The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy

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    the European 'ommission and the European )arliament to consider progress and to promote

    transparency and balance in the EUs approach.

    II &eneral Conte#t

    'our pillars o( the Strategy ) Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond

    Prevent

    Under this heading the EU aims to prevent people turning to terrorism by tacling the factors or

    root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment! both in Europe and

    internationally.

    -ey priorities:

    !evelop common approaches to spot and tac3le problematic behaviour, in particular the

    misuse of the internet9

    &ddress incitement and recruitment in 3ey environments (for example prisons and places

    of religious training or worship/ notably by introducing new criminal offences coveringsuch behaviour9

    !evelop a media and communication strategy to explain EU policies more effectively9

    )romote good governance, democracy, education and economic prosperity through

    'ommunity and 4ember 0tate assistance programmes9

    !evelop inter;cultural dialogue within the Union and outside it9

    !evelop a non;emotive lexicon for discussing the issues9 and

    To further develop our understanding of the issues and policy responses through

    continued research and the sharing of experience and analysis.

    Protect)rotection of citi

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    mplement agreed common standards on civil aviation, port and maritime security9

    &gree a European programme for critical infrastructure protection9 and

    4a3e best use of EU and 'ommunity level research activity.

    PursueThe ob6ective of the Union is to pursue and investigate terrorists both within the EU andglobally. t is crucial to impede terrorist planning! travel! and communications. Terrorist

    networ3s should also be disrupted by cutting off the supply of both financial finding and

    operational materials. %ore generally! the aim is to bring terrorists to $ustice.

    -ey priorities:

    0trengthen national capabilities to combat terrorism, in light of the recommendations of

    the peer evaluation of national anti;terrorism arrangements9

    4a3e full use of Europol, Euro6ust and the %oint 0ituation 'entre9

    Further develop mutual recognition of 6udicial decisions, including by adopting the

    European Evidence >arrant9

    Ensure full implementation and evaluation of existing legislation as well as the

    ratification of relevant international Treaties and 'onventions9

    !evelop the principle of availability in the exchange of law enforcement information

    between 4ember 0tates9

    Tac3le terrorist access to weapons and explosives, ranging from components for home;

    made explosives to '?@ materials9

    Tac3le terrorist financing, by implementing agreed legislation, wor3ing to prevent the

    abuse of the non;profit sector, and reviewing the EUs overall performance in this area9

    and

    )rovide technical assistance to priority third countries in order to enhance their own

    counter;terrorism capabilities.

    Respond

    >hen )revention, )rotection and ?esponse fail, we have to be prepared, in the spirit of

    solidarity! to manage and minimise the conseuences of a terrorist attac. This can be done by

    improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath! the co-ordination of response and the needs ofvictims.

    -ey priorities:

    &gree EU 'risis 'o;ordination &rrangements and supporting operational procedures9

    ?evise the legislation on the 'ommunity 4echanism for civil protection9

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    !evelop ris3 assessment as a tool to help inform the building of capabilities to respond to

    an attac39

    mprove co;ordination with international organisations on managing responses to terrorist

    attac3s and other disasters9 and

    0hare best practice, and develop approaches for, the provision of assistance to victims ofterrorism and their families.

    Strategies for Countering Terrorism:Lessons from the Israeli Experience1

    Jonathan B. Tucker

    March 2003

    Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D., is a policy analyst specializing in chemical

    and biological weapons proliferation and control. He is a 200203 seniorfellow at the .!. "nstit#te of Peace in $ashington, D%, on lea&e from

    the Monterey "nstit#te's %enter for (onproliferation !t#dies. )efore

    *oining the center in +-, he ser&ed for si years in .!. go&ernmentpositions at the Department of !tate, the %ongressional /ffice of

    echnology 1ssessment, and the 1rms %ontrol and Disarmament1gency. "n +, he was a ( biological weapons inspector in "ra. He

    holds a ).!. in biology from 4ale and a Ph.D. in political science from theMassach#setts "nstit#te of echnology. "n addition to n#mero#s papers

    and reports, he is the a#thor of Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpoxand theeditor of Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

    Introduction

    Eer since its founding in !"#$% the state of &srael has faced the threat of terror attac'sfrom re(ectionist organi)ations such as the *opular Front for the +i,eration of *alestine%-amas% *alestinian &slamic ihad% and -i),ollah.Because these groups cannot defeat the&srael /efense Forces 0&/F1 on the ,attlefield% the2 target &sraeli citi)ens in an attempt tosu,ert the national 3ill. According to Boa) 4anor% executie director of the &nternational*olic2 &nstitute for Counter5Terrorism in -er)li22a% terrorist iolence aims 6to undermine thepersonal securit2 of ciilians% to so3 fear and trepidation% and to sap pu,lic morale7 in orderto pressure decision ma'ers to ma'e political concessions.!

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    Oer the past 89 2ears% the &sraeli goernment has deeloped a ariet2 of measures topreent terrorist attac's or mitigate their effects. &srael has also made a irtue of necessit2,2 creating a cutting5edge securit2 industr2 that mar'ets counterterrorism technologies%products% and serices throughout the 3orld."The primar2 goals of &sraeli counterterrorismstrateg2 are to preent terrorists from influencing the national agenda and presere theps2chological resilience of the ciilian population. According to a(. 4en. U)i /a2an%

    chairman of the &srael ;ational Securit2 Council% the goernment miles1 against e3ish settlements and militar2 ,ases in the4a)a Strip.(*articularl2 damaging to the morale of the &sraeli population has ,een a 3aeof suicide ,om,ings ,2 *alestinian terrorists in cro3ded ,uses% mar'ets% restaurants% andnightclu,s. These attac's% 3hich occur essentiall2 at random% pose a serious threat to theps2chological and economic 3ell5,eing of &sraeli societ2.

    The crude ,ut effectie tactic of suicide terrorism 3as inented ,2 -i),ollah and used forthe first time on @ Octo,er !"$% to destro2 the U.S. arine ,arrac's in Beirut 3ith a truc'

    ,om, 'illing @#! American soldiers. Eleen 2ears later% on > April !""#% aed Da'arne% a@852ear5old mem,er of -amas% ,le3 himself up in a car next to a cro3ded &sraeli ,us in theto3n of Afula% 'illing eight &sraelis 0including a female Ara, passenger1 and 3ounding ##.)Since then% -amas% *alestinian &slamic ihad% and more recentl2 the al5Asa art2rsBrigades of Tan)im% the Fatah militia% hae recruited% indoctrinated% and euipped scores ofsuicide ,om,ers.

    At first% suicide terrorists 3ere all religious% militant 2oung men recruited from *alestinianuniersities or mosues. &n earl2 @99@% ho3eer% the profile ,egan to change as secular

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    *alestinians% 3omen% and een teenage girls olunteered for suicide missions. On @" arch@99@% A2at A'hras% an !$52ear5old *alestinian girl from Bethlehem 3ho loo'ed Europeanand spo'e -e,re3% ,le3 herself up in a West erusalem supermar'et% 'illing t3o &sraelis.1*Suicide ,om,ers hae also sought to foil profiling efforts ,2 shaing their ,eards% d2eingtheir hair ,lond% and 3earing &sraeli uniforms or een the traditional clothing of orthodoxe3s.11

    4ien the high motiation of suicide ,om,ers and the relatie simplicit2 and lo3 cost of theexplosies the2 use% deterrence is impossi,le and preention is far from certain.1Although&sraeli counterterrorism authorities interdict more than $8 of attempted suicide attac's%the small num,er of ,om,ers 3ho penetrate the securit2 net can still 3rea' considera,ledeath and destruction. The argua,le 6success7 of suicide terrorism in derailing the Oslopeace process and inflicting serious 3ounds on &sraeli societ2 ma2 inspire other militantgroups to adopt this tactic.1!&ndeed% FB& director o,ert S. ueller &&& 3arned in a2 @99@that suicide ,om,ings li'e the ones that hae terrori)ed &sraeli ciilians are 6ineita,le7 inthe United States.1"An2 insights that &srael can proide into com,ating suicide terrorismare therefore of great interest to American officials. &sraeli counterterrorism strateg2comprises fie elements:

    !. &ntelligence collection and anal2sis@. ilitar2 and paramilitar2 operations to disrupt terrorist infrastructure

    . Commercial aiation securit2

    #. /efense against chemical and ,iological attac's

    8. Efforts to strengthen the ps2chological endurance of the ciilian population

    The +ole of Intelligence

    The igilance of the &sraeli pu,lic pla2s a 'e2 role in preenting terrorism. According to

    securit2 experts% the aerage &sraeli is highl2 a3are of suspicious pac'ages% indiiduals% andactions that could pose a threat to pu,lic safet2 and does not hesitate to notif2 the police.As a result% ordinar2 citi)ens foil more than $9 of attempted terrorist attac's in &srael%including time ,om,s left ,2 terrorists.1#

    &sraeli experts contend that ,e2ond a igilant citi)enr2% intelligence is the essentialfoundation of an2 s2stematic effort to com,at terrorism. According to 4en. /agan%6&nestments in intelligence are inisi,le% 3hereas increased securit2 is isi,le ,ut often3asteful. The first priorit2 must ,e placed on intelligence% then on counterterrorismoperations% and finall2 on defense and protection.71&To support its 3ar on terrorism% &sraelhas deeloped a highl2 coordinated and efficient intelligence apparatus. /ra3ing on humanand technical means% &sraeli goernment agencies 3or' continuall2 to identif2 terroristoperaties and cells. Threats are categori)ed into those that appear imminent and reuireimmediate attention% those that are less pro,a,le ,ut could emerge later on% and those thatare unli'el2 ,ut still possi,le.1'

    &n contrast to the infamous rialr2 ,et3een the C&A and the FB&% &sraeli foreign anddomestic intelligence agencies cooperate 3ell in collecting and sharing terrorism5relatedinformation. The &srael Securit2 Agenc2% 'no3n as !hin )et% reports directl2 to the *rimeinister and is responsi,le for domestic intelligence% counterespionage% internal securit2%and the preention of terrorist acts. The Ara, Affairs /iision of !hin )etconducts political

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    su,ersion and sureillance of Ara, terrorists% 3hile the *rotection and Securit2 /iisionsafeguards &sraeli goernment ,uildings and em,assies% defense contractors% scientificinstallations% 'e2 industrial plants% and the national airline El Al.1(&srael also has a foreignintelligence agenc2% Mossad0-e,re3 for 6institute71% and a militar2 intelligence serice%1man. !hin )et3or's closel2 3ith Mossadand1manto prepare an annual terrorism threatassessment for the *rime inister.

    &sraeli goernment agencies gather human intelligence on terrorism ,2 deplo2ingundercoer agents in the *alestinian5controlled areas and ,2 recruiting local informantsinside or close to terrorist organi)ations. Seeral factors ma2 lead *alestinians to colla,orate3ith the &sraeli authorities: cash incenties% non5monetar2 ,enefits such as a ,uildingpermit or a ca, license% and ps2chological factors such as a desire for reenge% ideolog2% oradenture.1)0Still% sp2ing for &srael is extremel2 ris'2% and suspected colla,orators areoften executed or l2nched ,2 *alestinian mo,s.1 &srael also engages in freuent policeoperations in 3hich large num,ers of suspected *alestinian militants are rounded up andinterrogated. Onl2 rarel2 do such operations 2ield tactical 3arning of an imminent terroristattac'% ho3eer% and apparent tips o,tained during interrogation ma2 ,e disinformationdesigned to deflect attention from the real target.

    &n addition to human intelligence% &srael has deeloped sophisticated technologies fordetecting explosies and arms at a distance% electronic eaesdropping and signalsintelligence% and isual intelligence 3ith unmanned aerial ehicles. ;eertheless% &sraeliintelligence agencies gie priorit2 to human intelligence oer high5tech methods andcontend that the United States has placed too much emphasis on the latter at the expenseof the former. Although a satellite image can reeal the location of a terrorist training camp%it cannot proide insights into the thin'ing of operaties planning an attac'.

    5essons for .!. Policy

    The failure of the U.S. &ntelligence Communit2 to proide earl2 3arning of the !!Septem,er terrorist attac's in ;e3 Gor' Cit2 and near Washington% /C% exposed s2stemicpro,lems 3ith intelligence collection and anal2sis. Both the C&A and the FB& came under firefor not sharing information that might hae ena,led anal2sts to connect the dots andpreent the deastating attac's. oreoer% the ;ational Securit2 Agenc2 reportedl2 failed todetect a 3arning intercepted the da2 ,efore !! Septem,er ,ecause the message 3as nottranslated and anal2)ed in a timel2 manner.*

    The main lessons for the United States from the &sraeli experience are 0!1 the fundamentalrole of intelligence in the fight against terrorism 0@1 the need for close coordination andcooperation ,et3een foreign and domestic intelligence agencies% particularl2 in the case ofterrorist net3or's such as al5=aeda that operate ,oth inside and outside the United States01 the importance of human intelligence as a complement to technical collection s2stemsand 0#1 the need to improe the timeliness 3ith 3hich ra3 intelligence data are translated

    and anal2)ed.

    Counterterrorism ,perations

    &sraeli counterterrorism operations are designed to disrupt the 6terrorist infrastructure7 inthe West Ban' and 4a)a ,2 attac'ing ,om, factories and safe houses% gatheringintelligence% and arresting or 'illing 'e2 terrorist leaders and ,om,ma'ers. Seeralorgani)ations and units are inoled in such operations. !hin )etdetachments 3or' 3ith1manundercoer units to counter *alestinian terrorists% including the militar2 3ing of

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    -amas. &n addition% an elite &/F commando unit called !ayeret Mat6alis &srael

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    Court supported the &sraeli goernment%!"">% proo'ed four suicide attac's against &srael in eight da2s% 'illing >9 ciilians andin(uring hundreds.!!

    5essons for .!. Policy

    The United States should emulate the &sraeli approach of tr2ing to preent terrorist attac's,2 disrupting the ,roader infrastructure inoled in the recruitment% indoctrination% training%and logistical support of terrorist operaties. At the same time% for the reasons descri,eda,oe% it 3ould ,e un3ise to adopt the &sraeli polic2 of assassinating terrorist leaders%except in the context of actie com,at operations such as the 3ar in Afghanistan.Assassination tactics 3ould almost certainl2 proo'e retaliation in 'ind% including potential

    reprisals against senior U.S. political leaders.

    Commercial -iation Securit/

    &srael

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    disaster 3ould also attract extensie media coerage% magnif2ing its ps2chological% political%and economic impact.

    El Al% the &sraeli national airline% has a securit2 ,udget of roughl2 K$9 million% coering Ben4urion &nternational Airport near Tel Ai and the airliners themseles. Terminal securit2has ,een a ma(or concern for &srael since !"$8% 3hen *alestinian terrorists attac'ed the

    chec'5in counters at the airports in ome and Lienna 3ith guns and grenades% 'illing !$people. Ben 4urion airport is protected ,2 a defense in depth that ,egins 3ith a chec'pointon the single access road% 3here armed guards examine ehicles and uestion suspicious5loo'ing driers or passengers. Additional plainclothes securit2 officials monitor the entrancesto the terminal% continuall2 scan the cro3ds inside% and freuentl2 chec' 3aste,as'ets forexplosie deices.

    El Al$% 3hen *alestinianterrorists dierted a flight from ome to Algiers.!"Whereas the United States gies priorit2to screening ,aggage rather than people% &srael

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    profiling ,ased on racial or ethnic criteria 3ould ,e legall2 and culturall2 unaccepta,le in theUnited States.

    One possi,le solution to these pro,lems 3ould ,e a modified profiling s2stem% implemented,2 the airlines 3ith oersight ,2 the Transportation Securit2 Administration. This s2stem3ould ,e ,ased on the principle of reerse profiling. When someone purchased a tic'et% the

    airline 3ould as' the Transportation Securit2 Administration to run the passenger

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    room% seal the door 3ith tape or cloth% don their gas mas's 0creating the 6sealed ,od271%and 'eep them on until the 6all clear7 is gien.

    Since !""@% the goernment of &srael has reuired all ne3l2 constructed pu,lic ,uildings%apartment complexes% and single5famil2 homes to incorporate a 6protectie room7 that is,oth ,om,5resistant and capa,le of ,eing sealed airtight. ost protectie rooms are

    euipped 3ith electricit2 and a telephone hoo'up the more ela,orate ones hae 3ater% a,athroom% and a TL connection. Another lesson of the 4ulf War 3as that not eer2one couldhear the air5raid sirens. To address this pro,lem% &sraeli citi)ens 3ere told to turn on theradio ,efore going to sleep and tune it to a special station that ,roadcast onl2 static. &n theeent of a chemical attac'% the station 3ould commence a lie ,roadcast to 3a'e peopleand tell them to enter the sealed room.")&sraeli pu,lic health authorities are also a3are ofthe threat of ,ioterrorism and hae stoc'piled accines and anti,iotics. &n late @99!% the&sraeli goernment placed an order for > million additional doses of smallpox accine%enough to accinate the entire population.#*

    5essons for .!. Policy

    Surrounded ,2 hostile countries armed 3ith chemical and ,iological 3eapons% &srael faces amuch more immediate threat than does the United States. &srael is also a small countr2%ma'ing it economicall2 feasi,le to issue and maintain gas mas's and antidote 'its for theentire ciilian population free of charge. ;eertheless% the United States should do far moreto improe its domestic preparedness for chemical and ,iological terrorism and to educatethe pu,lic a,out these potential threats. Although distri,uting a gas mas' and an antidote'it to eer2 American 3ould not ,e practical% centrali)ed stoc's of mas's and antidotesshould ,e aaila,le for rapid distri,ution and use in the eent of a chemical attac'.

    Bioterrorism preparedness reuires a different set of measures. Because the release of a,iological agent such as anthrax 3ould ta'e a fe3 da2s to produce s2mptoms in thoseexposed% the ictims of a ,ioterrorist attac' 3ould disperse 3idel2 and the first responders3ould ,e emergenc2 room doctors and clinicians in priate practice. These indiidualsreuire training in the diagnosis of exotic infections such as anthrax and smallpox% 3hichthe2 3ould neer encounter in their routine medical practice. The2 also need to 'no3 ho3to report unusual disease out,rea's to the pu,lic health authorities% so that the appropriatetreatment and containment measures can ,e ,rought to ,ear rapidl2. Finall2% it 3ould ,edesira,le to reduce the ulnera,ilit2 to chemical or ,iological attac' of certain high5ris',uildings 0such as federal goernment offices1 ,2 ma'ing air5inta'e ents less accessi,leand ,2 installing high5efficienc2 particulate air filters and actiated5charcoal filters in theentilation s2stems to screen out toxic agents.

    Strengthening s/chological Coping Skills

    The &sraeli goernment has made a deli,erate effort to counter the demorali)ing effects of

    terrorism ,2 strengthening the ps2chological coping s'ills of ordinar2 citi)ens. Terroristssee' to ino'e a perasie fear in the ciilian population ,2 personali)ing the threat so thateer2one feels ulnera,le% regardless of the statistical pro,a,ilit2 that a gien indiidual 3ill,e affected. &n an effort to counter this form of ps2chological 3arfare% &sraeli terrorismexperts from the &nternational *olic2 &nstitute for Counter5Terrorism isit schoolsthroughout the countr2 and proide educational programs tailored to students of differentage groups. These lectures descri,e the moties and operational strateg2 of terrorists% 3iththe aim of immuni)ing students against the personali)ation of terror. According to instituteexecutie director 4anor% 6Education directed to3ards familiarit2 3ith the phenomenon Pof

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    religious% or social pro,lems that cannot ,e soled ,2 militar2 means alone. An effectiecampaign to preent terrorism must therefore treat the disease as 3ell as the s2mptoms ,2addressing the political and social conditions that gie rise to extremism and iolence.Because *alestinian terrorism is in part a response to the &sraeli militar2 occupation of theWest Ban' and 4a)a% steps that ma'e the occupation harsher are unli'el2 to improe thesecurit2 situation. Get een the unilateral &sraeli 3ithdra3al from the occupied territories

    3ould not appease re(ectionist groups such as -amas or &slamic ihad% 3hich aim to destro2the e3ish state. A realistic middle ground 3ould ,e for &srael to reach out to *alestinianmoderates 3hile continuing to pursue aggressie police actions against the extremist fringe.

    &n much the same 3a2% the United States needs to address the roots of &slamic terrorism%3hich lie in the chronic lac' of political freedom and economic opportunit2 in the Ara, 3orld%3hile aggressiel2 pursuing those extremists 3ho see' to 'ill Americans. &srael