T A C K I J N G CRIME AND V A N D A I J S M ON POST- WAR H O U S I N G ESTATES: TI:IE DUTCH APPROACH 1

Maria Elsinga and Frank Wassenberg

1 Introduction

From various studies, for example the work of Newman and Coleman (Newman, 1972; and Coleman, 1985) and in the Netherlands that of the Bureau for the Prevention of Crime (Van Soomeren, 1987), it has become clear that a relationship exists between criminal behaviour and the built environment. This relationship is strikingly present in post-war blocks of flats where, in comparison with low-rise buildings, crime is more frequent.

The objective of this paper is to provide some insight into the relationship between crime and post-war high-rise buildings. This paper deals with the problems and causes that have led to this development, the measures that can be taken to stop this situation deteriorating, and the effects of these measures.

Firstly, we shall examine the process of the decay of the housing estate and its surroundings in order to determine the causes of this decay. Some problems appear to have existed from the moment the complexes were buiIt. Others, like vandalism, untidiness and insecurity, are secondary. Apart from being effects, crime and decay can also cause even more problems. In section 3 we shall consider the measures that can be taken to remedy these problems. On the basis of a case study we go on to describe the effects of a number of measures. Section 5 presents our conclusions.

Five housing estates have been studied: Hoptille (in Amsterdam), De Tjalk (Lelystad), Gilliswijk (Delft), Falgabuurt (Den Helder), and eight high-rise blocks in Capelle aan den IJssel (see Figure 1). Section 4 deals with the results of our study of the Gilliswijk estate. In addition, research is being carried out at the OTB into the effects of appointing caretakers in problem buildings, of the applicability of selective housing allocation, and of the problems specific to an area of Amsterdam known as Bijlmermeer, the most notorious high-rise problem estate in the Netherlands.

Neth. J. of Housing and the Built Environment, Vol. 6 (1991) No. 2. 159

Figure 1 The location of the five housing estates studied

Delft

2 The process of decay

Relationship between price and quality The process of decay is illustrated in Figure 2. Problem neighbourhoods or buildings are often considered to be relatively expensive. Rents are relatively high, and so are the additional charges, while tenants and prospective tenants are not so convinced of the quality of the housing. Possibly the lack of quality results from absolute deficiencies, such as the small size of the flats and the absence of amenities (shower, good kitchen, sufficient room outside). Quality may also be expressed in more subjective terms (whether the neighbourhood is safe, whether it is clean, or whether it has a bad reputation). The first kind of deficiency is usually taken into account when the level of the rent is determined, the second is not. For the residents, however, the subjective factors are just as important (Prak and Priemus, 1984; OTB, 1989).

Three groups of factors contribute to a relatively low initial quality: physical, social and external factors.

In each of the five estates investigated there was a clear relationship between

160

Figure 2 Problems on post-war housing estates

C A U S E S I N D I C A T O R S A N D E F F E C T S

M E A S U R E S

O ( 7

Characteristics of the estate: - physical - social external factors

with new houses: moderate initial quality

high living expenses low quality rental problems unfavourable location for target group

difficult first tenancy

adjustment of rents supplementary charges change of design

--:-1 I I ,L

O

O

Z

q) gJ

willingness to move commitment

social control

vandalism and crime

image

living enjoyment declines further

outflow f influx influx of "problem- households"

' l 1 ~(~g~ ~ s

repair leavin~

tenants leaving turnover

deterioration damage complaints offences

negative publicity

turnover refusals

change of target group more precise allocation careful management residents' guidance

supervision - caretaker - police more intensive maintenance

visible measures campaign

combination of all preceding measures

I I I I

= i n c r e a s e s

vacancy rate costs of management costs of repair

= decreases

renovation demolition

161

Figure 3

$(9000

8OOO

�9 ~ 6 0 0 0

~4o~o " ; I

New housing construction in Amsterdam and vacancy rates in the Bijlmermeer, 1980-88

' , / ~ month

Amsterdam ..~ /t / \ \

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the physical surroundings and the occurrence of crime and vandalism. The blocks were characterized by balcony access, long basement corridors, a long inside passage, open stairwells and lifts. Since these were freely accessible to anyone, vandals and criminals could take advantage of them. The choice of materials in the older blocks of fiats appeared to be vulnerable to vandalism (Den Helder, Delft). An unattractive environment offered few recreational opportunities (Amsterdam, Lelystad).

Social factors are the second group of factors contributing to the low quality of housing. The various problem estates were populated by relatively less well-off tenants: young people, those entering the housing market for the first time, people with low incomes. In Amsterdam and Lelystad it was intended to build housing to be inhabited mainly by young people. The small dwellings built for this purpose were in areas with poor access to the city, however, so they were anything but popular. Housing was not carefully allocated (Amsterdam, Den Helder, some of the buildings in Capelle), resulting in concentrations of "problem households".

External features form the third group of factors. An important feature is the supply in the housing market. Landlords consider this to be the most important cause of vacancies. When more housing is available, more housing will become vacant on less popular estates and the problems of operating these estates will increase. The completion of many new houses over a short period may be disastrous for these less popular estates. Potential movers prefer the new houses to less popular estates. The problem of an increase in supply in the housing market became apparent in the mid-1980s in places like Capelle and Amsterdam. Figure 3 shows that the completion of many new houses in Amsterdam led to rising rates

162

of empty property in the Bijlmermeer, in the south-east of the city.

Progressive deterioration: the residential quality decreases Houses already considered to have a low initial quality are vulnerable to increasing problems, resulting in a declining quality of life for the residents. Despite the high level of rents, the houses are of poor quality and provide little satisfaction to their occupants. Tenants are keen to move and their commitment is low, both to their housing and towards each other. There is no opportunity for developing a community among the residents. People remaiu strangers to each other, which leads to an absence of informal social control.

In such a situation there is greater risk of vandalism and petty crime being committed by fellow residents, visitors, or by others. This is reinforced by physical characteristics, such as the presence of semi-public spaces that cannot be closed off: entrances, stairwells, and storerooms. The building increasingly attracts negative publicity in the local media and a negative image is created. The tenants' satisfaction diminishes even further and those who have a chance to depart will do so. The reputation of these estates discourages prospective tenants. When dwellings are allocated, the number of refusals is high and it becomes increasingly difficult to find tenants for the estate. On the other hand, such a building becomes increasingly attractive as a place to house asocial groups (criminals, drug dealers, etc.).

Operational losses When problems increase, vacancy becomes a quantifiable negative result of declining quality. A deteriorating residential environment is mainly a disadvantage to the residents; vacancy is a problem which mostly affects the landlord, whose financial management of the estate is made more difficult. As described above, the number of empty properties also depends on the situation in the housing market. Vacancies cause a loss of rental income, and high rates of mobility cause high management and repair costs. A high rate of empty properties discourages residents; it unsettles tenants if the house next to theirs is empty. Vacancies therefore cause more vacancies.

The danger is real that landlords will not be encouraged to invest in and improve the estate once it has reached this stage. Furthermore, if much damage has been caused by vandalism, a choice has to be made between repairing the damage, at considerable expense, or doing nothing. The latter will stimulate so-called erosion vandalism: vandalism attracts vandalism.

Process of decay The process of decay is not a phenomenon that all blocks of flats in the Netherlands are confronted with. Problems of crime and deterioration are mainly found in parts of housing estates.

The occurrence of problems does not automatically initiate the process described above; decay does not automatically escalate. Such escalation did, however, occur in De Tjalk in Lelystad and Hoptille in Amsterdam. Certainly, in the latter case, the

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whole process of deterioration was so rapid that the successive steps in the process of decay are hard to distinguish. Only two years after the estate was completed, it was necessary to renovate Hoptille completely. The cases of Gilliswijk in Delft and Falgabuurt in Den Helder are two examples where the process of decay was much slower. There were therefore more opportunities to intervene and to prevent the descent into the situation which resulted in Hoptille.

3 Remedial measures

Though measures are possible to try and counteract these problems, it is more important to avoid errors of design and location in new buildings. This means for example that massiveness, poorly-lit areas, and areas where people feel threatened should be avoided in designs. If problems do arise, it is important for intervention to be timely. When problems get out of hand, as they did in Lelystad and Amsterdam, radical measures are necessary. The case of CapeUe, however, shows that far less drastic measures can be sufficient if they are taken in time, that is, before minor problems develop into serious ones. In general, it may be concluded that the longer action is postponed, the worse the problems will become, and the more drastic, and expensive, the solutions will have to be.

Many measures are conceivable, and in practice a whole range of measures is used. Measures should preferably be directed at the causes of problems. Figure 2 outlines the relationship between problems and possible responses to these problems. It is not intended to suggest the "best" solution to particular problems. No single measure is, for that matter, always the most successful. Moreover, the effects of a particular measure may be different according to the conditions in which it is implemented. When the problems relate most to the quality of the dwelling, it makes most sense to take measures that have a direct effect on the relationship between price and quality, such as improving the character of the residential area or the quality of the dwelling, or reducing the rent.

Moreover, the diagram shows that not all measures are directed towards the problems of vandalism and crime (lowering rents, improving the environment, changing the target group or starting an advertising campaign do little to affect levels of crime). Most of them are, however, somehow related. In the following sections we shall elaborate on those measures that do have an impact on crime.

Measures that are specifically intended to reduce levels of vandalism and crime can be divided into two types: techno- and socio-preventive measures, directed at the physical and the social environment respectively.

Techno-preventive measures The techno-preventive measures appear to concentrate on the semi-public spaces within blocks of flats. Residents often feel extremely vulnerable in these areas. Freely accessible balconies, inside passageways and entrances were closed off to outsiders. Basement corridors were divided into segments. The locks on entrance

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doors were improved and the doors themselves strengthened. More durable materials were used for lighting, locks, letter boxes, and in the interior of the lifts. Other measures are directed towards increasing visibility. Dark places were bricked off, or the lighting improved. Shrubbery in the vicinity of the buildings was cut back. Another techno-preventive measure involves increasing the level of maintenance. Doing nothing to remove graffiti, clean up rubbish or repair damage will invite further and more extreme examples. Housing associations and municipalities often find themselves forced to make a choice between leaving things as they are (which used to be the policy followed on the estates included in this study), or to increase the level of maintenance (a policy introduced afterwards).

Socio-preventive measures Another way to tackle crime and vandalism is by means of socio-preventive measures. These are directed towards intensifying social control, by enhancing the residents' personal commitment to their environment. In a number of the areas studied we found exactly this sort of measure being adopted. Residents' committees were set-up and the residents given more influence over planning the development of the areas in which they lived. In one neighbourhood project involving residents and the police, the residents were actively involved in identifying and preventing forms of delinquent behaviour and in reducing the fear of crime.

All these measures aim to strengthen social control by encouraging the residents' commitment to their neighbourhood. The effects of these measures have been to increase the quality of life on these estates.

In addition, a semi-formal kind of social control was instituted by the appointment of caretakers. When used in conjunction with technical measures, like restricting access to buildings, this may help to combat vandalism and crime.

Another range of socio-preventive measures entails influencing the composition of a population in order to affect its social structure. This can be done by splitting houses up or by combining them, creating a greater diversity of housing types in a particular neighbourhood.

A more selective allocation of housing is another method of influencing the composition of the residential population. In the Netherlands housing allocation in the social housing sector - which accounts for forty-four per cent of all dwellings -is in the hands of municipalities or housing associations. In many places their allocation policy is becoming increasingly selective. This policy has some disadvantages however. What, for instance, should be done about applicants whom it is thought will not fit in in a certain neighbourhood? Who does one house on a "problem" estate? Can applicants be refused, and what alternatives are available to them? How does one avoid discrimination? How should housing associations or local authorities respond to tenants who harass other residents?

One other type of socio-preventive measure involves trying to influence (potential) offenders, by providing facilities for the young for example. The lack of facilities and opportunities on the estates often encourages asocial behaviour. We have not, however, come across educational programmes or employment schemes being started in the municipalities included in our research. Indeed, quite the

165

opposite is occurring: substantial cuts are being made in such schemes. Influencing (potential) offenders has the additional advantage of not transferring

problems. Locking an entrance and appointing a caretaker in one building may simply mean that another building further down the road is damaged and graffited. Prevention by means of offering meaningful alternatives to young people is a more structural solution.

Combined techno- and socio-preventive measures Often an approach is based solely on techno-preventive measures. These are often easy and quick to implement. They also have the advantage that they have clear visible effects and are quickly noticed. Socio-preventive measures are more difficult to implement. The resources available for socio-prevention are few, no distinct means or instruments exist, planning requires lengthy deliberations and a time- consuming process of decision making. As a rule, the effects are not immediately visible. The effects of revising housing allocation policy, for instance, are few in the short term. Employing caretakers, however, has a visible and immediate effect on improving these estates.

Techno-preventive measures are limited in their success. New locks may be forced, doors left open. Such measures often do little more than relieve the symptoms, and their effectiveness is therefore short time. Socio-preventive measures are often effective for a longer period and have a more permanent impact. A combination of both types of measures would therefore be the best. Technical measures may provide a starting point for good social management.

4 Measuring effects in the Gilliswijk

On one of the estates included in our study, the Gilliswijk in Delft, we have recently completed an examination of the effects of measures being taken to improve conditions.

The Gilliswijk is an estate in Delft, a medium-sized town in the west of the Netherlands situated between Rotterdam and The Hague. This estate was built in the early 1970s and consists of about 600 dwellings in seven five-storey apartment buildings. The area began to deteriorate soon after it was completed, and by the early 1980s the neighbourhood was recognized as a problem area. These problems were caused by various factors.

The blocks of flats had many semi-private areas, access~le to anybody. Residents did not feel responsible for what happened in these areas. These spaces were liable to vandalism. As a result, they looked shabby, even dilapidated, which made them even more susceptible to vandalism.

Many shrubs and trees had been planted between the blocks of flats, which made it difficult to keep an eye on children and parked cars. The children's playground was vandalized, and so too were the surrounding plants and shrubs; the park became unkempt. Refuse containers were often targets for vandals, adding to the untidiness of the immediate surroundings of the blocks of flats. Cars were often

166

Photo 1 The Gilliswijk

damaged or broken into. Nearly all the five-room flats the housing associations in Delft had to offer were

in the Gilliswijk. In the 1970s dwellings of that size were only allocated to families with at least four children. As a consequence, many children and teenagers lived in this neighbourhood. There were few social and cultural facilities provided for them. Small juvenile gangs emerged; vandalism and criminal behaviour added to the status of their members. Families who could afford to do so left the area as it continued to decay. They were mainly the more prosperous families. In the meantime, a new estate was being completed elsewhere in Delft providing single-family houses with gardens; this encouraged families to leave the Gilliswijk. This increase in the number of families leaving the estate was disadvantageous to the forming of social contacts. Because only economically poorer tenants moved to the estate, Gilliswijk developed a poor reputation among those looking for a house (Van der Zon, 1989).

A rehabilitation scheme In the early 1980s representatives of the tenants, the housing association, and the municipality set up a group to deal with the problems on the Gilliswijk estate. This group developed a plan to rehabilitate the Gilliswijk. It contained a variety of techno-preventive measures:

the entrance lobbies were no longer to be freely accessible and were redesigned; the long basement corridors, running the full length of the blocks, were closed

167

P h o t o 2 O n e o f t h e c a r e t a k e r s a t w o r k

off and divided into segments; eighty-six of the five-room fiats were split up into smaller fiats designed for one- and two-person households;

- the estate was redesigned in order to make it easier to supervise. In addition, a number of socio-preventive measures were taken: youth workers

were appointed and a youth club set up. A caretaker was appointed for each block of fiats. Each caretaker had responsibility for over eighty fiats, and they had the following functions: - cleaning public and semi-public areas within each block of fiats; - encouraging compliance with the regulations in force on the estates; - increasing general services to residents; - supervising the functioning of technical installations and checking for damage to

the building; - contacts between tenants and third parties. In practice it turns out that most of a caretaker's time (about 60%) is devoted to cleaning. The other tasks are approximately equally divided over the remaining working hours. Their most frequent tasks include checking the balconies to see if any bicycles, mopeds, or refuse bags have been left there, and they are also required

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to be available for half an hour daily for residents to see them. The caretaker also keeps the housing association's office informed, (s)he passes on individual complaints about technical defects, damage to common facilities, etc. When first appointed, the caretakers were required to attend an introductory programme. They were introduced to the offices of the housing association and to a number of important other authorities. In addition, they went on a training course during their first six months in order to help develop their social skills.

Assessing the effects Concerning the effect of appointing caretakers, two questions may be asked. How are improvements to be measured, and how can the effects of the presence of caretakers be distinguished from the effects that may result from other measures taken at the same time?

The best judges of vandalism, insecurity and uncleanliness are the residents themselves. Therefore all the tenants on the Gilliswijk estate were interviewed twice: before the caretakers were appointed, and two years after. In both enquiries the tenants were asked about conditions in their neighbourhood. A comparison of these two enquiries offers an insight into the effects of the presence of caretakers.

Another way in which to assess the effects of the measures is to compare police figures and figures relating to the costs of maintenance due to vandalism in previous years. Finally, interviews with people representing the tenants, the housing association and the municipality also provide an insight in the functioning of the caretakers.

As far as the second question is concerned, it is difficult to isolate unambiguously the effects resulting from the appointment of caretakers from the effects which result from other measures. These different measures were, after all, taken as part of a package which aimed to tackle a whole series of problems. By means of a number of questions asked in the second enquiry, concerning the caretakers' functions and the way they were carried out, an impression can be obtained of the importance of caretakers. In addition, a control group emerged. In two of the seven blocks of flats the caretakers resigned after about one year and were not replaced. A cleaning service has kept the buildings clean since then. A comparison between these two blocks and the other five provides some evidence of the effects of the presence of caretakers.

Results of the enquiry The measures taken have resulted in a number of favourable developments; some of these will be discussed below. The number of people intending to leave the estate has decreased: in 1987 40 per cent of residents wanted to move within a year; in 1989 the corresponding percentage was only 20 per cent.

Some explicit questions about the caretaker provide more insight in the role of caretakers in these developments.

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Table 1 Residents' opinions about caretakers, the Gilliswijk estate, Delft (%)

In favour of appointing caretakers Think vandalism decreased due to the caretakers Feel safer due to the caretakers

96 81 70

Source: Elsinga (199)

Figure 4 Proportion of residents who feared being victims of crime, on the Gilliswijk estate, in Delft and in the Netherlands (%)

Gi l l i sw i j k 1987

6 i l l i swi jk 1989

Netherlands 1984

never some L t mes ?r equen L I y o ? ten

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IO 20 30 40 50 60 ?0 80 90 tO0 % respondents

Source: Elsinga (1990)

Figure 5 Residents' views about the tidiness of the Gilliswijk estate (%)

?lats and environ- ment are dirty

Flats with caretaker

?tats wiLhout caretaker

10 20 30 40 50 GO ?0 BO 90 100 respondents

Source: Elsinga (1990)

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From Table 1 it appears that residents value highly the presence of caretakers. Most of them believe that their presence has contributed to a decrease in vandalism and an increase in safety. Figure 4 shows that residents on the Gilliswijk estate felt safer in 1989 than in 1987. The pattern in 1989 was similar to that in other medium-sized towns in the Netherlands.

Figure 5 presents data on residents' opinions concerning the tidiness of their neighbourhood. A distinction has been made between those blocks of fiats with and without caretakers.

From these figures it is clear that the blocks of flats without a caretaker are perceived to be less clean and tidy than the other blocks. The conclusion seems justified that the presence of a caretaker played an important part in improving the condition of the estate. Even though all the other measures were implemented throughout the estate, including the blocks of fiats without caretakers, the effects of these measures were significantly less impressive in those estates without caretakers.

In addition, residents are more willing to take action when they see vandalism occurring. In 1987 63 per cent of respondents took some kind of action when they witnessed vandalism; in 1989 the corresponding figure was 76 per cent.

Although many things improved, contacts between residents did not. Figure 6 shows that the opinions of residents about contacts with their neighbours did not change. Figure 7 shows that the crime rate on the estate fell from 74 per hundred residents in 1985 to 36 in 1988. In particular, the number of burglaries committed in basements decreased. This was mainly due to the closing off of basement corridors.

Figure 6 Opinion about contacts with neighbours on the Gilliswijk estate, 1987 and 1989

9ood s 9ood not 3ood~ not bad (very) bad

1987

1989 I to ~o 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 loo

respondents

Source: Elsinga (1990)

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Figure 7 CAme rate per'00 residents on the Gilliswijk estate and in Delft, 1985-88

6 i l l i s ~ i j k O e l C [

1985 1986 1987 1988

Source: Elsinga (1990)

Figure 8 Costs of maintenance due to vandalism, the Gilliswijk estate and Delft, 1984-89 (in f )

80000 t

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It is difficult to isolate the importance of appointing caretakers in this. Figure 8 shows that the cost of maintaining the estate declined up to 1986

because the housing association was reluctant to invest money in maintaining the

172

estate. In 1987 there was a significant increase in expenditure due to the cost of implementing measures to improve the estate. Thereafter, maintenance costs decreased. Unfortunately these figures are not broken down by block, so a comparison between blocks of flats with and without caretakers is not possible.

Results of the interviews On the whole, the residents' committee is positive about the work of the caretakers. They suggest, however, that the effects differ between caretakers. The members of the committee complained about a lack of involvement on the part of other residents.

The housing association is satisfied with the caretakers; the effect of appointing caretakers has been beneficial, and there was a good working relationship between the caretakers and the association. The association believes, however, that too many residents show too little concern with the problems on the estate. Because of the positive benefits which have resulted from improvements to the Gilliswijk estate, the association has appointed caretakers in some other blocks of flats too. At present the association is trying to raise the necessary financial resources in order to continue to employ caretakers on the Gilliswijk. Eighty per cent of the residents are willing to contribute to their cost.

Municipal officials, especially those responsible for cleaning and maintaining the estates, and the police, consider the work of these caretakers to have improved the estates significantly.

The caretakers themselves are also satisfied. They are highly motivated, regard their presence as a positive development for the estate, and are keen to continue working in the neighbourhood.

5 Conclusions

Crime, vandalism and decay appear to be only one set of reasons for problems in blocks of fiats. These problems may become so severe that residents move, and it may ultimately be necessary to demolish the flats. Another important factor is the availability of housing market alternatives for the prospective tenant. Alternatives may result in increased vacancies in one region, without crime necessarily being a problem there, while in another region houses are fully occupied, even though decay and crime may be relatively frequent. It would be an oversimplification therefore to suggest that crime is the sole cause of deterioration, vacancies and demolition.

Problems in flats can be remedied. It is important to act early on and to implement the right measures. The greater the decay, the more major and costlier repairs will be. It is important to discover the cause of the problems, and to know how far the process of decay has already advanced. Measures need to be directed at the causes of problems in order to be most effective.

A comprehensive approach will yield the best results. Such an approach will involve a combination of technical measures and social management; it will include the buildings and their environment, semi-public spaces (entrances, basements, lifts,

173

etc.), but also the green spaces around the buildings; it will also involve representatives from the municipality, the housing association, residents, the police, community workers, schools, etc.

The Gilliswijk estate is a good example of such a comprehensive approach. The combination of appointing a caretaker and taking a number of specific measures concerning the building and its surroundings has proved to be successful.

Appointing caretakers appears to be a useful measure in improving safety and reducing vandalism, and in improving conditions on the estate. A large majority of the residents reported that vandalism had decreased and that they felt safer in the neighbourhood since caretakers had been appointed. Most residents are prepared to contribute financially to retaining the caretakers. In the case of those blocks of flats where the caretakers had resigned, conditions were visibly worse.

Not all problems can be solved, however, even with the greatest of good will. The measures relating to social housing, environmental planning, management and maintenance taken by the housing association and the municipality can not provide answers to everything. There are limits to what such measures can achieve. Improvements can then only be achieved in other fields, for instance by direct crime prevention measures, a change of policy to control drug abuse, but also by educational programmes and employment schemes which create better opportunities for the young. These latter policies are beyond the means of housing associations to implement and sometimes even beyond those of municipalities. Some are even beyond the power of the state.

Note

(1) This paper is based on two papers presented at the Paris conference, "Housing debates - Urban challenges", 3-6 July 1990. Our research is part of a large-scale research project being conducted at the Research Institute for Policy Sciences and Technology (OTB) at the University of Delft into the problems of vandalism and crime on housing estates. This research is sponsored by the Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs, and affiliated to the research program of Urban Networks.

References

Coleman, A. (1985), Utopia on trial: vision and reality in planned housing, London: Hilary Shipman.

Elsinga, M. (1990), Verloedering verleden tijd voor de Gilliswijk, Delft: Delft University Press.

Newman, O. (1972), Defensible Space: crime prevention through urban design, New York: Macmillan.

Prak, N.L., and H. Priemus (1986), "A model for the analysis of the decline of post- war housing", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (10) no. 1, pp. 1-17.

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OTB (1989), Exploitatieproblemen in de naoorlogse woningvoorraad: diagnose en therapie, The Hague: Ministerie van VROM.

Soomeren, P. van (1987), Criminaliteit en gebouwde omgeving, The Hague: Ministerie van VROM.

Wassenberg, F. (1988), Hoptille: een idealistisch woonconeept op tilt, Delft: Delft University Press.

Zon, Frans van der (1989), De rehabilitatie van de Gilliswijk in Delft, Delft: Delft University Press.

175