The Journal of Value Inquiry 21:55-64 (1987). �9 198 7, Martinus Ni/hoffPublishers, Dordrech t. Printed in the Netherlands.

THE HOLOCAUST AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL JUDGMENT

GEORGE M. KREN Department of History, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506

Susan Sontag in On Photography wrote about seeing photographs of the camps that:

One's first encounter with the photographic inventory of ultimate horror is a kind of revelation, the prototypically modern revelation: a negative epi- phany. For me, it was photographs of Bergen-Belsen and Dachau . . . . Nothing I have s e e n . . , ever cut me as sharply, deeply, instantaneously. 1

This text may be contrasted with three others: one, by Rudolf Hoess, the comman- dant of Auschwitz, a second one by Adolf Eichmann, and finally that of an anony- mous railroad official.

Rudolf Hoess, while in prison in Poland awaiting his execution, wrote a very revealing autobiography. At its conclusion, referring to himself, he remarked that: "He too, had a heart, and . . . was not evil. ''2 Adolf Eichmann during his police interrogation in Jerusalem, and later on at his trial asserted that "he had lived his whole life according to Kant's moral precepts, and especially according to a Kantian definition of duty. ''3

Raul Hilberg, who wrote the first and in many ways still the most thorough history of the German administration of the Holocaust 4 recounts the following experience:

In my quest for railroad documents I went to the headquarters of the German railways in Frankfurt on Main . . . . I was directed to an annex building in the heart of the section of the city . . . where the document center was. I stood in the hallway and two gentlemen came by. "What would you be in- terested in? they asked. I said "What I 'm interested in is a bit of World War II history." "Ah," they said, "Military trains? .... No, civilian passenger traffic on special schedules." "Ah," said one of them, "Auschwitz! Treblinka!" Somewhat astonished by the quick recognition of what I was asking for from my sheer expression of interest in special trains, I asked him how he could know? And he said, "Oh railroad people get around." He had seen ghettos. He had been to Katyn. He was the first one there when the grave, with all those Polish officers shot by the Soviets was opened.

[After lunch] we came back to the o f f i ce . . . He explained to me technical

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matters pertaining to how trains were routed through timetable zones . . . . And then he said "I have seen Auschwitz." I said to myself: Perhaps this is a German who made a pilgrimage after the war. Aloud I said, "Did you make a pilgrimage? . . . . Oh no. I was there, then." "What did you do there? . . . . I put up the signal equipment. ' 's

Almost all who have studied the Holocaust speak of it as a radical novum which has left an indelible mark upon twentieth century history. Yet in an odd way that mark appears invisible, like the latent image of an exposed but undeveloped photo- graphic ftim, for few changes in history, or even in expressions of human conscious- ness such as philosophy or theology in any way appear to have roots in the Holo- caust experience. 6 Histories of the twentieth century barely mention it, or combine it with other events; 7 Phillipe Aries, in his monumental history of death, lovingly spent pages on changes in cemetery architecture, on burial customs and charnel houses - but gas chambers are never mentioned. 8 Even in the twentieth century death and dying appear to Aries as if they still were largely private matters. "The good death," portrayed in many eighteenth and even nineteenth century paintings of the dying man - it is always a man - surrounded by many tearful family mem- bers to whom he passes on final sage advice, is, after all, not the norm for the twen- tieth century, where death in a prison camp, through bombing or other forms of violence, by execution by left wing or right wing death squads, through neglect in jail, through killing because one belongs to the wrong social group - such as in the Soviet Union in the thirties or more recently in Cambodia - has come to be, if not the norm, than an ever more likely occurrence. If a new edition of Gil Eliot's Twentieth Century Book o f the Dead, 9 which presents statistical summaries of mass death were to be published it would show that the number of individuals who have died since 1972 has been substantial, and that deliberately inflicted mass death continues to be on the rise.

Alasdair MacIntyre, the author of what is without doubt the most important work in ethical theory in some decades provides a detailed analysis of the language which is used to justify or oppose the legitimacy of abortions, but never mentiones the ethical issues arising from modern genocide. There appears an apparent dialectic between the perception of the Holocaust as the essence of radical existential evil on the one hand, and the inability to find its perpetrators culpable of anything; this may in part account for the absence of any reference to it in MacIntyre who is concerned among other things with the question of individual moral action. ~~ The nature of modern radical mass killings is such that it is difficult to assign clear responsibility. Beyond that there is something very strange and odd in the fact that almost all of the perpetrators of what arguably is the most radical horror of this century, while awaiting execution, argued, with obvious sincerity, that they had done no wrong. A recurring theme found in all the trial records of individuals who had participated in mass killing is the indignant surprise they express that anyone should blame them for their actions, since they were only doing their duty. Eich- mann was no intellectual, yet his definition of the Kantian categorical imperative as "I mean by my remark about Kant that the principle of my will must always be

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such that it can become the principle of general laws," would certainly get him through philosophy 100 with a passing grade, n Hannah Arendt argued that Eich- mann subtly modified and distorted the Kantian principle by making it read that one ought to act as if the principle of your actions were the same as that of the legislator. But even with this distortion, if such it is, this still means that the moral imperative is interpreted so that the individual is called upon to go beyond mere obedience and identify his will with the principle behind the law; Eichmann cer- tainly did this - enthusiastically. Contrasting Eichmann with the Marquis de Sade makes it quite apparent that they were different from each other not least in that the Marquis sought to legitimize his rather strenuous and perverse sexual athletic activities through a full recognition and affirmation that they were evil, that they represented a violation of nature, because, he held, that only in that way could human freedom be asserted. 1~ In contrast the evidence is quite unequivocal that Eichmann was not plagued by any pangs of conscience, never believed that he was doing anything wrong. Within the context of his ethical knowledge and the ethical knowledge available to him it is unlikely that he could have known that his actions were in any sense reprehensible. Even when facing the gallows he did not express any regret for his actions. Eichmann, as a good Kantian, could have supported the principle that all Jews and indeed all racially inferior people ought - no matter how painful and nerve racking their killing might be to the perpetrators - be eliminated and killed for the good of posterity.

Rudolf Hoess' statement in which before his execution he affirmed that he had no sense of wrong-doing has a remarkable ring of truth to it. Similarly, Franz Stangl, the commander of Treblinka stated that his conscience was clear: "I have never hurt anyone myself. 'd3 When in 1945 individuals who had been involved in the camps were arrested few denied their actions, but all denied their guilt, showing incredible and genuine surprise that anyone would take them to task for their actions, which they did not believe constituted a crime. In the technical, legal, sense they were certainly right about this. The actions for which they were being tried had not involved a violation of [positive] law at the time that they were committed. They emphasized, probably honestly, that they were carrying out orders and implied, with some justice, that their counterparts in the Allied armies when given orders that appeared to violate the dictates of humanity would (and did) carry them out also. To cite only one example from post-1945 history, the officially tolerated use of torture in Viet-Nam would inter alia suggest that the Germans do not possess a monopoly on carrying out inhumane action within an official context. The individuals who had been involved in the running of the death camps and the murderous Einsatztruppen did not deny their culpability because of any defects of personality or a lack of Kohlbergian moral maturity. Their denial rests above all on the poverty of contemporary ethical theory which is unable to deal with individual acts carried on in service of the state (and to a lesser extent service to an ideology).

To simplify a complex issue: Morality in Western Civilization has two major roots: Christian revelation and the Enlightenment and its successors. From neither one

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could an ethical theory which would apply to these individuals be derived. Dis- cussion about the nature of good and evil begin with Genesis:

And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat.

But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shallt not eat of it: And the serpent said unto the woman, ye shall surely not die; For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall

be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing of good and evil. And the Lord, God said, Behold the man is become as one of us, to know

good and evil) 4

This passage has been subject to numerous interpretations: Freudians have had a field day with i t ) s The words referring to the knowledge of good and evil are in need of explication. Does anyone still maintain that human beings possess in- born concepts or right and wrong? The thrust of contemporary thought is to dem- onstrate how in the process of socialization individuals internalize moral concepts, and how the needs of a society tend to shape its values. It may be assumed that in the evolution of human beings out of the primeaval slime somewhere along the line, the abstract concepts of wrong, evil, sin developed. While it may be pos- sible to infer that animals recognize that they have done "wrong", certainly no abstract concept of wrongness exists for them. Indeed if one rashly were to seek a simple definition of the essential functions of religions, it would be that they attempt to explain how human beings came to be and what is expected of them. It should occasion no great surprise that there is a remarkable similarity between different religious ethical systems. And though stated with different rhetorics, though emphasis may differ here and there, the major moral demands of most world religions appear to be directed towards establishing the legitimacy of some kind of authority from priest to king, and to provide sanctions for restraining appetites and passions so that society may function. Thus the classic seven deadly sins speak of gluttony, avarice, sloth, lust and pride. The concern is almost ex- clusively with private conduct. It is the individual who seeks self gratification in a manner or degree beyond what is considered proper whose behavior is held up for censure. The injunction to resist temptation - above all sexual temptation - is part of an orientation which, particularly on the popular level tends to equate sin with pleasure. There is little in the tradition which would permit questioning the legitimacy of authority, much less disobeying or resisting it on moral grounds; on the contrary, acceptance of authority has almost always been regarded as a positive good in its own right. 16 St. Paul spoke about obeying the powers that be since "they are ordained by God" thus giving religious sanction to authority. Nor did the authority have to be legitimate: Thus Luther held that a Christian who had been sold into slavery to the Turks had no right to escape, because to do so would be to deprive his master of his legal property. Theologians have not con- demned Abraham for his contemplated infanticide - and indeed Kierkegaard in a brilliant essay affirmed the religious merit of the "suspension of the ethical."

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There is the very ambivalent and frequently cited statement of Jesus about render- ing unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God those that are God's; the problem is that the line of demarcation has not been defined. In practice the historical records suggests that churches throughout time have consistently been willing to give Caesar anything he asked for. Religious bodies have generally held that if the "Prince," to use the generic term, made demands which contradicted the teachings of Christianity, that the individual nevertheless should obey them, since they were his responsibility. Actions of the state have usually by means of at times brilliant casuistry been legitimized, no matter what their moral content. Machiavelli in The Pn'nce argued that the statesman was not bound by Christian morality when he acted for the state - that its preservation legitimized lying, murder, and other acts which, were they done for private gain, would be forbidden. Bismarck, though using a very different kind of language arrived at a similar conclu- sion. Faced with the question of how one can be a statesman and a Christian at the same time, he had recourse to a Calvinistic doctrine of stewardship from which he derived the conclusion that, as a Christian statesman, his primary duty was to preserve the state, and that therefore any act required to accomplish this, even though violating dictates of Christian morality, was legitimate.l?

During the middle ages doctrines of "just war," and by implication unjust wars, developed in theological thought. Yet they appear not to have been applied in practice. In the modern period neither Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, nor Germany's invasion of Poland, nor the American activities in Viet-Nam were ever defined by any major religious body as unjust wars. No religious bodies protested Frederick the Great's cynical partition of Poland. Neither religious nor secular ethics have seriously addressed the issue of the moral problems of an individual acting in the service of the state. Both religious and secular ethics tend to hold that an individ- ual acting as a servant of the state is not accountable for that action. And indeed a case can be made for this. Should we require of the executioner that he or she personally satisfy themselves of the guilt of the person to be killed? Would one wish to give the right to every soldier to decide whether a given order is moral or not?

Both Protestantism and Catholicism have been most reluctant to suggest that individual conscience should ever be permitted to supersede positive law, a law which is generally religiously sanctioned. Within the Christian tradition there is little which would allow disobeying the state on the basis of conscience. 18 During World War II Hans Jagerstaetter, a simple, pious Austrian peasant about to be inducted into the army felt that the war was wrong; various church leaders sug- gested to him that the rightness or wrongness of the war was not his responsibility, since any responsibility for deeds would be with those who had ordered them. He himself remained unconvinced, and was hanged. He has not been canonized.

Some religiously based support of the Holocaust may be found: Thus when Archbishop Kametko of Nietra in Slovakia was approached to intervene to stop deportations his response was: "It is not just a matter of deportation. You will not die there of hunger and disease. They will slaughter all of you there, old and

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young alike, women and children, at once - it is the punishment that you deserve for the death of our Lord and Redeemer, Jesus Christ - you have only one solu- tion. Come over to our religion and we will work to annul this decree. ''~9 Deporta- tions in Slovakia were carried out while the head of its government was a priest (Father Tiso). None of the priests who were members of the Slovak Parliament voted against that body's post hoc authorization of the deportations.2~

In Serbia, Helen Fein, in a work that includes the best general summary of the role of the various churches in the Holocaust, writes that "Priests participated in all aspects of political life, including extermination squads; the Franciscans were especially noted for their leadership. Paris tells us that nearly half of the twenty- two Croation extermination camps were headed by priests. 21

Revelation has been one major source for Western morality; another source for morality, which became significant in the eighteenth century in the Enlightenment have been the attempts to define morality on the basis of rationality. Already in antiquity Socrates brilliantly thought to demonstrate that knowledge of good and evil could be determined by mind, that it did not require the intervention of the gods. Man was to be the measure of all things. This tradition almost disappeared with the triumph of religion and mysticism, only to surface again in Europe during the Renaissance and above all during the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment in what Maclntyre 22 among others has demonstrated was a logically fallacious way, thought to prove that a jump could be made from knowledge about nature to natural laws which would provide differentiation between good and evil. The at- tempt failed, but there was a nobility about it, not least because it made no dif- ferentiation between nation or race. What was good for the Frenchman was good for the Hottentot. With the triumph of democracy and nationalism the attempt to define universal "laws of nature" wasreplaced by views which made the national state essentially the fundamental source of definitions of right and justice. Civil rights, derived from and provided by the state replaced natural rights. The eminent legal theorist Hans Kelsen in views which still command much support essentially identified justice as the codified will of the sovereign power. By this definition a view of the SS as possessing a "criminal superego" suggested by one survivor be- comes logically contradictory since the state by definition can commit no crimes and is the source of all justice beyond which there is no appeal. 23

In the wake of the discovery of the camps with their horrifying visual imagery the question of "how could people do these things" inevitably arose. How could individuals not only do these things, but do them with an apparently good con- science? Freud showed that conscience, which he labeled super ego, was created by authority figures. The child who sticks his hands in the cookie jar gets them slapped several times and is scolded for this by a parent, very quickly will begin to feel uneasy when contemplating such activity. And the lesson impressed upon the child more than any other is the need for uncritical obedience to authority - parent, teacher, policemen. "You will do this because I tell you and don't ask why." Hence the very fundamental socialization process makes it understandable why individuals will obey authority. Shocked by the readiness of people to carry

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out inhumane orders the social psychologist Milgram set up a brilliant experiment in which he had at first American college students and later on others administer electric shocks to subjects in a learning experiment. Told to increase the dosage most individuals did so even when the victim was screaming that he was dying or had a heart attack. Milgram concluded from his experiments that:

Ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their parts, can become agents in a terrible destructive process. 24

Why is it so difficult to prove that those who engaged in torture, those who engaged in mass killings of defenseless people on the basis of legal orders are acting repre- hensibly? A prevailing social morality is not derived from logic but is socially cre- ated; the problem faced in making judgments about individuals who participated in the Holocaust is that as a culture we demand the same rights to engage in de-

structive acts that other governments in the past have, and expect individuals to carry those acts out without scruples and without permitting them to refer the legitimacy of those acts to their own individual conscience. Nazi destructive acts during the Holocaust differed radically from previous massacres in that they were not the emotional acting out of pathological behavior, but a systematic, bureau- cratically administered social policy. It required, and had no difficulty in finding, individuals who did what they were told, who carried out the intentions of their superiors to the best of their ability. As a culture we also require this. While any number of individuals protested against the use of torture (usually delegated to South Vietnames) during the Viet Nam conflict, no one has suggested that those individuals who directly or indirectly participated in it were in any sense morally or legally culpable. Governments in Latin and Central America that engage direct- ly or indirectly in the use of torture and mass killings in the service of counter- insurgency are officially supported. The decision during World War II to bomb Dresden, which served no useful military purpose, and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have certainly been subject to severe criticism not only on tactical, but also on ethical grounds. Yet the issue of the morality of the in- dividuals who were involved in these actions has not been raised - and it would be very dubious to do so. In analyzing the Holocaust and seeking to answer what made it possible, it is quite clear that it required for its executions not abnormal sadists, but socialized individuals, like the railroad official who had no problem in installing the signal equipment for a death camp, who were willing to permit others in authority to make ethical decisions for them; it required individuals in authority who were willing to accept responsibility for decisions which they made but which were implemented by others.

Why were individuals, why were collectives willing to commit so many unspeak- able horrors? The previously cited Milgram experiments and others modeled after them demonstrate that previously held moral restraints are suspended in the pres- ence of a legitimizing authority. 2s The issue of the individual acting as an agent of the state has received almost no attention in ethical theory. Indeed it appears that

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there takes place a suspension of the ethical when actions of the state are involved. The ability to commit hitherto unimaginable horrors and destructive acts has its source not in human selfishness, greed, or destructive instincts, not in what the Victorians would have labeled man's baser nature�9 The answer to these questions can not be found in individual psychology. Probably the primary reason why "nor- mal" individuals have so few difficulties in carrying out massive destructive acts of a kind that appear to violate moral and civilized behavior is that these activities are identified with a higher transcendental purpose. Placing the Holocaust in a larger context it is quite clear that in the Western World the primary source of vio- lence is found in the willingness of individuals to be self-sacrificing for an ideal, ideology or cause. When individuals speak of a willingness to die for a cause, they also mean a willingness to kill. "Give me liberty or give me death" is soon followed by "give me liberty or I will give you death." Arthur Koestler years ago already recognized this:

The crimes of violence committed for selfish, personal motives are historical- ly insignificant compared to those committed ad maforem gloraim Dei, 26 out of a self sacrificing devotion to a flag, a leader, a religious faith or a political conviction. Man has always been prepared not only to kill but also to die for good, bad or completely futile causes�9 And what can be a more valid proof of the reality of the self-trasncending urge than this readiness to die for an ideal. 27

The commitment to ideals, the ability for transcendence, rather than simple selfish- ness accounts for most of the horrors of human history. This transcendence, these millenarial aspirations were also present in the Holocaust which had its origins in the desire on the parts of its perpetrators to create a purer, in their eyes, better world. The theologian John T. Pawlikowski writes that the Holocaust "has clearly revealed the dangers inherent in building a society deemed capable of moral excel- lence without any reference to transcendent ethical norms . . . . A primary task �9 . . is the development of a sense of transcendence . . . . 2s The opposite appears to be true. It is indeed the human capacity for transcendence, which has so fre- quently led to visions of the creation of a new and better society and individuals, and has been the source of the most radical destructive behavior. Christian piety led to the crusades and the inquisition, Robespiere's vision of the republic of virtue to the guillotine and the terror, and Lenin's view of a communal free and classless society to the Gulag. Visions of a national homeland by Jews and Palestinians have been responsible for the death of thousands�9 The Nazi image of racial beauty and purity is at the root of the Holocaust. It is difficult to accept the proposition that much of human destructiveness has its roots in utopian visions, in the desire to transform the world as it is into a better, purer or even more beautiful world. However these visions almost always require changing real flawed human being from what they are into what they ought to be, raising them to a new standard of perfection, whether they wish to be perfected or not. And it is in this that a primary source of human destructiveness, from the crusades to Cambodia may be found.

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Better Mayor Daley than Lenin, be t ter Boss Pendergast than Robespier re ; be t ter

corrupt poli t icians than dedicated c o m m i t t e d ascetic (suicidal?) ideologues o f the

right or left .

NOTES

1. Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Dell), pp. 19-20. 2. Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz: The Autobiography of Rudolf Hoess (Cleve-

land and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959), p. 202. 3. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York:

The Viking Press, 1965), p. 135. 4. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1967;

a new revised edition will be published by Holmes and Meier in 1985. 5. Raul Hilberg, "The Significance of the Holocaust" in Henry Friedlaender and Sybil

Milton, The Holocaust: Ideology, Bureaucracy, and Genocide (MiUwood, N.Y.: Kraus International Publications, 1980), pp. 95-102.

6. An alternate reading of the evidence is one which holds that, except for Jews, for whom the Holocaust obviously has been a major trauma, it really matters very little to most individuals, since other events from Hiroshima to Cambodia have made this generation immune, or at least insensitive to human suffering generally. If a widespread partially anti-Semitism is assumed, ranging from genteel to militant - and there is much that speaks for such a view - it may be argued that for many the fact that most victims of the Holocaust were Jews does much to mitigate its horror.

7. For a discussion of the treatment of the Holocaust by historians see Gerd Korman, "The Holocaust in Historical Writing," Societas 2 (Summer 1971); Henry Friedlaender, On the Holocaust: A Critique of the Treatment of the Holocaust in History Textbooks Accom- panied by an Annotated Bibliography (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 1972); Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); George M. Kren, "The Holocaust: Some Unresolved Issues," Annals of Scholarship 3, No. 2 (1985). Phillippe Aries, The Hour of OurDeath (New York: Knopf, 1981). New York, Scribner, 1972. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: Universi- ty of Notre Dame Press, 1981). Arendt, op.cit., p. 103. On De Sade see Henry Vyverberg, Historical Pessimism in the French Enlightenment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). Gitta Sereny, Into That Darkness: An Examination of Conscience (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), p. 384 ; Sereny, whose examination of his life and career is one of the most brilliant books in Holocaust literature, believes that as a result of her interviews with him, which came close to being psychoanalytical sessions, Stangl finally came to admit his guilt to himself and, having done that, was ready to die. Genesis 2:16-17, 3 :4-5 ,22 . Thus Ernest Rappaports, "The Tree of Life: A Psychoanalytic Investigation of the Origin of Mankind", The Psychoanalytic Review 30, No. 1 (January 1943), pp. 263-272. Significant exception to this appears to be when a rule prohibits the exercise of the "right" religion. Thus John Knox's attack on the improperness of women ruling; general- ly the Calvinist tradition at least in an ambivalent manner does entertain the idea that there are limits to obedience. This appears almost completely absent in the Lutheran one. There appear to be several coexistent Roman Catholic traditions. The radical sects of the reformation in the sixteenth century committed themselves to opposing both religious

8. 9.

10.

11. 12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

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and secular authority, and frequently were not adverse to using violence. They either destroyed or modified their doctriness to ones of acquiessence in authority.

17, Leonard yon Muralt, Bismarck's Verantwortlichkeit (GBttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1955).

18. The practice of "conscientious objection," whereby in the United States, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and some other countries individuals who find participation in the armed forces a violation of their religious beliefs and are given an exemption from that, to serve in other non war related (though almost always very unpleasant) service does not invalidate this point. On the contrary. The legitimacy of governmental actions is not called into questions. A few individuals believing themselves to be "special" make a mutually profitable arrangement with the government - they will not interfere with the war effort, while the government will respect their unique need for maintenance of a moral purity.

19. Cited Irving Greenberg, "Cloud of Smoke, Pillar of Fire: Judaism, Christianity, and Modernity after the Holocaust" in Eva Fteischner, ed., Auswitz: Beginning of a New Era? Reflections on the Holocaust (New York: KTVA Publishing House, 1977).

20. Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 100.

21. Ibid., p. 104; the Paris reference is to Edmond Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941- 1945 (Chicago: American Institute of Balkan Affairs, n.d.d [c. 1960]); Gita Sereny's discussion of the role of the Vatican must be singled out. Sereny, op.cit.

22. Op.cit. 23. Elie A. Cohen, Human Behavior in the Concentration Camp (New York: Norton, 1953). 24. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper

and Row, 1974), p. 6. 25. Stanley Milgram, op.cit. Using a different kind of experimental procedure, in which

individuals acted out roles as jailor or prisoners; P. Zimbardo, "Pathology of Imprison- ment," Transactions 9 (April, 1972), pp. 4 -8 , reached similar, though considerably more disturbing results.

26. Italics Koesfler. 27. Cf. Arthur Koestler, The Ghostin the Machine (New York: Macmillan 1967), p. 233. 28. John T. Pawlikowski, "Christian Perspective and Moral Implications," in Friedlaender

and Milton, op.cit., pp. 298-299.