The East Timor crisis

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The East Timor crisisG.V.C. Naidu aa Research Fellow at IDSAPublished online: 25 Apr 2008.

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The East Timor CrisisG.V.C. Naidu

The tragedy of East Timor is a typical manifestation of problems thatare associated with nation building in large, multi-ethnic societies in thedeveloping world. It is also a reiteration of the most conspicuous anddominant feature of the post-Cold War global order, viz., the emergenceof ethnic and sub-national issues as major themes of state and security.Probably never before in history has the world witnessed such strongfeelings, especially by ethnic groups, which more often than not tend toturn into militant separatist movements. Of course, any critical andobjective assessment of these tendencies should exercise sufficient caution,as each case is unique and not comparable with any other. Considerationssuch as historical roots and legacies, ethnic identities, civilisationallinkages, colonial experiences, geographic location, and linguistic andreligious aspects need to be carefully taken into account for any objectiveassessment, for most of these tend to be extremely complex in nature.Furthermore, there is the whole gamut of debate on what is a nation,what is a state, when does a nation become a state, what should be thebasic attributes of a nation-state and what is the standard to measurethese criteria. The same goes with the issue of sovereignty and authority.Therefore, enormous sensitivity and understanding have to be exhibitedrather than swept away by emotions whipped up by the media. It is notsimply an issue of a minority ethnic community being suppressed by themajority, but of dilemmas that most multi-ethnic societies in the ThirdWorld face. Invariably, in most cases, there is a strong external elementthat plays a crucial role in exploiting the ethnic problems.

Also of relevance is the issue of the role and character of the regimethat is at the helm of political/civil affairs of the state, for what appearsto be a common phenomenon is the tendency by the armed forces toeither intervene or usurp power where ethnic differences are acute.1 Manytheoretical perspectives (including Marxist and Liberal2)have failed toprovide a suitable framework to address the issue of ethnicity and sub-nationalism within a nation-state, and, hence, each case has to be examinedin a different framework. If one were to compare the two instances of

Dr. G.V.C. Naidu is a Research Fellow at IDSA.

The East Timor Crisis 1467

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East Timor and Kuwait, all the nations and media that are championingthe cause of East Timor now had turned a blind eye to its occupation andabuse of human rights since 1975 by Indonesia, whereas in the case ofKuwait, America and its allies unleased their most lethal war machine topunish Iraq. Indonesia was encouraged because it served Western strategicinterests, but a similar action in oil-rich Kuwait was not acceptable. HadIndonesia been warned that it would not get away with its action, thetragedy of East Timor could ha^° been averted.

Though the East Timor issut. r'vç^red periodically since the Indonesianinvasion in 1975, it came to the forefront only recently because of thepolitical changes that took place in Indonesia after General Suharto wasforced to step down in May 1998 in the wake of unprecedented positionto his continuation. This, of course, was prompted by the worst-evereconomic crisis that hit Indonesia since the famous military coup of 1965.The case of East Timor has also to be dealt with in the larger context offactional politics within the military dictatorship and the turmoil that thestate of Indonesia has been going through, particularly since the financialcrisis hit the region starting from July 1997.

Historical Background

There is nothing much to boast about East Timor by way of historyexcept that it belonged to a different ethnic group from its neighbourIndonesia. It came under the colonial occupation of the British, the Dutchand the Portuguese—the latter controlling East Timor for more than fourcenturies after the Netherlands ceded it to Portugal under an agreement.The prolonged Portuguese «ule was also responsible for the spread ofChristianity. Though the i ortuguese sailors were the first to reach theshores of most of Asia, they were edged out gradually by other morepowerful metropolitan European powers, especially the British, the Dutchand the French. However, the Portuguese held on to three tiny provinces:Goa in India, East Timor in South-East Asia and Macao in China, whileconcentrating on the five countries they colonised in Africa forexploitation. Because East Timor was not decolonised along with othersafter World War H, it became difficult to either grant independence inthe absence of sustaining that independence or ensure that it would notbe gobbled up by its giant neighbour later on till changes came aboutwi lin Portugal itself.

Portugal was under dictatorship for about 50 years—Salazar 1926-196* and Caetano 1968-74^and its neutrality during World War II putconstraints on the Japanese to go slow on the occupation of PortugueseT'mor. Even after the end of the war, Portugal did not pay much attention

1468 Strategic Analysis/December 1999

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to Timor simply because economic returns were far less than the fiveAfrican colonies it controlled. It was only after the left-wing army tookover power in Portugal in 1974, in what is called the Carnation Revolution,that the process of decolonisation was initiated. Part of this effort was anattempt to promote democracy in East Timor, resulting in theestablishment of three political pa-Mes: Democratic Union of Timor (UDT),Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT),3 and TimoreseDemocratic People's Union (APODETI). While the ASDT was the left-leaning radical organisation that advocated total independence, theAPODETI, promoted integration with Indonesia. In the local electionsthat were held in early 1975, the Revolutionary Front for IndependentEast Timor (FRETILIN) won 55 per cent of the vote and the UDT camea close second. Nearly 90 per cent of the people supported these twoparries. While the battle for political supremacy was beginning to ragebetween FRETILIN and the UDT, the Indonesian military was quietlysupporting and encouraging the UDT, leading to the UDT staging acoup in August 1975. This was challenged by FRETILIN through anarmed struggle, leading to the establishment of its supremacy. In themeantime, the Portuguese were gradually reducing their presence andthe last remaining Portuguese, including the governor, secretly left Timoron August 27, 1975. Thus, neither the handover of the administration tothe locals nor a decolonisation took place.4 That way, East Timor continuesto be a colony of the Portuguese because they never gave up power norwere they driven out. In fact, FRETILIN repeatedly requested thePortuguese to return to East Timor so that some order woul beestablished and a peaceful transfer of power could take place.

While FRETILIN was winning the civil war, because of its largerfollowing and better arms, and was beginning to take control of theadministration, the Indonesian generals were plotting to intervenemilitarily. Sensing that the Indonesian intervention was imminent,FRETILIN declared independence on November 28,1975, as a pre-emptivemove. Taking advantage of the politically unstable conditions and chaos(in part created by Indonesia itself), Indonesia created a pretext in theform of the Balibo Declaration (named after a small town in West Timoron East Timor's border but signed in Bali) purported to have been issuedby those opposed to FRETILIN, which asked the Indonesian government'sassistance in East Timor, to embark on an invasion on December 7,1975.

The International Context

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor and its incorporation into theRepublic of Indonesia in July 1976 have to be seen against the backdropof the domestic as well as global political environment. By the early


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1970s, the former Soviet Union had established a military parity with theUnited States and had begun to actively support the Communistmovements in the Third World, especially in Africa (Angola, Mozambiqueand Ethiopia, for instance) with renewed vigour which culminated in theSoviet intervention in Afghanistan, thus, starting the second round of theCold War. By the mid-rSeventies, the three countries of Indochinasuccessfully emerged victorious, defeating the Americans under theleadership of Communist parties and there was a resurgence of leftistmovements in countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia.5

After the military coup in 1965, deposing President Sukarno andmassacring nearly a million people, General Suharto's credentials as ananti-Communist crusader were impeccable as far as the West wasconcerned. It becomes obvious, based on circumstantial evidence, thatthere was Western complicity in what the Indonesians did in East Timorbecause the FRETTLIN-led movement was, by and large, considered tobe leftist. Indonesia itself would not tolerate the emergence of a leftistcountry on its border, however, small it might bé.

That the Australians knew of Indonesian plans to invade East Timorwas clear when Canberra kept quiet after five Australia-based journalists(two Australians, one New Zealander and two British) were believed tohave been murdered while covering Indonesian preparations for aninvasion on October 16,1975. Secret official documents of the Australiangovernment, which became available in March 1999, indicate that thePrime Minister o'f Australia, Gough Whitlam, strongly supportedIndonesia in two critical meetings with Suharto. The Australiannewspaper, Sydney Morning Herald, which procured these documents,stated, "He (Whitlam) affirmed, however, that he strongly desired closerand more cordial relations with Indonesia and would ensure that ouractions in regard to Portuguese Timor would always be guided by theprinciple that good relations with Indonesia were of paramountimportance to Australia."6 While reiterating the Australian position thatthe Timorese would need to determine their future, "the Prime Ministernoted in this regard that he was not prepared to accept at face value theclaims of the political personalities who have currently emerged inPortuguese Timor. He noted that they were predominantly drawn fromthe mestizo populations; they had their own economic interests to protectand sought to retain their European lifestyle. The Prime Minister impliedthat they, in fact, represented a small elite class. It may be that theywould be able to win the allegiance of the people of Timor; but theirclaims were as yet untested. There could be, below the surface, indigenousforces which could carry the people of Portuguese Timor in directionsdifferent from those in which they presently seem to be set."7


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A scrutiny of the documents related to the talks with President Suhartothat went on during Prime Minister Whitlam's visit to Indonesia onSeptember 6, 1994, reveals that Canberra was amenable to the idea ofIndonesia taking over East Timor. The prime minister said that "he felttwo things were basic to his own thinking on Portuguese Timor. First, hebelieved that Portuguese Timor, should become part of Indonesia. Second,this should happen in accordance with the properly expressed wishes ofthe people of Portuguese Timor. The Prime Minister emphasised thatthis was not yet Government policy but that it was likely .to become that.The Prime Minister said that he felt very strongly that Australia shouldnot seek, or appear to seek, any special interests in Portuguese Timor.They were people with a different ethnic background, languages andculture. It would be unrealistic and improper if we were to seek somespecial relationship. At the same time, he believed that Portuguese Timorwas too small to be independent. It was economically unviable.Independence would be unwelcome to Indonesia. To Australia and toother countries in the region, because an independent Portuguese Timorwould inevitably become the focus of attention of others outside theregion...The Prime Minister noted that, for the domestic audience inAustralia, incorporation into Indonesia should appear to be a naturalprocess arising from the wishes of the people. He recalled adverse publicopinion towards Indonesia, which had arisen almost 12 years ago, bothin Papua New Guinea and in Australia, in relation to Irian Barat.8 Therewas suspicion of Indonesia and its methods in effecting the return of theprovince. The Prime Minister said that he personally had expressedhimself in favour of the return of Irian Barat to Indonesia from the timethat he had first entered Parliament.9 In response, President Suharto wasreported to have emphasised "his concern that decolonisation inPortuguese Timor should not upset either Indonesian or regionalsecurity...If Portuguese Timor were to become independent, it wouldgive rise to problems. It was not economically viable. It would have toseek the help of another country, but Portuguese Timor would be ofinterest only because of its political importance. There was a big dangerthat communist countries—China or the Soviet Union—might gain theopportunity to intervene. This would lead, in turn, to intervention by theother great powers. Portuguese Timor in the way would become 'a mornin the eye of Australia and a thorn in Indonesia's back'...Ultimately theIndonesians hoped for the incorporation of Portuguese Timor as being inthe best interests of the region, of Indonesia and of Australia. The Presidentshared the belief that this should occur on the basis of the freely expressedwishes of the people of Portuguese Timor."10

As if to corroborate the Australian approval of the Indonesian action


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in East Timor, as soon as these documents came to public notice, DougEveringham, who served as health minister under Whitlam during 1972-1975, openly apologised to the people of Timor in a letter to the newspaperThe Australian on March 24,1999. He said, "I apologise to the EastTimorese people. I am ashamed to have belonged to the first of a seriesof Australian cabinets which failed to protest while our prime minister,unlike the world community, recognised the takeover of East Timor."11

Fascinatingly, Everingham later confessed that "the reason why successivegovernments and not just the Whitlam government, have recognisedIndonesia and East Timor is to get hold of the oil for big oil companiesin the Timor Gap."12

As one of the strongest backers of the New Order regime of GeneralSuharto after the military coup in 1965, resulting in the overthrow ofPresident Sukarno, the role of the United States in endorsing theIndonesian plans of an invasion of East Timor is also strongly suspectbecause of the fact that Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor aday after US President Gerald Ford left Jakarta after a visit to Indonesia.It was most unlikely that Suharto would have undertaken such a movewithout implicit American support. In an atmosphere of resurgentCommunist activity after the Indochina victories, any measure thatappeared to be anti-Communist, however remote it might have been,would have been endorsed by Washington.

Indonesian Political Context

Domestic politics, within Indonesia too/ played their part in promptingan overseas military escapade by the ruling elite. Although Suharto cameto power on.the promise of restoring political and economic order in thecountry by undertaking drastic measures to change the Constitution, theso-called New Order continued with the 1945 Constitution (which Sukarnohad invoked earlier to. consolidate his power) that vested enormouspowers in the hands of the president. Though it is a different issue,fascinatingly most of the tactics Suharto employed to perpetuate hispower, were borrowed from Sukarno: continuation of a Constitutionwhich was unitary in nature despite enormous social plurality, pittingone faction of the elite against another opposed to it, reservation ofparliamentary seats for the military by nomination, etc. The only visiblechange was the use of ruthless power to eliminate opposition to themilitary rule. However, the military itself was not a unified force. Thearmed forces, on whose backing Suharto remained in power, were riddenwith factions.

Corruption and factions have been endemic to the Indonesian armed


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forces since their inception. Known till recently as ABRI (AngkatanBersenjata Republik Indonesia or the Indonesian armed forces, whosenomenclature was changed to TNI—Tentara National Indonesia—afterthe fall of Suharto), they were borne out of the armed struggle forindependence that was launched between 1945 and 1949 against the Dutchcolonial rulers. Since then, the military has continued to be active on thepolitical scene of Indonesia. Although Sukarno did attempt to establishdemocratic political institutions, he was not very successful for a varietyof reasons. An atmosphere in w.hich no single party could commandclear majority in the Parliament in the successive elections in the Fifties,and Sukarno's own innate authoritarian tendencies contributed to therise of the military in politics. The armed forces were genuinely perceivedby the common people as the sole institution, with their supposeddiscipline and relatively modern technology in the form of arms at theirdisposal, which could not only keep the nation's unity and integrityintact, but also modernise the society much faster than the politicalleadership. In order to ensure the support of the powerful military,Sukarno offered statutorily mandated political share in power by way ofnominated seats in the Parliament. By the time Sukarno imposed GuidedDemocracy in 1963, he had usurped most of the powers and had to relyto a great extent on the military for support in order to checkmate thegrowing Communist influence.13 Thus, the political character of theIndonesian military remained unchanged. Like in most cases, when themilitary directly intervened in the political process, a large section of thepeople of Indonesia welcomed it, but soon discovered that'it was goingto be worse than the earlier regime. Similarly, corruption in the ABRIalso dates back to the freedom struggle days when it had to generate itsown funds to fight the war. This political background of the Indonesianmilitary has to be considered in any assessment of Indonesian politics.

Invasion of East Timor

Notwithstanding Suharto's ruthlessness, opposition to his rule startedbuilding up from the early days within the military, starting from theearly 1970s. The division in the military, between those who enjoyed thefinancial largesse of the military rule and those who were opposed to it,manifested in the anti-Chinese riots in Bandung, and later, morevociferously by students against the visiting Japanese Prime MinisterKakuei Tanaka in 1974. Better known as the Malari riots, ostensiblyopposed to the growing Japanese ownership of industrial concerns, thesecould not have taken place without the blessings of à section of thearmy's top brass.14 This was also the time when the hardliners foundfavour with the president who believed in taking aggressive steps to


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consolidate the military's hold. Ali Murtopo and Benny Murdani wereamong these. It is widely believed that these were the people whoconvinced a hesitant Suharto to invade East Timor. Muradni had been incharge of East Timor operations since the time trouble started brewingthere, till its incorporation. Despite lingering doubts about the possibleconsequences of the Indonesian action, Suharto went ahead because itserved his interests too. He could demonstrate to his mentors in the Westthat he continued to be a hardliner on anything remotely radical in nature.Second, the East Timor military action satisfied the growing impatienceof younger officers who were beginning to get disillusioned with Suharto'sstyle of functioning. And, finally, to remind his detractors of his intentto use force to suppress the opposition.

Probably Suharto never imagined that he was going to get muchmore than he had bargained for. For a variety of reasons, the little youngerbrother of East Timor could never be made an obedient child of a largeIndonesian family (as espoused and expected by the military in theIndonesian context) simply because, by the yardstick of any trait—language, culture, civilisation, religion, ethnicity—it was not related tothe family. Notwithstanding repeated claims, Timor Timur continued toboil and a small band of rebels allowed themselves to be subdued by thelarger and more powerful Indonesian troops. Of course, this was done atan enormous cost—nearly a fifth of that province's population has beeneliminated.15 It also remained under international focus even as the UnitedNations, and most other nations individually, never accepted Indonesia'ssuzerainty over East Timor. The only conspicuous exception was Australiawhich formally recognised the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

Massive deployment of troops did not help Indonesia to subjugatethe FALINTIL (the armed wing of the pro-independence movement)whose numbers have grown consistently despite a high toll of casualtiesin its ranlcs because of the growing radicalisation of the post-1975generation. The East Timor issue remained alive in the international forain part because of recurrent incidents of atrocities and wanton killing bythe army. Amnesty International brought out a detailed report onwidespread human rights violations by the Indonesian Army in 1985. Itwas cited that up to 200,000 East Timorese were killed. The mostprominent among the army's actions was the November 12,1991, massacreof an unarmed peaceful procession to a cemetery to mark the killing ofa guerilla earlier in the presence of the international media. For the firsttime,.an official inquiry was conducted by the Indonesian government,which put the death toll at 50, with 90 missing (though by all indications,it was far higher) resulting in the removal of two generals and court-marshalling of 10 soldiers. In 1993, the United Nations Human Rights


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Commission strongly indicted Indonesia for its human rights violationsin East Timor. The end of the Cold War and mounting internationalpressure forced Indonesia to hold high-level talks with exiled resistanceleader Jose Ramos Horta in October 1994. The basic issue had been thequestion of referendum, which Indonesia was reluctant to hold.

Although Indonesia realised by the mid-1990s that something urgently• needed to be done to settle the East Timor issue, it could not do so fora number of reasons. First, Indonesia had relocated through itstransmigration policy, a large number of Indonesians (mostly Javanese)who faced an uncertain future if the independence demand was conceded.Second, Indonesia had also pumped in hundreds of millions of dollarstoward developmental activities with the intent of blunting the unabatedclamour for independence. This would go down the drain if East Timorpreferred a separation. Third, in the light of other insurgency movementsfor independence, especially in Aceh and West Irian, if East Timor wasgranted independence, these and others too might demand secessionfrom the Indonesian Republic. Finally, and most importantly, was thereluctance of the army to give up East Timor just because the politicalleaders were facing international criticism. From the viewpoint of theIndonesian Army, they had invaded and controlled East Timor atenormous human and material cost and, hence, it should not be givenup. Because the army was the backbone of Suharto, he could not ignorethe army's feelings.

Referendum and After

Thus, though it continued to simmer, the East Timor problem couldnot be settled as long as Suharto was at the helm of affairs. When B.J.Habibie took over the reins after Suharto was forced to quit office in May1998, he promised to reduce the number of troops in East Timor. But noone took Habibie, a technologist by training, seriously, as he washandpicked by Suharto to be his deputy. When he announced that areferendum was possible to decide on the future of East Timor in January1999, it was a surprise, on the one hand, and yet not so surprising, on theother, because he had to do something to safeguard the presidency whichhad fallen totally unexpectedly in his lap. Habibie had his own vestedinterest in taking the initiative to soften the government's hardline stancebecause East Timor had become a thorn in the side of Indonesia; externalpressure continued to mount; it continued to drain precious resourceswith no political or economic returns; and, though East Timor had beenan issue close to the military's heart because of its involvement, thepopular unrest that forced Suharto to demit office had put the armedforces on the defensive and hence their reaction would be subdued if a

The East Timor Crisis '1475

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bold initiative was taken on East Timor. In any case, the invasion of EastTimor had never been a popular move within Indonesia.16

By the time the referendum on self-determination of East Timor washeld on August 30, 1999, the choice before the people was greaterautonomy within the union of Indonesia or "eventual separation", aeuphemism for independence. The outcome was a foregone conclusion,but what came as a surprise was the overwhelming turnout in the firstplace, with 78.5 per cent of the people opting for independence. Insteadof recounting the much talked about violence that followed after theresult was announced, unleashed by the pro-Indonesia militias, whichwas later accepted as highly exaggerated,17 it may be useful to concentrateon other and more important aspects.

First, the role of the United Nations. Without discounting the stellarrole the UN has so far played to reduce conflicts and establish peaceacross the world, it needs to be kept in mind that right from the day theUN got involved in East Timor, most of the UN observers were biasedand partial towards the Timorese, which means they were politicallyanti-Indonesia.18 Moreover, the West-dominated media went overboardto crucify the Indonesians for every act of omission and commission.Unless this tendency is rectified, this will not only put the UN credibilityat risk but also set a dangerous precedent for other UN operationselsewhere. It also becomes obvious that even the UN could not make aproper assessment of the ground realities and hurriedly pushed throughthe referendum.

Second, the role of Australia in East Timor. A little known fact is thatthe Australians fought the Japanese occupation of South-East Asia duringWorld War II. In the Timor campaign that took place between February1942 and January 1943, Australian commando forces received invaluablesupport from the Timorese by way of shelter, intelligence about locationof Japanese troops, and some even fought alongside the Australians.Australian historian C. Wray, in his book Timor 1942, summarises thefollowing:

The Australians received the willing cooperation of the Timorese peoplewho not only provided the commandos with food, portage and assistance,but also with warnings of Japanese movements. Without this assistance theAustralian force would soon have been flused out and destroyed. The contrastwith Dutch Timor (now Indonesia), where the natives refused to assist Alliedtroops and betrayed them to the Japanese, was significant...The Timoresepaid a heavy price for their support of the Australians...hundreds wereimprisoned, tortured or killed by the Japanese on suspicions of harbouringAustralians. Their villages were burned, livestock killed and crops destroyed.While exact calculation of the number of Timorese who died during the


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years of the Second World War is impossible, it has been estimated thatbetween 40,000 and 70,000 Timorese died...their losses were enormous andthe sacrifices suffered and the friendship given by many Timorese duringthe difficult days of mid to late 1942 were something which the Australianswho fought on Timor would never forget.19

In 1944, to keep the spirits and resistance up, Australian planesdropped leaflets written in Portuguese in bold letters over East Timorwhich read: "Your friends will not forget you". But soon, not only wasthe East Timorese help forgotten, as noted, the Australian governmentindirectly endorsed the Indonesian plans of invasion. Notwithstandingthe 1976 UN Security Council Resolution, which demanded that Indonesiawithdraw from East Timor, Australia first gave de-facto recognition toIndonesia's sovereignty in the late Seventies and a formal recognition inAugust 1985. Moreover, in December 1989, Australia signed the TimorGap Treaty with Indonesia which enabled Australia to undertake underseaoil exploration activities.20

The change of heart and policy came once Suharto was overthrown.Thus, the overt enthusiasm with which the Australia led a multinationalforce to save East Timor from mayhem after the referendum verdict wasdeclared has its roots in the feeling of guilt that the Australians havenursed for a long time. In the light of the above backdrop, questionshave been raised about the sincerity of the Australians in undertakingsuch a peace-keeping effort. From a long-term security point of view, anindependent East Timor, which is small, backward and heavily dependenton foreign aid for its survival perhaps serves Australia's interest muchbetter, especially at a time when Australia is striving hard to play therole of a "deputy to the US."21 Many South-East Asian nations have beenuneasy with Australia taking the initiative in a big way to "save EastTimor" because of pronouncements like these and because of its role andpolicy in the last several decades toward South-East Asia in general andEast Timor in particular.

On the other hand, the states of the Association of South-East AsianNations (ASEAN) were reluctant to spearhead the multinational presenceto stop the violence that was unleashed by the pro-Jakarta militia andensure that the wishes of the people of East Timor were implemented, inpart because they did not want antagonise the big brother in the regionwhose active involvement and support is indispensable for the veryexistence of ASEAN. The ASEAN's genesis and survival since 1967 havebeen predicated on the informal cardinal principle of non-interference ineach other's internal affairs. Like in so many occasions in the past, ASEANonce again lost a golden opportunity to take the lead in sending amultinational force under UN auspices. This would have sent the right


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signal to the outside world that ASEAN was capable of managing theaffairs of South-East Asia.

The second issue related to East Timor is the question of the securityof small states, especially in an environment of political and economicvolatility. Considerable literature has come out on the question of smallstates, but the question as to what extent they become susceptible toexternal pressures, or even become pawns in the hands of outside powershas not been fully understood. One of East Timor's leaders has alreadyannounced that seeking membership in, or in any association with,ASEAN, was ruled out. Full cooperation from Indonesia is indispensable,both to make sure that the transition to independence is peaceful andalso to ensure that Indonesia would not undertake such activities thatmight destabilise East Timor in the future. Given the strong anti-Australiansentiment that is prevalent in Indonesia, as long as Australia is in theforefront of UN operations in East Timor, it may be difficult to expectsuch cooperation from Jakarta. The pro-independence leaders are alreadybeginning to get disillusioned as the promised millions of dollars of aidis nowhere near to be seen.

Finally, the East Timor referendum has also opened up a new debateon the question of development and referendum. A look at the followingdata on East Timor is revealing: the per capita income in 1976 was US$40and in 1996 it was $398; the number of high schools was just three in1976, whereas by 1996, there were 172; and the number of health centresgrew from four to 525. The value of total taxes collected in 1995-96 wasRupiah 2.9 billion but the value of "subsidies and contributions" fromJakarta were to the tune of Rùpiah 63 billion. By the mid-1990s, thecentral government's share of East Timor's expenditure was 92.4 percent.22 When East Timor was incorporated into Indonesia, it was morebackward than when Indonesia gained independence in the Forties. Theinfrastructure was virtually non-existent. Today the largest employer isthe government and, except for coffee and a few agricultural products,there is nothing East Timor can boast of by way of natural resources. Onthe eve of the referendum, most people were aware of the fact that theywould be far better off with Indonesia than out of it. Still they preferredto be independent rather than part of a larger nation. The question is,what is the issue here: is it the fear of cultural domination by a largerethnic group; or is it the oppressive attitude of the state? Could ademocratic Indonesia have ameliorated the problems of the East Timorse?It is a larger socio-political question that needs careful examination inorder to come to certain convincing conclusions.

Now that East Timor has become independent, it has to fend for


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itself. It is estimated that a minimum of three years' presence of UNpeace-keeping forces is required in order establish some semblance oforder and a government that can govern. East Timor is a victim of thevested interests of various powers and these same powers have aresponsibility to ensure that it survives peacefully.

NOTES1. The problem of the military in politics, which is unique to the developing

countries, is a complex issue. However, there have been a number of instancesin which the military used the threat to the country's unity and integrity as aconvenient pretext to take over the reins of power.

2. The way the former Soviet Union disintegrated on ethnic lines soon after thecollapse of the central authority led by the Community Party, simmering ethnicproblems within China, especially Tibet and Xinjiang, ethnic separatistmovements in liberal democracies such as India and Sri Lanka, and Quebec,Northern Ireland and Basque in the developed countries are some examples.

3. ASDT later became the Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor(FRETILIN).

4. This was the pretext the Portuguese used to discount the Indonesian invasionand to have a moral right to represent the East Timor case in variousorganisations.

5. The Communist movements in these countries were supported mostly by China.6. http://www.pactok.net.au/docs/et/hforget.html7. Ibid.8. Irian Barat, before Indonesia took over in 1962, was known as West Irian. It

was later renamed as Irian Jaya.9. http://www.smh.com.au/news/9903/06/featuresl.html

10. Ibid.11. http://www.pactok.net.au/docts/et/ausgwda.html12. n. 6.13. Sukarno appointed Suharto as the commander of Operation Mandala which

was meant to take over West Irian in 1963. Before the invasion took place, theDutch ceded West Irian to Indonesia.

14. For a comprehensive discussion of any army politics, see Damien Kinsgbury,The Politics of Indonesia (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 99-126.

15. By most estimates, between 150,000 and 200,000 people out of the totalpopulation of about 800,000 died either due to starvation or in the anti-insurgency operations.

16. It is interesting to note that Megawati Sukarnoputri, who had emerged as astrong contender for the presidency in the proposed Parliamentary elections,was probably the only major political personality who had opposed grantingof independence to East Timor. She obviously had the armed forces in mindwhose support was perceived to be indispensable to become the president.

17. The United Nations admitted that it had uncovered no evidence to supportallegations that pro-Jakarta militias engaged in mass murder in East Timor.Michel Barton, spokesman for the UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Assistance (OCHA) in Dili stated: "We have heard horrendous


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stories for which so far there is not a shred of evidence. There have beenmurders. There have been terrible things that have happened here. But we donot believe that people in their thousands have been killed and their bodiesburied or thrown in the sea. If this had been the case, we would have foundevidence of this by now," International Herald Tribune, October 14, 1999.

18. After repeated protested by the Indonesian government, the UN eventuallyconceded that its observers were not objective in their role and functioning.

19. http://www.pactok.netau/docs/et/hforget.html20. In 1972, Australia and Indonesia had reached an agreement on oil exploration

and the talks with Portugal to cover the parts under the control of the Portuguesecould not materialise. It became convenient for Australia to sign a deal withIndonesia as it had been friendly. The price for that was recognition of EastTimor as part of Indonesia.

21. Far Eastern Economic Review, October 7, 1999, p. 14. The 1995 Security TreatyAustralia signed with Indonesia was the first casualty. The Australian attitudehas also raised strong nationalist sentiments in Indonesia.

22. Asia Week, September 10, 1999, p. 25.


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Documents

The East Timor crisis