IPCS Forecasts

Pakistan in 2015 Civil‐Military Equations & Increased Space for the Army I Intra‐Political 

Relations amongst Political Parties I Threat from the Islamic State I Strategy towards J&K I  

 

Sushant Sareen   

 IPCS Special Report # 170 January 2015 

IPCS Forecasts 2015 I Special Report #170, January 2015 

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About the Author 

Sushant Sareen  

Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow at 

Vivekananda International 

Foundation (VIF), New Delhi.  

 

He writes a column for the IPCS titled Industan. 

See http://www.ipcs.org/columnist/sushant‐

sareen/ 

 

 This report is an updated and compiled version of 

his earlier commentaries for his column during 

2014.  

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

©   IPCS, 2015 

  

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Safdarjung Enclave 

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Tel: 91‐11‐4100 1900, 4100 1901 

Fax: (91‐11) 41001902 

  

Cover Photo Credit:  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONTENTS 

Section‐I 

Pakistan in 2015: A Forecast 

Civil‐Military 

Relations 

Political Interplay 

Pakistan’s Likely 

Strategy Towards 

Jammu and Kashmir  

Rise of the Islamic 

State? 

Section‐II 

Pakistan in 2014: A Review 

 

 

Pakistan in 2015 

   

IPCS Forecasts Pakistan in 2015

Sushant Sareen

SeniorFellow,VivekanandaInternationalFoundation& IPCS Columnist on Pakistan

Pakistanin2015:AForecastMakingaforecastisalwaysfraughtwithrisk,moresowhenitisaboutacountrylikePakistanwheresomethingishappeningallthetime,andworse,asingleincidentorevent,whetherornotwithinthecountry,canchangethedynamicsandtrajectoryofhowthingsarelikelytoplayout.In2014,thereweresomecleartrendsthatmanifestthemselves:thecivil‐militarytussletiltedheavily in favour of the military; politically, the Nawaz Sharif government weakenedconsiderably,partlyasaresultof themilitarybecomingmoreassertiveandpartlybecauseofthe potent challenge mounted by Imran Khan; relations with India went through the usualroller‐coaster but the trend is significantly negative, more so with the issue of Jammu andKashmironceagainacquiringsalience;andfinally,theunabatedmarchofradicalismwhatwiththeIslamicStateregisteringitspresenceintheregionandattractingelementsfromtheTaliban.Most,ifnotall,ofthesetrendsarelikelytogatherforcein2015.Civil‐MilitaryRelations:WilltheCiviliansRemainaRubberStamp?The Nawaz Sharif government has, at least for the time being, reconciled to playing asubservientroletothemilitary.Whileunderlyingtensionsarelikelytodogthisrelationshipin2015, it is unlikely that therewill be anyovert orhostile takeoverof the governmentby thearmy. The army will continue to burnish its image in the public eye – the public relationsexercisebytheChiefofthePakistanArmy,GeneralRaheelSharif,atthePeshawarArmyPublicschool reopening is an example – and will use this to keep the civilian government underpressure.Civilians will be used to rubber‐stamp decisions that the army takes on issues like counter‐terrorism,Afghanistan,India,theUSandothersecurityandforeignpolicyissues.Thespaceofthearmyhas increased immensely,and thatof theciviliangovernmenthasconstricted in thesame measure after the creation of the military courts under the 21st ConstitutionalAmendment.Whilethegovernmentislikelytoavoidanystepthatcausesfrictionwiththearmy,itwillnotbeaversetotakingadvantageofanyblowbackofpoliciesthatthearmyforcesonthecountry to clawback someof the space it hadhad to cede to themilitary.Thiswill howeverdeepenthedisconnectbetweentheciviliansandthemilitaryestablishment.Theproblemwillbethatifthearmy’spoliciesstartunravelling,thereisn’tmuchthecivilianscandotosetthingsright.Whatismore,thearmywouldhavegamedhowthegovernmentislikelytoplayitscardsintheeventof thingsgoingawry. Itwouldthereforekeep its leverages tokeepanypossiblecivilianpushback incheck.For itspart, theNawazSharifgovernmenthasunderstoodthat itneedsto

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balancearampagingoppositionagainstanassertivearmyandpreventanylinking‐upbetweenthe two that can sound the death knell of the sitting government. But this balancing actwillcomeunderstrainifthemilitarymakesdemandsthatthegovernmentisloathtoconcede.Forinstance,ifthemilitarywantstoactagainstreligio‐politicalpartiesorwantstocontinueplayingfavouriteswith jihadists orwants to undertakemassiveoperations against ethnic separatistsanddissidents,itcouldbecomeunpalatablefortheciviliangovernment.WhileNawazSharifhascheckedhisproclivitytoenterintoahead‐oncollisionfornow,howlonghewillbeabletodothisremainsacrucialquestionwhichwilldecidehowthecivil‐militarycookiecrumbles.PoliticalInterplay:PTI‐PML‐PPP‐MQMEquationsIn2015,atthenationallevel,amongthecivilianpoliticalparties,thetwomaincontenderswillremain the ruling Pakistan Muslim League‐Nawaz (PML‐N) and the opposition PakistanTehreek‐e‐Insaaf(PTI).ThePakistanPeoplesParty(PPP)is likelytodiminishfurtherandwillonly serve as a handmaiden of the PMLN while keeping up the appearance of being in theopposition.EvenifBilawalBhuttoZardaristartsplayingamoreactiveroleinPPPaffairs, it ishighlyunlikelythatthepartywillbeabletore‐emergeasoneofthepolesofPakistanipolitics.ThePPPhasvirtuallynopresenceorresonanceanywhereinPakistanexceptforSindh,whereitcould see some crystallisation of forces opposed to it. In Sindh, the PPP‐Muttahida QuamiMovement(MQM)relationswillremainfraught.TheMQMisfacingerosioninbothitsfirepoweranditspoliticalbaseandcouldfacemajorcrisisevenifthecriminalcasesagainstAltafHusseininUKdon’tleadtohisarrest.Nevertheless,iftheMQMretaliates,Karachicouldseelargescaledisruptionsanddisturbances.InBalochistan,despitethegrowingdissentfromasectionofthePMLNleadership,thecoalitiongovernment is likely to continue under the current Chief Minister. The anti‐establishmentBaloch nationalists like the Balochistan National Party Mengal (BNP‐M) have lost politicalground because of their participation in the 2013 General Elections and are likely to getsqueezedbetweenthosetheinsurgentsononesideandthecollaboratorsontheotherside.InKhyberPakhtunkhwa,therecouldbeapoliticalvacuumin2015iftheanger,disillusionmentanddisenchantmentwiththePTI‐ledcoalitiongrows,partlybecauseithasn’treallybrokenanynew ground in terms of administration and good governance and partly because of its softattitude towards the Taliban. The trouble is that the Awami National Party (ANP) hasn’tmanagedtoreallyregroupafteritslossinthe2013pollsandisinnopositiontore‐emergeasapotent force in the province. The PMLN appears to be in disarray with senior leadersdisgruntled and the central leadership averse to doing anything to destabilise the PTI‐ledgovernment.TheJamiatUlema‐e‐Islam‐Fazal‐ur‐Rehman(JUI‐F)hasitspocketsofsupportbutitslinkswiththeTalibanaregoingtogoagainstit.Therealbattlegroundwill remain thePunjabwhere the fightwillbebetweenPTIandPMLN.UnlessthePMLNcommitsamajorblunder,eitherwiththemilitaryorinitsdealingswithotherpoliticalparties,itisunlikelythatin2015ImranKhanwillbeabletomountthesortofpressurehedidin2014.Hisanti‐governmentcampaignappearstohaveloststeam.Partlybecauseoftheurgencythattheanti‐terrorcampaignhasacquiredandpartlybecauseofthepaperingoverofdifferencesbetweenthePMLNgovernmentandthemilitary,ImranKhanisunlikelytogetmuchtractioninhisquesttoforcetheousterofthegovernment.ThechallengeforImranKhanwillbe

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tokeephisflocktogetherandevenexpandhispoliticalbase.Thereisagoodchancethatmanyanti‐PMLNelementsinPunjab,includingthoseinthePPP,willmakeabee‐lineforPTI.Therefore,whileImranKhanwillremaina forcetoreckonwith,hewillnotbeableto forceamid‐termelection.Inanycase,ifasituationdevelopswheretheelectedgovernmentisoustedby hook or by crook, then instead of an election, there could be another extra‐constitutionaldispensationtakingover.Pakistan’sLikelyStrategyTowardsJammuandKashmirKashmirislikelytoonceagainbecomethebigstickingpointbetweenIndiaandPakistan,moresobecausepositions inbothNewDelhi and Islamabadhavehardenedover the issue.Even ifPakistancracksdownagainstallshadesofjihadists,includinggroupsfocussedonIndialiketheJamaat‐ud‐Dawah/ Lashkar‐e‐Taiba, it won’t be of much help because Pakistan will try andbalancethisactionbyraisingthediplomaticandpoliticaltemperatureoverKashmir.EffortswillbemadetointernationaliseKashmir,whichinturnwillbearedragfortheIndiangovernment and tie its hands on re‐engaging with Pakistan. On the other hand, if Pakistancontinueswiththepolicyofusing jihadistproxies inIndiaandtriestokeepthepotboiling inKashmirbyexportingviolence,theninadditiontothenormalpoliticalanddiplomaticstand‐off,chancesarethattheLineofControl(LoC)willalsoheatup.Violence levels in Kashmir could also spike if Pakistan re‐starts the export of jihad. Pakistancould get an opportunity tomuddy thewaters inKashmir if the internal politics in the stateremainsindisarray.RiseoftheIslamicState?The rising attraction of the Islamic State (IS) is among themost worrying trends that couldunfoldin2015.Overthelastfewmonths,despitedenialsfromPakistaniofficials,thereisgoodreasontobelievethattheIShasstartedgainingtractioninPakistan.Ifthistrendgrows,andISgainsmoreadherents,thenitwillcomplicatenotjustanalreadycomplexjihadistproblembutalsotheregionaldynamics.ThereisagoodpossibilitythatifPakistanmanagestobrokeradealbetweentheMullahOmar‐led Taliban and the Afghan government, the more radical elements of the Taliban couldgravitatetowardsIS.ThiscouldinturnleadtoafightbetweentheTalibanandIS.Ontheotherhand,ifthePakistanieffortsateffectingarapprochementbetweentheAfghangovernmentandTalibancomesacropper,andthefightingcontinues,thentherecouldbesomekindofacompactbetweenISandTaliban,providedofcoursetheyareabletosettletheticklishproblemofhowaCaliphandanAmir‐ul‐Momineenaregoingtoworktogether.AthirdpossibilityisthattheTalibansnuffoutthechallengeoftheIS.TherelationshipbetweenalQaeda and the ISwill also be a critical factor. Although al Qaeda has a strong base in thisregion,ithasbeenlosingitsprimacyinthejihadistschemeofthingstotheIS.ForPakistantheproblemwillbehowitbalancesitslinkswiththeAfghanTalibanwithitsbuddingrelationshipwiththeAfghangovernment.IfitleanstoomuchonthesideoftheAfghangovernment,itcouldpushtheTalibanawayandifthisleadstothemuchfearedcompactbetweentheTalibanandIS,

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thenPakistanwillhavetopayaveryheavyprice.Ontheotherhand,ifitisn’tabletodelivertheTaliban to the Afghan government, then it could lead to a collapse of the Afghan‐Pakistanrelationship, which in turn will also destabilise the region. Regardless of what happens,radicalismisn’tgoinganywhereanytimesoon.

Pakistanin2014:AReview

ICivil‐MilitaryRelations

WhyisArmyagainstNawazSharif?1In2014,NawazSharifhasmanagedtosurvivethefirstmajorattempttoousthimfromoffice.Aseriesof fortuitousdevelopments– thewhistle‐blowingby JavedHashmiabout ImranKhan’slinks with the Pakistan Army stands at the top of the list – coupled with not just theuncharacteristic flexibility displayed in conceding most of the demands being raised by hisadversaries but also the characteristic obstinacy in refusing to resign, have all helpedNawazShariftocomeoutontopinthelatestroundofPakistan'sunending,butalsosinister,politicaldrama.While the ‘establishment’might have failed to decapitate theNawaz Sharif government, theyhavedefinitelysucceededindegradingittoapointwherethePrimeMinisterisreducedtonomorethanachairmanofamunicipality.Even if Nawaz Sharif reconciles to a subordinate role to themilitary, it will not address thefundamentalproblem that the ‘establishment’ haswithhim. Inotherwords, thearmycannotreconcile toNawazSharif’spoliticalprimacyandprominencebecausehiscoreconstituency–Punjabi,right‐wing,conservative,religiously inclined,business‐tradercommunity– isalsotheconstituencythatthearmycultivatesforpushingitsownpoliticalandnationalagenda.Thisisaconstituencythat thearmyhasconsciouslybuiltandnurturedtogainpolitical legitimacyandcounterforcesthatitperceivedashostiletoitsinterests.Nawaz Sharif himself is a product of such a political engineering. Today, not only has he haseffectivelysplit,naycaptured,thisnaturalconstituencyofthearmy,buthasgoneastepfurtherwithhisanti‐establishmentstance–insistenceonciviliansupremacy.IfSharifisallowedtogetawaywiththis, itwillhave farreaching implications forcivil‐militaryrelations.TheclearandpresentdangerfortheArmyistoallowthecoreconstituencytoturnagainstitself(intermsofitsroleandinterferenceinpolitics).Thenthebalanceofforcewilltiltagainst,whichthearmyissimplynotreadytoaccept.Hence, the army wants to get rid of the Sharif brothers, which will create the space forretrieving control over its constituency. In many ways, the military’s aversion to Sharif andPMLNissimilartoitsaversiontoZulfikarBhuttoandthePPP.Thelatterposedathreattothe

                                                            1 Originally published as an IPCS Commentary in September 2014. 

Pakistan in 2015 

   

army’s political position butwas countered by building up and strengthening the right‐wing.Withtheright‐wingnowslidingoutofcontrol,theArmyfindsitselfinabitofabind.ThetectonicshifttakingplaceinPakistan'spoliticshasbeensometimeinthemaking.Infact,itcanbetracedbacktothetusslebetweenSharifandtheArmyinthelate1990s.AlthoughNawazSharifhashadproblemswithallarmychiefswheneverhewasinpower,thistusslehassteadilybecome institutionalisedwith thePMLNopenlyspeakingagainst themilitary’s role inpoliticsandpolicymaking.The1999coupstalledthecoreconstituency’sdriftawayfromthemilitary.AlthoughSharifcontinuedtoenjoythesupportof thisconstituencyduringtheMusharrafandZardariyears,itdidn’tmattermuchatthattimebecausethegovernmentsweresubservienttothe army’s demands. But the power equation changed drastically themoment Sharif becamePrimeMinisterandthattoowithaclearmajority.Duringthe2014crisis,atacticalwithdrawalhasbeenmadebymanyseniorleadersoftherulingparty,butthereisnosignasyetthatthePMLNhasmadeastrategicretreatfromtheprincipleofciviliansupremacy.ThearmyknowsthisandwillnotbecomfortablewithSharifatthehelmpartlybecauseitanticipatestrouble.Forthearmy,therearenoeasyoptions.ImranKhanisanoptionandisalsomakingapitchforthe same constituency. But propping up ImranKhan as an alternative is aminefield that thearmywouldnotliketoventurebeyondapoint.ImranKhanisamaverickandhismegalomaniaishardlygoingtomakethearmycomfortable.Forthearmy,ImranisausefulfooltofixNawazSharifbutdangeroustohandoverthereinsofgovernment.The second option is to destroy Sharif’s credibility as a political leader by undermining hisability todelivergovernance.Thiswillonlybepossibleat thecostofmaking thegovernmentcompletely dysfunctional which in turnwill ensure that the economy doesn’t recover.WhileNawazSharifwouldundoubtedlybedamaged in thisoption, itwouldnot leavemuch for thearmy to rule. Third option for the army is to take over power directly and then build a newpuppet who does its bidding. But this option will come with its own set of monumentalproblems.Given the dearth of options, the army could well decide to enter into an uncomfortable co‐habitationarrangementwithNawazSharif.Ofcourse,onhispartNawazSharifcouldconcludethat the lack of options for the army, opens up opportunities for him to keep pushing theenvelopeandslowlybutsteadilytiltthebalanceagainstthemilitary.MorethanNawazSharif’sreducedpowersitisthispoliticaltusslebetweenhimandthearmythatwilldecidethefutureofcivil‐militaryrelationsinPakistan.Pakistan:DegradedDemocracy2In August 2014, the Imran Khan’s ‘Azadi’ March and Tahirul Qadri’s ‘Inquilab’ (revolution)MarchwerebesiegingIslamabad.TheformerwasdemandingtheresignationofPrimeMinisterNawazSharif;accountabilityofallpeopleinvolvedinriggingthe2013electioninfavourofthe

                                                            2 Originally published as an IPCS Commentary in August 2014 

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current ruling dispensation; electoral reforms; and a government of non‐political persons toconductfreshelections.Thelatterwantedacompleteoverhaulofthecurrentpoliticalsystem–hencerevolution,thoughinalegalandconstitutionalwaywithoutresortingtoviolence,whichwasinitselfacontradiction.Eventhoughtheturnoutofthesetwomarcheswasnowhereclosetothemillionormorethatwasbeingspokenabout,Pakistan’scapitalcitywasonthetenterhooks.Thefearwasthatifthecrowdsgooutofcontrolandlarge‐scaleviolenceerupts,itcouldwellleadtothecollapseofthegovernment. Needless to say, such disturbances would bring neither Azadi nor Revolution.Quite to the contrary, it stifled ‘Azadi’ and ushered in a counter‐revolution by that mostreactionaryofallforcesinPakistan–thePakistanArmy.PerhapswhenthePakistanArmyputKhanandQadritothejobofdestabilisingNawazSharif’sgovernment and bringing it under such immense pressure that it buckles and accepts itssubservience to the military establishment, they never thought things would reach a pointwhere they might have to step in and take over directly. But a series of administrativemishandlings and political miscalculations by the governments in Islamabad and Lahore,coupledwitheverrisingstridencyinthepositionsofKhanandQadri,broughtthesituationtoapointwhereanhonourableexitforanyofthemainprotagonistsseemednexttoimpossible.Noneoftheprotagonistsemergedfromthisbattleunscathed.Theonlywinnerwasthecat(readPakistanArmy)whichmadethemonkeys(readPakistan'spoliticalclass)fightoverthespoilsofpower.Afterall,Pakistanisauniquecasewhereeventhecourtshaveupheldthelegitimacyofmilitarycoupsbycallingthemarevolution!Clearly, neither Imran Khan nor Tahirul Qadri thought through the logic of what they weredemanding. This was hardly surprising considering that someone else has been doing thethinkingfor them.Thedialecticsof theirdemandswasthatunlessNawazSharifwasreadytoroll over and play dead, the onlyway they could getwhat theywantwas through an extra‐constitutional takeover. Bizarrely, even as they both emphatically stood against anymilitaryintervention, theywere pushing things in a directionwhere the political logjam can only bebrokenbysuchanintervention.For his part, Nawaz Sharif showed remarkable and uncharacteristic composure, and even aspirit of accommodation towards Khan’s and Qadri’s clearly illegitimate, illogical and illegaldemands.While thearmyhas fixedSharifniceandproper,and itwasquiteapparentbythenthat Sharif can only survive if he accepted subservience to the military. At that time, thequestionwaswhetherKhanwouldaccept themilitary’sdiktat.Whatwillbe thequidproquowhichhelpshimkeephisfaceamonghissupporterswhomhehaschargedtoanunsustainablelevel? Will the sop offered to Imran Khan be acceptable to Sharif, especially if it involvesanythingbeyondelectoralreforms?AndifKhanrefusestobackdown,willthearmyforceSharifout of office? For the army, to cutKhan andQadri down to size at that stagemeant losing apotentpoliticaltooltokeepSharifunderpressure–somethingtheywereaversetodoing.But deposing Sharif will also not solve the problem because that would set in motion thedestabilisingpoliticsof the1990s.Worse,even ifNawazSharifeats thehumblepieandKhanbacksdown,thegovernmentwillremainincrisismodefortherestofitsterm,somethingthat

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willseriouslydistractitfromitsambitiouseconomicagenda.Mostimportantly,ifthisroundofthepoliticalslugfestendsinadraw,itwillonlysetthestageforthenextroundofanevenworsecivil‐military confrontation,whichwon’t be long in coming.What thismeans is that all thosesinging hosannas for democracy having finally stuck roots in Pakistan need to start singingdirges.

IIIntra‐PoliticalRelations

DomesticPolitickinginPakistan:It'sNotCricket,Stupid!3Forsomeonewhoseunderstandingofpoliticsis limitedtodrawingbanalcricketinganalogies,thephrase‘it’snotcricket’aptlydescribesthesortofpoliticsImranKhanisindulginginthesedays. His threat of leading a ‘LongMarch’ (howMaomust be twisting in his grave over thePakistanimutilationoftheoriginalLongMarch)toIslamabadtoshakeupthepoliticalsystem–heishimself isn’tclearonwhatheactuallywants– isnotcricketbecauseitbrazenlyviolatesthebasicrulesofthepoliticalgamesetintheconstitution.Itisalsonotcricketinthesensethata five year term in government is not the same as a five‐day test match in which the twocontendingsidesgettoplaytwoinningseach.ThatKhanisn’tclearonwhathehopestogetoutofthe‘LongMarch’(orisitTsunamiMarchorAzadiMarch?)isevidentbecausehekeepsshiftingthegoalpostsdependingonwhatcatcheshisfancyataparticulartime.Hestartedwithdemandingavoteverificationinfourconstituencies,wentontodemandamid‐termelection,retractedtodemandinganauditoftheentireelection(inspiredbyAfghanistan).Theend‐game–howhehopestogethisdemandmet,whathewilldo if the government continues to stonewall, andwhat the consequences of anywidespreaddisturbance in Islamabad could be, including the outside chance of a derailment of thedemocratic process – has obviously not been thought through by him.Not only is his timingwrong(barelyayearafterthegeneralelectionheisdemandingamid‐termpoll),hehasalsonotfactoredinthepossibilitythatevenifhemanagedtograbpower,hewouldthenbefacedwithsimilar efforts to overthrowhim. In otherwords, itwill be back to the sordid politics of the1990s.Imran Khan suddenly became hyperactive against the government after the militaryestablishment seemed to get into a tussle with incumbent Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’sgovernmentleadingmanyanalyststosuspectthathehadbeenputuptothetaskbythepowersthatbe.DespitebeingseenasridingonthebackofthemilitarytoqueerthepitchfortheNawazSharif government, ImranKhanwas careful tokeepparrotinghis commitment todemocracy,eventhoughheisdoingeverythingtoundermineit.Evenifhecan’tforcethePakistanMuslimLeague–Nawaz(PMLN)outofofficethroughhisagitation,hewouldhaveweakenedtheciviliandispensationtoapointwhere itwouldbe forcedto leanonthecrutchesof themilitary,oratleast remainextremelydiffident,before themilitary.That thePMLNgovernmenthascometo

                                                            3 Originally published as an IPCS Commentary in July 2014 

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suchapasswithjustaboutayearinofficeisasorrystatementonthefragilityofthedemocraticprocessinPakistan.ItisnotjustImranKhanwhoisonthemarchagainstthegovernment.ThesomewhatcomicalclericfromCanada,TahirulQadri,hasalsobeenonthewarpath,sellinganinstantrevolutiontohisacolytesas if itweresomekindof instantcoffee.Politically,Qadri isanon‐entity.But likemanyotherGod‐men,andsuchlikeinthesubcontinent,Qadrihashisfollowingwhichprobablyruns intoamillionormore.Hisgame iseven lessnuanced thanKhan’sbecausehemakesnobonesaboutcompletelyoverthrowingthesystem. Ironically,hecallshis ‘revolution’ legalandconstitutional!Qadrihasbeengivena legupby thehorriblybotchedstrong‐armusedby thePMLN government against Qadri’s Lahore headquarters, killing around a dozen people andinjuringsome100inpolicefiring.Individually, however, neither Qadri nor Khan can oust the government. Hence, efforts byquintessential establishment flunkies and Tonga politicians (whose support base can fit on ahorse‐drivenTonga)liketheChaudariesofGujaratandSheikhRasheedofRawalpinditobringthem together. But this appears to be an uphill task becausewhile Khan has some kind of astake in the system, Qadri is amisguidedmissile seeking to destroy everythingwithout anyclearideaofhowandwhattoreplaceitwith.Whatismore,theyhavetheirproblemsonwhowillleadandtheirsuspicionsonwhowillretreatfirstleavingtheotherinthelurch.Meanwhile,thePakistanPeople’sParty(PPP)whichwasfastbecomingirrelevantandleaderless,withAsifZardari in his bunker, Bilawal active only on twitter and the party is disarray, disunited(especiallyinPunjab)anddirectionless,hasalsostartedmakingnoisesagainstthegovernmentandinsupportofKhan.ButevenifthePPPjoinedtheoppositionranks,unlessthearmycastsitslotwiththeforcesarraignedagainstthegovernment,itisunlikelythatSharifwouldlosepoweranytimesoon.Despite itsproblemswith thegovernment, thearmydoesn’t seemquite ready toeither forcemid‐termelections,orusherinamedium‐terminterimgovernmentoftechnocrats,oreventakeoverpowerdirectly.EventhepraetorianPakistanarmyknowsthatdoinganysuchthingwouldtantamount to jumping from the fryingpan into the fire. Itwould ratherputupwith aweakgovernmentthatsubordinatesitselftothemilitarythantemptfateorworsebydestabilisingthegovernment or ousting it. Of course, if massive disturbances break out as a result of theagitationsbeingplannedbyKhan,QadriandCo. thenallbetsareoff. If thingscometosuchapass, then ImranKhanwillhavetocoolhisheels in thepavilion,hisdreamsanddelusionsofleadingPakistanshattered.Themost remarkable thing in the unfoldingpolitical drama inPakistan is the swiftnesswithwhichNawazSharifhaslostpoliticalcapitalandmanagedtoboxhimselfintoacornerbecauseofwrong political decisions. He could still recover lost ground, but thatwill require politicalcunning,coolnessandcompromise,noneofthethingsheisknownfor.

IIIThreatofIslamicState

Pakistan in 2015 

   

In2014,therehasbeenalotofactivitytakingplaceinvariouspartsofPakistaninthenameoftheabominable,butalsoineluctable,IslamicState(IS).Apartfromsomeseniorcommandersofthe Mullah Fazlullah‐led Tehrik‐e‐Taliban Pakistan (TTP) faction who have announced theirallegiance to the IS’ Caliph Ibrahim a.k.a. Abu Bakr al‐Baghdadi, there are reports of othersmallergroupsofmilitantswhohavecasttheirlotwiththepestilentialIS.Graffitiandpostersofthe IS have appeared inKarachi, Peshawar, Lahore, Bannu,Balochistan, Gilgit‐Baltistan,Wah,Hangu,Kurram,Bhakkar,DeraIsmailKhanandothertownsandcitiesofthecountry.While these developments have caused a flutter in the media, official circles are quitenonchalantabouttheIS’spresenceinPakistanatpresent,orevenitspotentialforestablishingapresence in the future. Despite a classified report of the Balochistan government about the‘growingfootprint’ofIS,FederalInteriorMinisterChaudhryNisarhasconfidentlyclaimedthattheISdoesn’texistinPakistan.Consideringthat justafewdaysafterNisardeclaredthattherewasnodangerofterrorisminIslamabad an attack was launched on Islamabad courts and the city’s vegetable market, heshouldn’tbetakenseriously.AlthoughthereisnosignofamajorpresenceoftheISinPakistan,the threatof the ISestablishing itself isveryreal.Thereareeerieparallels thatcanbedrawnbetweenhowthe IS isregistering itspresence inPakistanwithhowtheTalibannetworkwasestablished in thecountry. In themid‐1990s,moresoafter theTalibancapturedKabul, therewereaspateofgangsandgroups,especiallyintheFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA),whodeclaredthemselveslocalrepresentativesorchaptersoftheTalibanmovement.ThesortofgraffitithattodayproclaimsthearrivaloftheIShadbackthendonethesamefortheTaliban.Noonehad imaginedat that time that theTalibanwouldmanage toestablishsucharobustpresenceinthecountryorattractsomanyfighters,supportersandsympathisersforitscause. More importantly, at that time, hardly anyone outside the liberal fringe in PakistanbelievedthattheTalibanwouldbeabletooccupythemindspaceofPakistanisthewaytheydid.Today, there are people from all walks of life in Pakistan –traders, soldiers, politicians,journalists, doctors, teachers, labourers and techies – who identify with the Taliban. It isthereforenottoofarfetchedtoimaginethatsomethingsimilarmayhappenwiththeIS,moresogiventhemannerinwhichthisghoulishoutfithasmanagedtostrikeresonanceamongcertainsections of Muslims around theworld and become amagnet for them,muchmore than theTalibanortheirpredecessorsinAfghanistanhadmanagedtodoeversinceviolentjihadbecamefashionable.One big disadvantage that the IS will suffer in its quest to make Pakistan a province of itsCaliphate is that, for now at least, it doesn’t enjoy the support of the Pakistan Army whichcontinues tobackMullahOmar, theotherpretender to the titleofAmir‐ul‐Momineen.On theflipside, theIShasadvantagesthattheTalibanortheirpatrons intheGHQRawalpindidon’t.MullahOmar isnothingmorethanamedievalmullahwhointhewordsofal‐Baghdadi, is"anilliterate,ignorantwarlordunworthyofspiritualorpoliticalrespect."TheISontheotherhandisamodern,tech‐savvyoutfitwithideologicalandpropagandamachinerythatstrikesachordamongMuslimyoutharoundtheworld.Second,theIShasresourcesandrevenuestreamthatneithertheTalibannortheirbankruptpatronsinRawalpindihave.Thisallowsthemtobuyandattractsupportasnothingelsecan.Third,unlikeOmarwho isanAfghanandassuchunfitor

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unacceptableasaleaderoftheIslamicworldasaCaliphorAmir‐ul‐Momineen,al‐Baghdadiisan Arabwho traces his roots to the Prophet’s tribe and clan and as such is better‐placed toassumeleadership.Fourth,whileOmar’svisiondoesn’textendbeyondhisdonkey,al‐Baghdaditalks of global domination of his Islamic caliphate. Omar’s outreach to the global Islamists isthroughalQaeda–thathasalreadybeenpushedtothefringesofthejihadistnarrativebytheISwhich now is in the vanguard of the international Islamist movement. The IS has startedestablishing a global footprint through its use of modern communication tools while the alQaedaleadershipremainsstuckintheirrabbitholes,unabletocommunicateorcommandtheirfranchises.DespitethefactthatabulkofthejihadistsinPakistancurrentlyswearloyaltytoMullahOmar,theadvantagesthat‘Caliph’IbrahimenjoysdoessomewhatlevelthefieldintryingtowinoverPakistan.Perhaps,thebiggestadvantagehewillhaveisthathedoesn’tdependonthecrutchesof thePakistanArmy.This, coupledwith the fact thatPakistan is ahighly radicalised society,makesitafertilegroundfortheIStospreaditspoison.Whatismore,al‐BaghdadiisbelievedtohaveheavilyreliedonJamaat‐e‐IslamifounderAbulAlaMaududi’swritingsinhisfirstkhutbaasCaliph, something thatwillmake it easy forhim to connect toPakistaniswhohave inoneformoranotherbeenindoctrinatedbytheMaududiandhisfollowers.Clearly, Baghdadi would be smacking his lips at the prospect of a nuclear‐armed IslamisedPakistan(partofthelegendaryKhorasan)becomingaprovinceofhiscaliphate.Fortheirpart,many Pakistanis too would be looking forward to becoming a part of such an abominationbecausethatwouldfulfiltheirquestforlivinginapureIslamiccaliphate.AndgiventhesortofintolerancethatexistsinPakistan,itisideallysuitedtobecomeaprovinceofIS.Allthatremainsistogetridofthatotherpretenderandthenthepathwillbeclearfor‘Caliph’Ibrahim.

IIIPakistan:TheFutilityofInternationalisingKashmir4

Ideally,PakistanieffortstointernationalisetheKashmirissueshoulddrawbigyawns,notjustfrom India but also the international community. After all this is a script that has played outbefore, and except for a short period in the early 1990s, it hardly draws any traction ininternational forums. But because of the recent ceasefire violations along the Line of Control(LoC), the ratcheting‐up of rhetoric from both sides, the Pakistani approach to the UN tointervene and now, the ‘million man’ march being planned in London, the issue ofinternationalisationofKashmirhasstarteddrawingalittlemorethanpassinginterest.For India, Pakistani efforts to once again internationalise Kashmir is nothing more than aneedlessdistraction.Butinsteadofreactingeitherwithfuryorfluster,IndiashouldusethisasanopportunitytoshowtheworldPakistan'sperfidyandpuerility.Inaway,PakistanmightbedoingIndiaafavourbytryingtointernationaliseKashmir,moresoatthispointintime.Tonotputtoofineapointonit,Pakistanistodayallbutaninternationalpariah,nottomentionaninternationalmigraine.India,ontheotherhand,isonceagainbeing

                                                            4 Originally published as an IPCS Commentary in October 2014 

Pakistan in 2015 

   

lookedatwithgreat interestbythe internationalcommunityandisonthevergeofbecomingthetoastoftown.Andyet,strangelyenough,PakistanisstruttingwithconfidencethatitwillbeabletogainbyinternationalisingKashmir,whileIndiaremainscharyoverthePakistaniploy.There is nothing new or novel in Pakistan's play this time that it hasn't tried in the past.Whether it is the nonsense about tensions between two nuclearweapon states, or about theexaggeratedandmostlyfalseaccountsofhumanrightsviolations,the ‘stifling’presenceoftheIndiansecurity forces,orevenallegationsof Indiaviolating theceasefire, ithasallbeendonebefore.AndunfortunatelyforPakistan,theworldhasseenthroughitsgameofstartingthefireand then running to the international community asking for intervention. The only new tackPakistanistryingtosell thistimeisthatwhileit isfightingtosavetherestoftheworldfromterrorism – via Operation Zarb‐e‐Azb – India is creating problems by responding withuncharacteristicferocitytoceasefireviolations.Buttheworldknowsthatmorethanbeingavictimof terrorism,Pakistan is likethatarsonistwho sets fire to his own establishment and then plays victim to claim insurance money. Ofcourse,givenitsnuisancevalue,theworldwill lenditanear(whichasif theirwont,Pakistanwillmisconstrue)andappealtobothsidestoshowrestraintandstartadialogue.IfthisisthesumandsubstanceofPakistanieffortstointernationaliseKashmir,thenitwon’tbelongbeforetheverymentionofthewordKashmirdrawsyawnsonceagain.Pakistanprobablyunderstandsthisandthereforeitwilltryandfurtherraisethetemperatureon the border, holding out thinly veiled threats of a possible nuclear conflagration.Normallywhenthishappens,theworldtendstoleanuponIndia,whichisseenasaniceandreasonableparty, tobackdownandstartsomedialogue.But the last time thishappened–Kargil– IndiaduginitsheelsandrefusedtoletPakistangetawaywithitsblatantandbrazenbrinkmanship.This led to the pressure rebounding on Pakistan which was then forced to withdrawunceremoniouslyandwithutterhumiliationfromtheheightstheyhadoccupied.For Pakistan, this is probably the last chance to internationalise Kashmir. They have a smallwindowofopportunitytill2016whenthepresenceofUSandotherforeignforcesgivePakistansome leverage as they control the logistic and supply routes. Pakistanwould like to use thisopportunitytogetsomeconcessiononKashmirbecauseitknowsthingswillbeverydifferentpost2016anditwon’tbeabletoexercisetheblackmailonAfghanistananymore.ThismeansPakistanwilldoeverythingtostir theKashmirpot–restartviolence in thestate,heatuptheLoC,senddelegations toWesterncapitals todrumup internationalsupport,andorganise themarches,liketheoneinLondon,inwhichonlyPakistaniswillbeinattendance.Indiacouldreact intwoways: first, ignorePakistanwithcontemptandrefuse todignifytheirpropagandabyrespondingtoitforcefully.TheprobleminthisoptionisthatIndiawillleavethefieldopenforPakistantofeedallsortsofself‐servingliestotheirwesterninterlocutors.Worse,India could start being perceived as arrogant, haughty and with something to hide orembarrassedaboutsomething.Thesecondoptionisengagingtheinternationalcommunityandtakingtheinitiativetoexplainwhywhatever Pakistan says is a lie, pointing to Pakistan's past record of perfidy andworse,

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undertakinghecticpublicdiplomacytoexposePakistan–rememberGhulamNabiFaiandhisISI‐funded jamborees – andmaking it clear to all countrieswhy their indulgence of Pakistanand/oranyattemptontheirparttoeitherinterfereormediateinKashmirwillnotbeseenasafriendlyact.IfIndiaplaysitscardswell,thenthisinternationalisationgambitofPakistancouldinfactworkin India’s favour because if, after having tried both open and proxy wars, Pakistan'sinternationalisationeffortalsocomesacropper, thenthere isanoutsidechancethatPakistancouldbecomeamenabletoalastingsolutiontothisissue.

IVModiandIndo‐PakRelations5

GiventhedecadesofhostilitybetweenIndiaandPakistan,animosityandprejudice isentirelyunderstandable; even natural; but the sheer ignorance about each other never ceases tosurprise.ThePakistanireactiontothevictoryofNarendraModiintheIndiangeneralelections,andtherather ill‐informedandmostlypedestriananalysisabout thepoliticalchangethathassweptIndialeftlittledoubtthatnotonlycanthetwocountriesnothavefriendlyrelations,theydon’tevenmakegoodenemies.Forgetaboutunderstandingtheforcesofchange,peopleacrossthe Radcliffe line cannot even correctly pronounce names of Indian politicians andorganisations.True to their form, Pakistani TV channels fielded either fossilised ex‐diplomats, soldiers andeven some journalist‐turned‐politicians, or neo‐lunatics (like the Man with a Red Beret) todiscusswhatModi’sascendancymeansforPakistan.Therewasalotofhotairandintemperatelanguageusedagainst thePrimeMinister‐designate,butvery little light.Thiswasnotentirelyunexpectedbecausemostofthesecharactersareunabashed,ifalsoinformal,spokesmenofthemilitaryestablishment.In that sense, their rants gave a fairly good idea of the thinking in Rawalpindi. The officialresponse (i.e. of the de jure government) was more sober – Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifcongratulated NarendraModi and invited him to Pakistan, and other seniormembers of thegovernment let it be known that Pakistan looks forward to engaging with the new Indiangovernment. The High Commissioner of Pakistan in NewDelhi, perhaps inadvertently, chosewords that seemed to convey a message contrary to that of the government and more inkeepingwiththemilitary.In almost all Pakistani analyses, there was the inevitable reference to the Gujarat riots andModi’sallegedrole in them.ThiswasheldupasamarkerofhiscredentialsasaHinduhard‐liner.Extrapolating fromthis,hewaspaintedassomeonewhowas inveteratelyanti‐Pakistan.ThatPakistanhasgivennoreasontoanysensibleIndiantobepro‐Pakistanwasconvenientlyignored.

                                                            5 Originally published as an IPCS Commentary in May 2014 

Pakistan in 2015 

   

What ismore, the constant reference to the Gujarat riots glossed over the fact that thiswasneitherthefirstnortheworstriotinIndia–worsethingshadhappenedunderthewatchofso‐called‘secular’parties.Therewas the comparisonwithAtalBehariVajpayeeand the conclusion thatwhileVajpayeewasasoftandreasonableperson,Modiwascompletelytheopposite.Onceagain,thePakistanisseemed to forget that when Vajpayee became Prime Minister, there was great disquiet inPakistanthata‘Hinduhard‐liner’hadcometopower.IfitisGujaratriotsinModi’scase,itwasthedemolitionofBabriMasjidthatwasheldagainstVajpayee.Thisdisquietturnedintohysteriaafter the 1998 nuclear tests. But subsequent events – the Lahore bus diplomacy, the Agrasummit,andfinallythestartoftheCompositeDialogueprocessin2004–madethePakistanisseeVajpayeeinadifferentlight.Tobesure,ModiisnoVajpayee;atleastthatistheimpressionhegives.However,thisdoesn’tmeanthathewillbelookingforafight.AllitmeansisthatifPakistanseeksafight,hewillnotbackdown.WhatitalsomeansisthatthepusillanimousapproachofthepreviousgovernmentstoceaselessprovocationsfromPakistanwillprobablychange.Inthissense,ifthereissomeamountofapprehensionandconcerninIslamabad,itisallforthegoodandcouldformthebasisofamorefruitfulandcooperativeengagementbetweenthetwocountries. But the portents are not good. Already there is a sense in New Delhi that soonerratherthanlaterthePakistaniswilltesttheModiSarkar,eitherthroughaterroristattackoranincident along the Line of Control/International Border. How the new Indian governmentrespondswilldeterminethefuturetrajectoryofrelationsbetweenIndiaandPakistan.TheoptimistsinPakistanwhoarehopingforaNixonianmomentwithModicomingtopowerare likely to be disappointed. The reason is thatNawaz Sharif is noMao andGeneral RaheelSharifisnoLinBiao;noristhePakistanArmythePeople’sLiberationArmywhichfallsinlinetotheordersofthepoliticalauthority.Inthepastcoupleofweeks,thePakistaniprimeministerhasbeenboxedintoacornerbythemilitaryand like in the caseof theprevious regime, speculationshavebegun in thePakistanimediaaboutwhenhemightbetoppled.Evenifnothingofthatsorthappens,theveryfactthatthisisthetalkinIslamabadisenoughtodisabuseNawazSharifofanynotionhemayhavehadaboutnormalisingrelationswithIndia.Withhisspacegettingincreasinglyconstricted,SharifisinnopositiontoofferIndiawhatitwantsonissuessuchasexportofterrorismintoIndia.On the other side of the great divide, it is highly unlikely that Modi will be inclined to givePakistanwhatitwantsonissuessuchasSiachen,SirCreekandKashmir.Perhaps,thebesthopeinthesecircumstancesisthatthetwocountriesdotheirownthingandavoidsteppingoneachother’s toes andwait for another time and opportunity. Anymisplaced optimism is likely toblowupintheirfacesandcreateasituationfarworsethanwhatobtainsatpresent.