The Future of the European Community in International Politics

Société québécoise de science politique

The Future of the European Community in International PoliticsAuthor(s): Roger A. RieberSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 9,No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp. 206-226Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3230920 .

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The Future of the European Community in International Politics

ROGER A. RIEBER University of Utah

The December 1973 conference of European Community heads of state and

government may, in retrospect, be viewed either as a futile attempt to save the

Community or as a milestone in the history of international politics. Reacting to the desperate energy supply situation caused by the previous autumn's renewal of the Mideast War, the members of the recently enlarged EC attempted to de-

velop a Community response to a common problem.' Though the results of the

meetings disappointed many observers who expected a greater show of strength and unity, the Community members did, for the first time, address as a unit issues of a magnitude sufficient to threaten the vital interests of all the states concerned. "Summit" meetings in September and December of 1974 and subsequent meetings of the European Council following its foundation in Dublin, 10-11 March 1975,2 have revealed an increasing tendency within the EC to intensify overt political co-

operation in the face of externally generated economic and political pressures. During the same period, the positive outcome of the British referendum on con- tinuance of Community participation virtually assured the Ec possession of the basic elements of great power status. The realization of this potential, which

depends upon the harnessing of these "elements of power" to a common external

policy, is the subject of this inquiry. The external political future of the European Community is currently a focus

of attention for students of international politics, law, and organization. To these observers, academics and practitioners alike, who maintain constant familiarity with the nature of participants in international political processes, the partial eclipse of the external economic policies of important economic powers such as France, Germany, and Great Britain and the harnessing of their capacities to

Community foreign economic policies has already had obvious effects within the limited area of international trade and finance. Should these developments be

complemented by the formation of an integrated European external policy, the form and intensity of participation by the EC's nine member states in this new role will critically affect the basic structure of international politics in the near and middle term. Formation of a European "personality" capable of promoting and defending Community interests via the generation and execution of cohesive external policies would certainly affect the future of Atlantic and Eastern bloc

politics. Moreover, the prospect of another major political entity participating in

'See "Communique of the European Community 'Summit' Meeting and Annexes," European Community Background Notes, no. 29/1973 (20 December 1973). 2At the Paris summit conference in December 1974, the participants decided to meet in the future at least three times a year as "Councils of the Communities."

Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, Ix, no. 2 (June/juin 1976). Printed in Canada/Imprime au Canada



L'avenir de la Communaut6 europ6enne en politique internationale

Cette etude analyse l'imergence d'une organisation internationale rigionale en tant que participant integrd aux affaires internationales. Partant du postulat selon lequel la Communaute europdenne doive, pour sa propre survie, ddvelopper une politique exterieure commune, I'auteur soutient que les politiques &conomiques communes aux pays membres ne peuvent plus etre considdrees en dehors d'un contexte politique plus large. Meme avant la crise inergitique actuelle, le succes des politiques economiques de la Communaute avait entraine une confrontation politique directe avec les Etats- Unis, confrontation qui a eu pour consdquence de mettre en cause la sdcurite euro- peenne dans le cas d'un retrait possible de l'aide militaire americaine.

Les deux principaux fondements d'une politique exterieure commune pour les pays de la CEE sont la sdcuritd et la formulation de certaines politiques. La securitd consti- tue un probleme essentiellement politique. C'est pourquoi il faut accorder beaucoup d'importance aux relations politiques que la CEE entretient avec les Etats-Unis et

I'URSs, de meme qu'P la capacite qu'a la CEE d'extraire des populations politiquement hetdrogenes qui la composent les ressources ndcessaires au maintien et au ddveloppement d'un systhme de dftense moderne.

Quant a la formulation de politiques extirieures communes, elle a ddja~ franchi deux itapes : celle des politiques dconomiques communes decoulant de l'intigration elle-meme et celle de la mise au point rdcente de certains mecanismes de coordination en matiere de politique exterieure. L'auteur croit cependant qu'une troisieme Itape est ndcessaire au succes de la formulation d'une politique exterieure commune, soit celle du ddveloppement d'une approche commune aux affaires internationales.

world affairs is bound to modify the future outlines of international policies cur-

rently being conceived by leading states in the Far East, Africa and Latin America.

Recently a number of studies have appeared concerning the formulation of a

comprehensive external policy for the Nine. Community foreign policy is often viewed as a necessary condition in the development of a European economic and

monetary union outlined at the Hague and Paris "summit" conferences. These

essays have examined in detail the many hazards with which the Nine are confronted as they contemplate their future course of action.3

The present study is intended to provide a broad analysis of the problems and possibilities of Community foreign policy within a conceptual framework which is centred around two major areas of concern: the politics of European security and the development of a European authority capable of welding the often divergent tendencies of member state national foreign policies into com-

patible, if not complementary, patterns in support of developing Community interests. This inquiry will therefore seek to illuminate the dilemmas confronting an emerging international actor of major consequence to all nations. Furthermore, consideration of important facets of the formation of Community external affairs will hopefully contribute to the current efforts to describe and analyse the changing nature of international actors, particularly the role of public international

organizations. 3See for example, Gordon Weil, A Foreign Policy for Europe? (College of Europe 1970); Mariam Camps, "Sources of Strain in Transatlantic Relations," International Affairs, 48 (1972), 559-78; Denis Greenhil, "The Future Security of Western Europe," International Affairs, 50 (January 1974), 1-14; Stanley Hoffman, "Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?" The United States and Western Europe, ed. W. Hanrieder, 79-105; Johan Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making; The External Relations of the European Community, ed. Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau; A Nation Writ Large? ed. Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager.



208 ROGER A. RIEBER

I. The European Community as an international actor

Conceptually, the dilemmas with which Community strategists are now confronted involve two major problem areas which can be expected to accompany the development of comprehensive external policy formulation by public international organizations. In the first place, the EC exhibits a considerable degree of economic integration, the result of deliberate political decisions which have also been responsible for the institution of a unified Community posture in economic relations. However, it is a fundamental premise of this inquiry that no international actor, state, or organization can achieve the degree of success experienced by the European Community in economic affairs and not expect eventually to come to grips with its consequences in the form of adversaries whose interests have been confronted with the political effects of economic leverage resulting from a close accommodation among powerful states. Statesmen have long been aware that economic "competition" is often an important component of international conflict. The contemporary importance of industrial development as a source of domestic welfare and external political power in an era of rapidly in-

creasing resource scarcity and rising material expectations indicates that members of international society must expect resistance to policies which are perceived as adverse to the economic interests of competing international actors. But in the sphere of interaction between public personalities, there is no com-

pelling reason why economic policies must be opposed in kind. Within domestic

politics, conflict is generally subject to severe restriction by the state, and power is largely defined by the possession and utilization of certain factors which are crucial to specific permissible forms of contention. Students and practitioners of international politics, however, must approach the concept of power within a

unitary framework. Without the degree of consensus or the force monopoly necessary to prescribe and execute general rules of conduct, international society cannot successfully restrict the goals or methods of its members. Therefore, states, the principal participants in international politics, have, practically speaking, re- tained the option both to determine the importance of various interests and to defend and promote these interests with relatively little regard to the propriety of their means.4 For this reason, international actors can ill afford to remain de- ficient in any of those factors which are necessary conditions of state power. Particular international interests must be amalgamated into and served by a rationalized comprehensive policy which the participant is capable of promoting and defending with a variety of means including, if necessary, the threat or use of force.

Therefore, the limitation of the Community's external activities to economic relations (which is derived from an artificial distinction between economics and

politics) is a dangerous source of weakness rather than a safeguard. In addition to the difficulties posed for the Community by the realities of its external environment, the political problems which face all international actors are intensified in the case of the EC by the fact that the Community is not a state, but an international organization. In its present configuration, the EC, like all international organizations, is an essentially "artificial" combination of sovereigns which cannot in 41n practice, application of many of the restrictions upon international conduct is marginal to the point of ineffectiveness.



The European Community in International Politics 209

its own name command personal loyalty to the degree which enables modern nation-states to weld their resources into political leverage for the defence and

promotion of national interests. Retention of significant vestiges of national par- ticularism results in the adherence to disparate interests which continue to offer serious competition to Community policies.

The European Community's economic development was founded upon the deliberate abstraction of "economic" issues from the normal political context of interstate relations and the gradual subjection of these selected issues to arti-

ficially structured regimes of policy formulation where the interplay of national interests occurs within a dual framework of common interest and administrative "rationalization." Ec experience has all too often illustrated that the superimpo- sition of such legal regimes has hardly extracted the political content from con- tentious issues; and the effectiveness of Community policies is often hindered by the presence of a considerable residue of national interest.

Yet, as we have observed, the political environment in which the Community operates increasingly demands that international actors support all facets of their external policies with an increasing unity of purpose. In this manner the international political environment proves to be as much a part of the "logic of inte-

gration" for international organizations as do the various aspects of their internal

dynamics. Thus the European Community is involved in a paradoxical situation which threatens its very existence, and from an analytical standpoint may well define the limits of international organizations as actors in international politics. In spite of the severe internal political problems associated with economic inte-

gration, the EC has successfully created a considerable degree of international economic leverage and used this power in the defence and promotion of policies that have adversely affected the interests of states which exhibit the full spectrum of power and flexibility provided by national unity.

Competitors of the Common Market, "ally" and "adversary" alike, have often

perceived the economic resurgence of the Nine as a political threat of significant dimensions; for it is increasingly apparent that the maintenance and improvement of economic status is crucial to national well-being and domestic tran-

quility as well as military security. The traditional contention over the world's resources and markets, eclipsed from popular view during the height of the bi-

polar ideological confrontation, has re-emerged as a principal source of international conflict. Community strategists, operating within the severely limited areas of economic consensus, are thus confronted with adversaries who view their economic thrusts in political terms, and whose responses can be selected from the entire range of foreign policy instruments, including, if necessary, the threat or use of force. When the Community's "economic" policy is viewed alone within the context of international power politics, its maintenance seems marginal at best.

The current political status of the European Community is thus extremely pre- carious. Though the Community's economic advantage is the fulcrum of a considerable degree of leverage in an area of critical importance to international politics, and thus poses a threat sufficient to provoke adverse political reaction from competing states, the Ec's economic policies continue to be largely isolated from other outstanding political interests of the member states. This artificial isolation of economic interests upon which the Common Market was founded there-



210 ROGER A. RIEBER

fore continues to deprive the Nine of the flexibility which normally characterizes modern states in promoting their economic interests. The recent Mideast crisis

forcefully illustrated that the "economic community" is in no position to alter

significantly the outcome of political events which grossly affect the economic welfare of its members.5 The EC's lack of a coherent and effective response rele-

gated the Nine to the sidelines while the Super Powers and their prot6g6s determined the outcome of the struggle, and with it the immediate economic future of Western Europe. Like Japan, the European Community exhibits the paradox of considerable strength and deplorable weakness.

In a world in which alliances are again beginning to shift along with changing perceptions of interest the Community finds it increasingly difficult to base the

security of its economic policies upon a rigid alliance system. It is therefore assumed that the European Community, in spite of its origins as an international

organization of distinctly limited characteristics, is an international actor which has reached the degree of maturity which will soon necessitate the abandonment of the isolation of "economic" issues from the context of international politics. In fact, the Community, in order to maintain its economic position, must effect an institutional reintegration of its economic relationships within the full spectrum of political interests involved in international relations. Though states may band together through the necessity created by weakness, as was the case during the EC's formative stages, future Community relations with the us and USSR will probably develop within entirely different political dimensions. It is only realistic to suggest that "co-operation" among major centres of power and culture will be intermixed with a significant degree of tension and conflict.

COMMUNITY ECONOMIC POLICIES

Two fundamental aspects of EC activities have been responsible for its current

predicament. Both the "domestic" and "foreign" policies which have been

developed by the Community since its inception can be viewed as inherent sources of tension between the member states and their major competitors. The

gravity of the policies' political repercussions was somewhat surprising inasmuch as the European Community, despite the founders' desires for eventual political union, has concentrated development almost exclusively within the area of economic co-operation.6 To a certain extent, the political effects of EC activities have

developed despite the efforts of the Community. The external political effects of

European integration have resulted indirectly from intra-market policies as well as from the Communty's tentative development of external affairs .7 As a matter of fact, the most significant international effects of European integration have derived from the Market's "domestic" developments, the most important of which have been the common agricultural and commercial policies with their erection of common external tariff barriers. Community leaders cannot seriously conceive

5The inability of the major European powers to affect materially the outcome of the Mideast conflict forced their nominal acceptance of American leadership of the oil-consuming states at the us-sponsored conference in January 1974.

6Stanley Hoffmann, "Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?" 79-80 7For complete studies of the Community's external policies see Weil, A Foreign Policy for Europe? and Werner Feld, The European Common Market and the World (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1967).




of abandoning these policies: for in contrast to the states with which it competes, the EC is fundamentally an international organization whose cohesion derives from the benefits of integration. Without risking an extreme position, one might add that, in view of the historical forces that divide Western Europe, an organization such as the Community cannot remain static, but must maintain its drive towards integration and political development.8 This situation can in large measure be traced to the fact that the Community's member states are individually embarked upon a broad range of social and economic experimentation in a variety of directions. Expansion of social welfare and environmental protection programs, worker participation in the management of state run and private enter-

prise, and diverse infrastructure development are examples of areas in which

policy harmonization is crucial to Community viability. If the present level of intra-Community integration is to be maintained, these national and regional programs must develop in at least a roughly compatible fashion. Significant di- vergences among such individual experiments either in direction or intensity can be expected to lead to serious distortions of trade resulting from cost disequilibria. Political tensions may also accompany developing inequalities in standards of human welfare among diverse countries and regions within the Community. In- deed, harmonization of the economic and social environment through the medium of Community policy (which distinguishes the EC from an ordinary customs union) has been largely responsible for its success. To the extent that changing conditions demand substantial alteration of economic and social policy, it is reasonable to expect that, to avoid damaging disequilibria, these policies within the Community will have to develop in a harmonious fashion. Thus "European" politicians are confronted not only with the political results of past success, but also with third state expectations of the consequences of a continuous drive towards the creation of a tightly integrated economic unit.

The external effects of Community policies are manifested primarily in the areas of economic competition. As several observers have recently noted, EC tariffs and trade regulations have produced serious strains in the Atlantic Al- liance.9 Strong economic competition between the Common Market and other members of the Western Alliance, the us in particular, has been generated by the Community's agricultural and commercial policies, which have significantly restricted Europe's lucrative markets to non-member producers.'0 Neither the Dillon nor the Kennedy rounds of trade negotiation served to alleviate the build- up of pressure which has resulted from the development of an integrated economic force comparable to that of its major competitors."1 Tension has been particularly intense in agriculture, and it can be expected to increase with the inclusion of Britain's vast free trade oriented market behind the Common Agricultural Policies' protective barriers.

8"Political development" might occur along supranational lines or via intensified political co-operation among the EC's membership. 9'See for example Camps, "Sources of Strain," 569; Hoffmann, "Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?" 86-8; Benjamin Cohen, "The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations: A Bargain Comes Unstuck," in Hanrieder, The United States and Western Europe, 106. IoCohen, "The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations," 126-30 "For details of Community preparations for the current round of tariff negotiations see European Community Background Information, no 17/1973 (19 July 1973).



212 ROGER A. RIEBER

In a somewhat less direct fashion, the Community's trading partners can ex-

pect to be affected by the development among the Nine of integrated approaches to such other economic areas as transportation, energy, taxation, and environmental protection. These common policies, though focused principally towards

intra-European "domestic" issues, will in many instances affect international

relationships through the erection of non-tariff barriers to trade and the development of product standards which, because of the size of the newly enlarged Market, will materially affect the export markets of important trading nations.12 The Community's environmental protection policy currently under development furnishes a good illustration of the considerations under review.13 Since they began work in this area, EC planners have recognized the importance of devising machinery for the protection of competitive distortions which might result from the institution of individual regulations for the preservation and improvement of the human environment. Sicco Mansholt, as vice-president of the Commission, has made it abundantly clear that considerations of this nature are not limited to

intra-Community trading.14 Rather, the EC will be forced to devise methods of

protecting its market from foreign products whose prices do not reflect the social costs of production involved in maintaining environmental quality. In this manner, the environmental protection policy can be expected indirectly to affect the costs of production of those corporations which wish to gain or maintain access to the EC's enormous market. Successful formulation of the economic and mone-

tary union would confront the major powers with nearly complete integration of

Community economic policies.15 Such intensive policy co-ordination may be

expected to accelerate the development of the tensions which have already resulted from the previous steps towards integration and from the Community's relatively limited excursions into the field of external policy.16

COMMUNITY EXTERNAL POLICIES So far, the Community's development of an extensive matrix of external relation-

ships has been directed almost exclusively towards the improvement of the Euro-

pean economic position. Such efforts have included the negotiation of supply agreements for critical materials by EURATOM, the development of a network of

agreements with non-member European states, the Yaound6 Association and the Arusha Agreement with twenty-two African states. Though such arrangements have not in the past involved the EC in serious conflicts, they have brought on a not inconsiderable degree of apprehension that the EC was developing a network

12An analogous case can be found in the development of automotive safety standards by the us government. These standards have required extensive alterations of imported vehicles, forcing some smaller manufacturers to withdraw from competition. 13See "Programme of Environmental Action of the European Communities," Bulletin of the European Communities, supplement 3/73. 14Letter of 9 February 1972 from Sicco Mansholt, vice-president of the European Commission to President Malfatti: "Europe Documents" 665, 28 February 1972 (Agence international d'information pour la presse, Luxembourg and Brussels) 15The United States, Western Europe's principal trading partner, may henceforth encounter serious opposition to the utilization of the dollar as a reserve currency. See Raymond Aron, "The Commonwealth and the European Community: A Continental View," Atlantic Com- munity Quarterly, 10 (Spring 1972), 48. See also "Monetary Organization of the Community," Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 12/73. 16Camps, "Sources of Strain," 562




of preferential relationships which could be detrimental to the interests of com-

petitors.17 The 1975 expiration date of the Yaound6 Convention along with the accession

of Great Britain to the EC has provided the occasion for a major expansion of

Community relationships with the developing world.'8 Protocol Twenty-Two of the Act of Accession provides opportunities for the development of co-operative relationships with the Community to twenty independent Commonwealth countries. On 17 October 1973, the Nine officially opened economic negotiations with forty-six states of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. To the Yaound6 and Protocol Twenty-Two states were added Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, and Guinea, which are members of the Organization of African Unity. The development of economic relationships between the Community and the Third World on the scale of the resulting Lom6 Convention could confront third states with some very serious problems.'9 Industrial competitors of the Nine can hardly remain indifferent to relationships between developing nations and the EC which might potentially restrict their access to the markets and resources of the Third World. Should the future of Ec-Third World relations follow the course suggested by Johan Galtung, competing industrial powers can expect only the most serious economic consequences.20 In any event, the Lom6 agreement will, in view of its scale, probably serve as a model against which future relationships of this nature will be measured. Moreover, the recent conclusion of a trade agreement by the

Community with Israel21 and Mexico22 and the continuing negotiations with China and the Arab League23 all will involve these countries in special rela-

tionships with an economic entity having the capacity to compete successfully with the us, the USSR, and Japan. That the Community intends to strengthen the cohesiveness of its position in economic relations was again demonstrated on 1 January 1975 when the Commission assumed responsibility for EC members' trade with state-trading countries.24

EXTERNAL REACTION TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC POLICY

Expansion of the EC's external relations along with the integration of the Com- munity's foreign policies was cast as part of the eventual development of the economic and monetary union.25 However, the political consequences of the Com- munity's successful formulation of comprehensive "domestic" policies and foreign

17Ibid. 'sSee "Renewal and Enlargement of the Association with the AASM and Certain Common- wealth Developing Countries," Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/73. 19The Lom6 Convention was signed on 28 February 1975. European Community, no. 184 (March 1975), 5. 20Galtung maintains that Ec-Third World economic relations will be characterized by continuation of the present "vertical division of labor" through the "exploitation", "fragmenta- tion," and "penetration" of the latter by the Community. See Galtung, The European Com- munity, ch. 6, especially 68-73. 21European Community, no. 187 (June 1975), 18 22European Community, no. 189 (September 1975), 12 23New York Times, 12 June 1975 24European Community, no. 187 (June 1975), 18 25See "Report on European Political Cooperation and Unification," Rapporteur, J.A. Mommersteeg, European Parliament Working Documents, Document 12/73 (24 May 1973), 10 and 19.



214 ROGER A. RIEBER

arrangements have generated external repercussions of such critical proportions as to endanger the entire integration process. In 1971, the economic facets of

European integration provoked a severe reaction within the government of West- ern Europe's principal ally, the United States.26 With the abandonment of dollar

convertibility, the Atlantic Alliance was thrown into disorder. The American

government declared in effect that the United States could no longer "afford" to maintain a positive or neutral position towards an organization whose commercial

policies and developing international linkages were perceived as a serious detri- ment to the interest of a patron-ally currently suffering a payments imbalance of crisis proportions.27 The effects of this action were compounded by the imposi- tion of a 10 per cent surcharge upon us imports, which was lifted only after significant trading concessions were made by the EC membership.

The us economic offensive was accompanied during the next two years by diplomatic pressure which, as Stanley Hoffman described it, combined the "new" economic issues and "traditional" security factors in such a way as to force the

Europeans immediately to grapple with the political ramifications of economic issues, the settlement of which they had selected as further steps toward integration:28 "Neo-Gaullism and archeo-Atlanticism in Washington, the two compasses of the national interest and of 'the common enterprise,' aim or at least result in

jostling the little group of West Europeans off their rocky road toward a 'Euro-

pean Europe.' "29

Progress towards transatlantic accommodation was abruptly halted by the renewal of the Mideast War in October 1973, when the United States government failed to consult its allies concerning issues vital to their survival, thus em-

phasizing the European sense of political frustration.30 For their part, the leading members of the Community antagonized the senior Atlantic partner by adopting pro-Arab postures, and in some cases denying their facilities to the us in its ef- fort to assist Israel. Instead of merely awaiting the outcome of the conflict, Com-

munity members, individually at least, applied their very limited resources to the

only possible independent defence of vital economic interests.31 An open breach within the Atlantic Alliance soon followed in the wake of us reaction to unilateral

European attempts to develop post-armistice relationships with the Mideast oil

producing states. This move, now without prior consultation of the United States

26The new direction in us policy towards the Community is described in detail by Hoffmann, "Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?" 86-8 and Cohen, "The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations," 107-12. 27It should, however, be pointed out that American governments have not been willing to apply the austerity measures usually associated with a return to a balance of international trade. 28Hoffmann, "Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?" 87 and 91 29Ibid., 91: "The combination of the old and the new amounts to the exercise of Realpolitik in a neo-Atlantic framework; to a highly skillful linkage of the security issue, which is at the heart of the old 'Atlantic' theme, with the economic and monetary issues raised by the Nixon Administration." 8OThis point was emphasized at the Washington conference of oil consuming nations. 31An unidentified European writing in Foreign Affairs stated the issue as follows: "For their part the leaders of America must recognize that the phase of unmodified us leadership of the West - a phase which lasted from 1945 to 1965 - is now over and must be replaced by a concept in which the interests of both sides receive equal consideration and there is a genuine reciprocity of advantage" ("The Year of Europe," by "z," Foreign Affairs, 52 [January 1974], 237-48).




by the Nine, and apparently in defiance of the spirit if not the letter of us-sponsored agreements among oil-consuming nations, provoked reactions from Presi- dent Nixon and his secretary of state which in diplomatic terms could fairly be termed "violent." Basically, the United States responded to the unilateral Euro-

pean initiative by threatening to withdraw the vital American component of the

European defence system.32 This outbreak of undisguised diplomatic hostility should not be viewed in isolation, but in context with Benjamin Cohen's conclusion that us foreign economic policy has become fundamentally opposed to the economic policies around which European integration is centred.33

It is hardly necessary to emphasize the gravity with which Community statesmen viewed the political confrontation with the senior partner upon whom they depend for security. The military power and geographic proximity of the Soviet Union are constant challenges to Western European security and therefore a threat to the progress of Community integration. Should the recent stormy period in Atlantic relations indeed indicate the development of a fundamental divergence of us-Community interests, the Alliance, and with it the security necessary to the

rapidly developing interests of the Nine, will be maintained on a diminishing number of planes of international politics. In that case, Community survival, which is founded upon a matrix of interdependent interests, will ultimately depend upon the development by the organization of attributes which are necessary conditions for the existence of the sovereign states. Within the political framework which is currently being established by the great powers, this can only mean the formulation of an integrated external policy and the independent security arrangements without which an autonomous European "foreign policy" would be worse than useless. Therefore, the security issue most seriously concerns those who envision a "political vocation" for the Community within a "society of nations" not

sufficiently organized to afford the Nine the opportunity to continue to develop their economic leverage behind the screen of the international legal prohibition of the "threat or use of force." Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the Community, lacking development of a minimal defence capacity, successfully maintaining the delicate balance between national and common interests in a predominantly hostile international environment.

II. The politics of security: EC-US relations

Evaluation of the feasibility of an independent European defence capacity re-

quires the analysis of a complex set of political relationships which exist between the Community, its principal ally, and its foremost adversary. Denis Greenhil and Marian Camps, two acute observers of European security problems, have re-

emphasized the importance of the Atlantic relationship to European politics in the next decade.34 Recently, however, with the expansion of the EC, the us-Soviet detente, and the establishment of a us-China dialogue, long-standing questions concerning the Atlantic relationship have emerged as the topics of practical political discussion.

321t is somewhat ironic that the Soviet military threat should serve to buttress American leadership of the Atlantic relationship. 33Cohen, "The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations," 120-1 34Camps, "Sources of Strain," 563; Greenhil, "The Future Security of Western Europe," 10



216 ROGER A. RIEBER

The Atlantic relationship has really two aspects: the current emphasis upon ideologically intensive politics contrasts with the more traditional materially oriented bases of international conflict and alliance. The contemporary phase, with which we are most familiar, derives from the post-Second World War bi-polariza- tion of international politics. The Atlantic "alliance" is therefore to a considerable

degree based upon the intense American interest in maintaining the "independence" of the Western European "democracies" and preventing their domination by the Soviet Union, leader of the ideological opposition as well as an historical

competitor for power on the European continent. The second, or traditional, as-

pect of the alliance has been centred on the presumption, in part generalized from

bi-polar ideological considerations, of a high degree of compatibility of traditional economic and political interests among the Atlantic partners. A compatibility of interests did exist during the post-war period when European recovery was an essential element of American cold war strategy. It has already been noted, however, that since the early 1960s the European members of the Alliance, particularly those involved in the Common Market, have emerged as serious economic com-

petitors of the us both for resources and markets. Moreover, as the Europeans, often with American "assistance," jettisoned their colonial burdens, they have

begun to appropriate an autonomous ideological posture vis-h-vis the Third World. Such manifestations of political competition within the Western bloc tend to produce a continuous and often severe tension between the leader of the Western bloc and its European allies.

The alliance is no less troublesome from the European point of view. The Nine have long been aware that their security system, with its dependence upon the American nuclear component, relies on the fact that an essentially sympathetic Western Europe is essential to us policy as long as that power remains in its present relationship to an ideologically and diplomatically hostile Soviet Union. The

logic of the relationship, therefore, should remain in force regardless of the degree of concurrence of traditional interests between the partners.35 Yet in spite of these political "realities," various American administrations have demanded as the price of security a degree of economic and political leadership which threatens the sensibilities and perhaps the independence of its allies.36 Evidence of this sur- faced again during the recent NATO "summit" meeting in the form of considerable

disagreement between the United States and its principal allies concerning the

proper (NATO) attitude towards Portugal and Spain.37 Seen from this perspective, the Atlantic Alliance is troubled by a fundamental paradox. Though the participants are tightly bound to one another, it is not a true alliance in the traditional sense, involving the mutual protection of multiple interests. One can therefore understand the French tactical gambits which directly contradict us interests as

35This is probably the primary cause of De Gaulle's lack of regard for the us deterrent. 36In confrontations between the us and USSR, European statesmen have apparently had little access to the American decision-making process. 37New York Times, 26 and 27 May 1975. The striking contrast between the us and European perspectives concerning Portugal and Spain can in part be explained by American ideological bloc leadership on the one hand, and the Europeans' first-hand acquaintance with Fascism on the other.




well as the intense anxiety which the various phases of the us-Soviet detente has aroused among the Nine.38

The credibility of American deterrence is also being questioned in terms of

military capabilities. Specifically, the termination of conscription in the United States coupled with its balance of payments difficulties has severely strained American capacity to maintain a major commitment of troops on European soil.39 Moreover, the reduction during the past decade of the gap between the capabilities of the American and Soviet Strategic Forces has tended to reduce the credibility of a us proxy deterrence by increasing the level of assured destruction on this side of the Atlantic in the event of an actual outbreak of nuclear warfare. Confronted then with what appears to be an escalation of us "Atlantic" requirements to an

unacceptable level along with the probability that, for a variety of reasons, they cannot practically affect the ultimate nature of the us strategic deterrent, Euro-

pean policy experts must now contemplate abandoning the dubious comfort of the "Atlantic umbrella" and realistically appraise the political liabilities and opportunities of the Community's emergence as an integrated factor in international

politics.

HI. The politics of security: EC-Soviet relations

Relations with the Soviet bloc would probably soon become nearly as important to a politically emergent Community as the current relationship with the United States. Western Europe's defence is based upon the presence of a strategic us nuclear deterrent buttressed by a combination of tactical forces, conventional and nuclear, sufficient to furnish the Atlantic allies with a reasonable flexibility of initial response, providing a measure of credibility not available in systems which

rely upon an immediate resort to strategic nuclear warfare regardless of propor- tionality. If European security depends upon indigenous replacement (to existing force levels) of the deterrent's American component, there would be little chance for the development of an independent external policy for the Community within the near future. There are, however, several factors which tend to mitigate the

necessity for the Nine actually to balance Soviet potential on the Continent. The Atlantic security system, it should be remembered, is involved not only with the defence of Western Europe, but also with the bi-polar conflict, and therefore Soviet perceptions of American intention and strength on a world-wide scale. The issues which fuel the perpetual conflict between the super powers are, however, often of marginal value to Community interests. It would appear, then, that with

Europe unencumbered by the bi-polar conflict of interest (which is often a neces-

38France has always been careful to support the United States on issues of basic strategic importance to the latter, such as Cuba, Berlin, and NATO membership. France's near total withdrawal from participation in NATO, overt French opposition to us involvement in Indo- China, French gold conversion prior to 1968 along with continued opposition to us monetary solutions, and the French government's reluctance to accept American leadership in the determination of a solution to the energy supply problem represent tactical manoeuvres in which President De Gaulle and his successors have exhibited a marked degree of independence from the United States. 39The persistent clamour in Congress for a reduction in us troop strength in Europe has been a recurrent source of anxiety in Europe.



218 ROGER A. RIEBER

sary condition of us involvement) the force-power relationship between the Nine and their Eastern neighbour would be greatly simplified: "Security, in the late twentieth century ... means relative security: a situation in which the use of armed force against us seems sufficiently improbable to impose no major constraint on our domestic policies or on the reasonable promotion of our national interests abroad."40 The force levels required to maintain an independent European external posture should, in favourable circumstances, depend upon the political rela-

tionship between Community and Soviet interests and derivatively upon the level of preparedness necessary to support a degree of confidence within Europe's polity sufficient to resist the extension of Soviet influence in the European theatre of

politics.41 Beyond the minimum degree of pressure inevitable in relations with a

great power, the Community can expect the Soviets to react on the basis of their

perception of the compatibility of Russian and Community interests within the framework of relative capabilities of the respective parties.

If one accepts the proposition that in the near future there are few immediate

prospects for direct conflict between the Community and the Soviet Union outside of the European continent,42 then the possibility of an indigenous European deterrent depends upon the fundamental approach of the Soviet Union to the Nine.43 Should the Soviets' primary interest in Western Europe be in extending their influence to the limits of their physical capability, then an autonomous Community deterrent would be a marginal prospect at best, at least during an interim period of extreme risk.44 However, as implied, there has been a distinct possibility that the Soviets are willing to entertain the prospect of "relational politics" with an autonomous European Community. Should the Soviets be willing to enter into a "normal" relationship with the Nine in which their actions were dictated by practical as well as ideological interests, the Community might indeed be capable of

developing a security system which combines a reasonable level of military capacity with an Eastern policy which supported European interests while not being inimicable to those of the USSR. Thus, the foremost question facing those involved with the security problem is that of Soviet intentions.

The successful development of the European Community confronts the Soviets with a dilemma in their European policy. For the Soviets, the optimal situation would be the detachment of individual members of the Atlantic Alliance from their relationships with the United States, but, even in the case of France, this has not proved feasible. Though Soviet planners cannot be unaware of the Atlantic difficulties caused by Western Europe's economic resurgence, this same success has also proven to be the source of considerable Soviet anxiety. It is not the United States but rather the geographically, historically, and culturally proximate members of the EC which attract Eastern Europe, and in this manner introduce

40Greenhil, "The Future Security of Western Europe," 2 41Ibid.: "A sense of minimum security depends essentially on the capability, intentions and opportunities of other governments." 42Ibid., 3-4 43A European deterrent would be based upon a modest nuclear force along with local replacement of us ground forces. 44The position of the us vis-a-vis Community independence of the Soviet Union would be decisive under such conditions. See Emanuele Gazzo, "The European Community and the United States," in Kohnstamm and Hager, A Nation Writ Large? 159-60.




tension into the Soviet-dominated system.45 Perhaps Bonn's opening to the East and the recent agreements concerning Germany which "legitimize" the territorial effects of the Second World War have served to reduce Soviet anxieties. This critical development plus the advantages of dividing the Atlantic system may serve to counter Soviet fears regarding the "security" of their East European bloc. On the other hand, unless the Soviets are prepared for very definite loosening of their bloc relationships,46 they cannot applaud the example afforded East Europe by the re-emergence of their Western neighbours into international politics via the instrument of the Communities.

IV. The economic and political "costs" of autonomy

Against this background, EC leaders must also assess long-term prospects for the

development of the wider aspects of a common external policy. These calculations of the benefits and liabilities of political autonomy will determine the scope of the

Community's external commitment and therefore the ultimate scale of Com-

munity involvement with its member states' international interests.47 Initially, it must be noted that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can be expected to accept without reservation the emergence of yet another major political com-

petitor into an international society which has recently become infinitely more

complex through the general acceptance of the expanded role of the People's Republic of China (with which the Community currently is establishing diplomatic and economic relations).

The introduction of another major "power" with world-wide interests and the

potential capacity for their promotion will not only increase the competition among significant powers (and therefore the options of the lesser powers), but also would probably render the process of accommodation among the super powers far more difficult. The immediate issue involves determination of the scale of European military development vis-h-vis the current drive by the Super Powers to establish legal controls over the weapons factor in modern politics.48 The Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties, the Helsinki accords, the SALT talks, and the MBFR negotiations will have a significant effect upon the form and rate of development of the military component of European power. For the time being, members of the Community, having little real bargaining leverage to influence their outcome, must be content with a role in these negotiations which is relatively peripheral when compared with the intensity of their concern about the long-

45Camps, "Sources of Strain," 566; Roger Morgan, "East-West Relations in Europe: Political Perspectives," International Affairs, 49 (April 1973), 184. The Soviet reaction to an autonomous EC will probably be determined by the nature of the Community's developing relationship with East Europe. According to Johan Galtung, The European Community, 53: "Whether seen in terms of language, culture, or ideology, Western Europe has always remained the center of the world, the seat of three of the world's five world languages; by definition the origin of the major cultures since these were the cultures of the imperialistic powers; and the cradle of the major ideologies of conservatism, liberalism and Marxism." See also Michall Tatu, "East-West Relations," in Kohnstamm and Hager, A Nation Writ Large? 172. 46This does not appear to be the thrust of the "Breshnev Doctrine." 47Japan serves as the prime example of a state which lacks the military capacity to defend an extensive network of foreign interests. 48Horst Menderhausen, "Will West Germany Go Nuclear?" Orbis, 16 (Summer 1972), 415



220 ROGER A. RIEBER

range political implications of these discussions and arrangements beyond the immediate context of European security. The European Security Conference furnishes a major illustration of this situation. Though the negotiations have been held within a framework of consensus, such critical issues as the link between the CSCE and MBFR talks as well as the question of prior notification of military manoeuvres appear to have been essentially worked out through compromise between the us and the USSR.49 Moreover, there is a growing apprehension within the Community that US-USSR competition could be subject to mutual accommoda- tions which might radically affect the world-wide political interests of Community members, ultimately generating conditions as restrictive as those experienced by the "junior partners" of the major bloc systems during the period of rigid bi-polar contention.

Conceptually, the problem centres around the relationship between vital interest in terms of minimum security requirements discussed above and the defence and

promotion of interests of lesser importance. It has already been noted that in its current relationship with the United States the Community is being confronted with a choice between security and economic autonomy. If, as has been suggested, it is possible for the Nine to develop a marginally adequate security system, then

long-range interests of an economic and political character begin to assume en-

tirely different proportions. The cost of autonomy will henceforth be calculated

against the importance of these interests and it can be argued that these "lesser" interests, both domestic and external, tend over time to assume proportions similar to those of immediate vital concern. They are vital in the political sense since in the long run interests such as these characterize political communities as necessary conditions of independence. The economic and political costs of an autonomous

European approach to international politics must therefore be weighed against a much broader conception of interest. When this is done, the costs, though still enormous, are reduced in proportion to the possible benefits, especially when the

long-run returns are equated with vital interest.

"DOMESTIC" CONSIDERATIONS

"Domestic" politics on both the intra-Community and sub-national levels is at least as important to the prognosis for a Community foreign policy as the external considerations discussed above. Development of a comprehensive external policy could not occur without successful confrontation of the difficulties caused by the

diversity of Western European domestic politics.50 The divergent national interests which result from this variety of European political experiences constitute a formidable barrier to the recognition of common external strategies among the member states. Vestiges of particular interests can therefore be viewed as a significant threat to Community existence in the face of the uncertainties which would

accompany the withdrawal of the overt manifestations of us protection.51 The

political ramifications of a major United States retrenchment would depend in

49Sir Bernard Burrows, "European Security," in Kohnstamm and Hager, A Nation Writ Large? 131 50Hoffmann, "Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?" 82-3 51As the Soviet Union becomes more involved in the European economy it will acquire other options for the application of leverage against the EC.




large measure upon the withdrawal's effects within domestic European politics. Should an American withdrawal coincide with the development of a European "political vocation," the event might serve as the catalyst for the development of a considerable degree of political cohesion among the Community's nine member states. Concurrence of these events is, however, by no means certain. Indeed, the proximity and power of the Soviet Union might, in the absence of manifest Ameri- can support, immobilize the Community's leadership and force the abandonment (under the guise of neutralism) of Western Europe's re-entry into international

politics. The supporting polity as well as the political leadership might react adversely

to being rudely abandoned to their own devices in the world of Super Power

politics. As Greenhil has suggested, the fundamental problem of developing the external component of a European union is social. Despite the fact that the

Community currently constitutes an economic base sufficient to support great power politics, the enormous military and economic costs of an integrated external

policy must compete with domestic welfare in an atmosphere of hostility to mili-

tary expenditure left over from the intra-European phase of the Second World War, the demise of European colonial empires, and the recent us misadventure in Southeast Asia.52 The problem, therefore, is one of generating acceptance within nine separate political systems of the degree of popular restraint necessary to maintain a competitive trading position within today's consumer-oriented Western societies under the demand pressure of a major armaments program. Creation and maintenance of viable military and foreign economic capabilities under modern conditions would, for the Community's peoples, require a considerable degree of sacrifice levied through government-imposed austerity. The capacity of governments to demand such sacrifices and thus to mobilize national resources has long been recognized as a crucial factor in the formulation of national power. National- istic appeals for the defence of the homeland often have enabled states to extract considerable quantities of energy and resources from their citizens. In contrast, the European Community must attempt to marshal its resources amid the often con-

tradictory priorities of the traditional external and domestic policies of its members; and therefore the Community operates at a serious disadvantage in competition with the world's other major economic and military powers, each of which possesses the political advantages which accrue to the modern nation-state.53

Perhaps European policy integration itself would supply a sense of regional purpose in world politics with cohesive and dynamic effects similar to that of external policy in modern domestic political systems. Though it is doubtful that the European Community will ever have access to the integrating forces of na- tionalism, the sense of purpose furnished by an overtly political external policy might serve as a surrogate for a national will in facilitating the mobilization of

52Greenhil, "The Future Security of Western Europe," 9--10. See also Frangois Duchene, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence," in Kohnstamm and Hager, A Nation Writ Large? 19: "The two great wars of the first half of the century have ruined Europe's traditional military and political power, which is why the super powers virtually meet in the heart of the continent. Extravagant exposure to the horrors of war has also produced one of the most resolutely amilitary populations in the world." 53For example, the American diplomatic offensive of August 1971 was presented to the public in strong nationalistic terms.



222 ROGER A. RIEBER

Community resources. Certainly, the purely material benefits of the Common Market will not be sufficient to extract the sacrifices demanded by bloc competition during this critical phase in the development of industrial society.

COLLABORATION IN MILITARY DEVELOPMENT Should the foreign and domestic political barriers to the formulation of a com-

prehensive European foreign policy prove surmountable, the Community will still be faced with "technical" problems, the solutions to which require a considerable degree of political co-operation. The feasibility of developing a security system necessary to the formulation of foreign policy depends upon the arrange- ment of effective collaboration among the member states in weapons development. The Nine cannot hope, either individually or through the pooling of nationally developed forces, to field a credible combination of nuclear and conventional de- terrents.54 The size and advanced technological state of the Community's military competition dictates that member states utilize the full advantages of a combined

weapons procurement scheme. These advantages, such as lower unit cost and

technological sharing, must be realized if the Community is to compete success-

fully with the Super Powers whose highly integrated systems are the ideal model for the procurement of military hardware.55

There are, however, several serious obstacles which have tended to retard

European collaboration in the military development area.56 Simpson and Gregory, in their recent study of the subject, note that in spite of the uneven economic burdens and extreme national sensitivities in the area, Western European states have achieved a modicum of success in the difficult field of joint development.57 They suggest, furthermore, that definite political advantages may accompany a

Community decision to "go it alone" rather than rely upon the less expensive "ready-made" technology which could be furnished by the United States.58 How- ever, the recent decision of Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands along with

Norway to purchase the American built YF 16 aircraft rather than the French built Mirage F1 is a clear illustration of the difficulties confronting European armament industries in the form of sophisticated allied competition. In spite of such setbacks joint development of increasingly expensive military technology may, through the initiation of private and official linkages, contribute substantially to the development of the European economic and political union. Certainly without an extensive program of joint development, there appears to be little possi-

54For a detailed study of joint weapons development in Western Europe, see John Simpson and Frank Gregory, "West European Collaboration in Weapons Development," Orbis, 16 (Summer 1961), 435-61 55The United States is also a major competitor of its European allies in the sale of weapons. 56According to Simpson and Gregory, "West European Collaboration," this includes the political sensitivity of national defence (435); the economic strain under which European defence budgets currently are operating (445); the relationship between weapons development and divergent military tactics (447); and the fact that to date joint defence efforts have relied on multilateralism rather than common enterprise. Specifically, Western Europe is lacking either a combined procurement budget or joint weapons development centre (448 and 449). 57Ibid., 440-2 58Political benefits of joint development could include the cementing of relationships among participants (ibid., 447), and the development of another closely integrated Community relationship (ibid., 460).




bility of the Community achieving even the minimum defence requirements of an

independent external policy.

V. Policy formulation and execution The form and intensity of diplomatic co-operation is of course no less important to external policy than the sharing of the burdens of weapons development. Politi- cal co-operation is the core of integrated policy development. In this crucial area, the Community is at a serious disadvantage in comparison with the powers with which they contend in international politics. Whereas the Community's national

competitors are equipped to resolve discrepancies among competing domestic interests and subsequently formulate an integrated external policy, the EC remains an organization of sovereign states, each with its own foreign policy. Only through the reintegration of those elements of domestic and external economic policies into a politically rational whole can the Nine hope to achieve the flexibility with which their international competitors utilize varying aspects of external relations in a complementary fashion to defend and promote a wide variety of European interests.59 Successful formulation of such a comprehensive international posture requires the development of adequate machinery for unified diplomatic activity and an intensity of political co-operation sufficient to ensure the development of

complementary policies over a broad range of subject areas.

DIPLOMACY Within the relatively limited framework of activity attendent upon the Commun-

ity's previous "non-political" external relations, the member states have with considerable difficulty gradually developed instruments for negotiating with third states. In spite of the reluctance expressed by some member states, the EC has

opted for representation by its own supranational instruments.60 The highly technical nature of the economic issues which have occupied the greater part of the EC's external affairs may be the most important factor in the development of the Commission's position in Community diplomacy. The general outline of the EC'S

negotiating posture for the Kennedy Round and the forthcoming trade talks was

developed on the basis of Commission initiatives. Though the Commission's limited mandate required constant recourse to the Council of Ministers for policy directives, it was definitely the supranational agency which dealt with the Com-

munity's opponents during the Kennedy Round.6' The importance of the Com- mission's diplomatic role should not be underestimated. It seems to indicate a

willingness on the part of the membership to entrust supranational organs with a considerable degree of political influence in external affairs in spite of the obvious limitations resulting from the residual interests of the major member states.

The degree of diplomatic authority which might ultimately be delegated to the Commission if the Community expands its external policy-making activities would be difficult to predict at the present time. Under the Davignon procedure,62 the

59The Nixon Doctrine, which links security with economic relationships, is a good example of such flexibility. 60Weil, A Foreign Policy for Europe, 42-8 1'Ibid., 58-68

62"Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification," Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 11/1970, 12



224 ROGER A. RIEBER

Commission is consulted on policy questions within its area of competence, an issue which is to be decided by the foreign ministers.63 This functional limitation of the Commission's activities is indicative of reluctance on the part of the member states to extend the role of the Community's supranational organs along with the

expansion of the organizational policy-making process in competition with their own institutions. It would, however, be difficult to envision the formulation of an EC foreign policy without the concurrent development of a specialized Community organ for its execution.

POLICY FORMULATION The machinery for formulating Ec external policy is also still in the process of

development. At present, the Community is utilizing two basic procedures. Regu- lar consultation among the member states' foreign ministers is provided for in the

Davignon procedure along with a "political committee" entrusted to prepare the ministerial meetings and carry out those tasks entrusted to them by the ministers.64 Though properly serviced ministerial consultation is essential to the eventual formulation of a comprehensive external policy, the regular machinery currently available to the Community does not appear to be adequate to develop common

positions from which subsequent Community policies could be derived.65 The formulation of the fundamental positions which form the basis of external

policy has, as expected, proved to be one of the most serious barriers to Com-

munity development of common external policies. Progress in this area has so far been achieved in three directions. Through the processes of integration, the economic interests of the member states have been unified to a degree which usually permits the formulation of commonly acceptable external policies. Community initiatives in formulating a broad range of economic agreements with third states, culminating in the Lom6 Convention, represent yet another major thrust towards the development of substantial commonality among member-state interests and the subsequent institutionalization of relationships between the Community and a considerable number of nations.

Though of considerable value, these processes are definitely not sufficient conditions of a fully integrated European external policy. The third and most crucial element to be considered involves determining the EC's reaction to situations which occur beyond the limits of prior policy formulation, particularly situations result-

ing from unanticipated events. Some formula must be developed to subject these demands for policy to a Community process which renders the interaction among member states predictable at least to a degree.

Fundamental policy decisions have so far been taken at a series of "summit" conferences of the heads of state and government. These "summit" conferences have been valuable in the development of political compromises between the

63The Davignon procedure was developed on the basis of a mandate given the foreign ministers of the member states by the heads of state and government at the Hague Summit Conference of 1 and 2 December 1969. The process is outlined in two reports by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Ibid., 9-14; no. 2, Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 9/73, 12-21. 64"Second Report by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs," 15 65"Report on Political Cooperation and Unification," 21: "In regard to material content, it will be noted that nothing spectacular has been achieved so far in terms of common action on fundamental problems."




divergent interests of the member states at the highest level of political responsibility. Consequently the Community's political leadership has formulated basic

positions which the EC's regular institutions have utilized to direct subsequent European development. In spite of their limited success, these "summit" meetings are not a suitable source of political authority for the formulation of Community foreign policy. If it is to formulate effective external policy as an international actor, the EC must develop adequate machinery for continuous political decision-

making at the highest levels of authority. The current attempt to institutionalize the "summits" as the European Councils appears to be a step in that direction. However, regular meetings of the Community leadership will not in themselves be sufficient to formulate a continuous and coherent spectrum of external policy. As noted previously, in spite of the significant degree of economic integration operating among the Nine, the heads of state and government still gather as representa- tives of sovereign entities with widely divergent political traditions and diverse national interests which have emerged from distinct political systems.

The Community's principal competition, nation states, rarely exhibit a high degree of domestic political cohesion in the area of external affairs. As a matter of fact, the various facets of foreign policy are often the centre of extreme conflict

among domestic political interests. However, when compared to an organization such as the European Community, the modern state exhibits a formal external cohesion which carries with it extraordinary advantages. The dimensions of domestic conflict over external affairs are severely circumscribed and in most instances eventually subjected to centralized authoritative decision-making. Lacking the equivalent centralization of authority available to the state as a result of its

multi-sovereign composition, the European Community must on a consensual basis develop institutional apparatus capable of generating external policy with a degree of final authority of the same general dimensions as that available to the

decision-making organs of the modern state. Only in this manner will the Nine be able to respond as a unit to the constant stream of external challenges to specific EC policies. Operating under this type of responsible direction, the Davignon institutions and their successors could be in a position to negotiate a continuous stream of compromise solutions incorporating the member states' divergent interests.

Assuming the successful institutionalization of policy formulation at the highest level, the development of Community foreign policy will then turn upon the existence of sufficient bases for compromise among the Nine regarding substantive issues upon which to formulate a comprehensive external policy. Institutions at

any level of authority are necessary for the successful formulation of European policy; they are also merely the vehicles or instruments of policies."6 The history of the Community is not particularly instructive in this area. Community success in external policy formulation has been limited to fields of economic importance, and

past French attempts to initiate overtly political policy formulation via the Fou- chet Plan were rejected. Serious obstacles to a common enterprise (such as the un- determined role of West Germany in a European nuclear system) remain to be dealt with. But beneath the welter of substantive issues, the fundamental problem

66Morgan, "East-West Relations in Europe," 179



226 ROGER A. RIEBER

confronting those advocating Community foreign policy concerns the formulation of a general approach to international politics. The Nine have already given ample evidence of a willingness and capacity to subject certain elements of competing national interests to commonly acceptable solutions. Re-integration of these "non- political" areas into a comprehensive external policy which directly engages political issues demands agreement on long-term goals and a relatively cohesive world view.

Community "leadership" by one member state is not possible in an area which involves the delegation of national sovereignty in such an obvious way; and the "federal solution," if it remains viable, is still a long way off. Rather, the formulation of a European political vocation in international politics calls for the creative use of some fundamental aspects of international law and organization in a novel fashion. As in the case of the "non-political" issues, Europe's regional institutions must be more than instrumentalities utilized to facilitate the diplomatic compromise of particular interests. Instead, a European policy will depend upon co- operation among member states and between the membership and Community institutions in the creation of a European direction in international politics. Only when set against this European direction rather than each other will competing national political interests cease to be overwhelmingly divisive. Therefore the success or failure of the European experiment is bound to the Community's capacity to develop a new definition of sovereignty - one which marries a partially sovereign Community to member states which have combined their interests in such a fashion that the loss of traditional sovereign independence is not a threat to their identity. In the process, the EC membership will have transformed a regional organization into an international actor of extraordinary capabilities and world-wide interests. An impossible task perhaps, but with the costs of power and independence rising by the day, community is the only apparent solution for less- than-great powers which seek to retain their identity along with a measure of influence over their destiny.

