies demonstrate convincingly that individuals believe they havebeen treated fairly to the extent they have been treated respectfully asvalued group members.

Although the group value and relational theories have successfullydescribed the importance of respect in encounters with fellowmembers of one's ingroup, they cannot easily account for the effectof respect on fairness in encounters with outgroup members. Wepropose that in such encounters, respect influences fairness because itis relevant to motives other than one concerned with standing withinone's own group (i.e., intragroup standing). In particular, as socialidentities create a concern with the standing of one's group vis-à-visother groups, we expect that this concern with intergroup standing issufficient to produce an effect of respect on fairness in outgroupencounters much like the effect of respect in ingroup encounters, butthrough a different meditational pathway. We predict that respectfultreatment expressed in an intergroup setting will be seen as fair notsimply because it signifies respect for one's standing within a groupbut also because it communicates respect for one's group in toto. Wedescribe three studies that test our prediction that the gratification ofa concern with intergroup standing, as well as the gratification of aconcern with intragroup standing, will mediate the relationshipbetween respect and procedural fairness. Before doing so, we brieflyreview existing work concerning the consequence of perceiving anencounter as one with an ingroup vs. an outgroup member for theeffect of relational treatment on perceived fairness.

Respect as an intergroup relational concern

Our proposal, that the respectfulness of one's treatment by anoutgroup member can communicate information about one's valuedgroup (and not merely one's standing in that group) follows directlyfrom Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985). It is well established thatpeople are motivated to view their ingroups favorably and to viewinformation about membership in high-status groups as validatingtheir self-esteem and self-respect (Abrams & Hogg, 1998; Tajfel &Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987). In fact, this social identity premise wasthe starting point for the Group Value Theory's claim that self-validation could be derived from information about one's positionwithin one's valued group.

Social Identity Theory also predicts that self-validation can bederived from information about the position of one's group vis-à-visother groups. Accordingly, group members whose social identity issalient perceive themselves as exemplars of the group rather than asindividuals. Based on this, Intergroup Emotions Theory (Baumeister &Wotman, 1992; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999)proposes that when social identities are salient, individuals whoexperience events that favor or harm their group will experience

positive or negative affect on their group's behalf, rather than on behalfof their personal identities. Consistent with this, Garcia, Miller, Smith,and Mackie (2006) found that people who experienced verbal insultsdirected toward their group responded emotionally to the group-levelevent and consequently experienced group-based negative emotionsand behavioral action tendencies, such as the desire to attack the sourceof the insult.

The notion that disrespectful treatment from an outgroupmembercan communicate different information than treatment from aningroup member is also consistent with Crocker, Voelkl, Testa andMajor's (1991, 2000) work on attributional ambiguity. These authorsargue that negative treatment by outgroup members will have lessdeleterious consequences compared with similar treatment fromingroup members if the treatment can be attributed to prejudicetoward one's group. In one study, the self-esteem of African-Americanparticipants following negative feedback was buffered when theycould attribute the feedback to a prejudiced evaluator (Crocker et al.,1991). More recently, Mendes, Major, McCoy and Blascovich (2008)reported that social rejection by an ingroup member producedinternal negative emotions (e.g., self-blame) whereas rejection froman outgroupmember evoked external negative emotions (e.g., anger).Performance on a task demanding executive control of cognitiveresources was superior in the later conditions, consistent with thenotion that the ability to attribute rejection to outgroup prejudice canserve a protective function. These findings suggest that feedback froman ingroup communicates information about one's within-groupstanding whereas feedback from an outgroup signals the perceivedstanding of one's group among other groups. To the degree thattreatment is disrespectful, some negative consequences are likely.However, the specific nature of these consequences and themechanisms by which they arise are expected to differ in intragroupand intergroup contexts.

Whereas the research discussed above examined affective andattributional consequences of feedback from intergroup encounters,several other lines of research have examined the way in whichintergroup relations can affect justice judgments. In one, relativedeprivation researchers have established the role of perceivedfraternal deprivation on collective action (Dube & Guimond, 1986;H. J. Smith, Spears, & Hamstra, 1999; Tropp & Wright, 1999). Forexample, Smith, Spears, and Oyen (1994) found that when people'ssocial identities were salient, they were more sensitive to collectiveinjustices. In a second, Leung, Tong, and Lind (2007) have argued thatwhen allocation decisions impact group interests, social identityconcerns can lead individuals to be more concerned with their group'soutcome than their within group standing, regardless of the presenceof an obvious outgroup. In a third, Hafer and Olson (2003) invokeintergroup relations as an alternative to the scope of justice'sexplanation for some instances of cruelty, such as the U.S.'sinternment of Japanese-Americans during World War II (Nagata,1990, 1993). According to one view, such behavior might have beenfacilitated by psychological processes leading some Americans to viewthis population as “subhuman,” and thus outside the scope of justice(Deutsch, 1985; Opotow, 1993, 2005, 2007). Alternatively, Hafer andOlson assert that such harm doing can occur as a direct result of thedesire for justice: sometimes victimized groups can be seen asdeserving of negative treatment (Feather, 1992, 2002; Heuer,Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999; Major, 1994; Sunshine &Heuer, 2002). In either case, intergroup relations are critical (ratherthan irrelevant) to justice judgments concerning the treatment ofoutgroups.

Like Hafer and Olson, we assert that justice judgments play acentral role in encounters with outgroup members. Like Leung et al.(2007), we expect that when social identity concerns are engaged,group concerns are directly implicated. However, whereas Leung andcolleagues predict an increased focus on collective outcomes, we arepredicting an increased emphasis on relational concerns. Our proposal

543L. Heuer, S.J. Stroessner / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47 (2011) 541–553

is that group memberships can influence the meaning of others'treatment, so that treatment frommembers of highly valued ingroupsis likely to be interpreted as a message about one's standing withinone's group. In contrast, treatment from outgroupmembers is likely tobe interpreted as a message about one's group's standing vis-à-vis theoutgroup. Both messages play an important role in mediating therelation between fairness of treatment and perceptions of fairness, butthe degree that each message plays a mediating role is expected tovary across social contexts.

Our contention that multiple values can be shown to mediate therelationship between respectful treatment and procedural fairness,and that contextual variables moderate the meaning of respectfultreatment depending on whether encounters are perceived as oneswith ingroup or outgroup members, is novel. If we are correct thatrespectful treatment communicates different information acrosssocial contexts, this raises the possibility that the impact of respecton fairness might be mediated via differing interpretational pathwaysacross different types of interactions.

Self-interest as a mediator of the respect–fairness relationship

Our focus on group identities as a moderator of the meaning of fairtreatment is not a claim that other values are unimportant in justicejudgments. Indeed, we also examine a third value that, while notunfamiliar to justice researchers, has received little attention as onethat might also mediate the relationship between respect andfairness: a self-interest or resource value. Self-interest was thefundamental motivational assumption of Thibaut and Walker's(1975, 1978) control theory of procedural justice (Leventhal, Karuza,& Fry, 1980; Shapiro & Brett, 1993; Tyler, 1987, 1994; Tyler, Rasinski,& Spodick, 1985). While the theoretical underpinnings of Thibaut andWalker's theory are well supported in tests of their control theory ofprocedural justice, there is also evidence that information about self-interest can influence the impact of the relational variables of trust,neutrality, and standing on procedural justice judgments. So, whereasTyler (1989) showed that respectful treatment from a police officerenhanced procedural justice, Heuer, Penrod, Hafer, and Cohn (2002)showed that the influence of respect is not entirely a relational one: itseffect is driven in part by its message about whether good or badoutcomes are forthcoming (e.g., “Am I going to get a speedingticket?”). In Studies 1 and 2 we include a test of the hypothesis thatrespectful treatment can influence fairness because of its implicationsfor one's self-interest, as well as because of its implications for eitherintragroup or intergroup standing.

In the studies belowwe look for evidence that respectful treatmentis relevant to two values other than intragroup status, and thatgratification of either value is sufficient to mediate the relation

Fig. 1. A multiple-mediation mo

between relational variables and fairness independent of beliefs aboutwithin-group standing.

Hypotheses

We argue that intergroup standing and self-interest, like intragroupstanding, are values that can influence the meaning and the con-sequences of respectful treatment for justice judgments. Two distincthypotheses derived from this argument are tested in each of the studiesbelow. Hypothesis 1 is that gratification of each of the values of within-group standing, intergroup standing, and self-interestwill independentlyenhance procedural justice. This prediction is tested by looking forindependent contributions of each value's gratification on proceduraljustice. Hypothesis 2 is that the effect of respect on fairness will bemediated by each of the three values measured in these studies. Fig. 1summarizes the mediation model implied by Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Our reasoning about multiple values, and the contexts that mightactivate them, suggests an ancillary hypothesis that we introducehere, and return to below. We expect that the meaning of respectmight vary according to the values activated in a particular context. Tomaximize the chance of capturing the effect of each of the valuemediators hypothesized here, each of our studies varies the context inwhich the participants experience more or less respectful treatment.The three contexts (an encounter with a member of one's valuedingroup, an encounter with a member of an outgroup that stands inclear contrast to one's ingroup, or an encounter in which there was noreference to any group), were devised in light of our expectation thatthe context in which an encounter takes place can influence themeaning of the more or less respectful treatment one receives.

Fig. 2 depicts our ancillary hypothesis that the context in whichsocial exchanges occur can moderate the meaning of the more or lessrespectful treatment one receives. So, for example, the solid line fromthe contextual moderator, Encounter with an Ingroup Member to thevalue mediator, Intragroup Standing, combined with the dashed linesfrom the same ingroup contextual moderator to the other two valuemediators (intergroup standing and self-interest) conveys ourexpectation that more or less respectful treatment in ingroupencounters is more likely to be interpreted by the target as a messageabout the target's within group standing than one about their group'sstanding vis-à-vis other groups or the likelihood of obtaining valuedoutcomes. Our manipulation of respect and context permits a test ofthis moderation hypothesis in each of our studies. In the interest ofbrevity however, we defer the summary of the results of these testsuntil after the report of Study 3.

There is an important distinction to be drawn between themediation models and the moderation model. While we expect thateach of the three value judgments is capable of mediating the effect ofrespect on fairness, we also expect respect in any context can

del of procedural fairness.

Fig. 2. A moderation model of procedural fairness.


communicate amessage aboutmultiple values. For example, althoughthe inference that respect communicates a message about one'swithin-group standing seems most likely to result from an encounterwith an ingroup member, the same within-group standing inferencemight plausibly be drawn from an outgroup encounter. Imagine, forexample, a governmental ambassador being denied a requestedmeeting with a foreign government official — while this might beviewed as slight to the ambassador's government, it might also beviewed as a slight to the suitor — perhaps a more credentialed callerwould have received a warmer reception. Similarly, consider theinterpretation of a police officer's more or less respectful treatment ofa civilian at the outset of a traffic stop. While the treatment mightplausibly be interpreted as a signal about the cost of the impendingcitation, it might just as plausibly be interpreted as a signal about theofficer's judgment of one's ethnic group (recall the indignationexperienced by drivers whose experience was that they were citedfor “driving while black.”). Because of the potential for multipleinferences to result from respectful treatment in any encounter, ourtests of the mediation hypothesis in these studies examine the effectof respect on each of the three value judgments, regardless of whetherthe source of the treatment was an ingroup member, an outgroupmember, or an individual in an encounter in which social groups werenot obviously a salient concern. Although the importance of eachmediator is expected to vary across social contexts, the degree ofambiguity inherent in social interactions suggests that any givenmediator might continue to play a role even in situations where it isnot obviously relevant.

Study 1

Study 1 involves a social encounter involving respectful ordisrespectful treatment in which one of the three hypothesized valuesmight actually be gratified. We assigned undergraduate participants towrite and then record an essay about the relationship of their owncollege (Barnard College) and its affiliate university (ColumbiaUniversity). To enhance participants' concernwith each of three values,participants in the ingroup condition were encouraged to imagine thatthey were writing their essay for publication in the Barnard Collegenewspaper andwere led to believe that thepersonwhoevaluated itwasa fellow Barnard College student; participants in the outgroup conditionwere encouraged to imagine that they were writing their essay forpublication in the Columbia University newspaper and were led tobelieve that the person who evaluated it was a Columbia Universitystudent; self-interest participants were told the essays that received thehighest evaluations from evaluators would have the greatest chance ofwinning an attractive prize (self-interest participants heard noreference to targeting the essay toward a particular group nor to their

evaluator's college affiliation). After recording their evaluations,participants were given what they believed was a critique of theiressay from a fellow participant. This critique was delivered in a mannerthat pre-testing revealed to be either respectful or disrespectful.

Method

DesignThe experiment employed a 2 (respect: high vs. low)×3 (context:

intragroup vs. intergroup vs. self-interest) between-subjects design.

Participants and procedureParticipants were 160 Barnard College undergraduates (all female)

who participated for course credit or financial compensation.Participants were instructed that this study was concerned with theeffect of situational variables (e.g., the topic, the position adopted,preparation time, or the presence of feedback) on their ability todeliver a persuasive argument. Participants were ushered intoseparate rooms and instructed that the experiment involved thecreation of a persuasive appeal on one of several topics. They weretold that they would be asked to focus on the relationship betweenBarnard College and Columbia University. Specifically, they would beasked to develop a persuasive appeal arguing either that BarnardCollege and Columbia University should merge into a singleinstitution or that Barnard College should retain its separate statusas a college and affiliate of Columbia University. They were furtherinstructed that they had been randomly assigned to adopt the positionthat Barnard College should retain its independent status. They wereprovided with some arguments on both sides of this issue to assistthem with developing their argument. Participants were then toldthat they would be permitted 15-min to write their argument and2 min to make a voice recording of it. Participants were told that theywould trade their tapes with other participants to exchange feedback.

At this point, participants received different information, dependingon their condition. Ingroup participants were instructed to imagine thattheywerewriting their argument as an editorial for theBarnardBulletin(the college newspaper). The experimenter noted that, “Since its [theBarnard Bulletin's] readership is 85% Barnard College students and only15% Columbia University students, you should position your argumentto have its most favorable impact among Barnard College students.”Outgroup participants were encouraged to imagine that they werewriting their argument as an editorial for the Columbia Spectator (theColumbia University newspaper). The experimenter noted that, “Sinceits [the Columbia Spectator] readership is 85% Columbia Universitystudents and only 15% Barnard College students, you should positionyour argument to have its most favorable impact among ColumbiaUniversity students.” Self-interest participants were encouraged to

image of Fig.�2


imagine that “you are writing this editorial for the greatest possibleeffect. Since you have a chance of being entered in a lottery for $50 andtwomicro-cassette recorders (with a retail value of about $40each), youshould position your argument to have its most favorable impact onyour evaluator.”

Participants were then left alone to prepare and record theirargument.When the experimenter collected the recordings, shehandedeach participant a pre-recorded argument on one of 6 different topics(e.g., supporting community service, assisting homeless persons,supporting the College's physical education requirement) and informedher that it had been recorded by a fellow participant. Participants wereinstructed to listen to and evaluate the argument while they werewaiting for their own feedback.

After participants had evaluated the other participant's tape, theexperimenter returnedwith the participant's own tape which had beenmodified to include a (pre-recorded) critique of their argumentallegedly recorded by a fellow participant. This critique contained theinformation relevant to both manipulations. Ingroup participantsreceived a recording that said, “I was asked to evaluate your argumentfrom the perspective of a Barnard College student. In fact, I ama BarnardCollege student.” Intergroup evaluations substituted “Columbia Univer-sity” for “Barnard College.” Evaluations in the self-interest conditionbegan, “I was asked to evaluate your argument from the perspective of aneutral observer. In fact, I do feel pretty neutral about this issue. I'vealmost never thought about it before.”

The next portion of the recorded feedback contained themanipulation of respect. The content of the feedback was identical,but the tone of the delivery varied so as to communicate sincerity orsarcasm as the evaluator said, “Oh right. I am so impressed by yourarguments. Like, I really think you've made some good points here.Perhaps you could read it all with just a bit more feeling.”

All pre-recorded evaluations were recorded by the same individ-ual. After listening to the recorded evaluations of their argument,participants completed a questionnaire about their experience withthe evaluation process.

2

MeasuresMultiple indicators were used to measure the key constructs of

respectful treatment and gratification of the three values. Respect wasmeasured by 3 statements (e.g., 9 = The evaluation was polite andrespectful). These items were combined to create a single compositeindex (α=.92;M=5.92, SD=2.68). Procedural fairnesswasmeasuredwith four items (e.g., 9 = I believe the process used for evaluations hasbeen a fair one; My evaluator treated me fairly) combined to create asingle composite measure index (α=.91; M=6.35, SD=2.23).

The 6-items measuring the value variables of intragroup standing,intergroup standing, and self-interest were submitted to a principlecomponents analysis with varimax rotation on components witheigenvalues greater than 1.0. This analysis produced three compo-nents accounting for 78.7% of the variance. The uncorrelated principalcomponents were saved using the regression method in SPSS, andthey were employed as the indicators of the unique role of each of thethree values in the regression analyses that follow. Each componentwas defined most clearly by two items with component loadings thatexceeded .70, with one crossloading that exceeded .30: Intragroupstanding (9 = My evaluation suggests that Barnard College studentsrespect and value me as a Barnard College student; My evaluationsuggests that I am a respected member of the Barnard Collegecommunity); Intergroup standing (9 = The student who evaluatedmy appeal thinks Barnard College is less prestigious than ColumbiaUniversity (reversed); My evaluator seems to hold Barnard Collegestudents in high regard1); and self-interest (I expect to have a chance

1 This second item also loaded (component loading=.50) on the intra-groupstanding component.

to win money or prizes based on my evaluation; I am likely to winmoney or prizes for my participation in this study).

Results

Manipulation checksParticipants were asked to indicate the institutional affiliation of

their evaluator (recall that intergroup participants were told theirevaluator was a Columbia University student, intragroup participantswere told their evaluator was a Barnard College student, and self-interest participants did not receive any information about theirevaluator's affiliation). Of 160 participants, 17 were eliminated due toanswers to this question that were contrary to ones that suited theirexperimental value condition (we eliminated only those participantswho reported that they knew the affiliation of their evaluator butwere incorrect).2 All analyses are based on N=143 participants.3

A 2 (respect high vs. low)×3 (context: intragroup vs. intergroup vs.self-interest) ANOVA was conducted on the composite measure ofrespect. This analysis revealed the expected effect of respect, F(1, 136)=56.51, pb .001, M, respect high=7.28, respect low=4.39, partialη2=.29. This analysis also revealed a respect×context interaction, F(1,136)=3.91, p=.02; partial η2=.05. The nature of this interaction wassuch that the effect of respect was somewhat greater among the self-interest participants (d=1.92) than among either the intragroup(d=1.15) or intergroup participants (d=.85).

Tests of hypothesesHypothesis 1 states that each of the three value judgments will

uniquely influence procedural fairness, and Hypothesis 2 states thatthe effect of respect on procedural fairness will bemediated by each ofthese three value judgments. Since the participants in the self-interestcondition were the only ones to hear anything about a potentialreward for a successful effort, they are the only ones who mightreasonably be expected to show that positive expectations for abeneficial outcome would mediate the effect of respect on proceduralfairness. Therefore, we report the results from the tests of Hypotheses1 and 2 first for all participants and then just for the participants in theself-interest condition (N=51). Because the tests of Hypotheses 1 and2 for the intragroup and intergroup standing value judgmentsinvolves multiple mediators of respect in a single model, weemployed a bootstrapping procedure for estimating indirect effectsin multiple mediation models (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2007). Theresult of this test is summarized in the top portion of Fig. 3. We testedthe indirect effect of the manipulated respect variable on proceduralfairness through the value judgments of intragroup and intergroupstanding. For interpretive clarity, the two value dummies and themeasure of self-interest were included in this model as controlvariables. Since we have not proposed a hypothesis of moderatedmediation (e.g., that the effect of intragroup standing on fairnessresults exclusively from ingroup encounters), our mediation testsinclude all main effects in the model, but exclude the interactionterms. The test of this indirect effect in this multiple mediation modelrevealed a significant effect (pb .05) of respect through each of thetwo mediators. This mediation test is simultaneously supportive ofboth Hypothesis 1 (since both of the two value judgments havesignificant direct effects on procedural fairness) and Hypothesis 2(since the indirect effect of respect through both value judgments wassignificant).

The tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 for the subset of self-interestcondition participants are summarized in the bottom portion of Fig. 3.

Our interpretations of these path analyses are unaffected by the elimination ofthese participants.

3 The degrees of freedom vary slightly in some hypothesis tests due to missing datafrom two participants.

Fig. 3. Hypotheses 1 and 2 multiple mediator tests, Study 1. Standardized, non-standardized coefficients, and (t) for all significant (pb .05) paths are shown (solid lines, pb .05;dashed line, pb .06). Manipulated variables and measured value variables not reflected in these models are controlled for as described in the text.


In this analysis, the value variables of intragroup standing andintergroup standing were included as covariates. The respectmanipulation produced a significant effect on the mediator variable(self-interest). In addition, consistent with Hypothesis 1, self-interesthad a marginally significant effect on procedural fairness. Finally, aspredicted by Hypothesis 2, the indirect effect of respect on proceduralfairness was significant (pb .05).4

Discussion

Study 1 was supportive of both of our hypotheses concerning therole of multiple values on procedural fairness and the role of multiplevalues as mediators of the effect of respectful treatment on proceduralfairness. Themulti-value hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) was supported bythe direct effects of each of the three uncorrelated value judgments onprocedural fairness (though the effect of self-interest was onlymarginally significant, pb .06). It is noteworthy that the effect of theintergroup standing judgment had an effect on procedural fairnessthat was roughly twice the magnitude of the intragroup standingjudgment. We speculate about the reason for this in our Generaldiscussion.

The multi-value mediation hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) was alsosupported. Each of the three value judgments was shown uniquely tomediate the effect of respect on procedural fairness (recall that themediator variables are orthogonal principle components). Overall,this study provides strong support for the claim that multiple valuesare involved in shaping the effect of respect on procedural fairness.

Study 2

In light of the novelty of the hypotheses concerning the directinfluence of multiple values on procedural fairness and their role asmediators of the effect of respect on fairness, we felt that an additionalstudy employing somewhat different methods than Study 1 was inorder. In Study 2, as in Study 1, we employed experimentalmanipulations of respectful treatment and the context of theencounter (ingroup vs. outgroup member vs. self-interest). However,we employed different operationalizations of respectful treatment,and, rather than relying on pre-existing groups as in Study 1, wecreated groups in the laboratory. Demonstrating similar effects withnovel groups will bolster our confidence that the effects obtainedreflect the role of respect and not any pre-existing or extraneousfactors involved in the relation between longstanding groups.

4 Contrary to the causal steps approach of testing mediation effects (Baron & Kenny,1986), bootstrapping procedures for testing mediation (Hayes, 2009) permit aninferential test of indirect effects that can be significant even when one of theconstituent paths is not.

Method

DesignThis experiment employed a 2 (respect high vs. low)×3 (context:

intragroup vs. intergroup vs. self-interest) between-subjects design.

Participants and procedureParticipants were 169 (151 female and 18 male) undergraduates

who participated for course credit or financial compensation.Participants were told that they would be participating in two

negotiations, one involving an interaction with members of a groupand one involving a dyadic interaction with another individual. In thedyadic negotiation, participants were led to believe they had beentreated respectfully or disrespectfully by someone they believed to bea member of an ingroup or an outgroup, or someone whose groupidentity was not salient.

In order to create an ingroup and an outgroup, participants engagedin a classic prisoner's dilemma exercise (see Colman, 1995). Upon theirarrival, to enhance their identification with their negotiation group inthe first portion of this study, participants completed a “PreferencesQuestionnaire” while waiting for other participants to arrive. Thisquestionnaire asked participants to circle “agree” or “disagree” for eachof 15 statements about them (e.g., “I am a psychology major”) that wecould use as the basis for dividing them into ingroups and outgroups.After the experimenter had described the procedure, participants weredivided into two groups for the prisoner's dilemma game based uponwhichever question on the preferences questionnaire came closest todividing them into 2 comparably sized groups. Participants were toldthat they had been divided into two groups based on their answers tothis question (e.g., psychology majors vs. non-psychology majors) andthat they should refer to this group when questioned about their groupmembership in any questionnaires.

The experimenter instructed the two groups to prepare their offerfor the first written exchange in the group negotiation. The first groupnegotiation simulated a multiple round variant of a prisoner's dilemmainvolving two competing companies. Participants (up to 12 per session)were randomly assigned to membership in one of two groups whichwere ushered to separate rooms where each group discussed theirnegotiating strategy. When the negotiations began, each group'sdecisions on each round (cooperate or compete) were exchanged inwriting and delivered by the experimenter. Thus, the experimenter wasable to surreptitiously control each group's offers to the other group. Onrounds 1 and 2, all groups believed that their opponent had firstcooperated and then defected. At this point, groups were told they hadan opportunity to send a written communication to the other groupprior to the next round. Once again, the experimenter controlled themessages, so that all groups received an apology for the defection alongwith a promise to cooperate on the third round. On round three, allgroups were led to believe that the other group had broken its promiseand had again defected.

image of Fig.�3


At this point the experimenter instructed both groups that theirintergroup negotiation would be interrupted while all participantsengaged in a brief dyadic negotiation. All participants were told thatthey would return to complete the group negotiation after theycompleted the dyadic one (the groups were interrupted, but notdisbanded; thus these groups had both a history and an anticipatedfuture of intra- and intergroup interaction). Participants were thenushered individually to private cubicles where they completed a briefquestionnaire that included measures of their attraction to their owngroup and the other group in the intergroup negotiation.

The experimenter explained that the dyadic negotiation would beone in which they and another participant were to seek agreement on aset of rankings of the likely success of various strategies that might beemployed for group-negotiations like the one they had been engaged inup until this point. Depending on their experimental condition,participants were told that they would be paired with another personrandomly selected from “today's participants” (self-interest condition),another person randomly selected from the opposing group (intergroupcondition) or another person randomly selected from their own group(intragroup condition). The experimenter explained that the kind ofnegotiation problem faced by their groups had been studied extensivelyby psychologists, who had determined which strategies (e.g., alwayscooperate; always compete)were actuallymore or less successful. Theirtask was to exchange rankings and any necessary communications, inwriting, with their negotiating partner in an effort to agree upon a set ofrankings. Once they had made their rankings and they had writtenanything they wanted, the experimenter would deliver the rankings totheir partner, who would be permitted to suggest his or her ownrankings and send them back to the participant. Participants were toldthat this offer-counteroffer sequence would continue until eachindividual had three opportunities to rank the strategies or until thepair had agreed,whichever camefirst. The experimenter alsonoted that,since research had established the efficacy of the 4 strategies, theirperformance on this ranking task could be scored and that their namewould be submitted 1–4 times to a lottery for a $5 gift certificate at alocal restaurant, depending on the accuracy of their rankings.

At this point the instructions varied somewhat according tocondition; an abbreviated summary follows:

Intergroup: Although your success or failure to agree with yourpartner on the rankings in this individual negotiation will not costor benefit you in any personal way, you should keep in mind thatyou are negotiating with a member of the opposing group in thegroup advertising negotiation.

Intragroup: Although your success or failure to agree with yourpartner on the rankings in this individual negotiation will not costor benefit you in any personal way, you should keep in mind thatyou are negotiating with another member of your own group inthe group advertising negotiation.

Self-interest: Your chances for a dinner certificate will bequadrupled and the amount of the lottery ticket will be increasedto $20 (your name will be entered in the lottery 4 times for a $20lottery) if you and your partner agree upon the rankings, andthose rankings are among the ones submitted that are closest tothe rankings suggested by previous research.

Participants were then escorted to private cubicles for the dyadicnegotiation. All participants were told that they had been randomlyselected to initiate their negotiation and that they were to do so byproviding their rankings of the four strategies summarized on theiroffer sheet. Once the participants had completed their rankings, theexperimenter collected them, indicating that she would deliver themto their partner. Several minutes later, the experimenter returned

with an identical form that the participants were told had beencompleted by their partner. On it, the experimenter had ranked thefour strategies in an order that reversed the participant's 1st andfourth, and their 2nd and 3rd rankings. All in- and outgroupparticipants exchanged ranking forms on which the respondentsindicated the group they were in during the 1st (group) negotiation.Thus, when they received the rankings from their partner, the formindicated that the partner had been either a member of the same orthe opposing group. Participants in the self-interest condition werenot asked to identify their group, nor did their partner's form requestor provide group identification.

The forms participants received from their partner also included amessage that was used to manipulate the variable of respect. Themessage read as follows [depending on experimental condition]:

Respectful comment: Hi. I've considered your rankings carefully.While they made me think,
[intragroup only: which makes me think you should take controlof our remaining group discussions]
[intergroup only: which makes me think your group is morethoughtful than I had previously given you credit for]
I have suggested an alternative ordering. Please reconsider yourrankings in light of my suggestions. I would appreciate yourthoughts.
Disrespectful comment: Oh please![intragroup only: I don't think I'll be nominating you to lead ourremaining group discussions.]
[intergroup only: I suppose I shouldn't be surprised to see suchthinking from your group.] Look at my ordering and think again.
At this point, the experimenter instructed the participants tocomplete a second questionnaire including checks on participants'recall of their own and their dyadic-session partner's negotiationgroup, the manipulation of respect, and all dependent measures. Afterthis questionnaire was completed, the participants were thanked fortheir participation and debriefed.

MeasuresThe first questionnaire included a 5-item composite measuring the

participants' attachment to both their ingroup and the outgroup (e.g.,9 = I like this group; I feel loyal to this group) adapted fromMowday,Steers, and Porter's (1979) Organizational Commitment Scale.Participants answered four questions about how politely andrespectfully they had been treated by their opponent in their dyadicnegotiation (e.g., 9 = The other person has treated me politely duringthis negotiation; So far, the other person has treatedmewith dignity).These items were combined to create a single measure of respect,M=5.32, SD=2.38, α=.91.

The 12 items designed to measure the values of intragroupstanding, intergroup standing, and self-interest were submitted to aprinciple components analysis with varimax rotation on componentswith eigenvalues greater than 1.0. This analysis produced threecomponents accounting for 80.7% of the variance. The uncorrelatedprincipal components were saved using the regression method inSPSS, and they were employed as the indicators of the three values inthe regression analyses that follow. Each component was defined byitems with component loadings that equal to or greater than .70, andno cross-loadings with eigenvalues exceeding .40: Intragroup stand-ing (5 items; e.g., 9 = The other negotiator in this strategy meetingconsiders me an important member of our mutual ComparativeAdvertising group; The other negotiator…respectsme as amember ofour mutual group); Intergroup standing (5 items, e.g., 9 = The other


negotiator in this strategymeeting holdsmy group in high regard; Theother negotiator...respectsmy group); and self-interest (2 items; 9= Iexpect to win a prize based on my performance in this experiment;There is a good chance that I will win dinner certificates as a result ofmy performance in this experiment).

Finally, four items were combined to create a composite measureof procedural fairness (e.g., 9 = So far, the other person has behavedfairly toward me during this encounter; The other person has treatedme unfairly during this strategy meeting (reversed)), M=5.3,SD=2.2, α=.91.

Results

Manipulation checksParticipants in the three groups were asked to indicate whether

their negotiation partner in the dyadic negotiation was in the samegroup as them, a different group, or was someone whose groupmembership was unknown. Of 169 participants, 20 were eliminateddue to answers to this question that were contrary to ones that suitedtheir experimental value condition (as in Study 1 we eliminated onlythose participants who reported that they knew the affiliation of theirevaluator but were incorrect).5 All analyses are based onN=149 (133female and 16 male) participants.

A within-subject t-test on participants' attachment to the ingroupand outgroup revealed significantly greater attachment to the ingroup(M=7.00; SD=1.69; α=.91) than to the outgroup (M=3.66;SD=1.40; α=.78), t(145)=16.52, pb .001, d=1.37.

A 2 (respect high vs. low)×3 (context: intragroup; intergroup; self-interest) ANOVA on the measure of polite and respectful treatmentrevealed a highly significant effect of the respectmanipulation:M, respecthigh=7.00, M, respect low=3.52, F(1, 143)=178.37, pb .001, partialη2=.56; and a smaller, but significant effect of nature of context, M,intragroup=5.3, M, intergroup=4.8, M, self-interest,=5.7; F(2, 143)=4.09, p=.019, partial η2=.05, and a respect×context interaction, F(2,143)=3.11. p=.047, partial η2=.04. LSD post-hoc tests on the pairwisedifferences among the context means revealed that only the intergroupand self-interest conditions differed significantly from one another. Thenature of the respect×context interaction was such that the effect ofrespect varied somewhat across the three contexts: intragroup, d=2.74;intergroup, d=2.11; self-interest, d=1.75.

Hypothesis testsWe employed the same bootstrapping procedure as in Study 1 to

test our hypotheses (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2007). However, unlikein Study 1, all participants in this study were aware of a possibility ofwinning a prize for a successful interaction with another participant,so the tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 were conducted on the entire set ofparticipants. The results of these tests are summarized in Fig. 4.Hypothesis 1, that each of the three value judgments wouldindependently enhance procedural fairness, is tested by the threedirect paths of each of the three value judgments that were part of thismediation test. This analysis revealed support for the direct effect ofintragroup standing and intergroup standing, but not self-interest, onprocedural justice. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the influence of respecton procedural fairness will be mediated by the intragroup standing,intergroup standing, and self-interest value judgments. For interpre-tive clarity, the two value dummies that capture the three levels of thecontext manipulation were included in this model as controlvariables. Fig. 4 shows that the independent variable of respectproduced a significant effect on the proposed mediator variables ofintragroup and intergroup standing but not self-interest and that both

5 Our interpretations of these path analyses are unaffected by the elimination ofthese participants.

of these two mediators produced significant effects on proceduralfairness. There was also a significant indirect effect of respect onprocedural fairness, as the multiple mediation tests revealedsignificant indirect effects (pb .05) of respect through each of thesetwo mediators. Thus, clear evidence of mediation was obtained.

Discussion

Study 2 supported both of our two primary hypotheses, thoughthis support was limited to two of the three values examined.Hypothesis 1, that each of the three values would independentlycontribute to procedural fairness, was supported for the intragroupstanding and intergroup standing values. In Study 1 we noted that theeffect of intergroup standing was greater than the effect of intragroupstanding on procedural fairness. This pattern is clearly reversed in thisstudy. Hypothesis 2, that the effect of respect on procedural fairnesswould be mediated by the multiple values, was also supported forboth the intragroup standing and the intergroup standing values.Thus, Studies 1 and 2 provide consistent evidence that respect canaffect procedural fairness through various routes.

While strongly supportive of our hypotheses, Studies 1 and 2 wereconducted in laboratory settings with undergraduate participantswho were misled to believe that they had been treated more or lessrespectfully through written feedback by another student who was amember of their college (Study 1) or their negotiation group (Study2). Study 3 tests the same predictions in a very different context. Inthis study, non-student adults recalled an actual encounter withanother individual who was a member of an existing ingroup oroutgroup. This study, like Study 1, taps participants' identificationwith natural pre-existing ingroups. However, whereas Study 1compared student reactions to respect from a member of their owncollege or an affiliate college, Study 3 surveys New York City policeofficers about their encounters with other police officers (ingroup) orcivilians (outgroup). Collecting evaluations of a large sample of real-world encounters allowed us to determine whether the effectsobtained in the laboratory also emerged in natural interactions thatvaried in other important respects.

Study 3

New York police officers were surveyed about a recent encounterwith either a civilian (an outgroup member) or another police officer(an ingroup member). In order to test our hypotheses, we comple-mented our quasi-manipulation of the context in which these officers'encounter took place with measures of the constructs of respectfultreatment, the value constructs of intragroup standing and intergroupstanding, and fair treatment. We also prompted officers to think aboutinteractions that occurred with authorities or subordinates and toconsider either serious or relatively benign encounters.

Method

DesignThis study employed a 2 (ingroup vs. outgroup)×2 (authority vs.

subordinate)×2 (routine vs. particularly serious encounter)×8(survey item-order) stratified random factorial design. The variableof respect was operationalized as the natural variation in theparticipants' report of how respectfully they were treated by theother individual in this encounter.

Participants and procedureParticipants were 879 New York City police officers, though

listwise deletion of variables with missing data in the principalcomponents and regression analyses produced a final data set of 839respondents. Of these respondents, 533 were reporting aboutencounters with civilians rather than encounters with police officers;

Fig. 4. Hypotheses 1 and 2 multiple mediator tests, Study 2. Standardized, non-standardized coefficients, and (t) for all significant (pb .05) paths are shown.


532 of the encounters were ones in which the officer was theauthority rather than the subordinate, and 416 were reporting aboutencounters which were relatively serious. The officers indicated theirrank on a 10-point ordinal scale from the lowest rank (policeofficer=1) to the highest rank (assistant chief=10). The majority(N=530) were officers, with notable numbers of officer in thefollowing categories of decreasing rank: 37 lieutenants; 142 detec-tives; and 95 sergeants. The officers were overwhelmingly male(N, males=734; N, females=73, with 32 officers leaving thisresponse unanswered), and white (N=498; with notable numbersof officers reporting their ethnicity as Black, N=83; Hispanic,N=184, and Asian, N=12, other=11, and 51 officers who did notanswer this question). Officers ranged in age from 18 to 66 years(M=32.9; SD=6.4), and experience (years as a police officer rangedfrom 1 to 38, M=8.8; SD=6.1).

Participants were surveyed at the beginning of an annual trainingsession that all officers were required to attend. Once the officers hadassembled for their training, the commanding officer introduced thelead researcher, who briefly explained that we were seekinginformation from police officers about their satisfaction with theirencounters with civilians and with other police officers. The officerswere asked to complete a 157-item survey that would takeapproximately 20 min of their time. In exchange for their completedsurveys, a $5 donation was made to one of several charitableorganizations of the officer's choosing.

Each survey asked the officer to think back to the most recent on-duty encounter with either a civilian (outgroup) or another policeofficer (ingroup). Depending on the authority–subordinate variable,the officers were asked to think of an encounter in which they or theother person in the encounter was the authority or person in charge.6

To assure representation of the range of the seriousness of theseencounters, respondents were either asked to think of an encounterthat “they considered meaningful (e.g., it lasted at least 10–15 minand it mattered enough to you that you can recall it well),” or anencounter that was “particularly serious or involved particularlyimportant outcomes.” Eight orderings of the questionnaire itemswerecreated by using 4 orders of the subsections, and two randomizedorders of the questions within each subsection. The analyses belowcollapse across questionnaire order.

MeasuresFour measures were employed in the path model used to test our

hypotheses. As in Studies 1 and 2,multiple bipolar adjective scales (1=

6 The authority–subordinate variable was included to test hypotheses not examinedin this paper. All regression analyses reported below include the authority–subordinate and seriousness variables as well as the interaction between each ofthese variables and respect as covariates in the design.

strongly disagree; 9 = strongly agree) served as indicators of the valuejudgments that were expected to mediate the influence of respect onprocedural fairness. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, a common measure of self-interest was not obtained for the police officers' encounters withcivilians and with other officers, therefore the self-interest valuehypotheses were not tested in this study. Three items were employedas measures of the police officers' view of whether the other person intheir encounter valued their group (the NYPD): The other personseemed to think theNYPD is an asset toNewYork City; The other personseemed to have a favorable view of the NYPD; The other person seemedto respect cops. Three items were also used as measures of the officers'view of whether the other person viewed the officer as a member offavorable standing within the NYPD: I was treated like a high rankingmember of the NYPD; I was treated like a high status member of theNYPD; I was treated like a senior member of the NYPD. A principlecomponents analysis with varimax rotation on components witheigenvalues greater than 1.0 was conducted on the six itemsmeasuringthese two value constructs. This analysis produced two componentsaccounting for 80.1% of the variance, with each of the items loading onthe intended component with eigenvalues greater than .80, and nocross-loadings with eigenvalues exceeding .40. These two componentswere saved using the regression method in SPSS and used in theregression analyses below as indicators of these two constructs.

Three items were employed as measures of procedural fairness:He/she treated me in a fair and reasonable way; The other person'sbehavior toward me was fair; The other person treated me fairlyduring our encounter;M=4.5, SD=2.8,α=.96. Five itemsmeasuredthe respondents' perception of respectful treatment: e.g., Throughoutthe encounter, the other person was polite to me; The other person'sbehavior probably infringed somewhat on my rights (reversed), Theother person treated me with dignity; M=5.0; SD=2.3; α=.86.

Results

As in Studies 1 and 2, a bootstrapping procedurewas used for testingHypotheses 1 and 2 involvingmultiple mediators in a single model. Theresults of these hypotheses tests are summarized in Fig. 5.We tested theeffect of themeasuredvariableof respect onprocedural fairness throughthe two hypothesized value judgmentmediators of intragroup standingand intergroup standing. For interpretive clarity, this model testincluded the three manipulated variables as covariates. The indepen-dent variable of respectful treatment had a significant effect on both ofthe two hypothesized mediators (both t'sN10.0; both p'sb .001), andboth of these mediators had significant direct effects on proceduralfairness (both t'sN7.0; both p'sb .001). Critically, the total indirect effectof respect through the two mediators on procedural fairness wassignificant (both t'sN10.0; both p'sb .001), and the indirect effect ofrespect througheachmediator individuallywasalso significant (pb .01).The significant effect of each of the two mediators again supports

image of Fig.�4

Fig. 5. Hypotheses 1 and 2 multiple mediator hypothesis tests, Study 3. Standardized, non-standardized coefficients, and (t) for all significant (pb .05) paths are shown.


Hypothesis 1, that multiple values, including intragroup and intergroupstanding, influence procedural fairness. The significant indirect effect ofrespect through each mediator also supports the mediation claimadvanced by Hypothesis 2.

Discussion

Both of our hypotheses were supported in this naturalistic fieldstudy among NYC police officers. Hypothesis 1 was supported by thedirect effect of both intragroup standing and intergroup standing onprocedural fairness. It is notable that, as in Study 1 (the other studytapping preexisting groups), the effect of intergroup standing onprocedural fairness was considerably greater than the effect ofintragroup standing on procedural fairness. Hypothesis 2, thatgratification of each of the values of intragroup standing andintergroup standingwouldmediate the effect of respect on proceduralfairness was supported for both of the two value measures.

Contextual moderation, Studies 1–3

In addition to the two primary hypotheses tested in our studies, weraised the possibility in our introduction that the context in whichrespectful treatment is communicated would moderate the inferencedrawn by the target about its meaning. As shown in Fig. 2, thisancillary hypothesis predicts a match between the context and theinference, such that that more or less respectful treatment wouldmost likely be interpreted as a message about within group standingwhen it was issued in an ingroup encounter, but as a message aboutone's group's standing when issued in an outgroup encounter, and asa message about the prospects for obtaining valued or deservedoutcomes in contexts where important outcomes were at stake.

Because of the exploratory nature of this moderation hypothesis andbecause it is only relevant to the degree that our two primary hypothesesreceivedsupport across thedifferent studies,wedidnot report tests of thishypothesis along with the results for the individual studies. However,because we manipulated context and respect in Studies 1 and 2 andcombined a measure of respect with a quasi-manipulation of context inStudy 3, we were able to test this moderation hypothesis in each of ourstudies. In each study, we examined the respect×context interaction onthemeasures of intragroup standing, intergroup standing, and (in Studies1 and 2) self-interest. In each instance the interactionwas tested in a pathmodel with dummy variables for context and respect. A brief descriptivesummary of these interaction tests is provided here.7

Results

The moderation hypothesis as it applies to the value of intergroupstanding was supported in all three of the interaction tests across thethree studies: in each test, intergroup standing was influenced more

7 A detailed report of these analyses is available upon request from the first author.

by respectful treatment in intergroup encounters than by respectfultreatment in intragroup encounters (though the interaction wassignificant only at pb .06 in Study 1). The moderation hypothesis as itpertains to intragroup standing was supported only in Study 2, whererespect from an ingroup member was particularly influential for thetarget's judgment of their standing within their group. Finally, themoderation hypothesis as it applies to self-interest was supported inStudy 1 but not in Study 2 (recall it was not tested in Study 3).

General discussion

We proposed that respectful treatment enhances fairness judg-ments because of its relevance to values beyond within-groupstanding. Two laboratory studies and one field survey tested theprediction that inferences about themeaning of respect for intergroupstanding and for self-interest (Studies 1 and 2 only) would influenceprocedural fairness just as inferences about the meaning of respect forintragroup standing influences procedural fairness.

Our argument suggested 2 hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicted thatthe gratification of two values in addition to intragroup standing—intergroup standing and self-interest—would enhance proceduralfairness. This hypothesiswas strongly supported. In Study 1, participantswere lead to believe they had been treated more or less respectfully bysomeonewhowas either amember of a group they valued, amember ofa clearly defined outgroup, or someone for whom group membershipwas not salient (but the potential for valued outcomes was salient). Allthree of the value judgments examined in this study (intragroupstanding, intergroup standing, and self-interest) made unique contribu-tions toprocedural fairness. In Study2,participantswere treatedmoreorless respectfully by a negotiating opponent whowas either amember ofan ingroup, an outgroup, or whose group membership was not salient(but a potential valued outcome was salient). In this study, both theintragroup and intergroup value judgments independently enhancedprocedural fairness. In Study 3, in which New York City police officersreported about an encounter with a fellow police officer (ingroup) orwith a civilian (outgroup), both intragroup and intergroup valuejudgments again made significant independent contributions to proce-dural fairness.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that each of the values examined in thesethree studies (intragroup standing, intergroup standing, and self-interest) would mediate the respect–fairness relationship. Thishypothesis was also strongly supported. All of the three valuejudgments were significant mediators in Study 1, and both intragroupstanding and intergroup standing were significant mediators inStudies 2 and 3. The self-interest mediation prediction was supportedin one of the two studies that tested its effect (Study 1).

Contextual moderation

The results of the moderation tests were particularly supportive ofcontextual moderation as it pertains to the meaning of respect inintergroup encounters. We think the limited support for the

image of Fig.�5


moderation test as it applies to the intragroup context is noteworthy,particularly since the prediction that ingroup encounters areparticularly well suited to produce an effect of respect on proceduralfairness follows directly from the Group Value Theory. Specifically,according to the Group Value Theory, if relational variables affectjudgments of procedural justice by serving as a signal of one'sstanding in one's group, then these variables should exert a greaterinfluence in encounters with ingroup rather than with outgroupmembers (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996;Tyler & Lind, 1990; Tyler, Lind, Ohbuchi, Sugawara, & Huo, 1998).Tyler and Smith (1999) state this explicitly suggesting, “If the group isnot important to one's sense of identity, the relational implications oftreatment should not matter” (p. 229).

One other observation about the moderation tests seems in order. InbothStudy1andStudy3,we found thedirect effect of intergroupstandingon procedural fairness to be greater than the effect of intragroup standingonprocedural fairness (see Figs. 3 and5).We think this pattern, combinedwith the more robust intergroup than intragroup moderation effect, is atleast suggestive of a stronger effect of intergroup respect than intragrouprespect effect on procedural fairness, and we propose that two processes,in combination, can explain this phenomenon. The first pertains to therole of deservingness assessments on procedural justice. Numeroustheorists have argued that notions of deservingness are central to bothdistributive (Crosby, 1982; Lerner, 1965, 1977; Major, 1994; Major,McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984) and procedural justice (Diekmann, Sondak, &Barsness, 2007; Heuer et al., 1999; Sunshine &Heuer, 2002). For example,Heuer et al. (1999) argued that judgments of procedural justice areinfluenced by assessments of whether treatment received in a socialencounter is in accord with the treatment deserved, and their researchshowed that people with high self-esteem feel more deserving ofrespectful treatment than people with low self-esteem. In a follow-upstudy, SunshineandHeuer (2002) showed thatwhenpeople interactwithother members of their ingroup, the effect of respect on their fairnessjudgments is mediated by their perception that they deserve respectbecause of their within-group status (e.g., higher status as greaterdeservingness).A similarfindingwas recently reportedbyDiekmannet al.(2007).

The second process follows from the Social Identity Theory (Hogg &Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) prediction that in intergroupencounters (such as those in our intergroup conditions) the need for apositive social identity leads to tendencies to see one's group as positivelydistinct from relevant outgroups. We suspect that when participants inour studies encountered individuals who were clearly members ofoutgroups, these social identity processeswere sufficient to enhance theirbelief that they, and their (higher status) group, were particularlydeserving of respectful treatment from the outgroup member. The samedeservingness processes might reasonably be expected to lead to aheightened attentiveness to whether one's group is shown the respect itdeserves. Thus, disrespect from an outgroupmember would be generallyperceived as an undeserved judgment about the value of one's group.

In contrast, consider what happens for ingroup encounters. Accordingto the Group Value Theory, respect from an ingroup member conveysimportant information about one's within-group status. However, in thecontext of an ingroup social interaction, the same social identity processesarenot expected to lead to a general perception that one is higher in statusthan the other members of one's ingroup, thus deservingness is notelevated, and there is no reason to expect individuals to feel particularlydeserving of respect, nor particularly attentive to whether respectfultreatment was obtained.

In sum, theevidence fromthe studiespresentedhereestablisha strongcase that at least one relational variable — respect — impacts fairnessjudgments for reasons beyond what it communicates about intragroupstanding. In essence,we are arguing that procedural justice judgments aremotivationally richer than is acknowledged by either the group value orcontrol theories of procedural justice. A similar claim has been advancedby Skitka (Skitka, 2003; Skitka &Mullen, 2002)who argues that concerns

with personal identity, such as those evoked by people'smoralmandates,can influence fairness perceptions independent of concerns with socialidentity. So, for example, Skitka and Mullen (2002) found that moralconvictions regarding parental rights and freedom were more importantthan social identity concerns for judgments about the fairness of the U.S.government's response to the Elián González custody dispute. Similarly,Skitka (2002) found that people who perceived a threat to a moralmandate (e.g., a state referendum that would render abortions illegal)judged the fairness of government policy according to its fit with theirmoral convictions independent of their views about trust, neutrality, andstanding. More recently, Skitka's (2003) accessible identity model ofjustice reasoningpredicts that different aspects of one's identity (material,social, and personal) can be accessible at any one point in time, so thatpeople's definitions of fairness will vary according to which aspect ofidentity is salient.

Directions for future research

We are aware of limitations of our work that must be considered infuture studies as well. Below we suggest some directions for futureresearch and consider some limitations of the studies presented here.Several directions seem particularly important for future researchexploring a multi-value role of the relational variables of trust,neutrality, and standing. First, the studies described here focusedexclusively on the procedural variable of respect, to the exclusion oftrust andneutrality. Thiswasa deliberate effort to focus on the relationalvariable that we expected to be least likely to tap self-interested orinstrumental concerns. By focusing on respect, we posed the greatestchallenge to our multi-value argument (in fact, the absence of a directeffect of self-interest on procedural justice in Study 2 might be partly afunction of this decision). Still, there is ample reason to think that thevariables of trust and neutrality will indirectly affect justice judgmentsthrough their influence on additional values aswell. So, for example, thevariable of trust has figured prominently in the research on dyadicconflict— it is also often the central problemfor thedisputants inmixed-motive conflicts. Similarly, Holmes andMurray (1996) discuss trust as akey problem for conflict in close interpersonal relationships. Thus, itseems reasonable to expect trust to matter for justice in encounterswhere individuals are concerned about self-interest or interpersonalstanding, independent of their concern for their value to their group.

Additional research is also needed to examine the role of values otherthan the three examined in Studies 1–3. Two are considered briefly here:interpersonal belongingness and self-esteemmaintenance. In an influen-tial review, Baumeister and Leary (1995) assert that “the desire forinterpersonal attachment may well be one of the most far-reaching andintegrative constructs currently available to understand human nature”(p. 522). Clearly, this is different than the group affiliation valuepositedbyLind and Tyler. Yet it is as easy to imagine an interpersonal motive as anintragroup one to cause people to focus on trust, neutrality, and standing.Being treatedwith respectmight signal that another person values us at astrictly interpersonal level as well as that they value ourmembership in acommongroup. Similarly, just as trust signals the long-term intentionsofgroup authorities from thegroupvalueperspective, somight it signal thelong-term viability of our interpersonal relationships.

The relational variables might also be relevant to self-esteemmaintenance andenhancement.While thegroupvaluemodel is premisedon such group identification models as Social Identity Theory (e.g., Tajfel,1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) other social psychological theories ofself-esteem emphasize more personal, or individualistic notions of self-concept (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Tesser, 1988; Tesser & Campbell, 1982).According to such theories, individuals value self-esteem enhancement,and minimization of self-esteem threats, and they are concerned withsuch personal attributes as competence, talent, and sociability.

The concern with one's self-esteem, while surely related to groupvalue concerns to the extent that one's esteem is dependent on groupidentification, is a different value than the group affiliation value posited


by the Group Value Theory. However, it is easy to imagine a concernwithrespectful treatment from the perspective of one concerned withenhancing their self-esteem, and at least two studies (Brockner et al.,1998; Heuer et al., 1999) demonstrated that self-esteem moderated theeffect of respect on procedural fairness — a finding that fits well withSkitka's (2003) predictions about the justice reasoning when one'spersonal identity is accessible.

Overall, we think the evidence presented here constitutes a strongpresumption that future theoretical and empirical work will need toconsider broader implications of the relational variables than has beenexamined to date.

Acknowledgments

The studies reported in this manuscript were supported in part bytwo National Science Foundation grants to the first author: SBR-9710946 and SES-0550495. We thank several anonymous reviewersfor their very thoughtful suggestions on this manuscript. We areparticularly grateful to the Barnard students who actually conductedthese studies: Mary Akhnoukh, Tally Aliphas, Lori Anderson, AmberDouglas, Deborah Edelman, Marie Falcone, Ilana Friedman, ReahGlassman, Stacey Gottesman, Elinor Huntington, Jenny Hyun, OgechiIwuoha, Ayelet Kattan, Alex Mark, Stephanie Sgambati, Tracy Sun,Laura Vale, Tara Weinblatt, and Elizabeth Zick.

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The multi-value basis of procedural justice