SUDAN Darfur: The Genocide Continues · 2013-07-03 · Darfur: The Genocide Continues — October 2004 3 2.0 Genocide 2.1 The British Government has said it sees no point in declaring

Darfur: The Genocide Continues — October 2004 1

A JUBILEE REPORT

October 2004

SUDANDarfur: The Genocide Continues

Prepared by Lord Alton of Liverpool and Rebecca Tinsley


1.0 Introduction

1.1 Lord Alton and journalist Rebecca Tinsley returned on Oct 4th from Geneina inDarfur, Western Sudan. This report confirms the World Health Organisation sestimate that 10,000 people are dying every month from malnutrition and disease inDarfur. Put more starkly, as every hour passes another fourteen people die. By theclose of each day another 333 people are among the 50,000 lives claimed in what theUN has rightly described as the world s worst humanitarian crisis. In addition to the50,000 dead, 1.4 million people are displaced. The rate of death is comparable to thedeath rate in Rwanda at the height of the genocide in 1994.

1.2 Over the past nine months David Alton (Lord Alton of Liverpool) and CarolineCox (Baroness Cox of Queensbury) have urged the UN and UK Government toformally declare the events in Darfur to be genocide. Prior to this both peers havetravelled independently into Southern Sudan and drawn attention to the two millionfatalities, and the five million displaced people, since the war started in 1983 (seeJubilee Campaign Report on Sudan 2002 and Hansard). To date, the Security Councilhas simply established a committee to consider the situation.

1.3 In September 2004 in Parliament David Alton challenged the Leader of theHouse, Baroness (Valerie) Amos to follow the lead of Colin Powell and the USAdministration in making a formal declaration of genocide. The Government havethus far declined to do so, but we strongly welcome the decision of the PrimeMinister, Tony Blair, to visit Sudan/ Darfur to see the situation first hand.

1.4 In 2002 David Alton called in the House for oil sanctions and a calibratedresponse against Sudan and in May in the House he warned the Government that theywere repeating the failure to intervene in Rwanda s genocide in 1994 (see Hansard).

1.5 During a visit to Darfur, on October 3rd and 4th, he and the journalist RebeccaTinsley — on behalf of the UK human rights group, Jubilee Campaign — saw forthemselves the situation in Geneina.


2.0 Genocide

2.1 The British Government has said it sees no point in declaring the situation inDarfur to be genocide. Ministers have claimed that such a declaration would addnothing to the UK s current actions. The EU mission to Darfur in August 2004 saidthe humanitarian disaster fell short of genocide , as did the UN s Representative toSudan, Jan Pronk.

2.2 But, as the US has recognised — and as we were bitterly reminded during thetaking of evidence in Rwanda immediately preceding our trip to Darfur (see JubileeReport Rwanda/DRC — The Killing Continues) — when no formal declaration existsthe international community feels able to stand idly by or literally conduct businessas usual with the perpetrators.

2.3 Under the 1949 Geneva Convention Against Genocide any country that namesgenocide for what it is must then act to prevent and to protect and subsequentlybring to justice those who commit crimes against humanity (Article 51 of the UNCharter).

2.4 Even if it were concluded that fewer than the 10,000 who died in August died inSeptember 2004, it would not alter the reality of what has already occurred. Norwould it absolve us of our duty to bring to trial the perpetrators — something that willcertainly not happen in the absence of a formal determination.

2.5 In any event, we received contemporaneous accounts that leave no room for puriletheological debates about how many people have to die before western interests act.The day we arrived in West Darfur two villages had reported that Governmenthelicopters had arrived bringing arms for the Janjaweed. We cite other examples,below.

2.6 We spoke to the Fashir of the eastern district of Geneina, Suliman Dina, who isaged 71 and was appointed to his senior position of local leadership by the formerSultan of Darfur.

2.7 He told us that the build up to genocide began in 1995 and during the years thatimmediately followed. It began with the usual catalogue of plundering and looting.Cows and cattle were stolen, and rustling was accompanied by sporadic attacks.

2.8 In 1997 the Janjaweed militia began to consolidate their position and build apresence. Nine hundred Janjaweed fighters, formed in three lines of 300 mountedmen, and reinforced by a Government helicopter from which guns and mortars weredistributed, attacked the 54 villages in the Fashir s district. 433 people were left dead.

2.9 Suliman Dina told us that of the 54 villages only one, Azena, was not raised to theground. In Azena 12 people were killed and there was much looting, but it was not


burnt. The Janjaweed forces were heavily armed and had land cruisers mounted withguns with which they have been able to control and subject the civilian population.

2.10 The Janjaweed tried to hunt down the Fashir but he escaped across the border (30miles away from where we met him) with many other villagers.

2.11 In 1998 he returned when the Government said there would be no reprisals:Instead of killing me, they killed my son in Khartoum. His son, Adam Dina, was adoctor serving as a lieutenant in the Sudanese army. The Government has alsocontinued to harass the Fashir. Last month he was arrested and released after severaldays in prison for being outspoken in reporting the events that have occurred inDarfur. His life is undoubtedly in danger, but he told us emphatically that he wantedthe truth to be told and for the international community to act.

2.12 When we asked him what was the Government s motive in allowing the rape ofDarfur, he said, We have lived on this land for generations, under five sultans, butthe Arabs want to empty us off our land and take it from us. Since the creation ofSudan the Khartoum Government has never wanted us and they behave as if theywant to rid the whole land of the tribes people.

2.13 He added that they suspect Khartoum is fearful that there are too many of uscompared to them. Now that the world is open and we can be educated they fear wewill over-whelm them. Changing demography has accelerated a process driven byracism. Darfur was always a collection point for the seizure of slaves, and even theArabic word for their African population reflects this servile relationship.

2.14 The Fashir, and others we met, told us that amongthe Janjaweed fighters are zealots originally fromcountries such as Chad, Mauritania and Niger — whohave been promised the land and possessions of Darfur stribes people. Sheik Adam Abdullah Ismael describedhis harrowing ordeal. By the end of his account he andthe other leaders were weeping. This glimpse of openemotion was itself indicative of the abyss into whichthese dignified people have been driven.

2.15 Sheik Ismael lived at Hafier Abu, the site of awater-pool. In 1997, 15 men and 2 women died after anarmed attack. One month later the fighters returned andburnt down the village. He and the villagers whoescaped spent 11 hours walking and running, pursuedby gunmen, finally reaching a place of safety. After

several months they returned and rebuilt their village. Then in 2003, 400 Janjaweedarrived, mounted on horses and camels. Don t worry, they said. We are just herefor the water. Two days later they started attacking the villagers in the area, stealingevery animal and all their property.

2.16 The Sheik went to Geneina to get a vehicle to transport his family and to escape.If we return we die, if we go back, we die. He decided to return and was

Sheik Ismael from Hafier Abu


accompanied by an Arab policeman. That night he was forced to watch as theJanjaweed raped 10 of the women. The policeman, who stopped the militia killing theSheik, told him, I thank God I am not from this tribe.

2.17 Sheik Ismael movingly said, A Government should act as a father — and a fathershould not love some of his children and not others. A father should love all hischildren. He also reflected that these events have created a climate of fear and acycle of revenge that will last for generations. Sheik Zacharia Yahian Ibrahim gavean equally harrowing account of events in the village of Terlile, in the east of theprovince of West Darfur, in 1999. During the religious festival of Eid three peoplewere killed during an attack, including the 85-year-old sheik of the village. Afterlooting the village, and stealing the cattle, the Janjaweed burnt it down.

2.18 After escaping, the Sheik returned with his wife and children in 2000. InNovember 2003 the village was incinerated after the men had their hands tied behindtheir backs and were forced to give promises never to speak of these events, never toreclaim their land and never to seek revenge. They were then allowed to leave withonly the clothes on their backs.

2.19 Sheik Ibrahim Abaka Yakiadescribed how his village of GoszBanat - in the north of the province— was also attacked by mountedJanjaweed and 17 were left dead:Nothing was left. The village justdisappeared. Sheik Yacob DeAllah lived in Ushara village, nearthe town of Geneina. 200 men onhorseback surrounded the village,whiplashed the women and

children, and beat the men with sticks.Ushara was one of 13 small villages raised to

the ground that day.

2.20 Sheik Ibrahim Adam Suleman told us that if the men now leave the refugeecamps they will be killed by the Janjaweed. When the women leave the camp tocollect firewood or fodder they are regularly attacked and raped by Janjaweed:A few weeks ago a lady went to collect firewood. They raped her, broke her arm andleft her. Why? The plan of these people is to force us to abandon our land and neverreturn.

2.21 We were told of another woman who the day before our visit went to collectbranches to make a fence for her small garden by her hut in the refugee camp. She isgrowing okra to try to support herself. She was carrying her baby on her back. Whenthe Janjaweed fighter stopped her she asked if she could lay the baby on the groundwhile he raped her. After he did this she produced an axe concealed under her clothesand he fled. The attacker is known to the woman and is from Anjudol area.

2.22 Sheik Suleman said that the presence of Non-Governmental Organisations in therefugee camps had provided a measure of protection inside the camps: but we are

The refugee Camp at Geneina, Darfur


prisoners, denied the right of movement. You can t go one kilometre from thecamps. Sheik Ismael added: If it weren t for the NGOs, we wouldn t be able to stayhere. We would have fled or have been dead ourselves.

2.23 Never-the-less, the NGOs do not get to every part of Darfur (or to all the areasof Chad where refugees have fled). UN Security believes 17% of the population isdeemed inaccessible. For instance, in addition to the police permit we had to obtain inKhartoum, travel passes are required to go outside Geneina. The Government ofSudan has recently put one of their senior intelligence officers in charge of security inGeneina and restrictions and reprisals against NGOs may intensify. Two weeks ago,local staff from an NGO were beaten and the local police refused to act for fear ofthe army and Janjaweed.

2.24 In addition to the numerous and repeated accounts of killings, burnings andlootings, we were shocked by the widespread use of rape as a weapon of war. Weconcluded that in every sense what we saw and heard about in Darfur is genocide andshould be named as such.

3.0 Rape as a Weapon Of War

3.1 It is hard to overstate the scale of the continuing suffering of the Black Africanwomen and girls in Darfur. At Ardamata Camp, outside Geneina, where 30,000people live, we talked to families who had fled from Abhasla, a village eight dayswalk to the west.

3.2 In February 2004 heavily armedJanjaweed on horseback swept into thevillage and killed every man and boy theycould find. Their cattle were looted and theirhomes were burned down.

3.3 Thirty five year old Hawry told us thatthe men harassed and beat the women andgirls before they rode off. It soon emergedthat these are euphemisms for rape, but intheir traditional society it is anunmentionable subject, bringing shame andhumiliation on the victim and her family.

3.4 We were told that the Arabs carriedrazor blades and sharp knives with them tocut open the atrophied vaginas of oldwomen before they raped them. They alsoraped girls as young as 10. When theJanjaweed had gone, Hawry told us, thewomen abandoned the village. My familyonce had 88 head of cattle, but I put one

Women are at particular risk from thearmed militia


baby around my neck and another child on my back, and I started walking. Her otherthree children had to walk for the next eight days, hiding in empty houses when theycould.

3.5 When Hawry and the other women arrived at the camp they were just some of the10,000 refugees who also arrived that same week. She and her girls built themselves ahut using branches, reeds and grass to weave a thatched roof. She draped plastic bagsacross the roof, hoping to keep the rain out when the season arrived.

3.6 As we sat in her hut she talked about the everyday difficulties of her life. She isgrateful for the UNICEF school in the camp, but she is frustrated because she wants tofind work. She yearns to return to her old life, but she knows it is not possible as longas the Janjaweed are armed. And the children are too scared to leave the compound,she adds.

3.7 We joined a group of 17 women sitting in the shade of a tree, drinking coffee. Allthe married women were widows, and most had also lost fathers, brothers and sons.They need firewood for cooking and grass for their animals, and are thus forced to gobeyond the camp. It emerged that they were all, without exception, the victims ofattack and rape by the Janjaweed. Although they are clearly traumatised by the dailyrisks they run, they speak philosophically about it. If our men go out, they die. If wego, we are raped. That s the choice.

3.8 When speaking about the future, 20 year old Semira said the shame of rape wouldnormally have prevented her from finding a husband. Since most of the young menare dead, I suppose this isn t going to be a problem. Semira s 18 year old sister,Roda, shrugged in agreement. Like all the other women in the group she wantededucation, but our conversation kept coming back to their terror at leaving the campcompound to fetch firewood. Someone has to take away their weapons, she said.They are cowards, and if they see soldiers from Britain here they will run away. Wefeel much safer when there are white faces around.

3.9 The women agreed it would be best to have a European troop presence. ThenDarfur can be an independent country without the Arabs harming us and stealing ourcattle.

3.10 We also met 19 year old Jewa whose parents were killed by the militia, and whois now responsible for a family for six. Unfortunately her situation is common, andwhen one woman succeeds in getting a job she is expected to support her extendedfamily. Sedeer, who cooks for an NGO, supports all eight families of her deadhusband s brothers.

3.11 Margaret, a nurse at the camp, summed it up when she said, Life for women inSudan is hard, but it is especially hard for women in Darfur. Her own parents hadbeen killed in southern Sudan, and she came to Darfur because she knows how therefugees feel, she says. I keep telling the girls to get as much education as they canbecause that is their best hope.


4.0 The Janjaweed is a pro-governmentmilitia.

4.1 It has its origins in the mid-1980s. SadiqEl Madhi initiated a policy of arming ArabBaggara militias in Darfur andKordofan.(Human Rights Watch: Darfur InFlames). It was originally intended as acounter-insurgency measure against the SPLArebels in the South and to entrench TujammoAl Arabi (Arab Alliance) throughout theregion, subjugating the non-Arab population.

4.2 The name of the region is the key tounderstanding its ethnicity. Dar meanshomeland. In addition to the native Fur peoplethe Massaleit and Zaghawa are among the 30ethnic groups living in Darfur. Ruthlesslydiscriminated against and targeted for vicioustreatment, the African people of Darfur beganattacking military installations in April 2003at El Fasher airport.

4.3 The tribal leaders we met were emphatic that the Janjaweed are determined tobring about their annihilation. They cannot understand why other Muslims haveattacked them (even as they have been gathered for religious festivals), why they haveburnt mosques, raped their women, and killed their people. This troubling question isone also for Muslim leaders who need to appreciate the nature of the genocide againstthese gentle Muslim people who are living through a reign of terror.

5.0 The Government of Sudan

5.1 The Sudanese Interior Minister, Rahim Mohamed Hussein, has issued a bellicosedeclaration that We will not agree to the presence of any foreign forces, whatevertheir nationality. Mr.Hussein is part of a government that enjoys single digit supportamong a population that has been described to us by many people as overwhelminglymoderate in its attitudes (although there is a rump of people who want to see strictSharia law).

5.2 Mr.Hussein s attitude reflects his Government s repeated indifference tointernational initiatives and a tendency to renege on undertakings given (eg the 1996Peace Charter), and to allow initiatives to collapse (eg the Ajuba Talks in September2004).

5.3 The Machakos Naivasha Protocols (2003), while a hopeful moment in theGovernment s relationship with the SPLA, have been used by the Government ofSudan as a means of stifling international criticism. The talks, which are to resumethis month, have become yet another bargaining chip. Khartoum has threatened to

There are no good roads to Geneina —making access for aid agencies difficult.


withdraw from the north-south dialogue if the international community takes actionagainst it over Darfur.

5.4 Throughout the gathering humanitarian disaster in Darfur, the Sudanesegovernment has let it be known that it will restrict or deny humanitarian relief accessif the international community asserts itself in ways Khartoum dislikes.

5.5 For the international community, the question is whether to accept such blatantblackmail or to make it clear that it will not tolerate genocide against a civilianpopulation. The choice is between appeasement or decisiveness.

6.0 The United Nations

6.1 There is no United Nations peace-keeping presence in Darfur. The Governmentof Sudan have bitterly opposed the presence of foreign troops although thereincarnated African Union (AU) has sent a small force of Rwandan soldiers(something their President Paul Kagame, told us he is very proud of when we met hima week earlier in Kigali, and especially given the international community s failure torespond to genocide in Rwanda in 1994). There are also troops from Tanzania andNigeria. Tribal leaders told us they would also like to see European andCommonwealth soldiers deployed.

6.2 Based at El Fasher, the main role of the AU peace-keepers has been to guard theUN monitors sent to Darfur. The UN has said that at least 3000 soldiers are neededand that they must have a robust mandate. The UN Security Council Resolution ofSeptember 18th 2004 committed the Security Council to do little more than thinkabout possible penalties in the event of Sudanese intransigence. China, Russia,Pakistan and Algeria abstained.

6.3 Despite at least eighteen months of atrocities in Sudan, the internationalcommunity has yet to take a single positive action against the Sudanese Government.

7.0 Britain

7.1 In 1898 Britain and Egypt formed a joint government for Sudan. The south, withits Christian and traditional religions, gravitated towards British East Africa, and thenorth to Egypt and Islam.

7.2 By 1947 - as a prelude to independence — Britain had fused the two regions andhanded power to the north. For the south independence resulted in a change ofcolonial masters. Within two years the army had taken power and begun a campaignof forced Islamisation. The cycle of displacements and refugee crises had begun. Inturn the SPLA (Sudanese People s Liberation Army) and other factions of resistancewere spawned. In Darfur, the emergence of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) —although acting independent of the SPLA - has now become a potent force. It hasarmoured vehicles and weapons, in many cases taken from their attackers duringreprisal campaigns. Tribal leaders told us, If we were given weapons, we wouldfight, but then added, We would prefer to go back to the way we were before all ofthis began.


7.3 There is a real danger of linkage between the insurgents in Darfur and SPLA.Such a violent escalation could lead to the implosion of Sudan, a coup in Khartoumand the emergence of an even more authoritarian regime (an attempted coup by theMuslim Brotherhood occurred last month), and derailment of the Machakos protocolsand the north-south process. The UK Government will want to emphasise all theseconsequences of the continuing genocide in Darfur.

7.4 Fashir Suleman Dina reminded us of Britain s historic links with Darfur, includinga treaty with Sultan Mohamaed Baharadin that provided for western Darfur to opt outof the state created in 1898 if it so wished. He said, We never really thought aboutthis before but if you are experiencing genocide then you would have to think ofanything that would allow you to escape from this.

8.0. Child Soldiers and the plight of children

8.1 We heard evidence that children as young as10 have become child soldiers. We also had achance to speak to Daniel Toole, Director of theoffice of emergency programmes for UNICEFworldwide about the plight of children. Forinstance we learnt that one child had joined therebel SLA after his father was killed. The SLAand Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)inevitably attract marginalised, disaffectedyoung people.

8.2 Many children have also been left asorphans. In the camps children join the foodlines for they are now the heads of theirfamilies. We were pleased to learn that theGovernment of Sudan has been supporting theimmunisation programme in West Darfur(especially against measles). However, polio hasbegun to reappear and also TB, and we weretold that more needs to be done to combat it.

8.3 The worst health threat appears to be malaria. In one refugee camp we visited wewere told that malaria is at its peak at present, with an average of one person perhousehold suffering — and over 4000 cases in that camp alone last week.Chloroquinine treatments are not working due to high resistance, and other treatmentsare limited by their cost.

8.4 We learnt that before the genocide stable villages had been very positiveparticipants in health improvement programmes for children, and although the campswere continuing their work children in inaccessible villages were greatly at risk.

8.5 An immeasurable problem will be the impact of so many babies born due to rapeby the Janjaweed. While the women we spoke to would eventually open up somewhatabout the horrors of their attacks by the militia, they would not even discuss what the

Omar was eight years old when heescaped on a train from Darfur tolive on the streets of Khartoum.


future holds in store for so many children. They want to dilute our blood, you see,one woman said. They hate black people.

9.0 The IDPs

9.1 There is a traumatised, helpless mood of resignation in the camps. Sometimes itboils over, as, for instance, at Otash camp, near Nyala, when a policeman wasrecently lynched. A woman recognised him as one of those who massacred herfamily.

9.2 Some IDPs, an estimated 200,000 have fled to Chad and 70,000 more to Kenya.The other million have left their homes for makeshift camps that have sprung up inmany parts of Western Sudan. This exodus has been precipitated by the Janjaweed sreign of terror. We learnt for example of a boy aged 11 whose mother had been killed,leaving him to care for his three brothers in the camp in which he is living.

9.3 Over one million IDPs have been herded into camps which are run by theGovernment. Some of the policemen who patrol the camps are Janjaweed militia whohave been given police uniforms. This understandably terrifies the people living there.

9.4 Stifling temperatures, soaring to a regular 45 degrees centigrade, food and watershortages, illness and makeshift sleeping quarters, all conspire to rob people of theirdignity. They have already lost their land, their homes, their independence and self-sufficiency for which they were noted.

9.5 The irony is that a nutritionalist in Darfur working for the UN earns $10,000 amonth to oversee the distribution of grain and supplements to malnourished children.We are in grave danger of creating vast numbers of dependent people out of thepreviously self-sufficient.

10.0 Conclusion

10.1 Targeted oil sanctions should have been imposed at least six months ago. Thefailure to do so and the abject failure to control the flow of arms into Sudan has lulledKhartoum into believing (rightly thus far) that the world community would allow theJanjaweed militia, with their deep associations with the Sudanese Government, tocontinue to act with impunity.

10.2 It is extremely disturbing that countries with direct interests in Sudan have usedtheir votes on the UN Security Council to soften the world s response to the crisis inDarfur. China s National Petroleum Company controls 40% of Sudan s oil and Indiacontrols about 25% (through the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Ltd).Malaysia s Petronas Company controls a further 30%.

10.3 One Sudanese — from the south — who has survived nine attempts on his life, toldus that, every barrel of your oil is half filled with our blood .

10.4 Sudan produces 32,000 barrels daily — worth $1m. In 2001 the CongressionalReserves Record estimated that this same sum, $1m, was what the Government of


Sudan has been spending each day on arms. China has sold AK47s, mortars,ammunition and rocket propelled grenades to Khartoum. We heard descriptions ofsuch weapons in use against civilians in West Darfur.

10.5 The elders whom we met — among the traditional leaders of Darfur — told us thattheir greatest desire is peace and an end to the genocide.

10.6 In West Darfur alone 600,000 of their people live in sprawling camps. There are120,000 IDPs just in and around Geneina (doubling its previous population).Throughout Darfur - a land mass the size of France — a colossal 44% of the populationis directly war-affected.

10.7 Mercifully the rainy season this year was very light. Extensive flooding wouldhave jeopardised humanitarian operations. Of course, this small mercy will also meana modest harvest — so it is a mixed blessing. And no-one should under-estimate eitherthe seriousness of the situation or the inadequacy of our response.

10.8 The elders said that security remains their greatest concern. They called for fivethings:

1) The disarmament of the Janjaweed2) The restoration of looted livestock3) The return or rebuilding of property4) A resolution of the land issue5) Freedom to move about

Above all they told us that the genocide must end.

10.9 Sheik De Allah put it well when he poignantly said, We are a simple people.We know our farms and cattle and that s all we want. The Government createdJanjaweed and have created this situation. We are desperate and pray that theinternational community will intervene.

11.0 Recommendations:

1) The British Government, The European Union, The United Nations and theArab League must immediately acknowledge that genocide has occurred inDarfur and that the Government of Sudan has supported the perpetrators,universally referred to by the people of Darfur as the Janjaweed militias.

2) Targeted economic and military sanctions must be imposed upon Sudan, andin particular oil sanctions, must be applied immediately. The internationalcommunity must prevent the flow of arms into Sudan, and impose animmediate no fly zone over Darfur, enforced by an armed international force,mandated by the Security Council to use force to prevent over-flight of theregion by the Sudanese Air Force or its proxies.

3) The Governments of Rwanda, Tanzania and Nigeria must be applauded andsupported for committing their troops to an international peacekeeping force inDarfur. International leaders must act upon their consciences by committingtroops, resources and funding to assemble an armed peacekeeping force,mandated to use appropriate force to defend civilians, internally displaced


people (IDPs), monitors and NGO staff in Darfur, and IDPs in camps inneighbouring Chad.

4) The Government of Sudan is urged to immediately stop its military, materieland financial support of the Janjaweed, to allow international peacekeepers todisarm the militias, and to guarantee the unconditional return of displacedpeople to Darfur with the participation of the African Union. The SudaneseGovernment must begin constructive dialogue with all sides of the communityin Darfur to institute a federal power-sharing system of government based onconstitutionally enshrined equality for all citizens irrespective of race, religion,sex or ethnicity. As soon as feasible there must be a referendum on the futuresovereign and legal status of Darfur.

5) The Sudanese Government must immediately stop recruiting people perceivedby the local people as Janjaweed into the Darfur police force. Theinternational community must apply pressure on the Khartoum regime in thisregard.

6) The international community must press the Sudanese Government to stop theintimidation and imprisonment of NGO staff and community leaders inDarfur.

7) The Sudanese Government must immediately drop its requirement for NGOstaff to obtain travel permits to travel around Darfur province. NGOs musthave freedom of movement to reach isolated areas at will.

8) Punitive financial penalties must be applied to international companies orgovernments involved in orchestrating or facilitating military sales to Sudan.These penalties must also be applied to companies violating oil sanctionsagainst Sudan.

9) Recognising that the genocidal terror campaign in Darfur has prevented cropsbeing planted this year, the international community must prepare andadequately fund relief operations to feed Darfur s displaced people. Given thatthe UN believes that the Darfur emergency is likely to continue for at least 18-24 months, planning is needed for returns and rehabilitation.

10) Recognising the burden being borne by Chad, the international communitymust provide assistance and support to the Government of Chad.

11) We learned that the US Government had promised emergency food aid in thespring which finally arrived in September. There clearly exists a need for amechanism by which governments who promise aid are held to theircommitments.

12) The 135 signatories of the 1949 Genocide Convention must affirm that oncegenocide has been determined, action to prevent and to punish is required.This action must be commensurate with the magnitude and urgency of thecatastrophe.

13) We commend the Sudanese Department of Health for its immunisationprogramme. Working with UNICEF and its NGO partners, two millionchildren in Darfur have been vaccinated against measles, out of a total targetof 2.3m. Polio vaccination has been even more impressive, reaching 97% ofthe target. But at the same time the Khartoum regime must be condemned forits deliberate, cynical and racist neglect of Darfur over decades. In all of WestDarfur there is one stretch of paved road; clinics go without supplies for threeyears before getting medicines; doctors and teachers are unpaid for months;and are expected to cope with minimal infrastructure. While the people of


Darfur are resourceful and stoical, it is clear Khartoum has brought the rebelinsurgency on itself through the contempt with which it has treated Darfur.

14) It is intolerable for Khartoum to impose Sharia law on the people of Darfur towhom it is alien and unacceptable. The international community must insistthe Sudanese Government requires the broad consent of the people for lawsenacted and applied.

15) We recognised a profound need on the part of the people of Darfur to givetestimony about what has befallen them. We owe it to survivors, and thosewho will not survive because of hunger, AIDS or attack, to collect theirtestimony into an archive. We commend Human Rights Watch for compilingevidence to be used in judicial proceedings, but believe the voices of Darfur spersecuted people must be recorded if we are to learn from current failings.

16) On a practical level, there is desperate need for interpreters because the NGOcommunity does not have enough Arab speaking personnel to communicateeffectively.

12.0 Contact Details

Jubilee Campaign St Johns Cranleigh Rd Wonersh Guildford GU5 0QX

Tel 0044 1483 894 787 Fax 0044 1483 894 797www.jubileecampaign.co.uk

Documents

SUDAN Darfur: The Genocide Continues · 2013-07-03 · Darfur: The Genocide Continues — October 2004 3 2.0 Genocide 2.1 The British Government has said it sees no point in declaring