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Structural Dynamics within and between Organizations Charles J. Fombrun New York University © 1986 by Cornell Universtty. 0001-8392/86/3103-0403/$! .00. \ am grateful to many colleagues for their comments on previous versions of thjs manuscript. Speciai thanks \o Eric Abra- hamson, R. Kabaliswaran. Michael Rosen, and the reviewers and editors of/!\SQ for helpful discussions along the way. The de- velopment of this paper was supported in part by a grant from the Tenneco Fund Pro- gram at the Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University. Theories of structure have artificially segregated various streams of research on intraorganizational and inter- organizational relations. This paper recasts the concept of structure as an instantaneous correspondence between an infrastructure, a sociostructure, and a superstructure— three manifestations of collective life joined through a dy- namic juxtaposition of technological solutions, political ex- changes, and socfai interpretations in and around organiza- tions. These levels are shown to describe reflexive yet partially autonomous realms whose progressive inter- relatedness is governed by processes of convergence and divergence, thereby supporting both stability and change in socia) relationships within organizations, populations, and communities. Ultimately, it is argued, structuring can be understood as a dialectical unfolding of relations be- tween embedded sociai actors that translates individual ac- tion into societal consequences.* INTRODUCTION Despite a common concem with capturing the essence of so- ciai structure, current interpretations of organization as adapta- tion, as power, and as culture suffer from three basic failings: (1) they have anificiaWy segregated complementary manifesta- tions of collective life; (2} they have promoted a microanalytic orientation that underplays the embeddedness of individuals in organizations, organizations in populations, and populations in communities; and (3) they have unduly stressed the short-run stability of structures at the expense of the long-run dynamic process of structuring. In so doing, they have encouraged a parochial allegiance of researchers to perspectives rooted in either ecoiogicaf, sociological, or anthropological thinking that overemphasize either static, cross-sectional analyses of fit or longitudinal studies of convergence {Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985) at the expense of punctuated and contradictory interpretations of change (Heydebrand, 1977; Miller and Friesen, 1983). To engage a dialogue between perspectives, this paper recasts the concept of structure in terms of three interactive but par- tially autonomous levels that exist within every social collec- tivity: infrastructure, sociostructure, and superstructure. Struc- ture is understood to be an instance in a dynamic process of structuring that coheres individual actions by animating pro- cesses of convergence and contradiction across these three levels. Over time, the levels of structure crystallize as layers of constraints on human action (Clegg, 1981) and thereby trans- late social relationships within organizations into environmental consequences. The environment of any single organization, however, is itself made up of other organizations (DIMaggio and Powell, 1983). Over time, it too develops a degree of structure. Both sociolo- gists and economists have endeavored to specify the constitu- tion of that environment, sociologists by focusing on the multi- plex network of exchanges in which organizations are embedded (Cook, 1977), and economists by stressing the rela- tions between organizations in homogeneous populations (Caves, 1977). Despite their common concerns, however, little has been done to bridge the gap between them. This paper takes a step in that direction. Specifically, the multitiered inter- 403/Administrative Science Quarterly, 31 (1986): 403-421

Structural Dynamics Within and Between Organizations

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Structural Dynamicswithin and betweenOrganizations

Charles J. FombrunNew York University

© 1986 by Cornell Universtty.0001-8392/86/3103-0403/$! .00.

\ am grateful to many colleagues for theircomments on previous versions of thjsmanuscript. Speciai thanks \o Eric Abra-hamson, R. Kabaliswaran. Michael Rosen,and the reviewers and editors of/!\SQ forhelpful discussions along the way. The de-velopment of this paper was supported inpart by a grant from the Tenneco Fund Pro-gram at the Graduate School of BusinessAdministration, New York University.

Theories of structure have artificially segregated variousstreams of research on intraorganizational and inter-organizational relations. This paper recasts the concept ofstructure as an instantaneous correspondence between aninfrastructure, a sociostructure, and a superstructure—three manifestations of collective life joined through a dy-namic juxtaposition of technological solutions, political ex-changes, and socfai interpretations in and around organiza-tions. These levels are shown to describe reflexive yetpartially autonomous realms whose progressive inter-relatedness is governed by processes of convergence anddivergence, thereby supporting both stability and changein socia) relationships within organizations, populations,and communities. Ultimately, it is argued, structuring canbe understood as a dialectical unfolding of relations be-tween embedded sociai actors that translates individual ac-tion into societal consequences.*

INTRODUCTION

Despite a common concem with capturing the essence of so-ciai structure, current interpretations of organization as adapta-tion, as power, and as culture suffer from three basic failings:(1) they have anificiaWy segregated complementary manifesta-tions of collective life; (2} they have promoted a microanalyticorientation that underplays the embeddedness of individuals inorganizations, organizations in populations, and populations incommunities; and (3) they have unduly stressed the short-runstability of structures at the expense of the long-run dynamicprocess of structuring. In so doing, they have encouraged aparochial allegiance of researchers to perspectives rooted ineither ecoiogicaf, sociological, or anthropological thinkingthat overemphasize either static, cross-sectional analyses offit or longitudinal studies of convergence {Drazin and Van deVen, 1985) at the expense of punctuated and contradictoryinterpretations of change (Heydebrand, 1977; Miller andFriesen, 1983).

To engage a dialogue between perspectives, this paper recaststhe concept of structure in terms of three interactive but par-tially autonomous levels that exist within every social collec-tivity: infrastructure, sociostructure, and superstructure. Struc-ture is understood to be an instance in a dynamic process ofstructuring that coheres individual actions by animating pro-cesses of convergence and contradiction across these threelevels. Over time, the levels of structure crystallize as layers ofconstraints on human action (Clegg, 1981) and thereby trans-late social relationships within organizations into environmentalconsequences.

The environment of any single organization, however, is itselfmade up of other organizations (DIMaggio and Powell, 1983).Over time, it too develops a degree of structure. Both sociolo-gists and economists have endeavored to specify the constitu-tion of that environment, sociologists by focusing on the multi-plex network of exchanges in which organizations areembedded (Cook, 1977), and economists by stressing the rela-tions between organizations in homogeneous populations(Caves, 1977). Despite their common concerns, however, littlehas been done to bridge the gap between them. This papertakes a step in that direction. Specifically, the multitiered inter-

403/Administrative Science Quarterly, 31 (1986): 403-421

Smicturai Dynamics

pretation of structure is shown to apply to both the internalstructuring of organizations and the external patterning of rela-tions between organizations. Single organizations cohere intopopulations {Caves, 1977), while networks fuse populationsthemselves into communities (Astley and Fombrun, 1983b; As-tley, 1985; Astley and Fombrun, 1986). This makes both popu-lations and communities potentially valuable mediating con-texts for analyzing the relationship between micro-levelorganizational activities and macro-level societal outcomes.

Finally, extant organizational research has overemphasized thestudy of stability rather than change, thereby paying greater at-tention to processes of convergence rather than divergence(Benson, 1977b; Heydebrand, 1977; Markovic, 1979).Toover-come these limitations, an analytic model is proposed in whichstructuring develops in two directions: (1) it promotes a dy-namic convergence of the three levels of structure within col-lectivities that favors stability and (2) it translates individual ac-tion into social consequences by building up contradictionswithin and between embedded collectivities that animatechange. Structuring is therefore interpreted as a resolution offorces favoring convergence with forces provoking contradic-tion that tends to propel episodic, punctuational, and meta-morphic transformations in the social relations within and be-tween organizations.

THE STRUCTURING OF ORGANIZATIONALCOLLECTIVITIES

Prevailing theories of structure are indebted to one of three in-tellectual strands: f 1) Parsonian adaptations of Durkheim'sfunctionalist sociology that emphasize overarching goals and acollective imperative (societal need: Parsons, 1951); (2) aNietzschean extoltation of power as the underlying impetus ofsocial dynamics (Weber, 1947); or (3) an understanding ofstructure as socially constructed through the interactions of hu-man actors (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The first drives vari-ous formulations of contingency theory (e.g., Lawrence andLorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967) which, though they differ intheir specifics (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985), are logically con-sistent with explanatory frameworks derived from populationecology and institutional economics that interpret the structur-ing of organizations as a consequence of either selection pro-cesses (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) or market failure (William-son, 1975,1981).

The second approach to structuring fuels neo-Weberian theo-ries that diagnose social configurations as manifestations of po-litical interests whose institutionalization results in variousforms of social domination (Selznick, 1957; Perrow, 1970,1972). In this view, actors manipulate systems to perpetuatetheir ability to achieve parochial ends, and individual actiontranslates into forms of corporate governance that ultimatelypromote the emergence of distinct social classes (Useem,1982).

The third approach takes its cue from anthropology in analyzingsocial collectivities as systems of signification that simul-taneously enable and constrain the behavior of participants(Pettigrew, 1979; Smircich, 1983). Here, actors are seen as in-trinsically involved in the production and reproduction of social

404/ASQ, September 1986

reality through the propagation of symbols, rituals, myths, andultimately language itself, and structure can only be understoodas a vehicle for interactive sense making.

Jointly, these three perspectives disagree on the root forcesthat propel the structuring of social collectivities, claiming pri-macy for either (1) survival, achieved through the adoption of atechnology that enables efficient resource acquisition and dis-posal, {2) power, asserted by a controlling elite, or (3) meaning,arrived at through ongoing social construction.

If these three perspectives refiect fundamental aspects ofstructuring, it may be useful to recast them as disaggregatedfacets of a more comprehensive concept of structure. Thus,the structure of any social collectivity could be said to consist ofthree layers of constraint on individual and organizational ac-tion: (1)an infrastructure of productive activities, to which iscoupled {2) a sociostructure of exchange relationships, itselfoverlaid by (3) a superstructure of shared values (Homans,1950; Harris. 1979). In this view, structure is understood to bea temporary configuration of infrastructure, sociostructure, andsuperstructure — an instance in a dynamic process of structur-ing that embues action with meaning. Thus, within organiza-tions, structure is an edifice resting on the infrastructural foun-dation of a technological solution to the production problem,framed by a sociostructure of interactions, around which crys-tallizes a set of superstructural norms and values.

Additionally, organizations exist in a field of other organizationsthat also attains a degree of structure {DiMaggio and Powell,1983). in an analytical sense, individual action is tied to socialconsequences through three collectivities: the organization.the population of commensals the organization is embedded in,and the community of symbiotically related organizations towhich transacting populations themselves belong.^ Throughaggregation, individual action within organizations is trans-formed into coalitional activity and such orgahizational out-comes as goals and strategies {Sllverman, 1970; Bacharachand Lawler, 1980). In turn, the strategic pursuits of single or-ganizations cumulate across like organizations to fuel the com-petitive dynamics of whole populations and the distribution ofprofits and opportunities between firms (Caves. 1977; Scherer.1980). The aggregate impact of these strategic pursuits and in-dustry dynamics across interdependent populations of organi-zations ultimately congeals as the infrastructure, sociostruc-ture. and superstructure of the collectivity — the structure ofthe organizational community {Astley and Fombrun, 1983b; As-tley. 1985; Astleyand Fombrun, 1986),

Although the focus in this paper is not onthe societal level, obviousty the superstruc-tures of organizations are partially condt-tioned by their embeddedness in societyas a whole (Granovetter. 1985i. The entre-preneunal founder of an organization, co-workers, managers, and employees are alldrawn from an institutional context thatpowerfuliy shapes beliefs and cognitions.Since this has been discussed elsewhere(Heydebfand. 1977; Benson, 1977a,1977b). this paper dwells on the mediatinglevels of population and community.

Organizational Structure

Within organizations, infrastructure defines the underlying mapof interdependencies (Thompson. 1967) that an organizationconfronts as it struggles to engage in and maintain its activitiesovertime. In formal organizations, infrastructure embodies theconstraints of technology, competition, and market context. Itdefines the feasible set of technological solutions to the pro-duction problem {i.e., alternative capital/labor combinations)that constrains the workflow and delimits the various config-urations of tasks that specific organizations draw upon at will(Perrow, 1970; HackmanandOldham, 1980).

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Structural D^anucs

Sociostructure encompasses both the administrative structureof the organization and Its socia) architecture of exchange rela-tionships. Three dimensions of a work organization's socio-structure are frequently distinguished: (1) the division of laborand its attendant grouping of activities (differentiation: Law-rence and Lorsch, 1967); (2) the formal control systems de-signed to coordinate social activity (integration: Galbraith,1977); and (3) the emergent pattern of social relations (the in-formal organization: RoethlisbergerandDickson, 1939) result-ing from exchange relationships that generate and modify thedistribution of power between individuals and groups in the or-ganization (Fombrun. 1983; Brass, 1984; Hackman, 1985),

Finally, superstructure distinguishes the ideational side of theorganization, the symbolic representations and interpretationsof collective life that come to be widely shared by participants.The recent emphasis on the dynamics of organizational cul-tures and subcultures, for instance, is clearly intended to com-pensate for the relative neglect of superstructural elements inprevious analyses (Smircich, 1983; Riley, 1983). Belonging tothe superstructure, then, are both the emic (i.e,, self-perceived)norms and values and implicit ideologies of members, whichmanifest themselves in the ongoing etic (i.e., externally ob-served and induced) cultural practices and rituals of theorganization.

Such a conceptualization may be valuable because it recog-nizes that structure is a complex construct whose disaggrega-tion in extant research has artificially compartmentalized com-plementary aspects of organization. It therefore encouragesthe simultaneous analysis of organized behavior in terms of in-frastructural constraints, political domination, and social sig-nification. Consensus seems to be building around such an ap-proach. Thus. Hanson, Hinings, and Greenwood (1980)proposed a framework in which structuring emerges from aninteraction of three interdependent realms: "provinces ofmeaning." "dependencies of power." and "contextual con-straints." Clegg (1981) proposed that structuring is akin to aprocess of sedimentation that layers constraints on individualbehavior, Riley (1983) built on Giddens' (1979) structurationisttheory to analyze the specific relationship between sociostruc-ture and superstructure in two professional organizations. Asshe reported, superstructural symbols are used by governingelites to legitimate and thereby perpetuate their dominationover organizational participants, Rosen (1985) also saw the ad-ministrative structure of an advertising agency as a reflection ofdomination from its controlling overlayer, Superstructural rit-uals, he argued, serve to couple administrative phenomena inthe sociostructure to organizational performance. Jointly theseauthors clearly agree that organizations should be viewed as acomplex patterning that progressively interrelates the threelevels of structure, with each levet seen as a distinct manifesta-tion of organizational life.

Interorganizational Structure

Beyond its applicability to the analysis of single organizations,however, such a multitiered understanding of structuring alsoseems relevant to the study of organizational populations,fields, and communities. Benson (1975), in fact, makes a re-lated distinction between substructure and superstructure to

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analyze the developnnent of interorganizational networks.Though the twofold distinction was suitable for his purposes,the ability to further untangte administrative phenomena fromcultural representations seems desirable in a more generalmode! of structuring. Furthermore, recent analyses have dem-onstrated how work organizations are embedded in organiza-tional populations and communities (Carroll, 1984). To better ar-ticulate the relationship between organizational action andcollective consequences, it should therefore prove useful tospecify the structural properties of these two mediating fields.

Population structure. The infrastructure of a set of like organi-zations is typically defined by the resource base the populationcollectively draws on in terms of technology, personnel, andother material inputs and the product markets to which it sells.Hannan and Freeman (1977) and Brittain and Freeman (1980),for instance, proposed measures of resource abundance thatdraw on bioecology to typify environmental spaces. Similarly,microeconomists stress the degree of competitive rivalry in anindustry as the principal factor responsible for inducing marketstructure (Porter, 1980; Scherer, 1980). Such measures of in-frastructure as the number of competing firms are used to ex-plain the resulting size distribution of firms in the industry(Nelson and Winter, 1982) and the concentration of economicactivity (Caves, 1977).

As an overlay on the population infrastructure, the sociostruc-ture represents the degree of collective administration in thepopulation, Astleyand Fombrun (1983a) proposed that distinctadministrative mechanisms emerge across a set of ideal typesof population. Like the structures of organizations, these so-ciostructural relationships vary in terms of their degree of cen-tralization and formality. Thus, trade associations are coordinat-ing bodies that seem to prevail in fragmented populations,while informal leadership and tacit collusion tend to appear inmore oligopolistic, confederated populations.

In turn, however, the administrative mechanisms of the popula-tion's sociostructure are regulated by implicit sanctions for non-compliance that can be described by a population superstruc-ture. Norms and institutionalized practices create focal points(Schelling, 1970) for population activity that limit the range ofbehaviors of member firms. Indeed, to neoclassical econo-mists, social institutions themselves are merely rules of thumbguiding the behavior of actors in the collectivity — rules whoseemergence is fueled by efficiency considerations (Schotter,1981),

Jointly, then, the strategic actions of similar organizations areboth constrained by — and cumulate into — a population struc-ture that defines the conditions of life for members of the popu-lation. As for single organizations, the collective structure of apopulation, it would seem, can also be apprehended in terms ofa correspondence between an infrastructure, a sociostructure,and a superstructure.

Community structure. PopuiationsthemseWes, however,also develop relationships with other populations that bindthem into organizational communities. Astley and Fombrun(1983b) suggested that underlying technologies create the hori-zontal and vertical interdependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik,1978) between populations that appear as transactions in the

407/ASa September 1986

Structural D^Miniis

input-output matrix (Leontief, 1966). Since tied to every tech-nology is a set of resource consumption patterns that inducesuch transactions (Pfeffer and Satancik, 1978), an input-outputmatrix can therefore be used to describe the infrastructure ofthe national community of firms.

In turn, administrative relationships come to modify the quan-tity and quality of the transactions between neighboring popu-lations in the community. As individual firms struggle either toincrease their autonomy (Burt, 1980) or stabilize their interde-pendence, they develop relationships with other firms in thoseneighboring populations. The resulting pattern of social inter-locks across populations in the community partly serves to de-fine the community's sociostructure.

Simultaneously, the sociostructure itself unfolds within a set ofinstitutionalized thought patterns (Warren, Rose, andBergunder, 1376). These shared understandings of work, prod-uct, efficiency, competition, cooperation, growth, marketshare, and the like are manifestations of the community's su-perstructure. Few researchers have investigated the normativeproperties of organizational communities. However, if, as Sahal(1981) has suggested, industrial innovations are characterizedby technological insularity that creates a bunching effect, it canreadily be conjectured that such a clustering of innovations re-sults, in fact, from the embeddedness of specific technologieswithin different organizational communities whose social sepa-ration impedes the free transfer of know-how across the indus-trial landscape. This kind of social dislocation would obtain iftechnological islands are akin to invisible colleges (Crane, 1972)in bringing together professionals with distinct work practices,beliefs, norms of conduct, and idiomatic linguistic practices.

Taken jointly, then, the structures of both organizational popula-tions and communities can be described as homologous to thestructures of single organizations. Figure 1 diagrams the sug-gested correspondence between infrastructure, sociostruc-ture, and superstructure ir\ these three embedded organiza-tional collectivities.

In Figure 1, different forms of interdependence are used tocharacterize the infrastructure of collectivities. Within organiza-tions, workflow interdependence induced by existing technol-ogy is the counterpart of the degree of task differentiation in-duced by the societal division of labor. Between organizations,horizontal interdependence binds organizations into popula-tions, while vertical interdependence is the basis of a com-munity's infrastructure.

Against this infrastructural background, Figure 1 juxtaposesvarious components of sociostructure and superstructure. Prin-cipal elements of the sociostructure include the following:within organizations, individuals come together through a politi-cal hierarchy, while in populations and communities various ad-ministrative mechanisms link organizations into an emergentpolitical configuration. Finally, at the superstructural level,norms and shared values come to characterize distinct organi-zational cultures, industry cultures, and community cultures.

White Figure 1 suggests that any social collectivity can be ana-lyzed in terms of an instantaneous correspondence betweenthe three ievels of structure, a more complete understanding of

408/ASQ, September 1986

Figure 1 • Th« structunng of organizational collectivities.

ORGANIZATION

INFRASTRUCTURE

SOCIOSTRUCTURE

SUPERSTRUCTURE

Workflow I nterdependenceTask Differentiation

Hierarchy

Core'Pen pheiv Jobs

Shared ValuesOrganizalionCulture

PROCESSOFCONVERGENCE

POPULATION

Horizontal InterdependenceNiche Differentiati on

I ndUBtry Associatio nsStrgtagic GroupsCore'PetiphorvCompanies

Regulationtndustrv Norms

CONTRAOICTKJN

VerticBl InterdependenceVenica! Disinlag rati on

Tectinotogicsl IslandsBusiness ClustersDual Economy/Dual Labor Market

social structure can only be achieved by explicating the dy-namic, embedded unfolding of relationships across levels andbetween collectivities. To this end. Figure 1 therefore proposesthat the process of structuring is animated by two sets offorces: (1) forces that promote a convergence between the lev-eis of structure within collectivities and (2) forces that stimulatea build-up of contradictions between collectivities.

Such a view of structure as convergentacross levels is not consistent v^rth theplea of critical theorists that organizationstructures be understood as tools of man-agerial elites (Braverman, 1974; Edwards,1979. Fischer and Sirianni, 1984). The inte-grated correspondence between infra-structure, sociostructure. and superstruc-ture is seen to originate in an initial patternof domination whose "sedimentation," asClegg (1981: 552) argued, accumulatesinto tayers of social rules that constrain be-havior and reproduce the existing organiza-tional configuration

STRUCTURAL CONVERGENCE WITHIN COLLECTIVITIES

The orthodoxy of organizational analysis interprets structunngas a process of convergence through which organizations es-tablish order, achieve stability, and maintain themselves in astate of homeostatic equilibrium vis-a-vis the environment(e.g., Katz and Kahn, 1978). In this view, structures are institu-tionalized in an incremental fashion, change is evolutionary, andorganizations develop over time. Research in this mode hasemphasized the convergence of social relationships withinboth organizational and interorganizatlona! collectivities.

Convergent Relations within Organizations

Three research traditions suggest that structuring provokes aprogressive correspondence between infrastructure, socio-structure, and superstructure toward a stable organizationalconfiguration: institutional theory, external control theory, andevolutionary theory. They differ in their relative stress on theprimacy of either inf rastructural or superstructural elements ininducing convergence.

Institutionatists analyze the process through which the par-ticularistic interests of a group within the organization come tobe widely shared by organizational participants. In so doing,they typically assert that the early history (and prehistory) of theorganization sets in motion interactions and processes in thesociostructure that ultimately become institutionalized to se-cure the commitment of lower-level participants to a reified cul-ture, vision, or purpose in the superstructure (Pettigrew,1979).2

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Structural Dynamics

In emphasizing convergence, institutionalists actually assumethe existence of legitimating forces from the environment, aform of approval that stems from either (1) the relative effec-tiveness of the firm in the wider competitive population contextin which it must maintain adequate input-output relations(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) or (2) external societal support forits continued existence (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), Under thesecircumstances, patterns that worked well for the first genera-tion of participants (i.e.. that proved capable of generating satis-factory outcomes for a minimal subset of participants) tend toget reproduced across subsequent generations in the organiza-tion, Clark (1972), for instance, described this process of inter-generational convergence in his institutional analysis of twoNew England colleges (cf. also Kimberly, 1980).

In unstable environments, however, organizations may proveincapable of maintaining external legitimacy, in which case theysoon face crisis conditions that may require radical change{Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg. 1978). Culture, in fact, can it-self become a source of inertia that supports convergence be-tween the levels of structure but inhibits adaptation. Fueled bydeclining levels of performance or legitimacy, rival coalitionswithin the structure rise up to challenge the existing dominantcoalition (Thompson. 1967), and convergence is disrupted infavor of a new, albeit fundamentally homologous configurationin which goals may be altered and a different set of playersdominate.

But institutionalists are not the only ones to emphasize con-vergence. External control {Thompson. 1967; Pfeffer and Sal-ancik. 1978) and transactions cost theories (Wiiliamson. 1975)also propose that structuring propels a convergence betweeninfrastructure, sociostructure, and superstructure, one thatculminates in an enduring orgahizational configuration. In thisview, an infrastructure of workflow interdependehcies sets thestage for an internal distribution of power (Hickson et al..1971), manifest in the relative centrality of individuals in thecommunication networks (Fombrun. 1983; Brass, 1984) andtheir mobilization into a form of collective governance in the so-ciostructure (Scott. Mitchell, and Peery. 1981; Fombrun, 1984).

Alternatively, infrastructural cost considerations are said to in-duce an efficient administrative configuration whose purpose isto mediate the uncertain market transactions that would other-wise obtain (Chandler. 1962; Williamson. 1975). Ultimately, thecontinued competitiveness and growth of the organization pro-mote organizational learning, and the emergence of ideationalelements and rituals that subsequently become identifiablethemes (Opier, 1945) of the organization's superstructure.These remembered routines, in a way. act as the organization'scollective memory (Nelson and Winter, 1982), one that sup-ports convergence and can inhibit adaptability {Hannan andFreeman, 1984).

Finally, proponents of life-cycle theories, by highlighting thepredictable developmental stages through which structuresare elaborated, also take the position that growth involves a dy-namic convergence of the different levels of structure (Kim-berly, Miles, and Associates, 1980). Though little is said of thespecific interaction between the levels of structure, they dosuggest that a universal process of growth progressively inter-

4T0/ASQ, September 1986

relates administrative systems, structures, and behaviors thateventually crystallize into discrete organizational configurations(Haire, 1959; Miller and Friesen, 1983),

Hence, institutionalists, externalists, and evolutionists ul-timately posit a dynamic convergence of the three levels ofstructure. Although they differ in the factor to which they as-cribe primacy (whether material conditions, political ascen-dency, or an institutional context), they all propose that struc-tures crystallize through a dynamic interaction of environmentand organization that supports an enduring convergence be-tween infrastructure, sociostructure, and superstructure withinorganizations.

Convergence in Populations and Communities

A homologous process can be said to obtain in higher-order col-lectivities, and researchers often see the unfolding structure ofpopulations and communities of organizations as a process ofconvergence.

For populations, ecologists view single organizations as ran-dom variations struggling for survival in an environment(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; McKelvey, 1982). Byoutcompet-ing rivals in the acquisition of resources, one of these variationsgets selected as the population form, thereby setting the stagefor the subsequent diffusion of the form across the populationthrough a process of imitation (Alchian, 1950) and the pro-gressive institutionalization of systems and practices inside theorganization (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).

As these organizations vie for scarce resources with competi-tors, however, the population fragments into progressively nar-rower differentiated niches (Freeman and Hannan, 1983) —vertical disintegration occurs (Stigler, 1951), A sociostructuretherefore comes into being as firms struggle to manage theircommon fate, Astley and Fombrun (1983b). for instance, ar-gued that sociostructural relationships emerge to cope with un-derlying horizontal interdependence in the infrastructure ofpopulations. Similarly, economists typically rationalize the evo-lution of social institutions as either the consequence of marketfailure (Williamson, 1975, 1981) or the outcome of repeated en-counters (or supergames) between competing organizations ina population (Schotter. 1981). Similarly, Cook (1977) relied on ageneral exchange theory to discuss the impact of an infrastruc-ture of transactional dependencies between organizations onthe evolution of network relations in the sociostructure.

Ultimately, the growing correspondence of a population's in-frastructure of niches and its sociostructure of relationshipsacross differentiated niches could conceivably foster the emer-gence of dominant beliefs across the population whose pro-gressive institutionalization would point to the elaboration of apopulation superstructure. Although anecdotal evidenceabounds, few studies systematically analyze either the emer-gence of shared values or their institutionalization as industrycultures, save for relatively superficial studies of price leader-ship and tacit collusion in various industrial settings (Scherer,1980). Yet populations are known to deveiop such superstruc-tural commonalities. McKelvey (1982) alluded to them when hesuggested that populations draw from a common competency

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Structural Dynamics

pool of skills. The transfer of personnel within a population is anelement of sociostructure that doubtless contributes to the dif-fusion of shared interpretations in the population's superstruc-ture. As Granovetter (1985: 504) pointed out, they are an im-portant context that conditions the economic relationsbetween organizations. Like single organizations, then, it maybe that a population develops a correspondence between its in-frastructure, sociostructure, and superstructure that in turnconstrains the dynamic unfolding of specific organizationalstructures.

But populations are themselves embedded in organizationalcommunities in which convergence is also sometimes said toresult. DiMaggio and Powell (1983), for instance, argued thatisomorphic processes provoke increased structural homoge-neity in organizational fields — a set of highly connected orstructurally equivalent firms, Zucker (1983) documented themimetic process through which the corporate form spreadthrough American industry, while Astley and Fombrun (1986)proposed that community-wide stability grew out of unfoldinginfrastructure! interdependencies between U.S, industries inthe twentieth century. Moreover, Piore and Sabel (1984) tracedthis emerging stability of U.S. industry to its epicenter in theadoption, community-wide application, and eventual institu-tionalization of mass-production technology. As they sug-gested, parallel to the adoption of an inf rastructural technologi-cal solution (mass production), there unfolded a sociostructureof oligopolistic interlocks between industries, supported bygovernment-industry relations that were themselves legiti-mated by a superstructure of more or less shared societal be-liefs about individualism, laissez-faire, and entrepreneurship.While microanalytical, Sahal's (1981) finding that innovationsthemselves occur in technological islands may itself be a con-sequence of the social insulation that develops from the con-vergence of superstructure, sociostructure, and infrastructurewithin organizational communities.

Thus, just as single organizations are thought to develop a pro-gressive correspondence between their infrastructure, socio-structure, and superstructure, it is often hypothesized that pop-ulations and communities elaborate a homologous process ofstructuring that brings the three levels of structure into coinci-dence. Such a process of convergence within collectivities maybe opposed, however, by a process of rationalization acrosscollectivities that stimulates contradictions in the relations be-tween organizations and creates a potential for change.

STRUCTURAL DIVERGENCE, CONTRADICTION, ANDCHANGE

Contemporary organization theory, it has been argued, favors aconvergent interpretation of organizational and interorganiza-tional dynamics that produces a homeostatic equilibrium (Par-sons, 1951), In such a model, change is invariably provoked byexogenous forces. Wilmott (1981) took Ranson, Hinings, andGreenwood (1980) to task on this issue, since, despite theiranalysis of the interrelatedness of infrastructure, sociostruc-ture, and superstructure, they appeared wedded to a homeo-static interpretation of structuring that saw exogenous forcesas the ultimate source of social change. Similarly, Perrow

412/ASQ, September 1986

(1985) challenged Langton (1984) for his application of a narrowevolutionary logic that claimed primacy for exogenous develop-ments affecting the infrastructure of England in the late eigh-teenth century and discounted considerations of power in theprogressive bureaucratization of the Wedgwood factory.

The problem presents itself as well in the structuring of organi-zational populations and communities. For populations, it is aquestion of how industries are transformed over time. Do all in-dustries go through growth stages whose properties are moreor less defined by exogenous developments that affect the re-source base of the population, or are population dynamics atleast partially controlled by the collective strategies of memberfirms, as Astley and Fombrun (1983a) suggested? Similarly, if inorganizational communities interorganizational relationshipstend toward stability (Cook, 1977), what drives the transforma-tion of these communities if not exogenous forces traceable totechnology?

A number of recent commentaries have proposed a view ofchange as revolutionary rather than incremental, disruptiverather than harmonious, quantum and metamorphic rather thanhomeostatic in the structuring of relations within organizations,populations, and communities of organizations (Miller andFriesen, 1983; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Astley, 1985).

They have claimed that a collectivity's history is characterizedby long periods of stability, punctuated by intervals duringwhich the collectivity faces severe crises (Starbuck, Greve, andHedberg, 1978) and either disintegrates or undergoes dramaticstructural change. Like them, this paper makes a case for con-ceptualizing the evoiution of sociai relations within and be-tween organizations as a discontinuous process. Unlike them,however, a diaiectical interpretation of structuring is advanced,one that takes its cue not from exogenous environmentalforces but from a metamorphic transformation of the collec-tivity's structure. Fueled by developing contradictions betweeninfrastructure, sociostructure, and superstructure that work tonegate the process of convergence, structuring moves forwardin fits and starts. Indeed, in an analytical sense, it can be saidthat structuring is propelled by two sets of endogenous forces:(1) contradictions induced by structural relations within collec-tivities; and (2) contradictions induced by structural reiationsbetween coilectivities (Benson, 1977a; Heydebrand, 1977;Markovic, 1979).

Emerging Contradictions within Collectivities

Structuring can be interpreted as a dialectical process involvingthe resolution of contradictions between outcomes and the ac-tivities mandated by the production of these outcomes (Ben-son, 1977a, 1977b; Fischer and Sirianni, 1984). Rather thanconsider structure as purely integrative (e.g., Lawrence andLorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1977), organizations are viewed assites of developing contradictions that come to light when theresearcher disaggregates the sectoral interests of social group-ings within the collectivity and isolates the group whose objec-tives are best served by maintaining and reproducing the exist-ing structure (Goldman and Van Houten, 1977). Divergentforces are brought into being as structures crystallize overtime, forces that oppose the particularistic interests best

413/ASQ, September 1986

Structurai Dynamics

served by a convergence of infrastructure, sociostructure. andsuperstructure, against those interests not served by the col-lective structure. These interests clash fundamentally, the so-ciostructure is polarized, convergence is threatened, and thestructure may be forced into radical realignment.

Profits and job opportunities, for instance, are two classes ofoutcomes resulting from productive activity that are frequentlysaid to come into contradiction within work organizations (Gold-man and Van Houten, 1977). The unbalanced allocation ofprofits and opportunities born of a skewed distribution of prop-erty, itself powerfully legitimated by a societal superstructure,defines social relations that gradually oppose management andlabor. As Heydebrand (1977: 63) suggested, policies designedby management to increase efficiency in the organizational in-frastructure result in a division of labor that comes into opposi-tion with the sociostructure of authority relations designed tocontrol labor in the interests of the owners of the firm's capital.

In this way, the process of convergence that aligns infrastruc-ture, sociostructure, and superstructure within work organiza-tions simultaneously fosters a divergence of interests thatdrives a wedge through the sociostructure. These divergencesmay or may not become apparent, of course, depending on therelative ability of the subgroups to marshal the forces of con-vergence and thereby mask the emerging contradiction. In thislight, attempts to promote the identification of the individualwith the organization through socialization and acculturationcan be understood as managerial strategies for diffusing theforces of divergence engendered by the contradiction betweencontrol and productivity. Similarly, the human relations em-phasis on improving the quality of work life retains its manipula-tive managerialist aura (Perrow, 1972), as do recent admoni-tions to manage the corporate culture to better implementcorporate strategies (Smircich, 1983) or to develop union-freeorganizations (Fossum, 1984), A union is a visible expression ofsubgroup mobilization, one that remains counterculturai andhence anathema to the process of convergence that favors thestatus quo's distribution of rights and privileges.

In this way, convergence and divergence appear as temporallyseparate aspects of the same process of structunng (Giddens.1979), Any convergence of the levels of structure Itself buildsup social tensions through contradiction that destabilize ornegate the convergence, leading to periodic revolutions and aforced shift to a new configuration.

Though it agrees with a punctuated interpretation of organiza-tional history, this dialectical view departs substantially fromthat advanced by Miller and Friesen (1983), Tushman and Ro-manelli (1985), and Astley (1985), who suggest that organiza-tions periodically move out of phase with their environmentand require dramatic realignment. The quantum leaps they de-scribe, in fact, result precisely from a successful convergenceof superstructure, sociostructure, and infrastructure that in-hibits adaptation. Change, in their view, is wholly induced byexogenous factors that can be traced to either technologicaldisruptions or messianic leaders, and the process by which theexogenous change itself is generated remains unexplained. Incontrast, the dialectical process interprets these forces as anintegral part of the organizational transformation, born of a fun-

414/ASQ, September 19B6

damental polarization of interests that drives a wedge throughthe sociostructure.

Contradictions can also be made salient in the structuring of re-lations in interorganizational collectivities. Zeitz (1980), for in-stance, proposed that networks unfold through a dialecticalprocess whereby contradictions are fueled by unbalanced ex-changes between organizations that gain momentum from theskewed distribution of outcomes. His argument can be clarifiedby specifying the population and community as distinct subsetsof interorganizational networks and focusing solely on the eco-nomic outcomes of structuring. The contradiction couldemerge in the following sequence. The progressive fragmenta-tion of populations into niches encourages the emergence of acollective sociostructure charged with coordinating activitiesbetween niches (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a). By fosteringabove-normal profits, however, the collusive sociostructurealso weakens the competitive fibre of the industry (Caves,1977), Mobility barriers come to stratify the industry into strate-gic groups, some of which earn higher profits than others (Por-ter, 1979). Yet this only encourages rivalry between groups,since ancillary free-riders are motivated to chisel away steadilyat these profits (Stigler, 1964) while public-interest groups andother stakeholders increasingly petition for government regula-tion of the population's activities (Caves, 1977). This evolvingcontradiction between the economic interests served by theexisting population structure and their social relations with by-passed groups could conceivably splinter the sociostructureand propel a dialectical realignment of the population structureto a new configuration. BresserandHarl (1986). in fact, pro-posed that just such an economic contradiction animates therelationship between competitive and cooperative strategies inpopulations of competing organizations.

Finally, endogenous forces favoring divergence could alsoblossom in organizational communities. The pursuit of struc-tural autonomy and profitability by individual organizations(Burt, 1980) is achieved through a sociostructure of board inter-locks, personnel transfers, contracts, and joint ventures. Theselinkages aggregate into patterned interactions between ver-tically interdependent populations {Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)whose purpose is to favor only the interests of network mem-bers, at the expense of nonparticipating firms and interestgroups. In turn, these disenfranchised groups can be expectedto splinter the sociostructure of the community by petitioningpublic opinion and governmental bodies for legislative interven-tion designed to regulate the distribution of economic out-comes across the community (Zeitz, 1980).

Systematic support for such macroscopic contradictions in or-ganizational communities is difficult to locate. Evidence ofthem in American industry can be adduced from the swings inpolitical sentiment from pro-business to antitrust and backagain as measured by the founding of governmental agencies andlegislative activity in the U.S, in the twentieth century (Chatov,1981). The dialectic between the creation of consensus net-works (such as the Federal Reserve System for the coordina-tion of banks, the Federal Radio Commission for radio, and theCivil Aeronautics Board for airlines) and the creation of conflictnetworks {such as the Sherman Antitrust Act and the ClaytonAct) was partially induced by dramatic shifts in the unfolding so-

415/ASQ, September 1986

Structural Dynamics

Morgan (1986: 236) has suggested that or-ganizations could also be imagined as auto-poietic systems — iiving systems that pro-gressively internalize environments andtransform themselves through self-referentiat processes. In this view, environ-ments do not exist — organizations arecoproduced with populations, populationswith communities. In emphasizing closureand convergence, however, such a modelis forced to refy on an unexplained sourceof random variation to explain change.

ciostructure and infrastructure of the U.S. national economy it-self, evident in the emergence, first, of large-scale horizontallyconsolidated trusts in the late 1890s and, second, of verticallyintegrated oligopolies in the early twentieth century (Chandler,1977). Far more detailed research is needed to clarify the di-alectic in this case.

Altogether, as the contradiction between strategic pursuits andcollective outcomes fragments the sociostructure and bringsdominant and ancillary interest groups into conflict, organiza-tional communities, like populations (Bresser and Harl, 1986)and organizations (Benson, 1977a), may be forced into aperiodic adjustment of their structures. Such an interpretationpresents a challenging and viable alternative to the develop-mental models relying on exogenous triggers of change thathave been emphasized to date.'

Emergent Contradictions across Collectivities

White the dynamic process of structuring can stimulate changethat is analytically rooted in forces endogenous to a collectivity,change can also be traced to the dialectic induced by contradic-tions born of the embeddedness of organizations within popu-lations and of populations within communities (Benson,1977b). These contradictions are important because theyspeak to the process by which organizational action is trans-formed into societal consequences.

Analytically, aggregative contradictions emerge as the forces ofconvergence spread from single organizations outward intopopulations, through communities, and ultimately into societyas a whole. While infrastucture, sociostructure, and superstruc-ture are pushed into alignment within organizations, the impactof these isolated convergences on the population is to promoteorganizational insularity, competitive rivalry, and hence in-creased horizontal interdependence between organizations,Porter(1979), for instance, found evidence that industries arestratified into strategic groups separated by mobility barriers(Caves and Porter, 1977), Higher profitability obtains for a groupthat consists of the largest firms in the industry. However, notcoincidentally, the largest firms are those that tend to developinternal labor markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), are theoldest firms in the industry, and hence are ideal sites for a priorconvergence between the levels of structure. Hence, intra-organizational convergence may well be tied to both economicand social outcomes that increase interdependence in the in-frastructure of the populations and communities in which theseorganizations are embedded.

Heightened interdependence, however, has two effects: (1) ittends to destabilize the internal configuration of the organiza-tion by fueling rivalry between political coalitions that may leadto an upset of the dominant coalition and delay the process ofconvergence (Thompson, 1967; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980);(2) it also creates an incentive for organizations to develop apopulation or community sociostructure capable of coping withthe heightened infrastructural demands firms confront individu-ally (Oliver, 1980).

As a result, a population sociostructure may be crafted to man-age infra structural interdependence manifest either in the elab-oration of administrative relations with competitors or their di-

416/ASQ, September 1986

rect absorption through merger (Chandler, 1962; Edwards.1979). Collusion and consolidation, however, tend to increaserather than decrease interdependence between competingmembers in the population, thereby exacerbating their interde-pendence. This obtains because collusion builds a free-riderand chiseling incentive into the strategies of individual organiza-tions (Stigler, 1964), while consolidation, by reducing the num-ber of players in the population, enhances their vulnerability toone another (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Scherer, 1980). Hencethe population sociostructure, though it addresses popu/af/oninfrastructurai concerns, generates a solution that ultimatelycontradicts organizational purposes (Oliver, 1980; BresserandHarl, 1986).

In this oligopolistic or confederated population context, singleorganizations are therefore driven to search for profitability inthe increasingly salient vertical interdependencies they experi-ence with neighboring populations in the community (Burt,1980). Here again, two sets of sociostructural mechanisms atthe community level result from individual organizational re-sponses to the progressive fragmentation of the community;(1) networking strategies and (2) absorption strategies (Astleyand Fombrun, 1983b). Indicative of the first are the proliferationof joint ventures and board interlocks (Pfeffer and Salancik,1978; Pennings, 1981). Indicativeof the second is vertical inte-gration (Chandler, 1962).

Unfortunately, as fruitful as these strategies may be for pro-moting the interests of single organizations and resolving theirindividual infrastructurai problems, the resulting community-wide proliferation of interorganizational linkages only works toenhance the complexity of the community structure as awhole, rendering single organizations increasingly vulnerable tothe actions of others and creating what Emery and Trist (1966)referred to as environmental turbulence. In so doing, the indi-vidual actions of organizations generate the very conditionsthat they were intended to redress, namely the exacerbation ofinterdependence in the population infrastructure and an in-crease in the volatility of an already volatile environment (Ter-rebery, 1968; Schon, 1971). Hence the structuring of organiza-tional populations and communities could also reflect adialectical resolution of contradictions between organizationalstrategies intended to suppress interdependence, and thecumulative heightening of interdependence across the popula-tion and community infrastructure.

While the preceding analysis emphasized contradictions bornof the differential distribution of economic outcomes acrosssubgroups within collectivities, contradictions may also de-velop from the impact of structural convergence on social out-comes (Baron and Bielby, 1980,1984). Insomuch as the pro-cess of convergence promotes a stratified work structure thatseparates core from periphery jobs in the infrastructure of sin-gle organizations, the cumulative impact of these isolated con-vergences is to foster a stratification of labor markets in indus-tries, communities, and society as a whole (Edwards, 1979;Baron, 1984), Faced with lower outcome distributions in termsof earnings, advancement opportunities, and status (Tolbert,Horan, and Beck, 1980), job incumbents in periphera! activitiesare motivated to mobi!ize and collectively respond by resistingorganizational initiatives, unionizing, or appealing to govern-

417/ASQ, September 1986

Structural Dynamics

mental regulation. Furthermore, if these peripheral jobs arethemselves concentrated In the less profitable peripheral in-dustries of organizational communities, as Averitt (1968) andEdwards (1979) claimed, then contradictions should emergethat progressively favor a radical realignment of both the inter-nal structures of organizations and the sociostructure of thecommunity that links business, government, and labor. In fact,Heydebrand (1983) suggested that this contradiction is in-creasingly obscured by an emerging system of technocraticcorporatism that blends occupational and organizational controiand fuses corporate interests with those of government andorganized labor. Concentrating on the manufacturing sector,Piore and Sabel (1984: 6, passim) also argued that such a radi-cal realignment is now underway as U.S. industry movesthrough the "second industrial divide" and develops a new epi-center in information technologies. Clearly detailed research isneeded to establish whether the proposed contradiction be-tween economic profitability and labor market segmentationactually holds at more than a metaphorical ievel.

Altogether, it does seem possible that contradictions are set inmotion by the very process of convergence that supports sta-bility in the relationships within and between organizations.These contradictions create a build-up of social tensions bothwithin and between collectivities that may or may not be appar-ent in the short run (Markovic, 1979: 37). Overtime, divergentforces lead to a progressive splintering of the sociostructurethat propagates from organizations into populations and com-munities, provoking radical changes in these collectivities con-sistent with a punctuationa! interpretation of organizational his-tories. It remains for future research to investigate the relativeexplanatory power of such an approach beyond the analyticlevel.

CONCLUSION

Students of structure have long sought to develop generaliz-abie properties of organization. In so doing, they have beenforced to assume that (Dan equilibrium relationship betweenthe three levels of structure exists, and (2) the equilibrium com-bination is necessarily the most effective (Drazin and Van deVen, 1985). As this paper argues, neither need hold. First, sincestructure is produced and reproduced through human interac-tions, it is both the medium and the outcome of a dynamic in-teraction between infrastructure, sociostructure, and super-structure (Giddens, 1979: 70). Therefore, the structuralproperties of organization can never be divorced from the expe-riences of participants (Fischer and Sirianni, 1984).

Second, human action is itself conditioned by the complex em-beddedness of individuals in organizations and wider coilec-tivities (Granovetter, 1985). Equilibrium structures are thus un-likely to obtain and, when attained, are at best fleetingmoments in a dynamic process of structuring through whichmeaning is increasingly intertwined with action, and action istransformed into social consequences (Silverman, 1970). Thus,to claim effectiveness for surviving organizations is simply toignore the process of contextualization through which effec-tiveness is itseif defined and rationalized.

418/ASQ, September 1986

Ultimately, this paper has argued that structuring involves aresolution of the twin polarities of convergence and contradic-tion. If so, then the development of organizational collectivitiescould conceivably take many forms, from pure convergence torecurrent crisis. Ratherthan debate the supremacy of con-vergence or contradiction, perhaps future research in this areacould endeavor to elucidate the conditions under which contra-dictions are masked by processes of convergence, and viceversa. This would better serve to define the domain of ap-plicability of alternative explanatory frameworks for under-standing the structuring of organizational collectivities.

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