The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, andPostwar Imperialism by Wm. Roger LouisReview by: Bruce R. KuniholmThe American Historical Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Oct., 1985), pp. 906-907Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1858854 .

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906 Reviews of Books 906 Reviews of Books

loans on behalf of the French as early as August 1914, only to encounter objections when the Wilson administration maintained that such financing would be inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality. By mid-1915 the U.S. Treasury and State depart- ments relented, thereby opening the American money market to belligerent governments. Not sur- prisingly, many Americans remained reluctant to invest until the Morgan group devised schemes for using British government securities as collateral. To, pay for their purchasing needs, the British required at least two hundred million dollars per month.

Following American intervention in April 1917, the British mission to the United States expanded from sixteen hundred to ten thousand persons within eight months. At first, Wilson expressed concern lest the American public get the impression that the British were influencing Washington's pol- icies, while the British worried lest the U.S. war effort siphon off America's valuable assistance needed by the Allies. From time to time, Burk notes, the Wilson administration contemplated the appli- cation of leverage to gain concessions from the British, but she fails to explain why such intentions never materialized. Surely, one significant feature of wartime British-American collaboration had to be the British government's circumvention of its em- bassy in Washington and its ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, whose ineffectiveness in developing close relations with American leaders was widely acknowledged. Special agents like Sir William Wiseman and successive British missions led by Balfour, Northcliffe, and Reading were intended to meet this need. What seems most impressive to this reviewer is the extent to which these missions suc- ceeded, not their inadequacies.

World War I culminated in the defeat of imperial Germany, the dismemberment of the venerable Austro-Hungarian empire, and revolutions in Rus- sia, but less obvious, if no less significant for twentieth-century international relations, were the consequences for the victorious Allied and associ- ated coalition. Commentators have long observed that the world war contributed to the decline of British power and influence in world affairs. Burk here provides an important explanation for this decline.

LAWRENCE E. GELFAND

University of Iowa

loans on behalf of the French as early as August 1914, only to encounter objections when the Wilson administration maintained that such financing would be inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality. By mid-1915 the U.S. Treasury and State depart- ments relented, thereby opening the American money market to belligerent governments. Not sur- prisingly, many Americans remained reluctant to invest until the Morgan group devised schemes for using British government securities as collateral. To, pay for their purchasing needs, the British required at least two hundred million dollars per month.

Following American intervention in April 1917, the British mission to the United States expanded from sixteen hundred to ten thousand persons within eight months. At first, Wilson expressed concern lest the American public get the impression that the British were influencing Washington's pol- icies, while the British worried lest the U.S. war effort siphon off America's valuable assistance needed by the Allies. From time to time, Burk notes, the Wilson administration contemplated the appli- cation of leverage to gain concessions from the British, but she fails to explain why such intentions never materialized. Surely, one significant feature of wartime British-American collaboration had to be the British government's circumvention of its em- bassy in Washington and its ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, whose ineffectiveness in developing close relations with American leaders was widely acknowledged. Special agents like Sir William Wiseman and successive British missions led by Balfour, Northcliffe, and Reading were intended to meet this need. What seems most impressive to this reviewer is the extent to which these missions suc- ceeded, not their inadequacies.

World War I culminated in the defeat of imperial Germany, the dismemberment of the venerable Austro-Hungarian empire, and revolutions in Rus- sia, but less obvious, if no less significant for twentieth-century international relations, were the consequences for the victorious Allied and associ- ated coalition. Commentators have long observed that the world war contributed to the decline of British power and influence in world affairs. Burk here provides an important explanation for this decline.

LAWRENCE E. GELFAND

University of Iowa

WM. ROGER LOUIS. The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, tiw United States, and Postwar Imperialism. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1984. Pp. xvii, 803. $55.00.

Wm. Roger Louis's comprehensive examination of the British Labour government's disengagement

WM. ROGER LOUIS. The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, tiw United States, and Postwar Imperialism. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1984. Pp. xvii, 803. $55.00.

Wm. Roger Louis's comprehensive examination of the British Labour government's disengagement

from the Middle East in the aftermath of World War II is the most impressive diplomatic history written about that region in the postwar period. Louis's work is structured around Ernest Bevin's unsuccessful effort to replace Britain's formal rule in the Middle East with an informal rule built on "equal" partnership and undergirded by economic and social development. By refraining from direct intervention in the region and conciliating "moder- ate" nationalists, Louis argues, Bevin hoped to avert extreme nationalism, halt the collapse of the British empire, and maintain Britain as the dominant re- gional power.

Once American commitment to the Middle East's "Northern Tier" (Greece and Turkey) provided Britain with a shield against the Soviet threat, Bevin's evolving strategy was to cut Britain's losses in Palestine; consolidate its position in Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, and Cyrenaica; and develop the "Brit- ish" Middle East, whose resources and strategic value Bevin regarded as a substitute for India. If the loss of India made Egypt more important to the British, the loss of Palestine underscored the lack of viable strategic alternatives to the base at Suez, while the advent of war in Korea seemed to confirm the necessity of continued access to the base (which the British desired for air offensives against the Soviet Union in the event of war).

Mutual interests, however, proved difficult to agree on. Attempts to conciliate Egypt in 1946 were counterproductive; efforts to "conciliate" Iran in the early 1950s were too late. Loss of the Indian Army, moreover, rendered the British incapable of exer- cising their power of old and conducting an imperial adventure in Iran in 1951. In short, neither concil- iation nor intervention seemed to be feasible, and events in both Egypt and Iran paved the way for the debacle at Suez in 1956.

Louis recognizes that resentment over seven dec- ades of British influence was profound, that there may have been no way to accommodate rising na- tionalism and maintain the kind of influence that Britain wanted. This judgment, however, was not apparent at the time, when the British confronted what they saw as two difficult choices: first, between intervention and tacit support for reaction; second, between weakening their strategic defenses and antagonizing nationalists by continuing to maintain enclaves in the region. Although the dilemmas posed by these choices proved incapable of resolu- tion, the contemporary belief that they could be resolved and that the British were engaged in a heroic struggle, Louis observes, "makes the story all the more fascinating" (p. 50).

A brief review cannot do justice to Louis's com- mand of his material, his mastery of issues, and the clarity of his presentation. His meticulous survey of documentary sources, carefully integrated with re-

from the Middle East in the aftermath of World War II is the most impressive diplomatic history written about that region in the postwar period. Louis's work is structured around Ernest Bevin's unsuccessful effort to replace Britain's formal rule in the Middle East with an informal rule built on "equal" partnership and undergirded by economic and social development. By refraining from direct intervention in the region and conciliating "moder- ate" nationalists, Louis argues, Bevin hoped to avert extreme nationalism, halt the collapse of the British empire, and maintain Britain as the dominant re- gional power.

Once American commitment to the Middle East's "Northern Tier" (Greece and Turkey) provided Britain with a shield against the Soviet threat, Bevin's evolving strategy was to cut Britain's losses in Palestine; consolidate its position in Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, and Cyrenaica; and develop the "Brit- ish" Middle East, whose resources and strategic value Bevin regarded as a substitute for India. If the loss of India made Egypt more important to the British, the loss of Palestine underscored the lack of viable strategic alternatives to the base at Suez, while the advent of war in Korea seemed to confirm the necessity of continued access to the base (which the British desired for air offensives against the Soviet Union in the event of war).

Mutual interests, however, proved difficult to agree on. Attempts to conciliate Egypt in 1946 were counterproductive; efforts to "conciliate" Iran in the early 1950s were too late. Loss of the Indian Army, moreover, rendered the British incapable of exer- cising their power of old and conducting an imperial adventure in Iran in 1951. In short, neither concil- iation nor intervention seemed to be feasible, and events in both Egypt and Iran paved the way for the debacle at Suez in 1956.

Louis recognizes that resentment over seven dec- ades of British influence was profound, that there may have been no way to accommodate rising na- tionalism and maintain the kind of influence that Britain wanted. This judgment, however, was not apparent at the time, when the British confronted what they saw as two difficult choices: first, between intervention and tacit support for reaction; second, between weakening their strategic defenses and antagonizing nationalists by continuing to maintain enclaves in the region. Although the dilemmas posed by these choices proved incapable of resolu- tion, the contemporary belief that they could be resolved and that the British were engaged in a heroic struggle, Louis observes, "makes the story all the more fascinating" (p. 50).

A brief review cannot do justice to Louis's com- mand of his material, his mastery of issues, and the clarity of his presentation. His meticulous survey of documentary sources, carefully integrated with re-

This content downloaded from 91.229.229.162 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 05:01:24 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

General 907 General 907

cent scholarship, enables him to examine key ques- tions, explore alternative interpretations, and pro- vide reasoned assessments, always thoughtful of the larger contexts that inform them. British withdrawal from Greece, for example, must be seen not only in the context of Britain's worsening economic situa- tion but also in view of Bevin's having learned that the United States was working on a new policy toward Greece, his desire to remove all grounds for legitimate Russian complaint over British deploy- ment in the Balkans, and his sensitivity to criticism in the United Nations at a time when he was trying to convince the Egyptians that the British intended to withdraw their troops from Egypt into the Canal Zone.

Louis has a keen sense of personalities and a firm grasp of the bureaucratic contexts within which those personalities operated. Bevin, Arthur Creech Jones, Reader Bullard, Reginald Leeper, John Troutbeck, William Strang, Arthur Dawe, Francis Shepherd, Michael Wright, and a host of others are the subjects of careful scrutiny. We learn whose insights are representative, whose are unorthodox, and where the tone of Foreign Office minutes is misleading. We gain insight into the role of Oriental counselors in Britain's Middle East embassies and into the biases that influenced the relationships among various bureaucracies such as the Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office. Louis is particularly adept at characterizing policy conflicts in the context of the personalities who are party to them. Thus, British policy in the Middle East can be seen as a clash between the "Little Englander" and "imperial" ideas about the Middle East embodied in Clement Attlee and Bevin; the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry's work can be understood as a clash between its respective British and American chairmen. Sensitive to nu- ances and to assumptions implicit in differing per- ceptions of a problem, Louis is always conscious that moral and historical issues are ambiguous and that diametrically opposed conclusions can be drawn from the same evidence by men of good will and intellectual integrity. Nonetheless, he is not afraid to make judgments, and when he does they are both reasonable and fair, particularly on Palestine, where he walks with assurance through interpretive and semantic minefields. Scholars looking for a model of historical diplomatic writing could find no better starting place.

BRUCE R. KUNIHOLM

Duke University

cent scholarship, enables him to examine key ques- tions, explore alternative interpretations, and pro- vide reasoned assessments, always thoughtful of the larger contexts that inform them. British withdrawal from Greece, for example, must be seen not only in the context of Britain's worsening economic situa- tion but also in view of Bevin's having learned that the United States was working on a new policy toward Greece, his desire to remove all grounds for legitimate Russian complaint over British deploy- ment in the Balkans, and his sensitivity to criticism in the United Nations at a time when he was trying to convince the Egyptians that the British intended to withdraw their troops from Egypt into the Canal Zone.

Louis has a keen sense of personalities and a firm grasp of the bureaucratic contexts within which those personalities operated. Bevin, Arthur Creech Jones, Reader Bullard, Reginald Leeper, John Troutbeck, William Strang, Arthur Dawe, Francis Shepherd, Michael Wright, and a host of others are the subjects of careful scrutiny. We learn whose insights are representative, whose are unorthodox, and where the tone of Foreign Office minutes is misleading. We gain insight into the role of Oriental counselors in Britain's Middle East embassies and into the biases that influenced the relationships among various bureaucracies such as the Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office. Louis is particularly adept at characterizing policy conflicts in the context of the personalities who are party to them. Thus, British policy in the Middle East can be seen as a clash between the "Little Englander" and "imperial" ideas about the Middle East embodied in Clement Attlee and Bevin; the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry's work can be understood as a clash between its respective British and American chairmen. Sensitive to nu- ances and to assumptions implicit in differing per- ceptions of a problem, Louis is always conscious that moral and historical issues are ambiguous and that diametrically opposed conclusions can be drawn from the same evidence by men of good will and intellectual integrity. Nonetheless, he is not afraid to make judgments, and when he does they are both reasonable and fair, particularly on Palestine, where he walks with assurance through interpretive and semantic minefields. Scholars looking for a model of historical diplomatic writing could find no better starting place.

BRUCE R. KUNIHOLM

Duke University

BRUCE D. PORTER. The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945-1980. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1984. Pp. viii, 248. $29.95.

BRUCE D. PORTER. The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945-1980. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1984. Pp. viii, 248. $29.95.

The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan has aroused much speculation among government and academic experts about what it portends for Moscow's future behavior in the Third World. Is this first use of Soviet troops in a local conflict an aberration, or does it mark an emergent policy pattern?

Bruce D. Porter's book presents five case studies of Moscow's role in local wars: the Yemeni civil war (1962-69), the Nigerian civil war (1967-70), the Yom Kippur war (1973), the Angola civil war (1973-76), and the Ogaden war (1977-78). Each of the book's five core essays is a lucid presentation of the circumstances of the local conflict itself, the nature of diplomatic relations between Moscow and its client, the course of the deepening Soviet involve- ment, and the contribution of the American and Chinese factors. Each ends with a concise discussion of the results of Soviet action.

The value of these essays is enhanced by tables on the estimated transfer of Soviet weapons and data about the numbers of Soviet and other Communist advisers. Altogether, this part of the book is a model presentation of pertinent diplomatic and military facts set against the broader regional and global backgrounds. On this level the book is a valuable and excellent source of coherently arranged infor- mation.

Some questions arise concerning the larger mes- sage of this work, however. The book is based on the assumption that the basic Soviet modus operandi and the core of the Communists' success is military power. The author posits at the start that the estab- lishment of Soviet rule in Russia by 1922 "depended more on raw military force than on anything else" and that this "lesson ... played a major role in shaping [the Soviet leaders'] attitude toward the uses and utility of military power" (p. 7). This one-factor explanation of an extended, complex historical event accounts for the largely deterministic presen- tation of the issues under examination. The book not only stresses the ever-bolder and ascending scale of Soviet military involvement in the Third World but also tends to argue that Moscow has the knack of choosing the winning side.

The fact that the USSR takes a long time in making up its mind to intervene, or that it has at times backed the wrong party, or gets mired in some murky and thankless situation-all indicating both hesitation about the efficacy of force and a lack of sure success-gets short shrift in this study. For readers interested in a more multifarious and less one-sided analysis, Stephen r. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe's recent book, Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts, is recommended.

ELIZABETH K. VALKENIER

Harriman Institute Columbia University

The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan has aroused much speculation among government and academic experts about what it portends for Moscow's future behavior in the Third World. Is this first use of Soviet troops in a local conflict an aberration, or does it mark an emergent policy pattern?

Bruce D. Porter's book presents five case studies of Moscow's role in local wars: the Yemeni civil war (1962-69), the Nigerian civil war (1967-70), the Yom Kippur war (1973), the Angola civil war (1973-76), and the Ogaden war (1977-78). Each of the book's five core essays is a lucid presentation of the circumstances of the local conflict itself, the nature of diplomatic relations between Moscow and its client, the course of the deepening Soviet involve- ment, and the contribution of the American and Chinese factors. Each ends with a concise discussion of the results of Soviet action.

The value of these essays is enhanced by tables on the estimated transfer of Soviet weapons and data about the numbers of Soviet and other Communist advisers. Altogether, this part of the book is a model presentation of pertinent diplomatic and military facts set against the broader regional and global backgrounds. On this level the book is a valuable and excellent source of coherently arranged infor- mation.

Some questions arise concerning the larger mes- sage of this work, however. The book is based on the assumption that the basic Soviet modus operandi and the core of the Communists' success is military power. The author posits at the start that the estab- lishment of Soviet rule in Russia by 1922 "depended more on raw military force than on anything else" and that this "lesson ... played a major role in shaping [the Soviet leaders'] attitude toward the uses and utility of military power" (p. 7). This one-factor explanation of an extended, complex historical event accounts for the largely deterministic presen- tation of the issues under examination. The book not only stresses the ever-bolder and ascending scale of Soviet military involvement in the Third World but also tends to argue that Moscow has the knack of choosing the winning side.

The fact that the USSR takes a long time in making up its mind to intervene, or that it has at times backed the wrong party, or gets mired in some murky and thankless situation-all indicating both hesitation about the efficacy of force and a lack of sure success-gets short shrift in this study. For readers interested in a more multifarious and less one-sided analysis, Stephen r. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe's recent book, Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts, is recommended.

ELIZABETH K. VALKENIER

Harriman Institute Columbia University

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