The Future Navy Vision to Reality

CAPTAIN CLARK GRAHAM, USN COMMANDER, DAVID TAYLOR RESEARCH CENTER

The Future Navy Vision to Reality

community. These conclusions, listed in Figure 1, will serve as an outline for this address.

Capt. Clark Graham

I CONCLUSIONS 1. Structure of Navy fixed

2. Navy facing a capability crisis

3. Navy must keep “chess board” flexible

4. Technology clusters must be linked to requirements

5. Evolutionary upgrades may not be capable or affordable

6. Systems Engineering is the bridge

7. Think Big, Think Together, Think Like Warriors

Figure 1 Admiral Meyer, Dr. Skolnick, Admiral MacKinnon,

fellow naval engineers. As Admiral Meyer mentioned, I am the commander of David Taylor Research Center. I am also double-hatted to Admiral MacKinnon, the chief engineer of the Navy. I have two jobs. One is to help the Navy create the technological vision for the future Navy, and the other is to help develop the engineering bridge from vision to reality.

In this keynote address, I will discuss seven conch- sions of critical importance to the naval engineering

56

Conclusion 1 - The Structure of the Navy has Remained Relatively Fixed Since World War II

The current mission of the United States Navy states that the Navy must be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of United

Naval Engineers Journal, July 1989

GRAHAM THE FUTURE NAVY VISION TO REALITY

r

FUNCTIONS - U.S. NAVY

0 Strategic Deterrence

0 Sea Control

0 Power Projection

0 Strategic Sealift

States national interests. (See Figure 2) The Navy must be ready for the possibility of general war as well as low- intensity conflicts.

MISSION - U.S. NAVY

To be prepared to canduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of US. national interests.

Figure 2

Figure 4 lists the warfare tasks facing our Navy now and in the past. What distinguishes the Navy from the other services is the wide variety of both fundamental and supporting warfare tasks. Of course, today we must have far greater capability to meet the requirements in these warfare areas.

WARFARE TASKS - U.S. NAVY [Fundamental] -Supporting

AAW c3

ASW EW

ASUW Logistics

Strike SPEC

AMPH Surveillance

Mine INTEL

Figure 4

The force structure of the Navy has also remained rather constant. (See Figure 5 ) We added fleet ballistic missile submarines to our naval forces nearly three decades ago. We continue to have carrier battle forces, battleship battle groups, amphibious task‘ forces, convoy escort forces, logistics support groups, and surveillance forces. The architectures of these forces prescribe how required operating functions are distributed and integrated. These force architectures have remained relatively fixed over the past decades. As naval engineers we must determine whether these force architectures require change in the future.

FORCE STRUCTURE - U.S. NAVY

0 FBM Submarines

0 Carrier Battle Force

0 Battle Ship Battle Group

0 Amphibious Task Force

0 Convoy/Escort Force

0 Logistics Support Groups

0 Surveillance Force

Figure 5

A summary of our maritime strategy is presented in Figure 6. The U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy has been articulated very clearly in recent years. The Navy must be flexible in its role leading to transition to war. We have to be ready to seize the initiative. And we have to be capable enough to carry the fight to the enemy.

I 1 MARITIME STRATEGY

Deter Escalation

Prepare for General War

Maritime Superiority

1. Transition to War

2. Seize Initiative

I Destroy Enemy Forces

Press the offensive f 3. Carry Fight to the I Enemy

I L I War termination

Figure 6

The structure of the Navy has remained relatively fixed for many decades. We must challenge ourselves to determine how fixed the structure of the Navy should remain in the future.

57 Naval Engineers Journal, July 1989

THE FUTURE NAVY VISION TO REALITY GRAHAM

Conclusion 2 - The Navy is Facing a Capability Crisis

During the past decade we have been successful in increasing the capability of the Navy. (See Figure 7.) We have enjoyed rather substantial budgets. Our national leadership has approved these budgets because of the reality of growing requirements. As we face the l!BO’s, the future is uncertain. Requirements will continue to grow. The questions which face us include: What is going to happen to the budgets? Will we be able to sustain our needed increase in force capability.

GOOD NEWS! BAD NEWS?

I 1980 1990 2000

Figure 7

This crisis we are facing might just provide us with the motivation to challenge the status quo. And this leads me to my next conclusion.

Conclusion 3 - We Must Keep the “Chess Board ’’ Flexible

We must keep our options open. As naval engineers we influence the totality of the Navy system. And the Navy system, the Navy chess board, is very large and diverse. (See Figure 8.) The Navy system consists of assets which include: surface combatants, aircraft carriers, amphibious ships and landing craft, the submarine force, aircraft both sea and land based, space systems, fiied systems, the entire logistics infrastructure including our logistic support ships, the infrastructi supports our personnel pipeline, and the entire in base.

::%&, Amphibious Submarim Aircrall

z!$& &$,s Loglslics Personnel Industry

TODAY (1990)

TRANSITION

FUTURE (2030)

Figure 8


-e that ustrial

Let’s assume that these assets are the chess pieces on this chess board. As naval engineers we have to look at these assets, and challenge the current system concepts. We must ask ourselves: “Are these the right system concepts for the future?” By the year 2030, forty years from now, the majority of the assets currently in the fleet will be retired. Between now and the year 2030 we will have rebuilt the Navy. The Navy which we conceptualize for the year 2030 does not have to consist of the same assets as today’s Navy. In 2030, a rook or pawn or a bishop may not be the right “chess piece” on that chess board. If we look at the chess board with too narrow a focus, we will be guaranteed to merely evolve the systems concepts that we have today. We have to keep the chess board flexible and change the force architecture and the system concepts if we determine that the existing structure has serious flaws and shortcomings.

In Figure 9 we outline the thought process. We naval engineers must be totally familiar with the naval mission requirements now and projected into the future. We must identify the fundamental shortcomings of today’s force architecture and system concepts. We must understand the root cause of these shortcomings. And then we must be willing to architect whole new forces and new system concepts that alleviate the fundamental sources of the shortcomings facing our Navy. We do not want to perpetuate system concepts that merely mask current problems. To insure this degree of openness, we need to challenge today’s paradigms.

\1

\1

\1

\1

Shortcomings

Sources of Shortcomings

Force Architectures

System Concepts

Figure 9

Paradigms are rules, regulations, standards, “conventional wisdom, ” and biases that influence our judge- ment. The decisions we make as naval engineers are governed by our paradigms. We see the world through our paradigms. We naval engineers, both as individuals and as institutions, frequently suffer from a dreaded disease called paradigm paralysis. (See Figure 10.) This occurs when our paradigm is the only paradigm. If we are going to make progress and if we indeed are going to


keep the chess board flexible, we must maintain paradigm flexibility.

the capability to meet requirements within fiscal constraints.

PARADIGM PARADIGM PARALYSIS FLEXIBILITY &

@ & + + B

Figure 10

Now paradigms are both good and bad. I believe that the three pre-eminent paradigms listed in Figure 11 have been true in the past, are true today, and will be true well into the future. America stands for freedom and human rights. Freedom requires strength. Our U.S. national interests require a strong Navy.

I 1 PREEMlNENT PARADIGMS

1. America stands for freeaom and human rights

2. Freedom requires strength

3. U.S. national interests require a strong Navy

Figure 11

In Figure 12 I have listed paradigms currently having a strong influence in the Navy. Some of these naval paradigms are pre-eminent and should be retained and some of these paradigms are past their prime and should be discarded. Aircraft carriers should have large decks. Ships with different missions are different. Women should not go "in harms way." Submarines should be nuclear powered. Tactical aviation requires high-performance manned aircraft. Successful ship designs require large margins. And bigger is always better. There are many more and they all are deserving of scrutiny as we come to grips with shortcomings of today's force architectures and system concepts. If we do not, we will suffer from paradigm paralysis leading to perpetuating the status quo. We will evolve conventional system concepts and merely mask shortcomings. On the other hand, paradigm flexibility will lead to progress in conceptualizing force architectures and system concepts with

TODAY'S NAVAL PARADIGMS

1. Aircraft carriers should have large

2. Ships with different missions are

3. Women should not go "in harm's way"

4. Submarines should be nuclear powered

5. Tactical aviation requires high performance, manned aircraft

6. Successful ship designs require large margins

7. Bigger is better

8.

decks

different

Figure 12

Conclusion 4 - Technology Clusters Must Be Linked to Operational and A ffordability Requirements

The U.S. Navy invests approximately 10 billion dol- lars a year in research and development. How do we determine what to invest in? We must invest in those technologies that support the most critical operational and affordability goals. The cartoon in Figure 13 de- picts a number of containers on two tables. By identifying the labels on the containers we specify the performance categories for our future systems affecting military effectiveness and cost categories impacting affordability. The relative size of the containers represent the priority of these attributes. When we commit to filling up the container, we have set requirements that should drive our technology investment decisions. Prioritized goals will lead to prioritized technologies.

PRIORITIZED GOALS LEAD TO PRIORITIZED TECHNOLOGIES

Figure 13

Naval Engineers Journal, July 1989 59

THE FUTURE NAVY VISION TO REALITY GRAHAM

As naval engineers we must fully understand the Navy’s mission. We then are in a position to assist our customer, the naval operators, in setting quantitative, time-phased, operational and affordability goals. (See Figure 14.) We then will be able to establish technical goals which ust be reached if we are to deliver systems which meet the operational and affordability goals. Only then can we identify the clusters of technologies which will get us to the goals. These technology clusters consist of synergistic combinations of technologies. (We will address clustering of technologies in the next issue of the Journal.) Then we can structure our integrated, prioritized research and development plan.

\1

\1

\1

\1

OperationallAffordability Goals

Technical Goals

Technology Clusters

Integrated R&D Plan

Figure 14

Quality in Navy R&D means developing technology which meets customer requirements. Our customer is the fleet. Quality in Navy R&D means transitioning this technology into the fleet when it is needed. As naval engineers we must help estalish the operational and affordability goals (the customer requirements) for the future Navy. And these goals must drive our technological strategic planning.

Conclusion 5 - Evolutionary Upgrades to Today’s Force Architecture and Today’s System Concepts May Not Meet Capability or A ffordability Requirements

The Navy is technologically intensive. In high technology systems, capability increases rapidly at first and then begins to level off with time. As shown in Figure 15, the capability of system concept A follows a classical “S” curve as it goes through initial exploitation and full development before it reaches its performance plateau.

The architecture of the current carrier battle force distributes required operating functions as follows. Manned surveillance, strike and air superiority aircraft are located on the large deck carrier. The Aegis cruisers and destroyers provide ship based area AAW and ASW


CHANGE IS REQUIRED Capability / System Concept B

Time

Figure 15

coverage. There is an outer ring of ASW ships. A nuclear submarine adds to the ASW defense of the force. Strike capability in terms of Tomahawk cruise missiles is distributed on the combatants (surface and submarine). Logistic support is provided by the multiproduct logistic ships of the force.

There are shortcomings in this architecture and these system concepts which must be dealt with. The force is observable. The ship of the force can be discriminated because of differences in their signatures. (Note paradigm number two in Figure 12.) The function in this force are concentrated. (The exception is the current emphasis in distributing cruise missiles.) And the force is logistically demanding.

This force architecture has remained relatively un- changed since World War I1 and is a reflection of many of the paradigms listed in Figure 12. Some of these paradigms may be past their prime. It may be time to consider alternative architectures and system concepts.

An alternative architecture emphasizes four characteristics which are aimed at today’s shortcomings: Distribute, Disperse, Disguise and Sustain (D3 + S). A system concept compatible with this architecture consists of only two types of ships: carriers of large objects (CLO) and scout fighters (SF). These ships would emphasize low observability and equally important indiscriminability. Required operating functions would be more widely distributed and the ship could be dispersed over greater distances. The force would have longer sustainability thus reducing the vulnerable logistic pipeline.

The D3 + S architecture is but one of any number of force architectures that could be employed. It looks forward but certainly has not been subjected to the rigorous scrutiny required before acceptance.

We naval engineers must approach this and other alternative force architectures and system concepts with paradigm flexibility. Continuing to evolve system concepts that are fundamentally flawed will only lead us to brute force solutions which mask shortcomings. Evo- lutionary upgrades to today’s force architecture and system concepts may not meet capability or affordability requirements. We must know the right time to jump from system concept A to system concept B. This jump from system A to system B must be dictated by the requirement to meet operational and affordability goals


unattainable with the old technology and old systems concept. We will need a broad perspective to know when to make these jumps from current force architectures and system concepts to new alternatives.

When we approach this task of conceptualizing alternative force architectures and system concepts, we have to insure that we obtain the proper balance among the requirements for offense, defense, and presence. (See Figure 16). No football team will be successful built solely on offense or defense. Every successful football team is marked by a sound strategy and the right forma- tions (i.e., architecture). And no successful football team is going to be built around all burly 300-pound athletes (i.e., system concept). We also need smaller, faster, more deceptive flanker backs and defensive backs. We have to conceptualize both the right force architecture and the right system concept.

BALANCE REQUIRED

0 0 OFFENSE f2

oi , (; I 0 0 0

X X X X DEFENSE

X X X

X X X X

Figure 16

Balance is required in our battle forces. (See Figure 17) The core systems of today’s carrier battle force cost over $15B to acquire. The carrier based offensive aircraft and the ship based cruise missiles are the primary contributors to the offensive warfare tasks. The hull, mechanical and electrical characteristics of the ship plat- forms are the primary determinants of the mobility and sustainability capabilities so vital to maintaining presence.

Capable defensive measures are required to insure survivability of the force against the increasingly potent threat. Defense, the ability to protect the force, take punishment and remain on station to control the seas and project power, is provided by “active” defensive aircraft and combat systems and by “passive” signature reduction and control and ship protection. The inherent shortcomings of the force architecture and system concepts of today’s carrier, battleship and amphibious battle forces have caused an increasing requirement for investment in active defense. We need to conceptualize alternative force architectures and system concepts with more offense and more presence per dollar. It is my opinion that emphasis on the characteristics of distribute, disperse, disguise and sustain (D3 + S) has significant merit in improving capability balance in our battle forces.

I BALANCE REQUIRED Aircraft r Offense -[z Combat Systems

Mobility

Presence Sustainability t Battle Force $15 B

Aircraft

Combat Systems

Signatures

Passive Ptotection

Figure 17

Conclusion 6 - The Bridge from Vision to Reality ii Determined by Systems Engineering

We need to be students of history and learn from our great naval engineering successes. Three of the most noteworthy successes include: nuclear power, the fleet ballistic missile system, and the Aegis system. (See Figure 18.) Each of these great successes had a common characteristic: a determined leader with vision, commit- ment, long-term tenacity, and an appreciation for sound engineering.

NAVY’S GREAT SUCCESSES

* Nuclear * FBM *AEGIS Power

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

The successful fleet introduction of each of these systems was earmarked by a classic message transmitted from three naval ships as they went to sea. On 17 January 1955 a message was sent from the USS Nautilus, “Underway on Nuclear Power.” On 22 July 1960 a message was transmitted from the USS George Washington, our first fleet ballistic missile submarine, “Polaris, from out of the deep to target, perfect.’’ And off the coast of Mississippi on 17 August 1982 from the USS Ticonderoga, we heard the message, “Move over Admiral Gorshkov, Aegis is at Sea.”

The three leaders, Admirals Rickover, Levering- Smith, and Meyer has the vision to conceive a

Naval Engineers Journal, July 1989 61


revolutionary new system concept. And they were superb engineers who realized that the key to bridging the gap between vision and reality is dogedly determined component and systems engineering. That bridge does not come easy. History has shown that there have been many promising new system concepts which have failed because of sloppy engineering execution. That buzzard sitting on the rail of the bridge is just waiting for projects with inadequate engineering.

I found this quote from a speech of Admiral Meyer: “In 1960, we made one of the best decisions ever. We decided to invest in the Aegis architecture.” He went on to say in this speech: “You must have a sound architecture - that’s where systems engineering begins. Sys- tems engineering must start first - you will be doomed to failure if you don’t invest in systems engineering. I hope today’s engineering community follows suit .” We naval engineers of today must indeed emulate the successes of the past.

Conclusion 7 - Think Big, Think Together, Think Like Warriors

We, the naval engineering community must think big. (See Figure 19) As we face the capability and affordability crisis, it is imperative that we think big. We have to challenge our evolutionary force architectures and system concepts. We must deal with clusters of technologies not individual technologies. We must reach out 40

CONCLUSION #7

THINK BIG THINK TOGETHER THINK LIKE WARRIORS

~~

Figure 19

years into the future. And if we are going to think big, we must think together. The winning system concepts of the future transcends organizational boundaries. We naval engineers must understand the linkage of our technology and our engineering to the required operational and affordability goals of our customer, the operating forces. We have to be able to articulate the value gained of new system concepts in terms that the customer can appreciate. We naval engineers must think like warriors.

Thank you very much for providing me this oppor- tunity to be your keynote speaker for ASNE Day. @


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The Future Navy Vision to Reality