ad = uufor J 1 PamIN 96-11O 58

AUGUST 1980

U.8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1980W-708 0O

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OmfoeWashlngton, D.C. 20402

5 0 2-1 7

1"THE FORGOTTEN GUINEA PIGS"

A REPORT ON HEALTH EFFECTS OF LOW-LEVELRADIATION SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THENUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING PROGRAM CON-DUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

REPORT

PREPARED OR THE U8I OF THB

COMMITTEE ON

INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND ITS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

INVESTIGATIONS

I

COMMITTEE ON INTEBBTATE AND FORIEGN COMMEROB

HARLBY 0. TAGGERS, West Virgtiaa OAMnkaJOHN D. DINOBL4 MicbhianLIONEL VAN DEBRLIN, CaliforniaJOHN M. MURPHY, New YorkDAVID I. 8ATTERPIULD II, VirglitaBOB BCK]HADT, TexasRICHARDSON PREHYR, North CarolinaJAMES H. 8CHUERB, New YorkRICHARD L. OTTINGEB, New YorkHBNRY A. WAXMAN, CaliforniaTIMOTHY B. WIRTH, ColoradoPHILIP R. 8HARP, IndianaJAMBS J. FLORIO, New JerseyANTHONY TOBY MOFPJTT, ConnecticutJIM SANTINI, NevadaANDREW MAGUIRE New JorseEDWARD J. MARKEY, MassachusettsTHOMAS A. LUKEN, OhioDOUO WALGREN, PenneylvaniaALBERT OORBE JA, TennesseeBARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MarylandBONALD M OTTL, OhioPHIL GRAMM, TexasAL SWIFT, WashinstonMICKEY LELAND, TexasRICHARD C. 8HELBY, AlabamaROBERT T. MATSUI, California

JAMES T. BROYHILL. North CarolnaSAMUEL L. DBVINBE OhioTIM LEU CARTER, KentuckyCLARENCE J. BROWN, OhioJAMES M. COLLINS, TeasNOBMAN P. LENT, New YorkEDWARD . MADIGAN, IllinoisCARLOS J. MOORHBAD, CalifornaMATTHEW J. RINALDO, New JerseyDAVE STOCKMAN, MichianMARC L. MARKS, PennsylvanlaTOM CORCORAN, IllinoisGARY A. LBM, New YorkTOM LOEFFLBB, TexasWILLIAM B. DANNBEMAYB, California

Kanxmnr J. PAI"Num , Ohe Olerh ad Staff DmetorELBsxon A. DINKxIa, Fret Assektat O(fe*

WunUAM L. Boras, Prts B editor

SUBcoMMUITT' ON OVaSHT AND InveSTIGATIONS

BOB ECKHARDT, Texas, OiedrmnJIM SMITINI, NevadaALBERT GORE, Ja., TennesseePHILIP X. HARP, IndianaANTHONY TOBY MOFFETT, ConnecticutANDRBW MAGUIRE, New JerseyDOUG WALOB•W, PennailvaniaRONALD M. MOTTL, OhioMICKEY LBLAND, TexasTIMOTHY E. WIRTH, ColoradoEDWARD J. MABRKt, MaaehusettsHARLEY 0. STAOGGOJM, Wt Virglini

(as Oteo)

NORMAN F. LENT, New YorkMATTHEW J. RINALDO, New JerseyMARC I. MARKS, PennsylvaniaTOM CORCORAN, IllinoisWILLIAM B. DANNEMEYER, CaliforniaJAMES T. BROYHILL, North Carolina

(Ex Omelo)

M tK J. RAA, Oki#/ OouoSel/89tf DireterDAu Nesawuax, OpecW Asel teat

PAICK X MChal MltMa~eal. J. SawAAM, Miort Bltal Aeooi0te

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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.... .. .M. am 0"mM n Ume. m.

iMN". Y.• ow A. &i0L,. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES Wa S.M*AO S W& I Mi.0400400ML Cu. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

' rm o* n WS•COM 0MITTU OVNS SIOM AND INVUETIATIOM*nmm . n'm aCOn Or Tni

" .se cO. LCOMIT•E ON INTERSTATE AND rF#oRt COMNMENC"WASHINGTON. D.C. MIS

August 7, 1980

Honorable Harley 0. StaggersChairmanInterstate and Foreign Commerce

CommitteeU.S. House of RepresentativesWashington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Over the past year, the Subcommittee on Oversight andInvestigations held four days of hearings and reviewed extensivescientific data to examine the consequences of the nuclear testscarried on at the Nevada Test Site during the 1950's and 1960's.The two overriding issues before the Subcommittee related to thegovernment's responsibility (1) for assuring the health andsafety of its people and the integrity of the environment whentesting nuclear weapons, and (2) for compensating any injuredparty and restoring the environment when harm has occurred as aconsequence of the government's action.

Upon review of the data, the Subcommittee found that whilethe government was aware of the health hazards posed to the peopleliving downwind from the test site, the government failed to pro-vide adequate protection for the residents of this area during itsoperation of the nuclear weapons testing program. At the veryleast, the government owed these people a responsibility to informthem of the exact time and place of each test and the necessaryprecautions that should have been taken to protect their healthand safety. Absent such notification, and uninformed of the evi-dence held by the government which suggested that exposure tonuclear fallout was causing harmful effects, the residents of thisarea merely became guinea pigs in a deadly experiment.

Sheep ranchers in the area lost some 4,400 sheep during thespring and summer of 1953, at the time that the "Upshot-Knothole"nuclear test series was being conducted at the test site. Despiteevidence indicating a causal relationship between the sheep deathsand exposure to nuclear fallout, the Subcommittee found that thesesheep ranchers remain uncompensated to this day because of thegovernment's suppression and disregard of such data in the officialinvestigation and reporting of the matter and, finally, in the

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IV

litigation of the case before the Utah District Court in 1956.

Still further, scientific data presented to the Subcommitteerevealed that an unusual increase in leukemia deaths occurred insouthwestern Utah for the years 1959-1960' additional leukemia"hot spots" were documented in Arizona and Utah for the years1965-1970, and in Nevada for the years 1959-1963; and a twofoldincrease in thyroiditis and a fourfold increase in thyroid canceroccurred in Utah during the years 1948-1962. Witnesses before theSubcommittee detailed personal accounts of illnesses and deathsamong family and friends which vividly painted a tragic picture ofhuman suffering that has continued to the present day.

The Subcommittee found that the existing legal remedy availableto claimants under the Federal Tort Claims Act is fraught with legalhurdles unique to radiation-related cases. Since the clinical fea-tures of radiogenic cancers are not distinguishable from the fea-tures of other cancers, it is virtually impossible to identify anindividual with a radiation-induced cancer from the much larger classof individuals who will develop cancer from other causes. As aresult, the nuclear radiation victims incur added burdens, in termsof time and expense, to pursue their claims against the governmentwith no degree of certainty or predictability of their successfuloutcome.

The Subcommittee determined that sufficient evidence exists forthe government to accept at least compassionate responsibility, ifnot strict legal liability, for the injuries sustained by the down-wind residents as a result of the nuclear weapons testing program.Additionally, the Subcommittee found that the arduous, time-consum-ing, and expensive nature of any judicial resolution of the mattercompels the Congress to develop a legislative solution.

In devising such a compensatory scheme, the Subcommittee recom-mends that the Congress define the class of eligible claimants by(a) the nature of the injury; (b) the residence of the eligibleclaimants; and (c) the time period and duration of such residence.To make further determinations respecting illnesses which may beappropriate for compensation, the Subcommittee proposed the estab-lishment of an independent review panel. Finally the Subcommitteerecommends that the Federal Courts have jurisdiction over resolvingthe questions pertaining to eligibility and damages.

Upon determining the reason for the government's failure toprovide adequate protection to the downwind residents, the Subcom-mittee concluded that a conflict within the authority to regulatenuclear energy existed in the Atomic Energy Commission such thatthe Commission's decisions were weighted in favor of promoting thenuclear weapons testing program over controlling the safe production

V

and use of nuclear energy. Still further, the Subcommittee foundthat this conflict has continued to this day in the AEC's successoragencies--the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, andthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As the primary responsibilityand funding authority for radiation health research remains withinthese agencies, a bias, or at the very least, an appearance of abias, to promote nuclear technology exists in the results of thisresearch without a corresponding concern for health and safety.

To address this inherent conflict in nuclear regulatory authority,the Subcommittee recommends that the agencies responsible for theprotection of the health and welfare of the American people--includ-ing the Department of Health and Human Services, the EnvironmentalProtection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-tion--be given the primary responsibility and funding authority toconduct radiation health research. Moreover, the Subcommittee pro-poses that the government undertake such health research to assistthe independent review panel, and continue to support the researchundertaken and proposed by the States of Utah, Nevada and Arizona.

The findings and recommendations in this report have been madeby the Subcommittee in recognition that we, as a nation, must ac-cept the consequences of our governmental decisions and properlyand promptly compensate the victims of our mistakes. Moreover, wemust learn from events such as these so that we do not repeat pastmistakes to the detriment of the health and welfare of future genera-tions.

In conclusion, I want to acknowledge the cooperation ofSenator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Researchand Committee on the Judiciary with respect to our joint hearing inSalt Lake City, Utah, and to recognize Subcommittee staff Counsels,Peter Kinzler and Mary Foldes, for their contribution in the prepa-ration of this report.

Sincerely,

ChairmanSubcommittee on

Oversight and Investigations

PROLOGUE

"We were on the trail home from our Nevada range into our Utahrange, and I was out on the saddle horse with this herd of sheep justsitting ... kind of watching the sheep. They were grazing and theseairplanes came over . . . and all at once this bomb dropped . . .

"I wasn't expecting it... it just was an atomic bomb. . . And,of course, the cloud came up and drifted over us . . . And, it was alittle bit later that day that some of the Army personnel that hadfour-by-fours and jeeps . . . came through there . . . and they said,'Boy, you guys are really in a hot spot' . . .

* * * * * *

"Well, we had to herd the sheep We had to move as fast as theywalked . . and that's not very fast.

* * * * * * *

"Well, we trailed on into Cedar City-I guess it was 200 and someodd miles ... and when we got into our lambing yards... westarted to losing the sheep.

* * * * * * *

"When they started to lamb, we started to losing them, and thelambs were born with little legs, kind of pot-bellied. As I remembersome of them didn't have any wool, kind of a skin instead of wool . . .

"And we just started to losing so many lambs that my father-[who] was alive at that time-just about went crazy. He had neverseen anything like it before. Neither had I; neither had anybody else."

Mr. KERN BULLOCcSheep ranmor.

"I was Iron County Agricultural Agent. And I lived in Cedar Cityduring this period, 1950-1954, [and] was present at the time the firstAEC veterinarians and personnel arrived . . .

* * * * * * *

"The policy was stated to me originally by ... the Chief of theBiological Branch of the Division of Biological Medicine of the AEC,Dr. Paul Pearson. Dr. Pearson told me ... that the AEC could underno circumstances afford to have a claim established against them and

Shave that precedent set. And he further indicated that the sheepmencould not expect under any circumstances to be reimbursed for thatreason . .

* * * * * * *

". . . there was a clear mandate that under no circumstance wouldthey do research . . . that involved radiation.

* * * * * * *

I

vii

". . by the end of 1954, they had a battery of people coming throughtelling us that the levels of radiation could not have caused the dam-age ... we were just constantly bombarded with expert opinions.

* * * * * * *

"[Yet] during the first month or two of the initial investigation, thescientists who were there were, in fact, ... saying and specifyingthis was radiation damage ..

* * * * * * *

"lBut] they were taken of the case. In fact, Dr. Thompsett, whosaid he would give me a copy of the report and provide a copy of hisreport to the livestock men indicting the readings and the appearanceof the animals definitely were similar to an experimental radiationdamage done on animals, told me later that his report was picked up-even his own personal copy-and he was told to rewrite it and elimi-nate any reference to speculation about radiation damage or effects.

* * * * * * *". . . I remember going with [Doug Clark] and some of the veteri-

narians who were doing some autopsies one day, and Doug raised somequestions with the team of scientists, one of whom was a colonel . .he seemed to be the leading spokesman to kind of press this issue thatit couldn't have been radiation. Doug asked him some farily technicalquestions about the effects of radiation on internal organs that he'dgotten from other veterinarians. The man, rather than answering thequestion, called him a dumb sheepman [and] told him he was stupid-he couldn't understand the answer if it was given to him, and for justten or fifteen minutes, just kind of berated hun rather than answer thequestion.

"[And] it was a tough kind of experience for Doug. I remember heleft there to go out to his ranch to meet with the loan company to ac-count for what sheep he had left, and within a couple of hours, he wasdead from a heart attack. I think that . . part of the stress that heexperienced at that time was that abuse that he had received fromthese officials."

Dr. STApHBN BROWER,Iron County Agricultuorl Agent.

CONTENTS

Proloue...... ....----------------------I. ntroduotion-.-------------------------- 1

A. Issues of concern ....----.......-- --------- 1B. Purpose of hearingsb . -- -- -- ----- -. I- - 1

II. Health and saety repercussions of nuclear testing program:A. Sheep death after the 1958 nuclear tests:

1. Background -----......-. --------------- 82. Personal accounts................ -----.. 48. Government response:

(a Summary....-------------------- 5Discussion.--------------. 6

4. Denial of compensation:(a) Summary..A-.......- ---- 8

SDiscussion-....--------------- 85. Causation.-.-------------------- 96. Conclusions..--..------ ------- -------- - 18

B. Human health hazards:1. Background ------------.. ------------------ 182. Personal accounts..........---- -188 Scientific medical studies:

(a Summary. .- --- -- --. - --......... 14SDscussion......-----------....--------------- 1

4. Government response:(a) Summary......------- 17(b) Discussion--....------------ 18

5. Conclusions......------------------------------- 21III. Nuclear weapons development v. Public health and safety: an un-

healthy conflict within nuclear regulatory authority:A. Establishment of continental nuclear test site ...... 28B. Radiationresearohauthority--....------------------ 2C. Conclusions.. ---------------------- 29D. Recommendations........------------------ 80

IV. Compensation for nuclear radiation victims:A. Statement of issues.--..---------------- --------- - 81B. Alternative considerations for compensation systems..-----. 88C. Recent developments.......------------ ----- 84D. Conclusions.. ------------------------------------ 8E. Recommendations-..-------. -- ----------- 86

V. Summary conclusion. ----------.-------------------------- 8Appendix A--Nature of ionising radiation-......--------- -- 89Appendix B-Regulatory authority .................... 41

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"THE FORGOTTEN GUINEA PIGS"-A REPORT ONHEALTH EFFECTS OF LOW-LEVEL RADIATION SUS-TAINED AS A RESULT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONSTESTING PROGRAM CONDUCTED BY THE U.S.GOVERNMENT

I. INTRODUOTION

A. ISSUES OF CONCERN

The foregoing scenario presents just one example of the many reallife dramas which were played out during the early stages of thiscountry's nuclear weapons testing program. These events raise im-portant questions about the government's responsibility for assuringthe health and safety of its people and the integrity of the environ-ment when it is testing potentially dangerous materials. More specifi-cally, what actions should the government take in the first place tominimize the dangers, including advance testing of the health andenvironmental effects, as well as informing its citizens of any potentialdangers and carefully monitoring their exposure to the substances?Finally, what is the government's responsibility for restoring to healthand compensating anyone injured as a consequence of the government'sactions and for restoring the environment

During the past year, similar issues have come before the Sub-committee in connection with its hearings on hazardous waste disposalproblems such as those at Love Canal; on involuntary exposure tospraying of Agent Orange in Viet Nam or of herbicides and pesticidesin the U.S.; on ozone poisoning in the upper atmosphere; and on harm-ful infant formula.1 The near disaster at Three Mile Island with thepossibility of potentially adverse health and environmental repercus-sions raises comparable questions.

It is the view of this Subcommittee that we, as a nation, must acceptthe consequences of our governmental decisions and properly andpromptly compensate the victims of our mistakes. We must learn fromevents such as these so that we do not repeat past mistakes and so se-cure the health and welfare of future generations.

B. PURPOSE OF HEARINGS

The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations conducted fourhearings-on April 19, 1979 in Salt Lake City, Utah* April 28, 1979,in Las Vegas, Nevada; and May 24 and August 1, 1" 9, in Washing-ton, D.C.-to examine the consequences of the nuclear tests carried

ise, Hasardous Waste Disposal Report, 96-IFC 81 and Infant Formula: Our Child-ren eed Better Protection, 9IC 42. ee also, Involuntar Exposure to Agent OranCeand Other T'oxic Spran" Hrearin before the Subcommittee on Ovenlnst and Inlvew.gattons, lit Seas, Serial ?umber 9-89 and "Adverse Health Effects of Infiht Wposue to Atmospheric Osone" fea benre the subcommittee on O ht andInvestigation lit SesL, erial aNmber

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on at the Nevada Test Site during the 1950's and 1960'* These hear-ings form the basis of this Subcommittee's report on the health effectsof low-level ionizing radiation from this testing as well as on the gov-ernment's role in nuclear development, radiation research, and publichealth and safety.' The Subcommittee heard from numerous wit-nesses, including government officials; scientific and legal experts;and concerned citizens, regarding the events of this particular era inour country's early development of nuclear technology.

SThe hearing held on April 19 1979, was conducted Jointly with the Senate nSbcom-mittee on Health and Scientific research of the Committee on Labor and Human Re.sources and the Committee on the Judiciary.

I For a detailed explanation on the nature of lonlslnl radiation, see Appendix A. Forbackground information on the government's nuclear regulatory authority, see AppendixB.

A,;

II. HEAIrH AND SAFETY REPERCUSSIONS OiNuCRzAR TESTwo PRooRAx

The first atomic bomb, commonly referred to as the "Trinity" shot,was exploded in the atmosphere in New Mexico on July 16, 1945.A few weeks later, the second and third detonations occurred as thewar bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Subsequently,the United States Government developed two atomic testing groundson the Bikini and Eniwetok atolls in the Marshall Islands where fiveadditional atomic bombs were detonated before 1950.

On December 18, 1950, President Harry Truman approved the test-"ing of nuclear devices within the continental United States at theNevada Test Site. Nuclear tests occurred as single-shot and multi-shot experiments. From January 1951 through October 1958, 121atmospheric tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site.' BetweenOctober 1958 and September 1961, a voluntary moratorium on nucleartesting was agreed to by the United States and Russia. Subsequently,after the moratorium expired, 102 atmospheric tests occurred betweenSeptember 1961 and August 1968.' Then, as a result of the LimitedNuclear Test Ban Treaty signed initially by the United States, theUnited Kingdom, and Russia on August 5, 1968, testing of nucleardevices went underground. Since 1968, 816 underground nuclear testshave been conducted at the Nevada Test Site.,

A. SHEEP DEATHS AFTER THB 1958 NUCLEAR TESTS

1. BackgroundDuring the "Upshot-Knothole" multi-shot experiment of eleven

atmospheric nuclear tests conducted between March 17 and June 4,1958, at the Nevada Test Site, 252 kilotons of nuclear fission productswere emitted as radioactive fallout.' The two tests which contributedthe greatest amounts of fallout to areas where sheep were known to begrazing were the 24.4-kiloton "Nancy" shot fired on a 800-foot toweron March 24, 1958, and the 82.4-kiloton "Harry" shot fired on a 800-foot tower on May 19, 1958.8 At the time of these two test shots, 11,710sheep were grazing in an area from 40 miles north to 160 miles east ofthe test site. Of these sheep, 1,420 lambing ewes (12.1%) and 2,970 newlambs (25.4%) died during the spring and summer of 1958.10

STestimony of Mahlon E. Gates, Manaer, Nevada Operations Omfi DOE, "Low LevelRadiation Effects on Health," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and In.vetlations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., let Ses.Ser8i No. 96-129, at 848. [ Hereinafter referred to as Hearings.]

"* Id.

'Knapp, Harold A. Sheep Deaths in Utah and Nevada Following the 1958 Nuclear To a(A u • 1979). (Hereinafter referred to as Knapp Report.] See Hearlnlg supra uote

*Idy. Also note, "lambin ewes" refer to those female shee which were pregnant during

the time of these test shof; "new lambs" refer to those sheep which wer orn after Inutero exposure to the radiation emitted during these test shots.

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4

After studying the conditions surrounding these deaths, the AtomicEnergy Commission (AEC) reported no causal connection betweenthe sheep's exposure to radioactive fallout emitted during the "Up-shot-Knothole" test series and their deaths. The Commission's formalconclusions, released on January 6, 1954, were introduced by the fol-lowing press statement:

On the basis of information now available, It is evident that radioactivity fromatomic tests was not responsible for deaths and Illness among sheep in areasadjacent to the Nevada Proving Grounds last Spring, the U.S. Atomic EnergyCommission reported today.

The ABC findings, reached as the result of extensive research studies, was con-curred in by the U.S. Public Health Service and the Bureau of Animal Industry,U.S. Department of Agriculture. Prior to issuance by the ABC, the report wasreviewed by the Department of Health, State of Utah. Special studies were con-ducted by veterinary and medical research scientists at Los Alamos ScientificLaboratory and Hanford Works and the University of Tennessee to determinewhether radioactivity contributed to the deaths.u

In marked contrast, Dr. Harold Knapp (a scientist formerly withthe AEC Fallout Studies Branch, 1962-68) testified before the Sub-committee that exposure to radioactive fallout was, in fact, the primarycause of the sheep deaths. Taking issue with the AEC's report, Dr.Knapp concluded in his recent exhaustive study, entitled "SheepDeaths in Utah and Nevada Following the 1953 Nuclear Tests," asfollows:

The simplest explanation of the primary cause of death in the lambing ewes isirradiation of the ewe's gastrointestinal tract by beta particles from all the fissionproducts that were ingested by the sheep along with open range forage. Irradia-tion of the sheep's thyroid and other internal organs by specific nuclides includedin the fallout, coupled with the severity of range conditions that particular year,were undoubtedly contributing factors. The internal radiation doses to the 01tract of adult sheep are calculated to be in the range of thousands of rads, eventhough the external gamma dose to the sheep was within the 8.9 r limit per testseries established by the Atomic Energy Commission as acceptable for personsliving in areas adjacent to the test site.

The death of the newborn lambs may be attributed to serious damage to theirthyroids from doses in the range of 20,000 to 40,000 rads from the isotopes ofradlolodine present in the fallout from the 24 March 1968 test (NANCY), and in-gested by the pregnant ewes 40-60 days prior to birth. Fetal thyroid doses in thisrange may occur when the pregnant ewe grazes in an area where the externalgamma infinite dose is only 4 rads."

Of even greater importance, the Subcommittee received substantialdocumentation from the files of the government veterinarians andscientists, assigned the task of investigating the 1958 sheep deaths,which revealed the government's concerted effort to disregard and todiscount all evidence of a causal relationship between exposure of thesheep to radioactive fallout and their deaths. In addition, the Subcom-mittee heard testimony from various sheep ranchers who herded sheepin the Utah/Nevada ranges during this time period and who sufferedextensive livestock losses.9. Personal aooounts

A panel of sheep ranchers, including Mr. Kern Bullock, Mr. JackPace, and Mrs. Annie Corry, and Dr. Stephen Brower (Iron CountyAgricultural Agent, 1950-54) testified before the Subcommittee about

"n ABC, Report on Sheep Losses Adcent to the Nevada Proving Grounds (January ,1954 [Hereiafter referred to as A Beport]. Hearings, supra note 4, at 1168.

Za Hearin, supra note 4, at 519, 1171-178.

• :,/*

5

the events surrounding the sheep losses which occurred in the springand summer of 1953. The sheepmen stated that they receiveAno warn-ing as to the actual time for the detonations or the potential dangersposed to them by the radioactive fallout:

Mr. SANTrNI ... during this period of time that you've testified about beforethis committee, did you receive any forewarnings about the fact that there wasgoing to be a blast and that you should not be in the area... ?

Mr. BULLOCL None whatsoever. Never told us anything. The bomb Just wentoff.

* * * * * * *

Mr. PACa. They had it on the radio that they were going to shoot. Sometimesthey'd delay the shot for two weeks till the wind condition was right, but as faras any warning as to whether it was going to do us any damage or not, we didn'thave any."

Owing to the fact that "there was no storm to wash the atomic fall-out off the brush" Mr. Pace testified the sheep were exposed furtherto radioactive fallout as they grazed their way home." During theroutine lambing and shearing operations, the sheep ranchers notedthat the lambs were born with grotesque deformities and the sheepdeveloped blisters and lesions on their faces and their bodies. 15 In addi-tion, the wool of the sheep did not shear properly.' Subsequently,thousands of the lambs and ewes died.16*

Dr. Stephen Brower stated that he was present at the time that thefirst government scientists arrived to investigate the sheep deaths.According to the sheepmen and the local veterinarian, Dr. Browertestified, the physical condition of the sheep reflected a malady uniqueto their experience:

... they assured me that, in the years that they had run sheep on the ranch,[they had never seen] these characteristics, such as the lesions around the faceand the head, the slippage of the wool, and particularly the high radiation read-ings we were getting off the thyroids of these live sheep.. ."

Although most of the sheep were dead at the time that the first gov-ernment investigation began, Mr. Bullock stated that "the AtomicEnergy Commission got a few of them to test ... and they were stillhot sheep." 1 Mr. Pace added that he overheard the scientists remarkthat the sheep were "hotter than a $2 pistol'".' In sum, the sheepmenconcluded that the sheep had died from radiation exposure particu-larly in view of the preliminary AEC report that found a high ac-cumulation of radioactive Iodine-131 in the sheep.

3. Government response(a) Summary.-The first field investigation, which was conducted

by federal and state government employees, revealed significant evi-dence of livestock exposure to radioactive fallout. The scientists foundskin irritations and burns on the animals as well as high levels of

""Health Etects of Low.Level Radiation," Joint Hearings before the House Subcom-mittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Comrmere and the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committeeon Labor and Human Resources and the Committee on the Judiciary. 96th Cong. 1stSession, Serial No. 96-41 and 96-42, at 240 (1979) (Hereinafter referred to as JointHearinsp].

"V Id. at 280."u Id. at 228-229."u Id. at 281."I, Id. at 229 and Hearings, supra note 4, at 996-999.st Joint Hearings, supra note 18, at 288."u Id. at 24."Id. at 280.

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radioisotopic concentrations in the thyroids of the sheep. Subse-quently, higher level government officials classified the reported re-sults of that investigation and assigned other scientists to investigatethe case.

Later, although there was a lack of unanimity between the AECofficials on the one hand, and the federal and state health officials onthe other, the Commission disregarded the evidence correlating thesheep deaths to radioactive fallout. The AEC further issued a state-ment absolving the government from responsibility in the sheepdeaths, misrepresenting that the statement was unanimously endorsedby the Commission officials and the health officials.

(b) Discssion.-The veterinary team--comprised of Utah StateHealth Veterinarian, Monroe A. Holmes; U.S. Public Health Veter-inarians, William 0, Hadlow and Arthur H. Wolff; Major Robert J.Veenstra U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory; and Dr. Rich-ard E. Thompsett, veterinary consultant to the AE -which con-ducted the first field investigation on the sheep noted extremely highreadings off the thyroids of the sheep, indicating a high accmumula-tion of radioactive Iodine-181, as well as lesions on the heads, mouthsand backs of the sheep, identified as beta burns similar to those foundon animals used in radiation experiments at the Health ResearchCenter in Los Alamos, New Mexico." In fact, the preliminary reportby Arthur H. Wolff (then-Acting Chief of the Radiological HealthTraining Section, U.S. Public Health Service) noted that,

the concentration of radioactivity in these thyroid glands as of June 9, 1958exceed(ed) by a factor of 200-1,000 the maximum permissible concentration ofradioactive Iodine for humans as stated in the National Bureau of StandardsHandbook 52."

Notably, these extraordinary concentrations were measured frontsheep which actually survived exposure to the radioactive fallout andwhich were sacrificed purposely for scientific analysis." Presumably,the sheep which died sustained higher exposures of radiation.

Yet, the final report issued by tha Atomic Energy Commissionomitted this data and inexplicably concluded that,

the peculiar lesions observed on sheep around Ce<ar City 1n the Spring of 1958and the abnormal losses suffered by the several sheepmen [could not be ...attributed to the atomic tests conducted at the Nevada Proving Grounds." "

County Agricultural Agent Stephen Brower asserted that the AECdid not merely ignore the data; "they covered it up."4 Alarmed thatthe scientists who initially were assigned to review the sheep deathswere taken off the investigation, Dr. Brower testified:

... In fact, Dr. Thompsett who said he would give me a copy of the reportand provide a copy of his report to the livestock men, indicating the readingsand the appearance of the animals definitely were similar to an experimentalradiation damage done on animals, told me later that his report was pickedup-even his own personal copy-and he was told to rewrite it and eliminateany reference to speculation about radiatioli damage or effects"

* See: Wolff, Arthur i. "Prellminary Report of Radioassays of Selected Tissue Sped-mens of Sheep from Cedal City, Utah Area" (June 10, 1953). Joint Hearings, supra note18. at 1509.

Also see: Holmes, Monroe A. "Report of Conference Held at Los Alamos, N. Mex. onUtah Sheep Deaths" (Nov. 9, 1958). Joint Heartinl, supra note 18, at 1700-170.n Joint Hearins, supra note 18, at 1509.

- Id. at 1702. Also see, Hearings, supra note 4, at 979, 1108, 1172-1178.* AIS Report, supra note 11. See Joint Hearings, supra note 18, at 571.9 Joint Hearins, supra note 18, at 282.

SId. at 288.

In addition, Monroe A. Homes (then-Veterinarian, Bureau StatesService, Utah $tate Department of Health) repeatedly objecte to theconclusions of the AEC'v draft report." Yet, the A~C' finS reportignored these criticisms."

Correspondence submitted fo inclusion in the Subcommitterecord by the Honorable Scott M. Matheson, Governor of the State ofUtah, revealed other irregularities during the AEC investigation ofthe sheep deaths. In a confidential memorandum, Dr. Arthur Wol ofthe veterinary team summarized a crucial meeting of government andscientific consultants which convened in Los Alamos, Nw Mexico onOctober 27, 1953, to discuss the sheep deaths. He noted tha GordonDunning (then-Health Physicist with the ABC Division of Biologyand Medicine) believed "it was imperative that he prepare a statementfor Commissioner Zuckert of the AEC pertaining to the Utah sheepsituation." " Dr. Dunning claimed that the statement was necessary"before Commissioner Zuckert [would] open the 'purse strings' forfuture continental weapons tests." "Despite the lack of unanimity be-tween the AEC government officials and the federal and state scientificexperts on the cause of the sheep deaths, pr. Dunning apparently wasanxious to release a statement that would free the Commission to con-tinue at any cost the nuclear weapons testing program. Dr. Wolff notedthat given the disagreement among the consultants the statement sup-posedly was "for internal use only within the AEC and it [would notlbe construed as a joint PHS-AEC statement."- Dr. Monroe Holmes also attested both to the lack of unanimityamong the individuals at this meeting and the desire of Dr. Dunningto prepare a vindicating summary statement on the sheep case. In hisreport of the meeting held on October 27, 1953 Dr. Holmes noted thatno final statement on the matter was concurred in by the participatingmembers:

Although we all did not agree with the conclusions, as a group, drawn up byGordon Dnning... we were asked to sign this [statement] attesting to ourattendance.... a

Yet, in a memorandum written by Gordon Dunning to Morse Salis-bury (then-Director of the AEC Division of Information Services),the statement was represented as a jointly-issued summary:

... After prolonged discussions I was able to get the group to agree to a seriesof statements which I thought you would be interested in seeing. The membersof the committee signed the original. The statements were finally agreed uponjust prior to departure time so that they are not in the most elegant grammaticalform but do represent the most tangible statements to date."

The AEC not only disregarded data which linked the sheep deaths tonuclear radioactive fallout, the Commission also fabricated the agree.ment between the AEC and various health officials which discountedradiation as the cause of these deaths. By falsely using the October 27th

- See, Holmes. Monroe A. Observations and Comments on Draft of Paul Pearson's FinalReport on Sheep Losses (Dee 80, 1958). See Joint Hearlns, supra note 18 at 1781-1782.

SSe, Bushnell, Daniel 8. "The Shep Deaths and the AEC Cover-Up" (Apr. 1, 1979)[hereinafter referred to as Bushnell Report. See Joint Hearin, supra note 18, at 521-

627 especiallyy "Report Revisions" at 580-88).SWolf Arthur H. "Report of Trip to Los Alamos," Oct. 26-29, 1958. See Joint Heartags,

suras note 18. at 17i.

SId.* Joint Hearlng. supra note 18, at 1702.N Memo from Gordon Dunning to Morse Salisbury. Nov. 3, 1958. See Hearinag, supra

note 4 at 7TT7

68-708 0 - 80 - 8

8

statement, the AEC misrepresented the group's belief and insteadconcluded that,

... (a)1 of these data present a preponderance of evidence to support theconclusion that the lesions were not produced by radioactive fallout . .. Theamount of highest radiation dosage to the thyroid has been calculated to be farbelow the quantity necessary to produce detectable injury."

In addition, this statement was used by the Commission in its finalreport released in January, 1954. While refined only marginally toreflect "review" rather than "concurrence" by the Utah State Depart-ment of Health, the final report persistently dismissed radiation asthe cause of the sheep losses:

Considering all of the information and the data now available at this time, itsa apparent that the peculiar lesions observed in the sheep around Cedar City in

the spring of 1908 and the abnormal losses suffered by the several sheepmen can-not at this time be accounted for by radiation or attributed to the atomic testsconducted at the Nevada Proving Grounds. This opinion is concurred in by theU.S. Public Health Service (HEW) and the Bureau of Animal Industry. Thisreport has been reviewed by the Department of Health of the State of Utah."

4. Denial of compensation(a) Sumnary.-The government's concerted effort to discount the

evidence correlating the sheep deaths to radioactive fallout clearly wasmanifested in the AEC's stated policy that the government would notcompensate the sheep ranchers for their livestock losse. In furtheranceof this policy, the government proceeded to classify all reportedevidence to the contrary and disregarded sworn testimony regardingsuch documentation. Predictably, the sheep ranchers' attempt to liti-gate their claim for recovery of their losses was thwarted by thegovernment.

(b) Discussiotn-Mr. Pace testified that, during the initial investi-gation, Joseph Sanders (then-Deputy Field Manager, Las Vegas FieldOffice of the AEC) advised him that the government could not reim-burse the sheepmen because of the financial repercussions of such com-pensation." "In other words " Mr. Pace continued, "every irregularitywould be blamed to them..." "

Dr. Stephen Brower testified that the government's policy not tocompensate the sheepmen was stated to himby Dr. Paul Pearson (then-Chief of the Biological Branch, Division of Medicine, AEC) :

... Dr. Pearson told me... that the AEC could under no circumstances affordto have a claim established against them and have that precedent set. And hefurther indicated that the sheepmen could not expect under any circumstances tobe reimbursed for that reason."

And, to prevent this precedent from being established, the govern-ment proceeded to build a case against compensation. As stated-by Dr.Brower before the Subcommittee, ".. by the end of 1954 they had abattery of people coming through telling us that the levels of radiationcould not have caused the damage ... we were just constantly bom-barded with expert opinions."

When the Iron County sheepmen finally pursued litigation againstthe Federal Government in 1955, they also were hampered in present-

SABC. Statement in re: Los Alamos Conference on livestock Loses Oct. S7 1958. eeJoit ler . supra note 13 at 1680.

SReport, supra note 11. See Joint Hearings, supra note 18, at 571." Joint earns supra note 18. at 230-231."N at 231.

"a? R23

9

ing evidence to support their claim." Expressing his concern on thismatter, Dr. Brower wrote to Utah Governor Scott Matheson, as fol-lows:

When we finally did get this case Into court, none of the technical data fromexperts was allowed to be used and of course the Iron County sheepmen couldnot make a case that would stand up in court without this data. The original,preplanned strategy of the AEC worked because they had the indiscriminatepower to intimidate, withhold, screen, change and classify any and all informa-tion, reports and data.*

Commenting on the lack of expert witnesses speaking on behalf ofthe sheepmen,Dr. Brewer also testified that the first scientists assignedto the investigation "were not allowed to testify." 1

Mr. Bullock added:The only witness we had was the livestock men themselves. The Government

had, in our case, witnesses from all over the country. . . "

Although the sheep ranchers' claim was denied by the court basedupon the government's contention that the levels of fallout were too

. low to have resulted in the sheep dethe Judge Sherman P. Christen.son apparently was moved by the plight of the sheepmen who wereex e unwittingly to the radioactive fallout. In his decision, JudgeChristenson severely admonished the government for failing to alertthe sheepmen of theblasts:

It seems so manifest as hardly to be subject to suggestion to the contrary thatthose charged with security provisions in connection with the tests owed to thosewho might be substantially damaged by resulting radioactive fallout, the duty touse reasonable care to ascertain their whereabouts within areas to be affected andto at least give them timely warning so that they would be in a position to pro-tect themselves and their property, If necessary. There were no advance warn-

.'ings given or other precautions taken to safeguard the herders or their sheep.There was no suggestion in the evidence of any unexpected developments. Anyvariables with reference to direction or velocity of winds aloft would seem Imma.terial since the agents of the Atomic Energy Commission did not attempt toascertain the location of the sheep with or without reference to any prospectivepattern of fallout dependent upon winds. Damage, tif any, which did oowr fromthe blket could well have been a•ticipated by those in charge of the tests for"aught the evidence disclose. [Emphasis added]

6. CawsationUpon reviewing the documents concerning the sheep case which

were submitted to the Subcommittee by Governor Matheson, Dr.Donald Frederickson (Director; National Institutes of Health; De-partment of Health Education and Welfare [HEW], now the Depart-ment of Health and Human Services [HHS]) stated that "it wouldhave been extremely difficult, probably impossible, to conclude thatradiation did not at least contribute to the cause of death of thesheep"." Dr. Harold Knapp, author of the recent scientific study en-titled "Sheep Deaths in Utah and Nevada Following the 1958 NuclearTests", concurred with Dr. Frederickson's statement. He further testi-fled'upon the government's limited investigation of the sheep deaths:

* As a result of damage sustained from the sheep deaths. the sheepmen ultimately suedthe U.8. Government. See. BuUoll, et at .rUited hstee, 145 P. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1956).

" nLetter from Stephen Brower to the Honorable Scott M. Matheson Feb. 14 19 SeeJoint Hearings, supra note 18. at 1850. See also, "Bushnell Report,' as fled in JointHearing, supra note 18, at 521-687.

t Jo t rHearings, supra note 18, at 288.A Id. at 242." *Id. a t • •. United Sfteo. 1465 . Supp. 827 (D. Utah 1956). See Joint Hearings,oun t 1 pra not. 1at 6at .- Joint HVrln sura note 18. at 00.

.. ..>.ml*'*f. . ~. . . .. . .... , . , * . ^

·:t~ ' ""*"^ - . ::

10

There were a number of things that should have been asked, but the mostImportant one was: How much did the sheep eat and how much fallout does Ittake to kill a sheep

* * * * * * *

These are things that you obviously would do if you were looking at the problemnow. But they were not done then.

* * * * * * *

I would certainly say there was no excessive zeal [by the AEC] in trying to ndall the possible ways in which a sheep could have been killed by fallout from thetests."

When queried about the ability of scientists to do the type calcula-tions required to ascertain the potential hazards from internalizinradiation, Dr. Knapp responded that there were a few people avail-able at that time who coul do these extrapolations. In this regard, Dr.Knapp attested to the expertise demonstrated particularly by theAEC's own health physicist:

"All I know is that Dr. Dunning and Dr. Wolff are the only people in the publicrecord whom I see doing anything like this kind of computation, particularly Dr.

-. - .. -Dunnlng." -Still further, Dr. Knapp stated that, in his opinion, the potential

hazard caused from internal ingestion of radiation was known to theAEC between the years 1951 and 1955. According to Dr. Knapp's testi-mony, this knowledge was not used by the AEC in its investigation ofthe sheep deaths:

Mr. SANTIrL Was the knowledge available between the years 1961 and 1965that there might be potential damage caused from internal ingestion of damagingradiation?

Dr. KzxA. I think so.

I found that by 1967 Dr. Gordon Dunning, who was a superb technician, had"put In the record of the congressional hearings essentially every one of the com-putations that I needed for my analysis.

Furthermore, I think it is on page 235 of his testimony in the 1967 hearingsthat he makes a very interesting statement He says: 'We just have a new reportthat suggests that a 40-rad external gamma dose would correspond to tens ofthousands of rads dose to the thyroid.'

I do not know what was in his mind [in 1958], but it is as if he anticipatedevery single question, equation, and natural line of investigation which anyonewould go through if they were trying to do what is done in the paper I havesubmitted.

* * * * * * *

I do know that when they had a conference at Los Alamos he was instru-mental in channeling the investigation into three speelfc routes, namely, theexternal gamma dose, the dose to the thyroid, and the beta dose to the skin. Hewas quite explicit... He was also explicit-in the statement which you wil find inannex 28 to appendix I of my study that it was only the thyroid dose that couldbe Important internally."

Dr. Knapp additionally testified that the theory which discountedinternal radiation as a major problem was incorporated into the AEC'sradiation protection policy and persisted as such until 1962. Comment*

* H.earin supra note 4. at 296. 27.Wld. at Stý-o . (Norn.-The term "rad" refers to the amount of fallout that has bdn

deposited and absorbed •r ram welhbt of tissue. rom 1961-1092, the National Bureauof Standards Handbook r2 establlhed 8. rads per one-fourth year exposure as the p arstandard for whole-body penetration exposure. From 192 to to the present. thestandard has been set at 8 rads. Also note: Potential exposure to the throd Is measure bthe teouetrations of Iodine-131 which Is found in mtlk. pon a tingflorteotamiated by radioactive fallout, cows produce milk with concenraon of -181.can delop uch radloliotople concentrations la their thyrods after drinking the cor-"tamnnated milk).

1 .* .* * .***

:4

11

ing upon the origin of these internal radiation standards, Dr. Knappasserted:

... the standards for internal hazards were explicit They were written byDr. Dunnlng. They said that unless the gamma dose got up to 20 rads or morethat you did not have to worry about the Internal hazard.

In his extensive study of the sheep deaths, Dr. Knapp calculatedthat, based upon the reported external gamma dose (8.6 rads) duringthe first week after the "Harry" shot (March 24,1958), a 70-kilogramadult sheep could be expected "to ingest between 90 and 860 milli-curies of gross fission product beta activity... [and] (t)he amountof Iodine-181 ingested by the sheep the first week of grading . ..o[ouldl be expected to lie in the range of 1120 and 4480 micro-curies." Still further in his analysis, Dr. Knapp stated that, "[fjorthe pregnant ewe, .. the damage to the GI tract from ros fissionproduct beta activity is the dominant biological effect" ~ Calculatingthat the sstrointestinal tract of the ewes received 1000-8000 rads ofgross fission radioactivity and the thyroid of the ewes received 20,000rads of Iodine-181, Dr. Knapp concluded that, during the last 40-60days of gestation, the thyroids of the fetal lambs would have re-ceived at least 1.5 times the isotopic dose of radioactivity received bythe thyroids of the ewes.51

Still further, Dr. Knapp argued that the government was aware,prior to 1958, of the deleterious effects on fetal lambs of ingestion ofrelatively low levels of I-181 by their mothers during the last stagesof pregnancy." He pointed to the fact that from late 1951 throughearly 1954, Dr. Leo K. Busted conducted sheep experiments at theHanford Atomic Products Operation in Richland, Washington,whereby pregnant ewes were individually fed 185, 240 or 1800 micro-curies of I-181 per day at varying intervals during gestation. Theresults of these experiments showed that the overwhelming majoritof lambs either were born dead, died shortly after birth, or were weakand lethargic at birth, exhibiting signs of hypothyroidism and otherphysical deformities, and eventually succumbed to pneumonia orother secondary infections." As Dr. Knapp stated in his study theHanford lambs exhibited symptoms similar to those of the Utahlambs-a fact which is particularly significant for the sheepranchers." Yet, these.results were not explicated in the text of theBusted report; rather, they were obscurely inferred through thelisted references to the report." In fact, the report's conclusionsmerely stated what did not occur as a result of these experiments:

Premature lambing described in some sheep flocks was not observed in theexperimental sheep at Hanford, although some test animals were fed up to 1800microcuries per day for 420 days.

Additionally, the results of these experiments demonstrated thatsignificantly greater doses of 1-181 than those used in the base case

* Id. at 802.* Knapp Report. supra note 7. a 21.(NoTr.-The term "milllcurles. refer to the actual amount of gros beta activity

Ingested by the sheep (without regard to body weight). Thee amounts were computedfrom measurements taken in experimental animal etu e.)

"aid.* Id. at 24-925. 957. 958 975-998.WId. at 923. 926, 956-109*.

SId. at 2957-958.

""I -id 'A 9 25.+-+

-»»,.< - ---

i

IS

computations were necessary to produce clinically observable effectsupon the adult sheep over an extended period of time." This particu.lar point was stressed by the AEC in denying a causative relationbetween nuclear fallout and the 1958 sheep deaths However, as Dr.Knapp further elucidated in his study, the dominant, lethal effect ofthe gross fission products upon the I tracts of adult sheep, was afact not considered by the AEC, and subsequently by the Utah Dis-trict Court, in reviewing the sheep case." In fact, the AEC omittedthis data from the discussion at the October 1958 conference held atLos Alamos, New Mexico:

. . It was Dr. Dunning who omitted the GI tract from consideration whenthe Los Alamos statement was drafted ...

* * * * * * *

. . It is at thbl point in the proceedings and the subsequent trial concerningthe sheep deaths . .. that the one internal hazard which would first be fatal toa racing ewe was neatly omitted from all consideration."

In addition, Dr. Knapp projected that, based on the reportedgamma dose rates of 2-4 mr/hr above background radiation made onte backs of some sheep from the Cedar City area on June 18 1958(25 days after the "Harry" shot), a hot spot area of limited geo-graphic size existed in the Cedar City vicinity which correspondedJtoa 1-week open field dose. from 8 to 66 rad, and an infinity dose - -in the range of 54 to 108 rads" "

Elaborating upon these calculations, Dr. Knapp was able to con-clude in his report that nuclear radioactive fallout emitted durin' the"Upshot-Knothole" test series was, in fact, the primary cause of thesheep deaths which occurred in Utah and Nevada during the springand summer of 1958. Contrary to the government's emphasis on thesafety of the external radiation dosage which resulted from this par-ticular test series, Dr. Knap held that these levels were sufficient,and in certain instances were her than ogally reported, to resultin the injuries and deaths of the sheep which grazed in the Utah/Nevada range areas.'.

Of particular significance among the comments submitted to theSubcommittee on the Knapp study were those filed by the Departmentof HHS, whereby the Department maintained that radiation was, infact, a contributing factor to the 1958 sheep deaths:

We maintain that overwintering, malnutrition, trailing, lambing, possibleintercurrent Illnesses, and radiation all contributed to the sheep deaths.. .(Emphasli added)]

The importance of this statement cannot be overemphasized inthat it is the first admission by a federal agency that a casual rela-

W • at 921.

* at 927-028, 957-95s*X at a92.

id at 624.* Id at 993-1098. 1169-1188. Subsequent to Dr. Knapp's presentation of his report

before the Subcommittee various scientie authorities and government agencies have eom*mented on the report's methodology and conclusion.Whlle these commentators have notbeeb able to disprove the theory advanced n the Knapp study relating the 1953 sheepeats to exposure to fallout emitted durlnt the "Upshot-Knothble" test iertes, the follow*

two ues have become focal points for discussion : (1) whether or not the small num-her of animals sacriiced by the government okclals from some of the affected herds were,in fact representative of the sheep which actually died but which were not exame byofcilals to ascertain their pathololcal eondltfos: and (2) what amount of radtactually existed In the range areas which absequently was inested by the ra sta een(For a complete text of these comments and responses, ee Hearna supra note 4, at T,

IA at 951.

tionship did exist let*eeO the fallout emitted during the nucleartest operations said te 19P8 sheep deaths. This admission is in ob-vious contradiction to the January 1954 statement issued by the AEC.6. Contusions

Based upon the evidence presented to the Subcommittee regard-ing the sheep case, the SubConmittee concludes that:

(1) the government t Iving sulicient reason to know of the hazardsassociated with radiation eXposure, inexcusably failed to give adequatewarning to the sheejpnea regarding the danger posed by the nuclearradiation emitted d-irig he 1958 "Upshot-Knothole" nuclear testseries;

(2) the governmewo t JIoin gly disregarded and suppressed evidencecorrelating the deaths of tle sheep to exposure to radioactive falloutemitted during the "Up4hotknothole" test series:

(8) exposure to rdiotve fallout emitted during the "Upehot.Knothole' test series wfa i~ore likely than not, the cause of the 1958shee deaths in Utah and &evads;

(4) the governrient wrongly denied compensation to the sheeprancere for losses umcurred as a result of the government's operationof the nuclear testing progr•ln.

1. BackgroundWhile livestock rising downwind from the test site had immedi-

ate reactions to nuclear radiation exposure, people who resided inthese areas demonstrated more long-term serious health effects. Years"after exposure to radio~etive fallout, residents living downwind fromthe test site were foumd to exhibit unusually high incidences of cancer-related illnesses.S The Subcommittee heard testimony from many individuals about

their exposure to ~eoa0cive fallout and the ill effects that they,their families and teir friends suffered during the government'soperation of the atnMospher c nuclear weapons testing program. Inedition, the Subcoinqnittee reviewed substantive documentation, mostnotably from Dr. Ed-ard Weiss of the U.S. Public Health Service,and Dr. Joseph Lyon. of the University of Utah, regarding the highincidence of leukei and thyroid cancers for tis particular popu-lation. The Subcommiittee also received testimony and evidence whichdisclosed the government's disregard of data questioning the ac-curacy and the adequy of the government's early radiological safetyprogram. Upon analysis of this material, the Subcommittee concludesthat exposure to radi tive fallout emitted during the atmosphericnuclear test operation was, iore likely than not, responsible for seri-ous adverse health effects asuered by the downwind residents.9. Personal account

On April 19, 1979, a panel of private citizens from the St. GeorgeSUtah vicinity-inchdin Elizabeth Catalan, Margaret Bruhn Cub

Hall Lyle, Janice Iammphries, and Elmer Pickett-testified beforethe Subcommittee coeerine g the nuclear tests conducted during theS 1950's and 1960's at thlrevaa Test Site and the adverse health reper-cussions suffered by their relatives and friends.

t

V" ̂ .'n~ .· ·* : . .. '*-l .- . *· ·- *· ~ - *,

14

On April 28, 1979, an additional panel of private citizens fromUtah and Nevada-including Martha Bardoli Laird, Dorothy andDoren Fox, Louise Nunamaker Dorothy Roberts and Ill Snyde---presented evidence of cancer-related illnesses that occurred in thesestates, particularly in the 1950's, during the government's operationof the nuclear testing program.

All of the witnesses attested to the lack of notice given them by.the government regarding the actual detonation times and the poten-tial health risks associated with radiation exposure. Testifying in thisregard, Mr. Lyle stated:

. .. we were never warned, only ... sometimes over the radio they'd tellus that there was going to be a blast and ... one time I can remember wherethey had the children stay inside; but other than that, they gave us no warningof any kind."

Mr. Pickett, concurring with this statement, testified:. .. I feelthat we were'totaily misled in the information [the A&O] gave

as to the dangers involved. We were led to believe.., that there was no danger.Once ... they asked us to stay indoors; but the majority of the people did nothear that warning .. broadcast over the radio... But other than that, I recallof no instance that we were given any type of indication of any danger."

Sharing these feelings, Mrs. Laird asserted:.---.-- At ao timewere-we-ever called upon or- talked tor told about- the-effeets---

of radiation, what it could do to us or anything else, and there is only onetime that I ever received a notice from the Government that they were goingto set a bomb of, and that was in 1908 after we had sold the ranch and movedto Carson Oity.

Exemplifying the present reactions of the individuals who livednear the Nevada Test Site during the atmospheric nuclear weaponsoperations, Mrs. Laird testified that she felt "used" by the govern-ment, like a forgotten guinea pig:

I feel that we were used more or less as guinea pigs. The forgotten guineapigs, because guinea pigs they will come to the cage and check which they neverhave. To this day, they have never checked anyone in my family or anyonethat I know of from the fallout of these bombs."

S. Sioentifio medial studies(a) Sumw nary.-The Subcommittee reviewed signifcant scientific

evidence of a high incidence of leukemia and thyroid cancers forresidents living downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the gov-ernment's operation of the atmospheric nuclear weapons testing pro-gram. In 1965, Dr. Edward S. Weiss documented an unusual increasein leukemia deaths in southwestern Utah for the years 1959 through1960. The Department of HEW investigated additional leukemia"hot spots" in Arizona and Utah for the years 1965 through 1970,but the Department failed to draw any final conclusions on causa-tion. Then, m 1979, Dr. Joseph L. Lyon's study in the New EnglndJournal of Medicine provided further substantiation of the earlyWeiss study on the excess leukemia deaths that occurred in Utah forthe years 1959 through 1987. Statistics from the Cancer Center inReno, Nevada also revealed a higher incidence of leukemia deathsthan the national average for the years 1959 through 1968.

"* Joint Hertn. supra note 13. at 246." Id at 24.* Ha qi. supr a note 4 at 1." Id at

•I • + +&

, * t . . .

15

Regarding the incidence of thyroid abnormalities and cancers, Dr.Edward S. Weiss also published a 1967 study in the American Journalof Public Health. Reporting a twofold increase in thyroiditis anda fourfold increase in thyroid cancer in Utah during the years 1948through 1962, the study recommended additional research to deter-mine both the extent of the excess cancer as well as its causal factors.Before conclusive evidence was compiled on this subject, however,federal funding of the research was discontinued in 19T0.

(b) Disoueswi-o-In 196, Dr. Edward S. Weiss (then-Deputy Chiefof the Population Studies Program, U.S. Public Health Service) re-ported to the AEC that, upon examining the leukemia death records forsouthwestern Utah fom 1950 to 1964, an unusual increase in deaths wasnoted for the years 1959-1960.*1 Dr. Weiss recommended that the U.S.Public Health Service perform a formal etiological study to analyze theleukemia deaths that occurred in Utah during this time period. In addi-tion, the U.S. Public Health Service proposed a formal review of theoral, dental and medical characteristics of Utah school children for the195 .o . ... ......

Despite the serious health issues raised in these proposals, the AECadvised against a formal investigation. Notably, the AEC's decision

S was based on the advice of Dwight A. Ink (then-General Manager forthe AEC) who recommended against the studies because. ofp o ntiayll

etrimen italfects uponiiegovernmeiis nuclear weapons ein pro-gram. In the pertinent part of the memorandum, Dwight Ink advised

. the Commission:S Although we do not oppose developing further data in these areas, performance

of the above U.S. Public Health Service studies will pose potential problems to theCommission. The problems are: (a) adverse public reaction; (b) law suits; and

S (c) jeopardising the programs at the Nevada Test 1ite.*In 1967, Dr. Edward Weiss published another report which stated

"that'thyroiditis increased twofold and thyroid cancer increased almostfourfold among Utah people during the years 1948 through 19628. Theabnormalities were observed in both sexes primarily in the 20-29 yearage group and most notably in the 1958-1962 time period.1'

S The study resulted from concerns raised at hearings held by theJoint Committee on Atomic Energy in August, 1968 regarding poten- .

S tial thyroid injury to Utah infants and young children as a consequence"of exposure to Iodine-181 emitted from the nuclear test operations atthe Nevada Test Site. Both the U.S. Public Health Service and theSUtah State Department of Health collaborated in the study as a partof their research on human health hazards from exposure to radioactivefallout.

"Although the most significant exposures were believed to have oc-curred in the early 1950's, no actual measurements of Iodine-181 con-

SWes•u, Edward 8. "Lmkeima Mortality Studles in Southwefter Utah," a proposedarticle (Sept 14. 1966). See Joint Hearts supra note 18, at 220. .

* e. "Comments ona nrmental and Genete to te Oal, Dental andM efkfI C fl terstles Uf tah Sc 0ool Chldren.1 See Joit Heft Csni, supra note 1S,

*N i orandO m from D a1 hr Ink to ABC Cbtrman SBeborr, Sept. 9, 196. See JointS,;l Olsen. Rilchar AL; Thompson, . D Carlyle Ma. Alfonu, V.*, "s 51Treate td8la AmoXng Young P.. le uta 8-12"; AmerIcan

S.... We8tud1.SeJpt!eang. supra note 18. at boM.SI alT No;- 10 OtoberiLsat.at Wt

10

centrations in milk were made by government monitors until 1987."For this reason, the study relied upon estimates of exposure to Iodine*181 from drinking milk based on measurements of ssion yield andcertain assumptions about the adionuclide's tranamission via the foodchain system to human beings. '

The 1967 Weiss Study recommended further research to determine -whether a true excess of thyroid cancer was occurring in Utah and, if so,to establish the genetic or environmental factors associated with it.Noting the relatively short period of time between potential exposureduring the early days of atmospheric nuclear testing and the review ofdisplayed illnesses, the subsequent study, as suggested by Dr. Weiss,recommended long-term surveillance of the exposed population toaccurately characterize the potentially adverse health effects of low-level radioactive fallout." However federal funding of the research,particularly that performed by Dr. obert Pendleton (Director, Uni-versity of Utah, Department of Radiologicl Health), was terminated.In 1970 before conclusive eiidence was compiled."

Additional incidences of leukemia outbreaks were investigated by theS " Center for Disease Control of the Publio Health Service (Department

of HEW) in cooperation with the National Cancer Institute (Depart-ment of HEW) during the years 1965 through 1970. The communitiesstudied were Fredonia Arizona; Kanab Mo entclo P' Kn _g aTeasG rove L eanCh Whl leukema

clusters were found in these communities, no conclusion was drawn asto the possible cause(s) of these concentrated incidences of the disease.Dr. Donald Frederickson responded to the Subcommittee that nodefinitive conclusions were developed from these studies in 1970:

In none of these communities did epidemiological Investigations reveal anyclear-cut etlological patterns, and it appeared possible that these case clusterswere chance Instances."

Ultimately, the recently-published study by Dr. Joseph' Lyoi (As-sistant Profesor, Family and Community Medicine, University ofUtah) provided compelling evidence to substantiate further the earlyWeiss Study on excess leukemia cancer deaths occurring in Utah andthe leukemia cluster studies investigated by the Center for DiseaseControl. It concluded that,

A significant excess of leuken)la deaths occurred In children up to 14 year atage livin in Utah between 1960 and 1907. This excess was concentrated int-thecohort of children born between 1951 and 1958, and was most pronounced inthose residing in counties receiving bigh tallout. Over half the excess deaths (1

"Welss dward 8. Rallson Marvin .; London W. Thomas; and Thompouqo D,Cariyle; *.id Nodularity in Southweter Utah School Cblldren Axp tose d

RadUlat6n: Ameri Journal of PubUe H Salth VYoL 61. No. 2, 5Febmrua, 1r oln-after rrd t We Study. ee Jont Heanl, s. upra note 1, at a.

S Testimony of Dr. Donald I. FrederlcksI, or National Injtl te -S Health; Deprtment of H=W. Joint ieau tesuprm not t l t206.(No.o-r._•J

'nederleson' tatmor before the tSbo mte a •la n that no fus wlre avlblto npport tIs reearch when the Nviro iuental Prortlon A6enResP m rbiltyfor cmh "tudyW from the Da et ofHelth. PIhttlon an' •el wtr.' .:WJ. t.eSubcommittee is table to draw any eoacuons about ths lack of feunudo, abo Su.committee notes that the a t to c.tnue thnt ea wanto Ian aency wlth untad ava lable fundto accompilti the task. (See. dlsusson •aft.a Onradiation authorsear at S seoto Iv.) us, s reear was Interrpted at a nritat stage which preluded the reetatop eofltv c s evidence on the occurrence o

thotecarls MU from 19415 rJospro1 "a t 804 view of t findings subtdthe . oltudo. howee. the ubcommltt notes that tee cl•stercd s" 1

dred dncat renc a m tane" S, port disco s-

,- ' - .. ,, :

- . , . ' . . * - ' I . . Ic 1

* *1 ~- **i

out of 80) occurred in the part of the State receiving heaviest radiationexposure."

The report stated that leukemia was studied as a separate categoryfrom other childhood neoplasms owing to its high incidence inchildren, its known association with radiation exposure and the relativelyshort latency period for the disease."' While reporting the associationbetween the excess leukemia deaths and exposure to radioactive fall-out emitted from the Nevada Test Site, the study also recommendedadditional research of similarly-exposed populations to substantiatefurther the findings submitted therein." In this regard Dr. Lyontestified before the Subcommittee that, as the evidence has been ac-cumulating on the subject, the association has become better defined:

Senator HATCH. And your conclusion would be as a scientist, as a medicalphysician, that there is a high probability that the leukemia has been causedfrom radiation fallout.

Dr. LYON. That's the only conclusion I can draw. The more we look at thedata, the more that becomes evident . . . and the other things we've beenthrough .. . seem to drop by the wayside.f

N.. N...ot unexpectedly,- indications arethat the residents of the Stateof Nevada also may have experienced an unusually high incidence ofleukemia cancer deaths during the nuclear testing period, particularlyfrom 1959 through 1968. From a comparison of the statistics com-piledb b the Reno Cancer.Center to the expected death rate for Nevada ... ,. ,as projected by the American Cancer Society Dr. Carl Chamberlain(Director of Medical Physics, Washoe Medical Center, Nevada) testi-fled that this data suggested a death rate that was "at least as high as

i. expected and most probably higher" than the national average forS leukemia fatalities at that time." For this reason, Dr. Chamberlain

strongly recommended "that a closer study of the radiation exposureS distribution correlated with the patterns of leukemia and cancer in-

cidence be undertaken" for the state."

4. Government response(a) Summary.-As early as 1958, the government was aware of the

potential health hazards posed to humans by the internalization ofS radionuclides absorbed through the food champ system. Yet, the gov-

ernment failed to take measurements of milk contamination by radio-isotopes upon which to establish internal safety standards, untilS 1957. Moreover, the government refused to alter the levels subse-

1 quently set for internal radiation exposure even after a 1968 scientificreport concluded that the government's original assessment of thehazard was substantially underestimated.

SEssentially, these radiation exposure levels were based upon ratesthat factored in what were considered to be countervailing influencessuch as shielding. It later became clear that these levels, upon whichthe early radiological program set both external and internal safety

S standards, were not reflective of the actual measurements taken by thegovernment's monitors of radiation doses or the actual health hazards

SLyon. Joseph L; Klauber, Melville X.; Oardner, John W. and Udall, King 8.; Child-ShoodLemla Associated with fallout from Nuclear Tetl'ng~ New England Journal of"Medicine, VoL 800. No. 8, Feb. 1979; page 899 [Hereinafter referred to as Lyon Studyl.

"Id. at 897* Id. at 01

S., Joint Hearings. sunra note 18 at 876.Heari. s, upra note 4, at 194.

18

posed by the radioactive fallout to specific populations. Nonetheless,the standards were not changed.

In addition, these levels failed to consider potential "hot spots" ofradioactive fallout owing to the limited number of sporadically-placedgovernment monitors. Disregarding personal reports of radiation-related illnesses, which demonstrated potentially higher radiationlevels than those actually measured by the government's monitors, thegovernment persistently discounted the possibility of higher radiationdoses. Still further, the government publicly espoused the safeness ofthe atmospheric nuclear testing program as the government also re-frained from advertising the health hazards associated with exposureto radioactive fallout.

(b) Disoussion.-According to testimony received from MahlonGates (Manager Nevada Operations Office, U.S. Department of En-ergy), there have been 659 nuclear detonations with 189 tests that re-leased radioactivity measured off the test site since January 1951."The responsibility for monitoring this off-site radiation rested withthe AEC Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory from 1951-1954. During1954 a memorandum of understanding was drawn up between the -AEC and the U.S. Public Health Service to share the development ofa program for radiological safety. In 1970, the operating authorityfor the program was transferred to the Environmental Monitoring

- - -. and Supporb Laboratory, Environmental Protection Agency [EPAJr --in Las Vegas, Nevada.

Comparing the protective measures observed'during the early atmos-pheric versus the later underground nuclear test operations, GeneralGates testified that "(i)n addition to some changes in titles of person-nel and locations of operating authority, the 'containment reviews sovital in our current procedures were not pertinent to atmospherictesting."" General Gates submitted that beginningig in 1961, theavailability of more sophisticated laboratory instrumentation . . .permitted major improvements in the estimation of internal exposurethrough the quantification of specific radionuclides." '

Although the current off-site monitoring operation was describedas a technically and instrumentally refined program, General Gatesattributed this characterization as being "basically representative ofthe program from 1961 to the present,' not of the early atmosphericprogram"

Richard Stanley (Deputy Director of the U.S. Environmental Mon-itoring and Support Laboratory in Las Vegas, Nevada) testifiedbefore the Subcommittee on the limitation of the government's radio-logical safety program enforced during the early period of nuclearweapons testing. Dr. Stanley characterized the early program asfollows:

During the first period or the days of atmospheric testing, such protectiveaction measures as keeping residents indoors during cloud passage, evacuatingresidents during cloud passage, and decontaminating vehicles travelling throughfallout areas were used, similar to procedures that would be used today. Theonly difference is that during the days of atmospheric testing, analyticalequipment and techniques weren't adequately developed for the identificationand quantitation of radiolodine. Oonseqently, radioiodine weas't recogoaned a

I at 348."I4. at

:i~e~J2

I

19

a potential problem, and no proteotive aotione were taken to mMmiuse thyroidS dose resulting from the ingestion of milk contaminated with radoiodine ...(Bmphasis added.)"

Yet Dr. Joseph Lyon testified that the AEC was aware of potentialhazards posed by the internalization of radionuclides through thefood chain system as early as 1958 and that, despite such knowledge,the Commission did not act to provide better protection for residentsliving off-site from the testing grounds:

S. . (W)hile there may have been some awareness in the Atomic EnergyCommission or lack of awareness of the seriousness of these problems, in 1968Mr. Weiss cited monitors' reports in the St. George area [which] were very con-Cerned about the milk, went so far as to sample the milk, actually took it backto Las Vegas; and then given the lack of knowledge, did attempt an analysis onthe nuclide higher levels of iodine. So there was some awareness of this.

* * * * * * *.. overall my impression was that there must have been some awareness

of a risk factor and yet nothing ever seems to be pursued to the end where youcan get the precise information .. , we need for our scientific studies."

Even as evidence began accumulating on the necessity for altering-- the permissible standards for internal radiation exposure, resistance

was met within the Atomic Energy Commission. In testimony beforethe Subcommittee, Dr. Harold Knapp detailed his discovery in 1968that the original estimates of the internal hazard posed by radioactive

.- fallout were understated drastically by the government:.. for 11 years we had missed by a factor of 100 to 1,000, perhaps, the doses

to the thyroid of infants and young children that drank milk from cows thatwere grazing downwind in the fallout areas down around the Nevada Test Site."

Dr. Knapp testified that the AEC's immediate reaction to his dis-covery was "to find ... why [his) conclusions might not be true."Still further, he asserted, "the Division of Operational Safety draggedits feet.. to prevent the report from being published." "

Referencing a memorandum written by Nathan H. Woodruff (then-Director, Division of Operational Safety, AEC), Dr. Knapp chargedthat the government refused to change the internal radiation stand-ards owing to the concern that past judgments and evaluations madeby the AEC then would be called into question. In pertinent part ofthe memo, Nathan Woodruff advised A. R. Luedecke (then-GeneralManager, Division of Operational Safety, AEC) as follows:

We do not recommend any new radiation protection guides for nuclear weap-ons testing at this time. The present guides have, in general, been adequate topermit continuance of nuclear weapons testing and at the same time have beenaccepted by the public, principally because of an extensive public informationprogram. To change the guides would require a re-education program that couldraise questions in the public mind as to the validity of the past guides. Lastly,the world situation today is not the best climate in which to raise the issue.Therefore, we recommend the continuation of the present criteria. (Emphasisadded.)

Regarding the ground monitoring that was performed during theatmospheric nuclear test operations, Bruce Church (Chief of the

S Radiological Branch, Nevada Operations Office, U.S. Department of

SnIAL at 409* Joint Hearigs, supra note 13. at 355-850.

* Id. at 25.*K at 84&

ca Memorandum from Nathan .I Woodruf to A. . Luedecke, January 11, 196. ee JointHarinlag, supra note 18, at 108 and 847.

Energy) testified that the measurements, upon which the protectivestandards were established, essentially were average rates. Mr. Churchstated that the actual off-site radiation, measured b the government'sground monitors, was "qualified to report a biological dose"." Asdocumented by Gordon Dunning in "Fallout From Nuclear Tests AtThe Nevade Test Site" (May, 1959) the cumulative dosages were fac-tored rates, that considered certain off-setting elements such as weather-ing and shielding, for a long-term period of exposure. " Thus, thesefactored rates did not reflect the actual health hazards posed to specificpopulations:

Mr. SANTIn'. They, in doing so, arrived at their best efforts at a scientificgeneralization with regard to dosage, and, as you observe, as with all general-isations, it is subject to serious shortcoming when you examine the individualcase of the sheepherders, the example you cited.

Mr. CHUcaH. Potentially, yes."

And, as noted by Dr. Joseph Lyon, the cumulative dosages were notconsistent with the measurements reported by the Public Health Serv-ice as in the case for the southern Utah area in 1953. Dr. Lyon testi-fed, "they [were] about three to four times higher for the 1953 testseries than the cumulative doses that Dunning published in 1959." "Thus, these exposure rates were potentially, and in some cases mostprobably, gross underestimations.

In addition, Dr. Harold Knapp reported that the "actual measure-ments of doses and dose rates were only made at a limited number oflocations, mostly along highways, by a limited number of people." "Owing to the irregular fallout patterns for radioactivity, Dr. Knappillustrated another manner by which exposure levels were seriouslyunderestimated. He concluded that,

. . . the question arises as to whether there may have been hot spots . . .which went undetected during the 1953 test series, and if so, how hot they mighthave been. There is Indirect, tenuous, but troublesome evidence that such hotspots may in fact have existed, and resulted in actual doses of up to 50 rads topersons as far as 100 miles from the test site. The crude dosimeters which pro-vide such evidence are people and sheep."

Despite personal accounts of radiation-related illnesses that werereceived from the off-site population, indicating potentially higher ex-posures than the 3.9 rad whole body maximum exposure rate measuredby the government's monitors, the government preferred to assume theaccuracy of the monitors' measurements. Detailing numerous accountsof illness that followed nuclear test shots, Dr. Knapp suggested inhis report on the sheep deaths that, on the basis of these symptoms, itwould not have been unreasonable to conclude that external gammaradiation exposures may have been in the range of 10-50 rads." In-stead, the government relied on the monitored measurements and dis-missed the personal complaints of illness. The following excerpt fromthe U.S. Public Health Service report on the "Plumbob" test in 1957was referenced by Dr. Knapp in his report as an example of the gov-ernment's response to such complaints:

s Hearnns, supra note 4, at 177."* Id. at 176-177."Id. at 177.SJont Hearings, supra note 18, at 855." Knap Rport, supra note 7, at 540.SId. at 540.

a Id. at 547.

21

The skin conditions observed by the medical officers in most cases were typicalof allergic dermatitis.... There were several cases of sunburn which the patientsthought were due to radiation, but the size, distribution, and time sequence ofevents would not substantiate the diagnosis of nuclear radiation inflicted burns.Two types of eye conditions were seen. One was flash blindness, and the otherwas itching, lachrymation, and reddening of the conjunctiva over a prolongedperiod of time.... Other cases were those of people who Just 'didn't feel well,or who had generalized malaise, or cases of enteritis. In most cases it was suf-ficient for the medical officer to discuss the possible biological effects of radiationwith them and they would realize that the symptoms which they had could notbe due to fallout."

In contrast to the U.S. Public Health Service documentation ofexhibited, albeit discounted, radiation-related illnesses, the AEC ad-vertized the "unusual safety record" set during the government'soperation of the atmospheric nuclear testing program. The followingexcerpt from an AEC pamphlet (dated January 1, 1955) aptly char-acterizes the publicized view of the AEC:

Each Nevada test has successfully added to scientific knowledge needed fordevelopment and for use of atomic weapons and needed to strengthen our defenseagainst enemy weapons. An unusual safety record has been set. No one insidethe Nevada test site has been injured as a result of the 31 test detonations. Noone outside the test site in the nearby region of potential exposure has been hurt.There were instances of property damage from blasts such as broken windows.Some cattle and horses grazing within a few miles of the detonations sufferedskin radiation burns, but the damage had no effect on their breeding value northe beef quality of the cattle.'

Commenting on the government's lack of candor with the Americanpublic, Utah Governor Scott Matheson testified that "an all-out publicrelations campaign was mounted by the Atomic Energy Commission toassure those who lived close to the test site that there [was] no dan-ger." 1 o' Peter A. Libassi (former General Counsel for the Departmentof Health, Education and Welfare) also discussed the issue before theSubcommittee. Mr. Libassi testified that, despite the urgings of then.HEW Secretary Gardner to the White House for full disclosure ofinformation, ". . the press releases which were finally issued did notcontain the information and warnings and concerns and questions thatwere already emerging." '0o Specifically with regard to the sheep, thy-roid and leukemia studies, Mr. Libassi noted the suppression of thedata by the Federal Government from public dissemination:

. . . the American people were not informed of the evidence that was gatheredduring the 1950's and 1960's of the uncertainty as to the health effects of radia-tion from these atmospheric nuclear tests. They were simply not informed ofthe uncertainties that we knew about at that time.o08

5. ConclusionsBased on the evidence presented, the Subcommittee concludes that:(1) the government, despite having sufcient reason to know of the

hazards associated with radiation exposure, failed to give adequatewarning to the residents living downwind from the test site regardingthe dangers posed by the radioactive fallout emitted during the atmos-pheric nuclear test operations;

(2) the radiation monitoring system established by the governmentduring the atmospheric nuclear testing program was deficient in giving

"*Id. at 548."m Joint Hearing, supra note 18, at 24."Id. at 1d.* M. sat 19.* ld.at 100.

accurate estimates of radiation exposure necessary to provide adequatehealth protection to the downwind residents;

(8) the government falsely interpreted and reported radiation ex-posure rates so as to give an inaccurate estimate of the hazards posedto the downwind residents from the atmospheric radioactive fallout;

(4) the government knowingly disregarded evidence which ques-tioned the accuracy of the government's measurements of radioac-tivity emitted from the test site as well as the adequacy of the then-employed radiological safety standards; and

(5) exposure to radioactive fallout emitted during the atmosphericnuclear test operations was, more likely than not, responsible for theserious adverse health effects suffered by the downwind residents.

III. NvULEA WAnPONs DEVELOPMENT V. PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY:AN UNHEALTmY CONFLmcT WTrrIN NucEAn REGULAToYr AUTHORITY

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTINENTAL NUCLEAR TEST SITE

Evidence presented to the Subcommittee revealed that, at the startof the continental nuclear testing program in 1950, a precautionary at*titude already had developed among government officials as well aswithin the scientific community regarding the health risks of radiationexposure for the general population. The pervasive damage sustainedas a result of the atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki alerted theentire nation to the immediate threat of atomic weaponry. Even at thisinitial stage of our development of nuclear technology, scientists weresuggesting that no safe threshold level existed below which radiationwould have no carcinogenic effect.10

Fearful of potentially adverse repercussions upon the population,government officials initially counseled President Harry Trumanagainst the establishment of atomictesting grounds within the con-tinental boundaries of the United States The following excerpt istaken from the statement of then-Chairman of the Atomic EnergyCommission, David E. Lilienthal, during a meeting of the NationalSecurity Council on June 27,1947:

(Secretary of War) Patterson asked why it couldn't be at Trinity in NewMexico-i.e., Alamogordo, as before. Elsenhower strongly opposed to any placeinside the country. Would spread fear, etc. He was firm about this. I said thatat Trinity would require elaborate super-atmosphere Investigations that taketime."

Even after Russia detonated an atomic bomb in September 1948, a cli-mate of caution prevailed as indicated by the comments of SumnerPike, member of the Atomic Energy Commission, to his colleagues in1949:

Only a national emergency would Justify testing within the United States."

However, with the involvement of the United States in the Koreanconflict, the issue of national security arose, and the Atomic EnergyCommission recommended establishing a test site within the continen-tal confines of the United States In the Decision Documents preparedby the AEC for the President and the National Security Council re-garding the location of the proving grounds for atomic weapons test-ing, the AEC counseled the necessity for a test site location "where its

- At a seminar on low-level radiation (Feb. 19, 8197) conducted by the BnvironmentalPoy Institute/tronmental d Conference Dr. Victor Bond of the Brookhaven

Laboraoy summarized the state ear encknovledge on the object a follow'.. i. t was way back in the late 40- and early 190's that the ICRP [Internatonal

Commission on Radiological Protection] and NCRP [National Committee on RadiationProtection) made the vety tlmpnt hma in phuosopy from a(n).. . essentiallythreshold concept to a nothd S oe This was speulle ot elesrly in NCRP Huandbook 59 issued in '4 but was agreed to t ain 18V"

Si enthal, David A. 'The Journals of vid U AUlentha," VoL II: The Atomta NB-1e4-1r50 19ow oelk. 1904) at &M ,

let (Ott oi n 08c ) Achacs "A history of the United States AtomleS B ommisson VoL II. Ato s led, 1947-192 (University Paru, Pa., 19 )

(28)«tiw. ^

^~ ·- , , . . . ,, . ,.. , , .. . ,

basic security and general accessibility (could not] be jeopardized byenemy action." I 10o

In these same documents, the Commission also discussed the matterof radiological safety. The following excerpt is taken from the AEODecision Documents:

8. Radiolo#Ocl Safety.--or the protection of the population existing near thetest site, favorable meterological conditions and wind structures, accompanied bythe capability for accurate predictions, are necessary to permit firing of test shotsat times selected for desired direction of drift and conditions of fallout . . .

9. It Is recognized that the problem of radiological safety Is most critical In siteselection. Not only must high safety factors be established In fact, but the ac-ceptance of these factors by the general public must be Insured by Judicioushandling of the public information program . . . By such means as these, andtaking advantage of more sparsely populated areas, it is believed certain con-tinental sites would permit a substantial improvement in predicted safety overthe Trinity shot [Emphasis added.J"

The record before the Subcommitte clearly demonstrates that theAEC's "handling of the public information program" often was at theexpense of the off-site population's health and general welfare. Whilethe government ostensibly sought to minimize the general population'sexposure to radioactive fallout, the AEC, by "taking advantage ofmore sparsely populated areas", failed to consider the adverse im-pact for the individuals in these areas. Ultimately, the Nevada TestSite was selected by the AEC for the continental testing grounds, notas an ideal site, but as a location that "most nearly satisfied all of theestablished criteria for a continental atomic test site." "

With this expressed awareness of the human health hazards as-sociated with such a test site location as well as of the Commission'sobligation to protect the general public from these risks, the AECviewed its overriding responsibility "above all to expedite the weaponsdevelopment program. 110

Whenever these divergent responsibilities came into conflict witheach other, the resulting policy decisions generally were weighted infavor of securing the weapons testing program. The testimony offormer-Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (1952-1954),Eugene Zuckert confirmed this conclusion:

... the weapons program did result in a lack of balance between the safetyrequirements and the requirements of the program... We supported muchcancer research. We considered this an Important mission. But I think when theycame into conflict, the balance was apt to tip on the science of the militaryprogram .... I think we... tended to become too introverted ... and toounanimous.m

The disproportionate interest in going forward with the testingoperations, despite the attendant radiological risks, clearly was evi-denced by the discussion of several AEC members during a meetingheld in 1955:

Chairman STRAues. There Is a Nevada legislator who has Introduced a bill Inthe Nevada legislature, according to one of the Las Vegas papers, asking us tomove out of the State. Both of the Las Vegas papers, which seldom agree on

A "Location of Provrln Ground for Atomic Weapons" (Dee. 18, 1950) (hereinafterreelr s to AUC on c Docuents). s8 Joint Hearins, super note 18, at 1412-1418.

*3 It at 1417."*u at 141.rmntlatimoRn of uoene pcert, Heartng on Health Impaet of Low-Level Radiation Be.

fer the Stbcommitt Heat and n h of the Committee on Lbor anHuman wResoa d the Committee on the 96th Conress, lt aon at 14(Jne 19, m1979).

", . or

anything, published editorials agreeing that this was nonsense, that we broughta lot of prosperity to the state. This was a fine thing for national defense, andthey rather laughed this fellow out of court

Commissioner LImsY. This is a sensible view. People have got to learn to livewith the facts of life, and part of the facts of life are fallout.

Chairman STBuaes. It is certainly all right, they say, if you don't live nextdoor to It.

* * * * * C CCommissioner MuBaaT. We must not let anything interfere with this series of

tests-nothing." mNot only was the balance weighted against public health issues in

the AEC's establishment of the test site, but this imbalance was car-ried forward in the government's consideration of questions raisedabout the protective measures. Dr. Joshua Holland (Chief of the AECFallout Studies Branch in 1959) testified that the unwitticgfhdivid-ual bore the burden for disproving the efficacy of these measures. Comnmenting on this rather paradoxical situation, Dr. Holland asserted:

There was one final thing . . that might have tipped the balance, and thiswas that [the AeC] tended to shift the burden of proof ... to anybody whoclaimed that exposures were higher than the guide or even when the AIB wasmaintaining that the exposures were well within the guides ... the burden wasalways put on this claimant rather than being taken on the agency Itslf.I think ... If they had to safeguard the health and safety of the public, 'tieburden of proof should have been on them to stay within these guides and to beable to verify it."

The Subcommittee can only conclude that the AEO's desire to securethe nuclear weapons testing program took precedence over the Com-mission's responsibility to protect the American public's health andwelfare. This troubling result may not have been unexpected giventhe fact that the decisions were made solely by those entities responsi-ble for the promotion of nuclear weapons without the requisite inputof those agencies responsible for the protection of the public health.

B. RADIATION RESEARCH AUTHORITY

One of the primary consequences of the government's aggressivepolicy of promoting the development of the nuclear weapons systemsand technology has been the failure to pursue adequate and impartialscientific research regarding the health hazards posed by nuclear ra-diation exposure. As noted by Dr. Joseph Lyon in testimony beforethe Subcommittee, the Atomic Energy Commission appeared to beconcerned with radiation exposure levels, -

*. .et they did not seem to want to pursue this to its logical concl ualon;that is, health effects in the population.m"Concurring with this criticism, then-HEW General Counsel Peter

Libassi testified before the Subcommittee that this reticence in pursu-mg research also extended to the disclosure of such information to thegeneral public:

. , . there seemed to be an unwillingness to address [the] issues, to pursue theresearch, and to disclose the Information to the public.1

SAi, Minutes o AiB Meetng No. 1062 (Feb. 28, 106). See Jolnt Hear~ i, supra

SSint HerIns. supra note 18, at 58-886.lioll a R

;", ^'

29As a result significant discoveries made by scientists, which ques-

tioned the safety of the nuclear test operations and which threatenedthe continuation of the continental weapons program, were disregard-ed by the AEC. For example the initial conclusions reached by Doc-tors Arthur H. Wolff and Monroe A. Holmes, which correlated the1958 sheep deaths to exposure to nuclear radioactive fallout, wereignored by the Commission despite the objections raised by the U.S.Pubic Health Service and the Utah State Department of Health. Ap-parently, the AEC was interested in preventing the establishment ofany precedent for claiming liability against the government whichcould impact adversely on the nuclear test operations.11

Also, the proposed U.S. Public Health study on leukemia cancer insouthwestern Utah and the recommended review of the oral, dentaland medical characteristics of southern Utah children were notpursued by the Commission. In fact, the AEC failed to follow upthis research for fear of adverse public reaction, potential lawsuits,and possible jeopardizing of the nuclear weapons developmentprogram.11T

The disinclination of the AEC to heed scientific warnings regardthe radiological health hazards of the weapons program was evidencedfurther by the Commission's reaction to the 1968 discovery by Dr.Harold Knapp, which suggested the need for more stringent stand-ards for internal radiation exposure. The AEC refrained from actingupon this data out of the concern that past judgments and evaluationspreviously made by the Commission would be subject to questionwhich, consequently, could challenge the entire nuclear testingprogram.118

"The problem in establishing adequate scientific research relates tothe very structure and funding of the government's radiation researchauthority. Commenting on the inherentconflict within the Departmentof Energy-the successor of the AEC-both to promote and to controlthe safe production and use of nuclear energy, Nevada GovernorRobert List testified that such conflict inevitably results in "researchwhich is intended to justify a new technology" rather than research"with a primary objective of determining health hazards. "* Conse-

.quently, Governor List insisted that "[w]e must now initiate scientificresearch by neutral scientists." 1o

Nowhere is this conflict more graphically illustrated than in thebreakdown of the fiscal authorities within the Federal Government forradiation health research. According to statistics compiled in the Re-port of the Interagency Task Force on the Health Effects of IonizingRadiation, the government spent approximately $76.5 million in fiscalyear 1978 for the study of the biologic effects of radiation.'1 Theagencies with primary responsibility for developing and promotingnuclear technology-the Department of Energy DOE), the Depart-ment of Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-funded

u * See, discussion supra, at Section III, Sheep Deaths, Government Response and Denialof Compensation.

"m See, discussion supra, at Section III, Human Health Hazards, Sclentific MedicalStudies.

"m See, discussion supra at Section III, Human Health Hazards, Government Response.1u Hearings, supra note 4, at 8.M Id.m HEW, "Report of the Interagency Task Force on the Health Erects of lonising Radia-

tion" (June, 1970), at 17 [hereinafter referred to as Interagency Task Force Report].

,:^ : . .f. ' . * .»" * ,. '* *-.;^ \. .- *"*' "- f.; -V -"1

^ . -"-'.'* ~*i^ *.i*'.t.'.: ' .* , :s * - *- , .. ' '* .*" -,

27

76.5% ($58.4 million) of the health research on radiation." In con-trast, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare funded only20% ($15.8 million) of this research.1" Incredibly, the agency withthe primary guidance function involving radiation protection, theEnvironmental Protection Agency, funded a mere 8% (82.7million).14

To avoid the inherent conflict within the Department of Energyaffecting the safe control of nuclear energy and to facilitate the fund-ing of the necessary health research in this area, Peter Libassi sug-gsted that a substantial portion of the research funds should be trans-

: erred from the Department of Energy to the health-relatedagencies While encouraging the development of such radiation re-search, Mr. Libassi testified, this transfer in funding authority wouldlend credence to the government's attempts to protect the health of thegeneral public:

.... the credibility of the Government's research effort would be improved byseparating the major responsibility for health research from the agency respon-sible for developing nuclear energy and nuclear weapons."

This recommendation does not represent the first time that a pro-Spo sa l h a s b e e n m a d e to d iv e s t th e D e p a r tm e n t o f E n e r g y o f its r e -

s possibility to perform and to fund research on the human health ef-Sfects associated with radiation exposure. Support for such a proposal

Was documented extensively during hearings conducted in January"and February of 1978 by the Subcommittee on Health and the En-vironment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-merce. 1 ' Those hearings provided the support for the Committee'samendment to the Community Mental Health Centers Extension Actof 1978 which required that the Secretary of the Department of

S Health, Education, and Welfare establish and coordinate a comprehen-sive research program on the biological effects of low-level ionizingradiation as well as a thorough review of the various federal radiationresearch programs.1"

In its rationale for establishing this program within the Departmentof HEW, the Committee was clear in its intent to avoid any inter-agency conflicts:

The Committee also believes that this program should be conducted by anagency which neither regulates lonising radiation, nor promotes activities whichproduce radiation or Involve radioactive materials."

Congressman Paul Rogers, then-Subcommittee Chairman and spon-sor of the amendment, argued for the amendment on the House Floor:

.. this provision would move the Department into a more appropriate pos•ltlon as a leader In radiation research. This Is only fitting g(iem the Deparlment',stat•eorytr mion as guardian of the pubUo health ... , [Emphasis added] )

"" Id. at 18 19. Also note limited research to supported by varou federal agenlesl withradiation.relae responlbltle (e.g., the veterans Adminlatration the National SlenceFoundation, the Fd ral Av$ation Adminlstrton the National Aeronautics and SpaceA traton, an e Department of Agriculture.

" Id. at 18." Joi lHearlngsp, supra note 18 at 72.

. Hearinls on Mfeet of Radiation on Human Hmalth by the Subcommittee onealth and the Environmet of the Committee on Interstate and Forein Commere%, 95th

S ubIe Law t (No1v. 9, 198).

*{ .'

9 ,. , * - -B, ,^ - , M ,..14»W 9 <- '-- - VC~,, ' •»a - » g " ii L t-ONW .O 4N"Wo 0 N

This provision in the 1978 Mental Health Act was a step forward inseeking to establish the primary radiation research authority withinthe Department of HEW. It fell short of this goal, however, by failingto transfer full radiation research authority and funding to carry outthis responsibility.

Many public interest, health and environmental organizations favor"this transfer of primary research and funding authorities to the De-partment of HHS. In a 1979 letter to former HEW Secretary JosephA. Califano, William W. Winpisinger (President of the InternationalAssociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers [IAMAW] andeleven other signatories, representing various public interest organi.nations, advised:

[O]ur position favoring elimination of DOE's role In radiation research is basedon DOE's conflict of interest in conducting such research and on the duplicitoustreatment by DOE and Its predecessors In the leading study of the effects oflow-level lonizing radiation on an industrial population, the study of health andmortality of workers at DOE facilities undertaken by Dr. Thomas Mancuso ofthe University of Pittsburgh."" M

Pointing to the disparate authorities vested in the DOE, IAMAWPresident Winpisinger further elaborated on the need to divest theagency of its health research functions:

[O]ur recommendation is based on eliminating the clear Institutional conflictof interest in the present situation in which DOE promotes nuclear energy an4"also conducts the research which determines the standards for exposure forionising radiation and compensation for radiation injury. This conflict should beeliminated by giving responsibility for radiation health research to HEW andEPA, agencies primarily concerned with public health's

Additionally, the Interagency Task Force Report discussed the rolesof the health and regulatory agencies in researching the biologicaleffects of ionizing radiation. The Task Force recommended that:

NIH assume a lead role in funding research into the biological effects of lontlaing radiation.

Other Health-oriented agencies such as EPA, PDA, 0C0, and the NationalScience Foundation expand their roles in this area.

The research committee review existing programs and the proposed researchagenda, [to] determine whether it is appropriate to transfer portions of DOB'sresearch budget to other agencies, and, if it is appropriate, [to] recommend whichprojects to transfer.,

While the White House has recognized the need to establish a soundresearch program on the long-term health effects of low-level radia-tion, the Subco mittee notes with disappointment that the WhiteHouse has failed to recommend a clear transfer of funding authoritiesto the health-related agencies for this purpose." Though an imple-Smentation of the Integria'" Task Force's recommendations pro-sented an excellent opportunity for the White House to exhibit a con-cern over the potential boflict inherent in the present radiation re-search funding authorities, the White House chose instead to avoid theissue by delegating its review to the Office of Management and Budgetand the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

S Letter from Willi W n to Joseph A. Ua Jr. (J 80, 1979). Co-iers include Dr. Irn ; at, PubUlot U n roaup

aron atr Tic tfoe JB

SLater from Wiar 80, 1979). 1SPo ea rt so it so i.tSPress f of the hite (Oct 31979).

S-y ^ ^

·I · .r ~ -n· ·. ·~·r. ··s-

Not only must the radiation research funding authorities be vestedin the health-related agencies, but such research must be vigorouslyencouraged by the Federal Government. Two crucial health studies,notably the Pendleton and Lyon research, emphatically demonstratethe importance of the government's role in supporting extended re-search on the health risks associated with radiation exposure. For ex-"ample, Dr. Robert Pendleton's follow-up study to the 1967 Weiss Studyon thyroid abnormalities and cancers m Utah was never finished due :to the unavailability of funding for the project." Moreover therecently-published study by Dr. Joseph Lyon regarding the incidence

Sleukemia cancers in Utah was accomplished with virtually nofederal support.1" As Dr. Lyon testified, the initial stage of thiscritical research was performed by scientists "practically in their]spare time." s"

Clearly, a tremendous amount of study remains to be done. Dr.Chase Peterson (Vice President for Health Sciences, University ofUtah) outlined the comprehensive review undertaken by the Univer-sity of Utah regarding the health risks posed to Utah residents:

The basic study that has to be done ... Is to find out . who was there,what they were dosed with, and what happened to them. It's very simple. Ex-cept that's a very hard study to do. But it's a study that can be done * * * M

Estimating that it will take several years of research before answerswill be uncovered, Dr. Joseph Lyon projected the costs of such study,which will require extensive federal support, to be "in the order ofseveral million dollars." "

Nevada Governor Robert List testified to the need for the unbiasedsupport and cooperation of the Federal Government with this investi-gation. Noting the active role taken by Nevadans during the nuclearage, Governor List underscored the need to inform the public of theactual hazards posed to them as a result of their unwitting participa-tion in the weapons program:

Federal support is mandatory; Federal candor Is a necessity; Federal credi-bility must be restored."

Concurring with the need for federal support of the research, UtahGovernor Scott Matheson noted that the groundwork already has beenlaid by the University of Utah, which presently enjoys a long-termcommitment from the Department of Health and Human Services.

S To complete its task, the Governor asserted, the University will re-quire continued federal aid:

S, . only Congrees can insure the funds are available to do the necesasrywork and insure that they continue to flow until the project is inished."m

0. OONOLUSIONS

Based on the evidence presented, the Suboommittee concludes that:(1) an irreconcilable conflict existed within the Atomic Energy

Commission between the competing functions of (a) promoting

SSee, diseuuaon supra, at Section III, Human Health Hasardi, Seenti Medleal

S di ueas•on supra, at Section III, Human Health Hasards~ Scdentidf Medal

Ss, su pra note 18, at 8$I&

sM n oteof 4, at 1. "\ "; e4T , 7 ..

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80.

the development of nuclear weapons systems and technology and(b) controllingtheir safe production and use;

(2) as a result of these conflicting functions, the Commissionchose to secure, at any cost, the atmospheric nuclear weaponstesting program rather than to protect the health and welfare ofresidents of the area who lived downwind from the site;

(8) as a result of its greater interest in pursuing the develop-ment of nuclear weapons systems, the AEC failed to pursue im-partial scientific research on the health hazards posed to the down-wind residents;

(4) these and subsequent scientific studies of the health effects -on the downwind residents, which indicate an unusually highincidence of leukemia and thyroid cancers, clearly demonstratethe need for the federal government to conduct and to support re-search to determine the actual health impact on the downwindresidents; and

(5) the conflict between promoting nuclear power and con-trolling its safe production and use continues today in the AEC'ssuccessor agencies-the Department of Energy, the Departmentof Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-and thisconflict has been compounded by placing the lion's share of fundsfor radiation health research in these three agencies; the result isto encourage a bias, or an appearance thereof, in the results of

"- such research.D. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the evidence presented to the Subcommittee as well as theconclusions reached therefrom, the Subcommittee recommends that:

(1) the Department of Health and Human Services; the En-vironmental Protection Agency; the Occupational Safety andHealth Administration; and other appropriate health-relatedagencies be given primary responsibility, and funding authorityto conduct radiation health research, with full access to all gov-ernment information bearing upon any issues concerning healtheffects from radiation exposure; and

(2) the government undertake the necessary radiation healthresearch and continue to support such on-going studies as thoseundertaken by the University of Utah and proposed by the Statesof Utah, Nevada and Arizona so as to determine the actual healthhazards posed to the downwind residents by the atmosphericradioactive fallout emitted from the Nevada Test Site.

* *»

IV. CoMPxENs"noN roB NucLEA RADIATION VIorMx

A. STATEMENT OF ISSUE

The Subcommittee's inquiry into our country's early period of at-mospheric nuclear weapons testing readily elucidated the fact thatmany individuals living in the Western United States have sufferedand continue to suffer serious injury at a rate which is unique to theirlocale. Due to the extensive radioactive fallout that was concentratedin this region during this testing period, many of these individualsquite naturally believe that their injuries have occurred as a direct re-sult of such testing. Similarly, they believe that as unwitting partici-pants in this hazardous nuclear experiment, they now should becompensated for any resultant harm.

Inasmuch as the government conducted the testing, all claims forinjury must be filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Todate, nearly 1000 claims have been filed against the United StatesGovernment for injury claimed as a result of the atmospheric nuclearweapons testing program. 142

As with all individuals brgingi suit under the Act, the plaintiffsmust satisfy at least four conditions in order to prevail on their radi-ation-related tort claims.1 * As detailed by William Schaeffer (DeputyAssistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice(DOJ)), a plaintiff must:

First, demonstrate that officers or employees of the UnitedStates were in some way negligent in the conduct of a given testor in the operation of the entire test program;

Second, establish that as a result of this negligence, the plaintiffwas exposed to low-level ionizing radiation; it may or may notbe pertinent for him to establish the exact level of that radiationexposure;

Third, prove that the plaintiff suffers or suffered from an illnesswhich may be caused by exposure to such radiation; and

Fourth, prove, by whatever applicable legal standard for causa-tion, that the plaintiff's illness, in fact, resulted from such ex-posure to radiation.'"

Most commentators would agree that while the first three of theseelements may involve difficult qstios of proof, they are no moredifficult to prove than other legal ie hi mapt#i se ai a negligencecause of action. Mr. Schaeeffe further tt iWhle litigation doesnot necessarily produce accurate results i r as these issues are in-volved, it does, m the absence of an alternative remedy, provide a fair

"1 AU4 v. U7• I t4*e Civil d I1. C-90-MU, U.S. DCtL Ot for the Distrlet ofUtah Central DivTison, I

SIt is not the inte•t ttee to co. en the platg' abillty to

cotrwo- o iintere(^Heaire *upr nel .- W ")

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82

acceptable method of resolving them." 14 However, the fourth elementof "causation in fact" presents a most formidable hurdle to the success-ful claimant in a radiation injury claim. The difficulty in drawing thecausal connection between any atmospheric nuclear weapons test anda given case of radiogenic cancer was aptly detailed by Donald A.Gonya (former Deputy Assistant General Counsel for the Departmentof Health, Education and Welfare). He testified:

[T]he clinical features of radiogenic cancer are indistinguishable from thefeatures of other cancers. It is virtually impossible to Isolate a person with radia-tion-induced cancer from the much larger number of persons exposed to radia-tion who will develop cancer from other causes . . . Scientific uncertainty makesit very difficult to calculate even a probability that a particular Individual's ill-ness is radiation induced.1"

As a result of this burden to prove direct causation, claimants areforced to rely on epidemiological and statistical evidence to establishthat the rate of a particular illness, among persons exposed to radia-tion, exceeds that which would otherwise occur. Hence, extensive dis-agreement may ensue respecting the validity of these studies' method-ologies as well as the accuracy and appropriateness of the comparativedata. And, as Dr. Chase Peterson testified, the scientific proof for suchcausation is distinct from the required legal proof:

Now, the legal proof is not a matter of our concern. The scientific proof . . .will never give 100 percent-proof. And you gentlemen should not be looking for it.No Doctor has ever seen a penicillin molecule fight a streptococcus germ andkill it and yet its incontrovertible, I believe, that penicillin kills streptococcusand prevents rheumatic fever. The point is that the data is by association. I thinkthe same will be true here. We will try to establish an association in time andin place, and we hope that the data can be reproduced.11

While it may be argued that the judicial setting is the proper forumfor resolving these scientific and legal distinctions, the Subcommitteeis acutely aware of the burden which would be placed both upon theclaimants and the government should these issues be tried in court.Deputy Assistant Attorney General Schaeffer graphically illustratedsuch burdens in describing the circumstances of a particular radiationcase which admittedly is '"less difficult than the claims presently pend-"ing." 14 The total transcript of the trial, which took 46 days, was esti-mated at fifteen thousand pages with approximately 650 exhibits in-troduced in evidence. Sixty-three witnesses gave testimony at the trial,including seven expert witnesses, who testified on the statistical sig-nificance of the epidemiological surveys, and twelve medical experts.In addition, prior to the trial, the government interviewed over 200individuals and took depositions which ran to over ten thousandpages."' The ultimate disposition of such claims may well require someten years of litigation. Consequently, the successful claimant may gouncompenated for his injuries many years after sustaining his initialexposure.

The Subcommittee believes that those persons injured as a resultof the government's operation of the nuclear weapons testing programshould not bear any further burden than what they have suffered todate. Concurring with this thought, Rex Lee (former Assistant At-torney General, Department of Justice, and current Dean of the Brig-ham Young University School of Law) testified:

a id."m Id. at 908." Joint Hearings, aur note 18, at 868."m Hearsln, supra note 4, at 248.' Id. Sv,

* * *•÷ ' .*, . •- *

ý& ý ow kars am - - -1

88I think it Is a national disgrace ... that after the evidence that came out in

Salt Lake and Las Vegas that ... those people who have had to put up tensof thousands of dollars of their own money because of the fact that they werehuman experiments, involuntarily and unwittingly . . . now have to walt forsix to ten years in order to simply be compensated for having had that thrust uponthem. . . .

Clearly, the government can compensate on the basis of legal liabil-ity, as a private person-would be liable, or it may compensate on thebasis of moral or equitable liability. The Subcommittee believes thatsufficient evidence exists for the government to accept at least "com.passionate responsibility," if not legal liability, for the injuries sus-tained as a result of the nuclear weapons testing program.'" In addi-tion, the arduous, time-consuming, and expensive nature of any ju-dicial resolution of the matter compels the Congress to develop a legis-lative solution. Consequently, the Subcommittee has reviewed alter-native considerations for compensation systems.

B. ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMPENSATION SYSTEMS

To facilitate consideration of radiation claims and to promote uni-formity of decisions in established compensation programs, AssistantGeneral Counsel Gonya testified on the Interagency Task Force WorkGroup's proposals for care and benefits. Mr. Gonya recommended that:

(1) the Federal Government develop a series of comprehensivemedical guidelines concerning the causal relationship between anindividual's illness and exposure to ionizing radiation;

(2) based on the guidelines, federal compensation programspublish clear criteria for deciding exposure claims;

(3) the states be encouraged to develop claims criteria for theircompensation programs based on the federal medical guidelines;

(4) the feasibility of a national registry of radiation workers-to assist in making records more accessible to claimants and ad-ministrators of compensation programs-be determined; and

(5) the government reinstitute an annual compilation of radia-tion exposure claims to assist in the evaluation of existing com-pensation programs.1t

Recognizing the potential need for special radiation compensationprograms for veterans and/or civilians, Donald Gonya further testi.fled on the Work Group's suggestion that, as statistical evidence de-velops to correlate particular diseases with radiation exposure, thenecessity for establishing such programs should be reevaluated.

In consideration of the extensive proof that is required to establishcausation in a court of law, Sidney Jacoby (Professor, ClevelandState University, College of Law) added that whatever system of com-pensation is chosen for the radiation cases Congress should set outguidelines with respect to an individual's eligibility for such repara-tion. Suggestive of the Work Group's proposals, Professor Jacobytestified that Congress should consider a preponderance of evidence,showing that more cancers did occur in a particular area of the coun-try, as demonstrative of cause." In addition, he encouraged Congress

w Id. at 258.Sa8 ,s Testimony of Lster Jayson, Professor, Potomac School of Law, Wauabatoa,a D.C.,Heatng, supra note 4, at&.

t8i supra note 4 , at I09"f:~w Id. ftat .f

I ~ ~ ~ * -.

84to establish the criteria to be met in determining negligence in theseradiation cases.'" And, Professor Jacoby specifically suggested thatclaims filed under the directive of special legislation should be referredto the Court of Claims with instructions from the Congress for thecourt to reach conclusions in a direct, uncomplicated manner.1'"

Clark Downs (Attorney; Isham, Lincoln and Beale; Chicago, Illi-nois) also cautioned the Subcommittee that compensation systems forradiation victims have the potential to be either under-inclusive orover-inclusive. To avoid either extreme in compensating victims, Dean

SLee suggested two alternative approaches within the framework of theFederal Tort Claims Act:

(1) inasmuch as the Fcderal Government caused some of theinjury, and inasmuch as the percentage of injury caused by thegovernment is statistically greater than that not caused by thegovernment, the government could have the burden of disprovingelgibilitiy for compensation; 15s

(2) one could determine the total amount of compensation towhich a claimant would be entitled by statistically estimating thepercentage of those who would have suffered damage without thenuclear test program, discounting the total amount by this per-centage, and spreading the remainder proportionately among theclaimants.15,

C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Subsequent to the Subcommittee's hearings on the effects of the nu-clear weapons testing program, substantial interest has been generatedin considering compensation to the radiation victims. CongressmanGunn McKay (D-Utah), who urged the Subcommittee to hold hear-ings, has introduced legislation which would amend the Federal TortClaims Act by imposing liability on the Federal Government for dam-ages sustained by individuals as a result of the nuclear weapons pro-gram.'5" The McKay bill defines the type injury which would qualifyan individual for compensation as well as the area in which an eligibleclaimant would have resided during this testing period. Further de-terminations regarding the type of injuries that would qualify an in-dividual for reparation would be delegated to the Secretary of Healthand Human Services. Additionally, the McKay bill provides for com-pensation to individuals who sustained sheep losses during the 1953test series.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy also has introduced a new bill to pro-vide for similar methods of compensation by amending the FederalTort Claims Act.'", As with the McKay bill, the amount of damagesand the eligibility of the claimant is left to the Federal Courts for de-termination. The Kennedy proposal would create an Advisory Panelon the Health Effects of Exposure to Radiation and Uranium whichwould be responsible for the identification of cancers, other than thosespecified in the bill, to be included under the compensation program.At the direction of the Administration, an Interagency Task Forcewas established under the Office of the Attorney General to study pos-

"I"Id." Id.

Id. at 289."" Id."' H.R. 4766, July 12. 1979.""S. 1865, Oct. 9, 199.

sible compensation to persons who may have developed radiation-related illnesses as a result of exposure to fallout from nuclear weap-ons tests.1*0 On October 23, 1979, the White House further announcedthat this existing Task Force would consider the criterion for compen-sating radiation workers and veterans as well as civilians.

Under the first phase of this study, the Task Force issued recom-mendations for resolving the claims of individuals residing downwindfrom the Nevada Test Site.1" Acknowledging that the fallout emittedduring the government's nuclear test operations resulted in an in-creased "risk of illness in the entire population exposed " the TaskForce Report also recognized the government's responsibility in caus-ing an increased number of cases of death or disease from this ex-posure.1" In analyzing alternative approaches to resolving these injuryclaims, the Report characterized litigation under the FTCA as "acumbersome technique" which is an "enormously complex, expensiveand time-consuming process." " The Task Force Report further criti-cized proposals to amend the FTCA, such as the McKay and Kennedybills, for resting upon "overbroad assumptions about the extent andmagnitude of fallout from the atmospheric tests and about the healtheffects of exposure to fallout." 1 Ultimately, the Report favored anadministrative remedy developed through legislation to provide bene-fits to a defined class of individuals who possessed a high probabilityfor incurring a fallout-related illness.1" The Report further advisedof the desirability of settling these claims in a non-antagonisticmanner:

. . . given the nature of the illnesses, and the underlying national securityreasons for the nuclear tests, resolution of these claims in a non-adversarialcontext is very much in the public interest."

The following questions were raised in the Task Force Report to beconsidered in dispensing benefits under an administrative remedy:

Should benefits be limited to medical expenses?If income maintenance is provided, should it be related to need

or should amounts be independent of individual needsIf income maintenance is provided regardless of need, what is

the appropriate level of benefits ?Should benefits be paid in a lump sum or periodically ?What should be the relationships between benefits paid under

this program and those paid under other programs, especiallyother governmental programs such as social security andwelfare I

Memorandum from Stuart Eisenstat in re: Task Force on Compensation for Radia-tion-Related Illness (July 20 1979).

m DOJ. "Report Mf thb Interagency Task Force on Compensation for Radiation-RelatedIllnesses" (Feb. 1, 1980).

*s Id. at 87."If Id. at 89-40."3 Id. at 48.'ld. at 44; 50-41. The Subcommittee recognizes the concern of the Administration to

confine the class of individuals. who claim radiation-related illnesses However the Sub-committee notes the failure of the Task Force Report to adequately consider the seriousthreat to humans of internalizing radiation through the food chain system (see pages 16-17of the report.) Falling to calculate the Internalised radiation exposure from fallout willresult most assuredly In underestimating the number of nuclear radiation victims.1m Id. at 57. While the Administration ostensibly has acted in good faith to address theIssue of radiation compensation, the Subcommittee is troubled by an apparent conflictwithin the Administration where the government recently has answered the existingplaintiffs' complaint, In the United States District Court tiation in Utah, by denyeach all gtion contained therein. (Seo, Answer, Allen v. United State., Civ. Action N.C-79-i, filed Oct. 80, 1979.)T Id. atB38.

86

Additionally, the Task Force discussed whether or not recoveryunder such a remedy should bar a downwind resident from filing aclaim under the FTCA. While an exclusive approach would limit thefinancial liability of the government to such claimants, the Reportadvised that such an approach must insure a reasonable alternativethrough the litigation process in order to be held constitutional.'" Insum, the Task Force concluded that an administrative compensationprogram "may well be the best mechanism for addressing the healthissues arising from the atmospheric weapons testing program" insofaras "such a remedy could include eligibility criteria which would reflectcurrent and future scientific knowledge of radiation effects, while atthe same time providing a reasonable level of benefits." 'l

D. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the evidence presented, the Subcommittee concludes that:(1) the existing legal remedy provided for under the Federal

Tort Claims Act offers no degree of certainty or predictabilityre ar4di questions of causation which are unique to radiation-related Ilnesses;

(2) nuclear radiation victims should not bear any further bur-dens, particularly in terms of time and expense, which may be at-tendant to a judicial resolution of such claims;

(8) the government must accept responsibility, whether legalor moral, for the injuries sustained by individuals as a result ofthe government's operation of the nuclear weapons testing pro-gram; and

(4) a legislative remedy would provide the most adequate andexpeditious means by which the government can accept and ad-dress such responsibility.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the evidence presented to the Subcommittee and the con-clusions reached therefrom, the Subcommittee recommends that:

(1) Congress should devise a legislative solution which wouldaddress and resolve the questions of causation for such nuclearradiation-related claims by defining the eligible claimants; thefactors to be specified under the legislation should include: (a)the nature of the injury, (b) the residence of the eligible claim-.ant, and (c) the time period and duration of such residence;

(2) an independent panel should be established to make fur-ther determinations respecting illnesses which may be appro-priate for compensation under this legislation; and

(3) the Federal Courts should have jurisdiction over the ques-tions of eligibility as well as the issues relative to the determina-tion of damages for compensating nuclear radiation victimsunder this legislation.

* d. at 5."r Id. at 56.

V. SUMMARY CONCLUSION

Atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the 1950's and 1960'smay well have been essential to secure the national defense. However,because the agency charged with developing nuclear weapons wasmore concerned with that goal than with its other mission of protect-ing the public from injury, the government totally failed to provideadequate protection for the residents of the area. There was sufficientinformation available from the beginning to suggest that if it was notpossible to conduct the testing outside the continental United States,then the people living nearby needed protection. The necessary pro-tection could have been provided by evacuating some of the peoplebut, at a minimum, the government owed the residents a duty to in-form them of the precise time and place of each test and to instructthem as to what precautions should be taken. In addition, the govern-ment's program for monitoring the health effects of the tests was in-adequate and, more disturbingly all evidence suggesting that radia-tion was having harmful effects, be it on the sheep or the people, wasnot only disregarded but actually suppressed.

The greatest irony of our atmospheric nuclear testing program isthat the only victims of U.S. nuclear arms since World War II havebeen our own people."1 The Subcommittee believes that legislationshould be passe that provides prompt and adequate compensation forthe victims of this program. In addition, the Subcommittee believesthat similar problems can best be avoided in the future if the responsi-bility for protecting the people is given to an agency whose main mis-sion is to assure public health, not to advance nuclear development.

"* The Subcommittee includes within this context those individuals living in the trustterritories of the Pacific Islands.

(87)

.-..-- y.4*~L~

APPENDIX A

NATUmr or IomtanoG RADIATION

DERiNITION

Ionizing radiation is radiation that has sufficient energy to add or to removeelectrons from an electrically neutral atomic or molecular configuration. It maybe divided Into two categories: electromagnetic radiation (X-rays and gammarays) and particulate radiation (which may have either an electrical charge-alpha and beta particles-or no charge-neutrons). Both electromagnetic andparticulate radiation can be produced by naturally-occurring radioactive ele-ments (e.g., uranium, radium, and thorium) or artificially-produced radioactiveelements (e.g., plutonium and tritium). Each radioactive element or radionuclideis inherently unstable; i.e., it transforms Itself into (an)other element(s). Dur-ing this decay process, radiation is emitted.

BIOLOGIC KrWIrOT

The biologic effects of all types of ionizing radiation similarly result in themolecular lonisation of living tissue, i.e., the alteration of molecules that arenecessary for normal cell function. The extent of the Injury Is dependent uponthe type of radiation; the type of body exposure (e.g., whole body vs. partialbody) as well as the particular sensitivity of the exposed tissue or organ; andthe amount of radiation exposure.

In summarizing the effects of radiation exposure, Dr. Karl Morgan, NeeleyProfessor at the School of Nuclear Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology,

I commented: *"When radiation passes through the human body, four principal things can

happen:(1) The radiation passes through the cell without producing any

damage;(2) The radiation kills the cell or renders It incapable of cell division;(8) The radiation damages the cell such that the damage is repaired

adequately; and(4) The cell is damaged such that it survives and multiplies in its

perturbated form over a period of years in forming a clone of cells thateventually is diagnosed as a malignancy."

Where cell damage is extensive or the cell is repaired incorrectly, certain ad-verse health conditions may result. These effects may be divided into four types:

(1) Acute somatic effects-various forms of illness that occur within daysor weeks after exposure to radiation

(2) Developmental effects-abnormalities that occur in stages after ex-posure to radiation in utero or at a primary level

(8) Genetic effects-gene mutations that occur in later generations afterexposure of reproductive cells to radiation.

(4) Later somatic effects-effects that become evident many years afterexposure to radiation.

Acute somatic effects generally occur from massive radiation exposure. Theresulting adverse reactions include anemia, hemorrhage, infection, nausea, anddiarrhea. With respect to developmental effects, low to moderate levels of radia-

'The primary source of the information contained in APpendix A is the Report of theInteraency Task Force on the Health Effects of Ionising Radiation by the Department ofHealth Education, and Welfare dated June, 1979.

STestimony, Dr. Karl Morgan Hearings ono Effect of Radiation of Human Health; Sub.committee on Health and the ronmet of the Committee on Interstate and ForeignCommerce; Jan. 24, 1978.

(89)

40

tion exposure in utero have been shown to produce small head sise in babies andappear to Increase the risk of childhood cancer; high-level doses of radiationexposure in utero have been associated with mental retardation. While animalstudies indicate that exposure of reproductive cells to radiation produces genemutations and associated genetic abnormalities in later generations, similargenetic effects have not been evidenced in human studies. The major and mostconclusively demonstrated late somatic effects are various forms of cancer. Al-though there are a wide range of carcinogenic responses to ionizing radiation, thelung, thyroid, blood-forming tissues, and the female breast are organs and tissuesof particular sensitivity.

CANCER RISK

As discussed by Dr. Clark Heath, Director, Chronic Disease Division of theCenter for Disease Control, current scientific knowledge on radiation exposureat low levels suggest no threshold exists below which radiation has no carcino-genic effect." Only in the instance of high-level radiation exposure, where cellsare killed rather than incorrectly repaired, is the threat of cancer lessened. Sincenearly all data on carcinogenic effects from radiation rely on observed reactionsat high-dose levels, low-dose patterns for human health risks commonly are esti-mated by extrapolating from high-dose data. Thus, a linear equation is derivedto express various radiation dose/response estimates.'

RADIATION DOSE/RESPONSE ESTIMATES

I

Cell-KillingEffect

Cancer ,/Incidence /

RadiationDose

Based upon the linear hypothesis, (he predominant scientific view holds thatabout 100 additional cancer deaths will occur per million people over a lifetimeas a result of exposure to one rem of radiation.' In a population of one million per-sons, the "natural" incidence of fatal cancer is approximately 160,000 cases overa lifetime." At this level of risk, exposure to one rem of low-level radiation mightbe expected to produce about one excess cancer death in a population of 10,000individuals or 1,601 cases over a lifetime.

aTestimony,- Dr. -Clark Heath * Hearings oh Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation; 'Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce Apr. 23, 1979.

'The linear hypothesis generally has been accepted by scientists as a conservative approach for estimating arcinogenic responses to radiation. Yet, several studies recentlyhave called this theory Into question. These studies include research on human exposure todiagnostic medical x-rays, occupational radiation and atmospheric nuclear tests. Someresearch suggests that the theory over-estimates the number of predicted cancers as a re-sult of low-level radiation exposure, while other studies maintain that the hypothesis ac-tually under-estimates the risks." United Nations Scientifle Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation; Sources andeffects of lonizsint Radiation; 1977.

* Seldman H. Silverberg B.S. Bodden A; Probabilities of Eventually Developing and Dy-ins of Cancer; Ca 28: 88-46; 1978.

a.

APPENDIX B

RaouATroaB AUTHORITY

NUCLEAR ENERGY 1

The Atomic Energy Act of 1964 empowered the AEO to control and to developatomic energy for both military and peaceful purposes. Included in the Com-mission's responsibilities were the licensing and the operation of nuclear facili-ties; the development of a weapons system for the national defense; and the re-search of nuclear power as a source for generating electricity. Through theEnergy Reorganization Act of 1974, the AEC was divided into the Nuclear Regu-latory Commission (NRO) which became responsible for the licensing/opera-tional functions and the Energy Research and Development Administration(ERDA) which inherited the research/development responsibilities of the AEO.Under the provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1977, ERDA's author-ity was transferred to the Department of Energy (DOE).

As amended by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1977, the Atomic Energy Actauthorizes DOE to produce nuclear weapons systems for the Department of De-fense (DOD). Although the development and the manufacture of nuclear weap-ons may be accomplished through contract to private companies or universities,the facilities generally are owned by DOE. For example, Los Alamos and Law-rence Livermore are two national laboratories where weapons systems are de-veloped, and Rocky Flats and Pantex are facilities where they are manufactured.DOE also tests the weapons by underground detonation. Once the weapons havebeen produced, they are deployed to and maintained in readiness for use by DOD.At certain intervals, the weapons become obsolete or inoperative; they areremoved from deployment for disassembly; and the weapons-grade materialseither are re-used or disposed of as radioactive wastes.

RADIATION PROTECTION

Some 19 major federal agencies have various radiation-related responsibilitiesand ari engaged in promulgating regulations to protect the public's health andsafety. The framework for these activities is provided by the EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) in its capacity for issuing guidelines to federal agen-cies that control the use of radiation. In addition to its guidance authority, EPAshares the responsibility with the NRO for controlling radiation uses in privateindustry and the general public.

EPA possesses the authority to establish environmental protection standardsapplicable to those radioactive materials which are specified under its jurisdictionby the Atomic Energy Act and the Reorganisation Act Plan No. 8 of 1970, i.e.,source material (uranium and thorium), special nuclear material (plutonium,enriched uranium 288, enriched uranium 285), and by-product material (radio-

'" activ4'mat~ilatC produced during the use of special nuclear material). In this re-S spect, EPA has the power to promulgate regulations concerning (1) the limit on

Planned releases of radiation from uranium fuel cycle facilities; (2) the dis-charge of radioactive materials into navigable waters as well as drinking water;

SThe primary source for the information contained in this section of Appendix B is theReport of the Interagency Task Force on the Health Effects of lonising Radiation by theDepartment of Health, Education, and Welfare dated June, 1979.

. The primary source for the information contained in this section of Appendix B IsS cited as follows: Dodge, Christopher; McCullough, James; Radiation Health and Safety:

Issues of Congressional Interest: Library of Congress, CR8, Major Issues System; datedApril 10, 1979.

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42(8) the recovery, storage and disposal of radioactive wastes; and (4) the air-borne emissions of radioactive materials.

NRO has the broad authority to regulate the possession and the use of sourcematerials, special nuclear materials, and by-product materials. In this regard,NRO principally is responsible for issuing and denying licenses to those facilitieswhich desire to produce, use, or possess these regulated materials. Among thoselicensed by NRO are nuclear power reactors, private reactor fuel producers, in-dustrial users of radioactive materials, manufacturers of products that containradioactive materials, and medical institutions which use radioactive materialsfor diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. NRC's authority also is extended to pro.tect the workers in these facilities from occupational exposures to radiation. Inaddition, NRC has the right to allocate some of its regulatory powers to stateswhich possess radiation control programs that are adequate and compatible withNRO standards. NRC may not delegate its authority to regulate facilities in-volved in the uranium fuel cycle, the exportation and importation of regulatedmaterials, quantities of special nuclear materials sufficient to form a criticalmass, and certain disposal functions for regulated materials

The following outline provides a brief description of the diffusion of the federalgovernment's authority in the field of radiation safety and health:

AoENCY AND AUTHOrTTr

Consumer Product Safety Commission: Safety aspects of luminous dials onwatches; consumer products emitting radiation.Department of Agriculture: Radiation contamination of crops; uses of radia-tion to control pests.Department of Commerce-National Bureau of Standards. Establishment ofstandards for radiation measurement.Department of Defense-Army, Navy, Air Force: Health effects of nuclear andlaser weapons and microwave emitting devices; radiological safety; civil defense.Department of Energy: Ionizing and non-ionizing radiation research relatedto hazards, biological effects, and safety standards.Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health,National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health: Biological effects andmedical applications of ionizing and non-ionizing radiation; occupational safetyand health standards.Department of the Interior-Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration:

Health and safety aspects of uranium mining.Department of Labor-Occupational Safety and Health Administration: Gen-

eral occupational safety and health of personnel, including those working aroundradiation sources.

Department of Transportation-Federal Aviation Administration, FederalRailroad Administration, Materials Transportation Bureau, U.S. Coast Guard:Safety aspects of the transportation of radioactive materials.Environmental Protection Agency: Control and monitoring of ionizing and non-Ionizing radiation in the environment; establishment of exposure standardsInterstate Commerce Commission: Safety aspects of the transportation ofradioactive materials in interstate commerce.National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Ionizing and non-Ionising

radiation safety and health aspects as related to space programs.National Science Foundation: Research on the biological effects of ionisingand non-lionizing radiation.National Telecommunications Information Agency (under Dept. of Commerce):Broad overview of the federal radiation research and development programs.National Transportation Safety Board: Safety aspects of the transportationof radioactive materials.Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Safety of facilities handling nuclear mate-rials; public and occupational safety; oversight of the use of radioisotopes innuclear medicines and industry.United States Postal Service: Safety of radioactive materials in the mail.Veterans Administration: Diagnostic and therapeutic applications of ionizing

and nonionizing radiation.

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