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The Leaders’ Old-New Instruments*
The Role of Political Movements in Democracy
Rudolf Metz
PhD Student (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Junior Research Fellow (Institute for Political Science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
Abstract
Political movements have embodied the utopia of anti-politics. This normative burden and de- politicized
perception keep the sociological social movement theory in captivity, which prevents the creation of a
realistic overview of collective actions. Hence I elucidate the movements’ role and function in the politi-
cal processes and in the functioning of democracy with the means of political theory. According to my
presupposition the three rival theories of democracy – deliberative -, participatory -, neoclassical repre-
sentative - and leader democracy (Pakulski-Körösényi 2012) – are connected logically to the forms of
direct democracy, such as classical direct -, referendum - and the populist ‘protest-democracy’ (Sartori
1987). Thus various movement concepts could be set up and compared to each other to point out their
differences and show the limits of the bottom-up approaches. The hypothesis of my research is that the
nature of movements is fundamentally political in a Schmittian sense and the direction of these collective
actions is mainly top-down, which makes them the leaders’ instruments easily as the leader-centric
view of democracy shows.
Keywords: political theory ▪ democracy ▪ direct democracy ▪ political leadership ▪ political movements
“But surely those who have supposed the masses to be all powerful, or at least well on their
way to triumph, are wrong. In our time (…) the influence of autonomous collectivities within
political life is in fact diminishing. Furthermore, such influence as they do have is guided;
they must now be seen not as publics acting autonomously, but as masses manipulated at fo-
cal points into crowds of demonstrators. For as publics become masses, masses some- times
become crowds.” C Wright Mills (1956: 309)
Movements are a constant and integral part of political processes. They shape and influence eve-
ry- day politics and public policies with their actions, protests and marches. Moreover in critical
and revolutionary moments their activities can lead to radical transformations, from authoritarian
or totalitarian regime to a democratic one and vice versa. These collective actions are more or
less part of extraordinary politics, which differs greatly from parliamentarian and electoral poli-
tics of normal times. Thus the question arises: what kind of function and role do movements have
in a democracy
The sociological movement research is not able to answer this question sufficiently, be-
cause the subject of its research is depoliticized in itself. The label of ‘social movements’
* This paper is a draft of my PhD dissertation.
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symbolizes a normative legitimation, which some authors refer to the activist movement the-
ory (Barker et al. 2001: 1-2.). The movements are usually seen as ‘non-political actors’, which
stand independent above the parties. In this sense they are rivals (Jenkins – Klandermans 1995:
5) and saviors (Cas- tells 2010, Dalton – Kuechler 1990; Flacks 1994; Offe 1985; della Porta
2013) of the representative institutions as well as of the declining liberal democracy. Moreover
the research field is mostly narrowed down to left-wing movements such as global justice -, hu-
man rights -, alternative – and green movements by the introducing of so-called ‘new social
movements’, which in time became an unavoidable barrier to the building of a comprehensive
theory. (Pichardo 1997: 412-413, 1. footnote) Consequently the major part of the literature con-
nects the movements to deliberative-participatory democracy. (della Porta 2005; 2009; 2012;
2013; della Porta - Diani 2006: 239-245; della Porta – Rucht 2013). Thus the concept of move-
ment is impregnated with the ethos of direct political participation and the normative ideal of
anti-political self-governance, which prevents the understanding of the phenomenon.
However, agreeing with Robert C. Tucker (1995:78) the political science literature has
over- concentrated on the analyzing of established polities (as the structure) and given too little
systematic attention to political movements (as a kind of the agency). In this paper my aim is to
elucidate the role and function of movements in democracies with the means of political theory
and the political process theory of movement research. Based on this, I define movements as
collections of comprehensive collective actions, whose nature is primarily political. Thus they
can become competitors, alternatives, and even complements of the established political parties
and actors. Their actions not only point out a social problem, a crisis or extraordinary situation,
but also introduce a new narrative about them and offer possible solutions. Hence they manage
to influence the preferential environment, decision making and agenda setting with their various
actions as well as establish the identity of their supporters and activists and organizational struc-
tures, which do not cross over the frame of goal-rationality.
I will build my analysis on the assumption that the classic theoretical debate between di-
rect and representative democracy has become obsolete and solvable (Körösényi 2009c: 23-26).
Based on Giovanni Sartori’s (1987: 111-123.) implicit distinction, the various forms, institutions
and practices of direct democracy – in a conceptually broad and flexible view1
– can be connect-
ed with other major systems describing theories of democracy (Pakulski-Körösényi 2012). With-
in this frame- work, we can set up and compare to each other three different movement concepts:
In the deliberative-participatory theory, - in which classic direct democracy can
be framed - embodies self-governance resting on real and active participation and de-
liberative interactions. Here movements are the participants and special forums of de-
liberation
3
The neoclassical theory is connected to the institution of referendum democracy,
which enables self-governance through direct and autonomous decision-making (vot-
ing) on specific matters. Thus the role of movements is to be independent advocacy
groups, lobbying and informing the governmental actors about preferences and their
changes.
The populist ‘protest-democracy’ related to the leader democracy model focuses
on direct, activist participations generated by leaders. In this sense the movements fit
primarily in a top-down political process, where they are subordinated by political
circumstances and competition, thus they could easily became the means of political
ambitions.
The direct democratic forms and the movement concepts, which I will specify hereinafter, logi-
cally fit into the theoretically environment. Moreover, according to the underlying presumptions
of the theories they allow varying space and scope for direct political action and emphasis on dif-
ferent segment of the activity.
The main thesis is that the nature of movements is top-down and vertical in practice and
therefore they could easily just enrich the toolbar of (outsider or insider) political leaders and
leadership2. In this sense these collective actions could be drawn in leader-follower interac-
tions. However, it is crystal clear: this relationship is characterized by interdependence. On the
one hand, the movements are connected to the political process as determined and reactive ac-
tors: they fit into the political competition, where they are subordinated by dominant actors (par-
ties and leaders) or they are forced to assimilate, transform to parties and high- light the leaders
and elite of the movements, which is key to political success and survival. On the other hand,
great leaders’, such as Gandhi, King, Malcolm X, Mandela, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mussolini,
Hitler, Nehru, Nasser, Ben-Gurion, Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Tito, Castro, and de Gaulle, efforts,
even with the exceptional capabilities and skills they have, would have failed, if there hadn’t been
any movements behind them. This mutual dependence, the importance of collective action and
nonconventional political actors and the crucial role of leaders, is emphasized by the theorists of
mass society theory – Hannah Arendt (1975), William Kornhauser (1959), Gustave Le Bon
(2002), Robert Michels (1959) and Charles Wright Mills (1956) –, as well as Carl Schmitt (2007)
in his partisan theory, Max Weber in quasi-latent conception of ‘charismatic movement’
(Tucker 1968; 1995; Kalyvas, 2008).
The following paper is divided into three major parts. The first part introduces the rival –
deliberative and neoclassical – movement concepts and shows their limitations. The second
part sets up the movement based concept of leader-democracy, in which I will touch upon the
arguments for the necessity of leadership and the limits of this approach. Finally, in the third
section I summarize the results and take account of the possible implications.
4
I. THE RIVAL MOVEMENTS CONCEPTIONS
I.1. The deliberative movement conception and its limit
The theory of deliberative and participatory democracy, which stemmed from the doctrine of Jür-
gen Habermas’ ideal speech situation and his discourse ethics as well as the Rawlsian theory of
justice, sets two main requirements for democracy. First, it is crucial that participation is realized
in a non- coercive way and based on equal-access and limited self-interest, which according to
John Stuart Mill improves the competences of citizens and increases the level of information for
them. The second postulate is directed towards decision making. In all cases, open and rational
debate results in consensus, which embodies the common good. (Elster 1997; 1998; Pakulski-
Körösényi 2012)
Within this framework classical direct democracy could be interpreted in the clearest and
widest sense, since it is based on real and (pro)active participation and deliberative interaction
(della Porta 2013). The formal and informal deliberation could affect each issue and the oppor-
tunity is given to discuss them comprehensively and completely. The outcome of negotiation –
the consensus – always has decisive, unquestionable power. This, absolutization of consensus,
forced activity out from the world of ‘politicum’, which is limited to decisions on technical (pol-
icy) issues. The theorists look at movements, especially the American civil rights movement, as
organizations which realize the deliberative idea (Gutmann-Thompson 1996: 133.; Rawls 1993:
247-54.; 1999: 131-80.). Here the collective action is a product of deliberation, which creates and
shapes as a specific forum in itself as well. On the other hand, the movements take part in the
nationwide deliberation and help build a consensus through bringing new premises and propagat-
ing new arguments. The nature of process is network-like, horizontal and bottom-up. Thus the
relationship between formal and informal actors is characterized by symmetry, in which the
movements could be equally partners and rivals of established political actors.
However, we should see that this concept could easily lead us to swampy ground. First
of all, we should take into account the inherent coercion, violence and intense emotions of
movements. At this point it is worth to recall the partisan theory of Carl Schmitt. The partisan,
interpreted as an internal enemy, is characterized by irregularity, increased mobility and intensive
political engagement and telluric nature (Schmitt 2007). The first two features can easily be ap-
preciated, but the latter two characteristics seem to be critical. ‘The invasion of space, territory’
and the expansion of the playing field are integral parts of collective action. Therefore the institu-
tional political actors don’t have any choice: they have to take up the fight in new arenas of poli-
tics. Of course, we might think with good reason that movements would give up their strategy, if
conventional politics accommodates them. However, this may result in the disappearance of
5
the collective action. Their actions, such as the blockade of meeting room and the occupation of
public spaces, make fair negotiation between the stakeholders impossible, because it inherently
embodies violence and extortion, which is always there during the consultation process to re-
strict, manipulate and influence the opponents (Young, 2001; Medearis 2005). Intense political
engagement and emotions classify the participation and its quality (Berelson 1952: 317.; Sartori
1987: 118-120.). It’s clear, that emotions are more important than rational arguments. In short,
the movements go far beyond commonsense and rationality and apply the politics of force, in
which the end justifies the means and not the means justify the end, as it is suggested by the
theorists of deliberative democracy.3
Secondly, there are lots of empirical observable group psychological barriers which can
emerge in cases of collective action. The strong cohesion of the group and its isolation strength-
ens conformity and has the tendency of narrowing down real alternatives. The phenomenon of
‘group deficit’ indicates that the group can rarely fully use its resources. Such barriers are insuf-
ficient co- ordination, the unequal weight of arguments (speaker vs. audience) and declining mo-
tivation and concentration. In addition, the phenomenon of group thinking is also a very danger-
ous trap which is reflected in a number of symptoms. The ‘illusion of invulnerability’ encourages
the optimism and irrational actions of the members, the values of the group become overrated and
there is a lack of questioning about it. Stereotyping and demonization of outsiders, direct pressure
on representatives of different opinion, the illusion of unanimous decision and implicit censorship
might also happen, while self-appointed opinion leaders, might block the group from exter-
nal/internal opposition, antagonistic information and opinions. (Femia 2009)
Thirdly, the classical problem of the size of the assembly should also be seen (Sartori,
1987: 111.), which implies that participation, the access to the ‘game of deliberation’ has real
physical barriers. Donatella della Porta’s (et al. 2009) empirical results show, that the extent of
organization and the lack of personal relation and integration is the biggest and most important
barrier for deliberation among the variety of structural and cultural factors. Besides, the recently
emerging internet- based communication, the so-called ‘e-democacy’ (della Porta et al. 2009,
della Porta 2013) pro- vides a seemingly perfect ground, in which numerous movements (occupy
movements and the movement of One Million People for the Freedom of the Hungarian Press)
and revolutions (Arab Spring, Euromaiden) could easily grow. We could admit that, the web 2.0
has changed the patterns of mobilization and reduced its costs. However, the real deliberation
does not come from the existence of a forum. After all, the movements do not really want to take
a part in the building of the consensus, rather they try to get over the distance and create an own
virtual habitat, network, identity to inform, influence and manipulate the followers and their pref-
6
erences, which boosts the chances for the realization of participation.4
I.2. The Neoclassical Movement Concept and its Limits
The neoclassical democratic theory (Pakulski-Körösényi 2012:88-93.), as an umbrella term in-
corporates the modern versions of the classical theory of democracy coined by Joseph Schum-
peter (1987: 250-268.). One of them is Robert Dahl’s pluralist democracy, in which the political
process is indicated and controlled by the independent and competing interest in society, which
set bounds to the tyranny of the majority and minority (Dahl 1956: 63-89.; 1982). Another popu-
lar approach of representative democracy is the aggregative democracy and the theory of median
voter brought to life by Anthony Downs. According to this view the political process is deter-
mined by the ex-ante given popular will, which is created by office-orientated politicians with the
aggregation of preferences, designing compromise and finding the median voter. (Downs 1957)
The idea of referendum democracy could be matched logically to this theory, which can be de-
scribe as a set of political actions concentrated around a vote on a ballot question, plebiscite or an
election. Here, compared to the previous concept, there is more focus on the aggregation of votes,
the institution of election and parties, but less on participation. Thus the quality of participation
decreases, because the number of negotiable issues and the depth of negotiations are limited.
In this process the non-conventional political actors, such as movements are valorized,
who use various campaigns to follow direct decision situations. In the Dahlian polyarchy the
different interest groups got equal access to governance. Accordingly, the necessity of independ-
ent organizations lay upon the plural interest articulation and mutual control. In the Downsian
aggregative democracy the associations from society and economy as lobby organizations, aim
to overcome the world of incomplete information. They inherently possess extra information.
They are more sensitive for the changes of preferential environment than established parties.
Consequently, the direction of process is vertical and bottom-up; the relationship with established
political actors is asymmetric, which is in favor of them because of the general hunger for infor-
mation. Hence the movements are established to entry politics to influence political decision.
However, the neoclassical approaches also take us onto thin ice. There are two clearly
distinguishable difficulties to face. The first is the uncertainty of the relationship. The interests
and relatively strong preferences transmitted by movements can unexpectedly emerge – out of
nowhere –, but could also suddenly disappear. The question could easily arise from the profes-
sional politicians: ‘How reasonable it would be to support a movement, if the investment may
not prove a long- lasting one?’ One further question is how the incumbents can be sure that the
preferences of the activists are similar to the median voters. It is clear, that such decisions are
really fraught with enormous risks. Uncertainty is further strengthened by the fact that move-
7
ments don’t have a stable, durable formal institutional framework and decision-making mecha-
nism (moreover it’s nearly amorphous) which makes the mutual accountability impossible. In
such situation with dubious out- comes the political stakes are high.
The second difficulty is the high costs associated with collective action. In his works,
Albert O. Hirschman (1970; 1985) takes account of costs for both sides’. For the traditional ac-
tors it is expensive to maintain the citizens’ loyalty, which leads them from desertion and exodus
to protests, in which they formulate, articulate their messages about their changing preferences.
The exit could mean emigration or seeking and joining a new political force (Hirschman 1970).
In parallel the costs of activist appear in getting over the disappointment. The political apathy
(exit) and participation, as two forms of political activity stem from each other’s disappoint-
ment. If the magnitude of disappointment in the public sphere, the intensity of political conflict
exceeds the costs of the action, the citizens vote with their feet (Hirschman 1985). The junction
of the two cycles of collective action shows antagonistic pictures. Because this frustration is im-
plicitly possessed by decreasing of the trust and fidelity, therefore the question could arise,
should the activists protest and introduce new information or desert. The objection creates the
need for change inside the organization and institution. Thus in spite of the disappointment the
fidelity is sustainable. Here costs grow in a greater extent for the activists, because dissatisfac-
tion is neither to great, nor the cost of loyalty increases drastically. However exit is cheaper for
movements, because the greater disillusionment undermines trust utterly. Hence, the costs of
maintaining loyalty raise significantly. Thus the movements as potential sources of information
are expensive for everyone. Nevertheless, there are less expensive, more accurate and reliable
sources (regular surveys and polls). Moreover as a result the independence of movements without
conventional sources is also questioned, which is a critical component of this approach.5
●
To sum up, both the deliberative-participative and the neoclassical conception of movements are
encumbered by many contradictions; therefore they cannot explain the function and role of col-
lective action sufficiently. However, these theories, as logically separated paradigms of de-
mocracy, weren’t undermined. In the following part of the study a more realistic conception is
provided, which could be helpful to get a more comprehensive picture about this phenomenon.
8
II. THE MOVEMENT CONTCEPT OF LEADERDEMOCRACY
The first two approaches are based on the idea of self-governance. According to the Weberian
and Schumpeterian theory of democracy, which try to go beyond this, political processes are kept
in motion not by the voters’ preferences and the interests of social groups, but by the leaders and
aspi- rations and ambitions of the political elite. Therefore, they are the active actors in poli-
tics, whose aim is not the building of consensus or compromise but to acquire and maintain polit-
ical support. In the electoral race they don’t take their cue from the preferential environment cre-
ated by citizens, but they rather form, shape or manipulate that, (Körösényi 2009:b; 2010) be-
cause the voters are not so competent and informed as it is assumed and required (Schumpeter
1987). Thus the ex-post originated preferences are produced by the vertical and top-down politi-
cal process. Adam Przeworski’s minimalist definition of democracy gives the normative ground
for this theory. According to him the only sufficient expectation of democracy is that the citi-
zens are able to replace the bad and in- competent leaders through elections without bloodshed
(Körösényi, 2005; 2009:d; Pakulski- Körösényi, 2012; Przeworski, 1999).
The protest democracy, is logically related to this theory, which emphasizes that collec-
tive actions or activist participation are generated directly or indirectly by the political elite and
leaders. The focus of action is placed on the demonstrations, protests or other forms of public
involvements, which express political will and ‘power’. Hence, the content of participation, un-
like other models presented so far, is very shallow and limited. According to the conception the
leader has a critical role in collective action whether we speak about internal or external leader-
ship. The literature (Aminzade, 2001; Barker et al., 2001; Goldstone 2001; Morris – Staggenborg.
2004; Pappas. 2008; Rucht, 2012) emphasizes uniformly, that there are some functions that only
the leaders are able to effectively fill. Beyond simple technical and organizational duties they
have also some cosmological task to deal with. The leaders set the agenda, identify problems,
introduce new narratives, set goals, give reasons for them and assign tools to them and decide
who are their allies as well as who could be counted as an adversary. Moreover they trigger and
focus the construction of collective action and identity.
The model thus allows less room for movements and for direct participation in general.
On the one hand, the audience of the movements fits into a mostly one-sided communication
scheme. The various actions, such as protests are can be characterized mostly responsive. In
demonstrations not everyone can give a speech, or take part in actions like occupying private or
public buildings because of the limitation of the temporal and spatial constraints, the asymmetry
of strength of preferences and the unequal distribution of information and competences. After
all, some people are born with rhetorical skills, while others do not possess such abilities; in
9
addition some of them feel a strong urge to go public, while others are not desperate and manful
enough to act in the same way. However the leaders have to pay attention to the audience and
its reactions. The expected effects can easily fail, the enthusiasm could disappear, and moreover
the speech could go wrong and be- come counterproductive, if it does not meet the most basic
requirements of the participants. There- fore, the leaders’ personal skills are especially important
(Grint 2001), which become one of the key catalysts of collective action.
The asymmetry is another critical aspect of Weberian and Schumpeterian approach
stemmed from the political monopoly (monopoly on violence and monopolistic political mar-
ket). Political decisions could be the catalysts and the medicine for problems, crisis situations and
conflicts as well as produce directly or indirectly collective actions at the same time. Most of the
movements respond to an undesirable decision or miss a particular decision. Therefore, the key to
the solution and thus the real political action is in the hands of politicians. Because of the short-
age of resources they are, who consider, which decisions are important and which ones are not.
They choose the issues to deal with, and to support according to their own interests. They calcu-
late the possible consequences of their decisions. On the other hand, the incumbents possess mo-
nopoly over the legitimate use of power. Thus they are the only ones, who could change and in-
fluence the political opportunity structure which mostly determinates the success of movements.
This notion, introduced by Peter Eisinger and conceptualized by many (Meyer-Minkoff 2004),
refers to the circumstance that the appearance, strategies, institutionalization, the dominant or-
ganizational form, and the nature of mobilization of movements depend on the political environ-
ment and context (Rucht 1996). Here we could mention the political culture (cleavages, will-
ingness to participate, institutional trust), the party system and the level and effect of access to
policy decision-making, the policy effectiveness of government and the nature of political com-
petition. Unlike other social and cultural factors all of these could be easier influenced by the
political elite. Beyond the simple institutional changes made by laws, the elite choose the way of
competition, the relevant cleavages and the openness of political process. All of these are the
result of political decisions. Consequently, the incumbents can shape the structure of oppor-
tunities with more success than the movements themselves, which makes them strongly de-
termined.
The reactive and determinative nature of movements suggests that in this view the agency
looks more decisive than structure; however we cannot separate the environment from the actor.
As I mentioned above the political movement is not an element of normal politics, which is mo-
nopolized by constituted and establish actors, such as the political elite, entrenched interest
groups, bureaucratic parties, rigid institutionalized procedures, the principle of representation,
10
and parliamentary-electoral process. In ordinary times politics run with low popular participation,
civic privatism, depoliticization and passivity and this process is carried out mostly by profes-
sional bureaucrats and technocrats. On the contrary in cases of extraordinary politics or in the
state of emergency or exception the conventions are breached, and processes become unpredicta-
ble, uncertainty and risks grow dramatically. In these circumstances the level of collective mobi-
lization is higher, leading to the emergence of irregular political actors and informal public spac-
es, extra-institutional groups, which directly challenge the established balance of forces and the
political status quo (Kalyvas 2008:6-7.). As Andreas Kalyvas highlighted “the democratic poli-
tics of the extraordinary refers to those infrequent and unusual moments when the citizenry,
overflowing the formal borders of institutionalized politics, reflectively aims at the modification
of the central political, symbolic, and constitutional principles and at the redefinition of the con-
tent and ends of a community.” (Kalyvas 2008:7)
The Weberian ‘charismatic movement’ arises at this point, when constituted and institu-
tionalized leadership, authority fails to define the situation characterized by dissatisfaction and
distress. Therefore the movements dedicate themselves to change through reforms or revolutions.
They pro- vide a new narrative, a new diagnose of the situation focusing upon such circumstanc-
es that do not even exist, but in which people are willing to believe. In the same time they pro-
pose changes and publicly urge their acceptance. They challenge the existing widespread system
of beliefs and values that maintain the legitimacy of the political and juridical order, before this
‘revolutionary’ moment spill over into the dimension of polity (Kalyvas 2008, Tucker 1968;
1977: 384-385.; 1995). Tucker in his work summarizes this phenomenon, and calls it ‘situational
charisma’ “Why leaders of movements for change would often be the objects of such loyalty and
enthusiasm is understandable: the leader, by virtue of personal attributes combined with the diag-
nosis of the situation as wrong but remediable and the formula for remedying it, embodies in the
minds of distressed followers the promise of salvation from distress, a way out of the impasse
that confronts them and the society. In short, a charismatic leader is the one perceived by the
followers as a savior, a messiah.” (Tucker 1995: 94.) Thus it seems necessary for leaders of
movements to create a symbiotic relationship with this context as many students of leadership
(Grint 2001; Greenstein 1992; Nye 2008, Schabert 2005). However, in such extraordinary and
uncertain environment characterized by perpetual motion, chaos the situational charisma (Tucker
1968: 743-44.) contextual intelligence (Nye 2008), and creativity (Schabert 2005) is far more
important than in normality, when the politics are predictable due to well-functioning institutions
and procedures. In this aspect leaders use the power, force of movements to define the situation
nationwide and introduce narrative and possible screenplays for change.
11
Hence, the engine of collective action, the dominant ‘agency’ is the political leader and
the elite of movement, who are not aggregating and articulating the various interests or partici-
pating in a societal deliberation, but are joining to a wider political competition. In this point of
view the movements are just tools in the hand of leaders, which they try to shape their environ-
ment (preferences, agenda, and legitimation) and invest more sources with. Therefore, the per-
sonal skills and abilities of leaders are valorized and became more and more critical. It largely
depends on them, if the mass becomes ‘crowds of demonstrators’ (Mills 1956: 309.) and will be
successful, but they de- pend on their follower as well.
II.1. The need for leadership
In the foregoing, I have presented the inherent relationship and interdependence of movements
and leadership. As it could be seen the nature of extraordinary, extra-institutional politics makes it
inevitable that the actors understand properly changing environments, capitalize on trends, and
use the flow of events to implement strategies. In the following, therefore I examine the motiva-
tions of leaders, movements and established parties especially in the light of empirically ob-
served trends, which encourage them externally to develop transformation and use seemingly
new tools and methods. In this sense, I will set up four arguments for the need for leadership.
They are the following: the argument of assimilation, legitimacy, identity and mass communica-
tion.
The argument of assimilation
According to the argument of assimilation, based on the theory of Robert Michels, entering into
the political space is a kind of ‘self-transformation’ for movements, in which they are forced to
con- form to the habits and norms of their competitors by such structural factors as participation
in political discourse, conditions of being visible in media, electoral system, and the parliamen-
tary work. Due to taking over the rules of the game the movements transform to so-called ‘latent
movements’ (Kitchelt 1993), ‘pseudo-movements’ (Kolinsky-Patterson 1976: 336.) or ‘move-
ment parties’ (Gunther-Diamond 2003). However, they became highly formalized and institu-
tionalized, and they do not have any or enough strong affection for movements, they make
claims for the identity of movements. The phenomenon is presented perfectly by the constant
waves of green, New Left and radical right, far right-wing and populist movements. But this
professionalization benefits mostly the leaders. The people with stronger political ambition and
ability emerge in front of us, while others scuttle, step aside or even go against the organization.
Other good, spectacular examples are the movements of the Central and Eastern European tran-
sition. Most of them provided a perfect base and preference points for the new party systems as
well as a perfect springboard for leaders, such as Lech Wałęsa, Václav Havel, Vladimír Mečiar,
12
József Antall and Viktor Orbán.
This compulsive metamorphosis is determined by the above-mentioned opportunity struc-
ture. Two ways of institutionalization are given for the movements, which mostly depend on
the kind of role in which they could represent their interests effectively. In a weak (two-)party
system the explicit and implicit entry thresholds are high and the parties do not prevail in the
space of politics. The appearance of a third party is nearly impossible, thus the movements rather
petrify and become pressure or interest groups. In Hirschmanian sense, the possible ways to ‘es-
cape’ are diminished, thus there is no other choice than to protest and fit in the background world
of parties. In a strong (multi-)party system, the thresholds are traditionally lower and the parties
are more dominant. The movements here take advantage of the opportunity to exercise greater
influence, and thus they turn easily into parties. (Tarrow 1991: 20; Rucht 1996., Kitschelt 1993:
27-28) This doesn’t mean that parties do not dominate the movement sector in both cases, they
just do it in a different way (as we will see in the next point.) Diarmuid Maguire (1995) shows
how both the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the Italian peace move-
ment depended on support from established parties. The CND initially grew and seemed likely to
gain success when the Labour Party supported it externally; and yet as soon as Labour literally
decided to end the partnership, its chances for success dropped to zero and its support dried up.
The Italian peace movement had an even weaker position, because it “could emerge only within
PCI (Italian Communist Party) support, and it was organizationally and financially dependent on
the party” (1995: 225.).
The argument of legitimacy
There are two revealing tendencies connected to parties and leaders. Firstly, we can observe the
functional change or decay of parties in the last two decades. During cartelization (Katz-
Mair 2001.) parties secede or move away from their social roots and invade and occupy the state,
also simultaneously, the growth of partisan de-alignment and the decline in party membership
and the weakening public trust in direct political institutions can be observed (Dalton - Kuechler
1990; Dalton - Wattenberg 2000; della Porta 2012). Another trend is emerging of political leaders
informally and formally from their parties and government, which diminish the political weight
of parliament and the representative institutions (Poguntke – Webb 2005; Webb et al. 2012).
The occupation of the state and centralization in party organization are critical aspects of
the cartelization. On the one hand this blurs the difference between the party members and
non-members, which entails unavoidably the decline of party membership. On the other hand,
the party moves away from civil society and becomes independent, which also increases the vot-
er’s disillusionment and political apathy. In parallel, presidentialization highlights the leaders in
13
parties and government, which weakens the legislature. Putting together these tendencies we can
see, that politics can run into a ‘vacuum’ because the leaders and their parties lose their legitimate
base. Another consequence is the above-mentioned appearance of movement parties. The differ-
ent party types interact with each other and take up each other's habits. Thus the establishment
actors’ motivation draws reverse direction from that follows the argument of assimilation (Dalton
– Kuechler 1990; Katz-Mair 2001):
The politicians try to cure this legitimation crisis by taking over tactics from movement
par- ties’, so they proceed to spin-off strategy or ‘activist enterprise’. The leaders are ‘forced’ to
seek a connection with society in a more populistic way. They create a movement or find already
existing ones to lead, to get around the unpopular parties. Such self-legitimation strategy of lead-
ers was/is quite common in totalitarian regimes, where the political elite tries/tried to borrow and
gain the credibility of the political system with mass events (Nuremberg Rally, the International
Workers’ Day in the communist era) and movements (youth and female movements of ruling
parties). Martin Kolinsky and William E. Patterson use the notion of quasi-movement (1976:
336.) to describe those movements, which typically emerge from inside organization and institu-
tion and because of this relationship is based on loyalty the movement identity cannot develop
properly. Roberta Ash Garner and Mayer N. Zald (1987: 312.) highlight through the instances
of Italian Communist Party (PCI) and France Communist Party (PCF) that the creating of quasi-
movements characterizes typically the strongly centralized parties. The political elite and leaders
have made an attempt to use this symbolical power (Pappas, 2008) for example with the left-
wing Civil Circles, Civil Unity Forum and their peace marches and Democratic Charta in Hunga-
ry or with the American Tea Party in the US.
The argument of identity
A collective identity enables the harmonic relationship between leaders and followers, which
underlies collective action and leadership (Boda 2013; Grint 2001). As Keith Grint highlights that
“imaginary communities may well be considerably stronger than ‘real’ communities” (Grint,
2001:6.). Under the conditions of decay traditional social institutions (Fromm 1968), disappeared
with classical mass parties so modern people have completely or partially lost their identity
which has grounded their rituals and existence leading them in a ’identity-vacuum’, which could
easily cause existential dread or distress. Thus creating collective identity satisfies essential psy-
chological needs for safety, and reduces the costs of participation. For example Gandhi with his
movements introduced a new collective identity for the people of India, on which the societal
and political changes were based.
14
Belonging to a community provides the psychological need of experiencing simultane-
ously the difference and sameness of people as well. In this sense, participation, going public
with your own preferences, results in long lasting and stable self- persuasion, since a safe envi-
ronment and the feeling of sameness are positive feedbacks for the individual. Thus, the cycle of
mobilization and realization of participation is a self-perpetuating process, which stabilizes and
strengthens the individuals’ preferences and identity. The collective action not just amplifies the
subjective sense of security, but it also offers benefits from the success of the movement and the
mobilized power and energy. In the case of intense conflicts these relative benefits definitely
increase, because the political stake grows and the changes that are desired to realize are divisive.
Therefore they are not favorable and beneficial for everyone. In addition, collective identity en-
sures goals and life experiences for the activists (Castells 2010). These orientation points and
schemes of interpretation reduce the costs of participation. A similar phenomenon is shown by
Downs, who points out, that ideological scope and self- identification cure the expensive deci-
sion of joining a movement in situations characterized by the lack of information. Thus it could
be easy to fill the gaps of knowledge with narratives. In this sense identity is a kind of setting
pattern for preference. Their strength, which Hirschman saw in the intensity of disappointment,
determines and sets the collective action, i.e. the stronger the preferences we have, the more like-
ly we will take a part in an action. (Berelson 1952: 317.; Sartori 1987: 118-120.). The aim of
movements and leaders is clear: they must strengthen the preferences to reduce the variation of
preferences and reactions which in turn increases the possibility for the realization of participa-
tion.
In tense situations and conflicts identity is even more important. In these situations the
collectively created protection and political force become more and more valuable to individuals.
The trends discussed above suggest that in these situations established political identities, tradi-
tional institutions such as parties lose their power to create identity. In Castel’s identity typology
(2010: 6-12.) these are called legitimizing identities, while movements are connected to re-
sistance and project identity. The legitimizing identity is introduced by the dominant institutions
to extend and rationalize their domination and to realize their authority. The resistance identity is
generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the
logic of domination so they are forced to build trenches of resistance and survive. While the pro-
ject identity is focused on creating a brand new identity, which redefines the position of move-
ments in society and seeks the transformation of overall social structure. The question is clear:
What kind of reaction could be triggered if the dominant societal and political organizations lost
their ability to create and sustain identity. The suspicion is strong, that in this case, which shows
15
weakening parties and representative institutions, the race for creating identity to fill the vacuum
becomes more and more general. This struggle aggravates the conflicts and the political land-
marks which could keep them under control and on track disappear. In this situation, the demand
increases to build distinctive identity such as movements do.
In a social and political sense identities are always constructed (Castells 2010; Grint
2001) The role of the leader is critical in creating, stabilizing and strengthening identity (Boda
2013; Grint 2001). This could be linked to Burns’ (1978) transformative leader, which contrary
to the transactional leader’s pragmatic approach reinforces the internal motivations of the mem-
bers, shares his vision, establishes common goals, these also give meaning to the actions and
makes it a special experience. A specific form of this is moral leadership, extends the identity
with (quasi-)universal values, such as the nation, the people, the freedom, the equality or the
justice. With these kinds of incentives the political stake of the action always decrease, which
clearly stimulates the citizens to act as it is needed. The leader constructs identities to make the
behavior of followers more and more predictable and to achieve desired obedience easier and
cheaper. Thus he stabilizes his environment and determinates the range of triggered responses.
It is worth mentioning the implications of the ‘us and them’ distinction. The identi-
ty- building leaders often refer to this dichotomy, which implies that the leaders’ politics and
communication tend toward populism. Nevertheless, anti-establishment political atmosphere and
populism are closely related phenomena. (Ilonszki-Lengyel 2009: 9., Szabó 2007:a: 1246-
1247.; 2007:b: 176-178., Körösényi et al. 2007: 328.) Without reference to ideological orienta-
tion, populism - and its logical roots – is observable in every movement because of strong identi-
cal frames. If we distinguish ourselves from the political and economic elite on the basis of that
we – the people, the nation, the working class, a group of environmentalists or feminists – are
more competent than who exercise the power, therefore we should govern and it doesn’t matter
for what reason – because of specific knowledge (intellectuals, environmentalists) or experience
(farmers, laborers) we hold our- selves more competent.
16
1. figure: The motivations of actors
The argument of mass communication
The media and the political movements mutually depend on each other. (Vliegenthart – Wal-
grave 2012) In the politics structured by media the aim of competition is not just for political
positions, but also for media attendance and attention, since if we are not shown or our massages
are not transmitted by TV or radio channels or the press, than we don’t simply exist in a political
sense. (Mazzoleni 2002: 91.) The movements, as not or barely institutionalized actors, have an
asymmetric relation with media. Thus in every situation they always have to struggle for the
attention, for the only way to reach their potential supporters with their massages. It is relatively
easy to see, that for the movements to be presented by the media it is necessary for them to live
and be alive. There-fore the movements generally build their own network of media, which is
even more important, if they are marginalized by the political elite and/or media.
In the mediatized political environment the trends, which we can experience such as tab-
loidization and personalization (Kiss 2003), suggest that the demand is increasing for extraordi-
17
nary political events. Therefore mass media also needs movements to produce with their
actions for news. It is really difficult to get into the declining numbers of political news with
simple parliamentary work. Thus the political actors try to exceed the established political prac-
tice, create scandals and attract attention. With mobilizations and actions they direct attention to
specific issues to create decision-making situations, set the agenda and provide alternatives. This
can be illustrated by different kinds of parliamentary performances – such as showing up news-
papers, signs and banners or throwing notes, wearing badges of movements – or even with the
use of physical aggression (fights in Ukrainian or South-Korean parliament).
II.2. Limits and lessons of conception
The movement concept of leader democracy compared to the approaches discussed so far seems
to be a more realistic view of the collective action. However, this doesn’t mean that this approach
is certainly the panacea of collective action because of its own normative and empirical limits.
However conflict is an inherent part of politics, but it doesn’t necessary’s lead to blood-
shed as the normative ground of concept, the minimalist definition of democracy suggests. The
only guarantee to preventing this outcome is the procedure of election, through which the citizens
can change the bad leader to a better one. They requite good leaders for their service and bad
ones for their perfidy. This means that activism should not cause violence because it would go
beyond the minimum limits of democracy. However, this might still happen: for instance demo-
cratic transition in Romania, the anti-globalization protest called ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999, the
Hungarian anti- governmental protest, called ‘Hot Fall’ in 2006, Arab Spring in 2011, protests
in Turkey in 2013 and the Ukrainian ‘Euromaiden’ and so on. The degree of violence, which is
analytically connected to extraordinary politics, depends greatly on the magnitude of change ar-
ticulated by movements. Based on Schmitt’s popular assemblies and Arendt’s voluntary associa-
tions and civil disobedience Kalyvas (2008) underlined that in a democratic framework these
‘self-organized’ political entities are extra institutional, but not always extraconstitutional, like-
wise Tucker, who distinguishes reform and revolutionary movements (1995:77-113.). Still
permanent fight is an essential element of movement’s, along with struggle and the use of co-
ercion and verbal or even physical violence. Therefore movements are still double-edged swords,
which make them so uncertain and an elusive phenomenon from the view point of democracy.
This is not a simple critic of the leader democracy’ movement concept, because it shows that
movements are fundamentally related to politics and not just to democratic societies. Thus with
a broader set of normative frames we are able to understand the nature, role and function of
movements not just in democratic contexts but also in more critical circumstances such as civil
wars, revolutions and coups or even in non-democratic regimes.
18
On an empirical level the concept trembles also, in cases when the leaders cannot be seen
or observed. The problem of invisible leadership could easily arise in the case of movements,
which ideologically reject leadership, for instance in alternative, New Left and green movements.
The task of researchers can be even more difficult if the movement hadn’t reached the level of
publicity yet, where their organizational features, such as decision making, external and internal
communication and the elite of the movement had already been outlined. Dieter Rucht (2012)
emphasizes that a minimal leadership is unavoidable, even if the ideology of the group
doesn’t allow somebody to lead explicitly, visibly and relevantly. There are two cases men-
tioned by the author. The first, when an informal leadership has been developed like Marcos for
Zapatista Army of National Liberation. The second, when the members of the movement scru-
pulously ensure to avoid leadership, but a core of the members or an informal elite exit(s) in
this case too, who fulfills these crucial functions. Of course, in such an environment other styles
of leadership could be realized compered to leader- centric typically right-wing groups, which is
actually pointed out by the follower/context/situation- centric leadership theories (Hollander
1992; for a review see Bass, 1990; Goethals 2004). According to Colin Barker (et al. 2001:b: 1-
4.) the critical problem in activists social movement research, in which activists write for activ-
ists about movements, is the dominant and prevailing, underlining assumptions against leader-
ship. Therefore, if we rejected the importance or denied the existence of leadership, claiming the
leader to be invisible or even irrelevant, we would miss the opportunity to understand or recog-
nize leadership in a contingent environment, which produced the non- institutionalized move-
ments and contemporary tendencies mentioned above.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
So far we have seen what kind of movement concepts the direct democratic forms associated with
theories of democracy implicate, and what controversies they face. These approaches due to the
different presumptions and logic they approach emphasize on other dimension or segment of col-
lective action. In the deliberative and neoclassical concept of democracy politics/policy or pro-
cedures – the deliberation and the aggregation of independent interests and preferences – are far
more important, than results and consequences, because the proper, appropriate methods not just
result, but also legitimate the decisions and answers. Conversely, in the leader democracy goals
determine the available means, which is the case in political movements as well. These goals,
according to my argumentation are always political: seeking and getting power, creating and
using political force, influencing the preferences and political processes.
19
Looking through the concepts and their theoretical and empirical contradictions we can
see that the leader democracy theory can capture the nature of movements the most compre-
hensively, as it draws a more realistic picture than the others. This mainly stems from its mini-
malist normative requirements that give more space to act freely and more opportunity for being
creative and using close to anything as a tool. According to my starting statement the nature of
movements is vertical and top-down in practice and movements typically enrich the toolbar of
political leaders. This relationship between the master and the means, as I have stressed earli-
er in different dimensions, is based on interdependence. As a musician depends on his instru-
ment, so does the leader on his movements and followers. But, how nice and perfect the music is
mostly rests on the skills, creativity and knowledge of the musicians. Thus the leader is no leader
without its followers, but the mean would also become easily dysfunctional, if it is not connected
to political will, creativity and desire. In this sense movements are a result of the
(re)constructing of followers, which is beneficial for both sides.
The aim of this study primarily was to reflect to the question of the relationship between
democracy and movements, which is surrounded by growing interest from the academia, (della
Porta 2005; 2009; 2012; 2013; della Porta - Diani 2006. 239-245.; della Porta - Rucht 2013) the
leadership in movements (Aminzade 2001; Barker et al. 2001; Goldstone 2001; Morris – Stag-
genborg 2004; Pappas. 2008; Rucht 2012), as well as the normative biases associated to move-
ments. In addition, during research the need formulated latently to set up a new horizon for lead-
ership studies. Associating the political leadership- and movement research can have major po-
tential. It is not difficult to see that leadership is not simply about leaders, but rather is a complex
social and political process and relation. Without elucidating the followers and the environment
and context of political action it is unimaginable to draw a realistic picture about leadership
(Blondel 1987; Burns 1978; Grint 2001). However without leadership we cannot understand po-
litical action as Aristotle pointed out political activity splits out leadership and followership but if
somebody wants to rule, then he should first have been ruled (Arist.PA VII.14, 1332b15-1333a
trans. C.D.C. Reeve) Thus the socio- logical movement research with its stable means and con-
cepts should be treated carefully and a leadership theory stemmed from democratic theory com-
plement each other. On the whole, my theoretical work may open a door for future research in
this area of political science.
20
Table 1. The three movement conception
Direct democracy Referendum democracy Protest democracy
Theoret-
ical
frame-
work
Deliberative democracy Neoclassical democracy Leader democracy
Input Rational individuals and communities
Self-interest orientated individ-ual and independent associa-tions
Irrational, incompetent individuals’ mass, crowds of demonstrators and ac-tivists, political leaders
Direction of col-
lective action Horizontal, bottom-up Vertical, bottom-up Vertical, top-down
Emphasis of ac-
tion
Procedure orientated Procedure orientated Goal orientated
Scope and depth
of action Broad and comprehensive Narrow (case specific) and
partly comprehensive Narrow (case specific) and shallow
Nature of action Self-governance based on true active participation, direct interactions, inter-personal relation- ships.
Self-governance through direct decision (voting)on certain is-sues, which is framed by civil campaigns and lobbying
Collective actions are based on direct – activist
- participation, which
are initiated, catalyzed
and utilized by political
leaders
Role of move-
ment Independent, autonomous participants and forum of deliberation, rival of repre-sentative institutions
Movements are partly inde-pendent, but complement nec-essarily the representative insti-tutional procedure
Movements are depend-ent, determined and just a tool for demonstrating force in the hand of lead-ers, which makes them rivals of representative institution
Party-
movement re-
lation
Symmetric, equal Asymmetric and movement dominated
Asymmetric and party (leader) dominated
1 This requires a minimal definition of direct democracy. We could define it as participation without medi-
ation in a political process (demonstration), a policy decision (referendum, strike) or a mixture of them
(town meeting) without reference to effectiveness of action as well as the quality and nature of participa-
tion. 2 By political leader(s), I mean one more person, who play(s) active and dominant role in interpersonal
relations permanently or temporarily. This specific interactions and behavior could be called leadership. 3 The notion of contentious politics denotes this disruptive phenomenon, which refers to the coercion
which lies in collective action (Tilly-Tarrow, 2007: 4-11.). 4 Story of Wael Ghoneim illustrates perfectly this phenomenon. Ghoneim was an employee of Google,
who was mobilizing Egyptian society on Facebook which became later a revolution. 5 This dilemma arise when the ‘astrosturf’ Tea Party financed and initiated by Republicans, Occupy Wall
Street movement financed and initiated by anti-consumerist and pro-environment Adbusters Media Foun-
dation or oppositional movements in European hybrid regimes (Slovakian OK’98, Serbian Otpor , Geor-
gian Kmart, Croatian Glas 99 and Ukrainian Pora supported by Western Foundations had appeared.
21
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