Takahashi Albertus 2008-Libre

8/10/2019 Takahashi Albertus 2008-Libre

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Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008) 451-481 www.brill.nl/esm

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/157338208X345740

Nature, Formative Power and Intellect in the NaturalPhilosophy of Albert the Great

Adam TakahashiRadboud University Nijmegen*

Abstracte Dominican theologian Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280) was one of the first toinvestigate into the system of the world on the basis of an acquaintance with the entireAristotelian corpus, which he read under the influence of Islamic philosophers. epresent study aims to understand the core of Alberts natural philosophy. Albertsemblematic phrase, every work of nature is the work of intelligence (omne opus natu-rae est opus intelligentiae), expresses the conviction that natural things are produced bythe intellects that move the celestial bodies, just as houses are made by architects mov-ing their instruments. Albert tried to fathom the secret of generation of natural thingswith his novel notion of formative power (virtus formativa), which flows from thecelestial intellects into the sublunary elements. His conception of the natural worldrepresents an alternative to the dominant medieval view on the relationship betweenthe artificial and the natural.

KeywordsAlbert the Great, medieval cosmology, celestial intellect, formative power, univocal

causality, nature and art

* Faculty of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9103, NL- 6500HD Nijmegen (e Netherlands), [email protected]. I would like to ac-

knowledge Hiro Hirai without whose tireless help and encouragement this articlewould never have existed. My sincere thanks also go to Nancy Siraisi, Charles Bur-nett, Henryk Anzulewicz, Sumio Nakagawa, Satoshi Horie, Noburu Notomi, and thisjournals referees for their kind comments. Evidently, all shortcomings and errors aremine.
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452 A. Takahashi / Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008) 451-481

1. Introduction

Many theologians of the later Middle Ages directed their attentionto the natural world.1Among them, Albert the Great (1200-1280)stands out for his early date, originality and productivity. Althoughhis conception of nature depended mostly on Aristotle, it also betraysthe influence of Arabic Neoplatonic traditions, which had modifiedthe Stagirites original conception of the world system.2

Previous studies on the thought of Albert, the Universal Doctor,can be roughly divided into two groups. e first comprises those

who have mainly examined his metaphysics and theology withoutpaying any serious attention to his natural science.3 e analysesproduced by this group of studies have doubtlessly yielded a deepunderstanding of Alberts ontology and epistemology. However, theytake little notice of the contribution of his metaphysical doctrinesto his perception of the created world. e other group consists ofthose who have treated of particular aspects of Alberts natural phi-losophy as subjects of the history of science.4 ese studies have

shown that the Universal Doctors encyclopedic ventures dependedon his reception of Arabic sciences and in several ways contributedto later developments in scientific thought. But these studies havepaid very little attention to the metaphysical foundations of Albertsnatural philosophy. In order to grasp Alberts perception of the cre-ated world, it is therefore of paramount importance to unify thesehitherto distinct currents in scholarship.5

1) See the classical discussions of Marie-Dominique Chenu, La thologie au douzimesicle(Paris, 1957), 19-51; Pierre Duhem, Le Systme du monde: histoire des doctrinescosmologiques de Platon Copernic, 10 vols. (Paris, 1913-1959), vols. 4 and 5.2) On the modification of Aristotles cosmological doctrines, see Herbert A. David-son,Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: eir Cosmologies, eories of the

Active Intellect, and eories of Human Intellect (Oxford, 1992), esp. 220-257; GadFreudenthal, e Medieval Astrologization of Aristotles Biology: Averroes on theRole of the Celestial Bodies in the Generation of Animate Beings,Arabic Sciences andPhilosophy, 12 (2002), 111-137.3) Cf. Alain de Libera,Albert le Grand et la philosophie(Paris, 1990); id.,Mtaphysi-que et notique: Albert le Grand (Paris, 2005).4) See for example the articles collected in James A. Weisheipl (ed.),Albertus Magnusand the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980 (Toronto, 1980).5) is point has already been made by James A. Weisheipl, e Development of Phys-


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A. Takahashi / Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008) 451-481 453

e aim of the present study is to understand the metaphysicaland cosmological principles underlying Alberts natural philosophy.To this end, we shall concentrate on a much discussed issue inmedieval and early modern science and philosophy, that is, the ques-tion of the relationship between nature and art.6 For, although itis often suggested that the medieval world view was marked by asharp division between art and nature, Albert seems constantly tohave relied upon an art-nature analogy to understand the physicalworld. In this connection, he often invoked the role of the intel-

lect or intelligence of the universe to explain natural phenom-ena in general. He often compared the natural world to artificialproductions made with the help of the human intellect. Of crucialimportance in this context is his notion of formative power (vir-tus formativa), which Albert used everywhere in his writings toaccount for natural generation on the model of artificial produc-tions.7 In this study, we shall attempt to document this, first, bystudying Alberts explanation of the formation of minerals and of

ical eory in the Middle Ages (Ann Arbor, 1971); id, Alberts Works on NaturalSciences (libri naturales) in Probable Chronological Order, inAlbertus Magnus andthe Sciences, 565-577; id., Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages(Washington DC,1985). See also Edward P. Mahoney, Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy ofBeing According to Some Late-Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers, in ParvizMorewedge (ed.), Philosophies of Existence, Ancient and Medieval(New York, 1982),164-257; Henryk Anzulewicz, Die Denkstruktur des Albertus Magnus: Ihre Deko-dierung und ihre Relevanz fr die Begrifflichkeit und Terminologie, in JacquelineHamesse and Carlos Steel (eds.),Llaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen

ge(Turnhout, 2000), 369-396.6) Anthony J. Close, Commonplace eories of Art and Nature in Classical Antiq-uity and in the Renaissance,Journal of the History of Ideas, 30 (1969), 467-486;id.,Philosophical eories of Art and Nature in Classical Antiquity,Journal of the His-tory of Ideas, 32 (1971), 163-184;William R. Newman, Technology and Alchemi-cal Debate in the Late Middle Ages, Isis, 80 (1989), 423-445; id., Promethean

Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature (Chicago, 2004). For more updatedand detailed information on this issue, see William R. Newman and Bernadette Ben-

saude-Vincent (eds.), e Artificial and the Natural (Cambridge, MA, 2007).7) On the notion of formative power, see Hiro Hirai, Semence, vertu formatrice etintellect agent chez Nicol Leoniceno entre la tradition arabo-latine et la renaissancedes commentateurs grecs, Early Science and Medicine, 12 (2007), 134-165;id, eInvisible Hand of God in Seeds: Jacob Schegks eory of Plastic Faculty, Early
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animals. Next, we shall take a look at some closely related textssuch as On Spirit and Respiration and On the Nature and Origin ofthe Soul, which further elucidate some of the key concepts. Finally,we shall treat with some brevity the metaphysical and ontologicalimplications of these issues in his Metaphysics and On the Causesand the Procession of the Universe from the First Cause.8

2. e Formation of Minerals

Of Alberts numerous writings, historians of science tend to citemost frequently from his treatise On Minerals (before 1256), becauseit grants a number of insights, not only into medieval mineralogy,but also into later developments of matter theory.9 However, themetaphysical dimensions of this work have been much neglected.10To fill in this lacuna, we shall examine here especially its theoreti-cal parts in the first and third books. e former treats the causesof stones in general and the latter those of metals.

In the first book, as the material cause of stones, Albert speaksof the mixture of the element of earth with viscous and unctuousmoisture. Unless this moisture is viscous, he explains, stones willnot possess any coherence. As for transparent stones such as gemsand glass, their matter must be more subtle than that of non-trans-

Science and Medicine, 12 (2007), 377-404. Cf. Walter Pagel, New Light on WilliamHarvey (Basel, 1974), 74-112.8) For the texts of Albert, we have used, wherever possible, the critical editionAlberti

Magni Opera omnia edenda curavit Institutum Alberti Magni Coloniense(Mnster-Westfalem, 1951-), hereafter indicated as Cologne edition. For some treatises, we haveused the standard Borgnet edition,Alberti Magni Opera omnia (Paris, 1890-1899).Otherwise, the new edition or translation of each separately published text is indi-cated in the notes.9) See, for example, Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order ofNature (New York, 2001), 109-172; Newman, Promethean Ambitions, esp. 46-50;

Hiro Hirai, Le concept de semence dans les thories de la matire la Renaissance: deMarsile Ficin Pierre Gassendi(Turnhout, 2005), passim.10) Cf. Udo R. Jeck, Materia,forma substantialis,transmutatio: Frhe BemerkungenAlberts des Groen zur Naturphilosophie und Alchemie,Documenti e studi sulla tra-dizione filosofica medievale, 5 (1994), 205-240.


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parent stones. e formation of these stones requires a higher levelof transmutation of elemental qualities. In order to explain himselfbetter, Albert refers to an example taken from the human arts,namely alchemy, which performs the same operation at a lower levelof perfection:

And indeed [alchemical] art performs this [kind of formation] with labor andmany mistakes, while nature does it without difficulty and labor. And its reasonis because the powers existing in the matter of stones and metals were moved bycertain and powerful celestial powers []. And these powers are the operations

of intelligences which do not make errors except accidentally, for instance becauseof the inequality of matter. But in [alchemical] art, there is nothing of these[powers], but rather some miserable assistance of skill and fire.11

It is evident that Alberts intention here is not at all to establish adivision between art and nature in terms of their ways of working,but rather to highlight the difference in their causes and efficacy,which explain the difference in the products quality: the natural

formation of stones is realized with the help of celestial powers thatare more powerful than the means of the alchemists art.After the material cause of stones, Albert inquires into their effi-

cient cause, which he identifies with the formative power. However,given that this power acts commonly for all stones and metals, headds a further explanation:

11) De mineralibus, I, tr. 1, c. 3 (ed. Borgnet, 5: 5 = Dorothy Wyckoff,Albertus Mag-nus: Book of Minerals[Oxford, 1967], 17): Et hoc quidem operatur ars cum laboreet erroribus multis: natura vero sine difficultate et labore. Cujus causa est, quia virtu-tibus caelestibus certis et efficacibus moventur virtutes in materia lapidum et metal-lorum existentes [...]: et illae virtutes sunt intelligentiarum operationes, quae nonerrant nisi per accidens, ex inaequalitate scilicet materiae. In arte autem nihil esthorum, sed potius mendicata suffragia ingenii et ignis. In the present section, we give

Wyckoffs pagination, although the translation is ours. Note that Albert uses intellec-tusand intelligentiaalmost interchangeably. On the division of Greek nousor Arabicaqlinto these two Latin words in translation, see Jean Jolivet, Intellect et intelligence:note sur la tradition arabo-latine des XIIeet XIIIesicles, in his Philosophie mdivalearabe et latine(Paris, 1995), 169-189.


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erefore, we add that the formative [power] of stone exists, although a proper[name] for stone should be given. But since we have no proper name for this

power, we should explain by similar things what this power is. us, we shall saythat,as in the seed of an animal, which is a residue of nutrition, and from theseminal vessels an animal formative power descends, which forms and makes theanimal and which lies in the seed in such a way as an artificer lies in his artifact,which he makes by his art; so also, in the matter suitable for stones, there is apower which forms and makes stones, leading it to the form of this or thatstone.12

Although Albert offered this explanation by way of an analogy, he

nevertheless believed in the real existence of the formative power ofstones, which he thought to be similar to that of animals. Only theproper name of this power was lacking. It is furthermore notewor-thy that Albert qualifies the formative power of both animals andstones as an artificer in the artifact (artifex in artificiato). If thispower acts like an artificer, it must by necessity also possess someinstruments suitable for carrying out its operations, just as an archi-tect uses his peculiar tools. at is why Albert argues that the for-mative power of stones has two proper instruments, namely heatand watery moisture. Of these two elemental qualities, the first ismore important for the formative power. us, Albert adds thatthis heat for the operation [of producing stones] is controlled bythe formative power, just as the heat which digests and transmutesanimal semen is controlled by the formative power which exists inthe semen.13

But if the analogy between natural generation and the work ofa human artifex is so close, why does Albert deem the alchemists

12) De mineralibus, I, tr. 1, c. 5 (Borgnet, 5: 7 = Wyckoff, 22): Et ideo addimus, quodsit lapidis formativa, ut efficiatur lapidi propria: et quia propria nomina hujus virtu-tis non habemus, ideo per similia oportet declarare quae sit illa virtus. Dicamus igi-tur quod sicut in semine animalis quod est superfluum nutrimenti, descendit a vasisseminariis vis formativa animalis, quae format et efficit animal, et est in semine permodum illum quo artifex est in artificiato quod facit per artem: sic est etiam in mate-

ria aptata lapidibus virtus formans et efficiens lapides et producens ad formam lapidishujus vel illius.13) De mineralibus, I, tr. 1, c. 5 (Borgnet, 5: 7-8 = Wyckoff, 22): hoc calidum diri-gitur in opere a virtute formativa, quemadmodum dirigitur calidum quod digerit ettransmutat semen animalis, a virtute formativa quae est in semine.


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art uncertain (incerta)? If we examine the relationship of the for-mative power to its principal instrument, heat, closely, this pointbecomes clear. According to Albert, the heat of the alchemists isinadequate, because they can only use burning heat, which worksvery uncertainly (incertissime). e heat employed by the forma-tive power is different, and more adequate to the formation of mat-ter. For this reason, Albert says that nature is most certain in heroperations.14us, the secret lies in the nature of this power.

is formative power is in fact further divided into three com-

ponents:e power thus determined by stars is poured down into the place of the genera-tion of each thing []. For, this power is productive and generative of every ele-ment and elemented being. And this power of the place is composed of threepowers. e first of them is the power of the mover of the moved sphere. esecond is the power of the moved sphere []. e third is the power of elements,that is, hot, cold, moist, dry or mixture of these. But, the first of these powers islike the form controlling and forming everything which is generated, as the power

of art is related to the matter of its artifact. e second is like the operation of thehand. And the third is like the operation of the instrument which is moved bythe hand and directed towards the end conceived by the artificer. For this reasonAristotle has said that every work of nature is the work of intelligence. For, aplace receives these powers as a womb receives the formative power of the embryo[...]. As the vivifying power is poured from stars into animals which are genera-ted by putrefaction, the same is done in the matter of stones, because the forma-tive power of stones is poured in the manner already explained.15

14) De mineralibus, I, tr. 1, c. 5 (Borgnet, 5:8 = Wyckoff, 23): certissima est naturain operationibus suis.15) De mineralibus, I, tr. 1, c. 8 (Borgnet, 5: 11 = Wyckoff, 30): Virtus autem sicdeterminata a stellis infunditur loco generationis unicuique rei [...]. Haec enim virtuset elementi et elementati omnis est productiva et generativa. Et est ista virtus loci extribus virtutibus congregata, quarum una est virtus motoris orbis moti. Secunda estvirtus orbis moti [...]. Tertia autem est virtus elementaris, quae est calidum, frigidum,humidum et siccum, vel commixtum ex his. Est autem prima harum virtutum utforma dirigens et formans omne quod generatur, sicut virtus artis ad materiam artifi-

ciati se habet. Et secunda est sicut operatio manus. Et tertia sicut operatio instrumentiquod manu movetur et dirigitur usque ad finem inceptum ab artifice. Et ideo dixitAristoteles quod omne opus naturae est opus intelligentiae: locus enim recipit has vir-tutes, sicut matrix recipit virtutem formativam embrionis [...]. Sicut enim in animal-ibus quae ex putrefactione generantur, infunditur virtus vivificativa ex stellis, sic fit


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For Albert, the formative power for stones is thus composed of threedistinct powers, which hail from (1) the mover of the spheres, (2)the moved spheres themselves, and (3) the elements. Once again,the order of these three components is modelled on the example ofartificial productions: (1) e power of the mover of spheres cor-responds to the form (forma); (2) that of the spheres to the actionof artists hands; and (3) that of elements to the workings of an art-ists instruments. Note that the power of the mover of the spheresis identified with the form possessing a formative power. Accord-

ing to Aristotle, when the architect makes a house, it is the formof this house as conceived in his mind that moves his instrumentsin the architects hands, eventually actualizing the form of the houseas the final product.16 In other words, the form residing in thearchitects mind is a kind of formative power. Similarly, for Albert,the form of the stones-to-be-formed must exist beforehand in themover of the spheres, which corresponds to the architects mind,before it is poured through the celestial bodies into particular

chunks of earth. Once this Aristotelian background is recognized,we can grasp Alberts intention in attributing that very singularphrase to Aristotle: Every work of nature is the work of intel-ligence (Omne opus naturae est opus intelligentiae).17is emblematicphrase may now be explained as follows: Just as a form conceivedin the architects mind is considered a formative principle with re-spect to the actual house, a form conceived by the intelligence ofthe universe, that is, the mover of the spheres, is the primary for-

mative principle in the natural generation of stones. For Albert, thevirtus formativarelies thus ultimately on this divine formative prin-ciple.

etiam in lapidum materia, quod infunditur per dictum modum virtus lapidum for-mativa. Cf. Hirai, Le concept de semence, 126-127.16) Aristotle,MetaphysicsZ.7, 1032b11-12 and Z.9, 1034a23-24.17) See James A. Weisheipl, e Axiom Opus naturae est opus intelligentiae and its

Origins, in Gerbert Meyer and Albert Zimmermann (eds.),Albertus Magnus,Doctoruniversalis: 1280/1980 (Mainz, 1980), 441-464; Ludwig Hdl, Opus naturae estopus intelligentiae: Ein neuplatonisches Axiom im aristotelischen Verstandnis desAlbertus Magnus, in Friedrich Niewhner and Loris Sturlese (eds.),Averroismus(Zur-ich, 1994), 132-148.


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Let us move on to the third book of On Minerals, which dis-cusses the causes of metals in general. eir generation is said tobe similar to that of stones. Once again, Albert denies that the effi-cient cause lies in some elemental quality. Elemental powers suchas hot or cold are only instruments in the production of the spe-cies or form of metals.18 And again, he compares the process ofmetallic generation with artificial operations:

Furthermore, we find that many arts have been discovered, where each of themleads the operation to its end by means of a manufactured instrument. Cooksand all others who try to change matters by some digestion are diligent in boilingand roasting. Likewise, therefore, it must be so in nature, which, in her operati-ons, is more certain and more direct than any other art, as she is in all other things.us, without doubt, there is in nature a formative power, poured from the starsand heaven, which controls the heat digesting the matter of a metal toward its[proper] species.19

anks to the assistance of the formative power, the operation of

nature is thus more certain and more direct (certior et directior)in generating metals than any human art. For one, it uses its instru-ment, namely heat, better than any human artificer. e power itselfis poured down (influxa) from the stars and heaven, which, inturn, function as the instruments moved by the supreme principleof nature.20 Albert writes:

[] it is necessary that the formal power must control and inform this heat that

determines [the form]. However, this form is not the same as that which is intro-

18) e terms species (species) and form (forma) are almost synonymous inAlbert.19) De mineralibus, III, tr. 1, c. 5 (Borgnet, 5: 65 = Wyckoff, 166): Adhuc auteminvenimus inventas esse artes plurimas, ut quaelibet earum ad finem ducat operatio-nem per instrumentum factum. Sic student coqui in elixando et assando, et omnes aliiqui per aliam digestionem nituntur convertere materias. Similiter igitur oportet quodsit in natura quae in operibus suis omni arte certior est et directior, sicut est in omni-

bus aliis, ita procul dubio virtus formativa est in natura et stellis et caelo influxa, quaead speciem dirigit calidum digerens materiam metalli.20) On celestial bodies as instrument, see James A. Weisheipl, e Celestial Moversin Medieval Physics, e omist, 24 (1961), 286-326; omas Litt, Les corps cles-tes dans lunivers de Saint omas dAquin(Louvain, 1963), passim.


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duced into matter. us, it is necessary that the form comes from the primeagent, which gives forms in every natural species. And this [agent] is the mover

of the sphere, which unfolds natural forms through the motion of heaven and thequalities of elements, just as an artificer unfolds the forms of his art with his axeand hammer. And for this reason, Aristotle says that in the work of nature it is as[the work of] art, where the house comes from [the form of] a house [in thecarpenters mind], and health from [the form of] health [] in the soul of thephysician.21

us, it is evident that, for Albert, only when the formal power(virtus formalis) guides heat as its instrument, matter proper tometallic generation receives metallic forms. e Aristotelian state-ment that the house comes from a house, and the health fromhealth in the soul of a physician (domus est ex domo, et sanitas exsanitate in anima medici) is meant to lend support to this instru-mentalist vision. e idea is that, as the forms of artifacts mustoriginate beforehand in the mind of artificer who moves his instru-ments, the forms of metals must be conceived in the prime agent

who directly moves the celestial bodies and indirectly, through thelatter, the elemental heat.

3. e Generation of Animals

In his discussion on minerals, Albert takes constant recourse to asingular notion of formative power. is power, which works likean internal artificer, makes mineral productions resemble artificial

ones. Similar explanatory strategies are found in Alberts treatmentof animal generation, as can be seen from book XVI of his treatiseOn Animals (after 1260), which corresponds to book II of Aristo-

21) De mineralibus, III, tr. 1, c. 5 (Borgnet, 5: 66 = Wyckoff, 167): [] oportet igi-tur quod virtus formalis dirigat et informet ipsum calidum terminans: forma autem

haec non est forma quae inducitur in materiam: oportet igitur quod sit forma primiefficientis quod dat formas in tota specie naturali. Hic autem est motor orbis formasnaturales explicans per motum caeli et qualitates elementorum, sicut artifex explicatformas artis securi et malleo: propter quod dicit Aristoteles, quod in opere naturae estsicut in arte, ubi domus est ex domo, et sanitas ex sanitate [...] in anima medici.


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tles Generation of Animals.22 In Alberts treatise on animal gener-ation, the role of the formative power and the artificial character ofnatural phenomena are amply discussed.23

Albert presupposes two distinct kinds of substance involved inthe generation of an embryo, of which one is divine, eternal andincorruptible, and the other temporary and corruptible. Becausealthough all sublunary things alter through generation and corrup-tion, they are unchangeable in terms of their form and species.

[] all things desire permanent being. For this reason, this divine thing, whichthey seek, is also in them the cause of the betterment of their being. For, every-thing that exists and has the possibility for both being or non-being, is madebetter in its being only through the divine permanence, in which it participatesby form and species.24

In Alberts world, then, everything seeks improvement in its statusand condition: animate being (animatum) is superior and hence

22) In the Arabo-Latin tradition, Aristotles zoological writings were circulated in theform of the following nineteen books: De historia animalium(books I-X); De parti-bus animalium(XI-XIV); De generatione animalium(XV-IXX). In his own treatise On

Animals, Albert first paraphrased these nineteen books, and then added seven origi-nal ones. Weisheipl, Alberts Works, 573, says: Clearly, Bk XVI contains the key tomuch of Alberts understanding of Aristotles doctrine concerning Gods creation ofthe human soul, the operations of intelligences in Nature, and the development of thehuman embryo. Weisheipl himself unfortunately did not develop this thought fur-ther.23) For medieval debates on animal generation, see Maaike van der Lugts excellentLever, le dmon et la vierge: les thories mdivales de la gnration extraordinaire(Paris,2004). See also Joan Cadden,Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages (Cam-bridge, 1993); Luke Demaitre and Anthony A. Travill, Human Embryology andDevelopment in the Works of Albertus Magnus, inAlbertus Magnus and the Sciences,405-440.24) De animalibus, XVI, tr. 1, c. 1 (ed. Hermann Stadler, Beitrge zur Geschichte derPhilosophie des Mittelalters, 15-16 (1916-1920), 1058-1059 = Kenneth F. Kitchell, Jr.

and Irven M. Resnick,Albertus Magnus on Animals[Baltimore, 1999] 1153): []omnia esse permanens desiderant: propter quod etiam hoc ipsum divinum quodoptant, est in eis causa meliorationis esse sui. Omne enim quod est ad utrumlibethabens potentiam ad esse et ad non esse, non melioratur in esse nisi per divinum per-manens quo participat secundum formam et speciem.


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desirable vis--vis non-animate being (inanimatum), being (ens)vis--vis non-being (non-ens) and finally life (vita) vis--visdeath (mors). By receiving a particular form, sublunary things,though corruptible, also participate in a divine permanence (divi-num permanens) and are therefore integral parts of the good-orientedorder. Since the reception of form is also the cause of goodness anddivinity for animals, he thinks that the effective and formative prin-ciple (effectivum et formativum principium), which furnishes theirform, is more important than the material principle from which

these animals are generated.25

In his book on the generation of animals, Albert therefore goesto seek the identity of the effective and formative principle ofsemen. After all, Aristotle had spoken of the divine formative prin-ciple contained in semen.26 First, Albert denies that this principleis the soul itself, which is defined as the perfection of an organicbody, because according to this definition, when bodily organs arenot yet formed, the soul cannot operate.27But since the formative

principle produces bodily organs, it must precede the souls emer-gence. en, after having refused to count this principle among cor-poreal qualities, he identifies it with the formative power, in voking

Avicennas authority.28 Albert recalls that this Persian philosopherhad admitted two stages in the emergence of this power insidesemen. First, in the ultimate digestion of food, this power is derivedfrom the sundry members of the animal body and is united insidethe semen. At this stage, this power is however not yet complete.

Only in the seminal vessels, which digest the semen further, doesthis power reach its perfection, allowing for the formation of bodily

25) De animalibus, XVI, tr. 1, c. 2 (Stadler, 1064 = Kitchell-Resnick, 1158).26) Aristotle, Generation of Animals, II.3, 736b29-737a7. A useful and detailed surveyfor the previous discussions on this passage is found in A. P. Bos, e Soul and ItsInstrumental Body: A Reinterpretation of Aristotles Philosophy of Living Nature (Leiden,2003), 146-181.27) De animalibus,XVI, tr. 1, c. 3 (Stadler, 1068-1069 = Kitchell-Resnick, 1163).28) Avicenna, De animalibus, XVI, c.1 (ed. Venice, 1508; repr. Louvain, 1961,f. 61va); id, Canon, III, fen, 20, tr. 1, c. 3; fen 21, tr. 1, c. 2 (ed. Giunta, Venice, 1555,ff. 372r; 380v). See also Van der Lugt, Le ver, le dmon et la vierge, 79-87; Hirai, Leo-niceno.


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members and introducing the spirit, which has the power of thesoul. Albert points out that, for Avicenna, the formative power can-not be reduced to elemental qualities. It is the soul that introducesthis power into seminal spirit. Following Avicenna, Albert says:

But the powers of hot, moist and other [qualities], which are in semen, are theinstruments of the power that has been poured into the spirit of the semen by thesoul [and] which we call the formative power. is [power] leads those instru-mental qualities to the end which it intends, that is, to the formation of themembers.29

e formative power possesses thus its own instruments for the pro-duction of the bodily members of animals, namely the four elemen-tal qualities. Among them, heat in the semen, controlled by theformative power, digests and changes the seminal matter. Albertspecifies that this power is something of the soul, and its subjectis the spirit, which exists in semen, being held in it by its thick-ness and viscosity.30 at is why, for him, thin watery semen is

incapable of generation, since it easily releases its spirit, which enclosesthe formative power in itself. We may notice here that the spirit isconceived as the vehicle of this seminal power.

To explain the workings of the formative power, Albert comparesits operations with artificial productions. Here, we should recall thefact that Aristotle himself had recourse to the model of artificialproductions in his discussion on the generation of living beings. Forhim, when the artificer works on matter by manipulating his owninstruments, the guiding principle of these instruments is the arti-facts form, which is conceived beforehand in the artificers mind.us, the Stagirite insisted that natural generation share the same

29) De animalibus,XVI, tr. 1, c. 4 (Stadler, 1073 = Kitchell-Resnick, 1167): Sed vir-tutes calidi et humidi et aliae quae sunt in semine, sunt instrumenta illius virtutis quaein spiritum seminis influxa est ab anima quam virtutem vocamus formativam: et ipsa

dirigit illas qualitates instrumentales ad finem a se intentum, hoc est ad membrorumformationem.30) De animalibus, XVI, tr. 1, c. 4 (Stadler, 1073 = Kitchell-Resnick, 1168): est aliq-uid animae et subiectum eius est spiritus qui est in semine retentus intra ipsum perspissitudinem et viscositatem ipsius.


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mode with artificial productions.31 Following this view, Albert af-firms, using the example of the architect, that the formative powerin semen is similar to the form poured from the architects mindinto the instruments.32

Just like the formative power in minerals, the power in semen iscomposed of several distinct components. Albert asserts that the ulti-mate digestion of semen cannot be realized only by simple elemen-tal heat. Besides that, two other powers are required: the power ofcelestial bodies and that of the soul, whereby the latter informs

(informare) the first two powers (elemental and celestial). ese threepowers are united in the semen.Having described the composite nature of the formative power,

Albert defines its status:

[] and this is what the more clever Peripatetics said, namely, that the soul is inthe semen not as the entelechy of the body possessing life in potency, but ratheras both the artificer and art are in the instruments by which an artificial productis produced.33

e Aristotelian background to this argument regarding the arti-ficer in the artifact has already been mentioned. Now, to thesethree components (elemental, celestial and soul powers), Albert addsa further one: the power of the prime intellect or intelligence, thatis, of the prime mover of the universe. Invoking his favorite axiom,he declares:

But to these statements we should add that every work of nature is a work of intel-ligence [...]. For, that is especially the work of intelligence in which the power ofthe intelligence determines the work of nature to the form nearer and more simi-lar to itself. For, although the work of nature and of intelligence are one and thesame, insofar as nature acts through intelligence and intelligence acts in nature,

31) See James G. Lennox, Teleology, Chance, and Aristotles eory of SpontaneousGeneration,Journal of the History of Philosophy, 20 (1982), 219-238.32) De animalibus, XVI, tr. 1, c. 6 (Stadler, 1081 = Kitchell-Resnick, 1175).33) De animalibus, XVI, tr. 1, c. 7 (Stadler, 1082 = Kitchell-Resnick, 1176): [] ethoc est quod dixerunt peritiores Perypatheticorum quod anima est in semine non utenthelechya corporis potentiam vitae habentis, sed potius sicut artifex et ars sunt ininstrumentis in quibus fit artificatum.


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still, the end of the work is sometimes closer to nature and at other times closerto intelligence.34

is, then, is the foundation of Alberts world system: the works ofnature and of intelligence are clearly one and the same (unum etidem). Animal generation is therefore no mere natural phenomenon,since the superior power of the intelligence necessarily intervenesinto this process and supervises it.35 Although the three compo-nents of the formative power in the semen are all active, if the mostimportant power, that of the ultimate intelligence is lacking, ani-

mal generation cannot take place. Indeed, the ultimate and themost simple of powers in semen is the power of intelligence, whichis most formal and simple and the first in moving, and informsboth the celestial and elemental power of both the soul and themembers.36

4. Spirit

From Antiquity to the early modern period, the notion of spirit(spiritus or pneuma) played a significant role in psychological andbiological thought.37 Scholars have discussed Alberts treatise On

34) De animalibus, XVI, tr. 1, c. 7 (Stadler, 1082 = Kitchell-Resnick, 1176): Estautem hiis adhuc addendum quod cum omne opus naturae sit opus intelligentiae[], quod istud maxime est opus intelligentiae in quo virtus intelligentiae opus natu-rae terminat ad formam sibi propinquiorem et similiorem. Cum enim unum et idemsit opus naturae et intelligentiae eo quo natura per intelligentiam et intelligentia innatura operatur: terminus tamen operis aliquando propinquior est naturae et ali-quando propinquior est intelligentiae.35) Avicenna and Averroes conceived natural operations like spontaneous generationas evidence of Gods marvelous wisdom and craftsmanship. See Remke Kruk, A FrothyBubble: Spontaneous Generation in the Medieval Islamic Tradition,Journal of SemiticStudies,35 (1990), 265-310;ead., Ibn Sina On Animals: Between the First Teacherand the Physician, in Jules Janssens and Daniel de Smet (eds.),Avicenna and His Her-itage (Louvain, 2002), 325-341; Freudenthal, Medieval Astrologization.36) De animalibus, XVI, tr. 1, c. 7 (Stadler, 1083 = Kitchell-Resnick, 1177): in sper-mate ultima et simplicissima virtutum est illa, quae est intelligentiae virtus quae for-malissima et simplicissima est et prima in movendo et informat et animae virtutem etmembrorum et caelestem et elementalem.37) See among others Grard Verbeke,Lvolution de la doctrine du pneuma du stocisme
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Spirit and Respiration (1258?) as a typical late medieval treatmentof the notion of spirit.38 ey have shown that Albert does notonly depend on Aristotle for his doctrine of spirit, but also onHunayn ibn Ishaq, Costa ben Luca, Isaac Israeli, Alfred of Saresheland Avicenna. Because of his division into three distinct kindsvital (vitalis), animal (animalis) and natural (naturalis)wemay assume that he is the heir to a Greco-Arabic medical traditionthat can ultimately be traced to Galen.39Previous studies have, how-ever, failed to connect Alberts notion of spirit with his views of

generation, discussed above. In On Animals, Albert argues that sev-eral powers, poured into semen, are united into one single forma-tive power, which resides in the spirit. He furthermore argues thatthe spirit is a divine thing, insofar as it has a divine power offorming and procreating. 40 It is therefore evident that the spirithas a close connection to the formative power. It is therefore prof-itable to examine more closely the spirits relationship to this powerin his work On Spirit and Respiration.

In the beginning of this treatise, Albert asserts that the soul isthe principle of life (vita). But he adds that life itself differs fromthose other psychic operations described by Aristotle, such as veg-etative life, sense-perception and reasoning, because it precedesthem. e proper vehicle of life, which is the foundation of all theseoperations, is the spirit. After examining the theories of his prede-cessors on its nature, Albert defines spirit as a body composed fromelements, having the form of air, serving organically the soul for all

s. Augustin (Louvain, 1945); Daniel P. Walker, e Astral Body in RenaissanceMedicine,Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 21 (1958), 119-133;HiroHirai, Alter Galenus: Jean Fernel et son interprtation platonico-chrtienne deGalien, Early Science and Medicine, 10 (2005), 1-35,esp. 22-25.38) James J. Bono, Medical Spirits and the Medieval Language of Life, Traditio, 40(1984), 91-130;Jacqueline Hamesse, Spirituschez les auteurs philosophiques des XIIeet XIIIesicles, in Marta Fattori and Massio L. Bianchi (eds.),Spiritus: IV Colloquio

internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo(Rome, 1984), 157-190.39) See Bono, Medical Spirits, 112-128; Hamesse, Spiritus, 180-181. Cf. OwseiTemkin, On Galens Pneumatology, Gesnerus, 8 (1951), 180-189.40) De animalibus, XVI, tr. 1, c. 13 (Stadler, 1098 = Kitchell-Resnick, 1193): spiri-tus est res divina per hoc quod habet virtutem divinam in formando et creando.
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actions of life.41But Albert sometimes uses the word instrumen-tally (instrumentaliter) to replace the term organically (organice).is emphasis on the instrumentality of spirit seems to be verymuch in keeping with Aristotles own ideas.42 is instrumental-ity is once again understood quite strongly in terms of an analogywith actual machinery. us Albert compares the spirit with thehammer of a smith as follows:

[] as a smith has one instrument, which is the hammer, by which he introducesinto iron all the forms of his art, so this single instrument is connected to thesoul, by which it universally introduces in the whole body all the forms and ope-rations of life.43

However, Albert goes further than Aristotle in his explanation ofthe formation of animals. If the spirit, moved by the soul, workslike the smiths hammer, one may rightly ask how this single instru-ment can form the various parts of the animal body. Albert answersthat the spirit receives in the testicles the formative power,whichis called divine by philosophers.44 It is thus not the spirit itself,but the formative power conveyed by the spirit that brings aboutthe various bodily organs and members. In other words, this poweris so divine because of the divine mind that is at work behind theinstrument, just as the smiths mind guides the hammer in his handin producing diverse products.

41) De spiritu et respiratione,I, tr. 1, c. 4 (ed. Borgnet, 9: 219): compositum corpusex elementis, habens formam aeris, animae organice deserviens ad omnes vitaeactus.42) See Verbeke,Lvolution de la doctrine du pneuma, 20. Cf. Bos, e Soul and ItsInstrumental Body. e idea of spirit as the souls instrument played a significant roleuntil the early modern period. Pagel, New Light, 74-112, suggests Albert as a primarysource for the biological works of prominent Aristotelians such as Daniel Sennert(1572-1637) and Jacob Schegk (1511-1587). Cf. Hirai, Jacob Schegk.43) De spiritu et respiratione,I, tr. 1, c. 4 (Borgnet, 9: 220): [] sicut enim unum

instrumentum quod est malleus, habet faber ferrarius, per quod omnes inducat in fer-rum formas artis suae: ita hoc unum instrumentum junctum est animae, per quod intoto corpore inducit omnes universaliter formas et operationes vitae.44) De spiritu et respiratione, I, tr. 1, c. 4 (Borgnet, 9: 221): in testiculis virtutem for-mativam quae a Philosophis vocatur divina.


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Albert then divides the workings of the formative power into twostages. First, he tells us, a certain moisture contained in the semenevaporates, stimulated by the heat of genital organs. Next, the for-mative power in the semen acts upon this vapor, so that spiritbegins to respire (spirans) inside the semen. It is in this way thatthe spirit is produced from seminal moisture with the help of theformative power. Albert affirms that the respiring spirit begins topulsate, carrying a forming artificer, which is the formative power.45

We cannot stress enough here the fact that this power is described

as a forming artificer (artifex formans). is corresponds to theidea of artificer in the artifact, which we have already encounteredat work in the formation of minerals.

Later in the same treatise, Albert provides us a crucial key to theunderstanding of the principles guiding his world system. is iswhen he argues that, just as a form conceived in the artificers mindis reiterated by a certain flux and procession (iteratur fluxu quo-dam et processu) in the artifact by means of his instrument, so the

form of life is introduced into a body through the instrumentalspirit.46is analogy between art and nature allows us to grasp thatthe fundamental principle shared by the macrocosm and the micro-cosm is the flux of forms, which originates from the prime prin-ciple (the prime intellect in nature or the heart in animal bodies)through its instruments (celestial bodies or spirits) into inferiorbeings or bodily members. We shall encounter a further develop-ment of this central doctrine below.

5. e Nature and Origin of Souls

e generation of minerals and animals always requires a formativepower, which ultimately has its origin from the prime intellect.

Albert claims that, without this power, vegetative and sensitive soulscannot come into being. To understand the relationship of the for-

mative power to the soul further, we shall now turn to his treatise45) De spiritu et respiratione,I, tr. 1, c. 5 (Borgnet, 9: 221): spirans spiritus ille primopulsare incipit, vehens artificem formantem, qui est virtus formativa.46) De spiritu et respiratione, I, tr. 1, c. 8 (Borgnet, 9: 226).


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On the Nature and Origin of the Soul, which seems to have beenwritten immediately after On Animals. is treatise is divided intotwo tracts. e first concerns the soul as united with the body, theother the soul in separation from the body. We shall here focusupon the generation of souls explained in the first tract.47

We find Albert invoking once more his favorite axiom, everywork of nature is the work of the intelligence, which he then refor-mulates as follows: Every work of nature is due to a form of theintelligence, which is the prime and universal mover in all nature. 48

As we have seen above, for Albert, this implies that the forms ofnatural things are already conceived in the prime intellect, just asthe form of the artifact is preconceived as an intellectual form inthe artificers mind. ese words reflect the fact that Albert dividesforms into two types, namely those conceived either in the artisansmind or in the prime intellect of the universe, and those of arti-facts or generated natural things. With regard to this division, hetries to reconcile the Platonists with the Aristotelians. According to

him, the Platonists defined the first kind of forms as the formbefore the thing (forma ante rem) and the second kind as the formin the thing (forma in re).49 On the first, he says:

47) See Bruno Nardi, Studi di filosofia medievale (Rome, 1960), passim; KatharinePark, Alberts Influence on Late Medieval Psychology, inAlbertus Magnus and theSciences, 501-535, esp. 504-505; Henryk Anzulewicz, Zur eorie des menschlichenLebens nach Albertus Magnus, Studia Mediewistyczne, 33 (1998), 35-49; Dag N.Hasse,Avicennas De Anima in the Latin West (London, 2000), esp. 60-69 and Indexlocorum.48) De natura et origine animae, tr. 1, c. 1 (ed. Cologne, 12: 3 = Henryk Anzulewicz,

Albert der Groe: ber die Natur und den Ursprung der Seele[Freiburg, 2006], 40-41):omne opus naturae est ad aliquam formam intelligentiae, quae primus et universalismotor est in tota natura. In this section, we indicate the pagination of AnzulewiczsGerman translation, although the English translation is ours.49) On the Platonic division of forms, see de Libera,Albert le Grand, 179-213; id.,

Mtaphysique et notique, 211-264; id, Albert le Grand et le platonisme: de la doc-trine des ides la thorie des trois tats de luniversel, in Egbert P. Bos and Pieter A.Meijer (eds.),On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy (Leiden, 1992), 89-119.


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One of these [forms] exists before the thing, is like a model and paradigm of thething, and is a form of the intellect [which is the] mover in nature; this form is

universally, immaterially and simply, possessing all the differences of forms before-hand.50

According to Albert, the Platonists also called these forms theforms [capable] of forming (formae formandi), in contradistinctionto those of the second kind, which were the images of those trueforms (illarum formarum verarum imagines).51 us, among allforms, some have the capacity of generating things, whereas the oth-

ers lack that capacity. At this stage in his argument, Albert intro-duces the Peripatetics, according to whom forms are educed frommatter by the formative power. On this power, he says:

[] but the formative power of each formed thing does not come from matter,because the mover and the thing moved cannot be the same, any more than theformer and the thing formed. Rather the formative power comes from the effici-ent prime mover.52

Albert thus attempts to argue that in the same way in which thePlatonists posited model-like forms in the the intellect which isthe mover in nature (intellectus movens in natura), the Peripateticslikewise suggested that the formative powers resided in the primeintellect prior to the generation of beings. For Albert, what is trulyformative must be a prior form, conceived in the prime intellect.He even goes as far as to argue that it is the same archetypal form

that is called model by the Platonists and formative power bythe Peripatetics. In his eyes, these two schools only differ in theirmode of expression.

50) De natura et origine animae, tr. 1, c. 2 (Cologne, 12: 4, Anzulewicz, 44-45):Quarum una est ante rem, quae est sicut rei exemplar et paradigma, quae est formaintellectus moventis in natura, quae forma est universaliter et immaterialiter et sim-pliciter praehabens omnes formarum differentias [].51) De natura et origine animae, tr. 1, c. 2 (Cologne, 12: 4, Anzulewicz, 44-45).52) De natura et origine animae, tr. 1, c. 2 (Cologne, 12: 4, Anzulewicz, 44-47): []tamen virtus formativa uniuscuiusque rei formatae non est ex materia, eo quod nonidem potest esse movens et motum neque formans et formatum, sed potius formativavirtus ex efficiente et movente est primo.


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Having defined the general character of forms in the universe,Albert explains the origin of the souls according to the status ofeach form in the order of nature. He begins with the forms of non-animate beings, which he divides into three kinds: (1) the forms ofelements; (2) those of mixed elements such as coagulation and liq-uefaction; and (3) the substantial forms of stones or metals. Afterthese non-animate corporeal forms comes the vegetative soul, a formthat is already closer to the prime mover and superior to the formsof non-animate beings. e superiority of plants is documented, for

example, by their ability to reproduce. In this context, Albert returnsonce more to the notion of the formative power contained in seed.Arguing that a plant can only be generated from that which hasformative power he adds:

It is also evident that this vegetative soul is educed from the interior power ofseed. Because of this, we have proved in the sixteenth book On Animals that [thispower] is in the seed, as the form of an artificer exists in the artifact, which thenbegins to take on the form of art.53

is confirms how in this treatise, too, Albert maintains his usualstance. It is moreover important to see how he places the genera-tion of animals in the larger context of a general theory on the ori-gin of natural forms. Whereas On Animalshad remained within anoverall Aristotelian framework, this work amply stresses the role ofthe prime intellect as the ultimate origin of all natural forms.

is contrast becomes even clearer in his discussions of the gen-eration of rational souls. For Albert, the rational soul differs fromthe other forms in that it cannot be generated from matter. To elu-cidate its true generation, Albert first explains that three powersoperate together in the formation of embryos, namely the powersof (1) the elements, (2) the soul, and (3) the prime intellect of theuniverse. However, these three powers do not contribute in an equal

53) De natura et origine animae, tr. 1, c. 3 (Cologne, 12: 8-9, Anzulewicz, 64-67): []non generatur nisi ex eo quod virtutem habet formativam. [] Patet etiam, quod haecvegetabilis anima educitur ab interiori virtute seminis. Propter quod in sexto decimolibro de animalibus probavimus, quod est in semine, sicut artificis forma est in artifi-ciato, quod iam formam artis incipit induere.


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way. Obviously, the power of the prime intellect is the most impor-tant one, because this intellect is the informer (informans) of allthings. After all, it is in its similitude to this prime intellect thatthe human rational soul is produced. Albert adds:

Since this [prime cause] is the intellect pure, active and productive of naturalthings, as the intellect of an artist produces artificial things, some persons said thatthe rational soul is made by the intelligence. And they said the truth, if the intel-ligence means the prime, separated and unmixed intellect [...]. en others, see-ing that form, which is called the rational soul, is in the image and similitude

of the prime intellect, which is the prime author and maker in the entire work ofnature, said that this [rational soul] is the copy of the prime cause.54

In this context, Albert asks his readers to reconsider the famous pas-sage of Aristotles Generation of Animals, which declares that theintellect comes into the embryo from outside.55 For the UniversalDoctor, Aristotle does not mean to say that the cause of the humanintellect exists outside the work of nature, but that the prime intel-

lect of the universe educes the human intellect from its own lightand not from any material principle. In conclusion, Albert gives hisown opinion on the origin of the soul and its relationship to theprime intellect:

[] this formative [power] educes these [vegetative and sensitive souls] in thisway, when they are the potencies of a rational and intellectual form and sub-

54) De natura et origine animae, tr. 1, c. 5 (Cologne, 12: 13, Anzulewicz, 84-87): Etcum ipse sit intellectus purus activus et productivus naturalium, sicut intellectus arti-ficis producit artificialia, dixerunt quidam animam rationalem ab intelligentia fieri; etverum dixerunt, si intelligentia dicatur intellectus primus separatus et immixtus, [].Alii autem videntes formam hanc quae anima rationalis vocatur, esse ad imaginem etsimilitudinem intellectus primi, qui auctor est et opifex primus in toto naturae opere,dixerunt eam esse exemplum causae primae.55) Aristotle, Generation of Animals, II.3, 736b27-29. See also Paul Moraux, pro-pos du chez Aristote, in Augustin Mansion (ed.),Autour dAristote:

recueil dtudes offert A. Mansion (Louvain, 1955), 255-295; Bos, e Soul and ItsInstrumental Body, 224-226; Joachim R. Sder, N: ber Natur und Ver-nunft im Ausgang von Aristoteles, in Ludger Honnefelder et al. (eds.),Albertus Mag-nus und die Anfnge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter (Mnster,2005), 375-398.


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stance, only insofar as this formative [power] is moved, being informed by theintellect, which universally acts in the work of generation. And therefore, the

pure and unmixed intellect of the prime cause introduces the ultimate comple-ment, which belongs to an intellectual form, not through an instrument nor frommatter, but through its own light.56

Albert clearly argues that the formative power, informed by theprime intellect, generates the two inferior kinds of souls (vegetativeand sensitive). For him, even the rational soul does not come fromoutside the realm of natural operation, since the prime intellect of

the universe is the author of all natural things. With his favoriteaxiom, every work of nature is the work of intelligence, Albertaims to explain the origin of the forms of all natural things com-prehensively, concluding that all forms are ultimately poured fromthe prime intellect.

6. Metaphysics

In his Metaphysics (1263-ca. 1267), Albert undertakes a furtherattempt to elucidate the relationship between the prior forms, con-ceived in the intellect, and the posterior forms of generated beings.

We shall briefly examine this point here.57

When Albert explains the generation of natural species, includ-ing minerals, he often has recourse to the axiom, a house [is pro-

56) De natura et origine animae, tr. 1, c. 5 (Cologne, 12: 14, Anzulewicz, 90-91): []haec formativa non educeret eas hoc modo, prout sunt potentiae rationalis et intel-lectualis formae et substantiae, nisi secundum quod ipsa formativa movetur informataab intellectu universaliter movente in opere generationis. Et ideo complementum ulti-mum, quod est intellectualis formae, non per instrumentum neque ex materia, sedper suam lucem influit intellectus primae causae purus et immixtus. Cf. Hirai, Leoni-ceno, 151-158.57) For the intimate relationship between the generation of sublunary things and

Metaphysicsin the Arabo-Latin tradition, see Charles Genequands introduction to his

Ibn Rushds Metaphysics: A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushds Commentary onAristotles Metaphysics, Book Lm (Leiden, 1984), 1-58; Davidson, On Intellect, 220-257; Jean Jolivet, Divergences entre les mtaphysiques dIbn Rud et dAristote, inhis Philosophie mdivale arabe et latine(Paris, 1995), 133-153; Freudenthal, MedievalAstrologization.


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duced] from a house. One of its sources is Aristotles Metaphysics,Zeta.58 ere, the Stagirite invoked it in his explanation of theprinciple that everything is produced from the what is univocal(omnia fiunt ex univoco).59 According to the Commentator, Aver-roes, by univocal, Aristotle meant that the form in the artisansmind is similar in terms of name (conveniens in nomine) to theform of the artifact that he makes.60Importantly, Aristotle thoughtthat the same principle also applied to animal generation. It wasthus the Stagirite himself who compared natural reproduction with

artificial production. In the same analogical vein, he argued thatanimal seed is productive, because the semen potentially has theform (sperma habet potestate speciem) of the animal.61

Albert however developed this analogy further than Aristotle haddone. He first argued that the process of everything which is gen-erated and made comes from a similar thing in terms of form,which is of the same substance as that which is generated.62 Wemust stress here that Albert intentionally interprets the term uni-

vocal, not as similar in terms of name, but as similar in termsof form. en, on the idea that semen has potentially the formof the animal, he continues:

For, semen makes [an animal] by its formative species, as those [things] that aremade by art are made by their formative and generative species. For, semen hasspecies potentially, that is, not materially, but effectively [...]. [] For, semen isnot a small animal as Plato said, but it is an animal thanks to a productive and

58) Aristotle,MetaphysicsZ.7, 1032b11-12; Z.9, 1034a23-24. In this section, we haveused the Latin translation of AristotlesMetaphysics, so-called translatio media, printedalong with AlbertsMetaphysica in ed. Cologne, 2/16.59) Aristotle,Metaphysics, Z.8, 1034a22-23.60) Averroes, Long Commentary on Aristotles Metaphysics, VII, 30 (ed. Giunta, Venice,1552, VIII, f. 179G-180L = Ahmed Elsakhawi, tude du livre Zy de la MtaphysiquedAristote dans sa version arabe et son commentaire par Averros (Lille, 1994), 109-

110).61) Aristotle,Metaphysics, Z.9, 1034a34-b1.62)Metaphysica, VII, tr. 2, c. 11 (ed. Cologne, 2/16: 354): processus omnis eius quodgeneratur et fit, est a convenienti secundum formam, quae est ipsa eius quod fit, sub-stantia.


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generative power, just as a form of art is not an artifact, but is generated thanksto a productive power.63

For Albert, then, the form or species, which has in itself a produc-tive and generative power, must exist prior to the formation ofsomething, in the realm of both natural generation and artificialproductions. For him, as for Averroes, this potential form in seed,which possesses the productive capacity, is the real identity of theformative power. It is important to understand that Albert supposesforms in the architects mind or in semen to be similar to those ofproducts and generated beings. Since the form, poured from theartisans mind into his instruments, produces an artifact of a simi-lar form, the formative power in semen, called artificer in the arti-fact, procreates the offspring of a form similar to the genitor.64

Concerning a passage of AristotlesMetaphysics, Lambda 3, Albertadvances the same idea:

It is evident from these [points] that everything which is generated is made by aunivocal generator, because in univocal generation, man generates man accordingto himself []. Similarly, it is in the case of the arts. For, the medical art in theintellect of a doctor is the univocal reason of health, which is in the humors. Allothers that are generating spontaneously (aequivoce) are reduced to univocal[generators]. And the formative power, which is in their matters, is like an art inthe artisans intellect, because it is evident, that heat, which is in the semen of man,receives divine powers from heaven and [also] the soul, by which it informs; andtherefore [the formative power] is called intellect and artificer by the Peripa-tetics.65

63)Metaphysica, VII, tr. 2, c. 11 (Cologne, 2/16: 354): Spermaenimfacita forma-tiva specie, sicut ea quaefiunt ab arte, fiunt a formativa et faciente specie. Sperma enimhabet speciem potestatenon materiali, sed effectiva []. [] non enim est sperma par-vum animal, sicut dixit Plato, sed est virtute factiva et generativa animal, sicut formaartis non est artificiatum, sed virtute factiva est generatum [].64)Metaphysica, XI, tr. 1, c. 6 (Cologne, 2/16: 466).65)Metaphysica, XI, tr. 1, c. 9 (Cologne, 2/16: 473): Ex his etiam patet [] quod

omne quod generatur, fiat ab univoco generante, quia in generatione univoca homogenerat hominem secundum se []. Similiter autem est etiam in artibus. Arsenimmedicinalisin intellectu medici ratio estunivoca sanitatis, quae est in umoribus. Aliaautem quaecumque sunt generantia aequivoce, ad univoca reducuntur. Et virtus for-mativa, quae est in materiis eorum, est sicut ars in intellectu artificis, sicut patet, quia


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e most fundamental rule of generation in Albert is the fact thateverything is generated from some univocal being, that is, fromsomething possessing a similar form. According to this rule, thereis nothing but univocal generation in the world. at is why evenspontaneous generation, traditionally considered equivocal, not uni-vocal, must ultimately be univocal. Animal generation forms noexception to this rule. From the celestial bodies, the forms in theprime intellect are poured into semen, where the power of the soulalready subsists. is power, informed by the divine powers, pro-

duces the eternal species of animals. is species must be univocalwith respect to the form that pre-exists in the prime intellect. It isby the authority of the Peripatetics that Albert compares this powerto an intellect and artificer. is univocal causality is crucial forour understanding his Platonization of Peripatetic metaphysics.66Indeed, we may claim that this notion is most emphatically devel-oped in his discussions of the generation of sublunary things.

ere remains one point to be noted: Albert expressly claims that

his theory differs from the Platonists theory of the Giver of Forms(dator formarum).67 Indeed, following Averroes, he rejects this the-ory, although it is evidently not too far removed from his own the-ory of the generative role of the prime intellect of the universe.68

calor, qui est in semine hominis, virtutes divinas accipit a caelo et anima, quibus for-mat, et ideo dicitur intellectus et artifex a Peripateticis. Cf. Aristotle,Metaphysics,.3, 1070a26-30.66) de Libera,Albert le Grand, 117-177; id.,Mtaphysique et notique, 143-209.67) On the Giver of Forms, see Hasse,Avicennas De Anima, 188-189; id., Plato Ara-bico-Latinus: Philosophy, Wisdom Literature, Occult Sciences, in Stephen Gersh(ed.), e Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographical Approach (Berlin,2002), 31-65, esp. 42-44; de Libera,Albert le Grand, 121-131; id.,Mtaphysique et

notique, 156-168; Henryk Anzulewicz, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita und das Struk-turprinzip des Denkens von Albert dem Groen, in Tzotcho Boiadjiev et al.(eds.),Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter (Turnhout, 2000), 251-295, esp. 258.68) For his criticism of Platos and Avicennas theories, seeMetaphysica, XI, tr. 1, c. 8(Cologne, 2/16: 468-471).


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7. e First Principle

For Albert, as all forms originate in the prime intellect, every nat-ural phenomenon is the work (opus) of this intellect, which sus-tains all operations of nature. is eminent role is made clear in

Alberts mature work On the Causes and the Procession of the Uni-verse from the Prime Cause (after 1263), which is closely tied to his

Metaphysicsand is the last work of his Aristotelian project. is trea-tise examines the nature of the prime intellect as the cause of allbeings in the world.69

In the second tract of the first book of this work, Albert tries toshow what the prime principle (primum principium) is. For him,it is not a power engaged in the body, such as the vegetative or sen-sitive power, but the intellect (intellectus). But there exist variouskinds of intellect. Albert rejects those that require a body as theirsubject. He also excludes the potential intellect, because what heseeks is a principle that is active in itself and does not depend onany other being. He therefore concludes that the prime principle is

the universally active intellect (intellectus agens universaliter).70isactive intellect knows everything that comes into being. Crucially,however, this knowledge is not only concerned with the perceptionof beings, but also with their production, as it is the forms or spe-cies known by and held in this principle that produce by themselvesall entitiesonce again, just as a form conceived in the artisansmind is the formative cause of artifacts.71 roughout this discus-sion, Albert relies anew on the Aristotelian axiom that the house

69) Besides de Liberas works, see Charles Lohr, e Pseudo-AristotelianLiber de Cau-sisand Latin eories of Science in the Twelfth and irteenth Centuries, in JillKraye et al. (eds.), Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages (London, 1986), 53-62; PaulHofeld, Der Liber de causis: Kommentar Alberts und seine naturphilosophischenKommentare, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 5 (1995), 39-105;rse Bonin, Creation as Emanation: e Origin of Diversity in Albert the Greats Onthe Causes and the Procession of the Universe (Notre Dame, IN, 2001).70) De causis,I, tr. 2, c. 1 (ed. Cologne, 2/17: 25 = Henryk Anzulewicz et al.,Alber-tus Magnus: Buch ber die Ursachen und den Hervorgang von allem aus der ersten Ursa-che[Hamburg, 2006] 100-101). Although we give the pagination of AnzulewiczsGerman translation in this section, the English translation is ours.71) De causis,I, tr. 2, c. 5 (Cologne, 2/17: 31 = Anzulewicz, 132-133).


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[as an artifact] is produced from a house [in the architects mind]in order to define the role of the prime principle.

In the last part of this tract, Albert discusses how the diversityof natural phenomena is caused by the prime intellect. He arguesthat to the extent that the knowledge contained in this prime prin-ciple is productive of all beings, it is the cause of being and of theorder of all entities including natural things. at is why he affirmsthat the prime principle is the source for the being of all existences(fontale ad esse existentium omnium).72Although Albert admits both

nature and the prime intellect as principles, he says that, since theagent principle cannot be plural, nature must be subordinate to theprime intellect. e cause of the diversity of natural phenomena isthus ultimately reduced to this prime principle.

As we have seen, for the generation of natural things, Albert hasrecourse to the notion of formative power, which is responsible forthe various parts of plants and animals and also for minerals. isformative power thus has the potency to determine matter into var-

ious parts, because it contains in itself the divine power of the primeintellect. With this view, we have arrived at the very core of Albertsnatural philosophy: he clearly argues that it is this formative powerthat relates the natural world to the prime principle, that is, to theuniversally active intellect:

For, this power, which is called formative, can [establish the diversity of naturalthings], not insofar as it is form or nature, but insofar as it is the copy of the

intelligence and contains in itself the power of the intelligence. For this reason,in the sixteenth book of On Animals, the intelligence is said to be in semen, andthe whole work of nature is said to be the work of the intelligence.73

72) De causis,I, tr. 2, c. 8 (Cologne, 2/17: 33 = Anzulewicz, 146-147).73) De causis,I, tr. 2, c. 8 (Cologne, 2/17: 34 = Anzulewicz, 148-151): Haec enimvirtus, quae formativa dicitur, non habet hoc in quantum forma est vel natura, sed inquantum exemplum est intelligentiae in se continens intelligentiae virtutem. Propterquod in XVI de animalibus intelligentia dicitur esse in semine, et totum opus natu-rae dicitur esse opus intelligentiae.


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8. Conclusions

In this essay, we have analyzed some key ideas of Alberts naturalphilosophy. We have seen that, in his explanation of the generationof natural things, he constantly takes recourse to the notion of for-mative power. In his treatise On Minerals, he argues that mineralscannot come into being through a simple combination of elements,but require the assistance of the formative power deriving from theprime universal mover. In his On Animals, he explains that, beforethe emergence of souls, a divine formative power introduces itself

into semen, making use of the semens heat as its instrument so asto form bodily organs. In animal bodies, the formative power iscarried by its vehicle, the spirit. Indeed, Albert thinks that thispower is a potential form hidden in seed, but once again ultimatelypoured down from the prime intellect of the universe through theintermediary services of the celestial bodies.

Regarding the origin and workings of this power, we have seenthat Albert introduces two fundamental elements into his Aristote-

lian framework. First, he frequently cites his masters adage thata house is produced from a house and health from health. By thisphrase, Aristotle had wished to explain that when an architect buildsa house by means of his tools, he must first conceive the form ofthe house in his mind; and likewise with the doctor prescribing acure for some illness. e Stagirite had applied this idea primarilyto animal generation. By globalizing its application to the wholenatural realm, and by ascribing to God the role of the ultimatemind, Albert, going beyond his masters intentions, claimed that theforms of all natural things take their origin from the prime intel-lect of the universe.74 Furthermore, so as to explain how intellec-tual forms are tied to natural forms, he took recourse to theNeoplatonic metaphysics of flux. He described this natural processas a sequential flux of forms reaching inferior beings from thehigher, superior intellect. In his commentary on Aristotles Meta-

74) e framework of the present paper does not permit to delve into an analysis ofAverroes shadow discernable in Alberts conception of natural operation as intellec-tual activity. On this issue, we are currently preparing another study. Cf. Freudenthal,Astrologization; Hirai, Leoniceno.


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physics, Albert went even further than that, considering all types ofnatural generation as univocal, including spontaneous generation,which had traditionally been viewed as equivocal. is idea couldimpossibly have been the result of a simple interpretation of Aris-totles work. Rather, it was the result of Alberts reception of the

Arabic Neoplatonization of Aristotelian thought.Once all of these points are clarified, we can grasp the real inten-

tion behind Alberts statement that every work of nature is thework of intelligence: it emphatically states the idea that all natu-

ral things are univocally produced by the formative power comingfrom the prime universal intellect.is conclusion demands that we reconsider some significant issues

in the study of medieval science and philosophy. First, our analy-sis requires a revision of the standard view on the relationship betweennature and art, the artificial and the natural, in medieval thought.

We have seen that for Albert, all natural phenomena necessarilyimply the intervention of a superior intellect, in the same way in

which artificial productions require the artists intellectual activity.Indeed, we have seen that he almost identified natural operationswith artificial ones. is analogy between nature and art is no mererhetoric or metaphor, but partakes in the core of Alberts under-standing of the created world.75 Second, our discussion sheds newlight on Alberts reception of the doctrine of flux. Although mostscholars who study the metaphysical or theological dimensions ofthis doctrine pay little attention to the issue of the generation of

natural things, our survey has shown that this Neoplatonic doctrineis, at least for Albert, intimately tied to this phenomenon. Finally,our analysis of Alberts natural philosophy demands a reconsidera-

75) On the identification of natural phenomena with intellectual art or artist, in addi-tion to Freudenthals and Hirais works mentioned above, see also Joseph Moreau,Lme du monde de Platon aux Stociens(Paris, 1939); Andr J. Festugire, Le Dieucosmique, in La rvlation dHerms Trismgiste, 4 vols. (Paris, 1942-1950), vol. 2;

Friedrich Solmsen, Nature as Craftsman in Greek ought,Journal of the History ofIdeas, 24 (1963), 473-496;Paula Findlen, Jokes of Nature and Jokes of Knowledge:e Playfulness of Scientific Discourse in Early Modern Europe, Renaissance Quar-terly, 43 (1990), 292-331;Nancy Siraisi, Vesalius and the Reading of Galens Teleol-ogy, Renaissance Quarterly, 50 (1997), 1-37.
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tion of the medieval reception of Peripatetic and Neoplatonic phi-losophy. For, we have seen that when Albert comments on the

Aristotelian corpus, he clearly develops the active and teleologicalcharacter of natural operations beyond Aristotles original intentions.is teleological understanding of natures work is fundamental for

Albert and was to persist uninterruptedly into the early modernperiod.76

76) On the teleological understanding of nature in early modern period, Pagels worksare still worth reading. Walter Pagel, William Harveys Biological Ideas: Selected Aspectsand Historical Background (Basel, 1967); id.,Joan Baptista Van Helmont: Reformer ofScience and Medicine (Cambridge 1982)

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