Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bargaining, and Communication in the Terrorist Event

Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bargaining, and Communication in the Terrorist EventAuthor(s): Jerome R. CorsiSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1981), pp. 47-85Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/173748 .

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Terrorism as a Desperate Game

FEAR, BARGAINING, AND COMMUNICATION IN THE TERRORIST EVENT

JEROME R. CORSI Department of Political Science University of Denver

This article examines terrorism both theoretically and empirically. A typology is presented to identify different types of terrorist events and characteristics particular to each. Following this, the negotiations involved in hostage situations are examined with emphasis on government / terrorist response options and event outcomes. Throughout the article, assumptions of the theoretical model are empirically tested utilizing the ITERATE data set. Decision routes are mapped as a method for conceptualizing the tactics involved in bargaining communications. Formal game theory is utilized to explore the complexities involved in modeling government/terrorist interaction regarding: (a) developing an extensive game form; (b) specifying utilities; and (c) constructing illustrative games. Probability functions for an empirically-based decision model are generated by an examination of government/ terrorist responses and outcomes for the cases in the data set. Discriminant function analysis is employed to specify quantitatively the degree to which theoretically identified types are distinct as posited. The argument presented emphasizes the significance of the communications (implicit and direct, calculated and manipulative) which result from the terrorist/target bargaining interaction.

This article focuses on terrorism viewed as a desperate game. Several terms require clarification. The form of terrorism under consideration is political. This distinction is made to exclude certain types of terrorist acts undertaken strictly for personal gain, as is the case in a kidnapping with the sole purpose of ransom. The distinction becomes hazy when we

AUTHOR'S NOTE: An earlier version of this article was presented as a paper at the Third Biennial Meeting of the International Society for Research on Aggression, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1978.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 25 No. 1, March 1981 47-85 ? 1981 Sage Publications, Inc.

47



48 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

recognize that the political aims of certain terrorists may appear ambiguous or even incomprehensible to certain authorities and publics. Furthermore, a given terrorist who begins an act strictly or primarily to obtain personal gain may during or after the act realize some value from articulating political goals (Edelman, 1971). Given all these qualifica- tions, "political" terrorism refers to those violent acts wherein the perpetrators articulate goals or purposes which relate to grievances against the policies or actions of some identifiable political actor(s) or state(s).

For the purposes of this discussion, attention will be limited to acts of violence initiated on behalf of minority interests and committed by individuals or small cadres to harm establishment persons or elite property. One implicit assumption is that the act is meant to affect a much larger audience in a given population, an audience in whom the act generates fear. This assumption reveals the implicit "theatrical" nature of terrorism and the importance of the media in what is essentially an act of communication (Alexander, 1979; Jenkins, 1974a, 1974b; Salomone, 1975).

In so limiting the focus, a wide variety of acts are excluded. Commentators have noted the terrorist effect of certain state activities, such as the bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki during World War II, or the repressive activities of a Stalin-type government on its own citizens (Schelling, 1966; Schreiber, 1978; Stohl, 1979). Un- doubtedly, such acts produce an extremely fearful reaction in a population whose members identify with the immediate victims. The decision to focus on minority terrorism, or what Bell (1973) calls "resistance," is not meant to imply a moral judgement that this form of terrorism is somehow "worse" or more reprehensible than related acts of state terror. However, while a study of state terror is relevant and necessary, the phenomenon is distinct from minority terrorism and must be analyzed separately.1

For instance, minority terrorism may be aimed at undermining the legitimacy of a given state; in contrast, a state may utilize legitimacy claims to justify inflicting terrorism upon individuals and/or groups viewed as resisting or challenging state authority (Walter, 1969).

1. Another excluded form is pro-establishment terror. This analysis focuses primarily on incidents which place government and terrorists in an adversary relationship. While governments need not necessarily endorse terrorist activities of pro-establishment groups, at a minimum the government/terrorist opposition relationship is attenuated. At the extreme, pro-establishment terror conducted by a minority group may merely be a surrogate form of state terrorism.



Corsi / TERRORISM AS A DESPERATE GAME 49

Minority terrorism, below the threshold point of civil war, generally draws support from a small segment of the domestic population and operates despite limited military capacity (Gurr, 1970). Domestic state terrorism, even though an extreme policy, is more likely to correlate positively with substantial (though not universal) regime institutional support and with a preponderance of regime-controlled military capacity. International state terrorism in warfare is likely to be justified by arguments concerning the excesses of the enemy, the threat to the state, or the demands of "total" war; even here such extreme violence is seriously suspect given established moral codes of jus in bello (Walzer, 1977). Thus, minority terrorism differs from state terrorism regarding not only political support configurations from which it derives, but in means and justifications as well.

The adjective "desperate" is used primarily to call attention to the most intense forms of terrorism. Such acts involve a definite threat to life and property. Individuals or groups engaging in violent acts of this nature are involved in a drastic crossing of majority norms. This crossing implies the judgement that a given cause is sufficiently "right" to justify extreme behavior, at times including the psychological willingness on the part of the perpetrators to place themselves in physical jeopardy. An extreme commitment to inflicting violence and the willingness to accept violence on oneself can lead to a "desperate" situation in which terrorists intend to create a dangerous and emotion- ally charged situation for themselves and others.2

The use of the term "game" is not intended to trivialize the terrorist/victim/authority interaction. Rather, the purpose is to call attention to the bargaining interaction which acts of terrorism intrinsically involve. As reflected above, even unpredictable attacks upon apparently random targets must involve an attempt to communicate a political message, and as such include an implied threat of more violence. That the game may become a "desperate game" underlines that the communication interaction can take place in the context of extreme threat and potentially general fear. This realization has important ramifications for distinguishing the bargaining interaction involved in

2. By utilizing the term "desperate," the author does not mean to imply that terrorist acts are signs of desperation. Many terrorists act calmly, and most calculate to keep their own lives out of danger or to reduce the danger to themselves. Noncredible phone threats differ importantly from hostage-taking both in their impact upon victims and their demands upon perpetrators. Even terrorists engaging in extreme and highly focused acts may argue that they had other political options and that their choice of the instant terrorist act represented a rational selection of efficient means.




terrorism from other forms of more normal bargaining. For instance, even though a labor strike may inflict severe economic hardship on a national economy, recent labor negotiations in the United States generally do not proceed under the assumption that mass violence or organized individual violence to persons or property are realistic potential outcomes should the bargaining fail to produce agreement.

I

In attempting to assess response options, different types of terrorism must be distinguished to identify the risks, bargaining situations and outcome possibilities inherent in each type. These distinctions primarily serve a heuristic value; prediction to certain specific instances will yet raise traditional problems of ecological inference (Langbein and Lichtman, 1978). Even the specification of an "instance" of terrorism is troublesome in that a given event can occur at several places simulta- neously, and the type of event at each location need not be identical. Despite these complications, the development of a typology is an analytic starting point.

The typology offered here involves two dimensions: (1) regarding the intent of the terrorists, whether the terrorists intend to capture persons or property to be held in a hostage-type situation, or whether the terrorists intend to inflict personal or property damage without seizing persons or property; and (2) regarding the location of the terrorist's target, whether the target is in a known or an unknown location. These dimensions were chosen out of a realization that communication interaction is a function of the physical configuration of an event (Chapanis, 1978). This typology focuses on certain basic distinctions regarding the target attacked as the primary determinants of the physical configuration of the terrorist event. An analysis of whether or not a target is seized and whether or not the location of the target is known permits identification of four kinds of event configurations, each with its own behavioral dynamics.

As indicated in Figure 1, both Type 1 and Type 2 events involve hostage situations: in the first instance, hostage(s) are held at a known location; in the second instance, authorities are not certain where the hostage(s) are being held. While terrorist instances of property seizure are less common, Type 1 and Type 2 events must be conceptualized so that the seizure could involve either persons or important property. An




Target Location

Terrorist Intent Known Unknown

To Capture Type 1 Type 2 Persons or Target Seized and Target Seized and Property Held at Known Site Held at Unknown Site

Not to Capture Type 3 Type 4 Persons or Attack on Specific Attack on General Property Target Target

Figure 1: Types of Terrorism

example of a Type 1 event involving the taking of property at a known location is the 1971 seizure of the Statue of Liberty by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. For an example of a Type 2 event involving property, consider the capture of nuclear material by a terrorist group, an event often envisioned to involve a seizure followed by the transportation of the stolen material to an undisclosed site.3

In Type 3 and Type 4 events, the intent is to launch an attack upon either persons or property. There is a good deal of indeterminacy intrinsic to such events. Targets may be known to the extent that certain types of individuals, structures, or systems may be vulnerable and common points of attack. Examples of known targets would be the President of the United States, foreign embassies and ambassadors, business corporation headquarters and executives, airlines, and so on. Unknown targets may be involved when a group is engaging in violence at public targets in general. Types of personal attacks include assassi- nations and more limited personal assaults.

Standard definitions of political terrorism usually imply that the creation of fear is an intent of the terrorist. However, most definitions do not distinguish differential levels of fear creation related to different modes of terrorism and styles of communication intrinsic to each mode (see National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976: 3-4, for a typical approach). In Type 1 and 2 events, fear is focused on the immediate hostages. Their lives are held in question while terrorists and authorities bargain. In Type 3 or 4 events, the intent of the terrorist is to create a much more general societal fear, namely that certain types of targets are intrinsically unsafe or that any public place

3. For an earlier attempt to distinguish "kidnappings" from "barricade and hostage incidents," see Jenkins et al. (1978).




might be subject to terrorist assault. Granted, in Type 1 or 2 hostage events various individuals or groups in the society may identify with the hostages and feel unsafe; similarly, in Type 3 and 4 events, the populace could focus their concern on the immediate victims. However, in differentiating the type of fear manipulated by terrorists and the mode of threat communicated, Type 1 and 2 events have an immediate focus and Type 3 and 4 events have a more general focus.

Figure 2 compares the four types of terrorism on several postulated dimensions. In Types 1 and 2 where targets are seized, the initial damage is likely to be minimal; one presumes that the terrorists want to keep hostages reasonably safe and property intact to preserve their bargaining position. However, in Types 3 and 4, attacks are intended to inflict hit-and-run damage at the time of the incident. When hostages are kept and property seized the major threat occurs after the initial incident; having seized persons or property, terrorists are in a position to inflict the ultimate damage at a later time of their choosing. Subsequent damage in cases of Type 3 or Type 4 attacks involves the possibility of repeated attacks on the same target or similar attacks on related targets.

The immediate danger to terrorists is presumed to be greatest when they seize and hold a target at a known location. In such instances, police can encircle the terrorists and on-site negotiations between terrorists and official representatives can take place. Immediate danger to terrorists is reduced when a target is seized andtaken to an unknown site. Here terrorists have removed themselves from direct encounters with law enforcement officials. Police, on the other hand, will attempt to locate the terrorists, hoping that a successful search will change the Type 2 event to a Type 1 event where they can encircle the terrorists' location.

In Type 3 attacks on specific targets, the immediate danger to terrorists will be somewhat greater if the target is well protected or the terrorist attack draws an immediate and effective law enforcement response. However, this danger to terrorists is minimized if the target is sufficiently general. In terms of the long-term danger to terrorists, Type 3 and Type 4 events could well induce the maximum regime retaliation.4

In all types of events, terrorists can make demands. When persons or property are seized, terrorists can make specific demands as conditions

4. Ironically, a repressive regime response may be the precise goal of the terrorists (Marighlla, 197 la, 197 lb). By imparting general fear, terrorism Types 3 and 4 can create the impression that a society's law enforcement and protection mechanisms are ineffective. At the same time, the infringement resulting from an aggressive law enforcement response may sufficiently limit civil liberties to generate a substantial level of dissatisfaction. Meanwhile, terrorists are ready to act as a vanguard, channelling this dissatisfaction into an anti-regime revolution.



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for release of the captured target. To avoid revealing their location, terrorists in Type 2 events (as well as Type 3 and 4 incidents) could be expected to negotiate indirectly, commonly through the media in the form of taped messages sent to radio stations, letters to newspapers, and so on. Attacks can be utilized to underscore the seriousness of a group and further attacks can be promised if concessions are not forthcoming. Type 3 and Type 4 events are likely to be expressive of a long-term issue or a complex set of grievances, which are not responsive to solution via short-term focused bargaining.

Given the different bargaining potentials of these four types of events, one could imagine a continuum ranging from a Type 1 event in which there is a high probability some specific concessions will be granted and a "deal struck" between terrorists and the government, to a Type 4 event where there is a low probability. Thus, the probability is expected to be a function of the degree to which (a) specific demands are made by the terrorists; (b) a specific threat is created; and (c) direct one-to-one negotiations can occur between the government and the terrorists.

As noted earlier, this discussion does not exhaust all possibilities. Terrorist attacks may be leveled at business rather than government per se. Governments may even entrust the primary negotiating strategy to the attacked business or leave considerable latitude in negotiation decision-making to the corporation's leaders. Nor can we assume an identity of corporate and government interests. For instance, a given corporation may wish to pay a demanded ransom even if the government prefers not to provide such resources to a dissident group. The potential for conflict exists then between government and business as well as between each of them and the terrorists.

Similarly, the terrorists may act in a foreign country where local government interests conflict with the interests of the attacked government or business. In the extreme, sanctuary may be provided to the terrorists so that, even in a Type 1 event, the terrorists avoid the disadvantage of encirclement while retaining the advantage of direct negotiations. The conflict potential here takes on the added dimension of government versus government, a difference which could well push the conflict in the direction of warfare.

After this theoretical typology was developed, the ITERATE data which covers 539 events of international terrorism occuring between January 1970 and July 1974 (Mickolus, 1976a) was obtained to empirically test the model's assumptions.5 The type of event category in

5. The theoretical typology was developed in 1978 when the paper was initially presented. The original paper was revised and first submitted for journal publication in




the data set were recoded to approximate the four types presented here.6 Skyjacking was coded separately as a form of terrorism related to Type 1 events in that a seized airplane can generally be located and most skyjackings end with focused negotiations in the air, at an intermediate airport, or at the skyjacker's final destination. Since the ITERATE data set contains primarily nominal data, the analysis is conveyed largely through cross-tabulation. In addition to presenting tests of significance, each table reports degree of association tests appropriate for data at this level. The most frequent class of incident in this data set was Type 3 specific attacks (n = 192, 37%), followed by skyjacking (n = 116, 22.4%), general attacks (n = 106, 20.4%), Type 2 target seized/ site unknown (n = 86, 16.6%o), and Type 1 target seized/known site (n = 19, 3.7%o).

Table 1 reports the relationship between the type of target and the type of terrorism. While virtually all Type 2 events involve people, Type 1 events often involve both people and installations/ material. Although skyjacking includes seizure of aircraft, the act is considered person- oriented. Only with Type 3 specific attacks are more than 50% of the occurences associated with property only. Of all the types, general attacks (Type 4) are most evenly distributed among the three target types.

The distinction between types of terrorism becomes clearer when one considers the terrorists' attributed purpose. As presented in Table 2, the

January 1980. The Mickolus data set was obtained later, at the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer. It has the scientific advantage of having been independently collected.

6. To assist other researchers who may examine this data, the following is provided. The types of terrorism were coded from ITERATE data base Variable 006, "Type of Event, " and Variable 007, "Selection of Target," as follows: Type I = (Var006, Value 2, "Seizure-barricade and hostage," and Value 3, "Seizure-occupation without hostages); Type la = (VarO06, Value 10, "Skyjack"); Type 2 = (Var006, Value 1, "Kidnapping"); Type 3 = (Var006, Value 4, "Bombing-letter/ parcel bombs"; Value 5, "Bombing-arson/ Mol- otov cocktail"; Value 6, "Bombing-planted or thrown, single-detonation"; Value 8, "Armed attack-missiles"; Value 9, "Armed attack-other"; Value 12, "Assassina- tion/ murder"; and Value 13, "Sabotage which does not involve only bombing of facility") and (VarOO7, Value 2, "Discriminate selection of targets-selective attack upon specific targets of symbolic value"); Type 4 = (VarO06, same values as in Type 3) and(VarOO7, Value 1, "Completely indiscriminate selection of targets, with no apparent symbolic value"). Four values of VarOO6 were excluded: Value 11, "Takeover of non-air means of transportation," (n = 2); Value 16, "Extortionate threat with no subsequent terrorist action," (n = 8); Value 17, "Other actions," (n = 9); and Value 18, "Hoax," (n = 1). Variables 006, Values 7, 14, and 15 contained no cases. Thus, the 20 excluded cases removed from subsequent analysis constituted less than 4% of the data set. Care is taken throughout to indicate precisely how the secondary analysis was conducted.



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most frequently attributed purpose of Type 1 events involved wringing specific concessions, followed in importance by an intent to cause widespread disorder. The vast majority of both skyjackings and Type 2 seizures were attributed to the first of these purposes. This finding suggests that Type 2 events, even more than Type 1 events, may exhibit less variety, being more limited to the expression of particular goals. In sharp contrast to Type 1 and 2 events, the desire to obtain specific concessions was virtually never attributed to Type 3 or Type 4 terrorists. As might be predicted, the modal response for Type 3 specific attacks involved punishment of individuals or symbols considered guilty, while the modal response for Type 4 general attacks concerned the terrorists' purpose to cause widespread disorder.

Tables 3 and 4 consider the demand possibilities of the various event types. The first of these tables reveals that Type 1 and 2 events were generally judged more conducive to the terrorists' ability to make demands known. As expected from the above model, only in Type 3 and Type 4 events were terrorists considered unable to make demands known in a reasonably large number of cases. The distinctions between Type 3 and 4 events, while slight, were in the direction expected, with a somewhat greater potential to express demands a posteriori in specific attacks and a somewhat larger inability to make demands known during events associated with general attacks.

In virtually none of the Type 3 or 4 events were any demands made. In sharp contrast, Type 1 and 2 events almost always were occasioned by terrorists' demands. The degree of association tests reported with the cross-tabulation underline the strength of the relationship and give further empirical basis for viewing Type 1 and 2 events as distinct in their bargaining configuration from Type 3 and 4 events. Further analysis revealed a strong relationship between potential for demands and expression of demands (gamma = 0.89808); thus, especially in Type 1 events (including skyjacking) and Type 2 events, terrorists took advantage of the possibility of making demands when the physical configuration of their particular form of terrorism afforded the structural possibility for demand expression.

In Table 5, data are presented regarding the attitudes of terrorists toward their own death. In Type 1 events, including skyjacking, terrorists are generally classified as willing to die although they prefer to avoid this outcome. Type 2 events are distinguished from Type 1 events in that virtually all terrorists exhibit elaborate plans to escape. This is not surprising when one considers that Type 2 events involve kidnap-



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pings and removal of victims to hideouts rather than seizure and barricade events. Similar to Type 2 terrorists, those engaging in Type 3 and 4 attacks generally plan to survive. By the coding scheme of this data set, very few terrorists were considered clearly suicidal.

Finally, assumptions about event duration also seem accurate (see Table 6). Type 1 events including skyjacking were predominantly one day in length. Evidently the ability to locate and encircle terrorists does lead to a focused response which temporally circumscribes the action. Of the few events which lasted 5 days or more, over 80% belonged to Type 2. Approximately 99% of all Type 3 and 4 events were limited to one day in duration.

II

To examine bargaining interactions more closely in their most direct and focused form, several theoretical decision routes have been graphed to demonstrate various outcome possibilities in hostage situations. Each of these decision routes is predicated on the assumption that terrorists have captured hostages, and that no harm has been inflicted upon the hostages after the initial capture. If the location of the incident is international, we will assume that the various governments involved are working in concert. Government officials are in contact with the hostages either directly or indirectly and demand-making/ negotiation is possible.

Figures 3-6 are constructed to examine different configurations of governmental response and terrorist action. An inspection of these figures reveals several postulated underlying dynamics of hostage bargaining situations. To begin with, terrorists obviously want to maximize the concessions they can obtain while governments want to cut their losses. The government capitulation model (Figure 3) repre- sents an extreme response, one in which the government has judged the loss of certain hostage lives an unthinkable cost to pay. In this calculation, not all hostages will be of equal value: for instance, legislators may be more critical than certain ordinary citizens, and a nation's diplomats serving far away may be less critical than certain domestic politicians.

Many governments have argued for a no-negotiation policy under the assumption that a willingness to make concessions will indicate a weakness, thereby encouraging terrorists to make future attacks. As

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indicated in Figure 4, if the government is truly adamant in its unwillingness to negotiate, only two outcomes are possible: (a) the terrorists will have to surrender or (b) the government will have to attack the terrorists, possibly after some or all of the hostages have been injured or killed. Whether or not this will discourage future terrorists is an empirical issue which some commentators have called into question (Cooper, 1976; Evans, 1977, 1979; Jenkins et al., 1978; Miller, 1978, 1979). Conceivably, dedicated terrorists willing to die might see such a policy as an inducement, an opportunity to reveal the callous nature of a given state. Other terrorists may believe that their violent seizure of hostages will be of such magnitude and cost to the state that in their case negotiations will have to occur. What is clear, however, is that a government adhering to this policy is willing to sacrifice present hostages to prevent future hostage-taking. Thus, the government's concern is the present incident and potential future acts, tG + tn+ i where tn = time now; the terrorists' perspective is the present incident and past grievances, tn + tn-1.

Once bargaining has begun, outcomes again hinge on how many objectives the terrorists feel they must accomplish and how willing authorities are to see hostages killed. The point where these two sets of judgements meet will probably be tested in the offering, refusing, and accepting of concessions. Terrorists can easily find themselves in a dilemma: unwillingness to injure hostages may lead authorities to prolong bargaining and refuse concessions; injuring hostages may be an invitation for the authorities to launch a determined strike against the terrorists. Hostages who manage to develop rapport with terrorists can make it more difficult for terrorists to injure them even when this may be an important tactical step for the terrorists to take in the negotiations (Miller, 1979). Psychologically, the reverse side of this dynamic is that hostages during the course of their captivity can come to view the government as the enemy who, by refusing to concede to terrorist demands, is fostering a situation which may result in their deaths (Ochberg, 1978).

An examination of Tables 7 and 8 yields interesting insights into negotiation behavior during the ITERATE cases. Not surprisingly, in Type 3 and Type 4 cases, the only governmental response coded with any frequency was the aggressive reaction of "shoot-out, attempt to arrest, nationwide search, no compromise or capitulation"; in virtually every one of these cases no contact for negotiation was established. In skyjackings and Type 2 events, the most common governmental



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response was "capitulation"; here the terrorist modal negotiation behavior involved "no change in demands."

Several important differences are evident among the types in which bargaining did occur. Skyjacking had the highest percentage of both capitulation (78.8%/) and no change in terrorists' demands (93.9%). Type 1 events, where law enforcement encirclement was possible, drew the most varied governmental response. Here capitulation was in lower proportion (compared to skyjackings and Type 2 events) and shoot- outs/attempts-to-arrest were in the highest proportion for these three types where contact for negotiation was established. Among these three conditions, only Type 1 reflected a reasonably large proportion of incidents where the Bangkok Solution (safe passage for terrorists in return for releasing hostages and dropping other demands) was used. That Type 1 situations (where the terrorists have seized persons or property at a known location) demand a quicker resolution than the kidnapping situation of Type 2 can be seen by a comparison of the stalling tactic: while no attempt was made to prolong negotiations in the Type 1 cases, authorities chose this delaying approach in 10.8% (n = 7) of Type 2 cases.

Additional analysis indicated that negotiators for targets of terrorism tended to be police in those few Type 3 incidents where a target negotiator was coded (n = 14, 93.3% of target negotiators for this type) and similarly in Type 4 incidents (n = 12, 75.0%). The most common negotiator for other types was some high-ranking host government official: Type 1 (n = 6, 42.9%); Type la (n = 11, 40.7%); Type 2 (n = 21, 44.7%o). Corporate officials coded as negotiators generally were associated with Type 2 kidnapping situations (n = 18, 38.3%). Finally, in all 33 cases with complete data where police were the target negotiators, the governmental response was the aggressive shoot-out, attempt to arrest terrorists, nationwide search, and the like. In contrast, the most frequent response for target negotiators who were high-ranking host government officials or corporate officers was capitulation. However, caution must be taken in interpreting these findings both because of the limited cell sizes involved and the difficulty of attributing causality in a cross- sectional analysis.

Concepts of "success" in Type 1 terrorist/ hostage situations require detailed analysis. From the point of view of the authorities, there are multiple goals: saving the lives of the hostages, granting the minimum acceptable number of concessions, capturing the terrorists, and deter-




ring future terrorist activity. These goals are not always mutually consistent. The objectives of terrorists may also vary. Some terrorists may be completely willing to die and will accept nothing less than total accession to their demands and freedom for themselves. Other terrorists may be satisfied with minor concessions or willing to settle for the disruption they have caused and the media attention received.

Within this morass of shifting motivations, unanticipated responses are likely. A terrorist group may find that the popular reaction to their deed is general revulsion and lack of sympathy, even to the point of generating vast majorities of a populace to support repressive government measures which otherwise would be unacceptable (Laqueur, 1977). Conversely, a government response may be viewed as excessively cruel to the terrorists, without sufficient concern for the hostages and their families, or too costly in terms of societal freedoms. Given these complications, it is exceedingly difficult for either terrorists or governmental authorities to accurately calculate in advance the likely impact of various decisions and actions.

Rather than deal with terrorists in a straightforward manner, authorities can engage in a variety of intentionally manipulative communications, calculated to confuse terrorists and to make them bear substantial costs for their activities as an unavoidable consequence of their action. The intent of reprisals and counterterrorism is to force terrorists to calculate the gains of a particular act against the anticipated future losses. Once again, a reverse effect could occur: terrorist acts could be launched precisely to induce this governmental response.

Manipulative communications clearly change the nature of the game. Terrorists attempt to create a situation where the government will lose no matter what action it takes. If terrorists are captured or killed, hostages will be killed; if hostages are released, concessions must be granted, and so on. The situation is "reframed" if terrorists are made to realize that they will not be permitted to escape and/or that their sympathizers will be made to pay for their actions. Through manipulative communications the desperate no-win dilemma that terrorists attempt to create for authorities may be returned to them.

All such counter-strategies are clearly risky games. The fact that manipulative communications are possible must enter into the calcu- lations; they further complicate the bargaining interaction by introdu- cing new weights that both sides must add to the interpretation and consideration of each communication.




III

Several commentators (Rapoport, 1966; Shubik, 1975a and 1975b) have noted the limitations of game theory when applied to an analysis of situations involving actual behavioral dynamics. To a large extent, game theory has developed as a pure science with emphasis upon the "rational choice," given identified utilities and payoffs analyzed in a normal form game matrix. At the same time, reflection upon the techniques and methods of game theory have been found useful even in analyses whose primary focus is upon the bargaining interactions of conflict situations (Schelling, 1960). In this section of the article, three points concerning game theoretic techniques are explored to further illustrate the complexities involved in modeling government/terrorist interaction.

DEVELOPING AN EXTENSIVE GAME FORM

A common problem with game theory is that even simple strategic decision modeling presents many practical difficulties in the construc- tion of a decision tree (Singleton and Tyndall, 1974). For instance, a game involving two players, each with only three decision points (two for the first player and one for the second player) and four decision options at each point, yields a total of 64 separate outcomes on the decision tree. Figure 7 illustrates a partial game tree, empirically generated by mapping target-response/terrorist-negotiating-behavior/ fate-of-victim sequences for capitulation, the most frequent target response in Type 2 events. Even this partial game tree underestimates the complexity of drawing an extensive form, in that rather than listing all possibilities in a determinate model, this partial diagram only lists actual behavioral chains.

Presentation of a complete set of decision trees is beyond the scope of this article. However, several limited observations from the analysis are noteworthy. The pattern evidenced in Figure 7 was also a major Type 1 and Type la interaction. Of the 12 Type 1 cases with sufficient data to be included in the analysis, 4 (33.3%) involved target capitulation, all followed by no change in terrorists' demands and ultimate safe release of hostages. In 79.3% (n = 88) of the skyjacking cases with sufficient data, the target response was capitulation while in all cases terrorists retained initial demands.7 In the 7 Type 2 cases where the target response involved

7. ITERATE data set Variable 100 for skyjacking cases contained mostly missing data, thus limiting outcome analysis on this type.




Target Response L Capitulation

n = 35 (55.6% of Type 2 Target Responses)

Terrorist Negotiating

Behavior WL I i Increase Demands No Change No Contact for

n = 1 in Negotiations (2.9% of Terrorist Demands Established

Negotiating Behaviors n = 32 n = 2 at this level) (91.4%) (5.7%)

Outcome/ Fate of Victims WLf I fl I

No Damage or n = 31 Missing n = 1 n = 1 Casualties, (96.9%) Data (50%) (50%)

Hostages Released, n = 1 Capitulation or (3.1%)

Compromise by Target n = 1

(100% of outcomes in this branch)

NOTE: First level drawn from ITERATE data set Variable 079, "Response of Target"; second level from Variable 076, "Terrorist Negotiation Behavior"; third level from Variable 100, "Fate of Victims." Linkages established through multiple cross-tabulations. Chosen options (boxes) in the decision tree retain value labels as assigned to Variables 076, 079, and 100 in the ITERATE data set. A case is excluded if the observation has missing data on either VarO76 or VarO79, thus accounting for the discrepancy in Type 2 capitulation target response totals in this Figure and Table 8 above.

Figure 7: Partial Game Tree for Capitulation Target Response in Type 2 Events

stalling with no compromise in demands, the terrorists lessened demands in 4 cases, substituted demands in 1 case, and had no change in demands in 2 cases; in all 7 cases the ultimate outcome involved capitulation or compromise by the target and no harm to the hostages who were released. In the Type 1 and 2 events where the aggressive




shoot-out/ arrest-attempt response was utilized, this target response was the strategy most highly linked with victim death as an outcome (see Jenkins, Johnson and Ronfeldt, 1978).

SPECIFYING UTILITIES

Another familiar problem involves having real actors quantify the value to them of given outcomes (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport, 1966). In this context we could expect difficulty in getting targets to agree in a meaningful manner upon the value of outcomes such as loss of terrorist lives, granting important concessions to terrorists, and so on. Furthermore, values would need to be specified with regard to the time frame under consideration. Thus, the utility of a given outcome such as saving hostage lives may differ for authorities depending upon whether the utility is specified for the time of the event (tn) or subsequent time (tn+i). The inability to clearly specify utilities results in practical difficulties when attempting to construct a payoff matrix for the normal game form of the government/ terrorist interaction. We could perhaps solve this by drawing one payoff matrix for tn and another for tn+i. However, even this solution is problematic should the optimum rational strategy in the first matrix be inconsistent with the optimum rational strategy in the second matrix.

Even if we were to attempt to construct a payoff matrix for tn+i, we would have to increase the number of stochastic elements in the model. For example, we would have to estimate the probability that a given initial strategy, for instance, conceding to terrorist demands, would lead to further terrorist instances. This form of "uncertainty due to ignorance of the state of nature" (Chernoff and Moses, 1959) means that the payoff matrix for tn+i would have to include action probabilities which, again, would need to be empirically determined.

CONSTRUCTING ILLUSTRATIVE GAMES

We cannot assume that all government/terrorist interactions will take the form of a two-person zero-sum game. Rather, some cooperative behavior (e.g., government conceding to some demands and terrorists releasing all prisoners) might, in certain circumstances, yield results benefiting both sides. Furthermore, some Type 1 terrorist situations may well necessitate n-person game forms for more accurate analysis. This might involve an event where one or more foreign governments or



76 JO URNA L OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

perhaps one or more dissident groups actively intervene to complicate a Type 1 event. Then the game must be analyzed in characteristic form to take into consideration solutions which involve coalitions and bargaining sets.

Much fundamental game theoretical analysis has been devoted to games such as the battle of the sexes and the prisoner's dilemma (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport, 1966). The difficulty with games of this nature is that, in their focus upon solutions, they deemphasize the complexity of the bargaining interaction.8 By concentrating on strategies only in relation to payoffs, they lose the nuances of effect which different actions have in terms of communicating threat of loss or opportunity of gain. A somewhat less mathematical approach, but perhaps a more fruitful line of inquiry, is to explore the more behaviorally oriented models presented in the bargaining literature (see Druckman, 1977; Zartman, 1978).

IV

To test further the ability of this model to accurately classify characteristics and response patterns of terrorist events, a discriminant function analysis was conducted. Independent variables were examined via a stepwise procedure in which the selection criteria sought to maximize the F ratio (thus minimizing the value of Wilk's Lambda) for the test of differences among the group centroids. A small group of theoretically relevant variables were chosen for possible inclusion into the discriminant function (Klecka, 1975).9

As presented in Tables 9 and 10 the six variables initially chosen for inclusion (all of which were accepted in the stepwise procedure) possessed a significant amount of power (Wilks's Lambda = 0.0828 with 0 functions derived, p < .001) to distinguish the five types of terrorism under consideration. Clearly the first function (eigenvalue = 6.06194, canonical correlation = 0.926) contributed most to separating the groups. A subsequent analysis of predicted group membership versus

8. An exception to this has been the work done by Rapoport and Chammah (1965) analyzing behavioral aspects of the prisoner's dilemma.

9. Discriminant function analyses including a large number of variables yielded even greater separation of groups. However, inspection of several variables indicated that missing data disproportionately represented among the types contributed to their discriminating powers. Thus, only theoretically relevant variables without problems generated by a substantial amount of missing data were included in the analysis.



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actual group membership shows 72.64% of grouped cases correctly classified by the functions derived. Most errors occured with the percent of Type 2 cases predicted to skyjacking and with missed predictions between Type 3 and Type 4.

An inspection of the standardized discriminant coefficients shows that the two reaction variables (i.e., terrorist negotiating behavior and target response) contributed most heavily to function 1.10 Analytically, this function (viewed as a "response dimension") shows the importance of terrorist/target response to making the primary distinctions among terrorist types. The second function, which contributes less but still significantly to distinguishing categories, draws most heavily from the attributed purpose of the event. The third function, approximately equal to the second in additional contribution, draws most from incident duration. Finally, the fourth function (and the last function possible given the number of groups to be distinguished) draws most from the type of target/immediate victim.

An inspection of the types of prediction errors made suggested that seizures (Types 1, la, and 2) might be somewhat more distinct from attacks (Types 3 and 4) than the five groups are distinct from one another. The reduced types were examined by a second discriminant function analysis performed stepwise with the same selection criteria. Results (Tables 11 and 12) confirmed the assumption. The analysis on the reduced types correctly classified 95.38% of all cases. Once again, as indicated by the standardized discriminant function coefficients, the reaction behavior (target response/terrorist negotiation behavior) contributed most to the derived function's ability to discriminate groups.

This analysis strongly suggests that the 5 types presented (and especially seizures versus attacks) identify truly distinct forms of terrorism. Moreover, the bargaining configuration and response behavior for each type contributes most heavily to the distinctiveness identified.

V

Much of the current literature on terrorism is in the form of case studies and historical surveys (e.g., Laqueur, 1977; Wilkinson, 1976).

10. The reader should recall that, as discussed above, these reaction variables included whether or not negotiations were accepted (see VarO79, Target Response, Value 08, "Negotiations not established").



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TABLE 12

Prediction Results: Discriminant Function Analysis, Reduced Types, Terrorist Seizures vs. Attacks

Predicted Group Membership

Actual Group Seizures A ttacks Membership N of Cases (Types 1, la, and 2) (Types 3 and 4)

Seizures 221 199 (90.0%) 22 (10.0%) (Types 1, la, and 2)

Attacks 298 2 (0.7%) 296 (99.3%)

(Types 3 and 4)

NOTE: Percentage of grouped cases correctly classified: 95.38%.

While work such as this is extremely valuable, the study of the government/ terrorist interaction needs to be approached from a scientific perspective if we are to understand this behavioral phenomenon more systematically. Considerable problems of research design will have to be faced; field research in this setting must be limited to drawing inferences from nonexperimental data (e.g., Blalock, 1961) or employing techniques of quasi-experimental analysis at best (e.g., Cook and Campbell, 1979). Still, research designs specifically constructed to rigorously examine government/ terrorist bargaining communications, decisions, and outcomes are a necessary development in this field.

In briefly considering research questions which need to be addressed, several issues come to mind immediately. Gurr (1970) has argued that different forms of political violence are likely to occur given different configurations of regime and dissident support. These same considerations may be a factor in determining which form of violence terrorists choose. This, for instance, could partially explain the more common incidence of Type 3 and 4 attacks in a setting such as Northern Ireland, or in Algeria during the war for independence from France, and the relative infrequency of such incidents in the United States since the end of overt American military presence in the Vietnam war. Alternatively, instead of placing the occurrence of Type 3 and 4 attacks on a continuum of regime/ dissident support configurations close to internal war, one might look to the types of political cleavages existing within a society. For instance, in situations where a deeper cleavage potential is present, political dissidents might engage in Type 3 or 4 attacks out of a perceived greater need to polarize the society and indicate the regime's ineffectiveness than to create situations where focused bargaining can occur over specific grievances.



Corsi/ TERRORISM AS A DESPERATE GAME 83

An act of political terrorism involves a complicated attempt by violent individuals to communicate messages that are deeply important to them. Ironically, terrorism has been more a threat for democratic societies than for dictatorships, despite (and perhaps because of) the greater openness of the former and the greater freedom and mobility of the population (Bell, 1978; Laqueur, 1977). Even a concerted attempt to redress societal grievances cannot be expected to eliminate the threat of terrorism; instead, the very generation of raised expectations (with a heightened realization of the gap between expectations and capabilities) may be an invitation to increase terrorism (Davies, 1962; I.K. Feier- abend et al., 1969; Gurr, 1970).

Still, the thesis of the article is that terrorism should not be viewed as an incomprehensible abnormality nor dismissed as a mere aberration. Rather, terrorism as politics in extremis has its own logic and dynamics which must be studied as intensively as the established political interactions which it so radically challenges. This analysis has attempted to contribute to the empirical endeavor by distinguishing characteristics of different forms of terrorism and identifying terrorist/ government bargaining interactions associated with each.

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Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bargaining, and Communication in the Terrorist Event