Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict

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MIDDLE EAST | MAY 2012

SUDAN: FROMCONFLICT TO CONFLIC

Marina Ottaway and

Mai El-Sadany


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MIDDLE EAST | MAY 2012

SUDAN: FROMCONFLICT TO CONFLIC

Marina Ottaway and

Mai El-Sadany


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2012 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.

The Carnegie Endowment does not take institutional positions on public policy

issues; the views represented here are the authors own and do not necessarily

reect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by

any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. Please

direct inquiries to:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Publications Department

1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20036

el. +1 202-483-7600

Fax: +1 202-483-1840

www.CarnegieEndowment.org

Tis publication can be downloaded at no cost

at www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs.

CP 148


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Summary 1

Introduction 3

Roots of Tension 4

Return to Conflict 6

Two Countries, One Revenue Source 8

The Norths New South: Border Conflicts

Between Sudan and South Sudan 10

South Sudan: Building a State from Scratch 14

Instability and Dissatisfaction in the North 18

Conclusion 22

Notes 25

About the Authors 27

Carnegie Endowement for International Peace 28

Contents


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CHAD

LIBYA

EGYPT

ETHIOPIA

CENTRAL

AFRICAN REPUBLIC

DEM. REP. OF THE CONGO

ERITREA

UGANDAKENYA

RED SEA

NILE

DALDAM

WHITEN

ILEBLUENILE

KAJBAR DAM

MEROWE

DAM

ROSEIRES

DAM

KHARTOUM

JUBA

AL-JAZIRAH

SENNAR

WHITE

NILE

AL-QADARIF

KASSALAKHARTOUM

NORTH

DARFUR

WEST

DARFUR

SOUTH

DARFUR

SOUTH

KORDOFAN

NORTH

KORDOFAN

NORTHERN

RED SEA

RIVER NILE

BLUE NILE

CENTRALEQUATORIA

WEST EQUATORIA EASTEQUATORIA

LAKES

UNITY

WARAB

UPPER

NILE

NORTH BAHRAL GHAZAL

WEST BAHRAL GHAZAL

JONGLEI

Heglig

Pibor

AkoboUror

Mayendit

Aweil

Abyei

Nyala

Al Fashir

El Obeid

Kaduqli

El Genaina

Wau

Warab

Dongola

Malakal

Bor

Rumbek

Kassala

Gedaref

El Damar

Port Sudan

Damazin

RabakSinja

KapoetaYambio

Bentiu

NU BIAN

DESERT

NU BA

MOUNTAINS

National Capital

State Capital

City or Town

North and South Sudan Boundary

State Boundary

County Boundary

River

Dam

* Shaded areas of conflict are the major sites of cattle raiding and tribalclashes in South Sudan. Fighting has spread to Pibor, Jalle, Akobo, andUror in Jonglei State, as well as Mayendit County in Unity State and

neighboring counties in Warab and Lakes States.

Note: The creation of the states of East and Central Darfur was

announced in January 2012, but no official maps have been released toreflect this information. Thus, they are not marked here.

Area of Political/Tribal Conflict*


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v

Acronyms

CPAComprehensive Peace Agreement: signed in 2005 by the SPLM/A and

the government of Sudan

JEMJustice and Equal ity Movement: a Darfur-based rebel group

NCPNational Congress Party: the Norths ruling political party

SAFSudanese Armed Forces: the Norths military force

SLM/ASudan Liberation Movement/Army: a Darfur-based rebel group

SPLM/ASudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army: the southern politi-

cal party and army, before independence

SPLASudan Peoples Liberation Army: the independent Souths military

force

SPLMSudan Peoples Liberation Movement: the independent Souths rul-

ing political party

SPLM-NSudan Peoples Liberation Movement-North: a separatist move-

ment and political party based in northern Sudan, primarily in the Blue Nile

and South Kordofan States

SSDM/ASouth Sudan Democratic Movement/Army: a prominent insur-

gent group in South Sudan opposed to SPLM rule

SSLM/ASouth Sudan Liberation Movement/Army: an insurgent group

operating in the Upper Nile region of South Sudan and opposed to SPLM rule

UNAMIDUnited Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur: peacekeeping

force deployed to Darfur after Khartoum and the SLM/A signed the Abuja

Peace Agreement in 2006

UNISFAUnited Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei: the force

deployed to the region of Abyei to, among other things, monitor and verify

the redeployment of the northern and southern armies outside the territory


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1

Summary

Less than a year after the old greater Sudan split into the northern Republic

of Sudan and the new Republic of South Sudanor North and South Sudan,

for claritythe two countries were again in a state of war. Years of interna-

tional efforts to bring an end to decades of conict by helping to negotiate the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and later efforts to ensure a smooth

separation of North and South appear to have come to naught.

In January 2011, a referendum in the South, stipulated by the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement, resulted in an overwhelming vote in favor of partition.

Over the next six months, North and South were supposed to negotiate out-

standing issues but failed to do so. As a result, conict broke out again almost

immediately after the South became independent.

At rst, the conict involved clashes along the border region between the

northern Sudanese Armed Forces and liberation movements in regions that

preferred incorporation into the South. By April 2012 though, the ghting had

escalated into war between North and South, with the Souths army crossing

into the North and the Norths military bombing villages across the border.

Oil exports from the South had been halted and other conicts had broken

out in both countries.

Oil has long been one of the central drivers of conict between the two

Sudans. After independence, that conict was heightened since about 75

percent of Sudans oil is produced below the border that now separates the

two countries, leaving the North with greatly reduced revenues. Another set

of conicts, which has quickly led to violence, involves attempts to control

territories along the border between the North and South, in particular, in

South Kordofan, the Blue Nile, and Abyei. Meanwhile, both North and South

struggle with internal political and tr ibal conicts as they try to build states on

truncated territory and woefully inadequate institutional foundations.

The failure of efforts thus far to bring peace to greater Sudan, especial ly the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement project, does not bode well for the chances

of avoiding new decades of conict and the countries continued impoverish-

ment. All signs suggest that the transition from greater Sudan to the Republics

of Sudan and South Sudan is not the end of a conict but rather the beginning

of multiple new ones.


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3

Introduction

Less than a year after the old greater Sudan split into the northern

Republic of Sudan and the new Republic of South Sudanor North and

South Sudan, for claritythe two countries were again in a state of war. Years

of international efforts to bring an end to decades of conict by helping to

negotiate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 and the later

efforts to ensure a smooth separation of North and South appear to have

come to naught. In January 2011, a referendum in the South, stipulated by the

CPA, resulted in an overwhelming vote in favor of partition. Over the next

six months, North and South were supposed to negotiate outstanding issues

to make sure that when the Republic of South Sudan came into existence in

July, it would do so peacefully and the separat ion would be orderly. However,

prospects for a peaceful split were destroyed even before the July date of inde-

pendence arrived.

Although the North appeared to accept the results of the referendum and

to resign itself to its much-diminished status as a country that had lost one-

third of its territory and three-quarters of its oil, in reality

it did not. For its part, the South was too divided inter-

nally, insecure, and essentially incompetent to engage in

a successful negotiation of outstanding issues. Thus, the

separation took place while a host of major problems

remained unresolved.

Conict broke out again almost immediately after the South became inde-

pendent. At rst, this involved clashes along the border region between the

northern Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and liberation movements in regions

that preferred incorporation into the South. By April 2012 though, the ght-

ing had degenerated into war between North and South, with the southern

Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) crossing into the North and the SAF

bombing villages across the border in the South.

This unhappy outcome of a problem that had been the target of a very

comprehensive attempt at conict resolution by the international community

gives pause for thought. Supercially, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

negotiated between the North and the South with much international coax-

ing and support appeared to be a groundbreaking attempt to solve a problem

that had seemed intractable for decades. The package of agreements and pro-

tocols that make up the CPA did not leave many stones unturned, seeking

not only to forge compromises between the two sides but also to encourage

the internal transformation of both North and South in a more democratic

Separation took place while a host of

major problems remained unresolved.


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4 | Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict

direction. On paper, few problems were overlooked. In practice, few clauses

were implemented.

Both North and South, despite their formally federal, decentralized struc-

tures, were de facto single-party states, and neither side was truly interested in

making the agreement work. The North deluded itself into thinking that the

South would not dare secede and so did nothing to make unity palatable. The

South was determined to secede no matter what the North did; most of its lead-

ers thus saw the six-year period imposed by the CPA before a referendum on

independence could be held, not as an opportunity to make unity possible, but

rather as a waiting period to be endured before independence could be attained.

John Garang, the leader of the South who had negotiated the CPA and wanted

to give unity a second chance, was kil led in a helicopter crash six months after

the agreement was signed. He was the last major southern leader to truly believe

that unity might be both possible and desirable for both countries.

The failure of the conict resolution effort represented by the CPA leads

to many questions about the past. For one, why did the attempt fail? Was it

because eager negotiators essentially managed to convince the two sides to

sign a set of agreements that they neither believed in nor intended to respect,

or was it because the international community did not exert sufcient pres-

sure to ensure that the agreement would be implemented? Key questions, to

be sure, but the most important unresolved issues concern the future rather

than the past.

The failure of the CPA project, dismally shown by the renewed state of war

between North and South, does not bode well for the chances of avoiding

new decades of conict and the countries continued impoverishment. Pastexperience could either act as a facilitator or a hindrance to a new agreement,

and it is not clear whether international intervention, without the parties to the

conict committed to a peaceful settlement, is an indispensible instrument of

peace or just a temporary respite from ghting that the two sides wil l unescap-

ably resume with renewed vigor. Is war simply inevitable because it represents

for both countries an escape from internal political and economic problems

that appear to have no solution?

Roots of TensionSince the days of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, Sudan had been of-

cially divided into two areas: the North and the South. The North, predomi-

nantly Arab and Muslim, constituted what French colonial authorities called

the useful country, where whatever resources were available and whatever

development took place were concentrated. And the South, African and hea-

then, appeared to be a remote region without resources best left to its own

devices and those of missionaries, but also to be protected from slave raiders.


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Marina Ottaway and Mai El-Sadany | 5

Under the condominium, an ofcial internal boundary existed that put the

South out of northern reach. Unfortunately for the present conicts, this inter-

nal boundary was never clearly delineated, let alone demarcatedit crossed,

after all, territory considered to have no value. Not surprisingly, when Sudan

became independent in 1956 and the barrier between the two areas was lifted,

the South found itself in an extremely disadvantaged position. It was not long

before it started agitating for a new status.

Conict in Sudan was never a simple bilateral affair between North and

South. The split between the two regions intersected fundamental problems

that existed within both. The North, which ruled the entire country, was

extremely unstable politically. Power switched back and forth between mili-

tary and civilian governments, ranging from those dominated by the left to

those with an Islamist orientation. The South was generally resentful of the

dominant North but also deeply divided, particularly along tribal lines; these

divisions were systematically exploited by northern governments to weaken

the southern rebel movements: the Anya-Nya in the early years and, after

1983, the Sudan Peoples Liberat ion Movement and its army.

Important to understanding the present predicament is that active ght-

ing between North and South took place mostly in the center of the country,

around the old North-South internal boundary. Complicating matters, the area

crossed by this poorly dened border turned out to be r ich

in oil, making it a vital resource for both sides. Oil in com-

mercial quantity was discovered in 1978 by Chevron near

the towns of Bentiu and Heglig, close to the North-South

boundary. The discovery made it all the more importantfor the North to maintain control, while providing added

incentives to the southern rebels to ght for control of

the territory. The Heglig nd created an especially dan-

gerous situation, because it was located in an area where

the boundary was particularly ill-dened and was thus

claimed, then and now, by both North and South.

At the t ime of the oil discovery, Sudan had been enjoying the most peace-

ful period in its troubled post-independence history. An agreement signed in

Addis Ababa in 1972 had put an end to the southern uprising, transforming

Sudan into an asymmetrical federation where southerners held positions inthe central government but also enjoyed a degree of autonomy. But in the

early 1980s, the North underwent another upheaval that put an end to peace.

President Jafaar Nimeiri, in power since 1969 rst as a military leader and later

as an elected president, dramatically changed his policies in two ways: He pro-

claimed that Sudan would henceforth be ruled by sharia, creating resentment

and fear among the countrys large non-Muslim population, especially in the

South. And he simultaneously started dismantling the Addis Ababa agreement

that he had helped negotiate by abolishing the Souths elected assembly and,

The Heglig find created an especially

dangerous situation, because it

was located in an area where the

boundary was particularly ill-defined

and was thus claimed, then and

now, by both North and South.


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later, by dividing the region into three separate provinces, something that was

seen by southerners as a blatant divide-and-rule maneuver.

By 1983, the country was slipping back into war and old patterns. North-

South conict was bubbling to the surface. Instability in the North increased

after Nimeiri was overthrown in 1985. His deposition was followed by a

period of civilian rule and another coup dtat in 1993 that brought to power

an alliance of military leaders and Islamist extremists under the presidency of

Omar al-Bashir. And war raged in the center of the country, with the northern

government fomenting divisions and tribal clashes in the South. New fac-

tors further complicated this context: the growing competition to control oil

resources in the countrys center accompanied by a change in Sudans foreign

oil partners as Western oil companies rejected Sudanese policies and withdrew

from the country, with Chinese, Malaysian, and Indian companies stepping in;

and, after 2003, a brewing conict in the western Darfur region. The signing

of the CPA in 2005 put an end to open North-South warfare, but all other

problems continued to simmer. These conicts are now again coming to a

head with the failure of the separation process.

Return to Conflict

Four types of conict afict the two Sudans today. First is the North-South

conict over oil. It is fueled by the Norths bitterness about the secession of

the South, the loss of territory and oil revenue, and the diminished position

to which it nds itself relegated as a result. Although the North has ofcially

accepted the secession, it does not take a visitor to the country long to discover

that in practice most people have not internalized the new reality and feel

deeply resentful. For its part, the South is angry at the Norths refusal to allow

a referendum to take place in the contested border region of Abyeiwhich

would have decided whether the region belongs to the North or Southand to

implement other provisions for the border areas. The South is also resentful of

the general disdain with which the North has historically treated it. Reciprocal

anger manifests itself most clearly in the dispute over the transit fees that the

landlocked South should pay the North in order to ship its oil through a pipe-

line running to the northern Port Sudan terminal. In this dispute, both sides

appear willing to undermine themselves economically in order to score points

against each otherby April 2012, no oil was being shipped, thus the South

received no revenue from sales and the North received no transit fees.

The second set of conicts, which quickly led to violence, involves attempts

to control territories along the border between the North and South. The

conict was well summed up in a conversation one of the authors had with

Hassan Turabi, one of the oldest Islamist politicians in Sudan and President

Bashirs ally-turned-enemy, who said: The New North has a New South.

In the post-secession context, the Khartoum government in the North is


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ghting insurgencies around its peripheryin South Kordofan, Blue Nile,

and Abyeias it fought in the same areas against the southern SPLM/A

before the South became independent. Conict in these areas is shaped by

the presence of various armed rebel groups, making it quite different from

the economic warfare between the two nations that has focused mostly on

pipelines and resource allocation. An agreement between Khartoum and Juba

would thus most probably not sett le the conicts of the border area because

liberation movements have formed, local populations have been mobilized,

and the capitals control is tenuous at best. The border areas are beginning to

look worse than they did before the CPA was signed in 2005; ghting is wide-

spread and the leadership is more fragmented.

The third set of conicts, which also involves violence,

is taking place within South Sudan, where the authority

of the Juba government is contested, and inexperienced

and powerless government ofcials are unable to impose

bureaucratic order on the new country. The concept of a

political opposition appears to be missing in the new state,

with politicians breaking from the ruling SPLM and rou-

tinely forming armed militias rather than political parties.

Across much of the South, furthermore, tribal authorities

still dominate. While this is an understandable response to

the Juba governments inability to maintain a presence, let

alone effectively provide administration, in much of the country, it weakens the

government even more, creating a vicious cycle that is difcult to interrupt.

Many southern states are witnessing signicant levels of violence andcontinued instability, much of it caused by competition to control natural

resourcesland, grazing rights, water, and even oil. While such conicts are

inevitable in a new country where a weak government is attempting to super-

impose the structures of a modern state on a society that must still rely on

existing social organizations and tribal structures, this does not make them

less destructive. The fact that Khartoum still shes in the troubled waters of

tribal tensions as it did before the Souths independence adds another political

layer to the problem.

The fourth set of conicts is internal to the North, which is also attempt-

ing to build a new state on its truncated territory. While the North is ahead ofthe South in terms of its administrative and physical infrastructure, poor as

they are, it also has a worn-out political system where old men dominate the

government, the opposition, and the military alike. Discredited by having lost

the South and by being involved in what seems to be an endless conict, both

civilian and military authorities command little respect and loyalty. Indeed,

what so far has kept the Khartoum government from being ousted as a con-

sequence of the secession is the fact that the opposition is also discredited.

The example of the Arab Spring in other countries has so far failed to catalyze

Across much of the South, tribal

authorities still dominate. While

this is an understandable response

to the Juba governments inability

to maintain a presence, it weakens

the government even more.


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the palpable discontent on the ground into a new and popular movement and

failed to lead to the rise of a new and organized opposition. Furthermore, the

population in the North continues to be displaced and suffer instability as a

result of the conict in Darfur, bears the subjugation of the eastern tribes, and

deals with a rising sense of dissatisfaction everywhere as economic conditions

continue to deteriorate.

Ultimately, Sudan nds itself mired in an intricate web of complex prob-

lems. All signs suggest that the transition from greater Sudan to the Republics

of Sudan and South Sudan is not the end of a conict but rather the beginning

of multiple new ones.

Two Countries, One Revenue Source

Sudan began exporting crude oil in 1999, and oil ow reached a level of 490,000

barrels per day by 2009, making oil the greatest resource for the unied coun-

try. It remains a signicant economic driver for both North and South Sudan

today. While dependence on oil has proven to be a serious

long-term impediment to both economic development

and democratization in most countries, in the short run it

represents salvation for poor nations. Sudan is no excep-

tion, making oil the most immediate source of conict.

At the time of the referendum on January 9, 2011, oil

accounted for 60 to 70 percent of government revenue in

the North and 98 percent in the South. Oil created a small

zone of prosperity in a country otherwise in dire condi-

tion, graphically illustrated by the gleaming oil-company

headquarters that dot dilapidated Khartoum. Together

with the ephemeral prosperity engendered by the sudden

revenue increase, oil brought serious distortions to the Sudanese economy.

The country caught the so-called Dutch disease with a vengeance. Agricu lture,

which had been considered the countrys lifeline before the discovery of oil,

was neglected, and the country became more dependent on food imports as

oil exports increased. Between 2000 and 2008, the average annual growth rate

of the agriculture sector in Sudan was only 3.6 percent as opposed to the 10.8

percent rate of the previous decade.1Declining agricultural production and

reliance on more expensive imports from other nations led to signicant food

crises in both the North and the South. Agriculture stil l employs 80 percent

of the workforce, but it accounts for only one-third of the gross domestic

product in the North. In the South, where land is abundant and mostly fertile,

agriculture remains equally underdeveloped.

About 75 percent of Sudans oil is produced below the old colonial l ine that

divided North and South and became the border between the two countries

after the split. Making the situation potentially volatile, a large part of the

While dependence on oil has been

proven to be a serious long-term

impediment to both economic

development and democratization

in most countries, in the short run itrepresents salavation for poor nations.


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oil elds are located close to that dividing line, thus creating the possibility

that either side will make a grab for oil elds that do not ofcially belong to

themindeed, this happened in April 2012 when the Souths army crossed

into the North and seized the Heglig oil elds before retreating again. Adding

to the complications, all oil has to be exported through Port Sudan in the

North, the terminal of the countrys only pipeline. The alternative for the

South of trucking oil southward to the Kenyan coast is impractical, and a new

pipeline to that destination remains prohibitively expensive and in any case,

years away.

Before the Republic of South Sudan became independent, the sharing of

oil revenue had been regulated by the CPA: 2 percent of it went directly to

the producing states (both North and South had a federal structure), with the

remainder split evenly between Khartoum and Juba. The South was never

happy with the formula, and after it gained independence, it inevitably stopped

sharing its oil revenue with the North. This resulted in a signicant loss of rev-

enue for the North, estimated by the International Monetary Fund to amount

to $7.77 billion from July 2011 until the end of 2015, about $ 1.7 billion per

year. Government revenue was estimated at about $9.26 billion in 2011, sug-

gesting that the loss of oil revenue would be a devastating blow to Sudan.

In an attempt to make up for lost oil revenue, in October 2011, Khartoum

demanded that the South pay $32/barrel in transit fees for oil shipped through

the pipeline to Port Sudanindustry experts reckon that a rate of $23/barrel

would be an internationally appropriate transit fee. In response, Juba offered

an equally unrealistic 41 cents/barrel.

Negotiations facilitated by Thabo Mbeki, chairman of the African UnionHigh-Level Implementation Panel, which was established in October 2009 to

assist with the implementation of the CPA, have restarted and broken down

multiple times. Numerous solutions were proposed by various mediators and

rejected by one side or the other: a compromise on oil transit fees; the for-

giveness of arrears; and even cash transfers from the South to the North in

exchange for southern control of Abyei have all been suggested, but to no avail.

With Khartoum seeking to salvage its national pride and make up some

of its expected revenue loss and Juba insistent on asserting its newly gained

national sovereignty, tensions have only ared further.2 In February 2012,

South Sudan decided to completely halt its oil production in response toKhartoums alleged conscation of $815 million worth of oil; the North

responded by saying that it was merely taking its fees in kind because it had

not received any transit payments from the South since July. Although Sudan

has asked China, a prominent investor in Sudanese oil, to intervene and facili-

tate negotiations, there has been no measurable success to date.


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The Norths New South: Border ConflictsBetween Sudan and South Sudan

The January 2011 referendum that overwhelmingly approved the secessionof the South did not address several important territorial issues: unclear and

undemarcated border tracts; the question of whether Abyei should stay within

the North or become a part of the South; and the status of South Kordofan

and Blue Nile States, regions that were clearly recognized as part of the North,

but expected to be given some form of special status under the provisions of

the CPA because of their ties to the South. These territorial problems involve

complex issues of nationalism in both North and South, deep-seated local

grievances, and competition for water and grazing land among local tribes.

The unresolved issues concerning the border areas led to the outbreak of

violence almost immediately after the split. Clashes initially began as separate,

isolated incidents north of the border, with ghting between movements sup-

posedly rooted in the contested areas and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

Before long though, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), which

became the ofcial army of the South after the split, also became a participant;

violence began spreading across the border and into the South, part icularly

Unity State. By April 2012, the SAF was carrying out bombing raids across

the border and the SPLA had crossed north and occupied the town of Heglig.

Since the split, attempts at mediation have been undertaken by the African

Union High-Level Implementation Panel, Ethiopia, China, and other interna-

tional powers; and the status of Abyei and removal of troops from the border

regions have come to dominate negotiation meetings. Despite the consider-

able effort, mediation has not been successful.

Border Demarcation

The potential for conict created by the uncerta inties surrounding the exact

demarcation of the North-South border was recognized early on in the nego-

tiations leading to the CPA. As a result, the CPA included a stipulation that

a North-South Technical Border Commission should complete the demarca-

tion of the boundary within six months of the signing of the agreement, but

this did not happen. Efforts to revive the commission took place regularly

throughout the CPA period, increasing in intensity in the months preceding

the referendum, again without success.

Part of the reason for this neglect was that many of the contested border

regions created disputes over land rights that, while vital to the local popula-

tions, did not appear so important from the point of view of national poli-

tics. Indeed, recent conicts in Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile indicate

that the problems do not stem from poor border demarcation but from much

more fundamental differences. Even if the North-South Technical Border


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Commission had been more diligent in carrying out its task, most conicts

would stil l have arisen.

Abyei

Whether Abyei would become part of the North or South was supposed to

be settled by a referendum scheduled for January 2011 that would have taken

place alongside the referendum on the independence of South Sudan. The

Abyei dispute had also been dealt with at length in the CPA and comprised

a separate, complicated chapter in the agreement, giving the region special

administrative status. Despite the important implications of this issue, the

referendum did not take place, turning the region into a festering problem.

On the most basic level, Abyei is a small territory permanently inhabited

by a southern population group, the Ngok Dinka, but also extensively used

during certain seasons by the nomadic Misseriya, who take their cattle back

and forth across the border following rain and pastures. It is this mixed use of

the land that prompted the transfer of the area, which historically consisted of

nine Dinka chiefdoms, to the control of Kordofan in 1905. The local problem

of land use probably could have been resolved had the two sides agreed to a

soft border that allowed nomads to move back and forth as they had tradition-

ally done. The problem, however, was national and not local: the Ngok Dinka,

identifying more with the South, were expected to vote accordingly in the ref-

erendum, with the backing of the SPLM/A; Khartoum, though, did not want

to give up a piece of territory that it had controlled since 1905.

When CPA negotiators rst addressed the matter of Abyei, the issue was

further complicated by the fact that it was considered to be an oil-rich ter-

ritory. The Abyei Boundary Commission, set up in 2005 to demarcate the

territory of the nine Dinka chiefdoms, had included the Heglig oil elds in

Abyeis territory. This inclusion was a blow to Khartoum because in the short

run, Abyei would keep more of the oil revenue it produced, and in the long

run, the South might keep it al l if Abyei voted for secession, as appeared likely.

Khartoum thus appealed the decision of the Abyei Commission and the issue

was taken up by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which in

2009 ruled that Heglig was not historically part of the old chiefdoms territory

but was located in Kordofan state. The oil town was thus taken from Abyei

and placed within South Kordofans borders, making it a contested hot spotthat both North and South Sudan claim to be a part of their territories.

The quarrel over the status of Abyei continued. First, it led to the cancel-

lation of the referendum on the regions status because of a dispute between

the two sides over who had the right to vote. The South claimed that only the

settled, permanent population should vote. The North argued that the Misseriya

nomads also had the right to participate in a decision that would affect their l ive-

lihoodsa reasonable position, except it begged the questions of who among


19/38


the Misseriya tribe actually used Abyei grazing lands and who would just be

brought in to sway the referendum results in an unrepresentative manner.

Second, Khartoums actions made clear that it intended to make the ter-

ritory an integral part of Sudan, ignoring the CPA provisions for an Abyei

referendum. In May 2011, it dissolved the Abyei Administration (which had

governed the contested region throughout the CPA interim period) and the

Sudanese Armed Forces seized the main town, causing thousands to ee and

hostilities to break out between the North and South. International efforts

led in June to the signing of an Agreement on Border Security and the Joint

Political and Security Mechanism by the two part ies and to the United Nations

Security Councils adoption of Resolution 1900, which set up the United

Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). That force, which would

be staffed by 4,200 Ethiopian Blue Helmets, was supposed to monitor and

verify the redeployment of the northern and southern armies, the SAF and

SPLA, outside the territory as called for in the agreement; it was also supposed

to help the Abyei Police Service maintain security, as well as supervise the

distribution of humanitarian aid.

According to UN accounts, both North and South Sudan failed to com-

pletely withdraw from the region, making it difcult for UNISFA to carry

out its tasks. Finding loopholes in the forces mandate, Sudan argued that it

would not remove its troops from Abyei until the full deployment of all 4,200

UNISFA personnel, which had not taken place at the time of this writing.

Despite the extension of UNISFAs mandate, continued efforts to bring North

and South to the table on Abyei, and pleas for the establishment of a Joint

Border Verication and Monitoring Mission to help govern the region, therehave been no conclusive resolutions on this front.

South Kordofan and Blue Nile States

Along with Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile are part of the three

areasthe contested zones that straddle the North-South border. Post-

secession ghting started in South Kordofan but soon spread to the neighbor-

ing Blue Nile State. It reached alarming levels in Heglig, with cross-border

raids by the South and then the occupation of the town, culminating in a

declaration of war by the North against the South on April 19, 2012.

Conict in this region dates back to the beginning of the southern SPLM/Arebellion in 1983; due to political and cultural marginalization by the gov-

ernment in Khartoum, many of the local Nuba people of South Kordofan

decided to join the rebellion. In response, they were heavily targeted by the

National Islamic Front, a predecessor to what is now the Norths ruling

National Congress Party (NCP). Despite a cease-re in 2002 and the incor-

poration of these states within the CPA provisions, this regional conict was

never truly resolved.


20/38


The CPA acknowledged the problem indirectly by including a Protocol on

the Resolution of the Conict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The

protocol was signed in 2004 and assumed that South Kordofan and Blue Nile

would remain in the North, but recognized that their populations had been

heavily affected by the war and that many of their inhabitants sympathized

with the South and had even fought alongside the SPLM/A. The two states

were thus given a somewhat different governing structure than others, with

more elaborate provisions for local government as well as revenue sharing.

The CPA also created a land commission in each state to address territorial

disputes that were at the core of much of the conict.

Finally, it created a monitoring commission in each of the two states to

study the impact of the implementation of the agreement and stipulated that

the states populations had to be involved in popular consultations, without

specifying their form or scope. These popular consultations proceeded in a

relatively smooth manner in Blue Nile because the two dominant parties, the

Norths NCP and the Souths SPLM/A, had a fairly cooperative relationship

there. There was signicantly less progress in South Kordofan, where dis-

agreement about the results of the state census led to the cancellation of elec-

tions for governor and state legislators in 2010.3When elections nally took

place in May 2011, the process was marred by serious aws, leading many to

question the legitimacy of the victory of the NCPs gubernatorial candidate.

Fighting resumed in South Kordofan in June 2011, even before the South

became independent, due to the festering tension that had remained after

the May elections. As the northern Sudanese Armed Forces entered South

Kordofan to disarm all non-SAF actors, the rebel Sudan Peoples LiberationMovement-North (SPLM-N) resisted, leading to numerous clashes and the

displacement of refugees. The Khartoum government blamed the clashes on

the SPLA because the SPLM-N had initially been a part of that organization.

However, the SPLM-Ns leaders alleged that it had become a separate entity

following the establishment of the South Sudan government. South Sudans

President Salva Kiir has acknowledged that there is a historical connection

between the SPLA and the SPLM-N, but he continues to deny that the South

is supporting the rebel group.4

On June 28, 2011, in Addis Ababa, the Norths government and the

SPLM-N signed a Two Areas Framework Agreement, agreeing to establish aJoint Political Committee and a Joint Security Committee for South Kordofan

and Blue Nile, complementing both parties stated commitment to a cease-

re. Despite the signing of this agreement, aerial bombardments by the North

have continued, violent clashes on the ground have escalated, and the num-

ber of victims continues to increase, as shown by satellite images indicating

the presence of mass graves. The SPLM-N says that it remains committed to

ghting against and toppling the Bashir government, and Khartoum seems

steadfast in its effort to establish dominance over the region.


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With violence rapidly escalating in both Abyei and South Kordofan, a spill-

over of the conict into Blue Nile State was inevitable. In September 2011,

the SAF clashed with the SPLM-N there; President Bashir declared a state

of emergency in Blue Nile, removed its governor, and stated that a resolution

could only be reached after the disarmament of the SPLM-N. But the SPLM-N

refuses to disarm and North Sudan continues to strike the region, making the

delivery of international humanitarian aid difcult. By late November 2011,

the North had captured the towns of Kurmuk and Diem Mansour, and in

February 2011, it drove the SPLM-N out of the town of Mukja in Blue Nile.

In April 2012, the southern army moved into Heglig. While the North saw

the advance of SPLA troops into Heglig as an act of aggression, the South

claimed that it was merely reacting to the ongoing northern aerial bombard -

ment of Unity State (in South Sudan) and that it was laying claims to territory

that it found to be its own. Juba initially refused to withdraw from the region

despite international calls, but Khartoum responded by bombing Heglig and

eventually succeeding in driving the SPLA out. Clashes along the border have

continued and dangerous total war rhetoric has been issued by both sides.

South Sudan: Building aState from Scratch

Despite the common goal of independence, the South Sudanese opposition was

never well unied. The countrys diverse population is dispersed over a large

territory and further divided by poor communications, making it difcult todevelop a truly common identity except in opposition to the North. The death

of John Garang only months after the signing of the CPA left the SPLM/A

without a strong leader. His successor Salva Kiir never commanded the same

respect. Furthermore, Khartoum has been quick to take advantage of every

opportunity to promote discord in the South, as it has done many times before.

In fact, one of the causes of the resumption of the conict after the hiatus pro-

vided by the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was a decision by the then-Sudanese

president Jafaar Nimeiri to divide the South into three separate statesa resolu-

tion that the South correctly saw as a maneuver to sow divisions.

Building a state in a vast, landlocked territory would be an extremely chal-

lenging task even in the absence of conict. But South Sudan is not at peace.

The political and tribal schisms that plagued the South during the second

civil war and the CPA interim period unsurprisingly continue in the inde -

pendent country today, greatly complicating the already daunting prospect of

building the new state. To make things even more challenging, the South has

always been the least-developed part of the already poorly developed Sudan,

regarded as the useless country both under the condominium and in the

eyes of the Khartoum government. The South has dismal infrastructure, as


22/38


is clear by the absence of paved roads outside of Juba. It has little experience

with self-governance and administration, and its education and health insti-

tutions are rudimentary. While the South has considerable revenue, it comes

solely from oil.

The Souths Many Movements and Insurgencies

Interlocking political and tribal divisions threaten to distract the country from

state-building efforts and plunge it into internal turmoil, adding to the misery

caused by renewed ghting with the North. The population is diverse, with

the Dinka accounting for an estimated 40 percent, the Lou

Nuer an additional 20 percent, and the remaining 40 per-

cent representing a large number of much smaller tribes.

The Dinka have been major players in the SPLM/A, while

the Nuer were more closely associated with the earlierseparatist movement, the Anya-Nya.

During the CPA period, the SPLM/A dominated the

South, just as the National Congress Party dominated the

North, although other parties and liberation movements

also existed. In the South Sudanese Legislative Assembly

elections of April 2010, the SPLM/A won 160 seats, the Sudan Peoples

Liberation Movement-Democratic Change (a breakaway of the SPLM/A) two

seats, the NCP one seat, and the remaining seven seats went to independents.

Much of the opposition was tribally based.

Fortunately for the country and unfortunately for analysts trying to deci-

pher the politics of the nation, differences between political and tribal oppo-

sition were never clear-cut. The Dinka have enjoyed a dominant presence

in the SPLM/A, but the organization has also made a considerable effort to

integrate other groups, even appointing them to leadership positions. For

example, President Salva Kiir is Dinka and Vice President Riek Machar is

Nuer. Relations between them have been far from stable, with Machar moving

in and out of the SPLM/A, founding a separate organization that sought to

negotiate directly with Khartoum and even signing an agreement in 1997, and

setting up a military force that sought to compete with the SPLM/A before

returning to the SPLM/A in 2002. Similarly convoluted histories mark other

members of the leadership.

A number of rebel groups and mil itias st ill operate in South Sudan today.

The South Sudan Defense Forces participated in the second civil war and had

an uneasy alliance with Khartoum between 1983 and 2005. Although many

of its soldiers were incorporated into the SPLA after the Juba Declaration of

January 2006, which laid out a basis for the unication of the Souths military

forces, recent news indicates that the militia may be reemerging within South

Sudan and may be trying to form a coalition with other groups.5

Interlocking political and tribal divisions

threaten to distract the country from state

building efforts and plunge it into internalturmoil, adding to the misery caused

by renewed fighting with the North.


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The South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A), which operates

in the Upper Nile region, was established in 1999 in the context of inght-

ing among the Nuer and now opposes the SPLM rule of South Sudan. It has

recently captured bases belonging to the SPLA and has pledged to provide

military support to parties involved in conict in Jonglei State. It is interesting

to note that the SSLM/A was led by Peter Gadet, who has since signed a peace

agreement with Juba and is now helping to lead a disarmament campaign in

Jonglei that, ironically, affects SSLM/A arms, among others.

Also rebelling against Salva Kiirs government and the rule by SPLM is the

militant South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A). It was estab-

lished in 2010 by former SPLM/A leader George Athor after he failed to win

the governorship of the state of Jonglei in an election that he claimed was

rigged. Although Athor was killed in December 2011, the movement remains

relatively active and is considered one of the most prominent insurgencies in

the country. Some have suggested that the SSDM has played a role in fanning

the ames of tribal conict in Jonglei between the Murle and Lou Nuer.

More recently, two new groups have emerged to challenge the SPLM: The

National Democratic Front, established in September 2011, is led by a relatively

unknown, Jack Deng, and seeks to overthrow Kiirs government, accusing it

of corruption, tribalism, and sliding into the abyss. December 2011 also

witnessed the rise of the South Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army,

which calls for South Sudan to be governed by Khartoum,

mimicking a vision of unity similar to that of the late John

Garang.6South Sudan has repeatedly accused Khartoum

of supporting rebel and militia groups like these, butPresident Bashir has categorically denied this is the case.

Conicts are further complicated by the fact that small

arms abound throughout the country, as both the SPLM/A

and the northern government sought to arm tribal mili-

tias for their own purposes. Arms inevitably leaked out of

these militias and the SPLM/A itself, making it easy for

any group with grievances to turn to violence.

Beyond politics, at the local level, much of the simmer-

ing tribal conict is still based on age-old problems that have historically led

to clashes, such as access to land, water, and pasturein other words, to themeans of livelihood for rural populations. The three cases below illustrate the

complex mixing of politics and local issues that undermine the fragile new

country and complicate the task of nation building.

Jonglei State

Conict in Jonglei between the Lou Nuer and Murle tribes, both pastoralists

highly dependent on farming and cattle, has intensied since secession, claim-

ing the lives of up to 3,000 and displacing more than 140,000. The conict is

Much of the simmering tribal conflictis still based on age-old problems

that have historically led to clashes,

such as access to land, water, and

pasturein other words, to the means

of livelihood for rural populations.


24/38


a long-standing one, involving access to land and ownership of cattle, but at

times it has also become entangled with broader political issues.

The latest round of violence started in June 2011 with a Lou Nuer attack

on the Murle in Pibor County that involved extensive cattle raiding and many

deaths. In response, the Murle launched a revenge attack in Uror County, kill-

ing at least 640. Since then, both the Lou Nuer and the Murle have pillaged

each others villages and conducted revenge attacks, cattle raids, and kidnap-

pings in Pibor, Jalle, Akobo, and Uror. The youth of both tribes have been

mobilized into the efforts, and the White Army has reemerged to guaran-

tee [the] long-term security of Nuers cattle.

The White Army, an informal and traditionally Nuer mil itant organiza-

tion, was suppressed in 2006 through a disarmament program undertaken by

the SPLM/A, which some regarded as a politically motivated intervention to

reduce the White Armys mobilization and strength. It has now resurfaced

to stop depredations by the Murle, according to its members, who do not

trust the state government or the government of South Sudan to do so.7More

recently, the White Army has expanded its purpose: Dinkas have started join-

ing the army, and the conict has changed from an attempt to stop cattle raid-

ing to a rivalry between the Lou Nuer and Dinka on one side and the Murle

on the other.

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan, which has a mandate until

July 8, 2012, to support South Sudans government in its state-building and

economic development efforts, launched in December a signicant humani-

tarian effort and deployed a battalion in Pibor to control the clashes. Raids

and violence nevertheless continued, claiming the lives of thousands and dis-placing around 120,000. In February 2012, the Lou Nuer indicated a will-

ingness to cooperate with tribes in Ethiopia to form a border force in order

to quarantine the Murle tribe, indicating the expansion of the conict. In

March 2012, the South Sudanese government announced the beginning of

an SPLA-led disarmament campaign in Jonglei across a number of counties;

while a signicant number of arms have been collected to date, clashes with

the SPLA have occurred, and both Murle and Lou Nuer are hesitant to give

up weapons unless their rivals promise to do the same.

Complicating matters further is the presence of rebel groups in Jonglei and

neighboring states like the SSDM/A and the SSLM/A, both of which existin rebellion against President Kiir and his government. They may contrib-

ute to increased clashes or at least the presence of loose arms in the state.

The SSLM/A in particular has pledged to provide mil itary support to parties

involved in the Jonglei conict. Among the many obstacles the new govern-

ment faces in building institutions and establishing control over its territory,

the challenges of disarming Jonglei and dealing with long-standing rivalries

are bound to be a signicant.


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Warab and Unity States

Jonglei is not the only South Sudanese state wracked by cattle raids and tribal

violence; in January 2012, youth from Mayendit County in Unity State attacked

a neighboring county in Warab, killing at least 78 and beginning a spiral ofrenewed violence. Although there is no indication that these attacks are related

to those occurring within Jonglei, the presence of loose arms and the contin-

ued movement of rebel groups like the SSDM/A and SSLM/A in this region

have contributed to a process of counter raiding and revenge attacks that are

quite similar. Violence has also spilled into the Lakes State.

Despite calls for a civilian disarmament program to

promote a peaceful settlement among Warab, Lakes, and

Unity States, antagonism and distrust, similar to what

exists in Jonglei, remain. Some have accused previous

disarmament campaigns of being discriminatory, put-

ting certain groups at a disadvantage and not targeting all

weapon holders equally.

Although tribal conicts in the South have often been

disregarded, recent events indicate that such inghting

is bound to bring increased levels of instability to the

newly established country. Unpaved roads, the presence

of illicit arms, the southern governments lack of control over the state, and

Khartoums alleged aerial bombardment of and clashes in the Unity, Warab,

North Bahr Al Ghazal, and Upper Nile States only serve to intensify the crisis,

giving way to tribal allegiances that detract from the sovereignty and bureau-

cratic control of the still-weak government.

Instability and Dissatisfactionin the North

The Republic of Sudan is as troubled as the South. In addition to the growing

conict with the South, it faces a host of other problems around its periphery,

above all in Darfur and in the Eastern Province, particularly among the Beja

people. Additionally, it faces serious political problems at the core: Omar al-

Bashir has presided over the dismantling of the former country and lost pres-tige. The long-standing al liance between the military and the National Congress

Party, as well as its predecessor, the National Islamic Front, on which Bashirs

power was based, has long since frayed; and strikingly, both the government

and the opposition are in the hands of old men increasingly bereft of new ideas

and initiativesBashir, the youngest, is sixty-eight; Hassan Turabi, the former

leader of the National Islamic Front and now an opponent of Bashir, eighty;

Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party and still an important opposition

Although tribal conflicts in the South have

often been disregarded, recent eventsindicate that such infighting is bound

to bring increased levels of instability

to the newly established country.


26/38


voice, is seventy-six. Socioeconomic discontent is high and bound to increase

as political instability continues to depress the economy.

Khartoum witnessed small protests throughout 2011

over rising food prices, protracted water cuts, and other

problems affecting daily life. It would be vastly exagger-

ated at this point to talk of a Sudanese Spring, but there

have been plenty of signs of mobilization among students

and youth groups such as Girifna, as well as a sullen

resentment in all circles of the government and its stagna-

tion. In a country where popular insurrections have periodically toppled the

regime long before the term Arab Spring was coined, resentment should not

be easily dismissed. The government certainly does not take it lightlyeven

small protests are met with a swift crackdown by riot police.

While protests have, for the most part, died down, there remains dissat-

isfaction on the streets of Khartoum, in Sudans periphery states, and even

within the ranks of the NCP, making for a tumultuous and uncerta in sta-

tus quo. The actions of the Sudanese government thus far indicate that it is

unwilling to respond to popular demands for economic and political reform,

an attitude that can only promise dangerous instability and chaos in the post

Arab Spring region.

Darfur

Conict in Darfur started in Apri l 2003 with an attack by the Sudan Liberation

Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on

government bases in North Darfurs capital, Al Fashir. The JEM and SLM/A,

both Darfur-based rebel groups, launched the rebellion against Khartoum in

protest of its oppression of non-Arabs and neglect of the region. The Sudanese

government promptly retaliated with a bombing campaign, backed on the

ground by the Janjaweed militia. This started a cycle of violence that tarnished

the reputation of Sudan even as its government was preparing to sign the CPA

to put an end to the conict with the South.

By January 2004, the Sudanese army had moved in to crush the mounting

rebellion in western Darfur, forcing thousands of refugees to ee to Chad. By

March, the UN found that the Janjaweed were conducting systematic killings

of non-Arabs in Darfur and in September it called for the militias disarma-ment. Witnesses stated that air raids by government aircraft would often be

followed by on-the-ground attacks by the Janjaweed, who would steal from,

rape, and kill villagers. By 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry

on Darfur, set up by UN Security Council Resolution 1564, found that war

crimes were being committed in Darfur. Khartoum and the SLM/A signed

the Abuja Peace Agreement in 2006, and the African Union deployed a peace-

keeping mission (later replaced by the joint United Nations-African Union

Mission in Darfur, UNAMID) but ghting continued.

Socioeconomic discontent is high andbound to increase as political instability

continues to depress the economy.


27/38


Throughout the conict, the United States strengthened its economic sanc-

tions against Sudan, which had been in place since 1997 and remain in place

today; and in March 2009, the International Criminal Court issued arrest

warrants for President Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against

humanity, adding charges of genocide in July 2010. Despite all of this, violence

has continued and the region remains in turmoil. Part of the problem is the

fragmentation of movements ghting in Darfur, not all of which have been

wil ling to sign the same agreements at the same t ime.

In July 2011, the Doha Agreement, formally known as the Doha Document

for Peace in Darfur, was nally signed between Khartoum and the Liberation

and Justice Movement, an alliance of ten small Darfuri rebel groups, establishing

a compensation fund for victims, a new Darfur Regional Authority to govern

the territory until the regions status could be determined through a referen-

dum, and a set of power-sharing agreements. An Implementation Follow-up

Committee was established to supervise the implementation of the agreement.

However, only the Liberation and Justice Movement signed the agreement, while

others, including the JEM, refused. Conict continues, and the UN, African

Union, and Implementation Follow-up Committee still support regional peace-

keeping efforts in Darfur through UNAMID, seeking to eventually bring all

rebel groups to the negotiating table for a more lasting resolution.

In January 2012, President Bashir established two new states in Darfur,

bringing the total to ve as stipulated by the terms of the Doha Agreement:

Central Darfur was created out of West Darfur, and East Darfur was created out

of South Darfur; North Darfur remained as is.8The Darfur Regional Authority,

led by Tijani Sese, was also assigned a number of important responsibilities,including reconstruction, reconciliation, and good governance of Darfur.

Although the Doha Agreement is gradual ly being implemented and the

intensity of conict has decreased somewhat, the region continues to wit-

ness skirmishes between rebel groups and the government, the kidnapping

of international aid workers, the disenfranchisement of internally displaced

people, and a deteriorating humanitarian situation. The inux of unspecied

amounts of weapons from Libya as the Qadda regime disintegrated has been

an additional aggravating factor in the ongoing conict. A number of rebel

groups have openly rejected the Doha Agreement in order to avoid becom-

ing irrelevant. Furthermore, with the death of JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim inDecember 2011, the rebel group nds itself in disarray and has already broken

into smaller factions, contributing to the proliferation of armed actors that are

not abiding by any agreement.

Eastern Sudan and the Beja People

With high-prole conict in Darfur and along the border between Sudan

and South Sudan, the Red Sea, Kassala, and Al-Qadarif States of eastern

Sudan have received little to no attention, despite extremely low humanitarian


28/38


indexes, serious food security challenges, and drought. While the eastern

states are signicantly rich in resources (they boast fertile agricultural zones,

grazing areas, and minerals like gold, oil, and natural gas), the indigenous Beja

and Rashaida tribes within these states rarely enjoy the regions wealth, which,

instead, serves to benet elites in Khartoum.

Although ghters from the Eastern Front (an all iance of the Beja Congress,

an ethnic political group incorporating the Beja people, and the Rashaida Free

Lions, an armed group of Rashaida) signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement

with the Sudanese government to end their rebel lion in 2006, since the seces-

sion of the South, the Beja and Rashaida have taken to the streets to express

their dissatisfaction with the government and its failure to respect all terms of

the agreement. The non-Arab Beja in particular contend that the agreement

does little to remedy the continued marginalization of their tribe. Beja ghters

have reportedly regrouped in the Hamid mountains, just across the Eritrean

border, from where they launch attacks on Sudanese forces. Furthermore, in

November 2011, the Beja Congress voiced its dissatisfaction by joining the

Sudanese Revolutionary Front, a coalition of opposition and rebel groups that

seek to overthrow President Bashir.

Complicating matters further, the Beja and Rashaida were never fully dis-

armed after the 2006 peace agreement; coupled with low human development

indicators in the region, the presence of loose weapons is bound to signi-

cantly contribute to the growing instability. The situation in eastern Sudan is

well summed up by UN peacekeepers who have suggested that the conict is

again simmering, much like a volcano waiting to erupt.9

Dam Building and Rural Discontent

A new source of discontent is emerging in previously quiet areas north of

Khartoum, along the Nile River, as a consequence of the governments ambi-

tious program to build new dams or refurbish old ones to meet the coun-

trys growing need for power generation. Large dams are always extremely

controversial public-works projects for a number of ecological, economic,

and political reasons. They have environmental consequences felt far away

from the dam siteNile dams are changing the Egyptian coastline on the

Mediterranean by reducing the amount of silt transported by the water, for

example. Furthermore, they invariably cause political problems because theydisplace a large number of people, as is the case in Sudan at present.

Built in 2009 by the Chinese, the Merowe Dam is located close to the fourth

cataract of the Nile, about 350 kilometers north of Khartoum. Although it

is said to have doubled Sudans power-generation capacity, the project has

also forced 15,000 families from their homes and has since become a rally-

ing point for many displaced individuals. While some villagers have accepted

various forms of government compensation for their displacement, a number

of clashes with authorities have also ensued. In November and December


29/38


of 2011, over 1,000 protesters gathered to demand more assistance for dis-

placed families and for the resignation of the electricity and dams minister.

According to witnesses, these protesters were met with tear gas and arrests,

signaling little will ingness on the part of the government to address its popu-

lations needs.

The Merowe Dam is not the only politically controversial dam project

that the government is pursuing. Khartoum is also raising the height of the

Roseires Dam in Blue Nile State. The project, due for completion by June 2012,

is expected to displace up to 22,000 other families, promising both dissatisfac-

tion and widespread instability. Plans to start projects in both Kajbar and Dal

are also equally threatening to the life of the Nubian people and are projected

to bring humanitarian disaster, invoking fears of another Darfur. 10

ConclusionThe state of war between North and South Sudan, the inabil ity of the two

sides to resolve the oil transit issue, and the incapacity of both states to bring

security to their own territories are a sad outcome of years of negotiations,

mediation, and agreements that sought to help Sudan, whether as a single or

divided entity, nd a degree of stability.

Both sides, perhaps overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problems they

face, seem to have sought refuge in something with which they have a long

experiencenamely war. In just a few months since the Republic of South

Sudan gained independence, the progress that had been

made over more than a decade in reaching a cease-re and

negotiating a comprehensive solution has come unraveled.

Furthermore, neither side seems willing to compromise at

this point. Far from believing they have reached a stale-

mate, North and South Sudan seem convinced that by

ghting, they can gain the advantage over the other side.

This situation raises disturbing questions for the international community,

which has understandably rushed in to try and halt the ghting, mediate solu-

tions, and maintain peace. Given the failure of previous efforts, is another inter-

national effort the right approach? Or do international attempts in reality allow

the two sides to continue provoking each other and pushing the limits, on the

assumption that if they get in serious trouble the international community will

move in and save them from the consequences of their actions?

These are not abstract questions, but very real ones. Those who believe

that previous efforts were insufcient and that the failure is in part due to the

lack of follow-through by the international community on the implementation

of agreements are now pushing for even greater international involvement

in extricating North and South Sudan from the conict they have initiated.

In light of the suffering created by this war, the casualties, and the rapidly

North and South Sudan seem convinced

that by fighting, they can gain the

advantage over the other side.


30/38


growing number of refugees, it is difcult to argue that halting the ghting

between North and Southand other conicts affecting the two countries

should not be an imperative. In light of previous failures, however, the ques-

tion of whether such efforts to help the affected population make it easier for

leaders to continue hostilities needs to be seriously discussed.


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Notes

1 David K. Keng, The New Frontier, Norwegian Peoples Aid Report, 1/11, March,

www.npaid.org/lestore/NPA_New_Frontier.pdf.

2 Negotiat ions Between the Two Sudans, Enough Project, December 2011, http://

enoughproject.org/les/Negotiations-Between-the-Two-Sudans.pdf.

3 Joe Temin and Theodore Murphy, Toward a New Republic of Sudan, U.S.

Institute of Peace, June 2011, www.usip.org/les/resources/SR278.pdf.

4 President Ki ir Says Juba distanced Itself From Sudanese Rebels, Sudan

Tribune, December 17, 2011, www.sudantribune.com/President-Kiir-says-Juba-

distanced,41016.

5 South Sudans Rebel Groups Accuse Uganda President of Ki ll ing George Athor,

Vow New Offensive, South Sudan News Agency, December 23, 2011, www.south-

sudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/south-sudans-rebel-groups-accuse-

uganda-president-of-killing-george-athor-vow-new-offensive.

6 New Rebel Movement Emerges in South Sudan; Calls for Overthrow of the

Government, South Sudan News Agency, September 25, 2011, www.southsudan-newsagency.com/news/press-releases/new-rebel-movement-emerges-in-south-

sudan-calls-for-the-overthrow-of-the-government.

7 South Sudan: The Boil ing Point,All Afr ica, January 11, 2012, http://allafrica.

com/stories/201201110842.html.

8 Beyond the Pledge, Relief Web, July 1, 2011, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.

int/les/resources/Full_Report_1566.pdf.

9 Sudan Conict Not Isolated to South, United Press International, December 8,

2011, www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/12/08/Sudan-conict-not-isolated-

to-south/UPI-13841323365149.

10 Peter Bosshard, New Chinese Dam Project Fuels Ethnic Conict in Sudan,

International Rivers, January 20, 2011, www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/6121.


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MARINA OTTAWAYis a senior associate in the Carnegie Endowments

Middle East Program. She works on issues of political transformation in

the Middle East and Gulf security. A long-time analyst of the formation

and transformation of political systems, she has also written on politicalreconstruction in Iraq, the Balkans, and African countries. Her extensive

research experience is reflected in her publications, which include nine

authored books and six edited ones. Her most recent publications include

Getting to Pluralism, co-authored with Amr Hamzawy and Yemen on the

Brink, co-edited with Christopher Boucek. She is also the author of Iraq:

Elections 2010, an online guide to Iraqi politics.

MAI EL-SADANY is a junior fellow in the Middle East Program at

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She graduated fromStanford University with a degree in Political Science and will be a J.D.

Candidate, class of 2015, in the fall at Georgetown University.

About the Authors


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Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace

Te Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private,

nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between

nations and promoting active international engagement by the United

States. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan and dedicated toachieving practical results.

Carnegie is pioneering the first global think tank, with flourishing

offices now in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels. Tese

five locations include the centers of world governance and the places

whose political evolution and international policies will most determine

the near-term possibilities for international peace and economic advance.

Te Carnegie Middle East Programcombines in-depth local knowledgewith incisive comparative analysis to examine economic, sociopolitical,

and strategic interests in the Arab world. Trough detailed country studies

and the exploration of key cross-cutting themes, the Carnegie Middle

East Program, in coordination with the Carnegie Middle East Center,

provides analysis and recommendations in both English and Arabic

that are deeply informed by knowledge and views from the region. Te

Carnegie Middle East Program has special expertise in political reform

and Islamist participation in pluralistic politics throughout the region.


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Documents

Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict