The Greenhouse Crisis: Myths and Misconceptions

The Greenhouse Crisis: Myths and MisconceptionsAuthor(s): C. R. de FreitasSource: Area, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 11-18Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20002915 .

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Area (1991) 23.1, 11-18

The greenhouse crisis: myths and misconceptions

C R de Freitas, Department of Geography, University of Auckland, Private Bag, Auckland, New Zealand

Summary The effect of increasing concentrations ofgreenhouse gases in the atmosphere is considered to be one of the most serious threats to the global environment. There are major areas of uncertainty and confusion surrounding the supposition that we are heading for global disaster. They underlie the problems confronting decision makers on how and when to act on greenhouse warming. Key issues are outlined and considered in terms of difficulties of policy formulation.

In an era of heightened environmental consciousness, the threat of climate change from the greenhouse effect has become a staple of national and international politics. Calls for action have put enormous pressure on governments to formulate policies in response to the perceived threat. Despite the political momentum generated, there has been little progress in national and international policy formulation. One reason for this is that there are so many areas of uncertainty and confusion.

Part of the problem stems from the inter-disciplinary nature of the subject of climate change and its impact and the great range of researchers involved. Commentaries and reviews often rely on second-hand information, frequently drawn from areas in which the authors of these commentaries have little expertise. As this information is, in turn, used by others, different points may be emphasised or exaggerated so that eventually distortion occurs. Thus, what the experts say to policy analysts is not always clear because 'expertise' is so widespread. Often there seems to be confusion between, on the one hand, what is sound, scientifically based information and, on the other, what is highly debatable conjecture put forward by scientists.

At the governmental policy level there are problems that flow from this. In response to public concern for the quality of the environment, politicians are increasingly turning to scientists for advice on the greenhouse effect. However, politicians expect uncomplicated explanations and often assume that there is only one answer to every scientific question. They seldom appreciate that scientists can be inconsistent, or that they could have vested interests in certain research areas as they compete for research funding. By the same token, scientific advice is wide open to abuse by governments who

may seek to use science for political ends. The purpose of this paper is to highlight areas of uncertainty and confusion and evaluate complications that arise for policy formulation.

The physical basis

To offset the uncertainty surrounding the reliability of climate forecasts, a great deal of effort has gone into finding evidence of the onset of global warming. To date, none of the claims of detection of greenhouse warming have been proved (Reifsnyder 1989; Solow and Broadus 1989). This should not be surprising since most climatologists are not saying that the climate is warming and here is the evidence; rather they are saying



12 de Freitas

that if there is a large increase in greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere, the climate must change since greenhouse gases are a major determinant of climate. There

may not be clear evidence of change for several decades due to the relatively slow response time of the global climate system (Schlesinger 1986).

What of the impending change? There is a tendency to view global climate as a natural resource base that can only be diminished by human action. A changed climate will not necessarily be worse, just different. Most evidence suggests that increases in green house gases will give rise to a wetter and warmer climate in most places (Hansen et al 1983; Manabe and Stouffer 1980; Schlesinger, Gates and Han 1985; Washington and

Meehl 1983; Wilson and Mitchell 1987). By convention, warm periods in Earth's past are referred to as periods of climatic improvement. The so called ' climatic optimum' refers to a period warmer than now, almost 8,000 years ago.

There are a growing number of climatologists who are challenging the doom and gloom forecasts of a greenhouse warmed world. For example, Budyko presents strong arguments that climate warming will by and large be beneficial both for world agricul ture and climate dependent water resources (Budyko 1989; Miller and Pearce 1989). Seventy-six authors report on the benefits as well as costs of climate change in detailed studies on agriculture worldwide in the two volumes edited by Parry, Carter and

Konijn (1988a, 1988b). Part of the problem is that researchers tend to focus on the negative aspects of climate change.

For agriculture generally, the worst-case prognosis is for changed rather than reduced opportunities. Rosenberg, McKenney and Martin (1989, 308) make the point, ' Considering annual cycles [of temperature] over the globe, plant growth is more often limited by temperatures that are too low rather than too high '. With respect to increased rainfall usually associated with a greenhouse warmed world, frequently the assumption is that increases in evapotranspiration will offset or even exceed increases in rainfall. Proof of this, however, is far from conclusive. In fact, recent evidence shows that increases in evapotranspiration predicted on the basis of increased temperature alone may be exaggerated (Rosenberg, McKenney and Martin 1989; Rosenberg et al 1990), and that the impact of increased temperature on evapotranspiration is partially offset by changes in other climatic factors (Martin, Rosenberg and McKenney 1989).

Many people it seems find the ' things-will-be-no-worse ' stance repugnant, probably because the natural greenhouse gases are seen to be as' evil' as the artificial greenhouse gases (mainly chlorofluorocarbons) and collectively perceived as man-made pollutants of a befouled, ruined planet.

Threat to the coastal zone

Some scientists have suggested that a climate change-induced rise in sea level could be

substantial, but only in the context of scenario impact assessment (Hoffman 1984; Bryant 1987; Bird 1988; Schneider 1989). This involves hypothesising about a variety of theoretically possible though not necessarily probable changes in order to assess impact. Scenarios typically range from reasonable to not-so-reasonable estimates of future conditions.

Reasonable or probable scenarios of sea level change are based on calculations that rely on scientifically sound assumptions. Over the short term, climatic warming would cause sea levels to rise mainly by the thermal expansion of the oceans. Melting of polar ice caps is not involved since this is a long term response. As only the surface water is affected, response times can be rapid. Given global climatic warming of say as much as 3?C by 2030, Warrick and Farmer (1989) have calculated that a sea level rise of between



Greenhouse crisis 13

8 and 14 cm can be expected (and possibly another 8 to 12 cm from the melting of mid latitude glaciers). After this, sea levels may continue to rise, but at a slower pace since further heating is offset by leakage into the deeper ocean.

An important point is that changes of sea level of this magnitude are not uncommon and sensitivity of coastal systems seems to be reasonably low. For instance, the large 1982-83 El Nino event raised sea levels 35 cm above average along parts of the west coast of the United States as the failure of the prevailing easterly winds caused water in the west Pacific to surge back eastward across the ocean (Wyrtki 1982; Harrison and

Cane 1984; Komar 1986). Low lying coral atolls are considered to be particularly vulnerable to changes in

climate, but reasons for this do not appear to be well founded. A number of authors who have interpreted coral reef history have concluded that not only can coral reefs maintain growth and survive under even extreme greenhouse estimates of sea level rise, but they will experience a major' turn on 'and grow at near maximum rate in the warmer, rising seas (Parnell 1989; Buddemeier and Smith 1988; Hopley and Kinsey 1988).

Emanuel (1987) has suggested that increased storminess may accompany higher sea surface temperatures; but this could result in significant build-up of land by reef sediment and debris moved shoreward by storm waves (Baines and McLean 1976a, 1976b; Bayliss-Smith 1988; Parnell 1989). In addition, storms provide a large proportion of available rainfall in these regions.

It is important to keep in mind that greenhouse gas induced climate change can also act to substantially reduce sea level. Numerical models of global air circulation are the

most reliable method of predicting climate change. Based on these, a possible outcome is increased snowfall over the vast Antarctic continent leading to an increase of less than one per cent in the volume of ice stored there. However, this would result in a 50 cmfall in global sea level (Clarke 1988; Morel 1990).

Sceptics say all this does not matter because their evidence shows that the sea level is rising; however changes in sea level are often relative changes which vary from one region to another. Currently, sea level is rising in many places, but is falling in others, such as along very large areas of coastline in Western North America, Western Europe and Eastern Asia (Bryant 1987)

Impact assessment On account of current uncertainties, a growing number of climatologists are taking the view that costly and potentially disruptive adjustments in anticipation of climate change are not in fact warranted. Reifsnyder (1989) makes the point this way. If asked by an intelligent farmer who believes a prediction of a warmer, drier climate, what he should do that he is not doing now, Reifsnyder would answer that since year-to-year variations in climate are one to two orders of magnitude greater than the gradual change predicted, the farmer should do nothing. Moreover, slow changes in climate are not important to agricultural food production since response times at the farm level are one growing season or next year's crop.

The source of answers to these questions will be the findings of climate impact assessments. The complexity and difficulty of undertaking impact assessments cannot be underestimated. The currently favoured approach in climate change impact assessment, is the use of climate change scenarios. In view of the simple and logical conceptual model underlying the scenario methodology, it is not surprising that it has been so widely used. What is surprising is that it has been adopted so uncritically with seemingly little appreciation of the considerable scope for misuse, and a failure to appreciate its inappropriateness under some circumstances.



14 de Freitas

There are two basic prerequisites for climate change impact assessment: information about the likely future climate state and transfer functions capable of transforming this information into resulting biophysical and societal impacts. Inability to predict with confidence future emissions of greenhouse gases, incomplete knowledge of the life cycle and radiative properties of these gases, and the weaknesses of atmospheric models used to assess the impacts on climate, mean that it is necessary to resort to scenarios of future climate. Scenarios are effectively ' what-if' statements that represent plausible future climate states based on the current state of knowledge.

General circulation models (GCMs) are the primary tools used for deriving scen arios of future climate brought about by increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The weaknesses of GCMs fall into three categories. First, the forecasts they provide are at a spatial resolution incompatible with that required by the transfer functions. Gates (1985) notes that no degree of imaginative extraction of statistics will ever produce regional statistics from GCMs, but decisions on social and economic impact and adjustment rely on information on changes expected at the local or regional scale. Yet it is precisely at this local or national scale that information is required to drive the process based transfer functions desirable for planning purposes.

Secondly, GCM output is at a temporal resolution unsuitable for driving the type of transfer function capable of providing useful output variables at a resolution that is appropriate for planning applications. Usually, the' effective CO2 doubling ' approach is used (radiative effect of all greenhouse gases equivalent to doubling pre-industrial

CO2 alone). The approach examines differences associated with a changed climatic state rather than the much more difficult problem of the climate expected at a particular point in time. The uncertainties associated with rates of greenhouse gas emissions and their life cycle are handled in terms of when this' 2 x CO2 ' state will occur.

Thirdly, GCMs are unreliable with regard to key variables. Schlesinger and Mitchell (1987), for example, show that there are significant inconsistencies, both qualitative and quantitative, between broad regional predictions of climate provided by different GCMs particularly as regards precipitation. Moreover, Grotch (1988) and Santer (1985) show that while different GCMs may be in reasonable agreement on the global scale, they produce quite different pictures of climatic change on a regional or even continental scale.

There are other problems. Climatologists who produce climate scenarios usually emphasise that they are not forecasts. However, it is not uncommon for them to be treated as such by researchers undertaking impact assessment. Furthermore, they are commonly treated as forecasts by those planners and policy makers that the impact assessments are aimed at. The result can be counterproductive, a point recognised by Lave and Epple (1985, 525): 'insofar as the scenarios generate confidence that a particular solution or policy is optimal, they have probably done a disservice'.

Another problem with the scenario methodology is related to the difficulties associ ated with focusing attention several decades into the future. Among non-specialists, including the popular press, this appears to have created the impression that there is some climate state associated with greenhouse gas enrichment that will occur about the

middle of the next century. There is a failure to appreciate the continuous nature of climate change and its impacts. In this respect, scenario analysis has created a fictitious image of climate. Henderson-Sellers (1989, 20) describes this method of impact evalu ation as 'grossly inappropriate [since] it is pointless to consider the effect of instan taneously warmed conditions on processes that operate predominantly on other time scales '. Referring specifically to agriculture she points out: ' Warming will occur slowly relative to the normal patterns of crop improvement and replacement. Today's crop




yield models are as inappropriate as the instantaneous climate modelling technique' (Henderson-Sellers 1989, 19).

There are other considerations. From the perspective of the researcher undertaking climate change impact assessment, focusing attention on decades into the future is not always useful. While having a standard climate state may assist in a comparison of the sensitivity of different activities, the time frame in question may have little relevance to the particular activities. For example, the planning time frame for water resource planners allocating water use rights for irrigation may be the next five years. On the other hand, planning for a high dam with an anticipated life time of say 200 years will require that consideration be given to a longer time frame. In neither case is a 2 x CO2 scenario likely to be particularly useful.

Many of the above criticisms relate to the use and interpretation of scenario analysis rather than weaknesses of scenario analysis as such. Yet, they are important because the response of society to changes in climate will largely be determined by how the results of scenario based research are perceived. A rather more serious problem is that in some situations scenario analysis is an inappropriate methodology to use. It can be counter productive where it obscures the inherent sensitivity of biophysical and societal systems (de Freitas and Fowler 1989; Fowler and de Freitas 1989, 1990).

Policy agenda A question central to the whole greenhouse issue is-are costs of adjustments to limit greenhouse gas emissions justifiable when compared to the costs that would occur if we did nothing? It is now widely argued that, since carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels is the most important greenhouse gas, a tax could be imposed on fossil fuels to discourage use (Cairncross 1989). On the other hand, the merits of a fossil fuel tax are highly debatable. Industrialised countries will find themselves having to respond to artificially high costs of traditional sources of energy. This may eventually encourage the use of different fuels; nuclear power for instance, which is arguably one of the greenest sources of energy, and quite compatible with sustainable-growth economics. It is not unreasonable to assume that current anxieties about nuclear power generation

will persist. For example, public confidence in nuclear energy could be partly restored by the development of a new generation of high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors (Pearce 1989). In any event, given that approximately 80 per cent of world's energy is provided by the burning of fossil fuels (Clarke 1988), a cut back will require consider ation of nuclear power as an alternative source of energy along with significant changes of life-style.

An artificially high cost of fossil fuels may also encourage improved efficiency of energy use which could contribute significantly to reducing emissions of carbon dioxide. However, this will only postpone not prevent greenhouse warming.

In some cases, very persuasive media campaigns will be required to convince some

people of the merits of a fossil fuel tax. The inhabitants of cooler climates may well ask why, to heat our homes, should we pay more for coal and gas to encourage the use of less coal to prevent climate warming that would require burning less coal and gas for comfort anyway?

The burning of fossil fuels is linked inextricably to economic growth, wealth gener ation and prosperity. Every percentage point of economic growth adds to the problem as the demand for coal, gas and oil increases. For this reason, economic sanctions of one sort or another on the use of fossil fuels are unlikely to be tolerated in developing countries, striving for economic growth, which even now produce one quarter of all greenhouse gas emissions and could be responsible for nearly two-thirds by 2050.



16 de Freitas

China, which is sitting on one-third of the world's vast reserves of coal, sees its modernisation programme being fuelled by coal (Cairncross 1989). An important question is-can Third World countries be justifiably denied the more obvious and direct paths to economic development? Moreover, their desire for economic growth is linked with eliminating poverty and suffering.

Developing countries have already made it clear that the climate changes likely to occur as a result of greenhouse warming could be welcomed by them. On the basis of current predictions that temperature rises would probably be small in tropical and sub-tropical regions, increased precipitation predicted by global climate models (Schlesinger and Mitchell 1987) would be beneficial in many developing areas.

Of course, there is the very real danger that a focused anti-fossil fuel reaction to the greenhouse problem will not have the desired effect. Soon methane could replace carbon dioxide as the prime greenhouse gas (Bolle, Seiler and Bolin 1986). Not only is

methane increasing more rapidly than carbon dioxide (about double the rate), but molecule-for-molecule it is more than 30 times more effective as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide (Clarke 1988; Moore 1988; Schneider 1989). Moreover, its sources are related to agriculture, decay of plant and animal wastes and biomass burning, among other things, which are more strongly correlated with size of human population than economic development (Bolle, Seiler and Bolin 1986). Thus, unlike the carbon dioxide problem, treating the cause may not be practicable.

Conclusion There is no doubt that the uncertainties surrounding the climate change issue are genuine. In addition, there is well founded scepticism about the adequacy of knowledge for taking strong action. However, the basis of political and policy response to the greenhouse crisis is, in part, popular perception of the problem. Clearly, the level of informed public discussion has experienced a dramatic upswing. It is equally clear that the discussion is tainted with half-truths and oversimplifications. This, together with inaccurate and poor quality forecasts and environmental false alarms, could produce bad policy decisions.

Reifsnyder (1989) has stated that society has two options: prepare for warming or do nothing. According to Reifsnyder, if we prepare for warming and there is no change we will have lost, but not as much as if there is cooling. On the other hand, if we prepare for warming and there is warming then the payoff to society is zero; we have neither gained nor lost. Although this is clearly an oversimplification, it presents a sobering perspec tive. There is no doubt that the greenhouse gas issue is in dire need of answers to certain crucial questions, but not for questionable actions launched prematurely.

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The Greenhouse Crisis: Myths and Misconceptions