The Kantian (Non)-Conceptualism Debate - PhilPapersThe Kantian (Non)-Conceptualism Debate Colin McLear University of Nebraska–Lincoln [email protected] July 21,2014 ... Attempt to Introduce

TheKantian(Non)-ConceptualismDebateColinMcLearUniversityofNebraska–[email protected], 2014

Abstract

OneofthecentraldebatesincontemporaryKantscholarshipconcernswhetherKanten-dorsesa“conceptualist”accountofthenatureofsensoryexperience. UnderstandingthedebateiscrucialforgettingafullgraspofKant’stheoryofmind, cognition, perception, andepistemology. ThispapersituatesthedebateinthecontextofKant’sbroadertheoryofcog-nitionandsurveyssomeofthemajorargumentsforconceptualistandnon-conceptualistinterpretationsofhiscriticalphilosophy.

1 Introduction

ONE OF THE CENTRAL TOPICS OF DEBATE incontemporaryKantscholarshiphasbeenwhetherKantendorsesapositionconcerningthenatureofsensoryexpe-riencecalled“conceptualism.” Asafirstapproximation, conceptualismabout

experienceistheclaimthatthecapacityforconscioussensoryexperienceoftheob-jectiveworlddepends, atleastinpart, ontherepertoireofconceptspossessedbytheexperiencingsubject, insofarastheyareexercisedinactsofsynthesisbythecognitivefacultywhichKanttermsthe“understanding”[Verstand]. Exactlyhowweshouldunder-standthisdependencerelation, aswellasthenotionofexperiencethatitpresupposes,issomethingwewilldiscussinmuchfurtherdetailbelow. ThehistoricalquestionastowhetherKantendorsedconceptualismhasalsobeenlinkedtothephilosophicalques-tionastothecommitmentsoftheconceptualistpositionandwhetheritis, intheend,atenableone.

ForthepurposesofthisarticleI shallfocusprimarilyonthehistoricalquestion, andthusI willlargelyignoreissuesinthephilosophyofmindandperceptionliteraturethathavearisenindependentlyofthescholarlydebateconcerningKant.1

Theargumentofthispaperproceedsasfollows. §2brieflysketchesthefundamen-talelementsofKant’stheoryofcognition. §3articulatesseveralmajorconsiderationswhichhelptodefinethenon-conceptualistinterpretationofKant. In§4I elaboratetheconceptualistinterpretationofKant. I presentandtosomeextentrevisewhatI taketobethecoreinterpretivecommitmentsoftheconceptualistposition. §5discussesseveralmajorobjectionstoconceptualismandnon-conceptualism, aswellasacentralissueofcontemporaryinterest—viz. theso-called“MythoftheGiven”anditsconnectiontotheconceptualismdebate. I thensummarizetheargumentofthepaper.

1 Forausefuloverviewofthecontemporaryliteraturesee Gunther(2003); Siegel(2010); Van Cleve(2012).

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TheKantian(Non)-ConceptualismDebate ColinMcLear

2 A SketchofKant’sTheoryofCognition

Kant’sconceptionofourmentaleconomyisbasicallytripartite, consistingofsensations[Empfindungen], intuitions [Anschauungen] and concepts [Begriffe].2 These are allvarietiesofwhatKantcalls“representation”[Vorstellung].3

Inwhatisgenerallycalledthe“stepladder”[Stufenleiter]passagefromtheTranscen-dentalDialecticofthefirst Critique, oneofthefewplacesintheKantiancorpuswhereheexplicitlydiscussesthemeaningsofandrelationsbetweenhistechnicalterms, Kantdefinesandclassifiesvarietiesofrepresentation.

The category is representation (representatio) in general. Under itstand representations with consciousness (perceptio). A perception[Wahrnehmung], that relates solely to a subject as a modification ofits state, is sensation (sensatio). An objective perception is cognition(cognitio). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus).Thefirstrelatesimmediatelytotheobjectandissingular; thesecondismediate, conveyed by amark, which can be common tomany things(A320/B376–7).4

AsKant’sdiscussionhereindicates, thecategoryofrepresentationcontainssensation,intuition, and concept. The faculty that provides sensory representations is called“sensibility” [Sinnlichkeit]. Sensibility generates representations based on being af-fectedeitherbyentitiesdistinctfromthesubjectorbythesubjectherself. Thisisincontrasttothefacultyof“understanding”[Verstand]whichgeneratesrepresentations“spontaneously”—i.e. withoutadvertancetoaffection.

2 Thereareothersignficantrepresentationalkinds, suchas schemata and ideas, buttheinterpretivetradi-tionhasfocusedprimarilyonsensations, intuitions, andconcepts. I followthattraditioninmydiscussionhere. Onecould, however, objectthatthedebateisnotwell-formed, andemphasizetheimportanceofincluding, e.g., schemata, inthediscussionoftherelationshipbetweenconceptpossessionandper-ceptualexperience. Fordiscussionofschematainthegenerationofperceptual“images”see Matherne(Unpublished); cf. Griffith(2012); Williams(2012).

3 Wemightquestionwhetheritisbesttotranslate“Vorstellung”as“representation.” Thereasonforhesi-tationhaslargelytodowiththebaggagewhichtheterm“representation”carrieswithincontemporaryphilosophy. Itisoftencharacterizedasan“inner,” causallyrelevant, andperhapsfunctionallydefinedstate, whosesemanticcontentallowsittoplayaroleinthecognitivelifeofsubject. InwhatfollowsIwilltranslate“Vorstellung”as“representation”butI wishtohighlightheretheimportanceofnotsimplyequatingKant’suseof“Vorstellung”witharepresentationalisttheoryofperception. ForanargumentthatKantdoes not endorsesuchatheorysee McLear(Forthcomingb)and§3.1below; cf. Gomes(2014).

4 QuotationsfromKant’sworkarefromtheAkademieAusgabe, withthefirstCritique citedbythestandardA/B editionpagination, andtheotherworksbyvolumeandpage. TranslationsarefromtheCambridgeEditionsoftheWorksofImmanuelKant, generaleditorsPaulGuyerandAllenWood. I have, onsomeoccasions, madeslightmodificationswithoutfurthercomment. Specifictextsareabbreviatedasfollows:

July21, 2014—Forthcomingin PhilosophyCompass 2


Kantclaimsthatall therepresentationsgeneratedviasensibilityarestructuredbytwo“forms”ofintuition—spaceandtime—andthatallsensoryaspectsofourexperi-encearetheir“matter”(A20/B34). ThesimplestwayofunderstandingwhatKantmeansby“form”hereis thatallperceivableswillbesuchas toeitherhavespatial features(e.g. extension, shape, location), ortemporalfeatures(e.g. beingsuccessiveorsimul-taneous).5 Sotheformalelementofanempiricalintuition, orsenseperception, willalwaysbeeitherspatialortemporal, whilethematerialelementisalwayssensory(inthesenseofdeterminingthephenomenalor“whatitislike”characterofexperience),andtiedtooneormoreofthefivesenses, orthefeelingsofpleasureanddispleasure.

Kanttiesthetwoformsofintuitiontotwodistinctspheres, theinnerandtheouter.Theouterconcernsthespatialworldofparticularmaterialobjectswhiletheinnercon-cernstemporallyorderedstatesofmind. Spaceisthustheformof“outersense”whiletimeistheformof“innersense”(A22/B37; cf. An7:154). IntheTranscendentalAes-thetic, Kantisprimarilyconcernedwith“pure”[rein]intuition, andoftenonlyspeaksinpassingofthesenseperceptionofphysicalbodies(e.g. A20–1/B35). However, Kantmoreclearlylinksthefivesenseswithintuitioninthe1798 AnthropologyfromaPrag-maticPointofView, inthesectionentitled“OntheFiveSenses.”

Sensibility inthecognitivefaculty(thefacultyofintuitiverepresentations)contains twoparts: sense and the imagination…But the senses, on theotherhand, aredividedinto outer and inner sense(sensusinternus); thefirstiswherethehumanbodyisaffectedbyphysicalthings, thesecondiswherethehumanbodyisaffectedbythemind(An7:153).

An: AnthropologyfromaPragmaticPointofViewCJ: CritiqueofJudgmentG: GroundworkfortheMetaphysicsofMoralsJL: JäscheLogicLL: LecturesonLogicNM: AttempttoIntroducetheConceptofNegativeMagnitudesintoPhilosophyOD:OnaDiscoveryWherebyanyNewCritiqueofPureReasonistobeMadeSuperfluousbyanOlderOnePr: ProlegomenatoanyFutureMetaphysicsR: NotesandFragments

5 TherearecomplicationsherethatI cannotgointo, concerningwhetherorhowspatialobjectsmightberepresentedasstandingintemporalrelationswithoneanothergiventhat“Timecannomorebeintuitedexternallythanspacecanbeintuitedassomethinginus”(A22-3/B37). Kantgoesontosaythatouterobjectsaretemporallyrelatedonly“mediately”, invirtueoftheirrepresentationsbeingtemporallyrelatedininnersense(A34/B50-1). Thus, thoughouterobjectsmaybesaidtostandintemporalrelations,timeisnotanaprioriconditionoftheappearanceofanouterobjectinthewaythatspaceis. Whetherthismeansthatobjectsinspaceonly seem tobeintime, invirtueoftheirrepresentationsbeingintuitedasstandingintemporalrelationsininnersense, goesbeyondwhatI candiscusshere. Fordiscussionsee Van Cleve(1999), ch. 5; Brook(2013).



Kantcharacterizes intuitiongenerally in termsof twocharacteristics—viz. imme-diacy [Unmittelbarkeit]and particularity [Einzelheit](cf. A19/B33, A68/B93; JL 9:91).Thisisincontrasttothemediacyandgenerality[Allgemeinheit]characteristicofcon-ceptualrepresentation(A68/B93; JL 9:91).

Kantcontrasts theparticularityof intuitionwith thegeneralityofconcepts in the“stepladder”passage(seethefirstquoteabove). Butthespecificremarkhemakesisthataconceptisrelatedtoitsobjectvia“amark, whichcanbecommontomanythings”(A320/B377)andthissuggeststhatintuition, incontrasttoconcepts, putsasubjectincognitivecontactwithfeaturesofanobjectthatarenothadbyotherthings.6 Spatio-temporalpropertiesseemlikeexcellentcandidatesforsuchfeatures.7 Butpehapsanynon-repeatable, non-universalfeatureofaperceivedobjectwilldo.8

Doestheoccurrenceofanintuitioncountashavinganexperience, inourcontem-porarysenseofacognitivelysignificantmentaleventorstatewithaparticular(sense-modal)phenomenalcharacter?9 Moregenerally, doesKant’susageoftermslike“per-ception”[Wahrnehmung]and“experience”[Erfahrung]cleanlymatchupwithours?Givenhowslipperythesetermsare, evenintheireverydayusage, weshouldbesome-whatcautiousinthinkingthattheydo. Atleasttwoworriesloomlargehere. First, wemightworrythatdisputesconcerningthenecessaryconditionsofhavinga“perception”oran“experience”aremerelyverbal. Second, wemightworrythattheconcepts<per-ception>and<experience>arenotwell-defined, andthusthatnosubstantivedisputeshouldhangoneitherof them. For thepurposesof thispaper, I shall take thecon-cepts<perception>and<experience>assufficientlywell-definedthatwecancredibly

6 Thereisafurthercontroversyhereaswhethertheimmediacyofintuitioniscompatiblewithanintuition’srelatingtoanobjectbymeansofmarksorwhetherrelationbymeansofmarksentailsmediacy, andthusthatonlyconceptsrelatetoobjectsbymeansofmarks. See Smit(2000)fordiscussion.

7 Thisistrueatleastifweassumethatspatio-temporallocationissufficienttoindividuateonethingfromanother. CertainlyKantthoughtthisthecase; cf. B327-8.

8 Forexample, intuitionmaygiveasubjectperceptualaccesstothetropescharacterizinganobject. Forthesuggestionofaviewalongtheselinessee Smit(2000); Grüne(2009), 50, 66-70.

9 A noteabouttheuseof“cognitive”here. Thereisadifferencebetweenmentalstateswhichpossessphe-nomenalcharacteristicsbutnoseemingobjectivecognitivefeatures, suchaswhathappensin“seeingstars”orbeingpokedintheeye, etc., andstatesthatarebothphenomenallyrichandcognitive, suchashavingaperceptualexperienceasofsomeobjectinone’senvironment, suchasatreeoranimal.Thereis, ofcourse, aseriousquestionastowhetherorhowthesetwokindsofstatesmightberelated.I shalltakeitthatKant’susageof“intuition”ismeanttodesignatea cogntive stateratherthanastatewhichmerelypossessesphenomenalcharacter. Thelatterseemstomostconsistentlybedesignatedbytheterm“sensation”[Empfindung], ormoreprecisely, by“feeling”[Gefühl]. ThisisespeciallyclearinKant’sdiscussionofsensationandfeelinginthethird Critique; cf. CJ 5:189, 203-6. Whetherandhowsuchcognitiveandnon-cognitivestatesarerelatedisacomplexissue, andwe’lltouchonitfurtherinthediscussionofconceptualismbelow.



disputeoverthenecessaryconditionsfortheirinstantiation.10 ButI dothinkthatitisnecessarytosaysomethingaboutthepossibilityofamerelyverbaldisputeconcerningtheconditionsfortheoccurrenceofaperceptualexperience.

Kantobviouslymakesadistinctionbetween“experience”[Erfahrung]and“intuition”[Anschauung]. Heisclearthat“experience,” inhissenseofan“empiricalcognition”[empirischeErkenntnis], includesconceptual synthesis, sincesuchsynthesis iswhatbindsthevariouselementsofanempiricalcognitiontogethersuchthattheyarenon-arbitrarilyconnected (cf. B12, B161, B201, B218, B233).11 Asa result, wecannotunderstandthe(non)-conceptualismdebateasconcerning“experience”inKant’ssenseoftheterm. Non-conceptualistinterpretersallconcedethatKant’susageof“experience”[Erfahrung]and“empiricalcognition”[empirischeErkenntnis]typicallyismeantinawaythatassumessomesortofcognitivecontributionbytheunderstanding.

ThedifficultiesthatresultintryingtopindownKant’suseof“experience”[Erfahrung]havenotgoneunnoticed in the literature.12 Forexample, HannahGinsborghasar-guedthatKant’sargumentthattheunderstandingmustbeactiveinthegenerationorconstitutionof“Erfahrung”ispotentiallyambiguousbetweendesignatingsensemodalspecific states of phenomenal consciousness—”sense impressions“—and full-blownperceptual judgments. But itseemsclear thatKanthimself tookthe terms”intuition”[Anschauung], “perception”[Wahrnehmung], and“experience”[Erfahrung]todesig-natedifferentthings.13 Intuitionisarelationtoan“undetermined”[unbestimmt]ob-jectoran“appearance”[Erscheinung](A20/B34). Intuitionisdistinguishedfrom“per-ception”[Wahrnehmung]byvirtueof thesubject’sbeingconsciousof the“content”[Inhalt]of the intuition (moreon thenotionof “content”below) (Pr4:300; cf. A99,A119-20, B162, B202-3).14 Finally, “experience” [Erfahrung] involves the synthesisofperceptions[Wahrnehmungen]viaapplicationof(orperhapsguidanceby)thecat-egories. “Experience iscognition throughconnectedperceptions [durchverknüpfte

10 See Hinton(1973); Byrne(2009)forcontemporarydiscussionofworriesconcerningthenotionofan“experience”.

11 AsKantsaysinthe Prolegomena, “Experienceconsistsinthesyntheticconnection[Verknüpfung]ofap-pearances(perceptions)inaconsciousness, insofarasthisconnectionisnecessary”(Pr4:305; cf. 4:275;B147, B218, B227).

12 Seethediscussionin Van Cleve(1999), 74-6; Ginsborg(2006b).13 ThankstoClintonTolleyfordiscussionconcerningtheseandrelatedpoints.14 Whatexactly is intendedbyKant’suseof “conscious” [Bewußt] and“consciousness” [Bewußtsein]furthercomplicatesmatters. Significantly, forourpurposes, wecannottakeforgrantedthatKantmeanstoindicatewhat we typicallymeaninusingtheterm—viz. “phenomenalconsciousness”or“whatitislike”tohavetherelevantexperience. KanttypicallyusesthetermintheLeibniz-Wolffsenseinwhichitindicatestheextenttowhichtherepresentingsubjectcandistinguishbetweenobjectsorthepartsofobjects. See Wunderlich(2005); La Rocca(2008a), La Rocca(2008b); Grüne(2009), ch.1; SturmandWunderlich(2010); McLear(2011)fordiscussion.



Wahrnehmungen]”(B161; cf. B218; Pr4:300). Thisthreefolddistinctionisalsocon-firmedintheheadingstothefirstthreechaptersofthePrinciplesofthefirst Critique,inwhichKantdistinguishesbetweenthe“Axiomsof Intuition”, the“AnticipationsofPerception”, andthe“AnalogiesofExperience”. IfKant weren’t thinkingthatthetermstheterms“intuition”[Anschauung], “perception”[Wahrnehmung], and“experience”[Erfahrung]designateddistinctmentalstates, thenitwouldbedifficulttounderstandwhyheorderedacentralpartofhisarchitectonicaroundthem.

There isalsoaprimafacie tensionbetweenthesuggestionabove, thatwedistin-guish“intuition” from“perception”—i.e“Wahrnehmung”—andKant’s remark in theStufenleiter passagequotedabove, that“perception”[perceptio]isthecategoryof“rep-resentationwithconsciousness”, inwhichheincludesintuition. Onedifficultyisthat“Wahrnehmung”, “perceptio”, and“Perzeption”arealltypicallytranslatedinEnglishusing“perception”, whileitisunclearthatallthesetermsmeanthesamethingforKant,orthattheymeanwhat wemean, using“perception”initscontemporaryEnglishsense.Butthedifficultyisn’tjustrelatedtotheproblemofEnglishtranslation; rather, thetextofthe Stufenleiter seemstodefineintuitionintermsofbeingaconsciousrepresenta-tion (and thusa “perceptio”), but I suggestedabove theKantdistinguishes intuitionfrom Wahrnehmung byappealtothepresenceofconsciousnessinthelatterbutnottheformer.

Onepossiblemoveinresolvingthistensionistosaythatthenotionof“conscious-ness” in the Stufenleiter concerns consciousness of the representation, rather than,specifically, itscontent. Intuitions, onthisreading, wouldbeconsciousrepresentations,butthesenseinwhichtheyareconsciousdiffersfromthatofa Wahrnehmung. ThereisalreadygroundforsuchadistinctioninKant’sdifferentiationbetweentheconscious-ness inherent in the awareness of a representation—its “clarity” [Klarheit], whichrequiresonlythattherepresentationsufficefordistinguishinganobjectfromothers—andtheconsciousnessinherentintheawarenessofthecontentofarepresentation—its“distinctness”[Deutlichkeit], whichrequiresthatoneclearlyrepresentallthedifferentpartsofthecontentoftherepresentation(orthepartsofitscorrespondingobject)(An7:137-8; cf. JL 9:34; R 643, 15:283; R 1709, 16:89).15 Thismeansof resolving theissueisperhapsmadeevenmoreattractivebyKant’sremarkinthe Anthropology that,

distinctnessalonemakesitpossiblethatanaggregate[Summe]ofrepre-sentationsbecomesacognition[Erkenntnis], inwhichorderisthoughtinthismanifold, becauseeveryconsciouscombination[ZusammensetzungmitBewußtsein]presupposesunityofconsciousness, andconsequentlyaruleforthecombination. (7:138)

15 Therearecomplications, however, in simply equating clarityandconsciousness; cf. B414-15, note.Kantalsoseemsquitehappytoentertainthepossibilityofunconsciousor“obscure”[Dunkel]intuitions(An7:135); cf. Wunderlich(2005), 141-2; Grüne(2009), ch. 1.3.



Thispassage suggests thatan intuition, of itself, isatbestconscious in the senseofbeing clear [klar]. WhenanintuitionisapprehendedinanactofWahrnehmung (cf. Pr4:300), itscontentisbroughttogetherinsuchawaythatitbecomes(atleasttosomedegree) distinct [deutlich], andthusacandidateforcognition. Inthismanner, weseemabletoresolvethetensionbetweentheaccountofthedifferencebetweenintuitionandWahrnehmung offeredaboveandKant’sremarksinthe Stufenleiter.16

GiventhedifficultyofprovidingapreciseaccountofhowKant’sterminologymapsontocontemporaryusage(assumingthatitdoesatall), I focusbelowonwhatI taketo be a central aspect of the contemporary debate between conceptualist and non-conceptualistinterpretationsofKant—viz. whether intuitions, understoodbythisde-bateasmentalstateswhicharebothcognitive, andhavesense-modalspecificphenom-enalcharacter, dependon(andinwhatwaytheydependon)actsoftheunderstanding.TheemphasisonintuitionisgroundedinKant’stextsinsofarasKantrepeatedlycitesempiricalintuitionasthatwhichisourfirstorprimarymeansofbeingsensorilyrelatedtoactualobjects(Pr4:283; cf. Pr4:350; B160; A180/B222; OD 8:217). I shallfreelyusetheterms“perception”, “experience”, and“perceptualexperience”todescribethementalstatesKantdesignatesby“intuition”[Anschauung], solongasitisunderstoodthattheseEnglishtermsaremeantinourcontemporaryusage, notnecessarilyKant’s.

SoI use“outerintuition”(orwherecontextpermits, simply“intuition”)toindicate,unlessotherwisenoted, theperception(i.e. theEnglishtermforcognitivesensorycon-sciousness)ofanexistencedistinctfromthesubject. “Inner”intuition, incontrast, istheawarenessof the subject’s existence, andaparticularmode thereof (e.g. feelingwarm, hungry, etc.). Bothareformsof experience intheEnglishsenseoftheterm—viz. acognitivementalstateoreventwithaparticularphenomenologybasedononeofthefivesenses. But, asnotedabove, neitherinnernorouterintuitionissufficientforexperience[Erfahrung]inKant’ssenseoftheterm. Kant’snotionofanexperiencere-quiresconceptualandapperceptivecapacitieswhichengenderanawarenessoflawfulrelationsbetweenconsciouslyperceivedobjects, properties, states, orevents.

Thequestiontowhichwenowturnconcernstheconditionsunderwhichamen-tal state type thatKantdesignatesas“intuition” [Anschauung] requiresorotherwisepresupposesmentalactsofsynthesis(oratleastthecapacityforsuchacts)bytheun-derstanding.

3 KantianNon-Conceptualism

Attheheartofnon-conceptualistreadingsofKantstandsthedenialthatmentalactsofsynthesiscarriedoutbytheunderstandingarenecessaryfortheoccurrenceofcognitivementalstatesofthetypewhichKantdesignatesbytheterm“intuition”[Anschauung].

16 ThankstoSamRicklessforencouragingclarityonthispoint.



Though it is controversial as towhatmightbeconsidered the “natural”or “default”readingofKant’smaturecriticalphilosophy, thereareatleastfourconsiderationswhichlendstrongsupporttoanon-conceptualistinterpretationofKant’smaturework.

First, asseveralscholarshavenoted, Kant repeatedlyand forcefullystates that inourcognitionthereisastrictdivisionofcognitivelabor—objectsaregivenbysensi-bilityandthoughtviatheunderstanding.17 AsRobertHannahasargued, whenKantdiscussesthedependenceofintuitiononconceptualjudgmentintheAnalyticofCon-cepts, heisspecificallytalkingabout cognition ratherthanwhatwewouldconsidertobeperceptualexperience.18

Second, Kantcharacterizestherepresentationalcapacitiescharacteristicofsensibil-ityasmoreprimitive than thosecharacteristicof theunderstanding (or reason), andasplausiblypartofwhathumans sharewith the restof theanimalkingdom.19 Forexample, RobertHannaconstruesKant’sdistinctionbetweenthefacultiesofsensibilityandunderstandingascapturingthedifferencebetweenthe“sub-rational”powersofthemindthatwesharewithnon-humananimals, andthe“rationalorhigher-levelcognitivepowers”thatarespecialtohumanbeings.20

Ifoneweretodenythat, accordingtoKant, sensibilityaloneiscapableofproducingmentalstatesthatwerecognitiveincharacterthenitwouldseemthatanyanimalwhichlacksafacultyofunderstanding, andthusthecapacityforconceptualsynthesis, wouldthereby lackanycapacity forgenuinely perceptual experience. Themental livesofnon-rationalanimalswouldthus, atbest, consistofnon-cognitivesensorystateswhichcausallycorrelatewithchangesintheanimal’senvironment. Asidefromwhatwewouldnowconsidertobeanunappealingandimplausiblecharacterizationofthecognitivecapacitiesofanimals, thisreadingalsofacestextualhurdles. Kantisonrecordinvariousplacesassayingthatanimalshavesensoryrepresentationsoftheirenvironment(CPJ5:464; LM 28:449; cf. An7:212), thattheyhaveintuitions(LL 24:702), andthattheyareacquaintedwithobjectsthoughtheydonotcognizethem(JL 9:64–5).21

IfKant’spositionisthatsyntheticactscarriedoutbytheunderstandingarenecessaryfor the cognitive standingof amental state, thenKant is contradicting fundamental

17 Hanna(2005); Allais(2009); McLear(2011); Hanna(2011a); Tolley(2013); McLear(Forthcominga),McLear(Forthcomingb).

18 SeethediscussionofKant’s“togethernessprinciple”andit’ssignificanceforsettingtheconditionsonobjectivelyvalidjudgmentin Hanna(2005), 265-7.

19 Kant connects the possession of a faculty of sensibility to animal nature in various places,e.g. A546/B574, A802/B830; An7:196.

20 Hanna(2005), 249; cf. Allais(2009); McLear(2011), McLear(Forthcominga), §3.21 Forfurtherdiscussionsee Naragon(1990); Allais(2009); McLear(2011). Forsomedefenseofthecon-ceptualistpositionsee McDowell(1996), chs. 3&6; Ginsborg(2006b), Ginsborg(2006a); Ginsborg(2008); Gomes(2014).



elementsofhisownpositionincreditingintuitions(ortheirpossibility)tonon-rationalanimals.

Third, anypositionwhichregardsperceptualexperienceasdependentuponactsofsynthesiscarriedoutbytheunderstandingmustalsoconstruethe“pure”intuitionsofspaceandtimeasdependentuponactsofsynthesis.22 However, Kant’sdiscussionofspace(andanalogously, time)inthethirdandfourtharguments(fourthandfifthinthecaseoftime)oftheMetaphysicalExpositionofSpaceintheTranscendentalAestheticseemsincompatiblewithsuchaproposedrelationofdependence.

Kant’spointinthethirdandfourthargumentsoftheMetaphysicalExpositionofspace(andsimilarlyoftime)isthatnofiniteintellectcouldgrasptheextentandnatureofspaceasaninfinitewholeviaasyntheticprocessmovingfromparttowhole. Iftheunityoftheformsofintuitionwerealsosomethingdependentuponintellectualactivity, thenthisunitywouldnecessarilyinvolvethediscursive(thoughnotnecessarilyconceptual)runningthroughandgatheringtogetherofagivenmultiplicity(presumablyofdifferentlocationsormoments)intoacombinedwhole, whichKantbelievesischaracteristicofsynthesisgenerally(A99).

ButKant’sargumentsintheMetaphysicalExpositionsofspaceandtimerequirethatthefundamentalbasisofourrepresentationofspaceandtimedoesnotproceedfromagraspofthemultiplicityoffeaturesofanintuitedparticulartothewholethathasthosefeatures. Insteadtheformofpureintuitionconstitutesarepresentationalwholethatisprior tothatofitscomponentparts(cf. CJ 5:407-8, 409).23

Hence, Kant’spositionisthatthepureintuitionsofspaceandtimepossessaunitywhollydifferentfromthatgivenbythediscursiveunityoftheunderstanding(whetheritbeinconceptualjudgmentortheintellectual cum imaginativesynthesisofintuitedobjectsmoregenerally). Theunityofaestheticrepresentation—characterizedbytheformsofspaceandtime—hasastructureinwhichtherepresentationalpartsdependonthewhole. Theunityofdiscursiverepresentation—representationwheretheactivityoftheunderstandingisinvolved—hasastructureinwhichtherepresentationalwholedependsonitsparts.24

Finally, therehasbeenextensivediscussionof thenon-conceptualityof intuitioninthesecondaryliteratureonKant’sphilosophyofmathematics. Forexample, MichaelFriedmanhasarguedthattheexpressivelimitationsoftheprevailinglogicinKant’stimerequiredthepostulationofintuitionasaformofsingular, non-conceptualrepresenta-

22 Thispositionisforcefullyarticulatedin Longuenesse(1998), ch. 8; seealso Griffith(2012); Friedman(2012).

23 Kant’sargumenthereisdirectedverymuchagainsttheLeibnizianviewthatallrepresentationispurelyconceptual. Forfurtherdiscussionsee Adams(1994), ch. 9; Janiak(2012).

24 Formuchmoreextensivediscussionofthisissuesee McLear(Forthcominga); cf. Messina(2014); OnofandSchulting(Forthcoming).



tion.25 CharlesParsonsandEmilyCarsonhavearguedthatspacemustbegiveninaphenomenologicalmannerasanoriginal, non-conceptualrepresentationinorderthatwebeabletodemonstratetherealpossibilityofconstructedmathematicalobjectsasrequiredforgeometricknowledge.26 Ultimately, however, therearedifficultiesinas-sessingwhetherKant’sphilosophyofmathematicscanhaverelevancefortheconceptu-alismdebate, sincethesenseinwhichintuitionmustbenon-conceptualinaccountingformathematicalknowledgeisnotobviouslyincompatiblewithclaimingthatintuitionsthemselves(includingpureintuition)aredependentuponaconceptually-guidedsyn-thesis.27

Thenon-conceptualistreadingisthusclearlycommittedtoallowingthatsensibilityaloneprovides, in a perhaps very primitivemanner, objective representationof theempiricalworld. Sensibilityisconstruedasanindependentcognitivefaculty, whichhumanssharewithothernon-rationalanimals, andwhichisthejumping-offpointformoresophisticatedconceptualrepresentationofempiricalreality.

4 KantianConceptualism

IntheintroductionI characterizedconceptualismasclaimingthatthereisadependencerelationbetweenasubject’shavingconscioussensoryexperienceofanobjectiveworld,andtherepertoireofconceptspossessedbythesubjectandexercisedinactsbyherfacultyofunderstanding.

Asafirstpassatsharpeningthisformulation, wemayunderstandconceptualism, asitappearsinthescholarlyliteratureonKant, asathesisconsistingoftwoclaims: (i)senseexperiencehascorrectnessconditionsdeterminedbythe“content”oftheexperience;(ii)thecontentofanexperienceisastructuredentitywhosecomponentsareconcepts.Let’staketheseinturn.

25 Friedman(1992), ch. 2; cf. thediscussionofthenon-conceptualconditionsofjudgmentsofequalityin Anderson(2005), 54-8andthediscussionoftherepresentationofhomogeneousunitsin Sutherland(2008).

26 Parsons(1964); Parsons(1992); Carson(1997); Carson(1999); cf. Hanna(2002). ForageneraloverviewofrelatedissuesinKant’sphilosophyofmathematicssee Shabel(2006)andtheworkscitedthereinatp. 107, note29.

27 MichaelFriedman(Friedman(2012))hasrecentlyarticulatedsuchaposition; cf. Longuenesse(1998).If, asFriedmanargues, Kant’snotionoftheconceptualistiedtohislogic, then, aswemoveawayfromsyllogisticlogicpost-Frege, theremaybenotionsoftheconceptualthatarecompatiblewithKant’sviewsinmathematics. Fordiscussionsee MacFarlane(2002); Anderson(2004), Anderson(2005).



4.1 Content&Correctness

Animportantbackgroundassumptiongoverningtheconceptualismdebateconstruesmentalstatesasrelatedtotheworldcognitively(asopposedtomerelycausally)ifandonlyiftheypossesscorrectnessconditions. Thatwhichdeterminesthecorrectnesscon-ditionforastateisthatstate’s“content”.

Suppose, forexample, thatanexperienceE hasthefollowingcontentC:

C:Thatcupiswhite.

ThiscontentdeterminesacorrectnessconditionV:

V:S’sexperienceE iscorrectiffthecupvisuallypresentedtothesubjectasthecontentofthedemonstrativeiswhiteandthecontentC correspondstohowthingsseemtothesubjecttobevisuallypresented.

Herethecontentoftheexperientialstatefunctionsmuchlikethecontentofabeliefstatetodeterminewhethertheexperience, likethebelief, isorisnotcorrect.

A state’spossessionofcontentthusdeterminesacorrectnesscondition, invirtueofwhichwecanconstruethestateasmapping, mirroring, orotherwisetrackingaspectsofthesubject’senvironment.

PerhapsthemostprominentrecentinterpretationofKantasendorsingthecontentassumptionisfoundinJohnMcDowell’s MindandWorld. McDowell’sprojectthereistoshow, givencertainpresuppositionsconcerningthenatureofjustification, howitisthatexperiencecanplayajustificatoryandnotmerelycausalroleinthefixationofbelief. InthecourseofthisargumentMcDowellarticulatesveryclearlyacommitmenttoconstruingrepresentationalcontentasthekindofthingthatiscorrectorincorrect.Hesays,

Theveryideaofrepresentationalcontentbringswithitanotionofcorrect-nessandincorrectness: somethingwithacertaincontentiscorrect, intherelevantsense, justincasethingsareasitrepresentsthemtobe. I canseenogoodreasonnottocallthiscorrectness“truth.” Butevenif, forsomereason, wereservethat titleforcorrectnessinthissensewhenit ispos-sessedbythingswithconceptualcontent, itseemsaroutinethoughtthattherecanberationalconnectionsbetweentheworld’sbeingasapossessorofonebitofcontentrepresentsitandtheworld’sbeingasapossessorofanotherbitofcontentrepresentsit, independentlyofwhatkindofcontentisinquestion.28

28 McDowell(1996), 162. ManyofMcDowell’sinterlocutorssharesimilarviews. Cf. Evans(1982), 202;Peacocke(1992), 55, 65; Burge(2003), 506.



McDowellexplainsthecloseconnectionbetweentheideaofrepresentationalcon-tentandthatofcorrectnessintermsofthenormativecharacterofanyworld-directedmentalstate, aparadigmaticinstanceofwhichisjudgingthatsomethingisthecase. Hesays,

Tomakesenseoftheideaofamentalstate’sorepisode’sbeingdirectedtowardstheworld, inthewayinwhich, say, abelieforjudgementis, weneedtoputthestateorepisodeinanormativecontext. A belieforjudge-menttotheeffectthatthingsarethusandso—abelieforjudgementwhosecontent(aswesay)isthatthingsarethusandso—mustbeapostureorstancethatiscorrectlyorincorrectlyadoptedaccordingtowhetherornotthingsareindeedthusandso. (Ifwecanmakesenseofjudgementorbeliefasdirectedtowardstheworldinthatway, otherkindsofcontent-bearingposturesorstancesshouldeasilyfallintoplace).29

HereMcDowellclaimsthatbeliefsandjudgmentshaveaparticularwayofdisclosingtheworld to a subject and that this is away inwhichwemightunderstandworld-directedmentalstatesmoregenerally. Hefurtherclaimsthatthewayinwhichamen-talstate isdirectedat theworld is in termsof itspossessingacorrectnessconditionconcerninghowtheworldinfactis. McDowellthenrelateshisunderstandingofsuchworld-disclosingorworld-directedstatestoperceptualexperience.

WeshouldunderstandwhatKantcalls“intuition”—experientialintake—notasabaregettingofanextra-conceptualGiven, butasakindofoc-currenceorstatethatalreadyhasconceptualcontent. Inexperienceonetakesin, forinstancesees, thatthingsarethusandso. Thatisthesortofthingonecanalso, forinstance, judge.30

McDowellhereutilizesKant’sterm“intuition”[Anschauung]whichMcDowellequateswith“experiential intake.‘’Soheendorses the idea that intuitionhascontent (beingnecessaryforour“takingin”thatsomethingisthecase), andthatitisinvirtueofthiscontentthattheexperientialstate, togetherwiththeworld, iseithercorrectorincorrect.Fromthiswecanconcludethat, accordingtoMcDowell, intuitionshaverepresenta-tionalcontent, thatthisentailsthatsuchcontentisassessableforitscorrectness, andthatintuitionswithcontentaretherebymentalstatesassessablefortheircorrectness.Hence, McDowell’sinterpretationclearlyunderstandsKantasendorsingaversionofthecontentassumption.

29 McDowell(1996), xi-xii.30 McDowell(1996), 9.



Manynon-conceptualistopponentsofMcDowell’sinterpretationneverthelesssharewithhimanendorsementofthecontentassumption.31 However, theydifferwithhiminatleastoneoftwoways. First, thecontentofanexperiencewhichsetsitscorrectnessconditionsisattributedtotheexperienceregardlessofwhat, ifany, otherconceptualcapacitiesthesubjectmayhave. Non-conceptualcontentsarethusmeanttocaptureaspectsoftheperceivingsubject’sexperiencethatmaywelloutrunthesubject’sowncapacitiesforarticulation.32

Second, proponents of non-conceptualist readings of contentmay construe non-conceptualcontentsascorrectinamannerthatisaltogetherdistinctfromconceptualcontents, whicharetrueorfalsedependingonwhethertheconditionssetoutbytheconceptsconstituting thecontentare satisfied. Incontrast, non-conceptualcontent,muchlikethecontentofamaporarecording, isaccurateorinaccurate. Itthusadmitsofdegreesofapproximation.33

Thus, formanynon-conceptualists, whileitisstillthecasethatasubject’smentalstatesonlycountasrepresentationalinvirtueofpossessingcorrectnessconditions, thenatureandarticulationofthesecorrectnessconditionsmaywelldifferradicallyfromthosesetoutbyconceptualism.

Wecanseethesetwofeaturesofnon-conceptualismatworkinaninterpretationofKantthatis, inmanyways, directlyopposedtoMcDowell’sconceptualism. RobertHannahasargued that, forKant, sensible intuitionspossesswhollynon-conceptualrepresentationalcontent. WecanseethisintwoquotesfromHanna, thefirstofwhichdescribes thenon-conceptualist position andattributes it toKant, while the secondarticulatesingreaterdetailthekindofrepresentationalcontentHannathinksispresentinperceptualexperience.

Non-conceptualismholdsthatnon-conceptualcontentexistsandisrep-resentationallysignificant…Non-conceptualcognitivecontentinthecon-temporarysenseis, forallphilosophicalintentsandpurposes, identicaltointuitionalcognitivecontentinKant’ssense.34

31 Many, butnotall. See Tolley(2011), Tolley(2013); McLear(Forthcomingb).32 Endorsementofthisthesissometimesgoesunderthename’statenon-conceptualism’or’relativenon-conceptualism.’ See Heck(2000); Speaks(2005); cf. Allais(2009); Hanna(2005), Hanna(2008), Hanna(2011b).

33 Cf. Burge (2003). This conception of non-conceptual content also goes under name ’content non-conceptualism’or’absolutenon-conceptualism.’ See, again, Heck(2000); Speaks(2005).

34 Hanna(2005), 248.



essentiallynon-conceptualcontentiseitheraccurateorinaccurate, andasI havesuggested, inherentlypoisedforuseintheintentionalactionsofconsciousanimals.35

WecanthusseethatforHanna, intuitionalcontentisnon-conceptualbutneverthelessrepresentational—itexpressesanaccuracyconditioninvirtueofwhichthementalstaterepresentssomeportionof themind-independentworld. Hanna’sposition (bothonits ownandas attributed toKant) regards thisnonconceptual content as essentiallyveridical, indexical, andcontextdependent.36 ButthebasicpresumptionwhichdrivesHanna’snon-conceptualismisthesameasthatofMcDowell’sconceptualism. A mentalstatecountsasastateofperceptualawareness—i.e. a“world-directed”state—onlyinvirtueofhavingarepresentationalcontentwhichsetsacorrectnessconditionforthestate. Hence, Hanna, likeMcDowell, articulatesaninterpretationwhichendorsesthecontentassumption.

I takeitthatMcDowell’sandHanna’sviewsarerepresentativeoftwoextremesre-gardinginterpretationsofKantunderstandingofthecontentofintuition. McDowell, atleastinthediscussionin MindandWorld, arguesthatintuitionisthroughandthroughconceptual. Thatis, McDowellunderstandstherepresentationalcontentofperceptionasthesamekindofcontentasisfoundinbeliefsorthoughts. Sothecontentofanexpe-rienceisaconceptuallystructured, truth-evaluableproposition.37 Hanna, incontrast,arguesthatintuitionhasabsolute non-conceptual content—ithasastructureessentiallydifferentinnaturefromthatofconceptualcontent.38

HannaandMcDowellarticulatethebasicshapeofmuchrecentdebateconcerning

35 Hanna(2008), 58.36 Hanna(2006), chs. 1-2; Hanna(2011b); cf. Howell(1973); Pereira(2013).37 McDowellhassincechangedhisview. A morecurrentspecificationof itstates that intuitionisnotpropositionalinstructurethoughitneverthelesspossessesconceptualcontent. See McDowell(2008).However, sinceMcDowellstillconstruesthecontentofintuitionasintentionalandconceptual, bringingwithitanormativenotionofcorrectness, I considerevenhismorecurrentstatementstobeanendorse-mentofthecontentassumption. Cf. McDowell(2013), whereheexplicitlysaysthatitis“invirtueofhavingcontentastheydothatperceptualexperiencesputusinsuch[i.e. cognitive]relationstothings”(p. 144).

38 Hanna(2011a), 354; cf. Hanna(2005).



theinterpretationofKant’sviewsconcerningperceptualexperience.39 Sowhetheraperceptualexperientialstatehasconceptuallystructuredcontent(McDowell), ornon-conceptuallystructuredcontent(Hanna), itisinvirtueofthestate’saimingatawaytheworldmightbe, andthushavingacorrectnesscondition, thatthestatecountsasaformofperceptualawareness.

Thereare reasons forquestioningwhetherKantendorses thecontentassumptionasI’vearticulateditabove.40 Kantseemstodenyseveralclaimswhichareintegraltoit. First, invariousplacesheexplicitlydeniesthatintuition, orthedeliverancesofthesensesmoregenerally, arethekindofthingwhichcouldbecorrectorincorrect(A293–4/B350; An§117:146; cf. LL 24:83ff, 103, 720ff, 825ff). Second, Kant’sconceptionofrepresentationalcontentrequiresanactofmentalunification(Pr4:304; cf. JL §179:101; LL 24:928), somethingwhichKantexplicitlydenies ispresent inanintuition(B129-30; cf. B176-7).41 Finally, Kant’s“modal”conditiononcognition, thatitprovideademonstrationofwhatisreallyactualratherthanmerelylogicallypossible, seemstoprecludeanendorsementofthecontentassumption. However, forthepurposesofunderstanding theconceptulismdebate, wewillassume thatKantdoesendorse thecontentassumption. Thequestionthenishowtounderstandthenatureofthecontentsounderstood.

4.2 ConceptualContent

Inaddition to thecontentassumption, I definedconceptualismascommitted to thecontentofintuitionbeingcompletelycomposedofconcepts. Againstthis, ClintonTol-ley(Tolley(2013), Tolley(2011))hasarguedthattheimmediacy/mediacydistinctionbetweenintuitionandconceptentailsadifferenceinthecontentofintuitionandcon-cept.

39 ThereareagreatmanyotherwaystoarticulatethenotionthatintuitionhascontentwithinthelimitssetbyHannaandMcDowell. Forexample, therearecoherentinterpretationswhichdenythatintuitionhasconceptualcontent, butassertthatitistheresultofanimaginativesynthesis, andholdthattheimageswhichconstituteexperientialconsciousnessareconstructionsaccordingtoconceptualrules. Hence,insofarastheimagespurporttoberepresentationaltheymustbeattributedacontentdeterminedbytherulesoftheirconstruction. Inmyterms, thisamountstoavariationoftheContentassumption. SeeLonguenesse’sdiscussionofconceptsasrules forsensiblesynthesis. Longuenesse(1998), 50ff. Seealso Anderson(2001); Land(2011); Matherne(Unpublished). Watkins (2008), 519-20alsosuggestsanimagisticview, thoughitisnotfullyarticulated. Otherviewsthatseemcompatiblewithsuchanaccountinclude Strawson(1966); Strawson(1970); Sellars(1968); Ginsborg(2006b); Ginsborg(2006a).Schulting(2012)presentsarecentandhelpfuloverviewofmanyoftherelevantissues.

40 See McLear(Forthcomingb)formoreextensivediscussion.41 Kantdoesnot, however, denythatintuitionhas“content”[Inhalt]insomesenseotherthanthatofacorrectnesscondition. Fordiscussionsee Tolley(2011), Tolley(2013); McLear(Forthcomingb).



ifweunderstandby“content”…arepresentation’sparticularrelationtoanobject…thenit isclear thatweshouldconcludethatKantacceptsnon-conceptualcontent. This isbecauseKantaccepts that intuitionsputusinarepresentational relation toobjects that isdistinct inkind fromtherelationthatpertainstoconcepts. I argued, furthermore, thatthisisthemeaningthatKanthimselfassignstotheterm“content”. (Tolley(2013),128)

InsofarasKantoftenspeaksofthe“content”[Inhalt]ofarepresentationasconsistinginaparticularkindofrelationtoanobject(Tolley(2013), 112; cf. B83, B87)Tolleythusgivesusakindof“shortargument”foranon-conceptualistreadingofKant:

1. Thecontentofacognition(whetherintuitionorconcept)consistsin—i.e. isnoth-ingbut—arelationtoanobject

2. Conceptsandintuitionsrelatetoobjectsindifferentways—viz. mediatelyandimmediately

3. ∴ Thecontentof intuition isdifferent from thecontentof concepts—i.e. it isnon-conceptual

Tolley’sargumentgivesusgoodreasontorejecttheideathatintuitioncouldhave, inKant’ssenseoftheterm, aconceptasits“content”.42 HoweveritdoesnotdemonstratethatthecontentofwhatKantcallsanintuitionisnotsomethingthat we wouldconstrueasconceptual, inawidersenseof that term. Forexample, bothpureandcomplexdemonstrativeexpressionshaveconceptualform(e.g. thatcolor, thisperson), butarenot, inKant’s terms, “conceptual” since theydonot exhibit the requisite generalitywhich, accordingtoKant, allconceptualrepresentationmust.43

4.3 Conceptualism&Synthesis

If it isn’t textuallyplausible tounderstand thecontentof an intuition in conceptualterms(atleastasKantunderstandsthenotionofaconcept)thenwhatwoulditmeantosaythatKantendorsesconceptualismwithregardtoexperience? Themostplausibleinterpretation, endorsedbyawidevarietyof interpreters, readsKantasarguing thatthegenerationofanintuition, whetherpureorsensory, dependsatleastinpartontheactivityoftheunderstanding. Onthiswayofcarvingthings, conceptualismdoes notconsistinthenarrowclaimthatintuitionshaveconceptsascontentsorcomponents,butratherconsistsinthebroaderclaimthattheoccurrenceofanintuitiondependsat

42 Foropposingviewssee Willaschek(1997); Griffith(2012); Engstrom(2006).43 Forfurtherdiscussionsee McLear(Forthcomingb), §5.2; Thompson(1972).



leastinpartonthediscursiveactivityoftheunderstanding.44 ThespecificactivityoftheunderstandingisthatwhichKantcalls“synthesis”, the“runningthrough, andgatheringtogether”ofrepresentations(A99).45

What’smore, the fact that intuitionsaregeneratedaccording toactsof synthesisdirectedbyorotherwisedependentuponconceptualcapacitiesprovidessomebasistoclaimthatwhatevercorrectnessconditionsmightbehadbyintuitionmustbeinaccordwiththeconceptualsynthesiswhichgeneratedthem. ThisseemsnicelyinlinewithKant’smuchquotedclaim,

The same function that gives unity to thedifferent representations in ajudgment alsogivesunitytothemeresynthesisofdifferentrepresentationsinanintuition, which, expressedgenerally, iscalledthepureconceptofunderstanding. (A79/B104-5)

Thelinkbetweenintuition, synthesisinaccordancewithconcepts, andrelationtoanobjectismadeevenclearerbyKant’sclaimin§17oftheB-editionTranscendentalDeductionthat,

Understanding is, generallyspeaking, thefacultyof cognitions. Thesecon-sistinthedeterminaterelationofgivenrepresentationstoanobject. Anobject, however, isthatintheconceptofwhichthemanifoldofagivenintuitionis united. (B137; emphasisintheoriginal)

Howeverelsewearetounderstandthispassage, Kanthereindicatesthattheunityofanintuitionnecessaryforittostandasacognitionofanobjectrequiresasynthesisbytheconcept<object>. Inotherwords, cognitionofanobjectrequiresthatintuitionbeunifiedbyanactoractsoftheunderstanding.

Accordingtotheconceptualistinterpretationwemustunderstandthenotionofarepresentation’scontentasarelationtoanobject, whichinturndependsonaconcep-tuallyguidedsynthesis. Sowecanreviseourinitialdefinitionofconceptualismtoreaditasclaimingthat(i)thecontentof anintuitionisakindofrelationtoanobject; (ii)

44 McLear(Forthcominga)callsthisbroaderposition“Intellectualism”, soastoemphasizetheimportanceoftheunderstanding’sactivity, ratherthanthespecificconceptualcontentofthatactivity.

45 See Grüne(2009), ch. 2foranalternativetaxonomy. Grünedistinguishes“judgment-theoretic”[Urteils-theoretik]from“conceptualist”[Konzeptualist]interpretationsonthebasisofwhethertheinterpretationconstruestheintuitiverepresentationsgeneratedbysensorysynthesisintermsof, orimplying, judgment(Grüne(2009), 111-12). However, sheandI agreethatsuch“judgment-theoretic”viewsarenotdefini-tiveofabroadlyconceptualistinterpretation, andthatwhetheronetakesKantasarguingthatintuitiondependsonaconceptually-guidedsynthesisremainsasignificantdifferencebetweenconceptualistandnon-conceptualistinterpretations(Grüne(2009), §2.4; cf. Grüne(2008)). SoI takethediscussionheretobebroadlycongenialtoherown.



therelationtoanobjectdependsonasynthesisdirectedinaccordancewithconcepts;(iii)synthesisinaccordancewithconceptssetscorrectnessconditionsfortheintuition’srepresentationofamind-independentobject.46

5 Objections

Oneof themaincriticismsof theconceptualist readingofKant is that it seeminglycommitshimtothepositionthatperceptualexperienceisconstrainedbythesubject’srepertoireofconcepts. However, HannahGinsborghasarguedthatKant’sconceptual-ismneednotbeconstruedinsuchaway.47 Instead,

thereisroomforalessdemandingconceptionofwhatitisforunderstand-ingtobeinvolvedinperceptualsynthesis, aconceptionwhichdoesnotrequirethatanyconceptsbegraspedantecedentlytoengaginginsynthe-sis. Onthisconception, tosay thatsynthesis involvesunderstanding issimply tosay that it involvesaconsciousnessofnormativity…I want toclaimthatthisconsciousnessofnormativityispossiblewithoutthesub-ject’sfirsthavinggraspedanyconceptgoverninghersynthesis, and, morespecifically, withouthersynthesisneedingtobeguidedbyanyconcept.(Ginsborg(2008), 71)

AccordingtoGinsborg, weneednotreadtheconceptualistasmakingthestrongclaimthat perceptual experience is constrained by conceptual repertoire that the subjectbringswiththemtoexperience. Instead, weneedmerelyseetheissueofconceptu-alizationasoneinwhichthesubjectcombinesanassociationofsomebundleofsenseimpressionswiththesensethatsheisassociatingthemassheought, anditisthiscon-sciousnessofthenormativityofone’scombinationthatisresponsible“fortheobject-directedcharacterofourperceptions” (Ginsborg (2008), 74). Hence, ifGinsborg iscorrect, oneofthemainsourcesforobjectingtoconceptualistreadingsofKant—viz.theirsupposeddenialthatnon-rationalanimalsenjoyperceptualexperiences—wouldberemoved.48

46 Onemightworryhereabouttheobjectofperceptualhallucination. I setthisissuelargelytooneside,thoughitiscompatiblewiththeaccountgivenabovethatthe“objects”towhichoneisimmediatelyre-latedinperceptionarealways“intentional”objects. See Aquila(1983); Pereboom(1988); Longuenesse(1998), 20-6; Aquila(2003), Aquila(2008); Grüne(2009), 42.

47 Foralternativeconstrualsoftheconceptualityofexperiencethatalsoseethemselvesascompatiblewiththeclaimthatexperienceisprimitivesee Gomes(2014); Gomes(Manuscript); Land(2011).

48 Ginsborg’spositionhasbeencriticizedbyscholarsoneithersideof theconceptualismdebate. SeeGrüne(2008); Allais(2009), 401.



Perhapsthemostobviousobjectiontothenon-conceptualistreadingofKantstemsfromhisfamousstatementthat,

Intuition[Anschauung]andconcepts[Begriffe]thereforeconstitutetheele-mentsofallourcognition[Erkenntnis]…Thoughtswithoutcontent[Inhalt]areempty, intuitionswithoutconceptsareblind. . . . Theunderstand-ingisnotcapableofintuitinganything, andthesensesarenotcapableofthinkinganything. Onlyfromtheirunificationcancognitionarise. (A50–51/B74–75; myemphasis)

Theso-called“blindness”problemraisestwoissues. First, thatintuitionswithoutcon-ceptsorconceptualsynthesisarenotintentionalstates, andsocannotprovidethemindwithrelationtoanobject.49 Second, thatwecannotevenidentifythecognitivecontri-butionmadebysensoryexperienceindependentofitsconceptualization.50

AgainstthefirstpointithasbeenarguedthatifKant’sconcerniswiththemecha-nism(s)thatundergirdsintentionalstates, andhethinksthatpossessionofafacultyofunderstandingisanecessaryconditionforbeinginintentionalstates, thenhewouldbesimplyconfusedinattributingthepossibilityofintentionalstatestonon-rationalani-mals.51 Ithasalsobeenpointedoutthat, totheextentthatKantproblematizestheissueofintentionalrelations, itisatbestintentionalrelationstoexternalmind-independentobjects thatare inquestion, andnot intentional relations (suchas those involved inthinkingofone’sownmentalstates) überhaupt.52

Againstthesecondpoint, LucyAllais(Allais(2009))hasforcefullyarguedthatifwetakeKant’sdefinitionofintuition(andlikewiseofconcepts)seriously, thenwe must beabletoidentifyanindependentcontributionofsensibilitytocognition—viz. singularandimmediaterepresentationofanobject—lestwefailtomakesenseofKant’sdivi-sionbetweenintuitionandconcept.53 ItwouldalsobeextremelyoddofKanttodenythepossibilityofarticulatingthedistinctcontributionmadebysensibilitygiventhathegoessofarastoorganizethestructureofargumentinthefirst Critique aroundthedis-tinctionbetweenthosecontributionsmadebysensibility(theTranscendentalAesthetic)andthosemadebytheunderstanding(theTranscendentalLogic, andinparticular, the

49 Foraclearstatementoftheviewthatconceptualsynthesisisthemechanismbywhichsensorystatesfirstachievethestatusofintentionalstatessee George(1981); Pereboom(1988); cf. Van Cleve(1999),95-7.

50 Falkenstein(1995); McDowell(1996). McDowellfamouslyclaimsthatsensibilitycannotbeeven“no-tionallyseperated”fromcontributionsmadebytheunderstanding(McDowell (1996), 51). Cf. Bird(2006), ch. 7.2.

51 See Naragon(1990); Allais(2009); McLear(2011)andthereferencescitedinnotes 20 and 21 above.52 Cf. George(1981), 233andVanCleve’scriticaldiscussionin Van Cleve(1999), 96.53 Allais(2009), 393-4; cf. Falkenstein(1995), 63.



Analytic).54 Theclaimof“blindness”, itisargued, shouldnotbeinterpretedassoex-tremeastorenderunintelligiblefundamentalaspectsofKant’sarchitectonic, orofhisrepeatedstatementsconcerningtheindividualcognitiverolesofthefacultiesofsensi-bilityandunderstanding. Finally, atbest, theblindnessproblemseemstoconcernthedifficultiesinvolvedinarticulatingthenatureofsensorycontentwithoutdrawingonconceptsintheprocessofprovidingthearticulation.55 Butthiscanbeconcededwith-outtherebyadmittingthatthereisnosensorycontent(orpositivecognitivecontribution)independentofconceptualarticulation.

A significantfurthersourceofcriticismofthenon-conceptualistreadingisthatitatbestrendersineffectualKant’sapparentstrategyfordemonstratingthelegitimacyofthecategoriesintheargumentoftheTranscendentalDeduction, andatworstshowsKanttobetotallyconfusedinhisargumentativestrategy.56

A key text for this readingcomes in theconclusion to the secondor“B-edition”versionoftheargumentoftheTranscendentalDeduction.

[E]verythingthatmayevercomebeforeoursensesmuststandunderthelawsthatarise apriori fromtheunderstandingalone(B160). . . Conse-quentlyallsynthesis, thoughwhichevenperceptionitselfbecomespossi-ble, standsunderthecategories, andsinceexperienceiscognitionthoughconnectedperceptions, thecategoriesareconditionsofthepossibilityofexperience, andarethusalsovalid apriori ofallobjectsofexperience.(B161)

What thispassageanditscontextsuggest is that theculminationofKant’sargumentdemonstratingthelegitimacyoftheaprioriconceptshecallsthe“categories”requiresshowingthatallperceptiondependsonasynthesisviathecategories. Here, however, itisimportanttonotethatKantisusing“perception”[Wahrnehmung]inhisowntechnicalsense, asdiscussedin§2above, ratherthanourcontemporaryEnglishsense. Sohearguesherethatthecategoriesarenecessaryforconsciousnessofthecomplexcontentofanintuition. Butit isn’tclearthatthisisequivalenttobeingnecessaryforhavinganintuition, andthusforhavingasensoryexperienceinthecontemporarysensewithwhichwe’vebeenconcerned.

A further, andmuchdiscussed, text in theB-editionTranscendentalDeduction isalsooftentakenassupportingaconceptualistinterpretation. ThereKantsays,

Space, presentedasobject(asweareactuallyrequiredtorepresentitinge-ometry), containsmorethan[the]mereformofintuition—viz. itcontains

54 Bird(2006), 12755 Bird(2006), 129-30.56 Cf. Ginsborg(2008), 68-9; Griffith(2012). Forcriticismsee Allais(2009); Tolley(2013); McLear(Forth-cominga).



alsothegathering-together[Zusammenfassung]ofthemanifoldgivenac-cordingtotheformofsensibility, inanintuitiverepresentation—sothattheformofintuitiongivesusmerelyamanifold, butformalintuitiongivesusunityofrepresentation. IntheTranscendentalAestheticI hadmerelyin-cludedthisunitywithsensibility, wantingonlytopointoutthatitprecedesanyconcept. Butthisunityindeedpresupposesasynthesiswhichdoesnotbelongtothesenses, throughwhichallconceptsofspaceandtimefirstbecomepossible. Forthroughthisunity(inasmuchasunderstandingde-terminessensibility)spaceortimearefirstgivenasintuitions, andhencetheunityofthisintuitionbelongs apriori tospaceandtime, andnottotheconceptofunderstanding(see§24)(B160-1, note).

Here theconceptualist takesKant to “complete” theargumentof theDeductionbyarguing that even the existenceof space and time aspure intuitions dependson asynthesisbythecategories.57 Theconceptualistideahereisthat, bymakingspaceandtimethemselvesdependonacategorialsynthesis, Kantassureshisdesiredconclusion—viz. thatallpossibleempiricalintuitionmustdependonthecategories, andthusthatallpossibleobjectsofempiricalintuitionmustfallunderthecategories. Theconceptualistthus takes thisasproof thatanon-conceptualistapproach toreading theDeductionmustmaketheargumenttherehopelessandKant’sstrategydeeplyconfused.58

One thing to note about the footnote passage is that, in thefirst sentence, Kantexplicitlyinvokesthenotionofspaceasanobjectofgeometry. Butitisn’tobviousthatKantidentifiestheconditionsunderwhichasubjectmayrepresentspacegeometricallywiththeconditionsforrepresentingspace simpliciter. Infact, Kant’sdistinctioninthefootnotebetweentheformsofintuitionandformalintuitionsuggeststhathedeniesanysuchidentification. SoKantcanconsistentlyholdthattheunityoftherepresentationofthepureformsofintuition—spaceandtime—isindependentofanysynthesis, whileacknowledging, ashedoesinthelastsentenceofthenote, thattherepresentationoftheseentitiesasobjects, aswedoin the formal intuitionsrequiredformathematics,requiresapre-conceptualsynthesiscarriedoutbytheimagination.59

57 ThesourceofthisinterpretationseemstobeHegel. See Hegel(1977), 69-72. Forrelevantdiscussionsee Pippin(1989), 29-31; Waxman(1991), 79ff; Longuenesse(1998), ch. 8; Keller(1998), 107-12, 254;McDowell(2003), McDowell(2007); McLear(Forthcominga); Messina(2014).

58 Longuenesse(1998); Wenzel(2005); Gomes(2010); Land(2011); Griffith(2012); Gomes(2014). Notallnon-conceptualiststakeupthischallenge. Hanna(2011b)simplyacceptsthisasaconsequenceofKant’snon-conceptualistposition, andconstruesKantasdeeplydividedinhisownviewsonthematter.ForobjectionstoHanna’spositionsee Grüne(2011); Schulting(2012). ForanextensivediscussionoftheB160-1footnoteanddefenseofanon-conceptulistreadingofitsee OnofandSchulting(Forthcoming).

59 Cf. thediscussionin McLear(Forthcominga), §2.1.



We’vealsoseenonenon-conceptulistargument, above, thatKant’sargumentativestrategyintheDeductioncannotdependonmakingtheunityofintuitionitselfdepen-dentonsynthesisbecauseitjeopardizeshisargumentsintheTranscendentalAesthetic.SuchaninterpretationwouldalsodirectlycontradictKant’scharacterizationofthefinitenatureofhumanintellectualactivity(CJ 5:407; cf. B72; CJ 5:251-2, 253-4).60 Othernon-conceptualrepliestothisconceptualistreadingincludedenyingthatthesynthe-sisrequiredfortheunityofperceptualintuitionisitselfconceptual,61 anddistinguish-ingbetween the having ofan intuition, and the representationof thecontentof anintuition—wherethelatterisunderstoodasadeterminaterepresentationalrelationtosomeobject.62

Finally, andperhapsmostcentrallyforsomeconceptualistreadings(mostnotablySellars’sandMcDowell’s), theroleofconceptsinthegenerationofperceptualexperi-enceissupposedtohelpexplainhowperceptioncanplayajustificatoryratherthanmerelyacausal role in thefixationofbelief. Non-conceptualism, so theobjectiongoes, cannotaccountforthejustificatoryroleofperceptualexperienceinthefixationofempiricalbelief. Versionsofthisobjectionhaveoften, sinceWilfredSellars’sfamouspaper, goneunderthemonikerofthe“MythoftheGiven”.63 WhileitisnotentirelyobvioushowKant’stextsorargumentsyieldanysubstantiveconnectionwiththecon-cernsarticulatedbySellars, I shallsuggestbelowthreepossiblewaysinwhichsuchaconnectionmightbeunderstood.

Theexactnatureofobjectionstothesupposedlymythical“Given”vary.64 Oneob-jection, madebySellars, isthatjustifiersforbeliefmusthaveacertainkindofstructure—viz. afact-likestructurethatmirrorsthepropositionalstructureofbelief. Incontrast,sensoryexperiences(construedassensations)areparticularsratherthanfacts, andsocannotplayanyjustificatoryrole.65 This“premiseprinciple”, asithasbeencalledincontemporaryepistemology, thusplaysasignificantroleinmotivatingtherejectionofexperience, insofarasit lacksrepresentationalcontent, asapotentialjustifierforbe-

60 Forfurtherdiscussionofthispointsee McLear(Forthcominga).61 Rohs(2001), 220-1; Allais(2009), 395-6, 406-7; cf. Tolley(2013). Willaschek(1997)arguesthatin-tuition causally relatestoitsobjectindependentofconcepts, butonlyhasintentional content givenaconceptualsyntheis. Hannatakesanothertackandarguesthatsensibilityhasitsownformofsponta-neoussynthesisdistinctfromtheunderstanding’s(cf. Hanna(2008), 62).

62 Tolley(2013), 122-24.63 Sellars(1956), reprintedin Sellars(1963); cf. McDowell(1996); McDowell(1998a), McDowell(1998b),McDowell(1998c); Abela(2002)

64 Cf. Watkins(2008); Watkins(2012).65 Sellars(1956), reprintedin Sellars(1963), 128. Allfurtherpagereferenceswillbetothereprint. Cf.BonJour(1985), ch. 4.



lief.66 Forexample, JohnMcDowellarguesthat

TheideaoftheGivenistheideathatthespaceofreasons, thespaceofjus-tifications’orwarrants, extendsmorewidelythantheconceptualsphere.Butwecannotreallyunderstandtherelationsinvirtueofwhichajudgmentiswarrantedexceptasrelationswithinthespaceofconcepts: relationssuchasimplicationorprobabilification, whichholdbetweenpotentialex-ercisesofconceptualcapacities67

ThepassageinKanttypicallyadducedinsupportofthispointisthe“samefunction”passageat(A79/B104-5)quotedin§4.3above.68 Thus, accordingtothisconceptualistreadingofKant, senseexperience would havetherequisiteproposition-likestructure,andthusbecapableofstandinginjustificatoryrelationstobeliefs, sincethesameca-pacitiesthatstructurethecontentsofjudgmentforKant(viz. thecategories)wouldalsostructuresensoryexperience. WhilesuchinterpretersaresurelycorrectthatKant’saim,asexemplifiedinthispassage, istoshowthattheverysamecognitivecapacitieswhichconnectrepresentationsinamentalactofjudgingarealsoinplayintheconnectionofrepresentationsinasensoryexperience, itisnotobvioushowthepassagedirectlysupportsanyargumentconcerningtheepistemicsignificanceofperceptualexperiencetoknowledge. Endorsementofthepremiseprincipleisasubstantiveepistemologicalcommitment, anddespitewhatKantsaysintheA79/B104-5passageconcerningtheunityofjudgmentandintuition, itisnotatallobviousthatKantendorsestheprinci-ple.69 HencefurtherworkneedstobedonetoshowthatKantactuallyendorsesorevenarticulatesthisargument.

A secondobjectionagainsttheGiven, thatmightbeattributedtoKant, isthatthemereoccurrenceofasensoryexperiencecannotlicenseanyparticularbelief. Instead,sensoryexperiencecanonlyplayitsjustificatoryroleagainstabackgroundofconceptspossessedbytheexperiencingsubject.70 Thisconnects toKantat least inthesensethat, if theconceptualist reading is correct, there is aparticularbatteryof concepts

66 See Pryor(2005); SiegelandSilins(Forthcoming); McLear(Forthcomingb), §4.3fordiscussion.67 McDowell(1996), 7; cf. BonJour(1985),78; Davidson(1986), 310; Brewer(1999), 15468 Seee.g. Sellars(1968), 4-5; McDowell(2003), 79; Haag(2007), 150-1, 199, andch. 8; Kalderon(2011),235-6. Cf. Pippin(1982), 99-101; Heidegger(1997), 45-6; Longuenesse(1998), 200; Grüne(2009),107-11.

69 Forexample, accordingtoatleastoneprominentinterpretationofKant’sepistemology, Kantendorsesanatleastpartly“externalist”positionconcerningepistemicjustification, andthusdoesnotendorsethepremiseprincipleinthemannerrequiredtoplausiblyattributetohimthisversionofthe“MythoftheGiven”argument. See Chignell(2007b), 49-50; McLear(Forthcomingb), §4.3.

70 Sellars(1963), 170; McDowell(1998a), 435-6.



necessaryforanyperceptualexperiencetoplayaroleinjustificationortheacquisitionofempiricalknowledge—viz. thecategories.71

Againthough, onemightworryaboutattributingtheaboveargumenttoKant. Cer-tainlyKantthoughtthatempiricalintuitionalonewasinsufficienttocountasempiricalknowledgeandthatthelegitimateapplicationofthecategorieswasnecessaryforanysuchknowledge. Butmuchmorewouldneedtobesaidregardingwhetherorhowin-tuitionmightstandinepistemicrelationstobeliefs.72 ThereisnostraightforwardroutefromKant’sargumentconcerningtheroleofthecategoriesinempiricalknowledgetotheconclusionthattheepistemologicalstatusofintuitiondependsonthecategories.Indeed, theremaybereasonstothinkthatKantwouldrejectsuchaclaim.

Forexample, Kantseemstoholdthatinintuitionwe“provethepossibility”ofthesubjectmatterofourthoughts. KantmakesthispointexplicitlyintheprefacetotheB-editionofthefirst Critique.

To cognize anobject, it is required that I be able toprove its possibil-ity(whetherbythetestimonyofexperiencefromitsactualityor apriorithroughreason). ButI can think whateverI like, aslongasI donotcon-tradictmyself, i.e., aslongasmyconceptisapossiblethought, evenifIcannotgiveanyassurancewhetherornotthereisacorrespondingobjectsomewherewithinthesumtotalofallpossibilities. Butinordertoascribeobjectivevalidity to suchaconcept (realpossibility, for thefirst sortofpossibilitywasmerelylogical)somethingmoreisrequired(Bxxvi).

HereKantcontrastsmerelylogicallypossiblethought, inwhichonebringstogetherlog-icallycompossibleconcepts, withthekindofrealempiricalpossibilitynecessaryforcognition. Kantdistinguishesbetweenthesetwosortsofpossibilityintermsoftheno-tionofcancellation[Aufhebung]. Thesubjectmatterofathoughtis logically possibleifthethought’sconstituentconceptsmaybecombinedinjudgementwithoutcontradic-tion, andthuswithoutbeinglogicallycancelledout(A151/B190; NM 2:171–2). Thesubjectmatterofathoughtis really possible, incontrast, ifitcanbeshownthatthesub-jectmattertowhichthethoughtcorrespondsconsistsofpropertieswhicharemutuallyempiricallycompossibleandnot, inKant’sterms, “reallyrepugnant.” Kantoftenillus-tratesthisideawithexamplesinvolvingphysicalforces(e.g. oppositemotions, opposing

71 McDowell(1996); Ginsborg(2006b), Ginsborg(2008). Itisnotactuallyclearthatonlytheconceptualistreadingcanaccommodate thisaspectofKant’sview. A non-conceptualistmaywellagree that thecategoriesarenecessaryforempiricalknowledgewhileneverthelessdenyingthattheyarenecessaryinaccountingfortheintentionalityofperceptualexperience. Cf. Hanna(2001), 46-65, Hanna(2005), 256-7; Bird(2006), 193-207; Watkins(2008); Allais(2009), 392-4; Watkins(2012); Tolley(2013); McLear(Forthcominga), §3; McLear(Forthcomingb), §5.2.

72 For discussion see Stevenson (2003); Chignell (2007a), Chignell (2007b); Watkins (2008), Watkins(2012).



attractiveandrepulsiveforces; cf. A264–5/B320–1). Moreover, Kantconsideredafur-therkindofrepugnance, whereinthesubjectitselfis“cancelledout”. Inotherwords, itwouldbeimpossibleforanybeingtoexistthatwouldinstantiatesuchrepugnantprop-erties.73 Inorderforknowledgetobepossible, thedemonstrationoftherealpossibilityoftheobjectofknowledgemustbesecured. Ifthisiscorrectthenthereseemstobeatleasta primafacie tensionbetweenattributingtoKantboththeclaimthatpossessionofsomebatteryofconceptsisnecessaryforintuitiontohaveepistemicstanding, andtheclaimthat it isvia intuitionthatone’sconcepts (or thejudgmentsconstitutedbythem)firstattainepistemiclegitimacy. Howcouldaconceptconferepistemicstandingtointuitionpriortothatconcept’sbeingshowntobelegitimate? TheymaywellbeaKantianbasisforansweringthisquestion, butmoreneedstobesaidbytheconceptu-alisttodefendthesupposedKantianprovenanceofthissecondversionofthe“MythoftheGiven”argument.74

Finally, bothSellarsandMcDowellclaimthat it issimplyamistaketo thinkthatmentalstateswhicharepurelytheupshotofcausalinteractionswiththeworldcouldthemselvesstandasreasonsforempiricalbelief. Sellarsremarksthatsuchamistakeis“ofapiecewiththeso-called’naturalisticfallacy’inethics”(Sellars(1963), 146). Sellarshimselfgivesnoclearargumentforthisclaim.75 McDowellfocusesonthedistinctionbetweenthekindsofmentalstates, theoccurrenceofwhichweareresponsiblefor, suchasjudgment, andthosewhichsimply happen tous, inthewaythat, e.g. afitofsneezingmighthappentoone.76 Onceagain, wecanseethesuggestedparallelinaconceptu-alistreadingofKant. Ifconceptualcapacities, suchasthecategories, arenecessaryfortheoccurrenceofperceptualexperiencethenexperienceisnotmerelysomethingthatcausally happens tothesubject, butratherissomethingthatthesubjectherselfpartiallyaccountsfor, inmuchthesamewaythatsheaccountsforherendorsementofthecon-tentofpropositionaljudgment. ItisnotclearthatthisargumentisconstruedasanythingmorethanKantianinspirit. Certainlythough, theredoesseemtobeadeeplyKantianpointbehindthenotionthatreasoningis thinkingforoneself, andthatthisrequiresthatthestructureofone’sthoughtsbe, insomesense, determinedbyoneself.77

73 Fordiscussionsee Chignell(2011), 144–5; Chignell(2014); McLear(Forthcomingb), §§4.3and5.2.74 A further possibility is thatKant’s views are genuinely dividedhere, and that subsequentmoves inGermanidealismreflectthisfact. See Pippin(1989), ch. 2andthesourcescitedinnote 57 above.

75 Watkins(2008); Watkins(2012).76 McDowell(1996), ch. 1-2; McDowell(1998a), 433-4; McDowell(2003), 80-5; cf. Engstrom(2006),8-13.

77 ThissuggeststhatKant’sviewsofpracticalandtheoreticalreasonhaveabroaderunity. Foroneclassicstatementofsuchaninterpretationsee O’Neill(1989), ch. 1; cf. Stevenson(2004); McDowell(2009),chs. 4, 5, and7.



[O]necannotpossiblythinkofareasonthatwouldconsciouslyreceivedirectionfromanyotherquarterwithrespecttoitsjudgments; sincethesubjectwouldthenattributethedeterminationofhisjudgment, nottohisreasonbuttoanimpulse. Reasonmustregarditselfastheauthorofitsprinciplesindependentlyofalieninfluences. (G 4:448)

WhetherornotKanthimselfintendedhisargumentsconcerningtheroleofconceptsinexperiencetobetakeninthewaysthatSellars, McDowell, andothershavesuggested,itisclearthathehasbeenacentralsourceofinspirationforthesepositions. Needlesstosay, thedisputeastoKant’sexactpositionregardingthesematterscontinues.78

Summary

To say thatKant is aconceptualist is, aswehave seen, to say thathe thinks (i) thecontentofanintuition(i.e. an“experience”inourcontemporarysense)isakindofrep-resentationalrelationtoanobject; (ii)suchrelationtoanobjectdependsonasynthesisdirectedinaccordancewithconcepts; (iii)synthesisinaccordancewithconceptssetscorrectnessconditionsfortheintuition’srepresentationofamind-independentobject.TheconceptualistreadingpromisestomakesenseofKant’sargumentintheTranscen-dentalDeductionbyshowinghowperceptualexperiencedependsonasynthesisbythecategories. Assumingthatwehavesuchexperience, if thecategoriesareneces-saryforperceptualexperience, thentheyhavelegitimateapplicationtotheobjectsofexperience. Inthismannerconceptualismpurportstohaveaninterpretiveadvantageovernon-conceptualistreadings. Conceptualistsfurtherclaimthattheirreadingbestexplainshowperceptualexperiencecouldplaya justificatory role in thefixationofbelief.

However, wehavealsoseenseveralapparentproblemsfortheconceptualistread-ing. First, thoughmuchofwhat theconceptualist saysmaybe trueofKant’sviewsconcerning“cognition”[Erkenntnis](or“experience”[Erfahrung]asheoftenusestheterm)it islessclearthatit istrueofperceptualexperienceorintuition. Second, theconceptualistmustbeabletoaccountforthemoreprimitiverolethatperceptionseemstoplayinKant’scognitivetheory, aswellastheseemingfactthatheacknowledgesthatperceptualexperienceissomethingwesharewithnon-rationalanimals. Third, concep-tualistreadingsseemtothreatenthecoherenceoftheargumentsoftheTranscendentalAesthetic, andthusthecoherenceofKant’sbroadercriticalposition. Fourth, Kant’sownphilosophyofmathematicsmayrequirethatintuitionbeunderstoodasaformofnon-conceptualrepresentation. Finally, itisnotatallclearthat, forKant, intuitionshave

78 Hanna(2011a)disputestheideathatKantiscentrallyconcernedwithdenyingtheroleoftheGiveninthewaysuggestedbySellarsandMcDowell. Seealsothereferencescitedinnote 71 above.



correctnessconditions. Thisisabasicassumptionoftheconceptualistpositionandispresupposedbyitsothercommitments.

Goingforward, conceptualismneedstoclarifyhowitsreadingiscompatiblewithKant’sarguments in theTranscendentalAesthetic, aswellashisviewsregardingthecognitivecapacitiesofnon-rationalanimals. Italsoneedstodomoretomotivatecon-fidenceinthegenuinelyKantianprovenanceofthefamilyofargumentsthatgounderthemonikerofcriticismsofthe“MythoftheGiven.” Similarly, thenon-conceptualistreadingwouldbegreatlyhelpedbyamoreextensiveaccountofthecompatibilityofnon-conceptualismwiththeargumentoftheTranscendentalDeduction. Bothsidesofthedebateneedalso toaccount forobjections to thecontentassumption. MuchofthefuroroverKant’sendorsementordenialofconceptualismhastrackedcontempo-raryissuesinthephilosophyofperception. Butwhateverthefortunesofconceptualismandnon-conceptualismascontemporaryphilosophicaldoctrines, ourunderstandingofKant’sphilosophy, andinparticularhistheoryofcognition, hasbeengreatlyextendedbythedebate.79

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