The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rusi20

Download by: [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] Date: 19 September 2015, At: 07:11

The RUSI Journal

ISSN: 0307-1847 (Print) 1744-0378 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20

The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare

Rod Thornton

To cite this article: Rod Thornton (2015) The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare, The RUSIJournal, 160:4, 40-48, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047

Published online: 04 Sep 2015.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 254

View related articles

View Crossmark data

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rusi20

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rusi20&page=instructions

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rusi20&page=instructions

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2015-09-04

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2015-09-04

THE RUSI JOURNAL

© RUSI JOURNAL AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2015 VOL. 160 NO. 4 pp. 40–48 DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047

For several years now, thephenomenon of ‘irregular warfare’(principally of the counter-

insurgency variety) has been the mainfocus of major Western militaries andtheir doctrine centres. In accordancewith such a focus, the armies of thesemilitaries have become smaller, moreagile and better equipped to deal withthe likes of Al-Qa’ida, the Taliban andDaesh (also known as the Islamic Stateof Iraq and Syria, ISIS). In this context,the study of ‘regular warfare’ againstopponents from developed statesappears to have been neglected.1 Inparticular, the militaries of the US andthe UK have taken their eyes off thisconventional-warfare ball. In contrast,the military of one country has clearlybeen thinking very seriously about theconduct of conventional warfare betweendeveloped states, and that country isRussia.

The results of this deliberation areevident today in Ukraine, and may laterextend to other theatres, notably the

Baltics, Georgia and Moldova. Therehas been a major change in the waythe Russian military regards theconduct of its regular warfare campaigns– from the strategic to the tacticalperspectives. Indeed, what has beencalled a ‘new generation of warfare’(voina novogo pokoleniya) has beendeveloped. Central to this concept is theuse of information.

Russia ‘won’ in Crimea recentlythrough a campaign based principallyon information warfare. This is nownot only seen by the Russian militaryas a force multiplier, but also as awar-winning tool. NATO’s Supreme AlliedCommander Europe (SACEUR), GeneralPhilip Breedlove, has rightly noted thatRussia is now waging ‘the most amazinginformation warfare blitzkrieg we haveever seen in the history of informationwarfare’.2

A pressing imperative thereforepresents itself. Western governmentsand their armed forces have to respondto these Russian successes through

their own use of information. Any suchresponses should, of course, be suitableand sound in nature. Unfortunately, asthis article will show, responses so farhave been neither. Instead, they appearto represent a twenty-first-centuryequivalent of ‘Maginot Line thinking’.3

The Drivers of ChangeIt is instructive first to discuss why theRussian military felt it necessary toadopt this new thinking. The literatureon change in military organisationssuggests that ‘major change’ onlycomes about through a defeat in war orthrough significant civilian intervention.4In Russia’s case, it was the result of acombination of both. The 2008 war withGeorgia was perceived to be somethingof a ‘defeat’ in terms of the failings ithighlighted and the problems that wereself-evident to senior military officers. Itwas Vladimir Putin, however, who wasthe chief critic of this poor performanceand who became the main driver ofchange, aiming to create a military that

THE CHANGING NATURE OFMODERN WARFARERESPONDING TO RUSSIAN INFORMATIONWARFARE

ROD THORNTON

While Western militaries recognise the logic and necessity of ‘irregular warfare’ in theirmilitary operations, the manifold aspects of irregular fighting have yet to be masteredfully. Information warfare, for example, appears to be a tool more capably employedby Russia, to the detriment of NATO. Rod Thornton explains how and why Russia has‘won’ in Crimea by affording subversive information campaigns primacy in its militaryoperations. Acknowledging the twofold constraints of international law andco-ordination that face Western governments seeking to play the same game, Thorntonnonetheless expounds how the West might better pursue asymmetry in the securityrealm.

RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 40 24/08/2015 13:34:48

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Roy

al U

nite

d Se

rvic

es I

nstit

ute

for

Def

ence

& S

ecur

ity S

tudi

es]

at 0

7:11

19

Sept

embe

r 20

15

41

Local residents carry a Russian flag in Simferopol, Crimea, March 2014. Courtesy of AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev.

would be a much more effective leverof Russian power on the internationalstage.5

Some analysts have suggested thatPutin needed a more powerful military tohelp him in a process of empire-building.6This, however, is rather simplistic. A morecogent explanation is that Putin wantedto stop both himself and Russia – ashe and his advisers saw it – from beingpushed around by Western powers, inparticular by the US. As Andrew Kuchinsand Igor Zevelev argue, in Russia, ‘anenduring belief exists that [the country]is a great power and must be treatedas such’.7 However, the West has notobliged. ‘They’, as Putin put it, ‘areconstantly trying to sweep us into acorner’.8 The Cold War seems, in Russianeyes, to have simply moved on to anew phase.9 The ‘colour revolutions’exemplified the problem for Putinand the Kremlin. Countries in Russia’straditional sphere of influence were beingturned away from Moscow by regimechanges that put in place pro-Westerngovernments. In Putin’s view, theserevolutions had been organised andfinanced in Western capitals. Moreover,the logical extension of blamingWashington and its allies for these‘revolutions’ was that Putin – and Russia

– would be the next in line. Indeed,in the Kremlin there is the ‘convictionthat the West intends to bring aboutregime change in Russia’.10 Such thinkingmay appear dark, yet it is perfectlyunderstandable if one accepts that thereis a belief in the Kremlin, and in Russiamore generally, that ‘international politicsis essentially a Darwinian or Hobbesiancompetition’.11

It was with this ‘competition’in mind that, following the war withGeorgia, Putin set in train a series ofreforms within those state structures thatcould contribute to a strengthening ofRussian power on the international stage– including the military.12 Furthermore,Putin was able to ensure that the reformswould mesh and complement each otheracross the range of structures involveddue to the ‘power vertical’ systemthat operates in Russia.13 In this, Putinmaintains a highly centralised, top-downsystem of control where he ‘directlymanages the government’14 – assistedby a ‘loyal support group’,15 known asthe ‘collective Putin’.16 This consists of aclose cohort of advisers and members ofthe Russian elite who have benefited –mainly financially – from having Putin inpower. His authority is further enhancedby the grip he has gained over the

Russian media, its output being almostuniversally in his favour.17

Hybrid WarfareHaving been instructed to reform, from2010 the Russianmilitary began to debatewhat would be the best way forward.With the ‘colour revolutions’ in mind, theRussian Ministry of Defence analysed (inprint and at conferences18) how theWesthad – seemingly – gone about ‘nurturingregime change by using political,economic or military support to selectedgroups, covert action and informationoperations’.19 This analysis identifiedthe concept known as ‘hybrid warfare’or ‘ambiguous warfare’ (‘non-linearwarfare’ in Russian parlance20) as themethod employed by the Westernpowers to achieve their aims. The ideaof hybrid warfare (growing out of workon the concept of asymmetric warfare)had been given form and substancemost notably by Frank Hoffman in theUS,21 and is seen, in essence, as a formof warfare characterised by ‘blurring’.At its most basic level, the aim is togenerate a situation where it is unclearwhether a state of war exists – and if itdoes, who is a combatant and who isnot.22 A feature of hybrid warfare is thatthe modes of conflict overlap and meld.

RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 41 24/08/2015 13:34:50

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Roy

al U

nite

d Se

rvic

es I

nstit

ute

for

Def

ence

& S

ecur

ity S

tudi

es]

at 0

7:11

19

Sept

embe

r 20

15

THE CHANGING NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE

Thus, the ‘battlespace’, such as it is, canbe shaped on one level by conventionaloperations and irregular activities andconcurrently, at a higher level, by theapplication of background political andeconomic pressures. The energeticemployment of cyber-warfare lends itselfwell to such hybrid efforts, while opinionsof both supporters and opponents canbe moulded by information operations.Ideally, the various inputs into a hybrid-warfare campaign will be closelyco-ordinated and controlled by a centralguiding authority.23

Moscow has openly accusedWashington of conducting such hybridwarfare against Russia during the ‘colourrevolutions’. A reflection of Russia’slongstanding suspicion of the US role inpost-Soviet satellite states, Sergey Lavrov,Russia’s foreign minister, charged thatsuch techniques were used to ‘chang[e]the regimes in the states that pursue apolicy Washington does not like’.24 Heblamed the US for using ‘financial andeconomic pressure, information attacks,proxy intensification of pressure alongthe borders of the state in questionas well as propaganda and ideologicalinfluence through externally financednon-governmental organisations’.25 ‘Isthis not’, he asked rhetorically, ‘a hybridprocess and not what we call war?’26

The Maidan events in Ukraine in2014 furthered Moscow’s perceptionthat it was at war: that is, ‘in a permanentstate of conflict’ with the US and itsallies.27 Its chosen battleground was theformer Soviet states, which Moscowwanted to bring back into the fold or,at the very least, destabilise in order to‘show who is boss in Russia’s backyard’.28This was a Hobbesian rationale writ largeand very much redolent of Cold Warthinking.29

Integration‘Drawing lessons from different Alliedoperations’ as part of the reformprocess,30 Putin’s military then embarkedon an attempt to ‘reverse-engineer’ aRussian version of the hybrid-warfaremeasures that the Kremlin saw as beingused against the country. As Kristin VenBruusgaard observes, ‘Despite heavilycriticising such Western practices,Russia clearly adopted and refined

these elements in its own planningfor modern military operations’.31 Theend result has been a completely newdoctrinal approach. Russian ‘operations’now reflect the ‘integrated use ofmilitary force and political, economic,informational and other non-militarymeasures’.32 As the head of the Russianmilitary, General Valery Gerasimov, put it,‘the very “rules of war” have changed’.33

This integration is at the heart ofhybrid warfare. If military activities canbe used in complete concert with otherstate levers of power, then they will bemuch more effective than if they weremerely the sum of their parts. However,such integration is difficult to achieve,but Russia has successfully refined thiselement, thereby moving the hybrid-warfare concept beyond what waspossible in the (perceived) Westernvariant. Of course, the process ofintegration is considerably eased in Russiaby the central guiding authority that Putinexercises in the aforementioned ‘powervertical’ system. The consolidation ofpower around Putin has a ‘discipliningeffect within the Russian bureaucracy’that allows for a ‘comprehensiveapproach’ to government functions. Thedegree of integration this facilitates thusmeans that the Russian version of hybridwarfare can be very effective.34

This was clearly demonstrated inthe operation to seize Crimea, whichmore than amply confirmed the Russianability to ‘[integrate] military tools withmore unconventional tools … on the“battlefield”.’35 Indeed, Russian troopsmanaged to take control of Crimeawithout firing a shot. This is what SunTzu would call the ‘acme of skill’ – thesubduing of an enemy without anyfighting. It was nevertheless a departurefor a Russian army once doctrinallywedded to the use of destructivefirepower. It was also reliant, in itssuccess, on remarkable troop discipline;again, something that is not usuallyassociated with the Russian armedforces.36 The way in which these forcesoperated in Crimea was thus a ‘realnovelty’.37

It should be remembered, however,that Russian forces were at the spearheadof a much larger hybrid-warfarecampaign in Crimea – with Ukraine

subject to various manifestations ofRussian pressure for some time prior toany Russian troops leaving their barrackson the peninsula. The ground had alreadybeen prepared before any Russian forceswere committed.38

A year before the Ukraine crisis,the nature of this process of preparationwas discussed in an article in a Russianmilitary journal, Voennaya Mysl’ (MilitaryThought). In describing this ‘newgeneration of warfare’, the article outlinedeight phases, ‘the first four of whichentail non-military, covert and subversiveasymmetric means to reduce the enemy’smorale and willingness to take up arms’– thereby rendering the violent use ofmilitary force unnecessary.39 This processhas variously been described as the‘internal decay’ of the enemy;40 ‘freezingsociety fromwithin’;41 and an intention to‘paralyse an opponent’.42

Such ‘subversive asymmetric means’are designed to generate defeatism in twoways: either the adversary’s government,military and population are passivelypersuaded that Russian occupation is notsomething to be feared – indeed, it is tobe welcomed – or they become convincedthat opposing such an occupation is futileand will lead to unimaginable destruction.The former relies on presenting a positiveimage, the latter on inculcating fear. Theprincipal tool in engendering both isinformation warfare. In the new Russianmilitary mindset, information warfareenables wars to be won without a shotbeing fired.

Information WarfareWestern militaries tend to look uponwhat they refer to as ‘informationoperations’ merely as an adjunct to theircampaign plans. In contrast, for Russianmilitary thinkers, information now has‘primacy in operations’, while ‘moreconventional military forces [are] in asupporting role’.43

The Latvian analyst Janis Berzinsobserves how this new Russian emphasison information has changed the focusin today’s major conflicts from ‘directdestruction to direct influence, from awar with weapons and technology to …information or psychological warfare’. Hefurther highlights the centre of gravitythat is now a target – people’s minds:44

© RUSI JOURNAL AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2015

RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 42 24/08/2015 13:34:50

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Roy

al U

nite

d Se

rvic

es I

nstit

ute

for

Def

ence

& S

ecur

ity S

tudi

es]

at 0

7:11

19

Sept

embe

r 20

15

43

ROD THORNTON

Thus the Russian view of modernwarfare is based on the idea that themain battlespace is in the mind and,as a result, new-generation wars areto be dominated by information andpsychological warfare [with] the mainobjective [being] to reduce the necessityfor deploying hard military power tothe minimum necessary, making theopponent’s military and civil populationsupport the attacker to the detriment oftheir own government and country.

As Berzins makes clear, from the Russianperspective, ‘modern warfare’ is to befought in the mind – and informationwill be the principal tool in this fight,creating a version of reality that suitspolitical and military purposes at alllevels of warfare. The information isdisseminated via, for example, televisionstations, websites, social media andeven the leafleting of individual homes.Veracity is not necessary – indeed, asMargarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of the Putin-leaning Russia Todaysatellite television station and website,asserted when describing Russianmedia output: ‘There is no objectivity– only approximations of the truth byas many different voices as possible’.45It is thus not the quality of informationthat is important in Russian informationwarfare, but the quantity.46 If enoughoutlets spread Russian propaganda at asufficient rate then, seemingly, whereverany individual (civilian or military) in atarget country obtains information – beit from a television station or throughrumour on the street – he or she willbe receiving the Russian version of it,or one of a number of versions at least.Moreover, these versions are lent extramileage by making them as interesting aspossible, often in the form of conspiracytheories, which gain much greatertraction – and therefore more influence– than the mundane.47

For such a tumult of informationto be truly effective, of course, it allhas to be controlled; it has to be theresult of ‘the synchronous execution ofmessaging’.48 This is where the ‘powervertical’ system is key: it is ‘control ofthe media by the Russian power elite[which] has ensured the systematiccontrol of narratives’.49 Ultimately, of

course, direction comes from the verytop: as NATO’s Strategic CommunicationsCentre of Excellence (STRATCOM COE)puts it, in Russian information-warfarecampaigns, ‘control is exerted directly bythe Presidential Administration’.50

The highly professional andvoluminous output of Russianpropaganda that is currently evidentis the result of years of significantworldwide investment. Turning Russianstate-controlled media outlets intotools of information warfare hasbeen part of the Kremlin’s perceivedneed to ‘compete’ in the ‘permanentwar’ in which it considers itself tobe involved. New Russian televisionstations, broadcasting in both Russianand local languages, have recently beenestablished across the world. Theyare at the front and centre of Russia’sinformation-warfare ‘blitzkrieg’. Indeed,as noted in a report by NATO’s STRATCOMCOE: ‘One cannot underestimate the roleof the mass media in executing Russia’sforeign policy goals’.51

Compatriot RussiansThe Russian information output isdesigned to influence minds. However,the subjects must be reasonablyreceptive in the first place. Moscowis fortunate in this respect in that thenow-independent states that wereonce part of the Soviet Union contain asignificant number of ethnic Russians, aswell as Russian speakers. These Russianminorities in places such as Ukraine, theBaltic States, Moldova and Georgia arethe principal focus of Moscow’s currentinformation-warfare campaign.

Russian law labels these individualsas ‘Compatriots Living Abroad’,52 andthey are seen as requiring the protectionof Mother Russia. While Moscow mayhave altruistic motives for providingsuch protection, the presence ofthese minorities does also provide aconvenient excuse for Russia to interferein the internal affairs of these states,an interference in which Putin is all tooready to engage.

The first goal of the information-warfare campaigns is to instil in these‘compatriot Russians’ what has beencalled a ‘soft loyalty’ to Russia throughan emphasis on cultural, linguistic and

ideological links. The plan is that this ‘mayevolve into a more formal relationship infuture, if or when needed’.53 The secondgoal is to instil fear among these targetgroups that their host governmentwill one day turn on them. Messagesare sent out that ‘leverage historicalmemory’. Particular emphasis is put onthe nature of the Nazi tyranny sufferedduring the occupation of countriesincluding Ukraine and the Baltic Statesduring the Great Patriotic War – andon the fact that the Red Army came tothe rescue of those under this tyranny.Moscow’s message today is that thecurrent governments in these countriesalso have their ‘Nazi’ elements, and soit may be better for compatriot Russiansto seek protection and ‘think about afuture joint destiny with Russia’.54 Havingsuccumbed to such influences, it isintended that compatriot Russians thenbecome channels of communicationthemselves. As the ‘multipliers of desiredinformation, attitudes and behaviour’,they should set about convincing theirnon-Russian neighbours to adopt thesame thinking.55 The primary goal isfor local populations in the targetedcountries, be they Russian-speaking ornot, to protest against the governingauthorities, and for Moscow to be ableto use any subsequent clampdown bythese authorities as an excuse for settingup local vigilante squads to provide‘protection’. These squads may, of course,contain Russian special forces in civilianclothes or unmarked uniforms – or theymay not; the situation may be ‘blurred’.The end-game comes when thoseinfluenced by the information campaignseek a ‘humanitarian intervention’ byRussian troops or ultimate safety byjoining Russia itself. Ideally, though, inKremlin thinking, this would be achievedvia the ballot box through the ‘clevermanipulation of local politics’.56 Russiathus obtains a new piece of territorythrough not muchmore than the passageof information.57

There will, of course, be thosecompatriots abroad or native inhabitantsof the former Soviet states targeted byMoscow who reject the Russian mediamessage. In the integrated system,though, any such waverers can bepersuaded by activities intended instead

RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 43 24/08/2015 13:34:50

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Roy

al U

nite

d Se

rvic

es I

nstit

ute

for

Def

ence

& S

ecur

ity S

tudi

es]

at 0

7:11

19

Sept

embe

r 20

15


to build psychological pressure. Theopen massing of troops on borders oran increased number of incursions byRussian military aircraft or naval vesselscan prove influential. ‘Terrorist’ bombingcampaigns or street demonstrations,both organised by Moscow, can add tothe mix.58 In addition, cyber-warfarecan be used to generate its ownpsychological effects. A Russiandistributed denial-of-service (DDoS)attack in 2007 on Estonia’s networksproved just how vulnerable moderneconomies can be to such tactics,59 andsent a clear message from Moscow: ‘thisis what we can do if you cross us’. Inthe face of such pressure, there will bethose who submit to fear and who evencome to view Russian occupation as abetter alternative than going to war withRussia. For these people, reverting backto Moscow’s rule would seem preferableto living in a country devastated byconflict.60

Of course, the most recent principaltargets of this type of campaign havebeen the audiences in Crimea andeastern Ukraine. Indeed, ‘the Russianmedia has systematically cultivated afeeling of fear and anxiety in [both] theethnically Russian and non-Ukrainianpopulations of Ukraine’.61 Other post-Soviet states are being lined up for thesame treatment. Today, ‘Russian mediadominate in the Russian-speakingcommunities of Moldova, Belarus,Georgia, the Baltic states and also theformer USSR republics of Central Asia’.62It is the Baltics, though, that representa special target. Estonia and Latvia havelarge Russian minorities and Lithuania isvulnerable because it separates Russianforces in the Kaliningrad exclave fromBelarus and the rest of Russia.63 Russia’sinformation-warfare campaign vis-à-vis these Baltic States is very slick, withPeter Pomerantsev observing that inEstonia, for instance, ‘huge parts of[the] population live in a separate realitycreated by the Russian media’.64

‘Contactless war’ iscrucial in preventingWestern intervention

Contactless WarRussia’s information campaigns are thussupposed to remove, as far as possible,displays of ‘hard military power’ frommodern warfare, with ‘war’ becomingsomething fought ‘at arm’s length’without the need to engage with anadversary’s forces.65 This ‘contactlesswar’ has many advantages.66Obviously, interms of costs – both financial and human– it is beneficial. However, contactless waris also crucial, from a Russian perspective,in blurring the lines sufficiently to preventintervention byWestern powers on behalfof the states targeted. In this way, Russiacan negate the significant advantage heldby the US and its NATO allies in terms oftheir conventional military forces, mostlyin the technological realm. If Moscow canachieve its aims without any ‘contact’,then there can be no justification forWestern intervention. True to the conceptof asymmetric warfare, Russian militarytheorists want to turn what is a USstrength (its firepower and technologicalsophistication) into a weakness (rooted inthe requirement that its use is properlyjustified). This approach was manifestedin the extraordinary fire discipline ofRussian forces in Crimea and the use ofthe infamous ‘little green men’ in Ukraine(the ‘plausibly deniable’ Russian troops inunmarked uniforms).

This aspect of deniability isalso important in terms of the widerinternational audience to which Moscowwants to appeal. In the ‘Hobbesianstruggle’, allies are essential. Moscow hassuch allies among, for instance, the otherBRICS countries (Brazil, India, China andSouth Africa), some of which seem all tooready to accept Russia’s version of eventswith regards to Ukraine.67 However, tokeep these states on board,Moscowmustgive the impression that it is ‘law abidingand “doing the right thing”’.68 Of course,as evidence inevitably accumulates toshow that Russian forces are, indeed,operating within Ukraine, the nature ofRussia’s information message will haveto change69 – possibly to an emphasison Russia’s ‘responsibility to protect’its ‘compatriots’ in other countries. Itshould be expected that the Russianinformation-warfare campaign would beflexible enough to react adroitly to anysuch changes in circumstances.

Responses to RussianInformation WarfareRussia has shown it can occupy wholeslices of another state’s territory usingno more than information warfare,deniability and a few highly disciplinedspecial forces. The Russian military,supported by a substantial information-warfare infrastructure, has employedthe tenets of hybrid warfare remarkablyskilfully. Such activities have, of course,to be countered by NATO and the EUto ensure Moscow cannot use thesetactics so easily in future. As NATOSTRATCOM COE puts it, ‘analysis of theUkraine conflict suggests that NATOand the EU must adapt to the newreality where information superiority, asopposed to military power, is becomingincreasingly important’.70 If today ‘themain battlespace is in the mind’, it mustbe considered how Western powers andinstitutions engage in this arena.

The first option, censorship ofthe Russian media message, is widelydismissed across the EU and in the US.As John Whittingdale, the UK’s currentsecretary of state for culture, mediaand sport, stressed in 2014: ‘There isnothing Russia would like more thanto be able to say the West is censoring[it]’.71 The second alternative would befor Western powers, through NATO, toemploy their own counter-information-warfare campaigns to match those ofRussia. However, this would be futile, notleast because NATO’s members are, forthe most part, liberal democracies whosegovernments are expected to remainwedded to the truth in the informationthey provide to both domestic andinternational audiences. Moreover,they have a free media acting as thefourth estate to ensure that the truthis told. When it comes to conductinginformation-warfare campaigns, thispredilection for the truth can besomething of a handicap, allowing for theprojection of only one narrative amid thewelter of counter-narratives produced byRussian outlets. Furthermore, Westernefforts to promote this singular messagehave been underwhelming. As the UKparliamentary Defence Committee wasrecently told, ‘although the BBC RussianService was available, it was only onlineand was in no way a counterweight to


RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 44 24/08/2015 13:34:50

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Roy

al U

nite

d Se

rvic

es I

nstit

ute

for

Def

ence

& S

ecur

ity S

tudi

es]

at 0

7:11

19

Sept

embe

r 20

15

45

ROD THORNTON

the propaganda channelled throughRussian Television’.72 One outlet tuckedaway on a website is no answer to aRussian information-warfare ‘blitzkrieg’.There is similar reluctance, for instance,in Washington, to use the Voice ofAmerica radio station in an ‘overtlypropagandistic role’. Meanwhile, in theBaltic States the attempts to counterMoscow’s ‘information war’ are seen as‘uncoordinated and weak’.73 The basicproblem across the board is that liberaldemocracies have an inherent distastefor producing anything at the strategiclevel that resembles propaganda or couldbe classed as psychological warfare.74In fact, one of the reasons that theRussians concentrate so much on theirinformation-warfare output is that theyknow it cannot be countered effectively;indeed, they have shown a ‘readinessto stoop to methods the West cannotemulate without sullying itself’.75 AsPeter Pomerantsev and Michael Weisspoint out, the Russians are thinkingasymmetrically: ‘Feeling itself relativelyweak, the Kremlin has systematicallylearnt to use the principles of liberaldemocracies against them’.76

This asymmetry in willingness andabilities does not, however, mean that noaction has been taken byWestern powers.In January 2014, NATO set up a StrategicCommunications Centre of Excellencein Riga as a direct consequence of theRussian information-warfare campaign inan attempt to counter Russia’s significantadvantage in this realm. Yet even thisbody recognises that it is difficult for theWest with its freemedia ‘to compete withthe forceful, synchronised messaging ofthe Russian government’.77

For its part, the EU is discussingsponsoring its own Russian-languagechannel as ‘The truth is the best weaponthe EU has’.78 However, doubts remain asto howmuch impact a single channel canhave; indeed, this channel ‘needs to finda way to counter Moscow’s grip on theRussian-language airwaves or its targetaudience will never hear [the truth]’.79

Furthermore, it will always bedifficult for any collective of states –whether NATO or the EU – to agree onthe nature and content of informationcampaigns, not least due to disagreementover what exactly the ‘truth’ is and

how best to present it. As one Estonianmilitary officer concerned with NATO’sinformation operations put it, ‘if we wantto counter Russian propaganda … wehave to unite our lines and speak with thesame voice’.80 However, there is no suchunity in these international organisationsand thus the idea of NATO producing itsown ‘synchronised messaging’ remains apipe-dream. Therefore what collectivessuch as NATO will always lack is whatmakes Moscow’s information assault soeffective: a truly integrated approach.

The major threat to Westerninterests anywhere in the world is notterrorism, it is the threat posed byinformation warfare such as that recentlyconducted by Russia. It has achieved clearresults and this success can be repeated.As NATO finds it almost impossible toreact effectively in a symmetrical fashionto this threat, it has felt the need toresort to more traditional means. Yetthe responses seen so far are redolentof ‘Maginot Line thinking’ – in otherwords, these are responses that arebetter suited to the ‘last war’. Unlike theRussian military, NATO is still putting theuse of military force ahead of informationwarfare because – as an institution – itknows no other way of reacting.

The US and the UK have, forinstance, decided to send a small numberof (non-combat) troops to Ukraine.81 This,though, is a naive move that does nomore than play into the Kremlin’s hands.The message that Moscow can nowsend out to those who would supportits actions is that while Russia is notsending any of its own troops over theborder into Ukraine (officially, at least),the US and UK are doing so – and fromthousands of miles away. Under suchcircumstances, it raises questions as towho the aggressor really is. It is an easysell for the information-warfare-savvyRussians.

There is talk, too, of NATOresponding both by beefing up the rapid-reaction forces currently on standby to besent to the Baltic States and by holdingmore exercises there.82 This, though,raises the question of to what exactly theyare supposed to ‘react’. Russian troops,while they might one day mass near theBaltics to apply psychological pressure,are unlikely to cross any borders, at

least not overtly. Indeed, Russia’s ‘newgeneration of warfare’ is specificallydesigned to achieve results without theneed for any such crass action that might,in turn, provide an excuse for NATO (orothers) to interfere – thereby paralysingboth the target country and those thatmight come to its defence. Moreover,one aim of the Russian information-warfare campaign has always been to‘sow discord’ within NATO.83 ‘Russia’, asthe former head of Polish special forces,Roman Polko, says, ‘is mercilessly usingNATO’s weaknesses in order to play itsown game’.84 Of prime importance toRussia is to prevent the invocation ofArticle V by avoiding the trigger for ‘anarmed attack’ on any one NATO state.85

This weakness of Article V has beenrecognised – with the UK parliamentaryDefence Committee one voice amongmany calling for the word ‘armed’ to beremoved:86

NATO must resolve the contradictionbetween the specification in Article5 that a response should be to an‘armed attack’ and the likelihood onthe other hand of an ‘unarmed attack’(such as a cyber attack or another formof ambiguous warfare). NATO mustconsider whether the adjective ‘armed’should be removed from the definitionof an Article 5 attack.

Most NATO states are, however, unlikelyto agree to this – again showing theweakness of a multinational body. Theywill not want to engage militarily withRussia just because one of their numbermight be subject to a (plausibly deniable)‘form of ambiguous warfare’, howeverdisruptive.

Thus, such debate over rapid-reaction forces and Article V merelyfacilitates Moscow’s information-warfarecampaign. It should be remembered thatNATO’s offer of military assistance to theBaltic States is also an offer to fight a

Russian informationwarfare is designed to‘sow discord’ withinNATO

RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 45 24/08/2015 13:34:50

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Roy

al U

nite

d Se

rvic

es I

nstit

ute

for

Def

ence

& S

ecur

ity S

tudi

es]

at 0

7:11

19

Sept

embe

r 20

15


war – a very destructive one – on theirterritory. Such an offer may well have theeffect of stoking fear among both Baltsand compatriot Russians, once againproviding potential grist to Moscow’sinformation-warfare mill.

‘Going Asymmetric’The best means of countering Russianactions regarding Ukraine and theBaltics is in all likelihood not militaryin nature at all. Western powers needto ‘start thinking about security in amuch more sophisticated way’87 and‘to craft a response as subtle as theonslaught’.88 They need to employ theirown asymmetric approach and turn whatappears to be a Russian strength – the‘power vertical’ – into a weakness. If theindividuals in the ‘collective Putin’ aretargeted with sanctions that limit theirpersonal wealth, damage their companies

and hinder their ability to move freelyaround the world, then these individualswill put pressure on Putin to rein in hisefforts to ‘compete’.89 Russian aggressivebehaviour should thus be toned down asit seeks to avoid its own ‘internal decay’.Such sanctions have been tried already,of course, if only half-heartedly. However,they could yet prove to be the answer.As The Economist puts it: ‘It is long pasttime for every Russian parliamentarianand senior official to join the sanctionslist’.90 These are the only ‘minds’ thatneed to be influenced by multinationalbodies such as NATO and the EU; hereis the centre of gravity that needs to betargeted in order to truly stymie Russia’shybrid-warfare campaign. NATO shouldbe using its technological capabilitiesto track the business interests of theseacolytes of Putin and to disrupt themby any means possible. Of course, if this

avenue is to be pursued then there aresome legal matters that will need to beaddressed in order to make it effective.The West must adjust to the situationin which it now finds itself in relation toRussia – a ‘permanent’, hybrid war. Thegoalposts have to be moved. GeneralGerasimov has said that the ‘rules of war’have changed; thus, the Western powersmust change their own rules and adopt a‘new thinking’ of their own.

Rod Thornton works in the DefenceStudies Department of King’s CollegeLondon. He originally served in theBritish Army and later studied Russian atuniversity. He is the author ofAsymmetric Warfare: Threat andResponse in the Twenty-First Century(Polity Press, 2007) and of severalmonographs and articles about theRussian military.

Notes

1 Over the last ten years or so theacademic literature devoted to‘warfare’ has been dominated by theissue of counter-insurgency. Gian Gentilehas remarked, for instance, that thestudy of counter-insurgency in the USmilitary has become central ‘dogma’to the exclusion of the study of regularwarfare. See Gian P Gentile, ‘Let’s Buildan Army to Win All Wars’, Joint ForceQuarterly (No. 52, January 2009),p. 31. Military doctrine centres followedthis trend. The UK’s Development,Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)has also produced key publicationswithout any emphasis at all on thenature of future state-on-state war. See‘Strategic Trends Programme: FutureCharacter of Conflict’, Ministry ofDefence (MoD), 2010, <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33685/FCOCReadactedFinalWeb.pdf>, accessed15 July 2015. See also Bettina Renz,‘Russian Military Capabilities after 20Years of Reform’, Survival (Vol. 56, No. 3,June/July 2014), pp. 70–71.

2 John Vandiver, ‘SACEUR: Allies MustPrepare for “Hybrid War”’, Stars andStripes, 4 September 2014, <http://www.stripes.com/news/saceur-

allies-must-prepare-for-russia-hybrid-war-1.301464>, accessed 15 July 2015.

3 In the 1930s, the French armyconstructed the Maginot Linefortifications running along the country’sborder with Germany. Based onexperience from the First World War, itwas thought that such a structure wouldhalt any future invasion by Germany. Itdid not.

4 See Deborah D Avant, PoliticalInstitutions and Military Change: Lessonsfrom Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 1994); BarryPosen, The Sources of Military Doctrine:France, Britain, and Germany betweenthe World Wars (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1984); Stephen Rosen,Winning the Next War: Innovation andthe Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1995).

5 See Bettina Renz and Rod Thornton,‘Russian Military Modernization: Cause,Course, and Consequences’, Problemsof Post-Communism (Vol. 59, No. 1,February 2012), pp. 44–54.

6 See Matthew Kroenig, ‘Facing Reality:Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War’,

Survival (Vol. 57, No. 1, February/March2015), pp. 53–54; Peter Apps, ‘RussiaRaises Military Clout With Reforms afterGeorgia War’, Reuters, 27 February2014; Con Coughlin, ‘Putin Wants aNew Russian Empire’, Daily Telegraph, 5September 2008; Lilia Shevtsova, ‘Putin’sAttempt to Recreate the Soviet Empire isFutile’, Financial Times, 8 January 2014.

7 Andrew C Kuchins and Igor A Zevelev,‘Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity inChange’,Washington Quarterly (Vol. 35,No. 1, Winter 2012), p. 147.

8 Cited in NATO Strategic CommunicationsCentre of Excellence (STRATCOMCOE), ‘Analysis of Russia’s InformationCampaign against Ukraine’, Report No. 3,2014, p. 8.

9 Kroenig, ‘Facing Reality’.

10 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Crimea andRussia’s Strategic Overhaul’, Parameters(Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 2014), p. 87; BBCMonitoring, ‘Analysis: What’s New inRussia’s Latest Military Doctrine’,9 January 2015.

11 Kuchins and Zevelev, ‘Russian ForeignPolicy’, p. 147.


RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 46 24/08/2015 13:34:50

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Roy

al U

nite

d Se

rvic

es I

nstit

ute

for

Def

ence

& S

ecur

ity S

tudi

es]

at 0

7:11

19

Sept

embe

r 20

15

47

ROD THORNTON

12 Fred Weir, ‘Oligarchs Out, “Siloviki”In: Why Russia’s Foreign Policy isHardening’, Christian Science Monitor,2 February 2015.

13 Andrew Monaghan, ‘The RussianVertikal: The Tandem, Power and theElections’, Russia and Eurasia ProgrammePaper 2011/01, Chatham House, June2011, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/19412_0511ppmonaghan.pdf>, accessed 15 July 2015.

14 Moscow Times, ‘Putin StrengtheningPower Vertical Report Says’, 22 May2013.

15 STRATCOM COE, ‘Analysis of Russia’sInformation Campaign against Ukraine’,p. 7.

16 Brian Whitmore, ‘The Sick Man ofMoscow’, Radio Free Europe, 12 March2015, <http://www.rferl.org/archive/The_Power_Vertical/latest/884/884.html>, accessed 15 July 2015.

17 See Monaghan, ‘The Russian Vertikal’.

18 The general quality of the study anddebate within the Russian Ministry ofDefence in regard to future warfareis high. See, for instance, the reviewundertaken by S G Chekinov and S ABogdanov, ‘The Nature and Contentof a New-Generation War’,MilitaryThought [Voennaya Mysl’] (No. 4, 2013),<http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/MT_FROM%20THE%20CURRENT%20ISSUE_No.4_2013.pdf>, accessed 15July 2015. See also Mark Galeotti, ‘The“Gerasimov Doctrine” and Russian Non-Linear War’, Moscow’s Shadows Blog,6 July 2014, <https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>, accessed 15 July2015; Dmitry Gorenburg, ‘CounteringColor Revolutions: Russia’s New SecurityStrategy and its Implications for USPolicy’, Russian Military Reform Blog,15 September 2014, <https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2014/09/15/countering-color-revolutions-russias-new-security-strategy-and-its-implications-for-u-s-policy/>, accessed 15 July 2015.

19 Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Crimea and Russia’sStrategic Overhaul’, p. 83.

20 Roger McDermott, ‘Myth and Reality:A Net Assessment of Russia’s “Hybrid

Warfare” Strategy since the Start of 2014(Part 1)’, Eurasia Daily Monitor (Vol. 11,No. 184, 17 October 2014).

21 Frank G Hoffman, ‘Hybrid Warfare andChallenges’, Joint Force Quarterly(No. 52, 2009), pp. 34–39.

22 James N Mattis and Frank Hoffman,‘Future Warfare: The Rise of HybridWars’, Proceedings (Vol. 132, No. 11,2005).

23 Frank G Hoffman, ‘Conflict in the 21st

Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars’,Potomac Institute for Policy Studies,December 2007, p. 8.

24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RussianFederation, ‘Remarks by Foreign MinisterSergey Lavrov at the XXII Assembly of theCouncil on Foreign and Defence Policy,Moscow, 22 November 2014’, <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/24454A08D48F695EC3257D9A004BA32E>, accessed15 July 2015.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Stephen Blank, ‘Russia, Hybrid War andthe Evolution of Europe’, Second Lineof Defense, 14 February 2015, <http://www.sldinfo.com/russia-hybrid-war-and-the-evolution-of-europe/>, accessed15 July 2015.

28 The Economist, ‘Putin’s War on theWest’, 14 February 2015, p. 4.

29 Kroenig, ‘Facing Reality’.



32 BBC Monitoring, ‘Analysis: What’s Newin Russia’s Latest Military Doctrine’.

33 Galeotti, ‘The “Gerasimov Doctrine” andRussian Non-Linear War’.

34 Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Crimea and Russia’sStrategic Overhaul’, pp. 87–88.

35 Ibid., p. 89.

36 See Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone

of Russian Power (New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press, 1998).

37 Ibid.

38 STRATCOM COE, ‘Analysis of Russia’sInformation Campaign against Ukraine’.

39 See Chekinov and Bogdanov, ‘The Natureand Content of a New-Generation War’.

40 Janis Berzins, ‘Russia’s New GenerationWarfare in Ukraine: Implications forLatvian Defense Policy’, National DefenceAcademy of Latvia, Center for Securityand Strategic Research, Policy PaperNo. 2, April 2014, p. 5.

41 Paulius Gritenas, ‘Zygimantas Pavilionis:Barbarians Already Inside the Country,Not Just at the Gates’, Lietuvos Rytas[Lithuania Morning], 4 December 2014,cited by BBC Monitoring.

42 House of Commons Defence Committee,‘Towards the Next Defence and SecurityReview: Part Two – NATO’, HC 755, NinthSpecial Report of Session 2014–15,October 2014, p. 17.


44 Berzins, ‘Russia’s New GenerationWarfare in Ukraine’, p. 5. Emphasisadded.

45 Cited in Guardian, ‘The Guardian Viewon Russian Propaganda: The Truth is OutThere’, 2 March 2015.

46 Peter Pomerantsev, ‘How Putin isReinventing Warfare’, Foreign Policy,5 May 2014.

47 Peter Pomerantsev and MichaelWeiss, ‘Russia and the Menace ofUnreality: How the Kremlin WeaponizesInformation, Culture and Money’,Interpreter, Institute of Modern Russia,2014.

48 STRATCOM COE, ‘Analysis of Russia’sInformation Campaign against Ukraine’,p.13.

49 Ibid., p. 20.

50 Ibid., p. 3.

51 Ibid., p. 11.

RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 47 24/08/2015 13:34:51

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Roy

al U

nite

d Se

rvic

es I

nstit

ute

for

Def

ence

& S

ecur

ity S

tudi

es]

at 0

7:11

19

Sept

embe

r 20

15



53 Agnia Grigas, ‘Anatomy of Russia’sInformation Warfare in the Baltic States’,Delfi, 29 December 2014.


55 Ibid.

56 Coughlin, ‘Putin Wants a New RussianEmpire’.


58 Allison Quinn, ‘Experts See Dark Plot inSpate of Mystery Bombings in Ukraine’,Moscow Times, 25 February 2015.

59 BBC News, ‘Estonia Hit by “MoscowCyber War”’, 17 May 2007.



62 Ibid., p. 12.

63 Russian troops actually guard theborders of Belarus with Kaliningrad andUkraine.

64 Pomerantsev and Weiss, ‘Russia and theMenace of Unreality’, p. 4.

65 Chekinov and Bogdanov, ‘The Natureand Content of a New-Generation War’,p. 13.

66 Berzins, ‘Russia’s New GenerationWarfare in Ukraine’, p. 5.

67 Zachary Keck, ‘Why Did BRICS Back

Russia on Crimea?’, Diplomat,31 March 2014.


69 Igor Sutyagin, ‘Russian Forces in Ukraine’,RUSI Briefing Paper, March 2015.


71 Josh Halliday, ‘BBC World Service FearsLosing the Information War as RussiaToday Ramps up Pressure’, Guardian,21 December 2014, p. 9.

72 House of Commons Defence Committee,‘Towards the Next Defence and SecurityReview: Part Two – NATO’, p. 28.

73 Chris McGreal, ‘Vladimir Putin’s“Misinformation” Offensive PromptsUS to Deploy its Cold War PropagandaTools’, Guardian, 25 April 2015.

74 Ibid.

75 The Economist, ‘Putin’s War on theWest’.

76 Pomerantsev and Weiss, ‘The Menace ofUnreality’, p. 4.


78 Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, ‘EuropeMulls a Russian Language TV Channel toCounter Moscow Propaganda’, Time,19 January 2015.

79 Kashmira Gander, ‘EU Could LaunchEuropean TV Channel to Combat“Aggressive” Russian Propaganda’,Independent, 1 January 2015.

80 Valentina Pop, ‘Nato Colonel Sheds Lighton Russia “Psy-Ops”, EU Observer,

22 January 2015, <https://euobserver.com/foreign/127174>, accessed 15 July2015.

81 FoxNews, ‘US Sending around 600Paratroopers to Ukraine to Train Troops’,11 February 2015, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/02/11/fighting-rages-on-in-ukraine-ahead-peace-talks/>,accessed 15 July 2015; Patrick Wintour,‘Britain to Send Military Advisers toUkraine, Announces Cameron’, Guardian,24 February 2015.

82 Ewen MacAskill, ‘NATO to Announce4,000-Strong Rapid Reaction Force toCounter Russian Threat’, Guardian,5 September 2014.


84 Delfi, ‘Former Polish Special ForcesCommander: Polish Soldiers WouldDefend Lithuania’, 16 March 2015.

85 Michael John Williams, ‘Russia’sNew Doctrine: How the Kremlin HasLearned to Fight Tomorrow’s WarToday’, Center for European PolicyAnalysis, 9 May 2014, <http://cepa.org/content/russia%E2%80%99s-new-doctrine-how-kremlin-has-learned-fight-tomorrow%E2%80%99s-war-today>,accessed 15 July 2015.

86 House of Commons Defence Committee,‘Towards the Next Defence and SecurityReview: Part Two – NATO’, p. 41.

87 Sam Jones, ‘Ukraine: Russia’s New Art ofWar’, Financial Times, 28 August 2014.


89 Vladimir Kara-Muza, ‘Russia and theBaltics: Once Friend, Now Foe’,WorldAffairs (January/February 2015).



RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 48 24/08/2015 13:34:51

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Roy

al U

nite

d Se

rvic

es I

nstit

ute

for

Def

ence

& S

ecur

ity S

tudi

es]

at 0

7:11

19

Sept

embe

r 20

15

Documents

The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare